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China Voices Opposition to Unilateral Sanctions, Rejects US’ Anti-Russia Restrictions

Sputnik – 17.11.2025

BEIJING – Beijing consistently opposes unilateral sanctions not approved by the UN Security Council, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said, commenting on the US bill regarding sanctions on countries cooperating with Russia.

“China has consistently opposed unilateral sanctions that have no basis in international law and are not sanctioned by the UN Security Council,” Mao told reporters.

Earlier in the day, US President Donald Trump commented on the bill to tighten sanctions against Russia, declaring that any country that cooperates with Russia will be subject to severe sanctions, and Iran may be added to the same bill.

US President Donald Trump told reporters that Republicans were introducing very tough legislation to slap sanctions on any country doing business with Russia. He added that Iran might be included as well, noting that he had suggested it, and said that any country engaging economically with Russia would face severe penalties.

November 17, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

In Busan, China did not just stand firm—it watched America blink

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 16, 2025

Beyond the optics of handshakes and photo-ops at the Busan summit, the much-hyped Trump–Xi meeting laid bare the paradox that defines US–China relations today: deep economic interdependence coupled with unrelenting strategic rivalry.

Washington’s fear of Beijing’s ascent—and Beijing’s determination to rewrite the terms of global power—mean that even when the two leaders talk of “cooperation,” they are really negotiating the limits of competition. Far from heralding a new détente, the Busan meeting merely pressed pause on a conflict too entrenched to be resolved by diplomatic theatre.

The Summit of Distrust

At the Busan meeting, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping announced a limited set of economic and diplomatic understandings aimed at easing immediate tensions without altering the fundamentals of their rivalry. The U.S. agreed to reduce certain tariffs on Chinese imports, while China pledged to resume large-scale purchases of American agricultural products and to delay the expansion of its rare-earth export controls. Both sides promised greater cooperation on curbing fentanyl precursor exports and maintaining stable supply chains, and they reaffirmed the need to prevent escalation in trade and technology disputes.

While the Busan deal was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough, it exposed a deeper void: there is still no framework for strategic coexistence between Washington and Beijing. The reason is simple—there is no trust. Beijing knows that under Donald Trump, U.S. foreign policy swings between confrontation and concession, depending on the political winds. And despite years of tariffs and rhetoric, Trump’s trade war has failed to dent China’s global standing. If anything, Beijing has learned how to weaponize US vulnerabilities. By withholding soybean purchases and rare-earth exports, it extracted precisely what it wanted in Busan: a rollback of select tariffs and a pause on new export controls. The so-called “agreement” restored the status quo—China promised to resume buying soybeans, a gesture aimed squarely at Trump’s Midwestern base, while deferring for a year the rare-earth restrictions that Washington fears most. The optics looked like cooperation; the substance showed who really dictated the terms.

Therefore, the Busan summit was less a diplomatic reset than a reckoning for Washington—a reminder of how limited its leverage over Beijing has become. After years of tariffs and bluster, the US has discovered that China can absorb the pain, reroute its exports across Asia, and keep its economy humming. The numbers tell the story: China’s trade surplus this year is projected to exceed last year’s record levels, and its stock market has surged more than 30 per cent in dollar terms, even as US inflation, stoked by tariff pressures, hit an election-year high of 3 per cent. Beijing has not only weathered the storm but also turned it into a strategy. By weaponising its $12 billion soybean market and dangling rare-earth supplies, China forced Washington into a truce on its own terms. In Busan, it wasn’t China that blinked.

Who will blink next?

The real question after Busan is not whether the US and China will clash again, but who will blink first. Washington’s arsenal of tariffs and tech bans is running up against the limits of its own economic pain threshold, while Beijing’s state-driven resilience is tested. Trump’s “America First” protectionism, fueled as it is by an aggressive form of politics, may soothe his domestic base, but it erodes US influence among allies, both in Europe and in Southeast Asia, who now see a power more obsessed with trade deficits than offering and/or providing strategic leadership. China, meanwhile, is playing a longer game: tightening regional supply chains, expanding the yuan’s footprint, and anchoring new trade corridors from Asia to Africa. Both sides are recalibrating rather than retreating, but the advantage increasingly lies with the player who can endure short-term costs for long-term control. If Busan revealed anything, it is that China is betting on (growing) American fatigue while America is still betting on Chinese collapse, which remains an unlikely event to take place even in the distant future.

In the end, Busan revealed not a reset but a reckoning: China has learned to endure pressure, while America has learned the limits of its own leverage. The US–China rivalry is now a contest of stamina, not ideology, in which Beijing appears better equipped to play the long game. With expanding regional trade networks, a growing technological base, and a much better, state-driven, and state-backed capacity to absorb external shocks, China has turned resilience into a strategy. Washington, by contrast, remains trapped between domestic populism and global ambition, unable to sustain confrontation without hurting itself. Busan showed that when forced to choose between economic pain and political optics, it is the US that blinks first. Therefore, what Washington can learn is this: in this rivalry of endurance, China’s patience—not America’s pressure—may prove decisive. The sooner it learns this lesson, the less it will hurt itself.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

November 16, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Ansar Allah official slams UN sanctions, West’s double standards

Al Mayadeen | November 15, 2025

Mohammed al-Farah, a member of the Political Bureau of Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, commented on the recent UN Security Council decision to extend sanctions on Yemen, stating that Yemen would respond in kind to anyone who attacks its people’s interests or attempts to undermine its sovereignty.

He emphasized, in this context, that Yemenis will not hesitate to defend their rights, religion, and national dignity by all legitimate means.

In a post on X, al-Farah accused the Security Council of perpetuating “the worst example of double standards,” noting that it has long turned a blind eye to crimes of genocide in Gaza, even supporting “Israel” while ignoring the bloodshed, and covering up the blockade and aggression against Yemen without any moral or legal stance.

He continued, saying the council “continues to apply double standards while Gaza is being devastated under two years of bombing and blockade with US and Western weapons,” reminding how “Yemen has been under siege for a decade.”

Al-Farah described the council as a platform for advancing Western interests, where “human rights are defined only as Western human rights and international interests are reduced to those of Washington alone.”

NGOs; culprits in espionage operations in Yemen

The Ansar Allah official also warned that some NGOs operating in Yemen have engaged in “dangerous practices”, including espionage on behalf of “Israel” under the guise of humanitarian work, exposing what he called the extent of “Zionist exploitation of UN institutions.”

Al-Farah, however, praised Russia and China for refusing to renew sanctions on Yemen, contrasting their stance with what he described as the “moral failure” of the UN Security Council. He said Moscow and Beijing’s positions reflect a “humanitarian and ethical awakening” and awareness of the dangers of US policies that use sanctions to subjugate nations.

At the same time, he expressed hope that Russia and China’s position would amount to a definitive rejection and veto of the resolution, describing it as a stand that “rejects the exploitation of the Security Council and restores some balance against Western dominance.”

Sanctions on Yemen are merely tools for Israeli objectives

Al-Farah also criticized the West and the United States for openly supporting “Israel” with weapons and financial aid while shielding it politically, arguing that the proposed sanctions on Yemen are merely “tools to serve Zionist objectives and punish the Yemeni people for their resilience, independent decision-making, and solidarity with Gaza.”

He concluded by reaffirming Yemen’s steadfast support for Gaza and for oppressed communities across the region, pledging to continue opposing Western and US hegemony over the countries and peoples of the region without hesitation.

UNSC extends sanctions on Yemen

On November 14, the UN Security Council approved a resolution extending financial sanctions and a travel ban on Yemen for another year, until November 14, 2026, while also extending the mandate of the panel of experts supporting the sanctions committee until December 15, 2026.

The resolution, adopted by a 13-member majority with Russia and China abstaining, renews Yemen’s international sanctions under Resolution 2140 for an additional year. It maintains frozen assets and travel restrictions on designated individuals and entities and extends the mandate of the expert panel overseeing Yemen sanctions until mid-December 2026.

The Security Council imposes these sanctions on Yemen under US pressure and under the cover of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, through Resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015).

The UN Security Council first imposed sanctions on Yemen in 2014 through Resolution 2140, targeting individuals and entities linked to destabilizing activities during the country’s ongoing conflict.

These measures included asset freezes and travel bans aimed at those accused of threatening Yemen’s stability or obstructing peace efforts.

In 2015, Resolution 2216 expanded the sanctions framework, further restricting financial and travel activities of key figures aligned with armed groups and reinforcing the Council’s oversight through a dedicated panel of experts.

November 15, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes | , , , , | 1 Comment

Can a second Ukraine on Taiwan be prevented?

By Ladislav Zemánek | RT | November 14, 2025

Taiwan’s political landscape is undergoing a moment of transformation marked by deepening divisions among the island’s elite. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by President Lai Ching-te, has been pushing forward a comprehensive military modernization program and closer security cooperation with the United States and Israel. In contrast, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), now under the leadership of Cheng Li-wun, envisions a different course – one based on peace, dialogue with Beijing, and the notion of a shared Chinese identity.

Peace, or war?

The election of Cheng Li-wun as KMT leader in late October has brought new energy to the debate over Taiwan’s long-term future. Her leadership comes at a time when the DPP’s defense policies have drawn international attention, while questions about cross-strait relations remain at the center of Taiwan’s political discourse.

Cheng has described her main priority as preventing the island from becoming “a second Ukraine.” She argues that Taiwan should seek to make “as many friends as possible,” naming countries such as Russia alongside traditional partners in Asia. Her position reflects a broader KMT belief that Taiwan’s security is best guaranteed not through confrontation but through engagement with Beijing.

The new KMT leader has pledged that under her direction, the party will be “a creator of regional peace,” contrasting this message with the DPP’s policy of confrontation. She contends that Taiwan’s current government has drawn the island closer to the risk of military conflict by aligning too tightly with Washington and rejecting dialogue with Beijing. Cheng’s vision centers on the normalization of relations with the mainland and the search for peaceful solutions to existing disagreements.

Since coming to power in 2016, the DPP has prioritized strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities and pushing for independence. Lai Ching-te has announced a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030, a level comparable to NATO commitments. For the 2026 budget year, military expenditures are set to reach 3.32% of GDP. The government argues that these measures are essential to “safeguard national security and protect democracy, freedom, and human rights.”

Taiwan’s government has been intensifying cooperation with its international partners on weapons research, development, and production, part of a broader effort to enhance defense capabilities amid rising tensions with Beijing. Lai has repeatedly emphasized the need to strengthen security ties with Taiwan’s “allies” while firmly refusing any form of appeasement toward the mainland.

In early October, Lai unveiled plans for a new multi-layered air defense system known as the “T-Dome,” a project explicitly inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome and America’s Golden Dome. He described the initiative as a cornerstone of a proposed trilateral cooperation framework among Taiwan, the US, and Israel, which he said could contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

Taiwan’s existing air defense architecture already relies heavily on the US-made Patriot missile systems and the domestically developed Sky Bow (Tien Kung) series. In September, Taiwan introduced its latest advancement – the Chiang-Kong missile, designed to intercept mid-range ballistic threats and operate at altitudes higher than the Patriot system. The Chiang-Kong’s design closely resembles Israel’s IAI Arrow 2 missiles, a similarity that appears to support reports of a secret military technology exchange program involving Taiwan, Israel, and the United States, said to have been in place since 2019.

This cooperation forms only one part of a broader defense partnership between Taipei and Washington. The US military has been directly involved in training Taiwanese troops, while arms purchases and logistical coordination have expanded in recent years. Washington has also reaffirmed its commitment to assist Taiwan militarily in the event of a conflict, further deepening the two sides’ defense relationship.

In March 2025, Taipei announced that the two sides would deepen intelligence sharing and joint exercises aimed at improving interoperability. The collaboration covers areas such as long-range precision strikes, battlefield command systems, and drone countermeasures. Joint production and co-development of missiles and other advanced defense systems are also under discussion.

Looking for the patriots

Central to the political divide within the island’s elite is the long-standing “1992 Consensus,” an understanding that both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’s authorities acknowledge there is only one China. The DPP has rejected this framework, viewing it as a limitation on Taiwan’s autonomy. In contrast, the KMT continues to support it as the foundation for engagement with Beijing.

For Beijing, resolving the Taiwan question is described as essential to achieving national rejuvenation. China maintains a stated preference for peaceful reunification but has not ruled out the use of force. Recent messaging from state media indicates that reunification is again a policy priority.

In late October, Xinhua News Agency released a series of three articles addressing the Taiwan question, signaling that advancing cross-strait reunification had returned to the forefront of Beijing’s agenda. The timing was notable: the publications appeared just before the Xi Jinping-Donald Trump meeting in South Korea and followed the establishment of the “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration.” The new holiday marks the anniversary of Taiwan’s handover from Japan in 1945, a symbolic move meant to reinforce the narrative that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and to commemorate what Beijing describes as one of the outcomes of the World Anti-Fascist War.

Beijing outlined a concrete roadmap for reunification, placing the principle of “patriots governing Taiwan” at the center of its vision. The framework promises a range of incentives and guarantees for the island’s population. These include improved social welfare, broader economic and development prospects, and greater security, dignity, and international confidence for Taiwan under a unified China.

Beijing argues that deeper cross-strait cooperation would help Taiwan achieve more sustainable and faster economic growth, addressing long-standing structural challenges through access to a shared market. Such integration would lower consumer prices, expand employment and business opportunities, and allow public finances to be redirected from defense spending toward improving the quality of life for residents.

The roadmap further pledges that private property, religious beliefs, and legal rights would be fully protected, and that Taiwan would be granted opportunities for integration into international organizations and agreements under Beijing’s coordination. Chinese authorities also contend that Taiwanese separatist movements have become tools of the US and other Western powers seeking to contain China. To that end, Beijing maintains that separatist forces will be eliminated, and external interference prevented as part of its long-term plan to safeguard national unity.

Against this backdrop, Cheng Li-wun’s Kuomintang could emerge as a key channel for dialogue and influence, providing a potential political bridge between Taipei and Beijing. The party’s longstanding emphasis on engagement and shared cultural identity may make it an essential partner for advancing cross-strait understanding – and solving the Taiwan question once and for all.

Ladislav Zemánek, non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club

November 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

China threatens Japan over PM’s Taiwan comments

RT | November 14, 2025

China has warned that potential military involvement by Japan in the Taiwan issue would be treated as aggression and met with a forceful response. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently suggested her country could intervene in the Taiwan Strait.

Speaking in parliament last week, Takaichi said Chinese attempts to forcibly reunify with the self-governing island could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” under Japan’s security legislation and potentially trigger a military response from Tokyo. Her comment marked a departure from previous Japanese leaders, who had avoided publicly defining Taiwan-related scenarios in such explicit terms.

On Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian condemned Takaichi’s remarks, describing them as “blatantly provocative” and stressing that they violate the one-China principle that recognizes Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan.

“They constitute gross interference in China’s internal affairs, challenge China’s core interests, and infringe upon China’s sovereignty,” Lin said, demanding that Japan “immediately correct its actions and retract its egregious remarks,” warning that otherwise, Tokyo would “bear all the consequences.”

Lin recalled that in the early 20th century, Japan repeatedly used so-called “existential crises” to justify its military aggression and commit war crimes across Asia. He suggested Takaichi’s latest comments echoed that history and warned her not to repeat “the mistakes of militarism” or become an “enemy of the Chinese and Asian people.”

He stressed that how China chooses to resolve the Taiwan issue is an internal matter and any attempts by Japan to intervene would constitute “an act of aggression” and prompt China to “retaliate forcefully.”

Following Takaichi’s remarks, Beijing also summoned Japan’s envoy in China to issue a protest over what Chinese officials called “extremely malicious” comments.

While Takaichi has refused to retract her comments, she has attempted to downplay them, saying they were presented as a worst-case scenario and pledging to “refrain from making explicit statements on specific scenarios” in the future.

Takaichi was elected as Japan’s first female prime minister last month. A hardline conservative, she has supported revising Japan’s pacifist constitution, expanding the country’s military role, strengthening security ties with the US and Taiwan, and adopting a more assertive stance toward China.

November 14, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025

The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.

In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?

Trump’s visit

Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.

Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.

The new thinking

The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.

To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.

Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.

Beyond Ambitions

Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.

Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

November 11, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | 2 Comments

Iran’s oil exports hit new post-sanctions record

Press TV – November 9, 2025

Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.

The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.

“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.

Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.

The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.

The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.

That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.

The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.

However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.

Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.

November 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

NATO chief urges West to prepare for long-term confrontation with Russia

RT | November 6, 2025

NATO member-states must boost military production to be ready for a prolonged standoff with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which are challenging the “global rules,” the bloc’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte, has said.

Speaking to Western defense contractors at the NATO-Industry Forum in Bucharest on Thursday, Rutte told the bloc’s arms makers that “there is more cash on the table and even more will flow” amid NATO’s rearmament push.

Moscow has rejected claims it harbors any aggressive intentions towards the US-led military bloc, saying such allegations are being used by politicians in the US and EU to scare the populations and justify huge increases in military spending. Russia also believes that NATO’s deepening involvement in Ukraine was instrumental in escalating the conflict in 2022.

Rutte labeled the fighting between Moscow and Kiev a “threat” to the bloc and he claimed that “the danger posed by Russia will not end when this war does. For the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a destabilizing force in Europe and the world.”

“And Russia is not alone in its efforts to undermine the global rules. As you know, it is working with China, with North Korea, with Iran, and others. They are increasing their defense industrial collaboration to unprecedented levels. They are preparing for long-term confrontation,” the secretary-general said.

He noted the pledge by NATO members to hike military spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, but claimed that “cash alone cannot provide security. We need the capabilities. We need the equipment, real firepower, and of course… the most advanced tech.” This would require the bloc’s defense industry “increasing production and shortening delivery times,” Rutte stressed.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova reacted to Rutte’s comments by asking him to clarify what “global rules” he was talking about and publish their “full list” on NATO’s website.

Moscow, Beijing, and the rest of “the global majority, have always declared their commitment to international law, while NATO has repeatedly violated this law with its aggressive actions and illegitimate coalitions: the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, the bombing of Yugoslavia, and so on,” Zakharova wrote on Telegram.

November 6, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Progressive Hypocrite, War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

US Atomic Tests Could Open Pandora’s Box for ‘New Arms Race and Nuclear War’

By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 31.10.2025

A nuclear war risk is growing and Washington’s apparent readiness to resume nuclear tests is making it more grave, warns Professor Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University, in an interview with Sputnik.

“All nine nuclear powers are modernizing their nuclear arsenals, making them more efficient and more deadly. On top of that, there’s pressure to expand the nuclear arsenals,” Kuznick tells Sputnik.

To complicate matters further, other countries – including South Korea and Ukraine – are flirting with the idea of developing their own nuclear weapons, the professor notes.

The world is going the wrong direction and becoming more dangerous.

US Unready for Nuclear Tests

If the US resumes nuclear tests, Russia and China will follow suit, according to the professor.

“They actually have more to gain from this than the US does,” he says, adding that it would probably take years before the US would be able to conduct new nuclear tests, as the Nevada test site has effectively atrophied.

At the same time, it would mean the end of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which have not been ratified by the majority of nuclear powers. Up until now, the US, Russia and China have abided by it: the last Russian nuclear test took place in 1990, China’s – in 1996.

Reaction to Russian Wonder-Weapon?

The idea of resuming nuclear tests followed Russia’s trials of its cutting-edge weapons. Could the US boast anything like that? Not yet — and it would take years to catch up, according to the pundit.

“The Burevestnik and the Poseidon [missiles] are new science fiction-like, new generation of nuclear delivery systems. You add that to the Oreshnik test back in November 2024,” Kuznick notes.

Give Peace a Chance

The most logical response to Washington’s breaking the de facto moratorium on nuclear tests should be “the United States is out of control,” Kuznick says.

“That would be what [Russia and China] should say and do and call for new talks to end this expansion, intensification of the nuclear arms race,” the professor underscores.

US President Donald Trump in the meantime said that it will be known soon whether the United States will resume underground nuclear testing.

“You will find out very soon,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One as he traveled to Palm Beach, Florida, as quoted by Reuters.

October 31, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Pressure against Venezuela as hybrid war against Russia and China

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 31, 2025

A common vice found among geopolitically anti-imperialist analysts and journalists is the attempt to explain all international conflicts by the “single cause” of the imperialist quest for natural resources — almost always oil. This is how the Iraq War is classically explained, for example: “Big Oil” would have used the Bush administration to open markets, once closed, through bombing and territorial occupation.

This type of clearly materialist explanation stems from an evidently Marxian premise, insofar as it aims to treat all social, cultural, and political phenomena as epiphenomena before the preponderant and structural reality of economic transformations and interests.

Like a good part of the 19th-century pseudo-scientific efforts to reduce reality to a single principle (as was the case with Freudianism and Positivism), this economist materialism also does not hold up under the hammer of critical analysis.

Just as an example, in the Iraqi case, the generic materialist explanation does not withstand the empirical discovery that the major U.S. oil companies were, in fact, already on a path of dialogue with the counter-hegemonic countries of the Middle East and, precisely for that reason, tried unsuccessfully to pressure for non-intervention and the pacification of American-Iraqi relations.

Nonetheless, the “oil myth” persists in the study of the Middle East. So we are not surprised that it is appealed to once again to explain the U.S. pressure on Venezuela. The narrative says that Trump’s pressure on Maduro, and the threats to overthrow his government, are due to Trump’s interest in Venezuela’s 300 billion barrel reserves — the largest in the world.

The problem with this narrative, however, is that according to all indications, Maduro would have offered to close extremely advantageous partnerships with the U.S. for the exploitation of Venezuelan oil, given that the current level of extraction in Venezuela is minimal. From a material perspective, the deal would be quite interesting for the U.S. oil industry, as the country consumes a vast amount of oil and its reserves are “only” the ninth largest in the world.

Everything indicates, however, that Trump would have rejected the offer of a deal.

The U.S., apparently, wants something that is worth more than the largest oil reserve in the world.

This is where geopolitical science comes in.

Generally, geopolitics is confused with “geo-economics,” in the sense that many people believe they are seeing a “geopolitical analysis” when they see an attribution of economic causes to some international conflict. But geopolitics is, fundamentally, the science that studies the correlation between geography and power. In this sense, resources can enter into geopolitical analyses, but only as part of a general context.

And in the Venezuelan case, even the very important and abundant oil is of secondary importance in the conflict with the U.S.

More important than oil, for the U.S., is to guarantee hemispheric hegemony — especially in the Americas. It is about, as defined in an arrogant and classic manner, the U.S. “backyard,” a space in which the U.S. elite in the 19th century decided to no longer tolerate any European presence.

Let’s fast forward 200 years. How are the international relations of Ibero-American countries?

China is the main commercial partner for most countries in the region, several of which have joined the Belt & Road Initiative (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, etc.). Some countries in the region (Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba) have also joined BRICS, which works towards the de-dollarization of international trade. Specifically Russia, in turn, has developed military ties — which consist of supplying equipment and conducting exercises — especially with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, with a military rapprochement also with Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Brazil.

In a context where pressure on the U.S. in other regions of the world is growing, it is dangerous for U.S. hegemony to see the growth of Russian-Chinese influence in its “backyard.”

Venezuela is a significant and priority target there because it is precisely the country with the deepest strategic relations with Russia and China. Venezuela is one of the main sources of oil for China, while at the same time Caracas seems to play a relevant role in the multifaceted Russian strategy of “pushing” for multipolarity by strengthening countries around the world that try to challenge the hegemonic order.

To confirm this thesis, we would need to analyze U.S. relations with the rest of the continent to verify if there is any movement by the U.S. to try to pull countries in the region away from Russia and China.

And it seems very clear: the strategy of rapprochement with Brazil is based precisely on an effort to pull the country out of the “Chinese orbit.” The U.S. also pressured Mexico to remain outside the New Silk Road. The U.S. increased its presence in Ecuador and pressured Milei to abandon plans for a Chinese base in its territory. Examples abound to indicate that we are facing a broad continental offensive whose goal is to update the Monroe Doctrine for the 21st century.

It is not, therefore, about oil, but about hegemony.

October 31, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Eurasian Integration as an Anti-Hegemonic Economic System

By Prof. Glenn Diesen | October 30, 2025

We are living in an era of economic disruptions as US-centric globalisation is replaced by a more decentralised format of globalisation spearheaded by the Greater Eurasian continent. The consequence of these disruptions during this transition period is instability in economics, politics, and international security, as economic coercion escalates into war.

The disruptions to the international economy were predictable—and indeed predicted—for decades. When immense economic power is concentrated in a hegemon, the hegemon has incentives to build trust in an economic architecture under its administration. This translates into an open international economic system with access to technologies, industries, energy, food, physical transportation corridors, banks, currencies, and payment systems. This is referred to as a benign hegemon, as building trust in an open system ensures that alternatives are not developed and the world becomes immensely dependent on the hegemon. Subsequently, globalisation meant Americanisation.

Hegemons are, however, inherently temporary. Over the years, the US economy became excessively rent-seeking, financialised, and debt-ridden as its competitive edge declined. A hegemon makes mistakes and fails to prioritise strategically, as it can absorb the costs—until it reaches a breaking point. Around the world, other countries climbed up global value chains and grew concerned about the fiscal irresponsibility and unsustainability of the hegemonic system.

A declining hegemon will predictably behave very differently. It will use its administrative control over the global economy to prevent the rise of rival centres of power. Economic coercion is the new normal—for example, restricting China’s access to key technologies, seizing Iranian tankers and preparing the establishment of maritime choke points, stealing Russia’s sovereign funds, etc. Trust collapses, and efforts to create a more decentralised international economic system only intensify.

The declining hegemon will also attempt to divide rival centres of power: Germany must be severed from Russia, Russia must be split from China, China should be kept at a distance from India, India should reduce its economic connectivity with Iran, Iran should not resolve its disputes with the Gulf States etc. Markets are captured as the declining hegemon, for example, pushes Europe to reduce cooperation with Chinese technology and Russian energy. As the Europeans and other allies develop excessive reliance on the US, economic and industrial power can be transferred to the US. Eventually, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe will recognise that hitching their wagon to a declining hegemon to preserve a unipolar order that is already gone, is inherently destructive. The option is to either diversify their economic connectivity for prosperity and political autonomy, or become captured markets that can be cannibalised by the declining hegemon.

The declining hegemon has—much like its adversaries and allies—strong incentives to embrace multipolar realities. New political forces within the declining hegemon will recognise that pursuing hegemonic policies under a multipolar international distribution of power will be punished by the international system. Exhausting its remaining resources and incentivising the rest of the world to collectively balance against the declining hegemon is unsustainable. The ideal strategy for the declining hegemon is to accept a more modest role in the international system as one among many great powers, reducing collective balancing and enabling socio-economic recovery to rebuild former strength.

The rise of Eurasia marks the end of 500 years of Western leadership and dominance in the world, since European maritime powers began connecting the world in the early 16th century. While some panic in the West is therefore understandable, there are nonetheless great opportunities.

Adam Smith famously wrote: “The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind… By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial”.

However, Adam Smith also recognised the problems of the skewed power distribution between the Europeans and the rest of the world. Adam Smith wrote: “To the natives however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned… At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”.

Adam Smith argued that a more even distribution of power could create a more harmonious international economy: “Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it”.

I conclude that the aspiration of Eurasian integration should be to make it anti-hegemonic but not anti-Western by descending into bloc politics.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

China will act if its interests are harmed by Iran sanctions: Envoy

Press TV – October 27, 2025

China will act to respond to the sanctions imposed against Iran if they harm its interests, the country’s ambassador to Iran has said.

Cong Peiwu said on Monday during a press conference in Tehran that China will not hesitate to act if its economic interests are affected by restrictions imposed on trade with Iran.

Cong made the remarks in response to questions about China’s way of dealing with recent United Nations sanctions on Iran, which were re-imposed in late September after European parties to a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers accused Tehran of failing to observe its obligations under the agreement.

Along with Russia and Iran, China believes that the move by Britain, France, and Germany to return UN sanctions on Iran was illegal, signaling that it would not necessarily abide by the UN sanctions.

The Chinese ambassador said that Beijing seeks closer cooperation with Tehran as he reiterated that Iran and China share a common stance opposing unilateralism in the world.

China is Iran’s largest trading partner, as it buys 29% of Iran’s total non-oil exports while being responsible for 25% of imports into the country.

Estimates suggest that more than 92% of Iran’s oil exports also end up in China, despite a harsh regime of US sanctions that imposes heavy penalties on buyers of Iranian oil.

Those estimates show that China’s total trade with Iran, including its oil purchases, amount to $65-70 billion per year.

Experts believe China counts on the smooth and affordable supply of oil from Iran for maintaining growth in its industrial sector.

Figures published in late August showed that China had relied on Iran for 13.6% of its total oil imports in the first half of 2025 as shipments reached an average of 1.38 million barrels per day (bpd) over the period.

Privately-owned refiners receive the bulk of Iranian oil shipments arriving in China as they enjoy discounts of up to 8% per barrel offered by Iran to circumvent US sanctions.

Recent data by international tanker tracking services suggest Iran’s oil exports to China reached records of more than 1.8 million bpd in September.

October 27, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

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