Is North Korea a nuclear state?
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – February 4, 2025
The transition from the Biden to the Trump government was marked by an interesting discussion as to how the outgoing and coming administrations view North Korea’s nuclear potential.
Republicans: DPRK is a nuclear state and de-nuclearisation is unlikely
On January 14, US Secretary of Defence nominee Pete Hegseth called North Korea a “nuclear power” that poses a threat to global stability. He noted Pyongyang’s success in increasing its nuclear potential, bringing down the size of nuclear warheads and improving mobile launch platforms, which is of particular concern given North Korea’s proximity to the territories where US military contingents are located.
Also, Donald Trump intends to appoint Elbridge Colby, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy and Force Development in his first term, to the post of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. This is a man who believes that the de-nuclearisation of the DPRK is an ‘unlikely’ goal. In addition, Colby believes that US troops on the Korean peninsula should focus more on threats from China and that “North Korea is not the primary threat to the United States”. “It is irrational to sacrifice several American cities to fight the DPRK” and Washington should allow South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons or at least to seriously consider such a possibility.
Democrats: DPRK is not a nuclear state, de-nuclearisation remains the goal
On the same day, January 14, the outgoing US president’s national security adviser, John Kirby, noted that the White House’s policy on this issue had not changed. The current US administration, led by Joe Biden, does not agree with Pete Hegseth’s statement.
On January 7, former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Philip Goldberg, stated that, despite the issues associated with the development of Pyongyang’s nuclear and weapons capabilities, the de-nuclearisation of North Korea should remain a goal that must continue to be fought for.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry made similar statements: “North Korea’s de-nuclearisation has been a principle consistently upheld by South Korea, the United States and the international community” … Under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), North Korea can never be recognised as a nuclear-armed state”.
The conservative media in South Korea also began to sound the alarm; such terminology ‘not only changes the international community’s understanding of North Korea’s nuclear status, but also undermines the long-standing efforts of South Korea and the United States to achieve the de-nuclearisation of the North’. “Recognising North Korea as a nuclear power is fundamentally different from recognising its technical nuclear capabilities”. Their writing show concerns that by shifting the conversation from de-nuclearisation to arms control, Washington and Pyongyang may eventually agree to freeze the nuclear programme, from which the US-ROK alliance would take a blow and which could also trigger a nuclear domino effect. “If North Korea is recognised as a nuclear power, countries like South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan may reconsider their non-nuclear positions”.
Marco Rubio’s views
A while later, on January 16, in response to statements that the US’ policy towards North Korea, including sanctions, is ‘ineffective’ and Pyongyang is only doubling down on its nuclear and missile programmes, Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio has already noted that Washington should take a serious look at policy on North Korea to study how to reduce the risk of an ‘unintended’ war between the two Koreas and prevent a crisis on the Korean peninsula without encouraging countries to build their own nuclear weapons.
Note that the new Secretary of State does not make the North out to be a ‘threat to humanity’ and sets more practical tasks, avoiding what the author calls ‘conflict for irrational reasons’ and the likely fall of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the emergence of new nuclear actors (we shall not name them specifically, but all is clear to everyone).
Rubio admitted that he was initially sceptical about engaging with Pyongyang, but during his first term as president, Trump “stopped missile tests. This did not stop the development of the programme, but at least it calmed the situation down a bit”.
Rubio did not directly mention de-nuclearisation, but noted that Kim Jong Un “used nuclear weapons as an insurance policy to stay in power” and “no sanctions prevented him from developing this potential”.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry’s response to Rubio’s remark on January 16, 2025, was similar to the answer to Hegseth: the de-nuclearisation of North Korea is a “unanimous goal” shared by the international community. We have heard Rubio, but “the new Trump administration has yet to outline its policy towards Pyongyang” and South Korea “intends to maintain close contacts with the United States in the process of reviewing its policies to ensure a coordinated response to North Korea’s nuclear and other challenges”.
In summary…
Previously, US officials refused to publicly recognise North Korea as a nuclear power, even though Pyongyang has called itself a nuclear power in its constitution, adopted a nuclear doctrine and showed no willingness to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons. In their opinion, the use of this term can be interpreted as the recognition of the DPRK’s nuclear status and thus negatively affect US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Biden administration tried to look the other way and not acknowledge the reality, perceiving the North Korean regime as a country that does not yet have real nuclear potential and, importantly, may even be subject to de-nuclearisation. Although, it was clear by the end of the 2010s that such a process was possible only after a regime change.
The Trump administration is more realistic in this regard. Perhaps the fact of the matter is that there are quite a lot of military personnel who have worked in the field and are well aware of what real North Korean nuclear missile power is.
The question, however, is how US policy will be adjusted in relation to the idea of a nuclear North. Say Trump decides to recognise North Korea’s nuclear status; what practical steps will follow and how it will affect changes in sanctions? On the one hand, it becomes clear that de-nuclearisation, which was the main formal goal of the negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at the previous stage, no longer makes sense. At best, it makes sense to talk about arms control and here there are some theoretical prospects. On the other hand, for American public opinion, North Korea remains an ‘evil state’ to which concessions are unacceptable. This means that Donald Trump will have to think very carefully to come up with a proposal that Pyongyang will actually be ready to discuss. Moreover, if such a proposal is formulated, the American deep state and public opinion will be strongly opposed to such concessions and it is unclear whether Donald Trump will be able to put his ideas into practice.
Nevertheless, it is still pleasant that the new US administration is beginning to recognise reality vis-à-vis Korea.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
Kiev reveals terms of $20 billion US loan
RT | December 9, 2024
The Ukrainian government has approved the terms of a conditional agreement with the US Federal Financing Bank (FFB) for a 40-year loan of $20 billion which will be backed by profits from frozen Russian state assets.
It’s part of a broader $50 billion G7 loan deal, which includes a separate $20 billion EU commitment, and $10 billion to be split by G7 members Britain, Japan and Canada.
The money will be transferred to the Facilitation of Resources to Invest in Strengthening Ukraine Financial Intermediary Fund, established by the World Bank on October 10, “for the sake of the state,” a resolution issued by Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on Friday stated.
The transfer will be based on a Certificate Purchase Agreement between Ukraine, the FFB, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with a loan guarantee and repayment agreement between Ukraine and USAID.
Under the deal, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry will issue a certificate of indebtedness to the FFB, guaranteed by USAID, the government resolution said.
The loan, which has an annual interest rate of 1.3% plus the current average rate for one-year US Treasury bills, will be repaid using interest earned from immobilized Russian sovereign assets.
The US and its allies froze an estimated $300 billion in assets belonging to the Russian central bank following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. In June, G7 members pledged a $50 billion loan for Kiev, with the frozen Russian assets to be used as collateral, to help Kiev buy weapons and rebuild damaged infrastructure. The agreement was finalized in October.
Moscow has repeatedly denounced the asset freeze as “theft” and argued that tapping into these funds would be illegal and set a dangerous precedent. The Russian Finance Ministry has warned that it will initiate retaliatory measures mirroring the West’s actions against resources of Western investors held in the country.
The latest move is part of the current US administration’s last-minute strategy to bolster Kiev’s war effort, which includes a new $725 million military aid package to Kiev and another round of sanctions against Russia. It comes as uncertainty grows over Washington’s commitments under the upcoming presidency of Donald Trump, particularly after US House Speaker Mike Johnson dismissed President Joe Biden’s request to include $24 billion in additional aid to Ukraine in a government funding bill last week.
Indo-Pacific braces for Trump 2.0
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 10 2024
The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election is far from unexpected. Yet, the fact that he has won means that many countries across the world will brace for the impact this win will have on them.
This is especially true for countries in Asia – in particular, in the Asia Pacific region – where the Biden administration, despite its flawed plans, appeared willing to invest US resources, both economic and military, to offset China. Although Donald Trump is, in many ways, more anti-China than Joe Biden is, his anti-China geopolitics is confined primarily to one arena: the US-China trade (im)balance.
It means that the Trump administration will be far less interested in extending military and economic assistance to the regional countries than the Biden administration has been in the past four years. On the contrary, his administration is likely to slap heavy tariffs, which will negatively affect Washington’s bilateral trade with regional countries. In such a scenario, regional countries will have one key policy option: turn more towards China to resolve bilateral ties via diplomatic means and reduce their dependence on Washington.
The Aftermath of the Victory
If Trump’s previous four years in office are any guides to the future, Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies, such as Japan and South Korea, are deeply worried. As former officials of the Trump administration, such as the former National Security Adviser John Bolton, revealed later in their memoirs, Trump had plans to withdraw US military forces from South Korea, keep up with his planned rapprochement with North Korea, and demand massive payments from Japan to pay for the American defence role. During his campaign, Trump defended his foreign policy and repeatedly vowed to continue after assuming the presidency.
For Japan, defence payments are, however, only one of the major areas of concern. Trump will hit trade as well. A key Trump campaign pledge is slapping 10- to 20-percent tariffs on all imports to the United States. Trump has also vowed to “absolutely” block Nippon Steel Corp.’s proposed 2-trillion-yen ($13 million) acquisition of US Steel Corp. More importantly, the US-Japan trade gap has widened to the disadvantage of the US – a situation that Trump would like to reset. According to US official data,
“In 2022, both U.S. exports to Japan and imports from Japan continued to grow for a third year in a row. U.S. exports totaled $80.3 billion, an increase of 7.7% ($5.8 billion), and U.S. imports totaled $148.3 billion, an increase of 10.0% ($13.5 billion). The trade deficit was $68.0 billion, increasing 12.8% ($7.7 billion) from 2021”.
“Our allies have taken advantage of us more than our enemies,” Trump said in a media interview on October 15, referring to the US trade deficit and other issues. With Trump having repeatedly referred to cutting off US support for NATO, Japan’s idea of an ‘Asian NATO’, too, seems in deep trouble. The military pacts Joe Biden made with Japan, South Korea, and Australia are likely to face the same fate. According to Trump, one of the key reasons why the Biden administration entered into these pacts was the pressure the Ukraine conflict generated on these states.
Therefore, he believes, that if he can end the Ukraine conflict – which he promised to end quickly by cutting off US aid to Ukraine – this will allow for the US to divest its sources away from these countries. On the other hand, Trump would not only want South Korea and Japan to spend more on defence but also push them to join him in slapping tariffs on China, thus pushing them into a ‘trade war’ with Beijing. Given South Korea’s and Japan’s trade (im)balance with China, they are bound to suffer from such a policy step because China has the leverage to retaliate. Therefore, they are unlikely to initiate their ‘trade war’. Alternative routes, however, exist.
The Alternative Option
Official Think Tanks in India are already proposing that India should join the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement. This policy shift probably speaks volumes about the direction that most regional countries might be willing to take. India is also one country that recently signed an agreement to jointly manage the disputed border. Now, this pact is crucial – not only because it signifies peaceful management of tensions, but also because the India-China border dispute is probably one major issue where China actually fought. This is unlike the South and East China Seas. Therefore, if China is able to diplomatically resolve its tense issues with India, there is little denying that other countries can do the same. There is, thus, a silver lining for countries like Japan, the Philippines, etc. to resolve their issues without relying on the US (or any other external power, such as the EU or NATO).
In some ways, an inward-looking approach, i.e., an approach that does not seek external mediation, would help push external powers permanently out of the region. Knowing that the Trump administration will itself be looking for disengagement, regional countries wouldn’t have to worry about annoying the US too.
For China, it presents an excellent opportunity to capitalise on US disengagement and deepen its ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. Although China will probably be fighting a ‘trade war’ in the Atlantic, it can still find a major leeway in the Indo-Pacific. Its willingness and openness will only find regional countries ready to jump on the regional bandwagon of free trade for growth and diplomacy for dispute resolution.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
India does not share Japan’s vision of NATO-like alliance in Asia: FM
By Ahmed Adel | October 4, 2024
Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, on October 1 stressed the need to seek deeper ties with allied nations, especially to create a NATO-like organisation in Asia. However, this pursuit is not shared by India, the second most powerful military in Asia, which is also projected to overtake Japan economically in the next few years.
Ishiba has repeatedly called for a more balanced relationship with Washington, including greater oversight of bases in Japan used by the US military, but he has also proposed creating an Asian version of NATO’s collective security group to deter China, an idea that could draw Beijing’s ire and has already been dismissed by a senior US official as hasty, Reuters reported.
On the same day, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said he does not share Ishiba’s vision of an “Asian NATO.” Jaishankar said at an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington that, unlike Japan, India has never been a treaty ally of another country.
“We don’t have that kind of strategic architecture in mind. We have … a different history and different way of approaching,” Jaishankar said when asked about Ishiba’s call.
In addition to the creation of a NATO-like organisation in Asia, the new premier has called for the stationing of Japanese troops on US soil and even shared control of Washington’s nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Japan’s nuclear-armed neighbours, namely China, Russia and North Korea.
“In his victory speech [on September 28], he spoke about the need to beef up Japan’s security after recent territorial incursions by Chinese and Russian military vessels,” Reuters reported.
Since a so-called Asian NATO would also target Russia, India clearly wants to distance itself from any notion of being involved, considering the burgeoning relations the two countries share, which are only growing stronger.
In his address at the 79th United Nations General Assembly on September 28, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his country’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, stressing that a “fairer world order” requires the expansion of the representation of the Global South.
“A fairer world order undoubtedly requires the expansion of the representation of the Global South in the UN Security Council. We support our position in favour of the candidacies of Brazil and India, while at the same time taking a positive decision on the well-known initiatives of the African Union,” Lavrov said.
Meanwhile, during his appearance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jaishankar answered a question about helping Russia and Ukraine resolve their differences: “I’m glad you used the word communication because I think at the moment perhaps (it) is the best description for what we are currently.”
At the same time, Russia was again the largest crude supplier to India in September, registering an increase of 11.5% to 1.79 million barrels per day against 1.61 million barrels per day in August, data from Vortexa showed. This comes as the two countries continue efforts to conduct trade in their respective currencies rather than the US dollar.
Given New Delhi’s traditional and long-held ties with Moscow, it is little surprise that Jaishankar has announced his reservations about Japan’s idea to establish a NATO-like alliance in Asia, which would target not only China but also Russia.
With the US expressing scepticism and India, as Asia’s second power, creating distance, Tokyo has humiliatingly backtracked from immediately pursuing Ishiba’s vision.
Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya on October 2 described Ishiba’s proposal for a NATO-like alliance in Asia as a “future vision” for longer-term consideration, downplaying the idea to avoid provoking China and Russia.
“It is quite difficult to immediately set up an organisation that would impose mutual defence obligations in Asia,” the 67-year-old former defence minister said during a press conference after Ishiba formed his Cabinet a day before.
“This is an issue to consider in the medium- to long-term, spending some time,” he added.
In an attempt to avoid backlash from Beijing and Moscow, Iwaya claimed that the Asian NATO idea is “not something directed toward any particular country.” However, the Chinese and Russians obviously would not believe this for a moment.
Although some regional states, such as South Korea, would obviously support the formation of such an alliance to oppose China, Ishiba’s idea was put to bed the moment the US and India expressed scepticism. However, the US is highly occupied by events in Ukraine and the Middle East and can very well activate Ishiba’s proposal once these other fronts have been pacified. This would leave India as the only major power without a stake in opposing a NATO-like alliance in Asia.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Biden’s Last QUAD summit: All substance and no real Action
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – September 27, 2024
When Biden hosted the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Group (QUAD) from India, Australia, and Japan in the US in 2021, they did not directly mention China. Still, the emphasis on “shared security and prosperity” was an unmistakable reference to a joint mechanism to counter Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly.
One would have expected the Biden administration to leave a legacy of a significantly functional mechanism producing collective security and prosperity at the end of its era in 2024. But, as it turns out, QUAD remains where it was in 2021: a club that hosts little more than tea parties to mean anything. The club, as the Indian Prime Minister remarked after the latest summit, is “here to stay”. The question, however, is: will it, or can it, turn into more than a club for occasional gatherings to talk about abstract geopolitics? It is quite unlikely. Donald Trump’s victory will dampen it even further. If Harris wins, she is unlikely to introduce any major changes from the Biden administration, for obvious reasons (she is currently part of the same administration!).
The Last Summit: What is new?
The last summit is, therefore, no different from the earlier ones insofar as it offers little more than a set of “commitments”, and occasional references to “unity”, “democracy” and certain joint ventures, such as Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI). Apparently a new initiative, MAITRI is backed by little to nothing actionable and concrete. It aims to equip partner countries with “tools” that they will use “to monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior”. Who will fund this initiative? What counts as “unlawful behaviour” and what exact action will be taken against those involved in any unlawful activity are some of the ‘black holes’ that need massive filling before this initiative can qualify to acquire any geostrategic significance. There are other concerns too.
While the joint statement mentions China several times, it does not mention Russia at all. Although it refers to Ukraine, the fact that it does not refer to Russia is due to the nature of Indian ties with Moscow. What does this mean for the future of QUAD? No references to any threats other than those emerging from, or associated with, China leave QUAD a club squarely and singularly focused on China. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage?
The China Factor
Being squarely anti-China means QUAD can never sell itself to the wider region as a framework of security. Had QUAD been a general framework of security, it could have attracted several other countries from the region. However, it is unable to do this because a large number of countries in the region do not wish to gang up against China due to the nature of their ties with Beijing. For instance, there is probably not a single example where a country from this region, which is not a QUAD member, ever endorsed anything QUAD said or did. In other words, QUAD operates in a disconnected regional space as an abstract idea rather than as a force to be reckoned with.
This is despite the fact that the latest QUAD summit categorically said China is “testing us”. Conversely, QUAD is “testing” China, but China’s advantage is that it does not have many real regional rivals. That includes India too.
Now, PM Modi thinks that QUAD is here to stay, but the exact purpose it will serve for him is far from clear to other QUAD members. Consider the bilateral trade volume, for instance. It has already reached US$118 billion in 2024. Despite so-called “tensions”, the overall trade grew by 1.5 per cent in terms of year-on-year growth. More significantly, QUAD downplays the role – and the possibility – of regional countries utilising bilateral channels for dispute resolution. Is QAUD the only mechanism that, for instance, PM Modi might depend upon in the wake of another border clash with China?
Bilateralism Trumps QUAD’s Multilateralism
Let’s see what both India and China have done in the past two years. Instead of relying on QUAD, New Delhi happens to have preferred meetings and regular interaction with China at the Corps Commander level. According to data shared by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, 21 meetings have been held until February 2024. None of these meetings either involved any third party, nor did New Delhi stress a multilateral approach for ‘effective’ dispute resolution. The Indian readout stressed the friendly and amicable nature of talks.
This is not the only mechanism. Since 2012, the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs has been another key bilateral avenue of dispute resolution, and it has remained relevant despite the border clashes. On August 29, the WMCC held its 31st meeting. The meeting’s aim was “to narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues”.
Now, the emphasis on narrowing down existing differences not only signals success, but also the willingness to remain nonviolent in their approaches to conflict resolution. Nonviolence directly implies the irrelevance of the securitised approach of the QUAD vis-à-vis China’s position in the Indo-Pacific.
There is, in simple words, a lesson for countries in the region. Many countries in Southeast Asia, for instance, have concerns about China’s dominance in the South and East China seas. Should they opt for a military approach considering that India, a much bigger military power than any country in Southeast Asia, is itself following dialogue and diplomacy to resolve disputes? The lesson, in other words, is to emphasise bilateral approach and talk directly to China.
All of these factors combine to produce the utter inability of QUAD to evolve, since its establishment in 2004, as a significant military or economic alliance. Much to Washington’s disappointment, it still does not have a regional mechanism to ‘contain’ China.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Typhon Missile Deployment is Part of US Plans to Maintain ‘Primacy Over the Planet’
Sputnik -10.09.2024
Having previously deployed the medium-range Typhon missile systems – a weapon banned under the now-obsolete INF Treaty – in the Philippines, the United States now moves to station them in Japan in relatively close proximity to China and North Korea.
Washington’s plans to deploy these weapons in Asia are “part of a much wider long-running US strategy to encircle and contain China,” with this move itself being “part of a global post-Cold War strategy to eliminate any peer or near-peer competitor and maintain US primacy over the planet,” geopolitical analyst and former US Marine Brian Berletic tells Sputnik.
The US plans to deploy Typhon missile systems in Europe are also “part of a wider strategy to encircle and contain Russia,” Berletic adds.
According to him, the deployment of these weapons “reveals several important factors regarding US foreign, policy including continuity of agenda.”
For one, Berletic notes, the US pulled out from the INF Treaty during Donald Trump’s presidency, but the deployment of the Typhon missiles in various corners of the globe takes place with Joe Biden at the helm.
“The process of withdrawing from a treaty, developing, and then deploying such systems took place over the course of two presidential administrations, serving one single agenda, regardless of who sat in the White House,” he says.
“The Typhon’s deployment also reveals the true nature of US foreign policy and its disruptive nature for supposed US ‘allies’,” Berletic remarks.
Though both the Philippines and Japan “count China as their largest trade partner,” they both end up hosting US missiles aimed squarely at Beijing, which does little to improve their relations.
“This is just the latest in a long line of provocations complicating what would otherwise be increasingly constructive relations with China,” Berletic explains, arguing that the Philippines and Japan’s willingness to enable such US provocations “reveals the absence of agency in terms of either nations’ foreign policy.”
“It is very clear that this policy of hosting US forces seeking to encircle and contain China is a policy determined in Washington, not Manila or Tokyo, and is a policy serving US interests at the expense of the Philippines and Japan,” he states.
Berletic also deemed ironic the fact that the United States claims that its deployment of weapon systems around the world “is necessary to ensure global peace and stability,” even as the US “consistently demonstrates that it itself is the greatest threat to both.”
PM Kishida Who Militarized Japan at US’ Behest to Resign
By Oleg Burunov – Sputnik – 14.08.2024
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has announced he will quit as leader of the country’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), amid his sinking approval rating resulting from the LDP-related corruption scandal, rising living costs, and a slumping yen.
Under Kishida, Japan pledged to double its defense spending up to the NATO standard of two percent of gross domestic product by 2027, in a US-encouraged U-turn from decades of strict pacifism.
Public support for Fumio Kishida’s Cabinet plummeted to 15.5% last month, another low since the LDP returned to power in Japan in December 2012.
Apart from his poor domestic strategy, what developments have marked Kishida’s foreign policy?
- Japan under Kishida has fueled the Ukrainian conflict by providing more than $12 billion of financial and other aid to the Kiev regime since 2022, per the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
- Japan embarked on the path of militarization, issuing in 2022 a new national security doctrine aimed at doubling the country’s defense spending within the next five years.
- The same year, Japan’s parliament did not think twice before approving a deal to spend $8.6 billion over five years to host American military personnel on Japanese soil.
- Tokyo continues to take part in the annual US-led RIMPAC, the world’s largest maritime military drills described by Chinese experts as “demonstration of America’s hegemony” in the region.
- The US currently has about 56,000 active-duty service members in Japan, more than in any other country, according to Pentagon data.
- Last month, Japan agreed on establishing a Joint Operations Command (JJOC) with the US on its territory by next March.
- What’s more, Tokyo and Washington reportedly discussed “extended deterrence”, which stipulated for the use of nuclear weapons in US protection of Japan.
- The US is now pushing for Japan to be included in Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement. China has repeatedly castigated the arrangement as part of America’s “new Cold War” antagonism aimed at containing Beijing by fueling the militarization of the Asia-Pacific region.
US Military Exports Skyrocketing as Washington Continues to Fuel Global Conflicts
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 09.08.2024
The US’ arms exports have risen dramatically since 2022 and may top $100 billion by the year’s end, according to the Pentagon.
In fiscal year (FY) 2022, sales through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system jumped to $49.7 billion from $34.8 billion in FY2021; in FY2023, this number rose again to around $66.2 billion.
So far, FMS sales are already above $80 billion for FY2024, as per the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Still, the total value of transferred weapons, services and security cooperation activities conducted under the Foreign Military Sales system in FY2023 was $80.9 billion, representing a 55.9% increase from a total of $51.9 billion in FY2022.
In 2024, the US State Department unveiled government-to-government FMS sales for FY2023, which required congressional notification:
Poland:
- AH-64E Apache Helicopters – $12 billion;
- High mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS) – $10 billion;
- Integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) battle command systems (IBCS) – $4 billion;
- M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks – $3.75 billion.
Germany:
- CH-47F Chinook helicopters – $8.5 billion;
- AIM-120C-8 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) – $2.9 billion.
Norway:
- Defense articles and services related to the MH-60R multi-mission helicopters – $1 billion.
Czech Republic:
- F-35 aircraft and munitions – $5.62 billion.
Bulgaria:
- Stryker vehicles – $1.5 billion.
Australia:
- C-130J-30 aircraft – $6.35 billion.
Canada:
- P-8A aircraft – $5.9 billion.
South Korea:
- F-35 aircraft – $5.06 billion;
- CH-47F Chinook helicopters – $1.5 billion.
Japan:
- E-2D advanced Hawkeye (AHE) airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft – $1.381 billion.
Kuwait:
- National advanced surface-to-air missile system (NASAMS) medium range air defense systems (MRADS) – $3 billion;
- Follow-up technical support – $1.8 billion.
Qatar:
- Fixed site-low, slow, small unmanned aircraft system integrated defeat system (FS-LIDS) – $1 billion.
In addition to that, direct commercial sales (DCS) between foreign nations and US defense contractors jumped from $153.6 billion in FY2022 to $157.5 billion for FY2023. These sales included unspecified military hardware, services and technical data.
The US State Department provided a glimpse on what major DCS Congressional Notifications included in FY2023:
- Italy – For the manufacturing of F-35 wing assemblies and sub-assemblies – $2.8 billion;
- India – For the manufacturing of GE F414-INS6 engine hardware – $1.8 billion;
- Singapore – F100 propulsion system and spare parts – $1.2 billion;
- South Korea – F100 propulsion system and spare parts – $1.2 billion;
- Norway, Ukraine – National advanced surface to air missile systems (NASAMS) – $1.2 billion;
- Saudi Arabia – Patriot guided missile – $1 billion.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlights that arms exports by the US rose by 17% between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The US share of total global arms exports increased from 34% to 42%. Between 2019 and 2023, the US delivered major arms to 107 states, which was more than the next two biggest exporters combined, as per SIPRI.
The largest share of US arms went to the Middle East (38%), mostly to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Israel.
US arms exports to states in Asia and Oceania increased by 14% between 2014–18 and 2019–23; 31% of all US arms exports in 2019–23 went to the region with Japan, South Korea and Australia being the largest buyers.
Europe purchased a total of 28% of US arms exports in 2019–23. US arms exports to the region increased by over 200% between the 2014–18 and 2019–23 periods. Ukraine accounted for 4.7% of all US arms exports and 17% of those to Europe.
The institute projects that the US will continue to ramp up military sales in 2024 and beyond, with the focus on combat aircraft, tanks and other armored vehicles, artillery, SAM systems and warships.
Okinawa on Fire: Division Brewing in Japan Over US Militarizing & Nuclearizing
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 31.07.2024
The US and Japan have made further steps towards closer military integration and an extension of Washington’s nuclear umbrella over its ally. Their increased military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region means a greater risk for war, particularly nuclear war, warns Okinawan rights activist Rob Kajiwara.
In the wake of their Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) July 28 meeting in Tokyo, the US and Japan announced the strengthening of military ties and upgrading of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) to a warfighting command.
“The US and Japan are increasing the threat of war in the region,” Robert Kajiwara, an Okinawan rights activist and founder of the Peace For Okinawa Coalition, told Sputnik, stressing that the military buildup has nothing to do with Japan’s security and national interests.
Actually, the US is using Japan as a bulwark against Russia, China and North Korea in a bid to maintain its dominance in the Asia Pacific region, according to the pundit. “The world is seeking to become multipolar, but the US is intent on doing whatever it can to maintain hegemony,” he noted.
The American and Japanese delegations also discussed extending the US nuclear umbrella over Japan. While the US and Japan have coordinated on the issue since 2010 within the framework of the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), most recently the US has doubled down on its nuclear umbrella in the region.
It is expected that this year the US and Japan will specify under what conditions the US will use its nukes to “protect” Japan, according to Newsweek.
For its part, Chinese media believes Washington is planning to deploy nuclear weapons in their military bases in Japan, again. The “extended deterrence” means nothing but the US intent to use Japan as an outpost to strengthen its nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia, according to Global Times.
Between 1954 and 1972, the US bases on Okinawa hosted a staggering 19 types of nuclear arms. In 2015, the US government officially admitted the fact that it stored hundreds of nuclear warheads in Japan during the Cold War. At the height of the Vietnam War, around 1,200 nuclear weapons were stationed in Okinawa.
“If there’s any country that should be against nuclear arms, it should be Japan, given the use of nuclear weapons against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan should be strongly against the storing of nuclear weapons in its territory. Unfortunately, Japan hasn’t learned anything from World War II and appears destined to repeat its past mistakes,” the pundit argued.
Why Okinawa is Important for the US
Okinawa, which is part of the Ryukyu island chain, is of utmost strategic importance for the US as it serves as a stronghold for the Pentagon’s operations in the Western Pacific and deployment of troops directly to the Taiwan Straits and to the Korean Peninsula.
The US military installations in the region – which American troops have occupied since the late 1940s – were crucial for Washington’s invasions of Vietnam and North Korea in the past.
The US air and naval bases on Okinawa are located in close proximity to China’s mainland and even closer to Taiwan Island. Furthermore, the Ryukyu island chain presents a natural “wall”, allowing the US military to “control” China’s passage into the Pacific Ocean.
While Tokyo and Washington name Russia, China and North Korea as potential “threats” to the region’s stability, a considerable chunk of Japanese citizens think otherwise, Kajiwara said, referring to Okinawa Prefecture, a home to numerous US military bases and facilities – over 70% of their total number in Japan.
“The overwhelming majority (somewhere between 70-90%) of Ryukyuans [another name for Okinawans] do not consider Russia, China, or North Korea to be military threats,” the activist stressed.
Okinawans Oppose US Bases and Japan’s Militarization
Ryukyuans have opposed the US militarization of the island for decades, citing security and environmental issues, as well as repeated criminal acts committed by US troops against local residents.
In September 1995, three US soldiers kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa, prompting prefecture-wide rallies which brought together 92,000 protesters. This year, two rape cases committed by US soldiers against an Okinawan minor and a woman came to light in June. The first occurred in December 2023 and remained muted by the US military for almost six months.
“The US and [Japan’s central government] covered this up until after Okinawa Prefecture’s recent election,” said Kajiwara. “They wanted to avoid negative publicity before or during the election in order to prevent the [ruling] Liberal Democratic Party from losing votes. Is this democracy? Can the US and Japan rightly call this democratic?”
In another snub of Okinawans’ democratic freedoms, Japan’s central government overruled the Okinawan authorities’ ban on building a new US military base at Henoko-Oura Bay near Nago in 2023. In September last year, Okinawa Gov. Denny Tamaki sought international backing at a UN session, arguing that the concentration of the US military forces in the prefecture threatens peace.
“My petition against the construction of the military base at Henoko received over 212,000 signatures,” Kajiwara said. “The 2019 Referendum in Okinawa resulted in over 70% of Okinawans voting against the Henoko base. In spite of all this, the US and Japan continually ignore the voices of Ryukyuans.”
Who are Okinawans and Why Do They Differ From Japanese
Okinawa was previously an independent Ryukyu kingdom, which was conquered and annexed by Japan at the end of the 19th century, the expert pointed out.
Ryukyuans have our own history, culture, languages, values, and identity. According to Kajiwara, Ryukyu has a tradition of being a “bridge of nations” with the focus on mutually-beneficial trade and diplomacy. “Whereas Japan has a long history of warfare and samurai bushido culture, Ryukyu banned the public carrying of weapons during the 15th century in order to promote peace,” the pundit remarked.
“In 1879, Japan invaded Ryukyu as the first of its colonial conquests… From 1879 until 1945, Ryukyu had to deal with imperial Japanese militarism,” he said. “During World War II, Japan deliberately placed a heavy amount of military presence in Ryukyu with the intent of sacrificing Ryukyuans in order to ‘save Japan’.”
This resulted in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, which amounted to nothing short of the Ryukyuan genocide, according to the activist.
“At least 123,000 Uchinaanchu (Native Okinawans) were killed during a time frame lasting only around three months, which was around one-third of the population at the time. Japanese soldiers deliberately killed Ryukyuan men, women, children, and elderly, claiming they were ‘Chinese spies,’ using them as human shields, and forcing thousands to commit suicide. It is said that every Okinawan family lost someone during the battle. Many of my own relatives were also killed,” Kajiwara continued.
Those who survived were sent to concentration camps by the US occupation forces. During the period from the end of 1945 to 1947 locals returned to their land to find many of their homes and farms bulldozed flat and turned into US military facilities. According to some estimates, at least 40,000 Okinawan landowners lost their land and were not compensated for the loss. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed between Japan and the Allies “legitimized” the US occupation of Okinawa.
“From 1945 until 1972 Ryukyu was under direct US military rule. Since 1972 Ryukyu has been under joint US and Japanese rule. This, of course, has caused great hardship for Ryukyuans, such as economic deprivation, environmental destruction, water poisoning, military accidents, and crime,” he said.
Currently, Ryukyuans fear that the US-Japanese military buildup will invite another devastating war to their land, as per the expert.
“As we speak, Japan is continuing the construction of a new airfield at Henoko, paving over the coral reef in order to build it. The Okinawan dugong, an endangered creature, is being driven into extinction by this. This airfield, along with missiles being stationed around Ryukyu, poses a direct threat to Russia, China, and North Korea. So you see, the US and Japan really have no intention of decreasing Ryukyu’s military burden at all.”
Kajiwara emphasized that he and his team are continuing to raise awareness about the risks of the US-Japanese growing militarization, adding that Okinawans remain hostages to Tokyo’s warmongering. “We discuss all these things in our upcoming documentary film, ‘Occupied Okinawa.’ The film will be entered into international film festivals around the world starting in September,” the pundit concluded.



