Ukraine does not need security guarantees from China because Beijing failed to prevent or stop the conflict between Moscow and Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky has said.
Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, the Ukrainian leader commented on potential security guarantees Kiev could receive from its partners once the hostilities with Russia are over. He noted, however, that he does not want to see China as one of the guarantors upholding peace.
“First, China did not help us stop this war from the very beginning,” Zelensky said, adding that Beijing “did nothing” to prevent the secession of Crimea, which overwhelmingly voted to join Russia in a public referendum in 2014. He went on to accuse China of sitting back when the conflict escalated in 2022.
“That is why we do not need guarantors who did not help Ukraine then, when it was truly necessary after February 24 [2022],” he said.
His remarks came after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested that Moscow supported robust security guarantees for Ukraine while not ruling out that they could be provided by members of the UN Security Council, including Western countries, as well as China. He stressed, however, that these guarantees should be “equal” and never be aimed against Russia.
China has positioned itself as a neutral party in the Ukraine conflict and has refused to join sanctions against Russia. It has called on both sides to hold peace talks while suggesting that one of the reasons for hostilities has been NATO expansion. In 2023, Beijing released a 12-point memorandum calling for a ceasefire, resumption of peace talks, protection of civilians, nuclear safety, and an end to unilateral sanctions.
Following the summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, in Alaska last week, China said it “supports all efforts conducive to the peaceful resolution of the [Ukraine] crisis,” adding that it “is glad to see Russia and the United States maintaining contact, [and] improving relations.”
China’s mission to the United Nations has declared the country’s firm opposition to threats by European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal to activate the “snapback” mechanism within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
The mission at the UN headquarters in New York distributed an explanatory note to the Security Council, stating that the difficult situation in implementing the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 is not the result of Iran’s actions but the disruption of the JCPOA’s implementation by the United States and the three European countries.
The statement said this cannot be an excuse to restore the anti-Iran sanctions that had been lifted under the 2015 deal.
In the note, China warned that attempts to activate the snapback could have “unpredictable and catastrophic” consequences, destroying all the diplomatic achievements of recent years.
The document said any attempt by some countries to activate the “snapback” without following the legal process would be an abuse of the Security Council’s powers and duties and would be invalid.
The note underscored Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as a member of the NPT, calling on all parties to adhere to dialogue, mutual respect, and finding solutions that address the legitimate concerns of the international community.
China concluded by stating that it will continue to play an active role in the negotiation process and called on the Security Council to, instead of creating obstacles, pave the way for a new and lasting agreement.
As the 2015 nuclear deal nears its official end, Iran is preparing for the removal of confidence-building curbs on its nuclear program.
However, the European signatories have threatened to invoke the “snapback” mechanism, which would restore all UN sanctions on Iran that were lifted under the deal.
Western media reports indicate that three European nations have agreed to activate the snapback by the end of August if a new nuclear deal is not reached.
This move would disrupt the successful conclusion of the current agreement.
The United States and Iran had been in talks to find a replacement for the 2015 deal, but these negotiations were halted following a surprise US-Israeli aggression against Iran.
In a show of support for Iran, Russia has also publicly opposed Europe’s activation of the snapback, distributing an explanatory note to declare its position.
Western naval doctrine relies heavily on the aircraft carrier battle group as the primary instrument of power projection. China’s military planners, however, developed a strategy that incorporates thousands of inexpensive, unmanned drone aircraft. China recently launched the first of many drone carriers, capable of carrying a hundred drones, including kamikaze drones. But a new breakthrough in VTOL (Vertical Take-Off-And-Landing) drones may make even the drone carrier concept obsolete. VTOL drones can be launched from any large warship, even in rough weather. Now, any Chinese warship can serve as an aircraft carrier, and control over vast areas of ocean are now possible. Perhaps even more ominous are recent developments in the Ukraine War. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian operators used commercial trucks, driven by Russian drivers unawares, to deploy drones deep inside Russian territory. Possibly assisted by Western satellite imagery, Ukrainians then launched those drones in deadly offensive strikes, from civilian assets. That may open the door to new military applications for naval drones. Closing scene, Hukou Waterfall, Shanxi
China reaffirms its commitment to the peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue and opposes the invocation of the UN Security Council’s “snapback” mechanism.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin issued the statement on Friday in response to the European troika’s warning to reimpose sanctions if a diplomatic solution is not achieved by the end of August.
“China stays committed to peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means, opposes invoking Security Council ‘snapback’ sanctions,” Lin said.
He argued that reimposing sanctions on Iran would not foster trust or bridge differences among parties and would hinder diplomatic efforts to resume talks promptly.
Lin emphasized that any actions taken by the Security Council should facilitate the achievement of new agreements rather than undermine the negotiation process.
The Chinese diplomat reiterated that China is committed to maintaining an objective and fair stance, continuing to promote conversations aimed at peace, and playing a constructive role in bringing the Iranian nuclear issue back to diplomatic negotiations at the earliest opportunity.
He also highlighted Beijing’s intention to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to promote peace and stability in the region.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Thursday that the country is actively collaborating with China and Russia to prevent the reactivation of UN sanctions through the so-called “snapback” mechanism.
“We are working with China and Russia to stop it. If this does not work and they apply it, we have tools to respond. We will discuss them in due course,” he added.
The snapback mechanism, embedded in the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), allows the automatic reinstatement of UN Security Council sanctions that had been lifted under the agreement. The deal terminates in October.
Iran, however, disputes the legitimacy of the European powers’ efforts to trigger the provision.
In a joint letter to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and the UN Security Council on Wednesday, the European troika — France, Germany and the United Kingdom – said they were “committed to us(ing) all diplomatic tools at our disposal to ensure Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon” unless Tehran meets a deadline to speak with them.
“We have made it clear that if Iran is not willing to reach a diplomatic solution before the end of August 2025, or does not seize the opportunity of an extension, the E3 are prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism,” the ministers wrote.
In a detailed letter to the UN Security Council last month, Iran laid out its position, asserting that Britain, France, and Germany are no longer legitimate JCPOA participants with the authority to reinstate sanctions through snapback. This position is supported by China and Russia, who share Tehran’s view on the matter.
China and Russia’s backing plays a critical role in Iran’s diplomatic efforts to counter the snapback threat. Both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and have veto power over resolutions, including those related to Iran’s nuclear program.
China is a top buyer of Iranian crude, taking 90% of its crude exports. But Iran has recently passed Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar as the top producer and exporter of NG products, bringing in billions more. Ambitious expansions of their petrochemical industry are also ongoing. Iranians report little difficulty in business operations among different currencies, despite the US Treasury Department’s blacklisting of key energy suppliers, and firm control over the SWIFT systems.
A staggering $11 trillion in US government debt needs to be borrowed or refinanced over the next 12 months.
Treasury Department officials are faced with painful choices, whether to borrow at very high rates, locked in for ten years or longer? Or instead borrow for one year or less, but at massive volumes?
Foreign governments and pension funds are also showing far less interest in absorbing new US government bonds, and are demanding ever-higher yields to compensate for inflation and policy risk.
China’s government, however, can borrow at far below half the rate Washington pays, across all maturities. And Chinese companies are paying the lowest interest rates in their history to access new capital. That represents a long-term structural advantage to Chinese policymakers and industry.
Closing scene, Hong Kong South China Morning Post, China cuts US Treasury holdings for third month amid trade war, debt ceiling fears https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-ec…
By slapping tariffs on India and linking them to its ties with Russia, the Trump administration exposed its willingness to strong-arm New Delhi into submission.
Unless India pulls off a dramatic reset with China—and thus reduce its dependence on the US for military support—it will remain caught between appeasing Washington and defending its strategic autonomy.
When the US President announced sweeping 25% tariffs on Indian goods in late July, his tone marked a jarring departure from the warmth once displayed toward New Delhi. Only months earlier, he had welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the Oval Office, hailing him as a “great friend” and celebrating the US-India relationship as a partnership destined for global leadership. Now, with the stroke of a Truth Social post, India is recast not as an ally, but as an economic adversary.
This abrupt reversal speaks volumes. The President’s social media declarations—accusing India of being a “dead economy”—ignored not only diplomatic decorum but economic reality. India is the world’s most populous nation and the fifth-largest economy, a critical player in global markets and geopolitics alike. To dismiss it so flippantly is to misunderstand the arc of global power.
But beyond the bluster lies a deeper provocation. Washington’s veiled threat—imposing additional, unspecified penalties on India over its continued oil trade with Russia—underscores a troubling shift in US foreign policy: coercion in place of collaboration. The implicit bargain offered to New Delhi is clear—cut ties with Moscow, and the US may relent on tariffs and even entertain a trade deal. Refuse and face economic punishment.
Why Trump Wants India to Submit
When Donald Trump referenced oil in the context of US-India relations, it wasn’t his only focus. A quieter, yet strategically significant, concern involved India’s long-standing defense ties with Russia. For decades, New Delhi has been one of Moscow’s most reliable customers in the global arms market. While India’s reliance on Russian military hardware has declined—from 55% of total imports in 2016 to an estimated 36% in 2025—Russia remains India’s top defense supplier.
To the Trump administration, however, this decline is an opening that must be exploited for American gains. A shrinking Russian share in India’s defense market presents the perfect opportunity to push more US-made military systems as replacements. In doing so, Washington hopes to edge out Moscow and deepen strategic ties with New Delhi in the process.
Signs suggest India may already be leaning toward such a transition. According to Indian defense media reports, the Indian Air Force (IAF) recently advised the government to prioritize acquiring US-made F-35 fighter jets instead of the fifth-generation aircraft offered by Russia earlier this year. Until now, India had remained undecided, caught between its historical ties with Russia and its evolving strategic calculus. However, should New Delhi proceed with the F-35 acquisition, it would mark a significant shift—not just symbolically, but financially and strategically. The Indian government reportedly plans to induct over 100 F-35s by 2035, an investment expected to run into billions of dollars, directly boosting the US defense sector. More importantly, such an investment will lock India as a firm US ally. As far as the Trump administration is concerned, this would also lend substance to Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda by channeling substantial foreign capital into the American economy.
As far as New Delhi is concerned, inducting F-35s could help bolster its regional standing vis-à-vis China and the latter’s continuous injection of its state-of-the-art defence technology into Pakistan, including its air-force. Indian defence analysts claim that this induction will allow India to avoid any more loses in aerial battles like the ones it suffered in its war with Pakistan in May.
What India Can Do
Yet, New Delhi’s strategic choices are far more complex than they might initially appear. Even if India opts to procure the F-35 fighter jets, it is far from certain that the US would permit their use in an offensive capacity against Pakistan—especially considering Washington’s increasingly cooperative ties with Islamabad. For context, Pakistan itself is restricted from employing its US-supplied F-16s for offensive operations against India. This raises a critical question for Indian policymakers: will a deepening defense relationship with the US genuinely enhance India’s air power posture vis-à-vis Pakistan, its principal adversary in South Asia?
The timing of New Delhi’s public disclosure of the Indian Air Force’s interest in F-35s—just days before a crucial deadline—was no accident. It seemed designed to sway the Trump administration’s position on trade tariffs. But the gambit failed to yield any concrete concessions. The episode underscores a deeper and more troubling question: should India continue to allow the US to exert disproportionate influence over its defense procurement and broader foreign policy?
This incident should prompt serious introspection among Indian policymakers. Rather than leaving its strategic vulnerabilities open to manipulation, India could take steps to insulate its foreign policy from external pressure. One pragmatic approach would be to normalize and even strengthen ties with regional competitors like China—an idea already gaining quiet traction. New Delhi has recently revived visa services with Beijing, and bilateral trade talks are beginning to show signs of momentum.
Interestingly, President Donald Trump’s remarks about “not doing much business with India” were widely interpreted as a thinly veiled reference to India’s growing economic engagement with China. In essence, Washington seeks to mold India’s foreign policy—particularly its relationships with China and Russia—to align more closely with American strategic interests. Should India capitulate to that pressure, it risks downgrading its role from an emerging regional power to a junior partner dependent on Washington for strategic direction.
India’s foreign policy establishment is now at a pivotal juncture. The choices made in the coming years will not just determine the shape of the country’s defense acquisitions or trade policies—they will define India’s role on the world stage for decades to come. If New Delhi is to maintain its claim to strategic autonomy, it must resist the temptation to shape its policies in reaction to US expectations.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
In a world where the international order is increasingly shaped by the struggle between a declining unipolarity and an emerging multipolarity, sanctions have become the main weapon of a superpower that can no longer dictate the course of global affairs by consensus. What was once an exception — economic punishment against states clearly involved in illegal activities or blatant violations of international norms — has become a systemic, arbitrary, and politically motivated practice. And India is now the latest target of this coercive apparatus that defines the foreign policy of the United States.
The repeated use of sanctions by Washington reveals, above all, the exhaustion of its diplomatic capacity. Instead of building bridges with strategic partners, the U.S. chooses to punish, isolate, and sabotage any country that dares to follow an autonomous path.
Sanctions policy as a mechanism of domination
U.S. unilateral sanctions — almost always imposed outside the UN Security Council and in defiance of international law — have become a systematic policy of intimidation. Iran, Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, Russia, and China have been the most well-known targets. But the list keeps growing. And India, previously seen as a potential Western ally in the Indo-Pacific, is now beginning to feel the weight of this punitive system.
The logic is simple: the U.S. identifies an “unacceptable” behavior — such as India’s refusal to join the sanctions against Russia — and from there constructs a narrative to justify pressure measures. It could be the defense of “human rights,” the “fight against terrorism,” or, as is now being done with India, the “war on drugs.” The content of the narrative is secondary; what matters is the effect: to break the sovereignty of the targeted country and force it to align with Washington’s foreign policy.
India: the new frontier of coercion
In recent days, Donald Trump has announced sanction packages of up to 50% against India, citing the “need” to punish trade partners of the Russian Federation. These coercive measures came after months of open threats toward India — some directly referencing the Indo-Russian partnership, others hiding behind the mask of the “fight against fentanyl.”
Although the recently announced sanctions are explicitly directed at Indo-Russian energy trade, there’s no guarantee that the U.S. will abandon the fentanyl rhetoric altogether. The “drug control” excuse may easily be revived at any moment to impose further sanctions on New Delhi, especially considering that this was Washington’s initial justification before Trump finally admitted the real motive: punishing India for its ties with Russia.
It must be emphasized that what brought India into Washington’s sanction crosshairs was not any real connection to fentanyl trafficking, but rather its strategic resilience in the face of Western efforts to isolate Russia. Since 2022, India has maintained firm energy and military cooperation with Moscow, refusing to take part in the U.S. and EU-led anti-Russian crusade. This pragmatic position — based on Indian national interests rather than ideological dogma — deeply irritated the Washington establishment.
In response, the U.S. began floating the idea that chemical exports from India could be diverted for fentanyl production — a claim made without solid evidence, but politically convenient. In a classic move, they attempt to turn a country with no proven role in fentanyl trafficking into part of the “drug problem,” paving the way for tariffs and trade restrictions.
This is Washington’s new modus operandi: transform internal crises — in this case, the collapse of the U.S. healthcare system and the opioid epidemic — into diplomatic weapons to force other nations to serve its strategic interests.
Rapprochement with Russia and China: India’s geopolitical response
In the face of this escalation, India appears to have understood the game — and is beginning to react astutely. Not only has it maintained and expanded its agreements with Russia, but it has also signaled a renewed openness to dialogue with China, having Prime Minister Modi announced a visit to Beijing.
This is a geopolitically significant move. India and China have long had a tense relationship, especially concerning the Himalayan border. But in the face of a common enemy — the global regime of unilateral sanctions that threatens the sovereignty of both — realism is starting to prevail. India already plays an active role in forums such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the G20, but now signals a willingness to deepen its coordination with both Beijing and Moscow.
This marks the emergence of a “new” strategic triangle in the Global South — not based on ideological affinity, but on a shared need to resist the economic coercion promoted by the West. India is not becoming an automatic ally of China, but rather a situational partner in building a multipolar order, where the right to chart one’s own path is no longer subject to Washington’s approval.
Fragmentation of the global system and alternatives to the dollar
This strategic reconfiguration is happening in parallel with the fragmentation of the global financial system. As more countries begin operating outside the SWIFT system, pursue bilateral trade agreements in local currencies, and strengthen alternative development banks, the power of unilateral sanctions is beginning to erode. India has already signed agreements with Russia, Iran, and the UAE to trade in rupees, bypassing the U.S. dollar. BRICS+, with the potential creation of a common currency, is moving in the same direction.
By abusing sanctions as a tool, Washington is accelerating this process. In its attempt to maintain control, it ends up stimulating the formation of new centers of economic and diplomatic power — exactly the opposite of its intended outcome.
The end of the American consensus
The attempt to punish India over a crisis that is, above all, the result of domestic failure in the U.S., is not only an act of hypocrisy but also a major strategic miscalculation. Instead of isolating India, the U.S. is driving it deeper into multilateral frameworks that challenge Western hegemony.
New Delhi has made it clear it will not be turned into a geopolitical vassal. India is a civilizational power with its own interests and will not hesitate to forge partnerships — even with historical rivals — if it means securing strategic autonomy.
Sanctions, once presented as instruments of international justice, have become the primary mechanism for imposing a failed global order — one that seeks to preserve historical privileges at the expense of national sovereignty. The economic attacks on India over its strategic ties with Russia are just one example of this broader reality.
But a new world is taking shape. A world where countries like India, Russia, and China are building bridges over ruins — converging not out of ideological alignment, but from the urgent need to resist the systemic coercion of a declining empire. National sovereignty, more and more, will be asserted not through submission, but through coordinated resistance to the language of sanctions.
India understands this. And by responding with dignity and pragmatism, it shows that the path to strategic independence necessarily involves rejecting the arbitrary use of sanctions as a weapon of economic warfare. The multipolar world is under construction — and there is no room in it for domination disguised as moralism.
Forever wars in the Middle East, and now in Ukraine, have drained NATO arsenals. But while the US and NATO countries have made giant pledges to boost defense spending, China’s export bans on critical materials are blowing up supply chains for Pentagon weapons makers.
US President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing an additional 25 percent tariff on India over its purchase of Russian energy, the White House said on 6 August.
The additional tariffs will stack on top of 25 percent country-specific tariffs due to take effect overnight, and will come into force within 21 days, according to the executive order signed by Trump.
“They’re fueling the war machine. And if they’re going to do that, then I’m not going to be happy,” Trump said Tuesday in an interview with CNBC.
Despite a warm public reception during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s White House visit in February, Indian diplomats were “stunned” by what one journalist briefed on the meeting described as a “lack of respect” shown to the prime minister behind closed doors.
Amid these economic tensions, Prime Minister Modi is scheduled to travel to China on 31 August to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin.
The visit will mark his first to China since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, and is being widely seen by Indian media as a step toward repairing ties with Beijing amid growing economic strain from the US.
Modi’s last visit to China was in June 2018, also for a summit of SCO leaders in Qingdao.
That was followed by Chinese President Xi Jinping traveling to India in October 2019, just months before the Chinese army’s incursions in eastern Ladakh.
Indian officials have linked the Tianjin summit to earlier visits by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, describing them as part of a slow move to reset ties with Beijing.
Separately, the Times of India reported that Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval is expected in Moscow this week for talks on defense cooperation, including a possible expansion of India’s S-400 missile system deal.
Doval’s trip, while previously planned, has reportedly gained renewed importance in light of US pressure over India’s energy relationship with Moscow.
A few weeks ago I published an article noting that the State of Israel and the Zionist movement that gave rise to it have probably employed assassination as a tool of statecraft more heavily than any other political entity in recorded history. Indeed, their deadly activities had easily eclipsed those of the notorious Muslim sect that had terrorized the Middle East a thousand years ago and gave rise to that term.
The piece had been prompted by Israel’s sudden strike against Iran, capping its reputation as the greatest band of assassins known to history. Even as the Iranian government was intensely focused on the negotiations with America over its nuclear program, a sudden Israeli surprise attack successfully assassinated most of Iran’s highest military commanders, some of its political leaders, and nearly all of its most prominent nuclear scientists. I cannot recall any previous case in which a major country had ever had so large a fraction of its top military, political, and scientific leadership eliminated in that sort of illegal sneak attack.
Less than one year earlier, a series of missile exchanges between Israel and Iran had soon been followed by the death of hardline Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and his foreign minister in a highly-suspicious and never explained helicopter crash. Given subsequent events, I think we can safely assume that he, too, had died at the hands of the Israelis.
Earlier this year, the declassification of a large batch of JFK Assassination files had prompted me to recapitulate and summarize many of my articles of the last half-dozen years on that landmark twentieth century event. I gathered together some of the very considerable evidence that the Israeli Mossad played the central role in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 as well as the death of his younger brother Robert a few years later, probably the highest-profile political assassinations of the last one hundred years or more.
The most weighty and authoritative work on the long history of Israeli assassinations is surely Ronen Bergman’s 2018 volume Rise and Kill First, running 750 pages and including a thousand-odd source references, with many of the latter citing official documents never previously made available to journalists. By some estimates, this book documented nearly 3,000 such foreign political killings, a remarkable total for a small country then less than three generations old.
Although the Bergman book was certainly very comprehensive, it was produced under strict Israeli censorship, so the text quite understandably omitted almost any coverage of some of the highest-profile Zionist attacks on Western targets. For example, there was no mention of the unsuccessful but well-documented attempts to kill President Harry Truman, nor the assassination efforts aimed at British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the top members of his Cabinet.
Some of this latter coverage may be found in Thomas Suarez’s 2016 book State of Terror which I would recommend as a very useful supplementary work, though its focus is almost entirely limited to the activities of Zionist groups just prior to the establishment of Israel.
For a broader discussion of the history of Israeli assassinations and closely-related terrorist attacks, especially those targeting Westerners, one of the most useful compilations might be my own very long January 2020 article, providing extensive references to the underlying primary and secondary sources.
That 2020 article had actually been prompted by America’s own sudden assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, a shocking development that drew a great deal of media coverage at the time.
I had opened my long discussion by noting that over the last several centuries Western governments had almost totally abandoned the use of political assassinations against the leadership of major rival nations, regarding such actions as immoral and illegal.
For example, historian David Irving revealed that when one of Adolf Hitler’s aides suggested to him that an attempt be made to assassinate the Soviet military leadership during the bitter combat on the Eastern Front of World War II, the German Fuhrer immediately forbade any such practices as obvious violations of the laws of civilized warfare.
For most of American history, a similar attitude had prevailed, but I explained that this began to change over the last couple of decades, mostly in the wake of the 9/11 Attacks.
The 1914 terrorist assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was certainly organized by fanatical elements of Serbian Intelligence, but the Serbian government fiercely denied its own complicity, and no major European power was ever directly implicated in the plot. The aftermath of the killing soon led to the outbreak of World War I, and although many millions died in the trenches over the next few years, it would have been completely unthinkable for one of the major belligerents to consider assassinating the leadership of another.
A century earlier, the Napoleonic Wars had raged across the entire continent of Europe for most of a generation, but I don’t recall reading of any governmental assassination plots during that era, let alone in the quite gentlemanly wars of the preceding 18th century when Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa disputed ownership of the wealthy province of Silesia by military means. I am hardly a specialist in modern European history, but after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and regularized the rules of warfare, no assassination as high-profile as that of Gen. Soleimani comes to mind…
During our Revolutionary War, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and our other Founding Fathers fully recognized that if their effort failed, they would all be hanged as rebels by the British. However, I have never heard that they feared falling to an assassin’s blade, nor that King George III ever considered using such an underhanded means of attack. During the first century and more of our nation’s history, nearly all our presidents and other top political leaders traced their ancestry back to the British Isles, and political assassinations were exceptionally rare, with Abraham Lincoln’s death being one of the very few that comes to mind.
At the height of the Cold War, our CIA did involve itself in various secret assassination plots against Cuba’s Communist dictator Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders considered hostile to US interests. But when these facts later came out in the 1970s, they evoked such enormous outrage from the public and the media, that three consecutive American presidents—Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan—all issued successive Executive Orders absolutely prohibiting assassinations by the CIA or any other agent of the US government.
Although some cynics might claim that these public declarations represented mere window-dressing, a March 2018 book review in the New York Times strongly suggests otherwise. Kenneth M. Pollack spent years as a CIA analyst and National Security Council staffer, then went on to publish a number of influential books on foreign policy and military strategy over the last two decades. He had originally joined the CIA in 1988, and opens his review by declaring:
One of the very first things I was taught when I joined the CIA was that we do not conduct assassinations. It was drilled into new recruits over and over again.
Yet Pollack notes with dismay that over the last quarter-century, these once solid prohibitions have been steadily eaten away, with the process rapidly accelerating after the 9/11 attacks of 2001. The laws on our books may not have changed, but
Today, it seems that all that is left of this policy is a euphemism.
We don’t call them assassinations anymore. Now, they are “targeted killings,” most often performed by drone strike, and they have become America’s go-to weapon in the war on terror.
The Bush Administration had conducted 47 of these assassinations-by-another-name, while his successor Barack Obama, a constitutional scholar and Nobel Peace Prize winner, had raised his own total to 542. Not without justification, Pollack wonders whether assassination has become “a very effective drug, but [one that] treats only the symptom and so offers no cure.”
Thus over the last couple of decades the American government has followed a disturbing trajectory in its use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy, first restricting its application only to the most extreme circumstances, next targeting small numbers of high-profile “terrorists” hiding in rough terrain, then escalating those same killings to the many hundreds. And now under President Trump, the fateful step has been taken of America claiming the right to assassinate any world leader not to our liking whom we unilaterally declare worthy of death.
Pollack had made his career as a Clinton Democrat, and is best known for his 2002 book The Threatening Storm that strongly endorsed President Bush’s proposed invasion of Iraq and was enormously influential in producing bipartisan support for that ill-fated policy. I have no doubt that he is a committed supporter of Israel, and he probably falls into a category that I would loosely describe as “Left Neocon.”
But while reviewing a history of Israel’s own long use of assassination as a mainstay of its national security policy, he seems deeply disturbed that America might now be following along that same terrible path.
Pollock’s discussion of these facts came in his lengthy 2018 New York Times review of the Bergman book entitled “Learning From Israel’s Political Assassination Program,” and he greatly decried what many have called the “Israelization” of the American government and its military doctrine. President Donald Trump’s sudden public assassination of so high-profile a foreign leader as Gen. Soleimani came less than two years later and demonstrated that Pollock’s concerns were fully warranted and indeed even understated.
As my January 2020 article explained, nothing like this had ever previously happened in peacetime American history, and only very rarely even during wars.
The January 2nd American assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani of Iran was an event of enormous moment.
Gen. Soleimani had been the highest-ranking military figure in his nation of 80 million, and with a storied career of 30 years, one of the most universally popular and highly regarded. Most analysts ranked him second in influence only to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s elderly Supreme Leader, and there were widespread reports that he was being urged to run for the presidency in the 2021 elections.
The circumstances of his peacetime death were also quite remarkable. His vehicle was incinerated by the missile of an American Reaper drone near Iraq’s Baghdad international airport just after he had arrived there on a regular commercial flight for peace negotiations originally suggested by the American government.
Our major media hardly ignored the gravity of this sudden, unexpected killing of so high-ranking a political and military figure, and gave it enormous attention. A day or so later, the front page of my morning New York Times was almost entirely filled with coverage of the event and its implications, along with several inside pages devoted to the same topic. Later that same week, America’s national newspaper of record allocated more than one-third of all the pages of its front section to the same shocking story.
But even such copious coverage by teams of veteran journalists failed to provide the incident with its proper context and implications. Last year, the Trump Administration had declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard “a terrorist organization,” drawing widespread criticism and even ridicule from national security experts appalled at the notion of classifying a major branch of Iran’s armed forces as “terrorists.” Gen. Soleimani was a top commander in that body, and this apparently provided the legal fig-leaf for his assassination in broad daylight while on a diplomatic peace mission.
Although Pollock provided some explanations for this shocking transformation in American doctrine, he failed to note what was arguably the most obvious factor. Over the last generation or two, the American government and American political life have been almost entirely captured by what scholars John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt called “The Israel Lobby” in their best-selling 2008 book of that title, and this political and ideological transformation has only further accelerated in the last couple of years, most recently reaching ridiculous, almost cartoonishly extreme levels.
For example, nearly every other country on earth regards Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as one of the worst war criminals in modern history, now under indictment by the International Criminal Court for his ongoing genocidal massacre of Gaza’s helpless two million civilians, with an international warrant issued for his arrest. But the American political system is almost entirely under the control of pro-Israel partisans so he was invited in 2024 to give an unprecedented fourth public address to a joint session of Congress, receiving an endless series of standing ovations by the trained barking seals of our national legislative body.
Over the last couple of generations, successful American politicians have increasingly been selected for their unswerving loyalty to the State of Israel and their admiration for all things Israeli, often describing themselves as committed Zionists, followers of a foreign nationalist movement.
As a notable example of this strange pattern, a Republican Gentile such as Rep. Brian Mast had not only volunteered for service in the Israeli military, but then proudly wore his foreign uniform while serving as an elected member of Congress. Perhaps partly as a consequence of this demonstration of his overriding loyalty to a foreign nation, in January he was named chairman of our powerful House Foreign Relations Committee.
In another bizarre twist, foreign students attending American universities have never been punished for denouncing or condemning America or the behavior of the American government, but under the Trump Administration they have been rounded up and deported if they criticized the foreign government of Israel.
So if Israel and the Zionist movement have spent the last one hundred years heavily relying upon political assassinations as a primary geopolitical tool, it is hardly surprising if American political leaders have now increasingly adopted the practice of their Israeli mentors and exemplars and done the same.
This trend was further accelerated by the complete capture of the foreign policy establishment of both of our major political parties by the militantly pro-Israel Neocons. Indeed, as I have noted, the term “Neocon” has largely dropped from usage during the last decade or so because the views and beliefs of almost everyone in DC establishment circles would now fall into that category, a tendency that extends across our entire political ecosphere of elected officials, staffers, think-tanks, and media outlets.
I believe that this new American emphasis on political assassinations has extremely dangerous consequences for the world, consequences that perhaps most analysts have failed to properly appreciate. Israel’s tendency to assassinate the political leaders of those countries it views as rivals or threats has naturally focused upon its own region. But when American leaders have adopted that same mind-set, their targets have obviously been different ones.
Israel’s sudden and largely successful decapitation strike against Iran had heavily relied upon the innovative use of drones. But just a couple of weeks earlier, a somewhat different but equally bold use of drones had been used to hit all of Russia’s interior airbases housing its strategic bomber fleet, successfully destroying quite a number of those nuclear-capable aircraft, one of the important legs of the country’s nuclear deterrent triad. Just before that, there was an attempt to assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin with a swarm of drones when he visited the Kursk area on a helicopter tour of that region.
Although the Ukrainian government took full credit for these latter two attacks against Russia, it seems extremely unlikely that they would have undertaken such action without the full support and approval of their American and NATO paymasters, and indeed the Russians claimed to have hard evidence of such involvement. As I noted in an article, the Ukrainian government explained that the planning for the project had begun roughly eighteen months earlier, and that had been exactly the time when New Jersey and parts of the East Coast had reported a mysterious wave of very heavy drone activity, which our government later admitted was testing for a highly classified military project. I think that the very close match of timing was hardly likely to have been coincidental.
The size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal surpasses our own and its large suite of unstoppable hypersonic delivery systems has given it a measure of strategic superiority over America and our NATO allies on both the nuclear and conventional escalation ladders. So the very strong likelihood that America was intimately involved in an attack on Russia’s nuclear triad and an attempt to assassinate Russia’s president seems exceptionally reckless and dangerous behavior. In a recent article, I suggested that Russia should take prompt and forceful action to deter any such future attacks, but this has not yet happened:
A couple of years earlier, I published an article focusing on indications of earlier American attempts to kill President Putin. This came after our bipartisan political and media elites had begun vilifying the Russian leader as “another Hitler,” with leading media figures and top U.S. Senators loudly calling for his assassination. I noted that the Russians seemed concerned that such assassination efforts might even employ novel, biological means:
We should also recognize the reality that during the last seventy years America has maintained the world’s largest and best-funded biological warfare program, with our government spending many tens of billions of dollars on biowarfare/biodefense across those decades. And as I’ve discussed in a long article, there is even considerable evidence that we actually used those illegal weapons during the very difficult first year of the Korean War…
Soon after their invasion, the Russians publicly claimed that the U.S. had established a series of biolabs in Ukraine, which were preparing biological warfare attacks against their country. Last year one of their top generals declared that the global Covid epidemic was probably the result of a deliberate American biowarfare attack against China and Iran, echoing the accusations previously made by those countries.
Russian security concerns over our advanced biowarfare capabilities and the extreme recklessness with which we might employ them may explain the rather strange behavior of President Putin when he met in Moscow for talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz shortly before the outbreak of the Ukraine war.
At the time many observers were puzzled why in each case the two national leaders were seated at opposite ends of a very long table, with Putin blandly suggesting that the placement was meant to symbolize the vast distance separating Russia and NATO’s Western leaders. Perhaps that innocuous explanation was correct. But I think it far more likely that the Russians were actually concerned that the Western leaders meeting him might be the immunized carriers of a dangerous biological agent intended to infect their president.
On the face of it, American attempts to assassinate Russia’s president would make little logical sense and these would obviously be extremely reckless and dangerous. But much the same could be said of American-orchestrated efforts to destroy Russia’s strategic nuclear bomber fleet, yet there seems very strong evidence that both these actions occurred. So we should seek to understand the logical framework, however irrational and unrealistic, under which such American decisions would be made.
I think an important insight may have been recently provided by Alistair Crooke, a former senior MI6 officer and Middle East peace negotiator, with a great deal of expertise and excellent sources in that latter region.
In an interview a couple of weeks ago, he claimed that America had been directly involved in the wave of Israeli assassinations against Iran’s leaders, taking such action despite the fact that we were currently in the midst of crucial nuclear negotiations with that country. Launching a massive assassination attack against the entire leadership of a country with whom you are currently negotiating is obviously an extremely destabilizing action, one that will hardly inspire confidence among other prospective negotiating partners and will surely long be remembered.
But according to Crooke, the logic behind such American action was the widespread belief that the hold of the Islamic Republic upon the 90 million people of that country was quite fragile, and that the successful assassination of most of the Iranian leaders would cause the collapse of the regime, much like the government of Syria had collapsed earlier this year after attacks by armed Islamicist forces based in Idlib. The American government was greatly disappointed when that wave of assassinations failed to trigger such a political collapse and instead redoubled popular support for the ruling regime.
Crooke suggested that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had been targeted for death as well, but unlike so many other senior Iranian officials they had been fortunate enough to survive. Indeed, not long afterward, President Trump repeatedly threatened to assassinate Ayatollah Khamenei unless he completely acceded to America’s demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Offhand, I can’t remember the last time a world leader has publicly threatened to assassinate one of his foreign counterparts in such fashion.
If Crooke’s analysis is correct, similarly mistaken reasoning might help to explain the likely American involvement in the attempt to assassinate Putin a few weeks earlier. Most of America’s political decisionmakers may have convinced themselves that the Russian regime was discredited, unpopular, and fragile, and that the sudden elimination of Russia’s president perhaps combined with a heavy blow to Russia’s nuclear retaliatory arsenal would cause its collapse.
Such an analysis might seem extremely implausible to most observers, but much of America’s leadership seems to exist in an unrealistic propaganda-bubble in which these notions have become widespread.
Consider, for example, estimates of Russian casualties in Ukraine. The Western-funded anti-Putin media outlet Mediazonahas used its considerable resources to continually sweep the Russian Internet in order to compile a running total of verified Russian losses in the Ukraine war, and as of July 2025 had confirmed a total of over 120,000 Russian soldiers killed. This is likely somewhat of an underestimate given that at least some such deaths have escaped public notice, and such totals certainly represent heavy losses in a Russian population of around 140 million.
But our Neocon-dominated American government and its intelligence services have instead accepted without question totally outrageous figures apparently based upon the dishonest claims of Ukrainian propagandists. Back in February, Trump told reporters that Russia had already suffered 1.5 million casualties, an astonishing figure, and just a few days ago, he claimed that almost 20,000 additional Russians had been killed in the month of July alone.
As former CIA officer Larry Johnson noted, journalist Seymour Hersh reported that an intelligence official described for him a destroyed Russian military that had already suffered two million casualties:
“The total now is two million. Most importantly,” the official stressed, “was how this number was described. All the best trained regular Army troops, to be replaced by ignorant peasants. All the best mid-grade officers and NCOs dead. All modern armor and fighting vehicles. Junk. This is unsustainable.”
Two million Russian casualties would probably amount to more than 5% of that country’s entire population of military-age males, and such enormous losses could not possibly be kept concealed. Those figures are obviously delusional.
But if America’s political leaders and many of their military advisors accept such fantasies, they could easily convince themselves that a defeated Russia is now ripe for regime-change triggered by Putin’s assassination. They would obviously hope that the replacement might be a new government closely aligned with the West and subservient to its demands, much as had been the case during the 1990s.
Other Neocon analysts have proposed Russia’s dismemberment into several different much smaller states, none of which would be able to resist American pressure and domination, with various such proposed maps floating around.
Thus, America’s likely involvement in assassination efforts against the top leadership of both Iran and Russia was based upon our unrealistic assumptions regarding the weakness of the two regimes, and the belief that elimination of their top leaders would lead to a collapse. Moreover, in each case these attacks rather treacherously occurred in the midst of ongoing negotiations, over Iran’s nuclear program in one case and over Russian willingness to end the Ukraine war in the other. We should also remember that Trump’s earlier assassination of Gen. Soleimani occurred when that latter leader had been treacherously lured to Iraq for peace negotiations.
Unfortunately, countries that are totally delusional on some national security matters are much more likely to be equally delusional on others as well. I have recently discovered that important elements of the American foreign policy establishment have convinced themselves that the government of China is also fragile and weak, and possibly ripe for collapse if it were hit by one or more sharp shocks. A blogpost brought these strange and surprising notions to my attention a couple of weeks ago.
The blogger highlighted a major article in the New Yorker focusing on aspects of a likely future war between America and China, and suggesting that in some respects it might be analogous to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza. Indeed, the subtitle even described Israel’s invasion of Gaza as “a dress rehearsal” for a future American war with China.
China has an enormous military, equipped with some of the world’s most highly-advanced weapons, and these include a full suite of the unstoppable hypersonic missiles that America has so far failed to successfully produce. So the belief that Israel’s ongoing slaughter of Gaza’s helpless, unarmed civilians holds any serious lessons for the course of a future American war with China seems rather strange reasoning indeed.
What’s Legally Allowed in War How U.S. military lawyers see Israel’s invasion of Gaza—and the public’s reaction to it—as a dress rehearsal for a potential conflict with a foreign power like China.
Colin Jones • The New Yorker • April 25, 2025 • 3,300 Words
The rather peculiar tone of that article may have been influenced by a very lengthy report published several months earlier by the Rand Corporation, whose title appeared to raise strong doubts about the military effectiveness of China’s armed forces.
The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness The People’s Liberation Army Remains Focused on Upholding Chinese Communist Party Rule, Not Preparing for War
Timothy R. Heath • The Rand Corporation • January 27, 2025 • 15,000 Words
However, after carefully reading that Rand study, I concluded that the title was somewhat misleading. The researcher correctly noted that China gave no indications of preparing to wage war against Taiwan, America, or any other country, and much unlike the U.S. had avoided involvement any military conflicts for the last half-century. But lack of interest in starting wars is quite different than lack of military effectiveness if attacked or sufficiently provoked, and conflating the two probably reflected the ideological climate found at most American think-tanks based upon the influence of their funders.
Finally, the lengthiest and most astonishing think-tank report of all was published just a couple of weeks ago by the Hudson Institute, one of our most unswervingly Neocon research organizations. This book-length study argued that China’s Communist government might be ripe for collapse and casually suggested that American military forces should be prepared for deployment inside China in order to seize crucial military and technological facilities and then reconstruct the government of that enormous country after the downfall of its current regime.
China After Communism Preparing for a Post-CCP China
Miles Yu et al. • The Hudson Institute • July 16, 2025 • 65,000 Words
The blogger quoted a couple of the paragraphs from the executive summary of this remarkable document:
While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has weathered crises before, a sudden regime collapse in China is not entirely unthinkable. Policymakers need to consider what might happen and what steps they would have to take if the world’s longest-ruling Communist dictatorship and second-largest economy collapses due to its domestic and international troubles.
With chapters written by experts in military affairs, intelligence, economics, human rights, transitional justice, and constitutional governance, this report examines the initial steps that should be taken in the immediate aftermath of the CCP regime’s collapse and the long-term trajectory China might take after a stabilization period. Drawing on historical analysis, strategic foresight, and domain-specific expertise, this anthology describes these challenges as an exercise in possibilities. The different chapters explore how a single-party system collapses in key sectors of the country and how political institutions transform, as well as China’s unique political, economic, and social situation. Taken together, they assess the daunting tasks of stabilizing a long-repressed country after it has collapsed, in addition to the forces shaping China’s future. In so doing, the authors hope to offer policy recommendations for managing the risks and opportunities of a transition.
Having carefully read the entire report, I found it just as astonishing as was suggested by those paragraphs.
Over the last half-century, China has certainly been the world’s most successful major country, experiencing perhaps the highest sustained rate of economic growth in all of human history and now possessing a real economy far larger than that of the U.S.
Indeed, if we exclude the service sector, whose statistics are easily subject to manipulation, China’s real productive economy is now actually larger than the combined total for America, the EU, and Japan, while certainly growing much more rapidly. Meanwhile, America has experienced decades of stagnation, with heavy financialization replacing our once enormous real industrial strength. Moreover, in many technological sectors, China has now become the world leader, and it is near the very top in most of the others.
Earlier this year I published a lengthy comparative analysis of China and America, whose conclusions were hardly favorable to the latter:
American Pravda: China vs. America A Comprehensive Review of the Economic, Technological, and Military Factors
Ron Unz • The Unz Review • January 13, 2025 • 14,100 Words
The following month I summarized much of this same material in a lengthy interview with Mike Whitney:
One of the main authors of that Hudson Institute report was lawyer and conservative columnist Gordon G. Chang, probably best known as the author of the 2001 book The Coming Collapse of China, and a quarter-century of absolutely contrary real-life trends seems to have hardly changed any of his views.
The Hudson Institute is a leading DC think-tank, quite influential in mainstream political circles, and a report with five co-authors that runs 128 pages must surely carry considerable weight in establishment circles. So when it suggests that the Chinese government is fragile and might soon collapse, those policy makers hostile to China are likely to take such views quite seriously.
Suppose that a leading Chinese think-tank with close ties to the PRC government published a weighty report predicting that America might soon collapse, then went on to argue that Chinese military forces would need to be deployed in our own country to seize our key military and technological assets and also establish a new government organized along Chinese lines. I doubt that most American political leaders or ordinary citizens would view such Chinese proposals with total equanimity, and indeed the blogger quoted a shocked Western pro-China business executive who succinctly summarized some of the striking elements in that Hudson Institute research study:
… which provides detailed operational plans for inducing Chinese regime collapse through systematic information operations, financial warfare, and covert influence campaigns, followed by detailed protocols for U.S. post-collapse management including military occupation, territorial reorganization, and the installation of a political and cultural system vassalized to the U.S.
Rand and Hudson are two of our leading mainstream think-tanks and the New Yorker is one of our most prestigious media outlets. Taken together those major articles and reports could easily convince the ignorant and suggestible ideologues in our government that the Chinese military was weak and the Chinese government fragile and ripe for collapse.
If delusional beliefs regarding the fragility of the Iranian and Russian governments had already led to American assassination attempts against their top leadership, similar reasoning might easily result in targeting those of China as well, especially President Xi Jinping, widely regarded as the strongest Chinese leader in decades. And given all of the recent American assassination projects, the Chinese government might certainly have itself reached such conclusions.
Xi’s surprising absence caused some discussion in the media. I initially paid little attention to this issue, but then some commenter suggested an obvious explanation: Both Xi and Putin were concerned about the possible risk of American assassination.
Brazil is located within the Western Hemisphere, a region under full American military domination. Given the extremely reckless and unpredictable behavior of the American government, with President Trump having publicly threatened to assassinate Iran’s top leader just a couple of weeks earlier, both China and Russia may have believed that some risks should best be avoided.
Suppose an errant missile struck down an incoming presidential plane, with no conclusive means of proving the source, or an aircraft were destroyed by some more sophisticated methods. Over the years, Xi and Putin had both met on numerous occasions with Iranian President Raisi, with whom they had developed an excellent working relationship, and surely his 2024 death in a mysterious helicopter crash while returning from a foreign trip would have concentrated their minds.
Any such “conspiratorial” explanation has naturally been entirely avoided by the media. For example, a lengthy article late last month in the Wall Street Journal described how Xi had drastically reduced his foreign travel over the last year or so, noting that a China-EU summit originally set for Brussels was moved to Beijing after the Chinese explained that Xi had no plans to visit Europe. Since the end of 2024, Xi’s only foreign travels have been to Russia and to several countries in South-East Asia. Unlike Europe or Latin America, none of these countries nor the travel routes to reach them would be likely venues for serious American attempts at assassination.
When major countries develop a well-deserved reputation for assassinating the leaders of other major countries, often even doing so in the midst of international negotiations, such behavior may obviously have serious consequences. Back in 2017, President Xi was quite willing to visit Mar-a-Lago for face-to-face negotiations with President Trump, but I very much doubt the Chinese leader will be taking any trips to our own country in the foreseeable future.
The European Union’s attempt to use trade policy as leverage to shift China’s stance on Russia is faltering, as Beijing firmly resists linking economic ties to geopolitical alignments.
EU-China Ties: Geopolitics more than Trade
The July 24 meeting between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing was widely described by international media as tense. At the close of the summit, von der Leyen reiterated that the European Union’s relationship with China stood at a “clear inflection point”—a diplomatic phrase signaling that long-standing tensions are now entangled with sharper geopolitical stakes.
Central to this strain is not merely the imbalance in trade—though China’s growing trade surplus with the EU has triggered increasing scrutiny—but rather, the political conditions under which future economic cooperation might occur. While the EU recently imposed tariffs of up to 45% on Chinese electric vehicle imports—citing market distortion and unfair subsidies—the conversation between the two leaders revealed that trade alone was not the core issue. Instead, the underlying tension revolved around China’s strategic alignment with Russia.
Behind closed doors, EU officials conveyed a pointed message: Beijing’s continued support for Moscow, particularly in the context of Russia’s military conflict with Ukraine, is an obstacle to improving trade relations. Von der Leyen was unusually blunt when she stated at the summit’s conclusion, “How China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for our relations going forward”. She obviously did not discuss the underlying reasons, i.e., Washington’s and EU states’ bid to expand NATO to include Ukraine and militarily encircle Russia, for Russia’s military conflict with Ukraine.
In response, President Xi Jinping pushed back against this framing. He maintained that “the challenges facing Europe today do not come from China,” and emphasized that there are “no fundamental conflicts of interest or geopolitical contradictions between China and Europe.” His comments signaled Beijing’s desire to compartmentalize its relationship with Moscow, resisting the EU’s efforts to link trade policy with foreign policy alignment.
For Brussels, however, such compartmentalization may no longer be tenable. European foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the transatlantic context. As the United States ramps up pressure on NATO allies—most of whom are in Europe—to boost defense spending and expand military capabilities, the EU finds itself under both strategic and political pressure to limit Russia’s influence. US officials have repeatedly called on European partners to take a more assertive role in confronting shared adversaries, with Russia chief among them.
How can the EU manage the so-called “threat” from Russia? One way is to boost its defence spending. But defence capacity cannot be increased overnight. It is a long-term solution. Simultaneously, therefore, Brussels is increasingly relying on its trade ties with China as a pressure tactic to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Beijing. EU officials hope that if China can somehow be weaned away from Russia, it might help them force Moscow to the negotiating table and end the ongoing conflict in ways that might protect their long-term interests. It is for this very reason that the EU has now begun sanctioning Chinese entities that may have some connection with Russia. This is pretty evident, in the EU’s decision to impose sanctions last week on two Chinese banks for their role in supplying Russia. Obviously, it annoyed Beijing, but it also sent a clear message. However, if the EU hopes that these pressures will force China to “decouple” from Moscow, it might be sorely mistaken.
Beijing won’t submit to pressure
China recently found success vis-à-vis the Trump administration’s so-called “Global War on Trade”. The US was forced to start negotiations with Beijing because the latter was able to demonstrate not only resilience but also its ability to dominate the global supply chain of critical minerals, forcing the Trump administration to roll back some export curbs on China, including a stunning reversal of the ban on sales of a key Nvidia AI chip.
In today’s context, the EU and the US are hardly the strongest of allies. With the EU fighting US tariffs separately, Beijing fully understands that there are no swords hanging over its head to quickly resolve trade or geopolitical issues with the EU in ways that may not protect Beijing’s interests. Still, while the expectation in both Washington and Brussels was that tariffs would hurt the Chinese economy hard enough for it to change its geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine, the Chinese economy has been performing well. In fact, it has delivered better-than-expected growth months into the trade war, according to government data, posting a record trade surplus that underscores the resilience of its exports as they pivot away from the US market. The EU economy, on the contrary, is facing sluggish growth rates in 2025 and will continue to grow very slowly in 2026. It is for this reason that when China slowed exports of rare earth minerals to Europe, it triggered a temporary shutdown of production lines at European auto parts manufacturers. And this month, China hit back at European Union curbs on government purchases of Chinese medical devices by imposing similar government procurement restrictions on European medical equipment.
The EU, therefore, must tread carefully. If the Trump administration was unable to force China into submission, Brussel’s capacity is no match either. In fact, Brussel’s core interests will be served much better if it were to 1) de-link its China policy from the US policy on China, and 2) de-link European geopolitical tensions from its ties with China. The EU can surely approach and maintain its ties with Beijing on their own merit and independently of any external factors.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
The people leading India and China lack the ability to predict the long-term consequences of their policies, a senior aide to Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky has claimed.
Mikhail Podoliak pointed to what he called “the problem of the modern world,” singling out India and China, in an interview with Ukrainian media on Tuesday.
“The problem with these countries is that they do not analyze the consequences of their own moves. These countries, unfortunately, have low intellectual potential,” he said.
Podoliak suggested that even though India has a lunar exploration program, it “does not mean that this nation understands what the modern world precisely is.”
The dismissive remarks were in the context of Beijing and New Delhi’s refusal to support Kiev in its conflict with Moscow. Podoliak complained that India, China and Türkiye were “profiting” from the war by maintaining trade with Russia.
“Technically, it is in their national interests,” he acknowledged, before presenting his view of what would benefit China in the long-run.
“China should be interested in Russia disappearing, because it is an archaic nation that drags China into unnecessary conflicts,” he claimed. … continue
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