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Rare Earths—or Arctic Control? Greenland’s Riches May Just Be Excuse

By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 13.01.2026

Greenland holds the world’s eighth-largest rare earth reserves—1.5 million tons—but US interests extend far beyond minerals, Ruslan Dimukhamedov, chairman of the Association of Producers and Consumers of Rare and Rare-Earth Metals, tells Sputnik.

Greenland is rich in iron ore, graphite, tungsten, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper, and oil. It also hosts two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits—Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly signaled US ambitions to secure leadership in rare earths to advance semiconductors, AI, and robotics. Against this backdrop, it seems like it’s no coincidence that he set his sights on Greenland.

“That means permanent magnets—for electric vehicles, drones, and robotics,” Dimukhamedov says. “If we’re talking about the so-called magnetic group, that includes dysprosium and terbium. If we look at lanthanum and cerium, those are used in petrochemicals and optics.”

Greenland’s rare earths are technologically complex and relatively poor deposits, located in challenging conditions—not just climatically, but geographically as well, in mountainous terrain, the pundit explains.

“If we’re talking about commercial extraction—that is, mining that is economically viable at today’s price levels, rather than production for appearances’ sake,” Greenland’s rare earths hold limited appeal for US companies, according to Dimukhamedov.

His experience in the rare earth industry shows that the conditions of these deposits indicate that rare earth metals themselves are not the main object of the US’ interest. What is it then?

“Territorial control? Yes. Control of the Arctic? Yes. Preventing Russia from freely using the Northern Sea Route, making our lives difficult with military bases? Yes,” the expert says.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics | , , | Leave a comment

US makes money from weapons, not from Ukrainian minerals

By Ahmed Adel | January 13, 2026

The statements by President Donald Trump that Washington can recover all funds invested in Ukraine and even make additional profits through agreements with Kiev on exploiting rare minerals are political manipulation because the United States does not earn money from Ukrainian resources but from selling weapons.

The real goal of the US is not just exploiting Ukraine’s natural resources, but mainly strengthening its own military industrial complex through arms sales. The US has shifted the financial and political costs of the war onto Europe and Ukraine, while still acting as a mediator and gaining economic benefits. The so-called resource deals are more about securing future influence than about genuine economic cooperation or a return on investment.

Trump has created a scheme where the American military industrial complex functions by manufacturing weapons, selling them to Europe, and Europe then supplies them to Ukraine. This arrangement generates far more income than the minerals, which still need to be exploited and processed, and require major financial investment to sustain.

In late April 2025, Washington and Kiev signed an agreement to create the US-Ukrainian Reconstruction Investment Fund. The deal grants the US access to new investment opportunities for developing Ukraine’s natural resources, including lithium, titanium, graphite, and rare earth minerals. Since the signing of the agreement, not a single valuable mineral has been extracted.

It is difficult to predict what will happen with the agreement on exploiting Ukrainian resources and whether it will be carried out. No one is seriously involved in exploitation yet, and it is difficult to imagine any company in an active conflict willing to take risks and invest in a country at war.

At the same time, Ukraine does not have any rare earth minerals. Most of the rare minerals are in Donbass, the region that has been returned to Russia. There are some useful minerals in Ukraine, but they are also found in other countries. Even for minerals like lithium, which might be more in the spotlight, there is plenty of supply, and, in principle, an investor will always choose to invest in a peaceful country rather than one at war.

With this agreement, the US has gained political control over the future use of Ukraine’s mineral resources and can decide who, how much, and how to mine. However, due to the war, there are currently no significant American investments in Ukrainian mining.

US economic interests in Ukraine are unlikely to lead to a US military presence there. The Americans do not have any economic stake in Ukraine — their interest is political, not economic. There are no resources in Ukraine so valuable that the US would go to war with Russia over them.

Trump criticized his predecessor, Joe Biden, for spending $350 billion on Ukraine, while his administration finalized a rare earths deal that could recoup a significant portion of those funds, perhaps even all of them, and potentially more. He is manipulating public opinion by claiming the US has invested $350 billion, but it has not invested that much in this conflict.

Zelensky has denied that this is the correct figure, and the latest estimate, which more or less aligns with reality, is around $100 billion. According to other sources, Biden’s total amount to Ukraine was about $65 billion. So, roughly $100 billion has been invested, and Trump is overstating that amount by 3 to 3.5 times.

Such claims may seem convincing to the American public, but they are a form of political manipulation and rhetoric aimed at achieving political success rather than generating real financial benefits for the US. The US positioned itself as a mediator, avoiding direct political responsibility while shifting the burden and risk to Europe and the Ukrainian leadership. The Americans are staying on the sidelines and moderating the entire process as mediators, while also gaining economic benefits from selling weapons and bolstering their military-industrial complex. The rest is all political games.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics, Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

Drone hits Kazakh tanker en route to Russian port

RT | January 13, 2026

An oil tanker commissioned to transport crude from an internationally-owned terminal located at a Russian Black Sea port has been attacked by a drone, Kazakhstan’s state-owned oil company KazMunayGas (KMG) reported on Tuesday.

The ship ‘Matilda’ was hit earlier in the day on its way to pick up cargo at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal this coming Sunday, the statement said. No crew members were hurt, KMG added, noting that the tanker remains seaworthy.

Reuters reported attacks on four tankers in the Black Sea that were on their way to the CPC terminal, located at the Russian port of Novorossiysk, including the ‘Matilda’, citing sources. The report suggested that Ukraine may have been responsible for the attacks, citing Kiev’s history of targeting the consortium’s assets in Russia, but said that Ukrainian officials have not commented on the situation.

CPC is a pipeline operator owned by Kazakh, Russian, and Western private firms and the government of Kazakhstan, which transports crude from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk terminal. The Russian military has in the past reported Ukrainian attacks on the infrastructure, as Kiev seeks to undermine Moscow’s international oil trade.

Although Kiev does not officially claim credit for attacks on civilian infrastructure, the role of Ukrainian special services in several incidents has been broadly reported in domestic and international media. Moscow has described them as an element in a global Ukrainian campaign of sabotage and terrorism targeting Russian interests.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

Why America’s Oil Giants Aren’t Eager to Invest in Venezuela in Wake of Maduro’s Abduction

Sputnik – 12.01.2026

The significant capital investment required ($100B) and the need to wait up to 15 years to make a profit are the biggest factors hindering oil majors like Exxon, ConocoPhillips and Chevron from returning to the Venezuelan market, says international oil economist Dr. Mamdouh G. Salameh.

“US oil majors will have to wait a very long time before benefiting from Venezuela’s oil largesse… Moreover, they feel embarrassed to be complicit” in this form of “daylight thievery with legal implications for them,” the expert told Sputnik.

In fact, the companies would probably be happy enough dealing with the existing “sovereign and national [government] in the country openly,” free of Washington’s threats of regime change.

Efforts by the White House to ban third parties from engaging with Venezuelan oil revenues constitutes not “only a total imposition of control over Venezuela’s oil but a daylight robbery,” Salameh stressed.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Illegal Occupation | , | Leave a comment

Halliburton Executive Contradicts Trump on Venezuela Sanctions, Exposing Economic Hypocrisy

Trump’s own 2019 sanctions — not business decisions — forced Halliburton to abandon Venezuela

teleSUR | January 10, 2026

A now-viral video has reignited global scrutiny over Washington’s coercive economic policies. Speaking directly to camera, asenior company official clarified a critical fact often omitted in U.S. political discourse: “We didn’t leave Venezuela by choice or due to operational issues. We were forced out by the sanctions imposed by Trump’s own administration in 2019.”

The statement, originally shared by Venezuelan journalist Joan Contreras and widely disseminated by the investigative outlet Misión Verdad, delivers a rare insider account from within one of America’s most powerful oil service corporations. It directly challenges recent claims by former President Donald Trump – who, amid speculation about his return to office in 2025, has floated the idea of “immediately lifting sanctions” to allow U.S. oil firms back into Venezuela.

But as the Halliburton executive makes clear, the very policies Trump championed are what expelled these companies in the first place. Far from being a neutral market withdrawal, Halliburton’s exit was a direct consequence of U.S. Treasury Department directives that criminalized financial and commercial transactions with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).

This revelation underscores a long-standing contradiction in U.S. foreign policy: sanctions billed as tools for “democracy promotion” end up punishing American corporations while deepening humanitarian suffering abroad. In Venezuela’s case, the human cost has been staggering – yet the corporate toll is now coming full circle.

Halliburton Executive Reveals Coercive Reality

The executive’s testimony aligns with documented history. In January 2019, during Trump’s first term, the U.S. imposed sweeping sanctions on PDVSA, effectively freezing its U.S.-based assets and prohibiting any American entity from engaging in oil-related transactions with the company. For Halliburton—a firm that had operated in Venezuela for over six decades and provided critical drilling, well completion, and reservoir management services—the order was unambiguous: comply or face crippling fines and legal penalties.

“We had no option,” the executive explained. “Continuing operations would have meant violating U.S. law. The Treasury made it clear: work with PDVSA, and you’re out of the U.S. financial system.”

These sanctions were part of a broader “maximum pressure” campaign that included secondary sanctions targeting non-U.S. entities, asset freezes, and visa bans. By 2020, nearly all major American oil service firms—including Schlumberger and Baker Hughes—had suspended Venezuelan operations, despite having profitable contracts and functional infrastructure on the ground.

Experts consulted by teleSUR emphasize that this episode reveals the self-defeating nature of unilateral sanctions. “Washington claims it wants U.S. companies to dominate global energy markets,” said Dr. Elena Martínez, an international trade analyst at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO). “But by weaponizing finance, it pushes its own corporations out of strategic territories—opening the door for Russia, China, and Iran to step in.”

Indeed, since 2019, PDVSA has forged new technical and commercial alliances with Rosneft, CNPC, and Iranian firms, gradually restoring production capacity despite ongoing U.S. restrictions. In 2025, Venezuela reported its highest oil output in five years—proof that economic siege does not equate to control.

Geopolitical Context: Sanctions as a Double-Edged Sword in Global Energy Politics

The Halliburton admission arrives at a pivotal moment in global energy realignment. As the world transitions toward multipolarity, U.S. sanctions are increasingly seen not as instruments of power, but as accelerants of de-dollarization and alliance diversification. Countries targeted by Washington – from Venezuela to Iran to Russia – are deepening trade in local currencies, building alternative payment systems, and reducing reliance on Western financial infrastructure.

For American oil giants, this shift carries long-term strategic costs. While short-term compliance with sanctions may avoid legal trouble, it cedes influence in some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. Venezuela alone holds the largest proven oil reserves on Earth – over 300 billion barrels – mostly in the heavy crude of the Orinoco Belt, a region where Halliburton once held technological dominance.

Moreover, the hypocrisy exposed by the executive’s statement undermines U.S. credibility in multilateral forums. When Washington presents sanctions as “peaceful tools,” yet they result in $130 billion in estimated Venezuelan economic losses since 2015 (according to Caracas), and simultaneously force U.S. firms out of lucrative markets, the narrative collapses under its own weight.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures has repeatedly condemned such policies, noting they violate international law and disproportionately harm civilians. Yet the Halliburton case shows even corporate elites are not immune—suggesting that sanctions function less as precision tools and more as blunt instruments of economic warfare with indiscriminate fallout.

Regionally, this dynamic strengthens Latin American calls for sovereignty. Brazil’s Lula, Colombia’s Petro, and Mexico’s Sheinbaum have all criticized U.S. sanctions as relics of interventionism. If American businesses themselves acknowledge the damage, regional resistance will only grow.

Corporate Testimony Undermines U.S. Political Narratives

Trump’s recent suggestion that lifting sanctions would “bring U.S. oil companies rushing back” ignores a fundamental reality: trust has been broken. After being compelled to abandon decades of investment overnight, firms like Halliburton face enormous legal, financial, and reputational risks in re-entering Venezuela—even if sanctions ease.

Furthermore, the geopolitical landscape has shifted. PDVSA no longer depends solely on Western technology. With Russian drilling equipment, Chinese refining partnerships, and Iranian logistical support, Venezuela has built a resilient, sanctions-resistant oil ecosystem. U.S. firms may find the door not as open as they imagine.

The Venezuelan government has consistently maintained that sanctions constitute a flagrant violation of international law, amounting to collective punishment of its civilian population. From medicine shortages to power grid failures, the humanitarian impact is well-documented. Yet the Halliburton video adds a new dimension: even the architects of U.S. corporate power are casualties of this policy.

As speculation grows about potential partial sanctions relief in 2026 – possibly tied to electoral conditions or oil-for-debt deals – the executive’s message serves as a sobering reminder: coercion begets fragmentation, not compliance.

Conclusion: When Sanctions Backfire on Their Own Enforcers

The viral testimony of a Halliburton executive does more than correct the historical record—it exposes the internal contradictions of U.S. foreign policy. The Halliburton executive contradicts Trump on Venezuela sanctions not to defend Caracas, but to defend truth: American companies didn’t flee Venezuela because of chaos or mismanagement. They were pushed out by Washington itself.

In doing so, the U.S. not only harmed millions of Venezuelans but also weakened its own strategic position in the global energy arena. As the world moves toward multipolarity, such self-inflicted wounds may prove harder to heal than any military defeat.

For now, the video stands as a rare moment of corporate candor—and a powerful indictment of a policy that sacrifices both people and profits on the altar of hegemony.

January 11, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics | , | Leave a comment

From Industrial Power to Military Keynesianism: Germany’s Engineered Collapse

By Gerry Nolan | Ron Paul Institute | January 8, 2026

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz now admits that “parts of Germany’s economy are in very critical condition” and that his government “hasn’t done enough.” That phrasing is an evasion. Germany did not drift into this collapse. The numbers were visible in real time. The warnings were explicit. And suicidal decisions were made anyway.

Start with energy, because everything downstream flows from it.

Before the 2022 launch of Russia’s special military operation (SMO), Germany’s industrial model rested on stable Russian pipeline gas priced roughly €15–25 per MWh. Wholesale electricity averaged €30–50 per MWh. That price stability, and not hysterical slogans, powered German competitiveness. It allowed long planning cycles, protected margins, and kept energy-intensive manufacturing viable. It also kept household bills manageable, wages meaningful, and social cohesion intact.

Post Russian SMO, that foundation was deliberately dismantled.

Gas prices predictably exploded, peaking above €300 per MWh in 2022 — a 12–20× increase at the height of the engineered crisis. Electricity followed. German wholesale power prices averaged ~€235 per MWh that year, with intraday spikes well north of €400 per MWh. Even after emergency subsidies, rationing, and accounting tricks, prices today still sit around €100–130 per MWh, approx three to four times the pre-SMO norm.

This cannot be blamed on volatility. This is permanent repricing of German industry — the direct result of Berlin going along with the Nord Stream sabotage, ending the era of cheap, reliable Russian energy without protest, without investigation, and without dignity.

That humiliation solely laid at the feet of supplicant German elite. It was downloaded directly onto German households via higher heating bills, higher electricity costs, higher food prices, shrinking real wages, all while being told this was the price of “standing with Ukraine.” Germans paid more to live worse, and were instructed to feel morally superior about it.

Berlin knew exactly what this would do.

Energy-intensive industrial output has fallen by 20% from pre-SMO levels. Chemical production shrank. Auto suppliers cut jobs at double-digit rates. BASF downsized at home and expanded abroad. New industrial investment increasingly flows to the United States and Asia, not Germany. The costs were socialized downward; the consequences localized.

Then came the autos, the core of the economy.

German carmakers have lost close to half of their China market position since 2020, with market share falling from the high-20s into the mid-teens. Porsche’s China sales are down ~25–30%. Volkswagen’s operating margins have collapsed toward 4%. Employment across the auto-supplier ecosystem has fallen by high single digits, with major firms cutting 10% or more of their workforce. These weren’t hidden trends. China was Germany’s largest trading partner. Berlin chose ideological obedience over industrial reality and paid the price.

And still, the policies continued. Why?

Because collapse below coincided with profit above.

While Germany’s civilian manufacturing base contracted, its military-industrial sector surged. Germany’s defense budget has ballooned as a share of federal outlays, with the Bundestag approving record arms contracts worth around €50–€52 billion in late-2025 alone, including 29 major procurement orders for vehicles, missiles, and satellites, one of the largest such spending decisions in the nation’s history.

At the center of that boom sits Rheinmetall, once a marginal player, now the engine of the continent’s rearmament. Its order backlog hit a new high of roughly €63 billion, with incoming framework agreements jumping 181 % year-on-year in early 2025, and sales surging 36 % in 2024 as defense demand exploded.

Rheinmetall’s stock performance answers the question of who profits. Its shares have more than doubled and at times tripled in value in recent years as markets priced in Europe’s structural defense spending shift, even as the broader economy languished.

Defense equities across the continent have followed suit. European defense indices returned well into the double digits in 2025, making military contractors some of the best-performing assets even as traditional industrial sectors faded.

Rearmament became the one form of “growth” Brussels would never question: losses socialized, gains concentrated. Civilian factories closed and exports faltered, but state-backed military contracts flowed like a firehose. De-industrialization for thee (Germans), weapons profits for me (Germany’s MIC).

Contrast this with Russia and China, and the comparison becomes merciless.

Russia ring-fenced energy, secured domestic supply, redirected trade flows east and south, and surged industrial output under sanctions designed to cripple it. China did the opposite of austerity theater by doubling down on production, scaled EVs, batteries, and supply chains, and absorbed global shocks without blowing up its own infrastructure or pricing its industry out of existence.

Neither country sacrificed its economic base to signal virtue and moralized itself into decline. But Germany did.

So when Merz says “we haven’t done enough,” the timeline exposes the lie. Enough for whom? The households rationing heat? German workers losing jobs? The firms closing plants? Or the protection racket (alliance) managers who demanded compliance regardless of cost?

Ask the question Berlin refuses to ask… If the energy calculus was known, if the China dependence was obvious, if the auto collapse was measurable in real time — at what point does failure become design?

Germany didn’t lose competitiveness by accident or incompetence alone. It surrendered it, to expensive LNG, to trade self-sabotage with China, to an EU architecture that rewards submission over outcomes and treats war as a military Keynesianism.

This was betrayal of the German people. An EU structure that treats Germans as an invoice, not a constituency. A population forced to absorb humiliation, higher bills, and industrial decay — while being told this sacrifice makes them morally superior.

But the bill has arrived. The damage is done.

And that is precisely why Merz and his fellow Eurocrats will cling to this war against Russia at all costs. Not because peace is dangerous, but because peace would bring a reckoning. Not from Moscow, but from German streets. From workers, households, and industries that would finally ask why their prosperity was sacrificed, who profited, and who signed the orders.

No letter to lawmakers, no partial confession, will erase who made these choices, or who paid for them.

Gerry Nolan is a political analyst, writer, and strategist focused on geopolitics, security affairs, and the structural dynamics of global power. He is the founder and editor of The Islander, an independent media platform examining war, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and the accelerating shift toward a multipolar world.

January 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | | Leave a comment

Offshore wind turbines steal each other’s wind: yields greatly overestimated

By Bert Weteringe – clintel – December 30, 2025

The energy yields of offshore wind turbines are overestimated by up to 50% in national policy documents. This conclusion is based on an analysis of operational data from 72 wind farms.

In order to meet the net-zero targets set out in the European Green Deal, offshore wind turbines will have to make a significant contribution to Europe’s future energy supply – at least, that is the plan of European governments. However, these plans are facing setbacks due to high investment costs and uncertainty about returns, as demand is lower than expected. On October 30, outgoing Minister Hermans of the Dutch Ministry of Climate & Green Growth (KGG) announced in a letter to the House of Representatives that no applications for a permit had been received for the tender for the Nederwiek I-A wind farm, which has an installed capacity of 1–1.15 gigawatts. This is a trend that is not limited to the Netherlands. In August, for example, there were no bids for the ten gigawatts of tenders that the German government had put out for offshore wind projects. On top of that, there is now another setback: the energy yields of offshore wind turbines appear to be much lower than assumed in most national policy plans.

“National policy targets show expectations of energy production up to 50% higher than can realistically be achieved”, concludes Carlos Simao Ferreira, professor of Wind Energy Science at Delft University of Technology. He published, together with Danish colleagues Gunner Chr. Larsen and Jens Nørkær Sørensen from the Technical University of Denmark (DTU), an article in the latest journal Cell Reports Sustainability, on November 21. “This study establishes a physically grounded upper limit on wind farm performance, demonstrating that aerodynamic constraints impose a fundamental ceiling on the energy extractable from the marine Atmospheric Boundary Layer”, the scientists continue.

According to the article, the ever-growing wind farms, which are also becoming increasingly denser, extract energy from the lower part of the atmospheric boundary layer, affecting this boundary layer up to several kilometres above the Earth’s surface. The energy extracted from the airflow must be replenished from the higher layers of the atmosphere, but this is only possible to a limited extent due to atmospheric limitations determined by physical principles known from meteorology and geophysics. This means that wind turbines literally steal each other’s wind, which means that the efficiency of wind turbines will decrease even further as their number increases. The scientists demonstrate this with a validated analytical model that defines the physical upper limit of offshore wind farm production.

They built their model based on the actual yields of 72 large wind farms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and compared the actual yields of the wind farms with the theoretically expected yields set out in national policy documents in a number of case studies. In seven of the nine case studies, the national policy targets for offshore wind yields turned out to be way overestimated. Two German wind farms were slightly underestimated.

The limitations of offshore wind revealed in the publication are not new. Scientists from the Danish university and the German Max Planck Institute have previously warned that the expected yields from offshore wind energy could fall by a third or more if offshore wind is scaled up further. In a 2020 publication by the German organization Agora Energiewende, an interdisciplinary and international team that develops scientifically sound and politically feasible strategies for the transformation towards climate neutrality, they showed how the efficiency of wind turbines decreases as the use of wind energy increases in scale. In addition, Axel Kleidon, physicist and group leader at the Max Planck Institute, states in a 2021 publication in the ‘Meteorologische Zeitschrift’ that the energy yields of areas with wind turbines covering more than 100 square kilometres, are up to twelve times lower than those of small wind farms in prominent locations, regardless of the technological advances made in wind turbines. The Cell Reports publication now confirms these earlier findings with hard figures.

The Netherlands stands out most conspicuously: with an overestimation of revenues of 49%, the scientists have labelled the Dutch government’s policy as “internally inconsistent”. The North Sea Wind Energy Infrastructure Plan (WIN), published by the Dutch government in July, assumes a capacity factor of 51 to 56 percent—this is the ratio between the actual electricity production of a wind turbine and the maximum possible yield in the same period. This is despite figures from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) showing that the capacity factor of wind turbines in the Dutch part of the North Sea was 37% and 38% in 2023 and 2024, respectively. The Delft publication cites this as a striking example of how “changing targets, spatial planning, and assumed performance can become misaligned with physical constraints.”

“Such overestimation not only hides true energy costs but also underestimates power variability, integration, and curtailment risks, and it distorts policy pathways”, the scientists argue. They further note that the resulting shortfall in electricity revenues “could have a profound impact on society and the economy.” The effectiveness of large-scale investments in the flexibility of the power grid and in wind energy storage—such as batteries and hydrogen production—depends to a large extent on the actual capacity factor of offshore wind turbines. According to the scientists, the underutilization of these investments in the future will have an impact on several generations. “The heavy demands on society, the economy, and the environment mean that corrective paths may become costly or unfeasible for a country or region”, they state.

Simão Ferreira et al., A theoretical upper limit for offshore wind energy extraction, Cell Reports Sustainability (2025), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2025.100573 

Bert Weteringe is a Dutch aeronautical engineer and the author of the book Downwind (2023), in which he informs readers about the devastating effects of the climate agenda on society and nature, specifically the impact of large-scale energy generation using wind turbines. As an independent investigative journalist, his focus is primarily on the energy transition. Through his website, he publishes news about the energy transition and wind turbines in particular.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Science and Pseudo-Science | | Leave a comment

The Year Ahead in Sino-American Relations

By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | January 8, 2026

From trade frictions to security flashpoints, the new year ahead promises a mix of continuity and potential volatility in U.S.-China relations. While Beijing’s growth in relative power—economic, technological, and military—continues, it is not aimed at “taking over the world.” Instead, it reflects a pragmatic pursuit of stability and influence in Asia. Washington would benefit from strategic empathy, recognizing China’s core concerns to avoid counterproductive escalations that could harm both nations in the long-term.

With that said, here’s what to be on the lookout for in Sino-American relations in 2026.

A hallmark of the U.S.-China rivalry since Donald Trump first took office in 2017, the current round of trade war enters 2026 on shaky ground following the one-year truce brokered in October 2025 during Presidents Trump and Xi’s meeting in Busan, South Korea. This agreement paused escalating tariffs—peaking at 145% on some Chinese goods and 125% on American products earlier in 2025—and committed China to resuming purchases of American soybeans (twelve million tons by year’s end—though American farmers are apparently in need of another bailout) while easing rare earth export curbs. In return, Washington suspended expansions of export controls on advanced tech affiliates.

Bilateral trade, which plummeted 44% year-on-year to $324 billion in the first nine months of 2025, could stabilize if the truce holds, benefiting U.S. farmers and manufacturers reliant on Chinese components.

Yet, fractures are already apparent. No formal written agreement has materialized two months post-summit, leaving commitments vague, vulnerable to misinterpretation, and doing little to dissipate the regime uncertainty plaguing the planning of businesses.

Beijing, focused on resilience, has diversified exports and boosted domestic consumption, reducing reliance on the U.S. market. If the truce unravels, expect tit-for-tat measures, but China’s strategic patience could expose U.S. domestic pressures, pushing Trump toward concessions to avoid economic fallout ahead of midterms.

Longer-term, this dynamic underscores the counterproductive nature of Washington’s escalations. The growth of Beijing’s relative power in Asia is virtually inevitable, but alienating the region with trade wars only accelerates this process, harming American competitiveness without altering the regional balance.

While tensions have decreased over the past year, particularly when measured against the trade and economic categories, security remains the most dangerous and volatile arena, with Taiwan and the South China Sea as perennial hotspots. And while improvements have been made, things have been a mixed bag.

On the one hand, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has toned down its language on China, and the administration has avoided the outlandish statements the Joe Biden administration was perpetually walking back; until recently, Trump hadn’t approved any arms sales to Taiwan since taking office; and Republicans and Democrats alike have avoided the high level visits that occurred multiple times over the course of the previous administration. At the same time, Beijing has kept its objections to U.S. naval operations in its area pro forma and has continued to signal its desire to work with Washington to keep disputes over conflicting maritime claims beneath the threshold.

On the other, frankly less promising, hand, there have been plenty of causes for concern on both sides. In Washington, there is little appetite for revisiting the key provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act that mandate arming the island, a longstanding point of continuing friction. U.S. troops are still present on Taiwan and the offshore islands, some of which are within sight of the mainland; having spent the previous several years busily clarifying commitments to allies such as the Philippines regarding their claims to sandy spits in the South China Sea, clashes that could draw Washington into direct conflict with Beijing have continued. On that note, besides Chinese coast guard harassment of Philippine fishing vessels, Beijing has declared a new “nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal institutionalizing its claims. While People Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) incursions since Taiwanese President William Lai’s 2024 inauguration have continued, highlighting Beijing’s resolve to counter perceived independence moves, Beijing recently conducted its second major blockade simulation around Taiwan (“Justice Mission 2025”).

Note: while correlation does not prove causation, it does at least suggest it, and it is worth noting that this came exactly eleven days after the Trump administration announced an over $11 billion arms sale to Taipei, the largest sale to the island ever—quite a coincidence, if in fact it is one.

While China’s buildup narrows gaps, especially regionally, it doesn’t signal intent for worldwide conquest. Beijing prioritizes deterring U.S. intervention in Taiwan, not challenging America globally.

Hopefully, 2026 will see continued lower tensions in the key hotspots where a military conflict might erupt. Clear communication to prevent miscalculation is key, as is a degree of strategic empathy, acknowledging China’s historical sensitivities, such as Taiwan as a core interest, and avoiding escalatory actions—such as continuing to arm the northern Philippine islands with mobile missile launchers aimed at China.

Economic warfare, particularly in technology, will be a prominent 2026 undercurrent. The Busan truce temporarily halted expansions of U.S. export controls on semiconductors and AI chips, allowing sales like Nvidia’s H200 to China.

Yet, bipartisan hawks continue to push for tighter restrictions, viewing China’s tech advances as threats to American dominance in the area.

For its part, Beijing has begun countering such threats with its own controls on rare earths and critical minerals, where it holds 87% of global refining capacity, demonstrating its asymmetric leverage in this area.

Such tit-for-tat exchanges are counterproductive: U.S. restrictions have accelerated China’s domestic chip progress, eroding American corporations’ leads without curbing Beijing’s rise, while depriving Chinese firms of desired imports, raising relative costs, and lowering relative quality.

Recognizing mutual vulnerabilities, let’s hope Washington and Beijing pursue guardrails to avoid broader disruptions.

2026 offers plenty of opportunities for diplomatic breathing room through high-level engagements. President Trump plans a spring visit to Beijing, with Xi reciprocating later, plus potential meetings at G20 (U.S.-hosted) and APEC (China-hosted in Shenzhen).

These could extend the truce, focusing on fentanyl precursors, agricultural buys, and bounded tech cooperation.

Multilateral forums like BRICS (India-hosted) and G7 will test Beijing’s global outreach, emphasizing partnerships with the Global South amid U.S. tariffs.

Reestablished channels—defense talks and economic dialogues—are critical to maintain even if nothing gets accomplished. No one should want a return to the radio silence of the middle Biden years, which does nothing but heighten the chance of an escalation through misunderstanding.

Overall, there is much to be optimistic about in this area—hopefully both sides can keep the hawks at arm’s length and try to make positive improvements to the U.S.-China relationship, which is still near its post-Cold War nadir.

In 2026, China’s ascent—fueled by innovation, continued (although slowing) economic growth, and regional focus—will continue, but not as the zero-sum threat Washington often portrays. Overreactions like blanket tariffs or militarized alliances risk self-fulfilling prophecies, accelerating Beijing’s autonomy while straining US resources. Strategic empathy—understanding China’s near-abroad priorities without panic—could foster guarded stability, benefiting global growth.

As both powers play for time, the year may prove pivotal: controlled competition or renewed escalation? The choice lies more in Washington’s hands than it admits. Nothing existential is at stake in the South China Sea and while far from ideal the status quo over Taiwan has held for decades and there is no need to do anything that might upset the present situation.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Venezuela to Buy Only US-Made Products Under New ‘Oil Deal’ – Trump

Sputnik – 08.01.2026

WASHINGTON – US President Donald Trump said Venezuela would only purchase American-made products as part of a “deal” with Washington to sell the Latin American country’s oil.

“I have just been informed that Venezuela is going to be purchasing ONLY American Made Products, with the money they receive from our new Oil Deal. These purchases will include, among other things, American Agricultural Products, and American Made Medicines, Medical Devices, and Equipment to improve Venezuela’s Electric Grid and Energy Facilities. In other words, Venezuela is committing to doing business with the United States of America as their principal partner,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

He said it is a “wise choice,” and a good thing for Venezuelans and Americans.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , | Leave a comment

President Trump’s Cross of Iron

By Adam Dick | Peace and Prosperity Blog | January 8, 2026

On Wednesday, United States President Donald Trump declared in a post at Truth Social that he has determined the military budget for the next fiscal year should be hiked to 1.5 trillion dollars.

A Thursday Reuters article by Costas Pitas and Andrea Shalal quantifies Trumps proposed spending increase as amounting to a 66 percent increase over what the US Congress approved for 2026. The Reuters article further relates that this proposed increase in spending is, historically speaking, very large. The article states:

Byron Callan, a defense analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, said Trump’s post raised questions about where the funds would be directed and whether they could even be absorbed by the defense sector.

He said the last time the U.S. Defense Department saw an increase higher than 50% was in 1951 during the Korean War, with even huge surges in military spending under former President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1982 amounting to 25% and 20%.

An analysis of the cost of this spending should go beyond dollars alone and consider as well what economists term the opportunity costs — what is foregone because of Trump’s proposed military buildup. President Dwight D. Eisenhower provided such an analysis in his April 16, 1953 “The Chance for Peace” speech. Summing up his tabulation of opportunity costs of military spending, Eisenhower in the speech related spending on the military to “humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” Eisenhower warned:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road. the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

Each Congress member would do well to read or listen to Eisenhower’s speech and give it thoughtful consideration before voting on Trump’s proposed military spending increase.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | | Leave a comment

China Slams U.S. Pressure on Venezuela and Vows to Deepen Trade Ties

teleSUR | January 8, 2026

On Thursday, He Yadong, a spokesperson for China’s Commerce Ministry (MOFCOM), questioned the United States for attempting to restrict Venezuela’s international economic relations and reaffirmed his country’s willingness to maintain trade ties with the South American nation.

“The hegemonic actions of the U.S. seriously violate international law, infringe on Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America. China firmly opposes such actions,” He said.

“Economic and trade cooperation between China and Venezuela is conducted between sovereign states and is protected by international law and the laws of both countries. No other country has the right to interfere.”

“Regardless of changes in Venezuela’s political situation, China’s willingness to continuously deepen bilateral economic and trade relations remains unchanged,” the MOFCOM official stressed.

“China’s economic and trade cooperation with Latin American countries has always adhered to the principles of mutual respect and win-win outcomes. China does not seek spheres of influence, nor does it target any specific party. Economic complementarity serves as a solid foundation for China–Latin America cooperation, with openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit as its defining features.”

“China will continue to work with Latin American countries to address international uncertainties through unity and collaboration, promote economic and trade cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and achieve shared development,” He concluded.

The remarks by the MOFCOM spokesperson come after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump informed Venezuela that it must end its relations with China, Russia, Iran and Cuba as part of a series of demands before it can extract and market its oil.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

Tucker Carlson reports on Paul Singer (2019)

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Timeless or most popular, Video | | Leave a comment

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