World on the verge of uncontrolled deployment of nuclear weapons in space
By Ahmed Adel | February 11, 2026
The militarization of space threatens to trigger a new global arms race and undermine stability and security. The world is already on the brink of uncontrolled deployment of nuclear forces and assets regarding American plans to establish dominance in space.
International law, especially the Soviet-American agreement of 1967, prohibits the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in space, as well as military activities in orbit, such as exercises and maneuvers. The agreement remains in place, but the issue of space militarization has resurfaced.
Although the law remains in effect and all space states are respecting it for now, other questions arise. When the United States asserted claims to space during Ronald Reagan’s administration (1981-1989) and began developing the concept of deploying missile defense in space, the Soviet Union responded by initiating the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987.
Perhaps most importantly, the Americans eventually suspended the program because missile defense assets were never deployed in space, and space activities by both the USSR and the US were limited to deploying satellites for missile launch warning, meaning satellites that track missiles over the territory of the Soviet Union and the US.
After that, a new phase started, not only in the militarization of space but also in the military-technical exploration of space. Now, reconnaissance satellites monitor Earth, along with communication satellites, including next-generation systems that provide broadband internet access.
The US and China are both actively involved in this, with large companies such as Elon Musk’s Starlink also participating in American projects. Meanwhile, Russia plans to develop its own satellite network by 2030, while China is rapidly deploying satellites in orbit for broadband internet.
It is precisely these systems that enable modern connectivity, battlefield communication, and control of unmanned aerial vehicles, which are currently being actively tested on the Ukrainian battlefield. The Americans started this with Ukraine, and now Russia is also actively using similar technologies.
In fact, this is the future. The next step for the Americans is the Golden Dome – an orbiting missile defense system. However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START) is no longer in force because the US declined to extend it.
Ultimately, extending the treaty in its current format has become nearly impossible, or at least very uncertain, because of the development of the Golden Dome system. This system does not align with either the current START or any future version of the treaty, or with any new nuclear security framework.
Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty remains formally observed, the absence of a new comprehensive agreement, such as a potential New START, creates opportunities for the US to conduct military activities in orbit. This could set a dangerous precedent and effectively undermine the existing international framework that, for decades, has prevented the direct militarization of space.
Over the past fifteen years, there have been heated debates about space and its militarization. The main reason is that the 1967 Treaty was mostly designed to ban nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, because there was a significant threat of nuclear weapons being deployed in orbit.
Today, however, attention is shifting toward the potential deployment of weapons that are not classified as weapons of mass destruction. In this context, in 2008, Russia proposed at the Conference on Disarmament a comprehensive ban on any weapons in space, including new systems like anti-satellite weapons, which can be used to forcibly disable the satellites of other countries.
The idea of formally establishing a comprehensive international ban on deploying any weapons in outer space has so far only remained at the discussion stage. No document entirely prohibits the deployment of weapons that are not classified as weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
Russia has already unilaterally pledged that it would not be the first to deploy weapons in space, during a period when these discussions were especially intense.
It is currently difficult to assess the extent to which the US is truly ready for this, as well as the extent to which the Golden Dome system is technically prepared for introduction into service. US President Donald Trump is consciously raising the stakes, seeking to draw Russia, China, and other key space powers not so much into an open arms race in space as into the process of forming and subsequently signing a new international agreement that would be based on American positions.
This means that if the US advances its positions, it would provide itself with a legal basis for deploying non-nuclear weapons systems in space, for example, anti-missile systems or other missile-defense-related weapons. How all this will ultimately fit within the new international legal framework remains uncertain.
In any case, the world needs an international instrument to regulate the deployment of weapons in space, a position Moscow has insisted on and promoted.
It is recalled that Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth stated in early February that the US must establish dominance in space, because, as he said, whoever controls the heights controls the battle, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously indicated that the US is actively working on deploying weapons in space and rejects Russia’s proposal to agree to abandon such activities, limiting itself only to opposing the deployment of nuclear weapons.
Moscow has repeatedly emphasized that Russia, together with other countries, including China, is committed to preventing an arms race in space.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
China’s new canal, Baltimore’s new bridge, and NYC’s wheelchair ramps: The GDP problem
Inside China Business | February 10, 2026
Why didn’t China protect Venezuela from the US?
Beijing is regrouping to adapt to the new hemispheric world order, but not retreating from Latin America
By Ladislav Zemánek | RT | February 9, 2026
The US military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026 – known as Operation Absolute Resolve – sent shockwaves far beyond Caracas. By striking targets in the Venezuelan capital and capturing President Nicolás Maduro, Washington signaled a decisive return to hard power in the Western hemisphere. The operation was not merely a tactical move against a hostile regime; it was a strategic message about influence, hierarchy, and control in the Americas. For China, which had invested heavily in Venezuela’s political and economic survival, the intervention raised immediate questions about the limits of its global reach and the evolving rules of great-power competition in an increasingly multipolar world.
China’s response to Operation Absolute Resolve was swift in tone but cautious in substance. Official statements from Beijing condemned the US action as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, framing it as destabilizing and emblematic of unilateral hegemony. Chinese foreign ministry officials repeatedly urged Washington to respect the UN Charter and cease interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs, positioning China as a defender of state sovereignty and multilateral norms.
Yet the rhetoric was not matched by escalation. Beijing avoided threats of retaliation or offers of direct military assistance to Caracas. Instead, it confined its response to diplomatic channels, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral sanctions, and issued travel advisories warning Chinese citizens to avoid Venezuela amid heightened instability. Chinese analysts emphasized that the priority was damage control: protecting long-standing economic and strategic interests without provoking a direct confrontation with US military power in the Western Hemisphere.
This measured reaction highlights a defining feature of China’s approach to Latin America. Beijing has pursued deep economic engagement and vocal support for sovereignty, but it has consistently avoided military competition with the US in a region where American power remains overwhelming. Operation Absolute Resolve exposed both the strengths and the limits of that strategy.
China’s relationship with the Maduro government was neither symbolic nor superficial. Over the past two decades, Venezuela emerged as one of Beijing’s most important partners in the Americas. In 2023, the two countries elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” China’s highest level of bilateral designation. This status reflected ambitions for durable cooperation across energy, finance, infrastructure, and political coordination, and placed Venezuela among a small circle of states Beijing regarded as strategically significant.
Chinese policy banks extended large-scale financing to Caracas, much of it structured as oil-backed loans that allowed Venezuela to maintain access to global markets despite US sanctions. Chinese companies became involved in energy projects, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, while bilateral trade expanded substantially. Venezuelan heavy crude, though difficult and expensive to refine, accounted for a meaningful share of China’s oil imports, contributing to Beijing’s broader strategy of supply diversification.
Security cooperation also developed, albeit cautiously. Venezuela became one of the largest buyers of Chinese military equipment in Latin America, and Chinese technicians gained access to satellite tracking facilities on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Beijing drew clear red lines. It avoided formal defense commitments, permanent troop deployments, or the establishment of military bases – signals that China did not seek to challenge US strategic primacy in the hemisphere.
Beijing’s interests in Venezuela extended well beyond oil and arms sales. The country served as a key node in China’s wider Latin American strategy, which emphasized infrastructure development, trade expansion, financial integration, political coordination, and cultural exchange within multilateral frameworks. This model sought to build influence through connectivity and economic interdependence rather than coercion or force, reinforcing China’s image as a development partner rather than a security patron.
The post-intervention reality, however, has significantly altered this equation. With Maduro removed from power, the US assumed effective control over Venezuela’s oil exports, redirecting revenues and setting the terms under which crude reaches global markets. While Washington has allowed China to continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, sales are now conducted strictly at market prices and under conditions that erode the preferential arrangements Beijing previously enjoyed. This shift directly affects China’s energy security calculations and weakens the leverage embedded in its oil-backed lending.
US control over oil flows also grants Washington influence over debt restructuring and creditor negotiations, potentially complicating China’s efforts to recover outstanding loans. The result is a sharp reduction in Beijing’s bargaining power in Caracas and a reassessment of the long-term viability of its investments. For China, the dilemma is acute: how to defend economic interests without crossing a strategic threshold that would invite confrontation with the US.
These developments align closely with the broader direction of US policy articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a core strategic priority and reflects a clear revival of Monroe Doctrine logic. It signals Washington’s determination to assert influence in the region and to limit the military, technological, and commercial presence of external powers – particularly China.
For Beijing, this creates a structural asymmetry. Decades of investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement cannot offset the reality of US military dominance in the Americas. China’s preferred toolkit – economic statecraft, infrastructure finance, and non-interference – faces inherent constraints when confronted with decisive uses of hard power. At the same time, Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and multilateralism continues to resonate with segments of Latin American political opinion that are wary of external intervention and eager to preserve strategic autonomy.
A comparison between US and Chinese strategies reveals different worldviews. The US approach, as outlined in the 2025 strategy, treats the hemisphere as a strategic space to be secured against external challengers through security partnerships, economic inducements, and military readiness. China’s approach prioritizes integration, development cooperation, and respect for national choice, relying on gradual influence rather than explicit enforcement.
Viewed through the lens of ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the transition to multipolarity, the Venezuelan episode marks a critical inflection point. The US has reasserted hemispheric dominance in unmistakable terms, while China has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its reach far from home.
China may well lose ground in Venezuela, but this does not necessarily signal retreat from the region. Instead, it suggests adaptation. Diversified partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico, along with continued engagement through trade and investment, offer alternative pathways forward. More broadly, the emergence of implicit spheres of influence may align with China’s interests elsewhere, particularly in Asia, where Beijing seeks greater recognition of its own strategic space.
In an international system increasingly defined by negotiated boundaries rather than universal dominance, both Washington and Beijing are testing how far their power extends – and where restraint becomes strategic. The outcome will shape not only Venezuela’s future, but also the evolving architecture of global order in a multipolar age.
Ladislav Zemánek is a non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club.
South American countries’ pragmatic reassessment of ties with China amid US hegemonism, protectionism
Global Times | February 8, 2026
A quiet but profound shift is reshaping the geopolitical map of South America, as revealed by an exclusive Reuters report, “Brazil signals new openness to Mercosur-China talks as Beijing seeks deeper ties”: For the first time, senior Brazilian officials are considering a push for a “partial” trade agreement between the Mercosur bloc and China.
This represents a major shift for Latin America’s largest economy. While Washington is busy raising tariffs and fortifying protectionist walls, countries in the Western hemisphere are recalculating their survival strategies. The result? A pragmatic reassessment of ties with Beijing.
We are already seeing the ripple effects of US pressure on neighbors like Mexico and Panama, but the shifting mood in the wider region is far more significant. The degree to which Latin American nations are pivoting is directly correlated to the economic squeeze they feel from the North.
Mercosur is the customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and newcomers Bolivia and Venezuela (currently a suspended member).
For decades, Brazil acted as the bloc’s protectionist “gatekeeper” against Chinese influence. Fearing that its domestic manufacturing sector would be hollowed out by Asian imports, Brasília consistently vetoed formal negotiations with Beijing. However, what Reuters describes as a “new global scenario” is forcing a change. This is a diplomatic euphemism for a stark reality: the rise of US protectionism coupled with the undeniable allure of Chinese opportunity. Facing the headwinds of American unilateralism, Brazil has done the math. Traditional allies offer no alternative market access, only higher tariff barriers.
Meanwhile, however, China is not only offering a market but also bringing tangible industrial investment, from BYD to Great Wall Motor. When Washington offers only sticks without carrots, Brazil has little choice but to turn toward a pragmatic East. Uruguay’s president, who recently visited China with a large business delegation to demand faster trade talks, is a clear testament to this regional impatience.
Historically, a Mercosur-China deal was viewed as “mission impossible” due to the bloc’s Common External Tariff rules, which forbid members from negotiating individual trade deals. Politics also posed a formidable barrier. Paraguay, a member of Mercosur, maintains “diplomatic ties” with China’s Taiwan region, creating a legal deadlock to any comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Beijing under the one-China principle.
Furthermore, Argentina’s political pendulum – swinging from protectionist Peronism to Javier Milei’s pro-US stance – has made a unified strategy difficult.
This is why the proposed “partial agreement” is a masterstroke of political pragmatism. It serves as a strategic bypass around these obstacles.
Unlike a full FTA targeting zero tariffs, a partial deal sidesteps the sensitive issue of tariff reduction that terrifies Brazilian manufacturers. It also navigates around Paraguay’s diplomatic dilemma. Instead, it would focus on non-tariff barriers, such as harmonizing sanitary regulations, streamlining customs procedures and setting import quotas.
By shifting the focus from tariffs to regulatory cooperation, Brazil is doing more than just clearing the path for soy and iron ore. It is paving the way for deeper integration of Chinese capital.
The China-Brazil relationship has already evolved from simple trade to manufacturing. With Chinese EV makers taking over shuttered Ford factories in Bahia, the two economies are moving toward supply chain symbiosis. This partial agreement could provide the institutional framework needed to secure those investments.
From a macro perspective, this is a snapshot of the Global South’s increasing autonomy. If these talks proceed, they will mark the opening of a new path – one where pragmatism supersedes ideology.
This serves as a stark reminder to policymakers in Washington: trying to block economic gravity with pressure tactics often accelerates the search for new partners. The shifting winds in South America are not merely a passive reaction to fading hegemony; they represent an active and powerful response from nations determined to define their own economic destiny.
China’s top universities are opening to foreign students. That’s a big problem for US schools.
Inside China Business | February 4, 2026
Chinese universities dominate the global rankings in hard sciences, Engineering, and Computer Science. Many of them now accept international students, and are marketing their schools in foreign countries. US schools already face serious financial challenges, from the steep decline in international student enrollment. Foreign families typically pay full tuition and room and board, and American colleges rely on those higher fees. Chinese universities pose an existential problem, going forward. They are qualitatively superior, even in Western surveys. And the over cost of attendance is a mere tenth of going to a top American program. Closing scene, Shanghai Container Port
Resources and links: Mapped: How China Overtook the U.S. in Global Trade (2000–2024) https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/h…
Fewer international students are enrolling at U.S. colleges, which could cost the country $1 billion, reports find https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/30/inter…
The College Conundrum: Chasing International Students And Full-Pay Families https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottwhi…
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) https://stubard.com/blog/admission/be…
Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) https://apply.china-admissions.com/un…
Best Global Universities for Engineering https://www.usnews.com/education/best…
Best Global Universities for Computer Science https://www.usnews.com/education/best…
International college students bring billions to the US. Here’s why that may change. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/e…
U.S. Economy Could Suffer a $7 Billion Loss from Precipitous Drop in International Students https://www.nafsa.org/about/about-naf…
Beijing cancels Panama deals after court blocks Chinese port operations
The Cradle | February 5, 2026
Chinese authorities have asked state-owned companies to suspend talks on new projects in Panama, in response to the Central American nation’s cancellation of a contract with China’s CK Hutchison Holdings to operate two ports along its strategic canal, Bloomberg reported on 5 February.
According to sources familiar with the matter, Panama’s decision could jeopardize billions of dollars in potential Chinese investments.
Chinese authorities also asked shipping companies to consider rerouting goods through other ports if the extra cost is not prohibitive, and have stepped up inspections of Panamanian imports, such as bananas and coffee.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian issued a statement saying that the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling “ignores the facts, violates credibility,” while harming the interests of Chinese companies.
Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison responded to the Supreme Court decision by initiating international arbitration proceedings against Panama.
CK Hutchison has operated Panama’s Cristobal and Balboa ports for decades. The ports lie at opposite ends of the Panama Canal – the strategic waterway that connects the Pacific and Caribbean Oceans, and through which roughly three percent of global seaborne trade passes.
The move comes amid US President Donald Trump’s campaign to counter Chinese influence over strategic infrastructure in the Americas.
Following his election last year, Trump argued that it was “foolish” of the US to hand over control of the canal to Panama. The US built the canal in 1904 and handed it back to Panamanians nearly a century later, in 1999.
Trump has also complained about the fees Panama charges the US to use the waterway.
Amid pressure from Washington, Panama also withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in February last year.
At the time, Beijing stated it “firmly opposes the United States using pressure and coercion to smear and undermine Belt and Road cooperation. The US side’s attacks … once again expose its hegemonic nature.”
Twenty Latin American nations have participated in the BRI since Beijing initiated it in 2013.
Current Chinese infrastructure projects in Panama include a $1.4-billion bridge over the canal, a cruise terminal constructed by China Harbour Engineering Co., and a segment of a metro line by China Railway Tunnel Group Co.
In Latin America, Trump is seeking to revive the 200-year-old Monroe Doctrine. It states that Washington will not allow European powers to interfere in the Western Hemisphere as they had in colonial times, asserting that the region would be regarded as a sphere of US interest.
Trump used the doctrine as one of his justifications for bombing Venezuela and abducting its president, Nicholas Maduro, on 3 January.
The US president claimed that Maduro was hosting “foreign adversaries in our region” and acquired “menacing offensive weapons that could threaten U.S. interests and lives.”
Douglas Macgregor: Russia, China & Iran Seek to Contain U.S. Military
Glenn Diesen | February 4, 2026
Douglas Macgregor is a retired Colonel, combat veteran and former senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Col. Macgregor explains how the military adventures of the U.S. are incentivising greater military cooperation between Russia, China and Iran.
Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen:
- Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/
- X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen
- Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen
Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen:
- PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen
- Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng
- Go Fund Me: https://gofund.me/09ea012f
Germany eyes military space spending splurge to counter ‘threats’ from Russia, China: Report
By Deng Xiaoci | Global Times | February 4, 2026
The head of German Space Command Michael Traut reportedly claimed that Germany is considering a 35 billion euro ($41 billion) military space push, including spy satellites, space planes and offensive lasers, citing so-called “threats” from Russia and China in orbit. Chinese analysts on Wednesday slammed the move as classic double standards and Cold War mentality, as it cites baseless China “threat” claims, while ignoring the fact that the US is the top driver of space militarization.
Speaking with Reuters on the sideline of a space event ahead of the Singapore Airshow, Traut claimed that the spending plan is “aimed at countering growing threats from Russia and China in orbit,” Reuters reported on Tuesday local time.
It is reported that Traut revealed that Germany will build an encrypted military constellation of more than 100 satellites, known as SATCOM Stage 4, over the next few years. He also claimed network would mirror the model used by the US Space Development Agency, which is described by the Reuters as “a Pentagon unit that deploys low-Earth-orbit satellites for communications and missile tracking.”
Chinese analysts pointed out that while turning a blind eye to the US, the main driver behind the militarization of outer space, Germany choses to hype a groundless space threat theory against China and Russia. This is a typical manifestation of deep-seated double standards and camp confrontation with Cold War mentality, analysts said.
This kind of double standard is blatantly obvious, military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times on Wednesday. “The US is currently the country that has deployed the most military offensive assets in space. Yet now, while Germany wants to imitate the US and do the same thing, it turns around and make baseless accusations against China and Russia. This is textbook double standards, Zhang criticized.
Notably, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has just expressively harped on the importance of “American space dominance,” and claimed that the US needs to “dominate the ultimate highground,” at Blue Origin rocket factory in Cape Canaveral, Florida, on US local time Monday, News Nation reported Tuesday.
Germany will channel funding into intelligence gathering satellites, sensors and systems designed to disrupt adversary spacecraft, including lasers and equipment capable of targeting ground-based infrastructure, Traut claimed in his interview with Reuters. He also pointed to so-called inspector satellites – small spacecraft capable of maneuvering close to other satellites – which he claimed Russia and China had already deployed.
Hype about the “China-Russia space threat” has become a form of political correctness among European countries. Regardless of the facts, they feel compelled to point the finger at China and Russia. As an established old-school Western power, Germany is no exception to this cliché, Song Zhongping, a military affairs expert, told the Global Times on Wednesday.
It must be emphasized that should this plan come to fruition, it would markedly heighten the intensity of the space arms race, Song noted.
Germany’s indigenous launch capabilities are woefully inadequate. If it turns to SpaceX’s Falcon 9 for these deployments, it would confirm Germany’s status as an immature and dependent space actor. Should it instead rely on foreign rocket systems, that reliance would primarily fall on the US – leaving Germany unable to shake off its profound strategic dependence on the US, Song warned.
Focus on Panama’s ‘port case’ must not be misplaced
Global Times | February 3, 2026
Since the Supreme Court of Panama ruled that CK Hutchison’s concession contract to operate Panama Canal ports was “unconstitutional,” the most elated individuals over the past few days have undoubtedly been certain US politicians and media outlets. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly posted on social media that the US is “encouraged,” while some American media outlets claimed this marks a “major victory” for Washington in curbing Chinese influence. The Wall Street Journal even issued a blunt threat, stating that other countries “might re-examine their ties to the world’s second-biggest economy.”
The cries of “victory” coming from the US confirm widespread outside suspicions and further expose Washington’s hegemonic arrogance in using geopolitical means to interfere with commercial cooperation and undermine trade rules. Although the US formally handed over control of the Panama Canal in 1999, in Washington’s Cold War mentality, this area remains an “inner lake” that others are not allowed to touch. The US has repeatedly expressed desire to “retake control of the Canal,” and Secretary of State Rubio chose Panama for his first overseas visit, threatening the country that it “must reduce Chinese influence.” Therefore, when the Supreme Court of Panama issued its so-called ruling, it is difficult for the international public opinion not to question its independence.
However, if one follows Washington’s rhythm and views this turmoil through the lens of “US-China competition,” they fall into a cognitive trap set by the US, and the focus on this matter becomes misplaced. These ports have never been, and should never be, bargaining chips in a geopolitical game. In fact, CK Hutchison has operated these ports for nearly 30 years; in such a long span of time, where has there ever been a shadow of a “Chinese threat”?
On the contrary, under the company’s management, these ports have been developed, benefiting the local area and contributing to global free trade. In this process, the US itself has been one of the beneficiaries. Therefore, regarding the attention on Panama’s port operation rights, if one must talk about winners and losers, the core should lie in the contest between free trade and hegemonism, and the confrontation between the spirit of contract and power politics.
Whether it is the ports along the Panama Canal, Australia’s Darwin Port mired in controversy, or the case of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the same “invisible hand” looms in the background. Some countries repeatedly claim to uphold a “rules-based order”; yet in practice, what they defend is an “order based on the interests of a single country.” This is, in essence, a targeted demolition of global investment credibility. If commercial contracts can be nullified at the whim of politicians or under pressure from allies, then no long-term investment within the Western system is truly safe. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, global investors are watching closely, asking whether today’s rapacious acts will tomorrow descend upon any profitable industry.
International investment law does indeed recognize “security exceptions,” but these are by no means a universal master key for hegemonism. The core of international commercial law is certainty: companies that operate in compliance with the rules deserve the protection of the law. By using diplomatic coercion to push allies into rulings that defy legal principles, the US is eroding from within the very credit foundations on which the capitalist world depends. In the short term, Washington may have secured a few “strategic footholds”; however, in the long term, this has fundamentally undermined the international credibility of the US and the space for transnational commercial interactions. It is foreseeable that when the law ceases to be a fair arbiter and becomes a political tool, global capital will have to seek safe havens independent of the dollar system and the US “long-arm” influence.
What is even more concerning to the international community is that the geopolitical will of the US often surpasses the constitutions of some sovereign nations. This is a mockery of the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. From the case of Alstom years ago to the current controversy over Darwin Port, the methods used by the US to attack competitors and seize interests are strikingly similar. The international business community needs a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment, not a “law of the jungle” dominated by hegemonic will. If this trend of politicizing economic and trade issues and weaponizing legal tools continues unchecked, the ultimate victim will be the entire international economic and trade order. Those who attempt to curb their rivals by undermining the rules will also find themselves facing a bankruptcy of credibility.
As an important maritime passage that carries about 5 percent of global shipping trade, the Panama Canal ports have become a crucial cargo hub on a global scale, and they should not waver under the shadow of hegemonism. According to reports, concessions for the Panama Canal ports will now need to be auctioned off.
In this context, it is hoped that the Panamanian side will truly demonstrate its “independence” by providing a predictable environment for fair competition for all bidders, rather than trying by any means to “ensure that China is blocked from the bidding” as some US media outlets have trumpeted. The whole world is watching everything that happens there.
US traders struggling to find buyers for Venezuelan oil, as China shifts supply chain to Canada
Inside China Business | February 2, 2026
Following the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry, commodities trading firms were given contracts to market the crude to buyers across the world, including to China. But Venezuelan crude oil is now being sold at far higher prices than before, with the profits routed through US companies and energy traders. The higher prices have pushed Chinese refiners out of the market for the heavy crude from Venezuela, and they are shifting their orders to Canada, Russia, and Iran. Canadian tar sands oil is more expensive than Venezuelan heavy sour, but is similar, and offers far shorter transit times and lower shipping costs. Chinese energy traders have been instructed to refuse new offers for Venezuelan crude. Closing scene, Wulingyuan, Hunan Resources and links:
Reuters, Vitol, Trafigura offer Venezuelan oil to Indian, Chinese refiners for March delivery, sources say https://www.reuters.com/business/ener…
China replaces US barrels with crude from Canada https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/tan…
Trump’s Venezuela oil grab is pushing Chinese refiners to Canada (Not paywalled) https://calgaryherald.com/business/tr…
Reuters Exclusive: PetroChina holds off from buying Venezuelan oil marketed under US control, sources say https://www.reuters.com/business/ener…
Bloomberg, Trump’s Venezuela Oil Grab Pushes Chinese Refiners to Canada https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl…
Trump administration demands Venezuela cut ties with US adversaries to resume oil production https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/07/politi…
Iran, China and Russia sign trilateral strategic pact
By Ranjan Solomon | MEMO | January 29, 2026
In a dramatic geopolitical development this afternoon, Iran, China and Russia formally signed a comprehensive strategic pact, marking one of the most consequential shifts in 21st-century international relations. While the full text of the agreement is being released in stages by the three governments, state media in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have acknowledged the ceremony and described it as a cornerstone for a new multipolar order.
The pact comes against the backdrop of decades of growing cooperation between these three states. Iran and Russia earlier concluded a 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty designed to deepen economic, political, and defence ties, and to blunt the impact of Western sanctions — a treaty that was signed in January 2025 and entered into force last year. Meanwhile, Iran and China have been bound by a 25-year cooperation agreement first signed in 2021, aimed at expanding trade, infrastructure, and energy integration.
What makes today’s signing significantly different, and newsworthy, is that it explicitly combines the three powers in a coordinated framework, aligning them on issues ranging from nuclear sovereignty and economic cooperation to military coordination and diplomatic strategy.
Officials in Tehran described the pact as a joint commitment to “mutual respect, sovereign independence and a rules-based international system that rejects unilateral coercion,” echoing similar statements issued by Beijing and Moscow.
What the pact represents
This agreement does not – at least from the initial public texts – constitute a formal mutual defence treaty akin to NATO’s Article 5, obligating one to defend the others militarily. Past pacts between Iran and Russia always carefully stopped short of a binding defence guarantee. Instead, the pact appears to link three major powers in a broader geopolitical coalition defined by shared opposition to Western military dominance and economic coercion.
Central to the agreement is a unified stance against reimposition of sanctions on Iran tied to its nuclear programme under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have previously issued joint statements rejecting European attempts to trigger “snapback” sanctions, and have declared the UN Security Council’s considerations of the nuclear deal terminated.
This trilateral pact is therefore as much about diplomatic leverage and strategic narrative as it is about concrete defence or economic mechanisms.
Immediate regional and global consequences
The pact’s signing coincides with heightened tensions between the United States and Iran. President Donald Trump has reiterated threats of military action against Iran absent a negotiated settlement on its nuclear activities, even deploying a US carrier strike group to the Middle East theatre. Against that backdrop, this new strategic pact serves both Tehran and its partners as a buffer against unilateral US military pressure. By presenting a united front, the three governments aim to compel Washington to negotiate from a position of constraint rather than dominance.
For the Middle East, the balance of power is reshaping. Iran, long isolated by Western policies — now claims the protection of two permanent members of the UN Security Council. This will embolden Tehran’s regional posture in theatres such as Iraq, Syria and the Persian Gulf, and complicate conventional deterrence strategies exercised by the United States and its Gulf allies.
For Europe, the pact undercuts Brussels’ ambitions to retain independent influence in Middle Eastern diplomacy. European powers have repeatedly attempted to revive elements of the JCPOA and threaten punitive measures against Tehran, but coordination by Iran, China and Russia has thwarted those efforts, exposing Europe’s diplomatic limitations in a world less anchored to Western consensus.
Economic repercussions
Economically, the deal signals deeper integration among three of the world’s most significant non-Western economies. Russia and China have already worked on investment protection and bilateral trade agreements designed to sidestep Western financial systems, such as SWIFT, which have been used as vectors for sanctions. A trilateral pact potentially accelerates the creation of alternative financial mechanisms and trade routes that further bleed Western economic leverage.
Iran — sitting on vast energy resources — gains broader access to markets and investment, especially as China continues its Belt and Road initiatives and Russia seeks alternatives to sanctions-laden European markets. In combination, these developments portend increased trade flows and reduced vulnerability to the US dollar-centric financial system.
Military and strategic dynamics
Although not a formal alliance, the pact strengthens military cooperation among the trio. China and Russia have conducted regular joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean and Gulf waters — exercises that Iran has participated in as well, signalling interoperability and shared security interests.
Strategically, the pact will likely lead to more coordinated defence planning and intelligence sharing, even if it stops short of a binding treaty that compels military intervention. For the United States and NATO partners, this raises the stakes in multiple regions: any escalation with Iran now risks broader strategic responses involving Beijing and Moscow, increasing the threshold for conflict and reducing the effectiveness of unilateral threats.
Longer-term global impact
In the long term, the pact accelerates the multipolar restructuring of international relations. For decades, the United States and its allies have dominated the architecture of global governance — from trade regimes to security pacts. A structured alignment of Iran, China and Russia signifies an alternative axis that challenges Western hegemony not through ideological competition but through pragmatic power balances.
Whether this pact evolves into a deeper defence agreement, or stays as a diplomatic and strategic framework, remains to be seen. What is indisputable is that the world’s power centre is shifting — not towards a simple “East vs West” dichotomy, but towards a more contested, multipolar world order where diplomatic leverage, economic resilience and military signalling converge in new and unpredictable ways.
Fānpán – Is China Turning the Tables on the ‘Democratic’ West?
By Mats Nilsson | 21st Century Wire | January 29, 2026
As a European born analyst with a realist mindset, I was, if not surprised, at least slightly intrigued when I read that China feels freer than Germany in the Era of Xi Jinping’s reforms.
In a world where narratives about freedom and authoritarianism are often painted in stark black and white, the words of Ai Weiwei, one of China’s, in the West most prominent dissident artists, have sent shockwaves through the European cultural scene, hurting our self-image. Ai, known for his bold critiques of the Chinese government, his iconic installations like the “Sunflower Seeds” at Tate Modern, and his 81-day detention in 2011, has long been a symbol of resistance against perceived oppression in his homeland. Yet, after a decade in exile, living primarily in Germany, Ai’s recent return visit to China has led him to a startling conclusion: Beijing now feels “more humane” than Berlin, and Germany, once renown for its liberalism, comes across as “insecure and unfree.” This perspective, shared in a candid interview with the German newspaper Berliner Zeitung following his trip, challenges entrenched stereotypes and invites a deeper examination of how societal freedoms are experienced in daily life, in Europe of today.
Ai’s statements are not mere embellishment; they stem from personal encounters that highlight bureaucratic inefficiencies, social isolation, and institutional irrationality in the West, contrasted with the efficiency and warmth he rediscovered in China. But what underpins this shift? A closer look reveals that Ai’s observations align closely with the sweeping reforms outlined by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his seminal works, particularly the multi-volume series Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. These books, which compile Xi’s speeches, writings, and policy directives, emphasize streamlining governance, enhancing people’s livelihoods, and fostering a “people-centered” development model. Under Xi’s leadership since 2012, China has undergone transformations that prioritize efficiency, anti-corruption, and social harmony; elements that Ai implicitly praises through his anecdotes.
When I read about Ai’s new insights, and tying them to Xi’s reforms, I can suddenly argue that in practical terms, China may indeed offer a form of freedom that eludes many in the West today.
Weiwei’s story is one of displacement. Born in 1957, he grew up amid the tumult of the Cultural Revolution, with his father, the poet Ai Qing, exiled to a labor camp. Ai himself rose to global fame through art that critiqued power structures, such as his investigation into the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which exposed local government negligence in school collapses. His activism led to clashes with Chinese authorities, culminating in his 2011 arrest on charges of tax evasion, a move in the West widely seen as politically motivated.
Released but stripped of his passport until 2015, Ai fled to Germany, where he was granted asylum and continued his work from Berlin and later Portugal. For ten years, Ai immersed himself in European life, producing art that often lambasted both Chinese and Western hypocrisies. Yet, his return visit to China in late 2025 marked a pivotal moment.
In the Berliner Zeitung interview, Ai describes Beijing not as the oppressive dystopia of Western media portrayals but as “a broken jade being perfectly reassembled.” He reports feeling no fear upon arrival, a stark contrast to his past experiences. Instead, he encountered a society that felt vibrant and accessible. “Perfectly ordinary people from at least five different professions lined up, hoping to meet me,” Ai recounts, highlighting a social openness that he found lacking in Germany.
This warmth, Ai suggests, extends to everyday interactions. In Germany, he laments, “almost no one has ever invited me to their home. Neighbors from above or below exchange at most a brief nod.” Such isolation, he argues, contributes to a sense of precariousness in Western societies. In China, by contrast, the immediate eagerness of strangers to connect reflects a cultural and social fabric that prioritizes community over individualism; a theme echoed in Xi’s reforms.
This also touches on the issue of bureaucracy and freedom. At the heart of Ai’s critique is the suffocating bureaucracy he encountered in Europe, which he claims makes daily life “at least ten times” more difficult than in China. A poignant example is his experience with banking. Upon returning to China, Ai reactivated a dormant bank account in mere minutes, discovering it still held “a considerable sum of money.” This seamless process stands in sharp relief to his ordeals in the West: “In Germany, my bank accounts were closed twice. And not just mine, but my girlfriend’s as well. In Switzerland, I was refused an account at the country’s largest bank, and another bank later closed my account there as well.”
Ai describes these incidents as “extraordinarily complicated and often irrational,” hinting at possible political motivations or overzealous compliance with anti-money laundering regulations that disproportionately affect outspoken figures like himself, and just recently struck US analyst and author Scott Ritter.
This disparity underscores a broader point about freedom: while Western democracies trumpet abstract rights like free speech, the practical exercise of freedom is often hampered by bureaucratic hindrances. In Germany, a country renowned for its efficiency in engineering, the administrative state can feel labyrinthine. Opening a bank account, registering a residence, or navigating healthcare requires layers of documentation, appointments, and verifications that can take weeks or months. Ai’s account stems from “de-risking” practices, where banks sever ties with high-profile clients to avoid regulatory government scrutiny; practices that have over the last four years intensified in Europe amid geopolitical tensions.
In contrast, China’s banking system under Xi has embraced digital innovation to enhance accessibility. Xi’s The Governance of China (Volume I, 2014) outlines reforms to modernize financial services, emphasizing “inclusive finance” to ensure even remote or dormant accounts remain functional. Through initiatives like the widespread adoption of mobile payment platforms such as WeChat Pay China has reduced bureaucratic hurdles, allowing transactions and account management to occur instantaneously via smartphones. Ai’s quick reactivation exemplifies this: no endless forms, no interrogations; just efficiency. This aligns with Xi’s push for “streamlining administration and delegating power,” a key reform pillar aimed at cutting red tape and boosting economic vitality.
Xi’s books repeatedly stress that true freedom emerges from governance that serves the people. In The Governance of China (Volume II, 2017), he discusses anti-corruption campaigns that have purged inefficiencies and graft from institutions, including banks. Since 2012, over 1.5 million officials have been disciplined, fostering a cleaner, more responsive system. This has translated into practical freedoms: the ability to access services without fear of arbitrary denial. Ai’s experience suggests that in China, freedom is not just rhetorical but operational, free from the “cold, rational, and deeply bureaucratic” constraints he felt in Germany.
Xi’s people-centered approach finds confirmation in Ai’s assertion that Beijing’s political climate feels “more natural and humane” than Germany’s. This in my humble view, points toward a deeper cultural and policy shift. Ai portrays Germany as a place where individuals feel “confined and precarious,” struggling under the weight of historical guilt and future uncertainties. This resonates with critiques of Western societies, where economic inequality, rising populism, and social fragmentation have eroded communal bonds. In Europe, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with energy crises and migration debates, has heightened a sense of insecurity. Ai’s social isolation in Germany, minimal neighborly interactions, mirrors surveys showing increasing loneliness in Western nations.
China, under Xi, has pursued a different path. Xi’s reforms, as detailed in The Governance of China (Volume III, 2020), prioritize “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” emphasizing social harmony and collective well-being. This includes massive poverty alleviation efforts, lifting nearly 100 million people out of extreme poverty by 2021: a feat Xi describes as ensuring “no one is left behind.”
Such policies foster a society where, as Ai observed in his interview, ordinary people eagerly engage with others, creating a humane environment. Moreover, Xi’s focus on cultural confidence has revitalized community ties. In Volume IV (2023), he advocates for “socialist core values” like civility and harmony, which manifest in everyday life through neighborhood committees, volunteer networks, and cultural events. Ai’s warm reception upon return; people from various professions seeking him out, reflects this. It’s a far cry from the European atomized individualism, where privacy norms can border on alienation.
Critics might argue that China’s harmony comes at the cost of dissent, pointing to tightened controls on expression under Xi. Yet, Ai’s lack of fear during his visit suggests a nuance: while political criticism remains sensitive, daily freedoms, economic mobility, social interaction, access to services, have expanded. Xi’s reforms include “rule of law” initiatives, with over 300 laws revised since 2012 to protect individual rights in non-political spheres. This “selective freedom” may feel more liberating in practice than the West’s more abstract liberties of today.
One must also consider China’s economic transformations in this aspect. Xi’s books outline the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation through innovation-driven growth. Reforms like the Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation strategy have bolstered domestic resilience, reducing reliance on Western systems that Ai found unreliable. Xi critiques European protectionism in his writings, advocating for open economies. Ironically, Ai, once a Western darling, now embodies the pitfalls of this approach, his accounts closed perhaps due to his Chinese ties, highlighting how geopolitical insecurities undermine personal freedoms. In China, Xi’s anti-corruption drive has stabilized institutions, ensuring accounts like Ai’s remain intact despite dormancy. This stability contributes to the “unfree” feeling Ai ascribes to Germany, which he says, “plays the role of an insecure and unfree country, struggling to find its position between history and future.”
Xi’s reforms, by contrast, position China as forward-looking, with policies like the 14th Five-Year Plan emphasizing high-quality development and environmental sustainability, creating a sense of progress and security.
So, in conclusion, Weiwei’s reflections serve as a mirror—forcing the West to confront its own contradictions. Germany, with its history of division and reunification, symbolizes the democratic triumph, and yet, Ai’s experiences reveal cracks: overregulation, social coldness, and institutional paranoia.
This isn’t unique to Germany or the EU; similar issues plague the U.S. and U.K., where bureaucratic hurdles in immigration, healthcare, and finance frustrate citizens. Xi’s governance model offers an alternative: efficiency through centralization, humaneness through collectivism. While not without flaws, critics note surveillance and censorship, and so Ai’s endorsement suggests that for many, China’s system delivers tangible freedoms. His words directly challenge the binary of “free West vs. authoritarian East,” urging a reevaluation based on lived realities. Ai Weiwei’s declaration that China feels more humane and freer than Germany isn’t a reversal of his principles, but an evolution based on experience. It underscores the success of Xi Jinping’s reforms in creating a society where bureaucracy recedes, community thrives, and daily life flows unencumbered. As the world grapples with uncertainty, perhaps the West can learn from China’s jade-like reassembly, piecing together a more practical freedom for all?
Author Mats Nilsson LL.M is political analyst and legal historian based in Sweden. See more of his work at The Dissident Club on Substack.
