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Iran: The Eurasian Lock

Iran’s geography makes it a strategic hinge – one that anchors Russia’s southern depth and gives China an escape from US maritime containment

By Abbas al-Zein | The Cradle | January 22, 2026

In the corridors of US strategic decision-making, Iran is no longer treated as a discrete regional file. Dealing with Tehran has become inseparable from great-power competition itself. Coordination between Iran, Russia, and China has moved beyond situational alignment, coalescing into what western analysts increasingly describe as a form of “structural synergy” that undermines Washington’s ability to isolate its rivals.

This assessment overlaps with conclusions reached by the Carnegie Endowment in its report on America’s Future Threats, which identifies Iran as a “central node” in the Eurasian landmass – one that prevents Russia’s geographical isolation while securing China’s energy needs beyond the reach of US naval control.

Any serious destabilization of the Islamic Republic would not remain confined within its borders. It would translate into a dual strategic blockade targeting both China and Russia: reviving security chaos across Eurasia’s interior while striking at the financial and energy platforms that emerging powers increasingly rely on to loosen unipolar dominance.

Geography as strategic depth

For Moscow, Iran’s importance begins with geography. It offers Russia a vital geopolitical opening beyond its immediate borders. According to studies by the Valdai Club, Iran’s significance lies not in formal alliance politics but in its function as the sole land bridge connecting the Eurasian heartland to the Indian Ocean via the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

This route provides Russia with insulation from NATO’s maritime pressure in the Baltic and Mediterranean, effectively converting Iranian territory into strategic depth protecting Russia’s southern flank.

This geographic interdependence has produced a shared political interest that goes beyond tactical coordination. The stability of the Iranian state acts as a safeguard against the Caucasus and Central Asia drifting toward the kind of fragmentation that preceded the Ukraine war. Research by the Russian Council for International Affairs (RIAC) frames Iranian geography as a cornerstone of the “Greater Eurasia” concept, central to Moscow’s effort to dilute western hegemony across the continent.

For Beijing, Iran plays a comparable role within a different strategic equation. As US naval pressure tightens across the Pacific, China’s westward extension through Iran has become increasingly difficult to replace. Research by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) identifies Iran as one of the most critical geographic nodes in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing Beijing with a land-based corridor into West Asia that bypasses US-controlled maritime choke points – from the Taiwan Strait to the Mediterranean approaches.

Iran’s intermediate position between the Eurasian interior and open seas has therefore imposed a durable entanglement between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing. In this configuration, political alignment is driven less by ideology than by physiogeographic necessity.

Any attempt to destabilize the Iranian plateau would likely trigger a cascading shock across Eurasia’s interior, escalating a regional confrontation into a systemic blockade aimed at arresting the rise of rival power centers.

Buffer state and security firewall

Beyond logistics, Iran functions as a stabilizing buffer within East Eurasia’s security architecture. One research report by RAND on “Extending Russia” speaks of adversary exhaustion strategies that emphasize the use of peripheral instability to drain rival powers. From this perspective, Iran represents a critical firewall.

Instability inside Iran would mechanically undermine security coordination across Russia’s southern periphery, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. RIAC assessments warn that such a breakdown would open pathways for extremist networks, transcontinental smuggling, and militant spillover – threats Moscow has repeatedly classified as existential.

For China, the concern lies in contagion. Iran’s stability limits the transmission of unrest through Central Asia’s mountain corridors, where Tehran functions as an integral security partner within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This role provides Beijing with a degree of security insulation, allowing it to pursue global ambitions without being drawn into attritional border conflicts.

Energy and financial sovereignty

Economically, Iran’s role extends beyond conventional trade logic. Its partnerships with Russia and China increasingly form part of an alternative financial and energy architecture designed to blunt western leverage.

From Beijing’s perspective, Iranian oil has become a form of strategic insulation. Data indicates that China purchases roughly 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude – around 13.4 percent of its seaborne oil imports – with close to 80 percent of Iran’s exports flowing eastward. Increasing settlement through non-dollar mechanisms, including the digital yuan, has further reduced vulnerability to US pressure, particularly at choke points such as the Strait of Malacca.

Reports from the Electricity Hub confirm that China imported more than 57 million tons of Iranian – or suspected Iranian – oil in 2025, often routed via intermediaries such as Malaysia. The figures underscore the diminishing effectiveness of sanctions when confronted with geoeconomic necessity.

Russia’s calculus follows a different path to the same outcome. Cooperation with Iran has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important routes around SWIFT-based isolation. Government of the Russian Federation data shows bilateral trade rising by 35 percent following the Eurasian Economic Union free trade agreement implemented in May 2025.

A central shift has been monetary. In January 2025, the Central Bank of Iran announced full connectivity between Russia’s MIR and Iran’s Shetab payment systems, creating a protected financial corridor. According to Iranian officials, Iran and Russia aim to expand bilateral trade to $10 billion over the next decade, while Iran’s exports to Russia are expected to rise to about $1.4 billion by the end of the current Iranian calendar year (March 20, 2026).

Tehran has increasingly functioned as a re-export hub for Russian technologies and goods, frustrating efforts to economically isolate Moscow.

Washington’s strategy of separation

Against this backdrop, US strategy has evolved. Rather than relying solely on pressure or open confrontation, Washington has gravitated toward what western policy circles describe as a “strategy of separation.” This is an attempt to loosen the interdependence binding Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing by offering alternative pathways rather than confronting the bloc directly.

On the Chinese front, energy has emerged as the primary point of leverage. As the world’s largest oil importer, Beijing remains sensitive to supply stability and pricing. US moves in Latin America – particularly regarding Venezuela – are widely interpreted as efforts to reintegrate large oil reserves into global markets under western regulatory frameworks, potentially diluting Iran’s role in China’s energy security calculus.

In parallel, Washington has expanded its naval and coalition presence across key trade corridors stretching from the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific. This posture is framed not only as deterrence but as a persistent reminder that maritime supply security remains tied to US-led power balances.

On the Russian front, Ukraine occupies a central role. While sustained military and economic pressure aims to drain Moscow’s capacity, intermittent diplomatic signals suggest interest in compartmentalized understandings over European security. The underlying wager is that Russia’s core interests might be partially accommodated in Europe, reducing the long-term value of its partnership with Iran.

US engagement has also intensified across Central Asia and the Caucasus – regions that constitute strategic depth for Russia and critical corridors for China’s BRI. From Moscow and Beijing’s view, expanded security and investment ties in these areas represent an effort to geographically encircle Iran and weaken its role as Eurasia’s connective knot.

Why the bet fails

Despite the breadth of these efforts, the strategy of separation runs up against entrenched distrust in both Moscow and Beijing. For the two powers, the issue is not the scale of incentives on offer but the structure of the international system itself – and the accumulated experience of sanctions, coercion, and volatile western commitments.

From Russia’s vantage point, any trade-off between Iran and Ukraine constitutes a strategic trap. Iran anchors Russia’s southern access to the Indian Ocean; its collapse would expose the Caucasus–Central Asia arc to chronic instability. Gains in Eastern Europe would offer little compensation for a structurally weakened southern flank.

China’s reasoning is similarly grounded. Alternative energy suppliers remain embedded within supply chains that Washington can influence or disrupt. Iranian oil, by contrast, offers a higher degree of geographic and political autonomy. Its value lies less in price than in resilience.

The last barrier

At its core, the contest over Iran pits two logics against one another. One assumes geopolitical networks can be dismantled through incentives and selective realignment. The other recognizes that geography, accumulated experience, and the erosion of trust render such guarantees fragile in a world moving steadily toward multipolarity.

Iran’s collapse or prolonged internal destabilization would not merely reorder energy markets or regional alignments. It would reopen West Asia as a zone of near-exclusive US influence, completing a strategic arc across Western Eurasia. For more than a century, the region has served as a central theater of global power competition – from imperial rivalries to the Cold War and into the present transition toward multipolarity.

Therefore, Iran becomes more than a pivotal state. Much as Venezuela once represented the outer limit of resistance to US power in the Western Hemisphere, Iran now stands as the final geopolitical barrier to the consolidation of American hegemony across the heart of Eurasia.

Its cohesion serves not only its own national interest but also the broader objective shared by Moscow and Beijing: constraining unilateral dominance and preserving strategic autonomy in their immediate neighborhoods.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Russian gas exports to China soar – data

RT | January 22, 2026

China sharply increased its purchases of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2025 and reached a record monthly volume in December, according to Chinese customs data cited by RIA Novosti.

In 2025, the Asian nation imported 9.8 million tons of the super-chilled fuel, up 18.3% from the previous year, the outlet reported.

December saw particularly strong growth, with imports rising to 1.9 million tons, a 114.6% increase from the 889,482 tons delivered in the final month of 2024.

Data also showed that in October, Russia became China’s second biggest LNG supplier, overtaking Australia and coming in slightly behind Qatar. Russia’s total gas supplies to China – via pipeline and in liquefied form – reached 5.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) in November 2025, a 33% increase from the same month a year earlier.

Imports of Russian LNG by China, one of the world’s largest gas consumers, have been rising steadily for several years. Alongside pipeline flows, Russia has expanded seaborne shipments from projects in the Arctic and the Far East, including Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 2, and Sakhalin-2. Cargoes are transported largely via the Northern Sea Route during the summer navigation season and via longer southern routes in winter.

Moscow has sought to expand LNG exports via the Arctic corridor due to Western sanctions targeting key parts of its energy sector.

The surge in gas deliveries reflects a broader shift of Russia’s energy exports toward Asia following the sharp reduction of pipeline supplies to the EU since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.

Russia also delivers natural gas to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline, which began operations in 2019 and reached full operational capacity in December 2024.

Moscow and Beijing are also advancing the planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline through Mongolia. President Vladimir Putin has said that, together with existing and future pipelines, Russian gas deliveries to China could exceed 100 bcm a year.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

European leaders’ shift in their Davos addresses exposes Europe’s strategic anxiety

Global Times | January 21, 2026

The World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting recently kicked off in the Swiss resort city of Davos. This year’s forum took place amid rare transatlantic tensions triggered by the US intention to acquire Greenland. The focus of European leaders’ speeches pivoted noticeably from global economic issues to geopolitics, reflecting Europe’s deepening strategic anxiety amid structural contradictions with the US.

French President Emmanuel Macron said the EU should not bend to “the law of the strongest,” while Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the bloc was “at a crossroads” where it must decide on how to get out of a “very bad position” after trying to appease Trump. Even European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the “geopolitical shocks” and “a dangerous downward spiral” brought by the US.

“The forum sends a clear political signal of Europe’s growing strategic awakening,” Zhao Junjie, a senior research fellow at the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Wednesday.

The maximum pressure exerted by the US on the Greenland issue has shaken the long-standing value consensus between Europe and the US. Its unilateral and bullying actions have triggered strong fear and anxiety across Europe, which is a key reason for the heightened emotions and intense reactions toward the US among European representatives at this year’s forum.

The statements made by European leaders at the forum appear to have demonstrated Europe’s resolve to stand firm to the world. Yet it remains to be seen whether such firm commitments can be translated into practical, unified, and effective actions. As senior bankers and corporate executives at Davos noted, they believe the current responses of European leaders to the US are more emotional than pragmatic. Moreover, due to long-standing structural constraints – its deep entanglement with the US in security, energy, and economic affairs – Europe’s response is weak and constrained. Zhao further noted that Europe still lacks systematic measures to effectively counter American unilateralism, with current efforts largely limited to soft multilateral mechanisms.

Europe’s response to US unilateral pressures has been sluggish and lacking in internal coordination. The EU countries have not reached a consensus on the activation of Anti-Coercion Instrument. Meanwhile, Europe continues to grapple with “double standards” in its multilateral engagements. Despite the leaders’ calls for trade diversification, restrictive market-access policies toward certain foreign products have fueled ongoing trade tensions. This contradiction is illustrated by Macron’s appeal for Chinese investment in key sectors, even as the EU moves to phase out components and equipment from tech suppliers such as Huawei in some sectors – a policy that inevitably raises questions about Europe’s consistency and sincerity in pursuing cooperative partnerships.

Canada has already taken action. Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that middle powers are not “powerless” facing “a rupture in the world order.” He called for “honesty about the world as it is” and for building “something bigger, better, stronger, and more just.” Recently, Canada established strategic partnerships with China and Qatar to promote the diversification of its foreign relations. Such strategic sobriety may offer some inspiration for Europe.

Ursula von der Leyen declared in her special address that “Europe will always choose the world, and the world is ready to choose Europe.” Yet Europe must now answer a more pressing question: what path will it choose for itself in the changing global order?

The statements at Davos have sent a clear political signal of Europe’s awakening. Moving forward, Europe must consolidate its strength through unity, steer its own course with greater autonomy, and expand its strategic space through diversification. Confronted with external pressures, only by reinforcing internal solidarity, advancing pragmatic actions, and broadening multilateral cooperation can Europe truly safeguard its own interests and uphold the international multilateral order. Only in this way can Europe genuinely protect its interests amid profound changes. History does not wait for the hesitant – it is time for Europe to act.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , | Leave a comment

What happens when START-3 expires, and US doesn’t want to prolong it?

By Ahmed Adel | January 20, 2026

Although START-3, the last strategic arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, expires on February 5, the two countries will most likely continue to informally respect it, unless Washington violates it. Washington likely wants the treaty to expire so a new agreement can be signed that will not limit the development of new weapons.

US President Donald Trump considers all agreements made before he took office outdated and does not want to accept restrictions from a bygone era. Russia has prepared for that, since the proposal to extend the agreement was made more than a year ago and received no response from the American side.

The US and Russia together possess almost 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, but Russia remains the largest nuclear power. The first START treaty was signed on July 31, 1991, at a summit in Moscow between then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George W. Bush, and entered into force on December 5, 1994. This was the first document of its kind between the Soviet Union and the US, aimed at ensuring parity between the two sides, with the nuclear potential of both countries to be reduced by 30%. The treaty remained in force for a full 15 years, when START-3 was signed, the last strategic arms control treaty concluded between Russia and the US after the end of the Cold War.

With the Prague disarmament agreement, signed in 2010 by heads of state Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, Washington and Moscow committed to having no more than 700 deployed warheads and no more than 1,550 nuclear warheads. The contract expired in February 2021, but the Joe Biden administration decided to extend the agreement for five years, without any amendments or changes.

Washington does not want this arms control agreement because Russia is now a step ahead in the development of modern weapons systems. Russia has manufactured weapons incomparable to anything else in the world, such as the Oreshnik and Poseidon systems, as well as nuclear-powered missiles, while the Americans believe that the restrictions under this agreement hinder their development in this direction and therefore do not want to limit themselves.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, said that the US is likely not prepared to accept the Russian proposal to voluntarily extend the key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for another year.

It is recalled that on January 8, the US president said regarding START, “If it expires, it expires,” adding, “We’ll just do a better agreement.”

All these agreements were concluded in different eras and under different conditions, and the Americans could, conditionally speaking, once impose many things on Russia. Now they cannot, because Russia has an advantage across a wide range of areas today, such as modernizing 95% of its nuclear forces, something the Americans have not done yet. Russia also has hypersonic missiles that have already been tested on the battlefield, which the Americans do not.

Trump stated in 2020 during his previous presidential term that the US possesses a “super-duper missile” about seventeen times faster than turbine-powered cruise missiles like the Tomahawk and unlike any other in the world, but such a missile has not been shown to the public to this day. Then the Trump administration claimed that Russia developed hypersonic weapons, allegedly stealing some technologies from the US.

Based on all this, the Trump administration considers the circumstances and refuses to enter into any agreements or treaties that limit US capabilities.

In reaching any new nuclear arms agreement, beyond Russia and the US, several other players would need to be involved, with the US president primarily considering China. From Washington’s perspective, Russia should persuade China to join the deal. However, China refuses to do so because its nuclear arsenal is much smaller than Russia’s and the US’s. Additionally, Trump might have also considered India.

However, if Moscow and Washington, for example, say that such an attitude is acceptable regarding China, there is the question of how they will handle England and France, which also possess nuclear weapons. It is clear, therefore, that American think tanks are working to develop different options for establishing a new world order, but it will mainly be ‘peace through force’ under United States dominance.

There is a possibility that Russia will announce it will continue to respect the limits of the agreement, as long as Washington does not violate them. What the Americans, for their part, will say is unknown, but there have been Trump’s statements about the necessity of resuming nuclear tests, which are banned. Moscow responded that they are against resuming, but if the US conducts nuclear tests, the Russians will immediately carry out their own in response.

In that case, a nuclear arms race could occur, which would lead to increased strategic risks and potentially threaten global security. Therefore, Moscow believes that responsible and restrained behavior by nuclear states is more important than ever and is firmly committed to the principle that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it must never be started.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

January 20, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Vitol tests Chinese demand with narrower discounts on Venezuelan crude

Al Mayadeen | January 19, 2026

Vitol Group has offered Venezuelan crude oil cargoes to Chinese buyers at discounts of around $5 per barrel to ICE Brent, signaling a bid to test Chinese firms’ demand for the Latin American country’s heavy, sour grades, Bloomberg reported, citing traders familiar with the matter.

If deals go through, the cargoes are expected to be delivered in the second half of April, traders said. The move underscores renewed efforts by major US-based trading houses to place Venezuelan barrels in Asia, with China remaining a key destination.

Venezuela’s Merey crude has historically been among the cheapest globally, with Asia, particularly China, absorbing large volumes. Before US President Donald Trump ordered the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, discounts on delivered barrels to Brent were as wide as $15 per barrel. The narrower spread now being tested suggests a recalibration of pricing after the US allowed for larger sales of Venezuelan crude, revenues it seeks to exploit. In recent years, Vitol has operated under licenses issued by the US Treasury that allow the loading and sale of Venezuelan crude. Under this imposed framework, proceeds from oil sales are directed into US-controlled bank accounts, a mechanism Washington claims is intended to manage revenues of Venezuela’s oil industry.

Marketing stolen oil

However, the deal only took effect after Maduro was kidnapped, oil tankers were stolen, and Venezuelan authorities were threatened. Vitol also gained preferential treatment, securing a deal it could only dream of to sell Venezuelan crude. The granting of an 18-month license to Vitol to market stolen crude triggered sharp controversy in Congress and across the energy sector.

Concerns center on the speed of the approval and Vitol’s political connections, which include reports that senior Vitol trader John Addison had donated more than $5 million to Donald Trump’s 2024 re-election campaign and attended a high-profile White House meeting with oil executives days before the roughly $250 million deal was awarded. US Senator Tim Kaine said the arrangement was “smacking of corruption,” questioning why proceeds were routed to specific bank accounts and who ultimately stood to benefit from the administration’s plan to effectively “run” Venezuela’s oil sales. The fact that Vitol and Trafigura were the first firms to receive such licenses, while other traders remained barred under sanctions, fueled accusations of “transactional diplomacy”.

The Trump administration and industry analysts rejected the allegations, arguing that Vitol and Trafigura were selected for practical reasons. US officials cited the traders’ vast shipping fleets and global logistics networks as essential for rapidly moving large volumes of stranded crude.

Indian, Chinese refiners seek clarity over Venezuelan crude

On January 12, Vitol and Trafigura were reportedly holding early-stage discussions with leading refiners in India and China over potential sales of Venezuelan crude. Bloomberg, citing people familiar with the matter, reported that the two trading giants contacted large Asian buyers over the weekend, though talks remained exploratory and no formal offers were made. Both firms are also gauging interest among US refiners.

India’s Reliance Industries previously imported Venezuelan oil under a waiver before halting purchases last year following a decision by Trump to impose a 25% tariff on countries buying oil from Venezuela.

India’s state-owned Indian Oil Corp. (IOC) is among the companies awaiting confirmation from Washington that it has been cleared to resume purchases of Venezuelan oil, according to Bloomberg‘s sources. IOC declined to comment. Reliance Industries said last week it was seeking clarity on whether non-US buyers could access Venezuelan crude and stated it would consider purchases “in a compliant manner.”

It remains unclear how much oil Vitol and Trafigura would be able to sell, or whether transactions would be limited to the initial tranche referenced by Trump. Nevertheless, any sales would mark a significant development for trading houses with longstanding involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector.

January 19, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

Scott Ritter Hiding the Dominant Minority Behind Geopolitics?

Peace Activists Forced to Hide the Jewish Geopolitical Dots?

By Geurt de Wit | Ruling Elite Studies | January 18, 2026

Introduction

All political scientists and historians agree that some minorities have historically been able to dominate their host nations. Notable modern examples include the Spanish in South America, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and Tutsis in Central Africa. Sometimes host nations rise against a dominant minority, as seen in Southeast Asia, where local populations have implemented various quotas and measures—such as Malaysia’s Bumiputera policies—to curb the economic and social influence of the ethnic Chinese community.

Jews

There is another significant example of a dominant minority, yet naming it remains a taboo: the Jewish elite in the West. This group exerts influence through economic and media power, a “Culture of Critique,” and its maneuvers within the geopolitical “Great Game”. U.S. foreign policy, for instance, appears heavily influenced by Jewish Zionists, compelling even the supposedly “America First” Trump administration to adopt “Israel First” policies. While parts of the peace movement have begun to note the Jewish role in fomenting conflicts also beyond the Middle East, many activists still fail to see the broader connections. The conflicts in Ukraine and Taiwan are directly linked to the crisis in the Middle East.

The reason is simple: Jewish led neoconservative and neoliberal forces aligned with Israel seek to weaken Russia and China, both of which support Iran and the Shia “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East. Consequently, the West attempts to encircle Russia and China with military bases and hostile alliances while undermining their economies through sanctions and high tariffs to facilitate regime change.

This is nothing new. For centuries, Jews have viewed Russia and China as “antisemitic” for opposing Jewish attempts to become a dominant minority within their borders. Historically, this has manifested as a prolonged struggle. Jewish elite dynasties like the Rothschilds, Sassoons and Kadooreis, for example, pushed Western empires to subjugate China during its “Century of Humiliation.” Similarly, they managed to organize various wars against Russia including the first Crimean War in the 1850’s and then later the Jewish led Bolshevik and Oligarch takeovers in the 1920’s and 90’s. The present Ukraine War is just the latest in a series of conflicts and wars between Jews and Russia going back a millennium.

The obvious Jewish role in geopolitics and various wars has always been known to political scientists and historians. It is also common knowledge in many parts of the world such as in Eastern Europe, China and the Arab world. However, in America the Jewish dominant minority has achieved such power that both academia and media now avoid the subject entirely. Only occasionally does the American public hear about it through random outbursts, such as Mel Gibson’s criticism of the Jewish role in instigating wars.

Putin and Xi

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, Russia and China have regained their independence and power. Their geopolitical support for the Axis of Resistance has drawn the ire of Zionist Jews running Great Game geopolitics, while their nationalist anti-liberal policies have alienated liberal Jewish factions running the Culture of Critique movements. As a result, the Jewish dominated Western academia and media has totally demonized both nations, while Jewish led neoconservatives and neoliberals push for their encirclement and the targeting of their global allies.

The influence of Jewish dominant minority behind these conflicts remains such a taboo that even peace activists often ignore it. This gives Zionists a carte blanche to pursue military and cultural wars, regime change operations and proxy wars aimed at isolating Russia and China. By refusing to “connect the dots,” Western peace activists effectively allow this dominant minority to continue pushing for perpetual war.

Scott Ritter

In recent years, the peace movement has been bolstered by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. A prolific advocate, Ritter has tirelessly warned against the dangers of nuclear war, organized demonstrations and personally lobbied Congress. Despite his background as a leftist philosemitic Democrat, he has significantly influenced the Republican “MAGA” movement toward anti-war policies.

Ritter has gained a massive following as a commentator on the Ukraine War. However, during the conflict’s first year, he remained silent on the Jewish and even Israeli connection, blaming only the CIA, MI6 and the U.S. and British governments. In this, he was joined by libertarian figures like Andrew Napolitano and Lew Rockwell, who focus on American “Primacists” rather than identifying a dominant minority.

Traditionally, both leftists and libertarians have avoided identifying the Jewish dominant minority to avoid being labeled as antisemitic. It was only during the recent genocide in Gaza that Ritter began to explicitly critique Israel’s geopolitical role, though he has yet to identify the dominant minority or even connect these dots to the broader global landscape.

Silent Peace Activists

Some suggest that platform policies, such as those on YouTube, drive this reticence. Peace activists like Andrew Napolitano, Alexander Mercouris, and Danny Haiphong reach hundreds of thousands of viewers daily through their Youtube channels. Openly discussing Jewish dominant minority and connecting Jewish geopolitical dots could lead to deplatforming and lost revenue. However, this doesn’t fully explain the silence, as they could simultaneously use alternative platforms like Rumble, X or Locals—a strategy successfully employed by the famous anti-Zionist, Candace Owens. Unsurprisingly she has been branded an “anti-Semite” by many Jewish organizations.

Alexander Mercouris

Another explanation is ideological. Many activists from leftist or libertarian backgrounds may instinctively view the concept of a “dominant minority” as inherently racist. The most dramatic example of this is the leftist peace activist and popular YouTube commentator Alexander Mercouris, who for years was oblivious to the Jewish connection. However, a few months ago, due to audience feedback, he admitted on his channel that he had never even thought about a possible connection between the Ukraine War and the Middle East Crises.

Afterward, he has not talked about the subject anymore, though he does seem to increasingly speak in code. For example, he repeatedly emphasizes that his channel will be shut down if he analyzes the Epstein case too deeply. At the same time, he seems to spell “Epstein” in the Jewish-German way, making Epstein’s ethnic background clearer. Mercouris also has the revealing habit of always following the arch-neocon warmonger Lindsey Graham’s name with the name Richard Blumenthal, possibly hinting that Graham is influenced by him and other Jews to a significant extent.

The third explanation for not openly noticing the dominant minority is that many prominent peace activists hope to attract the support of wealthy, anti-Zionist Jewish donors to finance the movement, a development that has yet to materialize.

Debanking

Certainly, the fourth and most important explanation is fear. Leading peace activists face tremendous pressure from various sides. Ironically, this pressure appears stronger in America than in Europe, despite stricter official censorship in Europe. However, Europeans benefit from strong employment and social security protections against firings and debanking. In America, people’s lives are more precarious and heavily dependent on high incomes, making it easier to intimidate them with threats to their reputation, job, income, or even bank accounts. The American media rarely discusses this, but hundreds of politically incorrect individuals have been debanked—not only in Canada but also in the U.S. Scott Ritter has now joined their ranks.

Video Link

In the above video Scott Ritter recalls his days as a highly connected American intelligence operative, working closely with the CIA, Israelis, and even the White House. He emphasizes that he was once the “Golden Boy” of intelligence, privy to “everything.” Clearly, he must be aware of America’s dominant minority and their potential to ignite a nuclear war. Yet, despite recent escalations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Ritter in this video claims that the main problem is America itself, with Trump as a “prisoner of the CIA”—not the Mossad, Israel, or even the Zionists.

The next day, however, Ritter appeared in an interview with Andrew Napolitano. He admitted that after being debanked, he fell into depression and briefly felt hopeless, especially as his wife had grown weary of the persecution that had affected their entire family for decades. At that point, Napolitano played a clip of Jonathan Greenblatt, the Jewish ADL’s chairman, boasting about the organization’s role in training American police and officials. This ignited Ritter, who then openly declared that Zionists are running the American government.

Video Link

Trump’s chess moves

At the same time, Ritter suggested there might still be hope. He noted that many parts of the government resent Zionist dominance, and even Donald Trump could be among them. That wouldn’t be surprising, given Trump’s ego—he can’t be pleased with how Netanyahu and many other Jews publicly humiliate him. Being Israel’s bitch cannot be fun.

It could even be that Trump is deliberately undermining American influence abroad through his erratic behavior, bullying threats, and tariffs. After all, U.S. foreign policy is thoroughly dominated by Zionists, so disrupting the entire system might be the only way to halt it. For instance, threatening to annex Greenland would certainly fracture or weaken NATO, making it harder for EU NATO countries to sustain their warmongering. Perhaps Trump truly seeks peace through a “Fortress America” approach, dividing the world among American, Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. Maybe he’s really playing four-dimensional chess, with method to his madness. Of course, the alternative is that he’s simply a madman. As Scott Ritter admits, he doesn’t know—and neither does anyone else. Probably not even Trump himself.

People worldwide are deeply divided over Donald Trump. Some view him as a mastermind playing four-dimensional chess to save the world, while others see him as a narcissistic bumbler who sows chaos wherever he goes. So, which perspective aligns more closely with the truth? We do not know but let’s first assume that Donald Trump is a rational player in do…

Conclusion

Many in the peace movement believe that concealing the Jewish dominant minority and obscuring its role in numerous wars is essential for peace. However, this strategy may backfire, giving that minority a free hand to escalate proxy conflicts and try again and again to push the world toward “limited” nuclear war.

People often demand perfection from their heroes, which is counterproductive. No one is a superman—not even Scott Ritter. Of course, he must consider his family. Of course, he has been reticent about exposing Jewish power. The same applies to all other peace activists. But gradually, things are changing on both the left and right. They are beginning to point out the man and group behind the curtain.

In any case, peace activists perform invaluable work and deserve unwavering support. After all, they do what they humanly can. Without them—especially Scott Ritter—a nuclear war might already have begun.

January 18, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | 1 Comment

Venezuela Has Right to Have Relations With China, Russia, Cuba, Iran – Acting President

Sputnik – 16.01.2026

Venezuela has the right to relations with all countries of the world, including China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran, and will exercise this right in compliance with international norms, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodriguez said on Thursday.

Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said the country’s energy dialogue with the United States is not new, but stressed that it is now taking place amid “aggression and a fierce threat.”

“Venezuela has the right to relations with China, with Russia, with Cuba, with Iran — with all the peoples of the world,” Rodríguez said while presenting the government’s 2025 annual report.

She said Caracas is shaping energy cooperation based on “decency, dignity and independence,” rejecting both internal and external constraints aimed at influencing Venezuela’s foreign policy.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Deep-state forces from abroad instigated violence in Nepal – former foreign minister

RT | January 13, 2026

External deep-state forces were instrumental in instigating the September 2025 violence in Nepal that led to the ouster of the government, its former foreign minister has told RT India.

K.P. Sharma Oli resigned as Nepal’s prime minister after violent clashes – known as the Gen Z protests – killed 77 and injured more than 2,000.  Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, a former foreign minister, has now backed Oli’s assertion that Gen Z protests that led to the ouster of the government were backed by external forces.

“Those elements who were actively engaged with the deep state, who used the cross-border misinformation and disinformation to instigate the violence, they were active,” he told RT India in an exclusive interview.

The remarks came after Oli told RT India about external influences in the uprising last year.

Gyawali said Kathmandu’s growing engagement with India and China and its aspiration of being a bridge for the economic development of Nepal between the two neighboring countries “was not a very good message to some powers.”

He added, “[They] wanted to use Nepal’s geostrategic location for their policy in their favor. So maybe our engagement with our neighboring countries may have some grievances to the big powers as well.”

The Grayzone has cited leaked documents to reveal that the US government’s National Endowment for Democracy (NED) had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars tutoring Nepalese young people to stage the protests.

The Gen Z protests happened as the US sought to neutralize Chinese and Indian influence over Kathmandu, Grayzone investigations revealed.

The NED is officially a US State Department-funded nonprofit that provides grants to support ‘democratic initiatives’ worldwide.

The International Republican Institute (IRI), a NED division, has been accused of funding clandestine activities in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, apart from funneling tens of millions of dollars to Ukrainian political entities and anti-Russian interests.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Deception | , , , , | Leave a comment

Pirates of the Caribbean

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 12, 2026

So many things are happening in such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep track of them all. Certainly, one of the most “entertaining” is the return of piracy, which the United States of America inaugurated at the beginning of 2026.

We are talking about a new and particularly controversial phase of their economic and strategic pressure policy: the direct seizure of oil tankers on the high seas, believed to be involved in the transport of crude oil on behalf of states subject to unilateral U.S. sanctions, in particular Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. This practice, which Washington presents as a legitimate enforcement activity against illegal trafficking, is raising profound questions about international maritime law and the balance between state sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and the use of force.

From the Caribbean to the icy North Seas, the most emblematic case is that of the oil tanker Mariner, seized a few days ago after a long chase in the North Atlantic by the U.S. Coast Guard, while the ship was being joined by Russian naval forces. According to U.S. authorities, the ship was part of the so-called shadow fleet, an informal network of oil tankers that operate through frequent changes of name, flag, and management company in order to evade sanctions regimes. This operation is accompanied by other significant seizures or interceptions, including the tankers Sophia, Skipper, and Centuries, stopped in various maritime areas on similar charges of sanctioned oil trafficking and fraudulent use of flags of convenience. In short, a cinematic-style raid. Donald “Sparrow” Trump has found a new hobby.

As for the Mariner, to be fair, it is a VLCC oil tanker built in 2002. Its gross tonnage is over 318,000 tons, making it one of the largest types of oil tankers used in the global crude oil trade. In terms of age and technical characteristics, it is an ordinary working ship, designed to operate for 25-30 years, provided it passes inspections. Since its construction, the ship has not had a stable “nationality.”

Over the course of more than twenty years, it has changed its name, flag, and owners several times, a practice typical of tankers operating in sanctioned and semi-sanctioned segments of the market. The ship was successively named Overseas Mulan, Seaways Mulan, Xiao Zhu Shan, Yannis, Neofit, Timimus, Bella 1, and finally Marinera. Each name change was accompanied by a change of jurisdiction or management company. The flags also changed regularly. The ship flew the flags of the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Palau, and Panama. According to international databases, there was a period when the ship flew the flag of Guyana, indicating an incorrect or unconfirmed registration. This episode was subsequently used as a formal pretext for intervention by the U.S. Coast Guard.

After the persecution began, the ship obtained temporary registration under the flag of the Russian Federation with Sochi as its port of registry, as recorded in official ship registers. The history of the ship’s ownership and management also indicates its commercial rather than state nature. Over the years, the ship has been managed by companies registered in Asia and offshore jurisdictions, including structures linked to Chinese and Singaporean operators. Between 2022 and 2023, the owner and manager of the ship was Neofit Shipping Ltd, then Louis Marine Shipholding ENT. Since the end of December 2025, the owner and commercial operator of the ship has been the Russian company Burevestmarin LLC. This is a private entity, not linked to state-owned oil companies and not part of any “state fleet.”

In recent years, the ship has been used in the classic sanctions evasion scheme linked to the Iran-Venezuela-China routes. A crucial turning point came in mid-December 2025, when the United States announced an effective maritime blockade of Venezuela. The tanker, then called Bella 1, had left the Iranian port in November and was approaching the Venezuelan coast just as these measures were introduced. The attempt to enter the port was interrupted by the U.S., after which the ship set course for the Atlantic Ocean. The composition of the crew also clearly shows the commercial nature of the ship. Most of the sailors on board are Ukrainian citizens, while there were also Georgian citizens and only two Russians on board. The Mariner proved to be a convenient demonstration target for the U.S. as part of its new strategy of forcibly disrupting Venezuelan oil routes.

The owner’s attempt to hide under the Russian flag was a logical commercial move, but it did not change the intentions of the U.S. Russia was formally involved in the situation as the flag state and because of the presence of Russian citizens in the crew. The ship was not of strategic value to Russia and was not part of its oil logistics. Any escalation around a private tanker, which had been operating for decades on gray routes, would have made no rational sense.

From Washington’s point of view, the legitimacy of such actions rests on two main pillars. The first is the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions: seized tankers are considered assets directly involved in violations of Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations and are therefore subject to confiscation. The second pillar is the doctrine of the stateless vessel, according to which a ship that cannot credibly prove its nationality—due to irregular registrations, false flags, or contradictory documentation—loses the legal protection guaranteed by the flag state and can be stopped by any other state on the high seas.

Bye-bye Law of the Sea

It is precisely this second point that is the focus of much of the legal debate. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes that, on the high seas, a ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Exceptions to this principle are limited and strict: piracy, slave trade, unauthorized radio transmissions, absence of nationality, or express authorization from the UN Security Council. The extension of these exceptions to the application of unilateral sanctions, not approved by the United Nations, is a highly contested interpretation.

Russia and China have reacted harshly to the seizures, calling them a blatant violation of international law and, in some cases, an act comparable to state piracy. Moscow argues that the seized tankers were flying regular flags and that the use of force against commercial vessels in peacetime, outside a UN mandate, constitutes a breach of the maritime legal order. Beijing, for its part, has emphasized the illegitimate nature of unilateral sanctions and the risk that such practices create dangerous precedents, normalizing the armed interdiction of commercial shipping.

The implications of this new phase are significant. On the legal front, there is growing tension between a law of the sea based on the neutrality of routes and freedom of navigation, and a power practice that tends to transform economic sanctions into instruments of military coercion. On the geopolitical front, there is a risk of maritime escalation, with possible countermeasures by the affected states and a progressive militarization of global energy routes.

On the other hand, all this is consistent with what the U.S. administration is doing: creating rapid chaos that distracts the world, while surgically targeting certain elements within the American system and, on the other hand, applying the Donroe Doctrine and establishing control over the Western Hemisphere.

The seizure of oil tankers is not just an isolated episode of conflict between states, but a sign of a deeper transformation of the international order. The U.S. has set out with conviction and has no intention of stopping. If this practice were to become established, international maritime law would risk being very quickly stripped of its fundamental principles, leaving room for a logic of force in which naval supremacy replaces shared legality. The issue, therefore, is not only about the seized ships, but the entire future of global maritime governance.

The U.S. has said it: Venezuela is American property and from now on will be its new backyard. Greenland will be next.

Piracy elevated to the rank of military strategy and international relations.

And remember: in just 11 months of government, since the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump has bombed seven sovereign countries: Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela. He has kidnapped one head of state (Maduro) and threatened to kill three others: Khamenei, Petro, and Rodriguez. He has threatened to invade five countries: Iran, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Greenland (i.e., Denmark). He has done everything in his power to prevent the international community from passing resolutions against Israel and its prime minister Netanyahu during and after the massacres in Gaza.

Anyone with a modicum of common sense, who is not misled by political preconceptions, can draw the most basic conclusions from these actions.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, War Crimes | , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Year Ahead in Sino-American Relations

By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | January 8, 2026

From trade frictions to security flashpoints, the new year ahead promises a mix of continuity and potential volatility in U.S.-China relations. While Beijing’s growth in relative power—economic, technological, and military—continues, it is not aimed at “taking over the world.” Instead, it reflects a pragmatic pursuit of stability and influence in Asia. Washington would benefit from strategic empathy, recognizing China’s core concerns to avoid counterproductive escalations that could harm both nations in the long-term.

With that said, here’s what to be on the lookout for in Sino-American relations in 2026.

A hallmark of the U.S.-China rivalry since Donald Trump first took office in 2017, the current round of trade war enters 2026 on shaky ground following the one-year truce brokered in October 2025 during Presidents Trump and Xi’s meeting in Busan, South Korea. This agreement paused escalating tariffs—peaking at 145% on some Chinese goods and 125% on American products earlier in 2025—and committed China to resuming purchases of American soybeans (twelve million tons by year’s end—though American farmers are apparently in need of another bailout) while easing rare earth export curbs. In return, Washington suspended expansions of export controls on advanced tech affiliates.

Bilateral trade, which plummeted 44% year-on-year to $324 billion in the first nine months of 2025, could stabilize if the truce holds, benefiting U.S. farmers and manufacturers reliant on Chinese components.

Yet, fractures are already apparent. No formal written agreement has materialized two months post-summit, leaving commitments vague, vulnerable to misinterpretation, and doing little to dissipate the regime uncertainty plaguing the planning of businesses.

Beijing, focused on resilience, has diversified exports and boosted domestic consumption, reducing reliance on the U.S. market. If the truce unravels, expect tit-for-tat measures, but China’s strategic patience could expose U.S. domestic pressures, pushing Trump toward concessions to avoid economic fallout ahead of midterms.

Longer-term, this dynamic underscores the counterproductive nature of Washington’s escalations. The growth of Beijing’s relative power in Asia is virtually inevitable, but alienating the region with trade wars only accelerates this process, harming American competitiveness without altering the regional balance.

While tensions have decreased over the past year, particularly when measured against the trade and economic categories, security remains the most dangerous and volatile arena, with Taiwan and the South China Sea as perennial hotspots. And while improvements have been made, things have been a mixed bag.

On the one hand, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has toned down its language on China, and the administration has avoided the outlandish statements the Joe Biden administration was perpetually walking back; until recently, Trump hadn’t approved any arms sales to Taiwan since taking office; and Republicans and Democrats alike have avoided the high level visits that occurred multiple times over the course of the previous administration. At the same time, Beijing has kept its objections to U.S. naval operations in its area pro forma and has continued to signal its desire to work with Washington to keep disputes over conflicting maritime claims beneath the threshold.

On the other, frankly less promising, hand, there have been plenty of causes for concern on both sides. In Washington, there is little appetite for revisiting the key provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act that mandate arming the island, a longstanding point of continuing friction. U.S. troops are still present on Taiwan and the offshore islands, some of which are within sight of the mainland; having spent the previous several years busily clarifying commitments to allies such as the Philippines regarding their claims to sandy spits in the South China Sea, clashes that could draw Washington into direct conflict with Beijing have continued. On that note, besides Chinese coast guard harassment of Philippine fishing vessels, Beijing has declared a new “nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal institutionalizing its claims. While People Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) incursions since Taiwanese President William Lai’s 2024 inauguration have continued, highlighting Beijing’s resolve to counter perceived independence moves, Beijing recently conducted its second major blockade simulation around Taiwan (“Justice Mission 2025”).

Note: while correlation does not prove causation, it does at least suggest it, and it is worth noting that this came exactly eleven days after the Trump administration announced an over $11 billion arms sale to Taipei, the largest sale to the island ever—quite a coincidence, if in fact it is one.

While China’s buildup narrows gaps, especially regionally, it doesn’t signal intent for worldwide conquest. Beijing prioritizes deterring U.S. intervention in Taiwan, not challenging America globally.

Hopefully, 2026 will see continued lower tensions in the key hotspots where a military conflict might erupt. Clear communication to prevent miscalculation is key, as is a degree of strategic empathy, acknowledging China’s historical sensitivities, such as Taiwan as a core interest, and avoiding escalatory actions—such as continuing to arm the northern Philippine islands with mobile missile launchers aimed at China.

Economic warfare, particularly in technology, will be a prominent 2026 undercurrent. The Busan truce temporarily halted expansions of U.S. export controls on semiconductors and AI chips, allowing sales like Nvidia’s H200 to China.

Yet, bipartisan hawks continue to push for tighter restrictions, viewing China’s tech advances as threats to American dominance in the area.

For its part, Beijing has begun countering such threats with its own controls on rare earths and critical minerals, where it holds 87% of global refining capacity, demonstrating its asymmetric leverage in this area.

Such tit-for-tat exchanges are counterproductive: U.S. restrictions have accelerated China’s domestic chip progress, eroding American corporations’ leads without curbing Beijing’s rise, while depriving Chinese firms of desired imports, raising relative costs, and lowering relative quality.

Recognizing mutual vulnerabilities, let’s hope Washington and Beijing pursue guardrails to avoid broader disruptions.

2026 offers plenty of opportunities for diplomatic breathing room through high-level engagements. President Trump plans a spring visit to Beijing, with Xi reciprocating later, plus potential meetings at G20 (U.S.-hosted) and APEC (China-hosted in Shenzhen).

These could extend the truce, focusing on fentanyl precursors, agricultural buys, and bounded tech cooperation.

Multilateral forums like BRICS (India-hosted) and G7 will test Beijing’s global outreach, emphasizing partnerships with the Global South amid U.S. tariffs.

Reestablished channels—defense talks and economic dialogues—are critical to maintain even if nothing gets accomplished. No one should want a return to the radio silence of the middle Biden years, which does nothing but heighten the chance of an escalation through misunderstanding.

Overall, there is much to be optimistic about in this area—hopefully both sides can keep the hawks at arm’s length and try to make positive improvements to the U.S.-China relationship, which is still near its post-Cold War nadir.

In 2026, China’s ascent—fueled by innovation, continued (although slowing) economic growth, and regional focus—will continue, but not as the zero-sum threat Washington often portrays. Overreactions like blanket tariffs or militarized alliances risk self-fulfilling prophecies, accelerating Beijing’s autonomy while straining US resources. Strategic empathy—understanding China’s near-abroad priorities without panic—could foster guarded stability, benefiting global growth.

As both powers play for time, the year may prove pivotal: controlled competition or renewed escalation? The choice lies more in Washington’s hands than it admits. Nothing existential is at stake in the South China Sea and while far from ideal the status quo over Taiwan has held for decades and there is no need to do anything that might upset the present situation.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

China Slams U.S. Pressure on Venezuela and Vows to Deepen Trade Ties

teleSUR | January 8, 2026

On Thursday, He Yadong, a spokesperson for China’s Commerce Ministry (MOFCOM), questioned the United States for attempting to restrict Venezuela’s international economic relations and reaffirmed his country’s willingness to maintain trade ties with the South American nation.

“The hegemonic actions of the U.S. seriously violate international law, infringe on Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America. China firmly opposes such actions,” He said.

“Economic and trade cooperation between China and Venezuela is conducted between sovereign states and is protected by international law and the laws of both countries. No other country has the right to interfere.”

“Regardless of changes in Venezuela’s political situation, China’s willingness to continuously deepen bilateral economic and trade relations remains unchanged,” the MOFCOM official stressed.

“China’s economic and trade cooperation with Latin American countries has always adhered to the principles of mutual respect and win-win outcomes. China does not seek spheres of influence, nor does it target any specific party. Economic complementarity serves as a solid foundation for China–Latin America cooperation, with openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit as its defining features.”

“China will continue to work with Latin American countries to address international uncertainties through unity and collaboration, promote economic and trade cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and achieve shared development,” He concluded.

The remarks by the MOFCOM spokesperson come after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump informed Venezuela that it must end its relations with China, Russia, Iran and Cuba as part of a series of demands before it can extract and market its oil.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

US Actions in Venezuela Threaten Global Supply Chain Stability – Chinese Foreign Ministry

Sputnik – 07.01.2026

BEIJING – The US military operation against Venezuela has threatened the stability of the global supply chain and the economic situation in the country, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said on Wednesday.

Earlier in the day, the ABC TV channel reported, citing sources familiar with the White House’s position, that the US had required Venezuela to “agree” to an exclusive partnership with the US on oil and give preference to Washington in the sale of heavy oil. US President Donald Trump has previously called himself a key figure in the governance of Venezuela after the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US forces.

“The blatant use of force against Venezuela has seriously affected Venezuela’s economic and social order and threatens the stability of the global supply chain. China strongly condemns this,” Mao said.

Cooperation between China and Venezuela is cooperation between sovereign states, protected by international law and the laws of both countries, Mao added when asked about Beijing’s plans to protect its energy interests in Venezuela.

On January 3, the US launched a massive attack on Venezuela that led to the capture of Maduro and his wife. The presidential couple was flown to New York to be tried under US laws on charges of “narco-terrorism.” On Monday, the Venezuelan Supreme Court temporarily transferred the presidency to Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who was sworn in before the National Assembly.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people, calling for Maduro and his wife to be released and for the situation not to be allowed to escalate further. Following Moscow, Beijing called for the immediate release of Maduro and his wife, stressing that the US actions violate international law. The North Korean Foreign Ministry has also criticized the US actions.

January 7, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , , | Leave a comment

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