Details of Iran’s nuclear demands revealed – media
RT | April 15, 2025
Iran is ready to provide assurances that it is not seeking to weaponize its nuclear program in exchange for US sanctions relief, the country’s top diplomat has said, as quoted by the Tehran Times. Seyed Abbas Araghchi headed the Iranian delegation during indirect talks with US envoy Steve Witkoff in the Omani capital, Muscat on Saturday.
The meeting was the first diplomatic engagement between Washington and Tehran in years, with discussions focusing on Iran’s nuclear program and the potential easing of US sanctions.
According to the news outlet, Araghchi stated that Iran wants a “win-win agreement” and “would not, under any circumstances, agree to dismantle its nuclear program.”
He said, however, that the country is “willing to take steps to provide assurances against the militarization of its nuclear activities.” This would include allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency access to the country’s nuclear sites.
In return, Tehran wants US sanctions on several sectors to be removed without the possibility of being brought back “under other pretexts,” according to the Tehran Times.
The publication said it learned that Witkoff acknowledged that the US needs to make concessions. During the talks, the envoy reportedly did not mention the potential dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, nor did he reference the original deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which US President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2018 during his first term in office.
In an interview with Fox News on Monday, Witkoff stopped short of calling for Tehran to dismantle its nuclear program, despite demands from other US officials, including White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz.
“The conversation with the Iranians will be much about two critical points,” Witkoff said. The first is the verification of uranium enrichment, “and ultimately verification on weaponization, that includes missiles, type of missiles that they have stockpiled there, and it includes the trigger for a bomb.”
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), however, has since insisted that Iran’s military capabilities are off limits.
“National security and defense, and military power are among the red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which cannot be discussed or negotiated under any circumstances,” IRGC spokesman Ali Mohammad Naini said on Tuesday, as cited by various media outlets.
The next round of talks between Iran and the US is expected to take place on April 19.
The US and Iran: March to war – or a backroom deal?
The Cradle | April 14, 2025
The rhetoric surrounding a potential US–Israeli strike on Iran has intensified, fueled by veiled threats, media leaks, and what appeared to be an unofficial ultimatum from the Trump administration to Tehran. While no concrete consequences were outlined, the implication of direct military action looms large.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution – and especially after the Iran–Iraq War – Iran has lived under constant threat of US-led military intervention. These threats have fluctuated depending on regional dynamics and shifting US priorities.
In the aftermath of the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran and Syria appeared to be next in line for American-style regime-change. But the protracted insurgency in Iraq and the cost of occupation deterred further US military adventures – particularly against a civilization-state like Iran, whose size and geography pose significant challenges.
Republican leaders, and especially US President Donald Trump, have typically leaned toward employing open threats and economic strangulation policies against perceived US adversaries, rather than pursuing quiet diplomatic solutions. Today, they sense a unique opportunity to strike a deadly blow against Tehran given the recent weakening of Iran’s allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian state, both of which have faced military setbacks and political isolation under western pressure and US-backed Israeli aggression.
Hezbollah, long viewed as Iran’s forward line of defense, now faces internal Lebanese constraints and sustained Israeli aggression, limiting its capacity to act preemptively should Iran be targeted. Meanwhile, Syria’s logistical value to the Axis of Resistance has diminished under sanctions, military exhaustion, and the toppling of former president Bashar al-Assad’s government by foreign-backed extremists under its self-appointed Al Qaeda-linked President Ahmad al-Sharaa.
Exploiting the regional moment
With the Axis of Resistance on the defensive, Washington and Tel Aviv see a fleeting opportunity to consolidate their gains. Yet despite their saber-rattling, Iran retains significant deterrence capabilities and appears prepared to retaliate if provoked.
Trump’s strategy, it must also be noted, extends well beyond Iran and its indigenous nuclear program. These foreign policy postures are part of a broader bid to isolate China, reset regional conflicts, distance Beijing from Moscow, and redirect global energy flows and prices, all while propping up Israel as Washington’s local enforcer.
In this context, West Asia becomes both a proving ground and a potential quagmire. Trump seeks to finalize the so-called “normalization” process between Israel and Arab states, neutralize Palestinian resistance, and pressure Iran to concede its regional role.
While he casts himself as a pragmatist open to deals, this posture serves a dual purpose: securing domestic political capital and forging a regional alliance rooted in US dependency.
Still, for such a deal to materialize, Iran would have to abandon core ideological and strategic pillars – namely, its regional alliances and missile deterrence. This is unlikely. Iran knows that surrendering these elements would strip the Islamic Republic not only of its ideological foundation but of any meaningful regional influence.
Iran’s multi-layered deterrence
Tehran’s defense strategy rests on several pillars. First is its alliance network stretching from Iraq to Yemen and Lebanon, forming a buffer against western hegemony. Second is its growing arsenal of precision missiles, drones, and domestically developed air defense systems. Third is geography: Iran’s control over key chokepoints in the Persian Gulf and its capacity to disrupt global oil supply grants it substantial leverage.
The final line of defense remains Iran’s nuclear program. While officially peaceful, there have been sporadic signals that suggest Tehran may recalibrate its doctrine in response to a major direct attack. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly at Fordow – a fortified facility deep beneath a mountain – underscores this strategic depth.
Despite recent blows, Hezbollah is unlikely to remain passive if Iran faces an existential threat. Likewise, US interests in Iraq and bases in the region, particularly Djibouti, could become targets for retaliatory strikes from Yemen’s Ansarallah movement.
Iran’s weapons development program has made extraordinary strides post-2011, with multiple lines of ballistic missiles like the Khyber Shakan and Fattah series, and more basic but highly producible systems like Imad and Radwan.
Meanwhile, Iran’s drones have proven effective in theaters from Ukraine to the Red Sea, while its layered air defenses – Khordad, Power-373, and Majid systems – make sustained air campaigns costly for adversaries. Its naval strategy hinges on asymmetric warfare and control of the Strait of Hormuz, a lifeline for global energy trade.
American options – and constraints
The US maintains around 60,000 troops across West Asia, mainly in Persian Gulf bases, and has shifted assets – including aircraft carriers and Patriot systems – from the Pacific to the region. Washington can certainly initiate a campaign to damage Iran’s infrastructure, but sustaining it would be difficult.
All regional US bases are within range of Iranian missiles, meaning any engagement could mark the first conventional war for the US with real counter-fire in decades.
Expect Washington to lean heavily on cyberwarfare and covert operations targeting civilian and military infrastructure alike to sow chaos inside Iran. Yet, a limited strike risks triggering a protracted conflict – something Iran is arguably more prepared for.
Iran’s strategy of attrition suits its asymmetric strengths and the fragility of US supply chains for munitions such as Patriots, SM-series interceptors, and cruise missiles.
The ongoing engagement in the Red Sea has already strained American resources. US aircraft carriers are operating from positions well beyond effective range, and stockpiles of precision munitions are running low – many earmarked for future conflict with China.
Manufacturing limitations, not cost, are the real bottleneck in sustaining a prolonged campaign. Despite these constraints, the US could still inflict serious initial damage. But sustaining such an operation, especially in the face of regional retaliation, would exact a high political and economic cost.
Between brinkmanship and bargaining
Both sides have much to lose – and much to bargain with. For Washington, a limited conflict could serve immediate strategic aims. For Tehran, dragging the US into a drawn-out war could shift pressure back onto American decision-makers already grappling with economic turbulence at home.
While the rhetoric of war dominates headlines, the path to direct conflict remains uncertain. Much depends on the outcome of indirect negotiations, particularly the recent round of indirect talks in Muscat, Oman.
Trump’s theatrics – threats, military build-up, and erratic messaging – are better understood as negotiating tactics than a clear march to war. Notably, Trump’s insistence that the occupation state should take the lead in any war on Iran reveals his reluctance to entangle the US in yet another West Asian quagmire.
His preference remains a deal, on his terms, allowing him to parade a foreign policy ‘win’ without bloodshed. In sum, war is neither inevitable nor necessarily decisive. The US needs a strategic pause in West Asia to refocus on other global priorities.
Iran, meanwhile, seeks time to rebuild internally and block Israel from exploiting current momentum. The coming weeks may decide whether this standoff ends in confrontation, or compromise.
Standing at the Edge of the Iran War Cliff
By Ron Paul | April 14, 2025
Millions of people around the world were at the edge of their seats over the weekend, waiting to hear whether Trump special envoy Steve Witkoff’s indirect talks with the Iranian foreign minister would ratchet down tensions or would break down and bring on a major Middle East war.
If it seems bizarre that the outcome of a meeting between a US president’s designated negotiator and a foreign government minister could determine whether we plunge into possibly our biggest war since World War II, that’s because it is bizarre. In fact, this is an excellent example of why our Founders were so determined to keep warmaking authority out of the Executive Branch of government. No one person – much less his aide – should have the power to take this country to war.
That is why the Constitution places the authority to go to war firmly and exclusively in the hands of the representatives of the people: the US Congress. After all, it is the US people who will be expected to fight the wars and to pay for the wars and to bear the burden of the outcome of the wars. When that incredible power is placed in the hands of one individual – even if that individual is elected – the temptation to use it is far too great. Our Founders recognized this weakness in the system they were rebelling against – the British monarchy – so they wisely corrected it when they drafted our Constitution.
Unless the US is under direct attack or is facing imminent direct attack, the Constitution requires Congress to deliberate, discuss, and decide whether a conflict or potential conflict is worth bringing the weight of the US military to bear. They wanted it harder, not easier, to take us to war.
When wars can be started by presidents with no authority granted by Congress, the results can be the kinds of endless military engagements with ever-shifting, unachievable objectives such as we’ve seen in Afghanistan and Iraq.
We are currently seeing another such endless conflict brewing with President Trump’s decision to start bombing Yemen last month. The stated objectives– to end Houthi interference with Israeli Red Sea shipping – are not being achieved so, as usually happens, the bombing expands and creates more death and destruction for the civilian population. In the last week or so, US bombs have struck the water supply facilities for 50,000 civilians and have apparently blown up a civilian tribal gathering.
Starting a war with Iran was the furthest thing from the minds of American voters last November, and certainly those who voted for Donald Trump were at least partly motivated by his promise to end current wars and start no new wars. However, there is a strange logic that to fulfill the promise of no new wars, the US must saber rattle around the world to intimidate others from crossing the White House. This is what the recycled phrase “peace through strength” seems to have come to mean. But the real strength that it takes to make and keep peace is the strength to just walk away. It is the strength to stop meddling in conflicts that have nothing to do with the United States.
That is where Congress comes in. Except they are not coming in. They are nowhere to be found. And that is not a good thing.
US, Iran take a leap forward in trust building
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | April 13, 2025
With the foreplay over and US-Iranian talks commencing in Muscat on Saturday, a constructive engagement has begun in right earnestness. The sure sign of it is that Iran’s currency rose nearly 6 percent on Sunday. The Tehran bazaar, the weathervane of Shia politics, has spoken.
Most important, the two key negotiators in Muscat Steve Witkoff and Abbas Araqchi have decided to return to the talks on April 19 in exactly a week’s time after reporting back to their principals in Washington and Tehran respectively and seeking fresh guidelines going forward.
The White House said the talks were positive and constructive and appreciated that “direct communication was a step forward in achieving a mutually beneficial outcome.” Witkoff described the talks as “very positive and constructive.”
Iran’s foreign ministry said the talks were held in “a constructive atmosphere based on mutual respect. Araqchi also described the negotiations as “promising and constructive.” Significantly, Araqchi told the Iranian national television that the talks brought the two sides closer to establishing “the basis of negotiations” for future discussions.
He added cryptically that while Oman will continue to act as mediator in the upcoming round on April 19, the venue for the next session may change.
Signalling to Witkoff and addressing the domestic audience, Araqchi gave an insightful perspective. He said the discussions aimed to create a structured agenda for the negotiations based on a timeline. The following remarks by Araqchi must be noted carefully:
- “We agreed to hold a second round next Saturday, and in the next session, we will delve into the overall framework that a deal can take to see how far this process can advance.”
- It is important to set a basis for the talks; “If we can finalise the basis in the next meeting… we can begin real discussions based on that basis.”
- The talks were conducted in a “calm and very respectful atmosphere. No inappropriate language was used. Both sides demonstrated their determination to advance the talks until an agreement is reached that is desirable for both parties and is based on an equal footing.”
- Neither Iran nor the US wants to “negotiate for the sake of negotiating” and does not favour protracted “attritional talks.” Both sides voiced their keenness to achieve an agreement “at the shortest time. This, however, will not be easy and requires full determination of the two sides.”
- “When leaving, the two delegations encountered each other, and we talked for a few minutes. This is a completely accepted issue. We have always observed diplomatic courtesy when dealing with American diplomats, and this time, too, an initial greeting was exchanged, and then we left the place. It was nothing extraordinary.”
Dr Mohammad Jafar Qaempanah, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s trusted chief of staff who holds the position of vice-president for executive affairs — and, incidentally, a medical doctor by profession with research papers and foreign citations to his credit — that the negotiations “were conducted well with dignity, prudence, expediency, and in line with the interests of the Iranian people.”
President Donald Trump reined himself in his early comments to the media from Air Force One, “Nothing matters until you get it done, so I don’t like talking about it, but it’s going OK. The Iran situation is going pretty good, I think.”
Elsewhere, Trump added, “I want Iran to be a wonderful, great, happy country, but they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” But that is Iran’s strategic choice, too.
That said, both in the US and in Iran, the hardliners are straining at the leash to throw stones. Then there are also the third parties with their own agenda. If the Iranians spurned the initial US attempt to have the UAE mediate, and instead also bypassed Qatar and opted for Oman as their preferred mediator for the talks, it tells a tale by itself of the complex regional alignments in the Gulf as well as Tehran’s need to keep Israelis miles away from messing around.
The crux of the matter is that the initial round of talks in Muscat represents a turning point in the challenging dynamics between Tehran and Washington. According to the Tehran grapevine, the talks focussed on two intertwined contentious issues — sanctions relief and the nuclear issue — as in the past negotiations.
Reaching a mutually agreeable framework for dialogue could pave the way for reducing tensions and returning to a diplomatic path. It is doable today from all indications. The game changer is that both sides have shown willingness to reduce tensions and seek a middle ground. Araqchi’s positive spin on the atmospherics at the Muscat talks signalled that the enduring mutual distrust notwithstanding, both sides acknowledge the necessity of continuing discussions, and are determined to avoid deadlock and explore new opportunities.
This is not to overlook that the path ahead remains challenging and fraught with obstacles. Sensitive issues need to be sorted out such as the the timing of sanctions relief, the scope of nuclear commitments, and verification mechanisms. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that the return to diplomacy after such high spiralling of tensions in recent months provides an opportunity to rebuild relative trust and recalibrate US-Iran relations—at least on technical and substantive levels.
Indeed, Witkoff and Araqchi are just the negotiators with the temperament not to succumb to the temptations of oneupmanship and grandstanding and instead proceed with precision, patience, and creativity in an all-out attempt to capitalise on the good start.
Witkoff already signalled an openness to compromise when he told Wall Street Journal that “our position today” starts with demanding that Iran completely dismantle its nuclear program. “That doesn’t mean, by the way, that at the margin we’re not going to find other ways to find compromise between the two countries.
“Where our red line will be, there can’t be weaponisation of your [Iran’s] nuclear capability,” Witkoff added underscoring that any deal must include extensive oversight measures to guarantee Iran is not developing an atomic weapon. Nuclear experts from the US state department are assisting Witkoff.
Iran has consistently denied seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. On Friday, foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said in Tehran that Iran is “giving diplomacy a genuine chance in good faith and full vigilance. America should appreciate this decision, which was made despite their hostile rhetoric.”
READ MORE: Steve Witkoff’s Iran mission holds seamless possibilities, Indian Punchline, April 11, 2025
Steve Witkoff’s Iran mission holds seamless possibilities
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | April 11, 2025
The rubric of the US-Iranian talks slated for Saturday in Muscat turned into a vanity fair of sorts — whether the talks should be called ‘indirect’ or ‘direct’. The US President Donald Trump sought direct talks and claimed that Iranians conveyed through back channel that they had no objection to it. Furthermore, Trump disclosed that indirect talks already started. While maintaining publicly that the talks will be ‘indirect’, Iranians didn’t call out Trump.
Accordingly, Trump nominated his trusted aide and longstanding friend Steve Witkoff to represent him at the talks. Tehran reciprocated with Abbas Araqchi, a veteran nuclear negotiator and brilliant diplomat, and currently the foreign minister.
Trump noted with satisfaction that Tehran has fielded a negotiator at the highest possible level. Interestingly, Trump made the announcement on the talks from the Oval Office in the presence of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Such hyper activism on the optics may create a surreal impression. After all, there is also a military build-up going on in the US base in Diego Garcia, including B-52 heavy bombers with a range of 10000 kms. But the Russian assessment is that the US’ mobilisation of military assets falls way short of the level of force strength required to start a war with Iran.
The presence of Araqchi and Witkoff at the talks in Muscat underscores that both sides are approaching the talks in all seriousness conscious of the real risk of a dangerous escalation of the present precarious situation around the Iran nuclear issue if concrete progress is not achieved in the negotiations by mid-2025.
The clock starts ticking for the E3 (France, Germany, and Britain) to move to restore the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran by invoking the JCPOA’s veto-proof ‘snapback’ mechanism for which the cutoff date is the month of October. Snapback also restores Security Council ban on uranium enrichment, further reactor development, and ballistic missile activities.
Tehran has warned that if the UN sanctions are restored, it may withdraw from the NPT in response and if that happens, it is no longer obligated to retain IAEA safeguards. But there is a gestation period of 3 months before Iran’s exit from NPT gets formalised.
Enter Russia. According to the 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement between Moscow and Tehran, “nuclear material, equipment, special non-nuclear-material, and related technology” as well as nuclear materials produced by the result of transferred technology “shall be under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards” during their “entire period” of stay in Iran.
The agreement further stipulates that these materials “shall be used only for declared purposes that are not connected with activities of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices” and “shall not be used to carry out activities in the field of nuclear fuel cycle” that are not under IAEA safeguards.
Suffice to say, at the very least, Iran’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia may obligate Tehran to retain some IAEA presence. Russia’s economic interests in nuclear cooperation with Iran will also play a part. Besides, the recent Russian-Iranian treaty on strategic cooperation explicitly affirms Tehran’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Russia also tends to prioritise a constructive engagement of the US in its foreign policies and its moderating influence on Iran lest it goes the North Korean way will be a significant factor in the US-Iranian negotiations. The situation around Iran has already figured more than once in the recent US-Russia exchanges since February including at the highest level between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
During this week, against the backdrop of the talks in Muscat, President Masoud Pezeshkian made certain significant remarks. It is entirely conceivable that he was speaking for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
First, Pezeshkian said Khamenei is “not opposed to US entities investing capital” in the Iranian economy. Succinctly put, this is a radical departure from Iran’s traditional stance.
Second, Pezeshkian said, “We are open to dialogue, but with dignity and pride, we will not compromise on our achievements and we will not make deals (on them).” In effect, Pezeshkian has notified that any suggestions that the only acceptable deal with Iran must include complete dismantlement of the country’s nuclear program will be a non-starter.
Third, Pezeshkian not only reiterated Iran’s rejection of nuclear weapons but stated its willingness to be subject to robust safeguards. As he put it, “We are not looking for an atomic bomb. Who is setting policy above the Leader of the Islamic Revolution who has officially announced that we are not looking for a nuclear bomb? Check it a thousand times. You can verify a thousand times that we don’t have atomic bombs, but we need nuclear science and nuclear energy.”
Fourth, Pezeshkian also had a message of sorts for Israel. He said, “We are not looking for war, but we will stand strong against any aggression with the knowledge and power that our scientists have created. The more they harm us, the more powerful we will become, and the stronger we will stand against any threat they pose to us.”
Taken together, these remarks by Pezeshkian would give a fair idea of what the contours of a possible settlement of the nuclear issue could be as the talks proceed.
Most importantly, Iran seeks an economic partnership with the US and implicit in it is the unspoken readiness for political and diplomatic ties. Iran’s approach bears an uncanny resemblance to what Russia has adopted in its nascent dialogue with the Trump administration. Trump’s choice of Witkoff as the negotiator for Iran can be seen as a signal that the US is open to explore opportunities of economic cooperation with Iran as an underpinning to the normalisation process. (By the way, the Washington Post has reported that Witkoff is willing to travel to Tehran, if invited.) Certainly, Tehran pins hopes on Witkoff bringing new thinking into the paradigm. Do not be surprised if he travels to Tehran in the near future.
That said, the Trump administration must appreciate that Iran lives in a tough security environment and is attempting to use its nuclear threshold status as a deterrent. Therefore, what is possible is a combination of limits and monitoring that can adequately reduce proliferation risks.
The onus is on Witkoff to articulate behind closed doors realistic US objectives for a nuclear deal, bearing in mind that politics is the art of the possible. This involves refraining from calls for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program, and, equally, the projection of ideas as to how Tehran will benefit from an agreement with the United States.
When I visited Tehran last June to observe the presidential election, a topic that came up in almost all conversations and TV interviews was: What to expect from a Trump administration? What I could sense was that contrary to what Israeli media management strives to project to muddy waters, Tehran has no revenge mentality and instead senses that Trump’s priorities in a second term are not about projection of power but the regeneration of America. As a civilisational state that was never colonised through millennia, Iranian culture is highly pragmatic but it will never surrender its legitimate interests or compromise under pressure. In this respect, it is a unique country in the region. (See an outstanding policy brief by Washington-based Arms Control Association titled The Art of a New Iranian Nuclear Deal in 2025.)
Iran’s relevance to the regeneration of the American economy (MAGA) is self-evident. Apart from vast mineral resources, Iran’s human resources can give a solid underpinning to economic and technological partnership with American business and industry. An enduring nuclear deal with Iran is best achieved through an overarching relationship to reengage with Iran as a partner after over four decades.
Israel beats drums of war in run-up to Iran-US talks
Press TV – April 9, 2025
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has revisited threats of deployment of military force against Iran’s nuclear facilities, demanding physical destruction of the nuclear sites, a few days before the Islamic Republic and the United States are slated to engage in indirect talks.
The Israeli official made the call in a video address on Tuesday, alleging that the prospect of using military force was the only means of ensuring, what he called, Tehran’s non-pursuance of “nuclear weapons.”
He asserted that any agreement between the United States and Iran could only succeed if Iran’s nuclear facilities were “blown up” and “dismantled” under American supervision.
“We agree that Iran will not have nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu said, referring to his discussions with US President Donald Trump. However, he dismissed the prospect of a purely diplomatic path, saying things would only work if the United States took direct military action to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
“If we go in, blow up the [nuclear] facilities, dismantle all the equipment, under American supervision and American execution — that is good,” he claimed.
“If that doesn’t happen,” he added, Iran could “drag out talks.” “Then the option is military,” Netanyahu alleged.
The Israeli premier also said he and Trump had discussed that scenario “at length.”
The remarks flew directly in the face of the Islamic Republic’s repeated assertions that it would neither pursue nor possess any such unconventional weapons as per clear moral and religious imperatives.
Netanyahu’s comments followed a tense meeting at the White House, where he appeared publicly out of step with Trump on several major issues, including Iran, regional diplomacy, and trade.
During the meeting, he found out from Trump firsthand that Iran and the US were to engage in indirect talks.
Several major Israeli media outlets later said the Israeli delegation had “shock written all over their faces” after the announcement, saying Netanyahu had returned from the meeting “empty-handed” and “humiliated.” One outlet even described the meeting as the “most failed” one to ever take place between an Israeli premier and a US president.
Nonetheless, Netanyahu tried to frame the visit positively, describing it as “very warm” and suggesting further announcements would be made in due time.
Netanyahu’s D.C. trip: All optics, no outcomes – Israeli media
Al Mayadeen | April 8, 2025
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on Monday, becoming the first foreign leader to personally appeal for relief from newly imposed US tariffs that have caused global concern.
Trump welcomed Netanyahu outside the West Wing with a fist pump before both entered the Oval Office for their meeting. In an unusual move, a planned joint press conference was canceled at the last minute without any explanation. During Netanyahu’s previous visit, the two had addressed the media in the Oval Office and held a formal press event.
In the wake of the visit, Israeli media burst with speculation and criticism over how Netanyahu’s White House trip ended in humiliation, as he left with no gains and was publicly sidelined by President Trump—highlighting his waning influence and deepening reliance on Washington.
Trump’s curveballs leave Netanyahu swinging
Israeli media likened Netanyahu’s White House visit to a political strikeout. Borrowing a baseball metaphor, commentators said Trump pitched a series of curveballs on issues vital to “Israel”—from security and trade to regional geopolitics—and Netanyahu missed every single one.
Furthermore, observers in “Israel” were quick to highlight the stark contrast in Netanyahu’s behavior during this meeting compared to past interactions with US presidents.
While he had often been confrontational and assertive, this time, seated beside Trump under the cameras’ scrutiny, Netanyahu merely smiled and absorbed the blows in silence.
The optics were hard to ignore: A figure once known for his strong stance was now reduced to a passive observer, underscoring his political vulnerability, diminishing influence over Trump, and growing dependence on the US president’s whims, as per the Israeli press.
Netanyahu cast as a prop, not a partner
Israeli commentators noted that while the private tone between the two leaders may have differed behind closed doors, the public optics told a harsher story. In coverage across Israeli outlets, Netanyahu was described as more of a stage prop than a strategic partner—ironically echoing his own past jab about being treated like “a flowerpot.” For over 30 minutes, Trump answered questions solo, with Netanyahu largely sidelined and silent.
Israeli media also pointed to the bitter irony of Netanyahu boasting about being the first foreign figure invited to Washington after the announcement of sweeping US tariffs on over 60 countries, including “Israel”. The prime minister had hoped to secure ‘a diplomatic victory’—perhaps a tariff exemption—but left with nothing to show.
In a moment of performative diplomacy, Netanyahu promised Trump he would “eliminate the trade deficit with the US,” a vow many doubt he can fulfill. Trump, unfazed, deflected the gesture by reminding everyone of America’s $4 billion annual military aid to “Israel”: “We give Israel four billion dollars a year. That’s a lot. By the way—congratulations. That’s not bad,” he quipped.
A diplomatic misfire
Israeli media were quick to contrast Netanyahu’s incompatible moods during his recent meetings with US President Donald Trump. Just two months ago, he stood ‘triumphantly’ beside Trump when the US president unveiled his “Riviera in Gaza” plan. But this time, Israeli outlets noted, the atmosphere was decidedly different.
Trump’s surprise announcement of direct talks with Iran visibly rattled Netanyahu, who had expected tougher rhetoric or a potential military commitment. Instead, he offered a subdued response, calling for a deal to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program “completely, as in the case of Libya.”
The Israeli press also highlighted Netanyahu’s concerns over Turkiye’s growing influence in Syria, yet Trump’s response was less than reassuring. Trump downplayed Netanyahu’s concerns with a lighthearted monologue about his close relationship with Erdogan, even suggesting that he could resolve Turkiye-related issues as long as Netanyahu “acted logically.”
Israeli commentators were left questioning the purpose of Netanyahu’s visit, with many concluding that it was a diplomatic failure. They argued that Netanyahu returned from Washington empty-handed—his influence diminished and his political position further weakened.
US, Iran to Hold Indirect Negotiations in Oman
Sputnik – 08.04.2025
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirms the upcoming US-Iran meeting in Oman on Saturday for high-level indirect talks.
Donald Trump previously announced direct negotiations with the Iranian side at “almost the highest level” this Saturday, which Tehran later corrected.
Iran has previously ruled out direct talks with the US under threats and pressure, but has left the door open for indirect negotiations.
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Russia, China and Iran will hold talks on Iran’s nuclear program in Moscow tomorrow.
Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah denies Reuters’ report citing ‘commander’
Al Mayadeen | April 7, 2025
Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah stated that the remarks attributed by Reuters to an individual described as a “Kataib Hezbollah commander” do not reflect the group’s principles or positions.
The brigades emphasized that all official media statements are made solely by their official and military spokespersons.
Any claims made in the name of Kataib Hezbollah by individuals other than these spokespersons are considered false and defamatory, it stressed.
Reuters had reported that Iraqi armed groups are ready to dismantle amid fears of a Trump strike, citing senior Iraqi commanders and officials.
Kataib Hezbollah, a group active under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, took part in the military operations against Israeli targets in response to “Israel’s” war on the Gaza Strip.
US-Iran war would set entire region ablaze: Iraqi official
Last week, the Secretary-General of Iraq’s Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, cautioned that a war between Iran and the United States would not be a “walk in the park” or a simple affair but would set the entire region on fire.
“The outbreak of war with Iran does not mean it will be a walk in the park; rather, it will set the entire region ablaze,” al-Amiri warned during a meeting with tribal leaders and dignitaries from Diyala province at the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ Diyala Operations Command.
The Iraqi politician stressed that “no one should assume that we and other countries of the region will stand idly by if war breaks out between Iran and the US.”
His remarks come two days after US President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Iran if no agreement was reached on its nuclear program.
Ali Larijani, senior advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Sayyed Ali Khamenei, warned that any US or Israeli attack on Iran under the pretext of its nuclear program would force Tehran to move toward producing a nuclear bomb.
Iranian officials have also rejected negotiations under pressure or threats, affirming Tehran’s readiness to respond firmly to any attack.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Tehran was open to indirect negotiations with Washington but pointed out that the US approach would determine the course of the discussions.
‘Break-a-Leg’ (that old Mafia warning) – Trump has threatened Iran over an ultimatum that likely cannot be met
By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 7, 2025
Trump’s ultimatum to Iran? Colonel Doug Macgregor compares the Trump ultimatum to Iran to that which Austria-Hungary delivered to Serbia in 1914: An offer, in short, that ‘could not be refused’. Serbia accepted nine out of the ten demands. But it refused one – and Austria-Hungary immediately declared war.
On 4 February, shortly after his Inauguration, President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM); that is to say, a legally binding directive requiring government agencies to carry out the specified actions precisely.
The demands are that Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon; denied inter-continental missiles, and denied too other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. All these demands go beyond the NPT and the existing JCPOA. To this end, the NSPM directs maximum economic pressure be imposed; that the U.S. Treasury act to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero; that the U.S. work to trigger JCPOA Snapback of sanctions; and that Iran’s “malign influence abroad” – its “proxies” – be neutralised.
The UN sanctions snapback expires in October, so time is short to fulfil the procedural requirements to Snapback. All this suggests why Trump and Israeli officials give Spring as the deadline to a negotiated agreement.
Trump’s ultimatum to Iran appears to be moving the U.S. down a path to where war is the only outcome, as occurred in 1914 – an outcome which ultimately triggered WW1.
Might this just be Trump bluster? Possibly, but it does sound as if Trump is issuing legally binding demands such that he must expect cannot be met. Acceptance of Trump’s demands would leave Iran neutered and stripped of its sovereignty, at the very least. There is an implicit ‘tone’ to these demands too, that is one of threatening and expecting regime change in Iran as its outcome.
It may be Trump bluster, but the President has ‘form’ (past convictions) on this issue. He has unabashedly hewed to the Netanyahu line on Iran that the JCPOA (or any deal with Iran) was ‘bad’. In May 2014, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA at Netanyahu’s behest and instead issued a new set of 12 demands to Iran – including permanently and verifiably abandoning its nuclear programme in perpetuity and ceasing all uranium enrichment.
What is the difference between those earlier Trump demands and those of this February? Essentially they are the same, except today he says: If Iran “doesn’t make a deal, there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before”.
Thus, there is both history, and the fact that Trump is surrounded – on this issue at least – by a hostile cabal of Israeli Firsters and Super Hawks. Witkoff is there, but is poorly grounded on the issues. Trump too, has shown himself virtually totalitarian in terms of any and all criticism of Israel in American Academia. And in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, he is fully supportive of Netanyahu’s far-right provocative and expansionist agenda.
These present demands regarding Iran also run counter to the 25 March 2025 latest annual U.S. Intelligence Threat Assessment that Iran is NOT building a nuclear weapon. This Intelligence Assessment is effectively disregarded. A few days before its release, Trump’s National Security Adviser, Mike Waltz clearly stated that the Trump Administration is seeking the “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear energy program: “Iran has to give up its program in a way that the entire world can see”, Waltz said. “It is time for Iran to walk away completely from its desire to have a nuclear weapon”.
On the one hand, it seems that behind these ultimata stands a President made “pissed off and angry” at his inability to end the Ukraine war almost immediately – as he first mooted – together with pressures from a bitterly fractured Israel and a volatile Netanyahu to compress the timeline for the speedy ‘finishing off’ of the Iranian ‘regime’ (which, it is claimed, has never been weaker). All so that Israel can normalise with Lebanon –and even Syria. And with Iran supposedly ‘disabled’, pursue implementation of the Greater Israel project to be normalised across the Middle East.
Which, on the other hand, will enable Trump to pursue the ‘long-overdue’ grand pivot to China. (And China is energy-vulnerable – regime change in Tehran would be a calamity, from the Chinese perspective).
To be plain, Trump’s China strategy needs to be in place too, in order to advance Trump’s financial system re-balancing plans. For, should China feel itself besieged, it could well act as a spoiler to Trump’s re-working of the American and global financial system.
The Washington Post reports on a ‘secret’ Pentagon memo from Hegseth that “China [now] is the Department’s sole pacing threat, [together] with denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland”.
The ‘force planning construct’ (a concept of how the Pentagon will build and resource the armed services to take on perceived threats) will only consider conflict with Beijing when planning contingencies for a major power war, the Pentagon memo says, leaving the threat from Moscow largely to be attended by European allies.
Trump wants to be powerful enough credibly to threaten China militarily, and therefore wants Putin to agree speedily to a ceasefire in Ukraine, so that military resources can quickly be moved to the China theatre.
On his flight back to Washington last Sunday evening, Trump reiterated his annoyance toward Putin, but added “I don’t think he’s going to go back on his word, I’ve known him for a long time. We’ve always gotten along well”. Asked when he wanted Russia to agree to a ceasefire, Trump said there was a “psychological deadline” – “If I think they’re tapping us along, I will not be happy about it”.
Trump’s venting against Russia may, perhaps, have an element of reality-TV to it. For his domestic audience, he needs to be perceived as bringing ‘peace through strength’ – to keep up the Alpha-Male appearance, lest the truth of his lack of leverage over Putin becomes all too apparent for the American public and to the world.
Part of the reason for Trump’s frustration too, may be his cultural formation as a New York businessman; that a deal is about first dominating the negotiations, and then quickly ‘splitting the difference’. This, however, is not how diplomacy works. The transactional approach also reflects deep conceptual flaws.
The Ukraine ceasefire process is stalled, not because of Russian intransigence, but rather because Team Trump has determined that achieving a settlement in Ukraine comes firstly through insisting on a unilateral and immediate ceasefire – without introducing temporary governance to enable elections in Ukraine, nor addressing the root causes of the conflict. And secondly, because Trump rushed in, without listening to what the Russians were saying, and/or without hearing it.
Now that initial pleasantries are over, and Russia is saying flatly that current ‘ceasefire’ proposals simply are inadequate and unacceptable, Trump becomes angry and lashes out at Putin, saying that 25% tariffs on Russian oil could happen ANY moment.
Putin and Iran are both now under ‘deadlines’ (a ‘psychological’ one in Putin’s case), so as to enable Trump to proceed with credibly threatening China to come to a ‘deal’ soon – as the global economy is already wobbling.
Trump fumes and spits fire. He tries to hurry matters along by making a big show of bombing the Houthis, boasting that they have been hit hard, with many Houthi leaders killed. Yet, such callousness towards Yemeni civilian deaths sits awkwardly with his claimed heart-rendering empathy for the thousands of ‘handsome’ Ukrainian young men needlessly dying on the front lines.
It all becomes reality-TV.
Trump threatens Iran with “bombing [the] likes of which they have never seen before” over an ultimatum that likely cannot be met. Simply put, this threat (which includes the possible use of nuclear weapons) is not given because Iran poses a threat to the U.S. It does not. But it is given as an option. A plan; a ‘thing’ placed calmly on the geo-political table and intended to spread fear. “Cities full of children, women, and the elderly to be killed: Not morally wrong. Not a war crime”.
No. Just the ‘reality’ that Trump takes the Iranian nuclear programme to be an existential threat to Israel. And that the U.S. is committed to using military force to eliminate existential threats to Israel.
This is the heart to Trump’s ultimatum. It owes to the fact that it is Israel – not America, and not the U.S. intelligence community – that views Iran as an existential threat. Professor Hudson, speaking with direct knowledge of the background policy (see here and here) says, “it’s NOT just that Israel as we know it – must be safe and secure and free from terrorism”. That’s Trump and his Team’s ‘line’; that’s the Israeli and its supporters narrative too. “But the mentality [behind it] is different”, Hudson says.
There are some 2-3 million Israelis who see themselves as destined to control all of what we now call the Middle East, the Levant, what some call West Asia – and others call “Greater Israel”. These Zionists believe that they are mandated by God to take this land – and that all who oppose them are Amalek. They believe the Amalek to be consumed with an overwhelming desire to kill Jews, and who therefore should be annihilated.
The Torah records the story of Amalek: Parshat Ki Teitzei, when the Torah states, machoh timcheh et zecher Amalek—that we must erase Amalek’s memory. “Every year we [Jews] are obligated to read – not how God will destroy Amalek – but how we should destroy Amalek”. (Though many Jews puzzle how to reconcile this mitzvah with their ingrained contrarian values of compassion and mercy).
This commandment in the Torah is in fact one of the key factors that lies at the root of Israel’s obsession with Iran. Israelis perceive Iran as an Amalek tribe plotting to kill Jews. No deal, no compromise therefore is possible. It is also, of course, about Iran’s strategic challenge (albeit secular) to the Israeli state.
And what has made the Trump ultimatum so pressing in Washington’s view – apart from the China-pivot considerations – was the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. That assassination marked a big shift in U.S. thinking, because, before that, we inhabited an era of careful calculation; incremental moves up an escalator ladder. What is understood now is that ‘we’re no longer playing chess’. There are no rules anymore.
Israel (Netanyahu) is going hell-for-leather on all fronts to mitigate the divisions and turmoil at home in Israel through igniting the Iranian front – even though this course might well threaten Israel’s destruction.
This latter prospect marks the reddest of ‘red lines’ to ingrained Deep State structures.
Tehran rules out talks on US terms, says ‘Libya-style deal a dream’
Al Mayadeen | April 6, 2025
Iran has restated its refusal to hold direct talks with the United States over its nuclear program, instead demanding that all negotiations proceed through intermediaries. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reaffirmed Tehran’s position on Sunday, saying that no discussions with Washington have occurred and none will take place without mediation.
“We have stated our position – we are in favor of the diplomatic path and negotiations, but via mediators. Of course, it should be emphasized that not a single round of such talks has been held yet,” Araghchi said in a statement posted on Telegram.
His comments came after US President Donald Trump threatened Iran with bombings if it refuses to accept his new ‘nuclear deal’. Araghchi firmly rejected the idea of Iran following the model imposed on Libya in 2003—when Libya abandoned its WMD program in exchange for sanctions relief, only to later be invaded and see its leader killed.
“The US can only dream” of such an outcome with Iran, he stated.
Araghchi’s reference to Libya alludes to the fate of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was captured and killed by NATO-backed rebel forces in 2011 after agreeing to disarm years earlier. Gaddafi, who had pushed for African unity and economic sovereignty through efforts like a gold-backed currency, was eliminated following a NATO airstrike on his convoy and extrajudicial execution by opposition forces. His death, seen by many as a betrayal of a disarmament deal, has deeply influenced how nations like Iran assess US diplomatic overtures under threat.
Regional Warning
Against this backdrop, Iran has also warned its neighbors—including Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Turkey, and Bahrain—not to allow their airspace or territory to be used for any US military action.
“Such an act will have severe consequences for them,” a senior Iranian official said, confirming that Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei has placed Iran’s armed forces on high alert.
The official also suggested that indirect talks could resume soon via Oman, a long-standing diplomatic channel, but stressed that progress will depend on Washington’s willingness to de-escalate. They warned that the process may be “rocky” and pointed to a narrow two-month window before potential Israeli military action or a reimposition of UN sanctions.
Iran insists its nuclear program is peaceful, but the International Atomic Energy Agency recently reported that enrichment has reached 60%—dangerously close to weapons-grade. Tehran has ruled out discussing its missile capabilities and continues to reject negotiations conducted under pressure or military threat.
IRGC commander Amirali Hajizadeh has warned that in the event of full-scale conflict, US military installations across the region will be treated as legitimate targets.
Policy Reversal: Why Is the U.S. Softening Its Position on Iran?
By Viktor Mikhin – New Eastern Outlook – April 5, 2025
In Recent Days, the Trump Administration—Known for Its Hardline Stance on Iran—Has Shown Unexpected Shifts in Rhetoric.
U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Steven Whitcoff, who previously advocated for a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, now speaks of the need for “confidence-building” and “resolving disagreements.” This sharp turn in foreign policy strategy raises many questions: What exactly prompted Washington to change its approach? What factors influenced the decision to soften its stance? And most importantly—does the U.S. have a real plan of action, or is this just a temporary tactical maneuver?
An analysis of the situation suggests that the policy shift is tied to a combination of factors—from the failure of sanctions to the Trump administration’s domestic political calculations. Additionally, Iran’s response and that of the international community play a key role in determining how events will unfold.
The Failure of “Maximum Pressure”
In 2018, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), expecting that harsh sanctions would force Iran to make concessions. The Trump administration believed economic strangulation would either lead to regime change in Tehran or its surrender on the nuclear issue. However, these calculations proved wrong.
Instead of backing down, Iran responded by escalating its nuclear activities. According to the IAEA, Tehran has significantly increased its stockpile of enriched uranium and begun developing more advanced centrifuges. Moreover, the country strengthened ties with Russia and China, finding alternative ways to bypass sanctions. As a result, the “maximum pressure” policy not only failed to achieve its goals but, from Washington’s perspective, worsened the situation by bringing Iran closer to developing nuclear weapons.
Now, Washington seems to have realized that isolating Iran hasn’t worked and is attempting to shift to diplomatic methods. The question, however, is whether it’s too late—Tehran, hardened by bitter experience, is unlikely to agree to new negotiations without serious guarantees.
Another reason for the policy shift may be domestic U.S. issues. Facing economic challenges and a lack of clear successes, President Trump urgently needs a foreign policy win that can be framed as a major achievement of his so-called “new approach.” A full-scale war with Iran is too risky—a scenario that could spell disaster for both the region and the U.S. itself. Thus, the administration is likely betting on a temporary agreement that can be marketed as a “diplomatic breakthrough.” However, this approach risks new problems—if the deal proves short-lived, it will further erode international trust in the U.S.
Internal Divisions in U.S. Leadership
The rhetorical shift also reflects deep divisions within the American leadership. While some officials, like Steven Whitcoff, advocate for negotiations, others—including National Security Advisor Mike Waltz—continue to insist on Iran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear program. These contradictions indicate a lack of a unified strategy.
Part of the administration appears to recognize the futility of further pressure, while another faction remains committed to a hardline approach. This division makes any long-term U.S. strategy unstable—a change in administration or even a shift in Congressional power dynamics could undo any agreements reached. Such confusion weakens the effectiveness of U.S. policy and gives Iran additional leverage.
Iran’s Response: Why Tehran Doesn’t Trust the U.S.
Iranian leaders remain deeply skeptical of Washington’s new overtures. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly stated that “threats and bribes do not work on Iran.” The experience of the 2015 JCPOA showed that the U.S. could abandon the deal at any moment, even if Iran fully complied.
After Washington’s unilateral withdrawal, Tehran lost faith in American guarantees. Now, Iran’s leadership demands not only sanctions relief but also legally binding commitments to prevent the U.S. from reneging again.
The situation is further complicated by internal political struggles in Iran. Conservative factions, empowered after the JCPOA’s collapse, oppose any concessions to the West. Additionally, Iran has adapted to sanctions by finding alternative oil markets and deepening cooperation with China and Russia. This reduces the effectiveness of U.S. pressure and diminishes Tehran’s incentives to compromise.
Even Washington’s closest allies, like Israel, have expressed discontent with the policy shift. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated he distrusts new negotiations with Iran and views any concessions as dangerous.
European nations, however, have long called for renewed dialogue. Germany, France, and the UK—who remained in the JCPOA after the U.S. exit—hope for de-escalation. Yet their influence is limited, as key decisions are made in Washington and Tehran.
Currently, negotiations remain at an impasse. The U.S. offers dialogue but maintains sanctions, while Iran refuses concessions without guarantees. Experts believe Trump is attempting a “good cop, bad cop” tactic, similar to his approach with North Korea. However, unlike in 2015, Tehran is no longer willing to negotiate under pressure. Iranian leaders recognize that time is on their side—the longer the U.S. fails to achieve its goals, the weaker its position becomes.
A Way Out?
An exit from the deadlock—which the U.S. created in its relations with Iran—was discussed during recent trilateral talks between China, Russia, and Iran in Beijing. The meeting produced a comprehensive initiative to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, based on five principles:
- Peaceful Solutions Over Sanctions: All parties must reject coercive pressure and illegal restrictions, prioritizing dialogue. Conditions for renewed negotiations must be created while avoiding escalatory steps.
- Balancing Rights and Obligations: Iran must uphold its commitment against nuclear weapons development, while the international community recognizes its right to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT.
- Returning to the JCPOA as a Foundation: The initiative calls for renewed focus on the JCPOA, urging the U.S. to demonstrate goodwill and rejoin the process.
- Dialogue Over UN Pressure: Premature involvement of the UN Security Council would undermine trust and stall progress. Confrontational mechanisms would negate years of diplomacy.
- Gradual Steps and Mutual Compromises: Forceful methods are ineffective—only equal consultations can produce a compromise respecting all parties’ interests and global demands.
The softening of U.S. rhetoric is a clear sign that “maximum pressure” has failed. Yet without real concessions and guarantees, negotiations are unlikely to yield a breakthrough. Iran has learned to play the long game, leaving Washington with a choice: serious, equal-footed dialogue or further escalation with unpredictable consequences. For now, the situation remains in limbo, with neither side willing to make the first move.
Viktor Mikhin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RAEN), Expert on Arab World Affairs
