US ramps up nuclear claims against China
RT | February 18, 2026
China carried out an underground “nuclear explosive test” in June 2020, a senior US State Department official has claimed, citing “fresh intelligence” on the matter. Beijing has repeatedly dismissed such allegations as “entirely unfounded,” while independent observers say the evidence is inconclusive.
The US assistant secretary for arms control and nonproliferation, Christopher Yeaw, made the latest claims on Tuesday during an event hosted by the conservative Hudson Institute think tank in Washington.
He cited seismic data “quite consistent with what you would expect from a nuclear explosive test.”
“I’ve looked at additional data since then. There is very little possibility, I would say, that it is anything but an explosion, a singular explosion,” Yeaw stated.
The minor 2.75 magnitude seismic event was registered by a remote station in Kazakhstan. Its epicenter was located some 725km away at the Lop Nur nuclear testing grounds in China, prompting the US to claim that it was caused by an underground blast.
China has repeatedly dismissed the American allegations as “entirely unfounded” and used only as a pretext to justify Washington’s own intent to resume nuclear testing. Yeaw’s remarks invoked a similar reaction, with a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington telling Reuters the latest claims were “political manipulation aimed at pursuing nuclear hegemony and evading its own nuclear disarmament responsibilities.”
Moscow has backed Beijing, repeatedly stating no evidence to support Washington’s claims exists. “Neither Russia nor China has conducted any nuclear tests. And we also know that these claims were firmly denied by representatives of China,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Preskov told reporters on Wednesday.
Independent observers have said there is too little evidence to positively establish the nature of the June 2020 incident. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, for instance, said that the monitoring station in Kazakhstan merely picked up “two very small seismic events, 12 seconds apart,” and it was not possible “with this data alone” to assess “the cause of these events with confidence.”
Trump stalls over Iran strike plan, Iran holds all the aces
By Martin Jay | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 17, 2026
Trump has the option of going to war with Iran and receiving much-needed campaign funds from Israel for the midterms – or opting to defy Bibi and facing certain defeat by losing both houses and facing certain impeachment. Can the Iranians save him?
Is Trump serious about going to war with Iran? To understand this, it’s important to examine his relationship with Netanyahu and to see who has the advantage when it comes to dragging the U.S. into a war, and whether Israel can actually be a greater threat to the U.S. than Tehran can ever be.
The trap that Trump is falling into is one where he has little or no wiggle room at all to control the Iran crisis, whereby Israel can threaten him with isolation while it goes ahead with its strike.
There are two dynamics at play here which are struggling to find a compromise. Trump wants a deal with Iran which takes away their nuclear capability, while Israel wants a war which overthrows the Iranian regime and installs a Mossad/CIA puppet. The problem, though, is that Israel is not an honest broker and keeps shifting the goalposts. The latest demand now is that removing Iran’s ballistic missiles should be at the heart of any deal that Trump pulls off.
Trump is ensnared and is aware of how Bibi is manipulating him. He may, on occasion, swear at journalists and pretend he is his own boss and his own president and that Israel is a client state of Washington which has to toe the line, but in reality, it is clear that Israel is calling the shots.
In recent days, we have heard that the one aircraft carrier the U.S. had in the region, the USS Abraham Lincoln, is to be joined by a second called the USS Gerald Ford. U.S. media report that the Lincoln is in the “Arabian Sea,” which is a comical way of saying that it’s keeping its distance from Iran’s shores and Houthi missiles off the coast of Yemen. But other reports are suggesting that the reason why Trump claims he has sent a second carrier – to beef up the “flotilla” in case of a war breaking out with Iran – is untrue. Some insiders are briefing journalists that the Lincoln has technical problems which will render it useless in a combat situation and so needs to be replaced with the more advanced Ford.
However, even this might be a false narrative offered by Pentagon insiders who are not supporters of Trump. A second explanation about the carriers is that it buys Trump time. He has even told reporters that it will take about a month for the Ford to get there, which he believes should be ample time for a deal to be struck with Iran, or at least will give him four more weeks to work out a way of dealing with the threat – that’s the threat from Israel, not Iran.
Israel threatened Trump before when he went ahead with his bunker buster bombs in June of last year by saying simply, “If you don’t do it, we’ll nuke Iran.” It worked. This time around, the threat is, “If you don’t join us, then we’ll strike Iran alone and you will have to deal with the consequences of being the first U.S. president to have to explain to the Jewish lobby why Iran is wiping Israel off the face of the map.” This second threat is multi-layered and also might work with Trump, given that the midterm elections, which are approaching, will cost twice what the elections cost which got him into office. It will be Jewish money which bankrolls him this time around, with the intention of saving him from losing both houses and facing inevitable impeachment.
And so, in many ways, Trump is closer to and more dependent on the regime in Tehran to help him out. A deal which limits the enrichment of uranium and can guarantee no nuclear bomb can be made might be something he can present to the American people as a great victory. The irony is that the deal might be more or less a carbon copy of Obama’s, which he, Trump, rejected while in his first term in office, a rejection which has created the present crisis.
The trouble with any deal now about enrichment is that it is unlikely to satisfy the Israelis, who have become more aware in recent weeks about the capability of Iran’s latest generation of ballistic missiles both in terms of defence and attack. Moreover, the U.S. attack on Iran last year for 12 days has now raised the stakes to a fever pitch, making the Iranians clearer and more focused about any kind of attack happening against them: all-out war.
According to some credible reports, Trump was recently asking Pentagon chiefs if the U.S. could carry out a single in-and-out strike operation which could be used to warn Iran while satisfying Israel at the same time about the U.S. threat, and he was told no such options are feasible. This is due to Iran being much more prepared now for such attacks, both militarily and intelligence-wise, while the Mossad operation of creating civil strife on the ground failed spectacularly. The U.S. is in a very tight corner right now, as its forces and its allies in the region are in the crosshairs of Iran the moment the first bomb is dropped, and so Trump’s options to go to war are very limited. It would be suicidal for Trump to strike Iran, as the losses to U.S. forces and the disruption to oil distribution via the Straits of Hormuz would be too great, not to mention the destruction of infrastructure in Israel itself.
But there is also another factor which is putting all the pressure on Trump to get a deal with Iran. Since last June’s attack and more recently Trump’s betrayal of cordial relations with Putin conjured up at Alaska, along with the Venezuela coup, both Russia and China have upped their support for Iran. This is a critical factor now preventing Trump from hitting Iran with anything. China recently gave Iran its latest state-of-the-art new radar system which can identify U.S. stealth bombers at a range of 700km. Game changer. If you consider Iran, Israel, and the U.S. as three poker players at the table, it is clear that Iran now has the best hand with the most options. It can maximize its role now and exploit Trump’s vulnerability by going for a deal which involves sanctions being relieved, or it could hold out and play a long game way beyond Trump’s one-month breathing space and really turn up the heat on him leading up to the midterms in November. Iran always plays for time and is good at this strategy. And given that even the kindest analysis of America’s strike capability in Iran is two weeks before depletion of all missile stocks is reached, any hawks close to Trump who are pushing for a strike must have the destruction of the U.S. in their strategy as well, as Iran cannot be pounded into a state of submission in such a short space of time. Surely that can’t be the aim of Bibi. Surely not!
Russia and China Are Expanding Their Cooperation to Counter US Efforts to Bully Iran and Cuba
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR 21 | February 14, 2026
This will be a rather lengthy article, but you need to know what Russia and China are doing in a closely coordinated series of actions that show a serious commitment to counter US actions to punish and isolate Iran and Cuba. Let’s start with Iran… Since the June 2025 12-day Iran–Israel war (which ended with a US-brokered ceasefire on 24 June 2025), Russia and China have provided Iran with a combination of diplomatic, economic, military-technical, and strategic support. This has helped Tehran recover from strikes on its nuclear sites, air defenses, and missile infrastructure, while deepening their “axis” alignment against Western pressure. Support has been pragmatic rather than unconditional—neither offered direct intervention during the conflict, leading to some Iranian frustration—but has accelerated in the months since.
The biggest news — a development that has been largely ignored in the West — was the signing of the Trilateral Strategic Pact (signed 29 January 2026), which provides a comprehensive framework for diplomatic, economic, and security coordination (emphasizing sovereignty, sanctions resistance, and multipolarity; no formal defense alliance). The signing occurred through simultaneous ceremonies in Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow, as confirmed by state media in all three countries and reported across outlets like Middle East Monitor, GV Wire, and others. It represents a significant escalation in coordination among the three nations, building directly on their existing bilateral frameworks.
It formalizes a trilateral coordination mechanism for the first time, linking the three powers in a shared strategic framework. It builds on the bilateral agreements that Iran had signed previously with Russia and China:
The Iran-Russia 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty (signed January 17, 2025, entered into force October 2025), focused on economic, political, defense, and sanctions-evasion ties.
The Iran-China 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (signed 2021), emphasizing trade, infrastructure, energy, and Belt and Road Initiative projects.
While the full text has been released incrementally (with portions still emerging as of early February 2026), public descriptions and official statements highlight the following core elements:
- Diplomatic coordination — Unified stances on international issues, including opposition to Western sanctions, support for multipolarity, and mutual backing in forums like the UN.
- Economic resilience and cooperation — Enhanced trade (e.g., energy exports, yuan/ruble-based mechanisms), sanctions circumvention, and infrastructure projects (e.g., expanding Belt and Road ties, North-South Transport Corridor involvement).
- Strategic and security alignment — Military-technical cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint exercises (e.g., building on annual “Maritime Security Belt” drills; a major joint naval exercise involving all three that will take place in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean in the coming weeks).
- Nuclear sovereignty — Emphasis on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear development and resistance to external interference.
- Trilateral nuclear and military talks — Including IAEA discussions and coordinated exercises.
- No mutual defense clause — It explicitly stops short of a formal military alliance (unlike NATO’s Article 5), focusing instead on coordination and mutual support without automatic defense obligations.
State media in Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow described it as a “cornerstone” for a new multipolar world order, with Chinese messaging highlighting opposition to “unilateral coercion” and Russian/Iranian outlets framing it as bolstering sovereignty against external threats. While I do not believe that Russia and China will join the fray if Iran is attacked, they are making a concerted, substantive effort to ensure that Iran can effectively defend itself and thwart US attempts at regime change.
Both Russia and China are providing important military assistance to Iran, but China appears to be playing a bigger role in supplying hardware while Russia is supplying Iran with critical intelligence. According to press reports and photographic evidence, Russia has deliveried Mi-28NE attack helicopters (confirmed in early 2026) and possible MiG-29 fighters. Russia also has sent a large number of military transport flights to Iran, but there are no reports about what was on board. The most likely case is that Russia is fulfilling supplies of weapons based on prior contracts and in defiance of reinstated UN/EU arms sanctions via the JCPOA “snapback” mechanism.
China has focused on upgrading Iran’s air defense system by supplying HQ-9B surface-to-air missile systems (a long-range SAMs comparable to Russia’s S-300; deliveries reported from July 2025 onward, with Iranian officials confirming integration to replace losses from Israeli strikes). In addition, China has deployed the YLC-8B long-range surveillance radars (for detecting stealth aircraft like the F-35), and shipped missile components (e.g., solid-fuel propellants, guidance systems) to rebuild ballistic missile production lines damaged in the war. Iran is in a much stronger position militarily than it was on June 13, 2025, when Israel launched its surprise attack.
CUBA
Russia and China also are providing significant political, economic, humanitarian, energy, and material support to Cuba, especially amid the island’s severe fuel/energy crisis, food shortages, and economic strains intensified by the longstanding US blockade and recent US actions under President Trump (e.g., pressure on Venezuelan/Mexican oil supplies and threats of tariffs on countries aiding Cuba).
Russia and China are coordinating rhetorically (both denounce US “inhumane” tactics and reaffirm support in bilateral calls and statements). They also are coordinating the kind of aid that each supplies to Cuba… Russia focuses on supplying direct oil/fuel while China is aiding Cuba with financial/renewables/food assistance. There is not a formal trilateral mechanism like the one they signed with Iran, but both countries frame their support as countering US pressure in the Western Hemisphere. This support is ongoing and responsive to Cuba’s acute needs (fuel rationing, blackouts, food scarcity). Deliveries and projects continue despite US threats, with both countries emphasizing it as humanitarian and sovereign cooperation.
Russia’s Support
Russia emphasizes solidarity, political backing, and practical material/energy assistance, framing it as opposition to “suffocating” US measures. Russia’s help consists of the following:
Energy Aid (Oil and Fuel): Russia is preparing to deliver crude oil and petroleum products to Cuba “in the near future” as humanitarian aid. The Russian Embassy in Havana confirmed this to Izvestia. Russia last sent a major shipment in February 2025 (100,000 metric tons of crude under a $60 million state-backed loan approved by Putin). The Kremlin (via spokesman Dmitry Peskov) states it is in active contact with Havana to discuss assistance options and has described Cuba’s fuel situation as “critical.” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov (Feb 13, 2026) confirmed Russia is providing material assistance, including supplies already underway.
Political and Diplomatic Support: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (phone call with Cuban FM Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Feb 2, 2026) reaffirmed Russia’s “principled position” that economic/military pressure on Cuba is unacceptable and committed to continued political and material/financial support. Russia repeatedly condemns the US blockade, opposes any military intervention, and expresses solidarity with Cuba (and Venezuela). Ambassador Viktor Koronelli has stated Russia “will not abandon Cuba.”
Historical/Longer-Term Ties: Russia wrote off ~90% of Cuba’s Soviet-era debt (~$32 billion) in 2014. Ongoing cooperation includes trade, scientific/academic exchanges, and past energy deals.
China’s Support
China has positioned itself as a major strategic partner, focusing on humanitarian aid, energy infrastructure, food security, and debt/investment cooperation (Cuba is a Belt and Road Initiative partner). The recent Emergency Aid Package (Approved by Xi Jinping, Jan 2026) provides $80 million in financial assistance (in euros equivalent) for purchasing electrical equipment and other urgent needs — specifically to help resolve the energy crisis (blackouts affecting >60% of the country). China also donated 60,000 tons of rice in emergency mode (first shipment of ~4,800 tons arrived Jan 2026; rest in coming months) for food security.
China also is expanding support that builds on prior commitments. Previously it was helping Cuba with a 200 MW photovoltaic (solar) energy projects and, recent days, has delivered 5,000 solar panel kits for isolated homes (new executing company established with Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Trade). Shortly after Venezuelan President Maduro was abducted, China, acting under an emergency program, delivered 30,000 tons of rice (first shipments in Jan 2026)… This was in addition to prior donations of solar lamps, roofing materials, mattresses, and generator sets.
In the face of the US effort to crush Cuba economically, China is helping Cuba with debt restructuring negotiations (banking/financial/corporate debts). Cuba also is being Integrated into China’s CIPS payment system and increased use of yuan in trade (announced 2025). China is in effect helping wean Cuba off of the US dollar. China also is helping Cuba with biopharma (e.g., technology transfers for aspirin production), digital transformation (Phase 4 program), high-definition TV projects, mining, oil exploration, sugar industry recovery, and renewables (China investing in solar to help Cuba reach 25% renewables by 2030).
The support that Russia and China are providing to Iran and Cuba sends a clear message to Donald Trump and to the nations of the global south: i.e., Russia and China are building a new financial and security infrastructure designed to immunize countries against US coercion and threats. They are doing more than just offering words of solidarity… They are backing up their words with concrete economic, diplomatic and military actions. The foundation of the American hegemon is crumbling.
I started my vlogging day with Nima and Colonel Wilkerson:
Ray McGovern and I discussed the latest developments with Iran and the war in Ukraine with Judge Napolitano:
And here’s my interview with Alastair Crooke… we analyzed the impending attack on Iran and the prospects for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine:
Populations in key NATO nations balk at sacrifices for military spending – poll
RT | February 13, 2026
People in key NATO nations are reluctant to tighten their belts to fund increased defense spending, despite believing that the world is “heading toward global war,” according to a Politico poll published on Friday.
The poll, which surveyed at least 2,000 people from the US, Canada, the UK, France, and Germany each, found that majorities in four of the five countries think “the world is becoming more dangerous” and expect World War III to break out within five years.
Nearly half of Americans (46%) consider a new world war ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ by 2031, up from 38% last year. In the UK, 43% share this belief, up from 30% in March 2025.
French respondents matched British levels at 43%, and 40% of Canadians expect war within five years. Only Germans remain skeptical, with a majority believing that a global conflict is unlikely in the near term.
The survey suggested a stark disconnect, however, between the growing alarm and willingness to pay for a defense buildup. While respondents support increased military spending in principle, support fell dramatically when specific trade-offs were mentioned.
In France, support dropped from 40% to 28% when those being surveyed were told about the potential financial and fiscal consequences. In Germany, it fell from 37% to 24%, with defense spending ranking as one of the least popular uses of money.
The survey also suggested significant skepticism about creating an EU army under a central command, with support at 22% in Germany and 17% in France.
While the poll suggests that Russia is perceived as the ‘biggest threat’ to Europe, Canadians view the administration of US President Donald Trump as the greatest danger to their security. Respondents in France, Germany, and the UK rank the US as the second-biggest threat – cited far more often than China.
The findings come after NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte urged members states in December to embrace a “wartime mindset” amid the stand-off with Russia. This also comes amid Western media speculation that Russia could attack European NATO members within several years. Moscow has dismissed the claims as “nonsense,” while accusing EU countries of manufacturing anti-Russia hysteria to justify reckless militarization.
World on the verge of uncontrolled deployment of nuclear weapons in space
By Ahmed Adel | February 11, 2026
The militarization of space threatens to trigger a new global arms race and undermine stability and security. The world is already on the brink of uncontrolled deployment of nuclear forces and assets regarding American plans to establish dominance in space.
International law, especially the Soviet-American agreement of 1967, prohibits the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in space, as well as military activities in orbit, such as exercises and maneuvers. The agreement remains in place, but the issue of space militarization has resurfaced.
Although the law remains in effect and all space states are respecting it for now, other questions arise. When the United States asserted claims to space during Ronald Reagan’s administration (1981-1989) and began developing the concept of deploying missile defense in space, the Soviet Union responded by initiating the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987.
Perhaps most importantly, the Americans eventually suspended the program because missile defense assets were never deployed in space, and space activities by both the USSR and the US were limited to deploying satellites for missile launch warning, meaning satellites that track missiles over the territory of the Soviet Union and the US.
After that, a new phase started, not only in the militarization of space but also in the military-technical exploration of space. Now, reconnaissance satellites monitor Earth, along with communication satellites, including next-generation systems that provide broadband internet access.
The US and China are both actively involved in this, with large companies such as Elon Musk’s Starlink also participating in American projects. Meanwhile, Russia plans to develop its own satellite network by 2030, while China is rapidly deploying satellites in orbit for broadband internet.
It is precisely these systems that enable modern connectivity, battlefield communication, and control of unmanned aerial vehicles, which are currently being actively tested on the Ukrainian battlefield. The Americans started this with Ukraine, and now Russia is also actively using similar technologies.
In fact, this is the future. The next step for the Americans is the Golden Dome – an orbiting missile defense system. However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START) is no longer in force because the US declined to extend it.
Ultimately, extending the treaty in its current format has become nearly impossible, or at least very uncertain, because of the development of the Golden Dome system. This system does not align with either the current START or any future version of the treaty, or with any new nuclear security framework.
Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty remains formally observed, the absence of a new comprehensive agreement, such as a potential New START, creates opportunities for the US to conduct military activities in orbit. This could set a dangerous precedent and effectively undermine the existing international framework that, for decades, has prevented the direct militarization of space.
Over the past fifteen years, there have been heated debates about space and its militarization. The main reason is that the 1967 Treaty was mostly designed to ban nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, because there was a significant threat of nuclear weapons being deployed in orbit.
Today, however, attention is shifting toward the potential deployment of weapons that are not classified as weapons of mass destruction. In this context, in 2008, Russia proposed at the Conference on Disarmament a comprehensive ban on any weapons in space, including new systems like anti-satellite weapons, which can be used to forcibly disable the satellites of other countries.
The idea of formally establishing a comprehensive international ban on deploying any weapons in outer space has so far only remained at the discussion stage. No document entirely prohibits the deployment of weapons that are not classified as weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
Russia has already unilaterally pledged that it would not be the first to deploy weapons in space, during a period when these discussions were especially intense.
It is currently difficult to assess the extent to which the US is truly ready for this, as well as the extent to which the Golden Dome system is technically prepared for introduction into service. US President Donald Trump is consciously raising the stakes, seeking to draw Russia, China, and other key space powers not so much into an open arms race in space as into the process of forming and subsequently signing a new international agreement that would be based on American positions.
This means that if the US advances its positions, it would provide itself with a legal basis for deploying non-nuclear weapons systems in space, for example, anti-missile systems or other missile-defense-related weapons. How all this will ultimately fit within the new international legal framework remains uncertain.
In any case, the world needs an international instrument to regulate the deployment of weapons in space, a position Moscow has insisted on and promoted.
It is recalled that Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth stated in early February that the US must establish dominance in space, because, as he said, whoever controls the heights controls the battle, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously indicated that the US is actively working on deploying weapons in space and rejects Russia’s proposal to agree to abandon such activities, limiting itself only to opposing the deployment of nuclear weapons.
Moscow has repeatedly emphasized that Russia, together with other countries, including China, is committed to preventing an arms race in space.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
China’s new canal, Baltimore’s new bridge, and NYC’s wheelchair ramps: The GDP problem
Inside China Business | February 10, 2026
Why didn’t China protect Venezuela from the US?
Beijing is regrouping to adapt to the new hemispheric world order, but not retreating from Latin America
By Ladislav Zemánek | RT | February 9, 2026
The US military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026 – known as Operation Absolute Resolve – sent shockwaves far beyond Caracas. By striking targets in the Venezuelan capital and capturing President Nicolás Maduro, Washington signaled a decisive return to hard power in the Western hemisphere. The operation was not merely a tactical move against a hostile regime; it was a strategic message about influence, hierarchy, and control in the Americas. For China, which had invested heavily in Venezuela’s political and economic survival, the intervention raised immediate questions about the limits of its global reach and the evolving rules of great-power competition in an increasingly multipolar world.
China’s response to Operation Absolute Resolve was swift in tone but cautious in substance. Official statements from Beijing condemned the US action as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, framing it as destabilizing and emblematic of unilateral hegemony. Chinese foreign ministry officials repeatedly urged Washington to respect the UN Charter and cease interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs, positioning China as a defender of state sovereignty and multilateral norms.
Yet the rhetoric was not matched by escalation. Beijing avoided threats of retaliation or offers of direct military assistance to Caracas. Instead, it confined its response to diplomatic channels, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral sanctions, and issued travel advisories warning Chinese citizens to avoid Venezuela amid heightened instability. Chinese analysts emphasized that the priority was damage control: protecting long-standing economic and strategic interests without provoking a direct confrontation with US military power in the Western Hemisphere.
This measured reaction highlights a defining feature of China’s approach to Latin America. Beijing has pursued deep economic engagement and vocal support for sovereignty, but it has consistently avoided military competition with the US in a region where American power remains overwhelming. Operation Absolute Resolve exposed both the strengths and the limits of that strategy.
China’s relationship with the Maduro government was neither symbolic nor superficial. Over the past two decades, Venezuela emerged as one of Beijing’s most important partners in the Americas. In 2023, the two countries elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” China’s highest level of bilateral designation. This status reflected ambitions for durable cooperation across energy, finance, infrastructure, and political coordination, and placed Venezuela among a small circle of states Beijing regarded as strategically significant.
Chinese policy banks extended large-scale financing to Caracas, much of it structured as oil-backed loans that allowed Venezuela to maintain access to global markets despite US sanctions. Chinese companies became involved in energy projects, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, while bilateral trade expanded substantially. Venezuelan heavy crude, though difficult and expensive to refine, accounted for a meaningful share of China’s oil imports, contributing to Beijing’s broader strategy of supply diversification.
Security cooperation also developed, albeit cautiously. Venezuela became one of the largest buyers of Chinese military equipment in Latin America, and Chinese technicians gained access to satellite tracking facilities on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Beijing drew clear red lines. It avoided formal defense commitments, permanent troop deployments, or the establishment of military bases – signals that China did not seek to challenge US strategic primacy in the hemisphere.
Beijing’s interests in Venezuela extended well beyond oil and arms sales. The country served as a key node in China’s wider Latin American strategy, which emphasized infrastructure development, trade expansion, financial integration, political coordination, and cultural exchange within multilateral frameworks. This model sought to build influence through connectivity and economic interdependence rather than coercion or force, reinforcing China’s image as a development partner rather than a security patron.
The post-intervention reality, however, has significantly altered this equation. With Maduro removed from power, the US assumed effective control over Venezuela’s oil exports, redirecting revenues and setting the terms under which crude reaches global markets. While Washington has allowed China to continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, sales are now conducted strictly at market prices and under conditions that erode the preferential arrangements Beijing previously enjoyed. This shift directly affects China’s energy security calculations and weakens the leverage embedded in its oil-backed lending.
US control over oil flows also grants Washington influence over debt restructuring and creditor negotiations, potentially complicating China’s efforts to recover outstanding loans. The result is a sharp reduction in Beijing’s bargaining power in Caracas and a reassessment of the long-term viability of its investments. For China, the dilemma is acute: how to defend economic interests without crossing a strategic threshold that would invite confrontation with the US.
These developments align closely with the broader direction of US policy articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a core strategic priority and reflects a clear revival of Monroe Doctrine logic. It signals Washington’s determination to assert influence in the region and to limit the military, technological, and commercial presence of external powers – particularly China.
For Beijing, this creates a structural asymmetry. Decades of investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement cannot offset the reality of US military dominance in the Americas. China’s preferred toolkit – economic statecraft, infrastructure finance, and non-interference – faces inherent constraints when confronted with decisive uses of hard power. At the same time, Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and multilateralism continues to resonate with segments of Latin American political opinion that are wary of external intervention and eager to preserve strategic autonomy.
A comparison between US and Chinese strategies reveals different worldviews. The US approach, as outlined in the 2025 strategy, treats the hemisphere as a strategic space to be secured against external challengers through security partnerships, economic inducements, and military readiness. China’s approach prioritizes integration, development cooperation, and respect for national choice, relying on gradual influence rather than explicit enforcement.
Viewed through the lens of ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the transition to multipolarity, the Venezuelan episode marks a critical inflection point. The US has reasserted hemispheric dominance in unmistakable terms, while China has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its reach far from home.
China may well lose ground in Venezuela, but this does not necessarily signal retreat from the region. Instead, it suggests adaptation. Diversified partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico, along with continued engagement through trade and investment, offer alternative pathways forward. More broadly, the emergence of implicit spheres of influence may align with China’s interests elsewhere, particularly in Asia, where Beijing seeks greater recognition of its own strategic space.
In an international system increasingly defined by negotiated boundaries rather than universal dominance, both Washington and Beijing are testing how far their power extends – and where restraint becomes strategic. The outcome will shape not only Venezuela’s future, but also the evolving architecture of global order in a multipolar age.
Ladislav Zemánek is a non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club.
South American countries’ pragmatic reassessment of ties with China amid US hegemonism, protectionism
Global Times | February 8, 2026
A quiet but profound shift is reshaping the geopolitical map of South America, as revealed by an exclusive Reuters report, “Brazil signals new openness to Mercosur-China talks as Beijing seeks deeper ties”: For the first time, senior Brazilian officials are considering a push for a “partial” trade agreement between the Mercosur bloc and China.
This represents a major shift for Latin America’s largest economy. While Washington is busy raising tariffs and fortifying protectionist walls, countries in the Western hemisphere are recalculating their survival strategies. The result? A pragmatic reassessment of ties with Beijing.
We are already seeing the ripple effects of US pressure on neighbors like Mexico and Panama, but the shifting mood in the wider region is far more significant. The degree to which Latin American nations are pivoting is directly correlated to the economic squeeze they feel from the North.
Mercosur is the customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and newcomers Bolivia and Venezuela (currently a suspended member).
For decades, Brazil acted as the bloc’s protectionist “gatekeeper” against Chinese influence. Fearing that its domestic manufacturing sector would be hollowed out by Asian imports, Brasília consistently vetoed formal negotiations with Beijing. However, what Reuters describes as a “new global scenario” is forcing a change. This is a diplomatic euphemism for a stark reality: the rise of US protectionism coupled with the undeniable allure of Chinese opportunity. Facing the headwinds of American unilateralism, Brazil has done the math. Traditional allies offer no alternative market access, only higher tariff barriers.
Meanwhile, however, China is not only offering a market but also bringing tangible industrial investment, from BYD to Great Wall Motor. When Washington offers only sticks without carrots, Brazil has little choice but to turn toward a pragmatic East. Uruguay’s president, who recently visited China with a large business delegation to demand faster trade talks, is a clear testament to this regional impatience.
Historically, a Mercosur-China deal was viewed as “mission impossible” due to the bloc’s Common External Tariff rules, which forbid members from negotiating individual trade deals. Politics also posed a formidable barrier. Paraguay, a member of Mercosur, maintains “diplomatic ties” with China’s Taiwan region, creating a legal deadlock to any comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Beijing under the one-China principle.
Furthermore, Argentina’s political pendulum – swinging from protectionist Peronism to Javier Milei’s pro-US stance – has made a unified strategy difficult.
This is why the proposed “partial agreement” is a masterstroke of political pragmatism. It serves as a strategic bypass around these obstacles.
Unlike a full FTA targeting zero tariffs, a partial deal sidesteps the sensitive issue of tariff reduction that terrifies Brazilian manufacturers. It also navigates around Paraguay’s diplomatic dilemma. Instead, it would focus on non-tariff barriers, such as harmonizing sanitary regulations, streamlining customs procedures and setting import quotas.
By shifting the focus from tariffs to regulatory cooperation, Brazil is doing more than just clearing the path for soy and iron ore. It is paving the way for deeper integration of Chinese capital.
The China-Brazil relationship has already evolved from simple trade to manufacturing. With Chinese EV makers taking over shuttered Ford factories in Bahia, the two economies are moving toward supply chain symbiosis. This partial agreement could provide the institutional framework needed to secure those investments.
From a macro perspective, this is a snapshot of the Global South’s increasing autonomy. If these talks proceed, they will mark the opening of a new path – one where pragmatism supersedes ideology.
This serves as a stark reminder to policymakers in Washington: trying to block economic gravity with pressure tactics often accelerates the search for new partners. The shifting winds in South America are not merely a passive reaction to fading hegemony; they represent an active and powerful response from nations determined to define their own economic destiny.
China’s top universities are opening to foreign students. That’s a big problem for US schools.
Inside China Business | February 4, 2026
Chinese universities dominate the global rankings in hard sciences, Engineering, and Computer Science. Many of them now accept international students, and are marketing their schools in foreign countries. US schools already face serious financial challenges, from the steep decline in international student enrollment. Foreign families typically pay full tuition and room and board, and American colleges rely on those higher fees. Chinese universities pose an existential problem, going forward. They are qualitatively superior, even in Western surveys. And the over cost of attendance is a mere tenth of going to a top American program. Closing scene, Shanghai Container Port
Resources and links: Mapped: How China Overtook the U.S. in Global Trade (2000–2024) https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/h…
Fewer international students are enrolling at U.S. colleges, which could cost the country $1 billion, reports find https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/30/inter…
The College Conundrum: Chasing International Students And Full-Pay Families https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottwhi…
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) https://stubard.com/blog/admission/be…
Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) https://apply.china-admissions.com/un…
Best Global Universities for Engineering https://www.usnews.com/education/best…
Best Global Universities for Computer Science https://www.usnews.com/education/best…
International college students bring billions to the US. Here’s why that may change. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/e…
U.S. Economy Could Suffer a $7 Billion Loss from Precipitous Drop in International Students https://www.nafsa.org/about/about-naf…
Beijing cancels Panama deals after court blocks Chinese port operations
The Cradle | February 5, 2026
Chinese authorities have asked state-owned companies to suspend talks on new projects in Panama, in response to the Central American nation’s cancellation of a contract with China’s CK Hutchison Holdings to operate two ports along its strategic canal, Bloomberg reported on 5 February.
According to sources familiar with the matter, Panama’s decision could jeopardize billions of dollars in potential Chinese investments.
Chinese authorities also asked shipping companies to consider rerouting goods through other ports if the extra cost is not prohibitive, and have stepped up inspections of Panamanian imports, such as bananas and coffee.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian issued a statement saying that the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling “ignores the facts, violates credibility,” while harming the interests of Chinese companies.
Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison responded to the Supreme Court decision by initiating international arbitration proceedings against Panama.
CK Hutchison has operated Panama’s Cristobal and Balboa ports for decades. The ports lie at opposite ends of the Panama Canal – the strategic waterway that connects the Pacific and Caribbean Oceans, and through which roughly three percent of global seaborne trade passes.
The move comes amid US President Donald Trump’s campaign to counter Chinese influence over strategic infrastructure in the Americas.
Following his election last year, Trump argued that it was “foolish” of the US to hand over control of the canal to Panama. The US built the canal in 1904 and handed it back to Panamanians nearly a century later, in 1999.
Trump has also complained about the fees Panama charges the US to use the waterway.
Amid pressure from Washington, Panama also withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in February last year.
At the time, Beijing stated it “firmly opposes the United States using pressure and coercion to smear and undermine Belt and Road cooperation. The US side’s attacks … once again expose its hegemonic nature.”
Twenty Latin American nations have participated in the BRI since Beijing initiated it in 2013.
Current Chinese infrastructure projects in Panama include a $1.4-billion bridge over the canal, a cruise terminal constructed by China Harbour Engineering Co., and a segment of a metro line by China Railway Tunnel Group Co.
In Latin America, Trump is seeking to revive the 200-year-old Monroe Doctrine. It states that Washington will not allow European powers to interfere in the Western Hemisphere as they had in colonial times, asserting that the region would be regarded as a sphere of US interest.
Trump used the doctrine as one of his justifications for bombing Venezuela and abducting its president, Nicholas Maduro, on 3 January.
The US president claimed that Maduro was hosting “foreign adversaries in our region” and acquired “menacing offensive weapons that could threaten U.S. interests and lives.”
Douglas Macgregor: Russia, China & Iran Seek to Contain U.S. Military
Glenn Diesen | February 4, 2026
Douglas Macgregor is a retired Colonel, combat veteran and former senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Col. Macgregor explains how the military adventures of the U.S. are incentivising greater military cooperation between Russia, China and Iran.
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Germany eyes military space spending splurge to counter ‘threats’ from Russia, China: Report
By Deng Xiaoci | Global Times | February 4, 2026
The head of German Space Command Michael Traut reportedly claimed that Germany is considering a 35 billion euro ($41 billion) military space push, including spy satellites, space planes and offensive lasers, citing so-called “threats” from Russia and China in orbit. Chinese analysts on Wednesday slammed the move as classic double standards and Cold War mentality, as it cites baseless China “threat” claims, while ignoring the fact that the US is the top driver of space militarization.
Speaking with Reuters on the sideline of a space event ahead of the Singapore Airshow, Traut claimed that the spending plan is “aimed at countering growing threats from Russia and China in orbit,” Reuters reported on Tuesday local time.
It is reported that Traut revealed that Germany will build an encrypted military constellation of more than 100 satellites, known as SATCOM Stage 4, over the next few years. He also claimed network would mirror the model used by the US Space Development Agency, which is described by the Reuters as “a Pentagon unit that deploys low-Earth-orbit satellites for communications and missile tracking.”
Chinese analysts pointed out that while turning a blind eye to the US, the main driver behind the militarization of outer space, Germany choses to hype a groundless space threat theory against China and Russia. This is a typical manifestation of deep-seated double standards and camp confrontation with Cold War mentality, analysts said.
This kind of double standard is blatantly obvious, military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times on Wednesday. “The US is currently the country that has deployed the most military offensive assets in space. Yet now, while Germany wants to imitate the US and do the same thing, it turns around and make baseless accusations against China and Russia. This is textbook double standards, Zhang criticized.
Notably, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has just expressively harped on the importance of “American space dominance,” and claimed that the US needs to “dominate the ultimate highground,” at Blue Origin rocket factory in Cape Canaveral, Florida, on US local time Monday, News Nation reported Tuesday.
Germany will channel funding into intelligence gathering satellites, sensors and systems designed to disrupt adversary spacecraft, including lasers and equipment capable of targeting ground-based infrastructure, Traut claimed in his interview with Reuters. He also pointed to so-called inspector satellites – small spacecraft capable of maneuvering close to other satellites – which he claimed Russia and China had already deployed.
Hype about the “China-Russia space threat” has become a form of political correctness among European countries. Regardless of the facts, they feel compelled to point the finger at China and Russia. As an established old-school Western power, Germany is no exception to this cliché, Song Zhongping, a military affairs expert, told the Global Times on Wednesday.
It must be emphasized that should this plan come to fruition, it would markedly heighten the intensity of the space arms race, Song noted.
Germany’s indigenous launch capabilities are woefully inadequate. If it turns to SpaceX’s Falcon 9 for these deployments, it would confirm Germany’s status as an immature and dependent space actor. Should it instead rely on foreign rocket systems, that reliance would primarily fall on the US – leaving Germany unable to shake off its profound strategic dependence on the US, Song warned.

