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Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran

By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | February 21, 2026

While it is impossible to predict precisely what the war on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies will result in, the winnability of the regional conflict is clear. The only thing driving this attack is sheer Israeli arrogance, as there is no conceivable situation where all out regional war delivers anything short of uncontrollable chaos.

Why is an all out regional war unwinnable? Although there are various reasons as to why this is the case, it suffices to say that the US and Israelis have no way of controlling its outcomes, in addition to this, they simply do not possess the military industrial capacity to wage such a war for a long period of time.

Now, when this argument is made, it is not done from an idealistic point of view. Therefore, it is important to preface this piece on the fact that there is a clear Israeli-US superiority in terms of technology and the kinds of weapons they possess. Nobody disputes this. There is also clear superiority in the field of their intelligence agencies.

So, let us first assume that the United States and the Zionist entity manage to score all of their desired tactical victories. Working on this assumption will then definitively prove the injudicious nature of the endeavour.

Therefore, under the best case scenario for the Zionist coalition, perhaps they succeed in conducting another decapitation strike on the Iranian military leadership, manage to penetrate and destroy some missile bases, nuclear facilities, while gutting the Islamic Republic’s air defences. These are very likely goals that they will seek to achieve.

Let’s also work under the assumption that they manage to put Tehran on the backfoot for at least a week, due to the intensity of their air campaign, making it difficult for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) to fire large bursts of ballistic missiles at a single time. Then, after achieving air dominance, strikes on essential infrastructure begin, including cultural sites, government buildings, the media, but also the likes of oil facilities, agricultural areas and water systems.

On top of all of this, assume hybrid warfare tactics will be ongoing. Militant groups, especially those focused along the Iranian periphery, will start major offensive operations, working in conjunction with foreign intelligence agents and operatives on the ground, similar to what we witnessed during the 12-day War in June of 2025.

Note that the much debated potential goal of assassinating Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is not included above. Although many have speculated that the strategy could very well hindge upon this, it guarantees a war with no predictable end, no escalation ladder and will likely trigger calls for global Jihad.

An inevitable US-Israeli defeat

Giving the Zionist coalition the best possible conditions and achievements as a result of their opening offensive, this strategy will quickly begin to run into major issues.

As we saw last June, decapitation strikes against the Iranian leadership do not work at crippling the government and its military, they are simply replaced by another line of leadership, who implement a whole series of pre-planned counter attack strategies.

The Israelis wrongfully believed that their success during the initial attack on Iran last year was going to yield major results, even attempting to utilise their asset in the United States, the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, to call for a revolt. Not only did no such action take place, as Iranians outside of the diaspora do not support this clear Zionist puppet, but the very opposite occurred as the population rallied behind the flag.

Within 15 hours, the Iranians not only managed to get their air defences back online, but captured the initiative and began launching huge volleys of ballistic missiles into the heart of Tel Aviv. As the conflict evolved, a few important developments occurred: the Israeli air defences began to buckle – with the draining of anti-air munitions – while their agents on the ground carried out most of the attacks, something that is key to note.

While it is clear that the US will bring in greater firepower than the Israelis can muster, an air force is still run by human operators who get tired and operate equipment that needs to be serviced. Iran will very easily be able to launch drones waves constantly at US and Zionist positions, and even if their ability to launch large salvos of missiles is constrained during the first week of the conflict, eventually the opportunity will present itself.

If the Iranian State has not crumbled and civil war has not erupted within this time, then the US and Israelis will then be subjected to wave after wave of counterattacks. Inevitably, this means that airbases will be struck, equipment will be lost, and with fewer assets, this means less ability to keep up the pace of their offensive.

Bear in mind that warhawks employed by Washington and Tel Aviv based pro-war think tanks, who claim that the Iranian State is crumbling at least once a year, are far detached from reality. Take the latest round of foreign backed riots for example, the Western corporate media invented an alternate reality in order to sell the idea that Iran was falling, yet the entire ordeal was more or less over in two days.

It is clear to any learned observer, that without a significant ground element, toppling the Iranian government is impossible. Which then leads to the obvious next question: What if major militant offensives occur inside Iranian territory?

Answering this in depth would take time and a more nimble military mind. Yet, again assuming some level of success on the behalf of separatist militias and al-Qaeda linked Takfiri groups, even if they were to seize territory, Iran is a massive country that allows for mistakes. None of these groups compare and can stand up to the Iranian army and IRGC, nor do they likely possess any considerable advanced capabilities.

What this means is that even if they manage to see some level of initial success, the much larger, well trained, motivated and well equipped Iranian armed forces will eventually crush these insurgents. The only real threat is some kind of mass civilian mobilisation that will deal a blow to the Iranian economy, for which there is no indication this will happen, especially as the nation is suffering through a bloody war of aggression against it.

Then come the attacks on missile bases and nuclear sites. Even if some of these attacks are successful, they won’t destroy all of Iran’s capabilities, and as we saw in June of last year, the US attacks on the nuclear facilities don’t appear to have stopped the nuclear program. If it were that easy to simply take out Iran’s capabilities, it would have been done long ago. The Israelis tried last year and failed. If anything, on the nuclear issue, such a war could end up leading to Tehran actually reversing course on its stance against developing the bomb.

Even with full US-Israeli air superiority, the remaining air defences of Iran will at some point come back online, but even in the event that 100% of their anti-air capabilities are gone, their power is in their offensive, not defensive capabilities.

Once this initial period of assumed US-Israeli offensive dominance is over, Iran can easily block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, inflict large casualty events on US and Israeli targets, while taking out assets. It is impossible to predict which strikes will be the most effective, however, it is clear that everything will become a target. So expect a big hit on the global oil market, resulting in an economic crisis.

If Iran simply keeps up a pace of fire against the Israelis, the likes of which we saw during the 12-day War, then they only have a matter of weeks before their air defences also become useless.

This is all without factoring in Iran’s various allies, which may enter at any level of intensity at any point in this conflict. There’s Ansar Allah, which has the capability of striking the Israelis, but also assets throughout the Persian Gulf. If Hezbollah manages to wage a considerable ground war, the Israelis have proven in the past to be the weakest in this arena.

The Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU/PMF, Hashd al-Shaabi) are around 250,000 men strong, alongside Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who can use their own capabilities to not only target the US, but the Israelis also. So far, since October 7, 2023, we have not seen a true demonstration of their power. Another factor which is not often discussed, but is also very important, is the role of the Palestinian resistance, who are more likely to wait for the right opportunity, but can also pose a major ground challenge to the Israelis from Gaza.

None of this considers the other elements that could come into play, such as the roles played by regional nations, armed groups we may not have previously heard of, the likes of the Fatemiyoun of Afghanistan and Zainabiyoun of Pakistan, or the general populations throughout the region and what we could see in the event that chaos erupts. Governments could be overthrown, the civilian populations of Jordan and Egypt could become active and out of control. There is also the possibility that some groups in Syria could seize the opportunity to attack the Israelis.

In the event that such a war occurs, the longer it goes on, the more chaotic and unpredictable it becomes. A situation will be totally out of the US’s control, especially as the only means of combating this regional explosion is through the air. As we witnessed with the US campaign against Yemen, airstrikes alone change very little. Even in Gaza, the armed resistance groups fought for over 2 years with no supply chain, and by the admissions of the US and Israelis, their fighting force is still roughly the same size.

If things don’t go their way very quickly, then the Zionist coalition is going to get battered, and not even nuclear weapons will get them out of it. Therefore, [if] the US and Israelis, as long as we again grant them another assumption, that they are somewhat sane, choose to go to war, they will have to try and establish an escalation ladder, devising a real exit strategy.

The question becomes whether the Iranians and their allies allow them to exit the fight. An all out war will be bloody, it will claim an enormous amount of civilian lives, and it will also inflict considerable damage on civilian infrastructure. Truly, the effects of such a war are not desired by anyone in the region, yet the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance have long prepared their capabilities in order to combat what appears to have been inevitable.

Another thing to be mentioned here is that the US government, under the Trump administration, is totally captured by the Zionist entity. For all the reasons noted above, no previous administrations have dared escalate to this extent. If it were easy to launch a regime change operation against Iran, it would have been carried out many years ago.

However, a Zionist stooge is occupying the White House, a narcissistic man whose already low cognitive abilities are clearly declining. He is a President that an FBI report concluded had been compromised by the Mossad, but even if that report isn’t to be taken seriously, his whole campaign was bankrolled by Zionist donors, and his administration is an embarrassing collection of Zionist war hawks. If there was ever any US administration that was foolish enough to launch such a war, it is that of Donald Trump.

February 21, 2026 Posted by aletho | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | Iran, Israel, Middle East, United States, Zionism | Comments Off on Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran