Why does MSM believe bizarre rumors coming from the South about North Korea?
The two countries are still technically AT WAR!
By Helen Buyniski | RT | April 21, 2020
The rash of stories claiming North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is on his deathbed – all sourced to a South Korean blog post – show Western media will run any horrific item on the Hermit Kingdom, confident they won’t be contradicted.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is clinging to life by a thread after heart surgery went horribly, horribly wrong! Or at least, US intelligence is monitoring reports that Kim was “in grave danger” after botched surgery, as CNN reported on Monday. The source for Kim’s health troubles was a single report from South Korean web outlet The Daily NK, itself citing a single source in the North.
While CNN acknowledged it “couldn’t independently verify” the story (or anything else happening in North Korea), the outlet ran with it anyway, leading others to do the same. And while the Guardian eventually front-loaded its own article with official denials from China and South Korea as the story began to unravel, its Twitter account reveals the original title, “North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has heart surgery – report,” a much more authoritative-sounding line than the lukewarm “South Korea and China play down Kim Jong-un health claims” it became.
By the time the stories had been edited, however, fervent speculation on “the North Korean succession” was already underway.
None of these stories thought to mention that the South Korean source regularly runs sensationalist pieces depicting the North as a seething pit of death and misery (“Pyongyang hospital construction workers stealing to survive” and “Chagang Province forestry official executed for illegal corn farm” are some recent headlines). Nor do they mention that the South and North never formally concluded the decades-long war that split the Korean landmass, or explain that such atrocity propaganda is typical among enemies.
Indeed, Western media rely on South Korea for news about the North, a weakness which has resulted in some truly preposterous stories being reported with a straight face by Western outlets eager to take a whack at the DPRK piñata.
A 2014 story claiming Kim had his uncle (and several aides) killed by stripping them naked and feeding them to a pack of starving dogs was reported by numerous “reputable” outlets, including NBC and the UK’s Channel 4 even though it originated with a satirical post on a Chinese social network.
About the only thing more embarrassing than publishing the Chinese equivalent of the Onion as straight news is for one of Kim’s “grisly execution” victims to appear in public alongside her executioner. The Telegraph, HuffPost and other ‘reputable’ Western outlets reported in 2013 that Kim had his ex-girlfriend, pop singer Hyon Song-wol, executed by firing squad, citing a South Korean news outlet that in turn cited an anonymous Chinese source. The story was proven spectacularly false last year, when she was photographed alongside the North Korean leader on a factory tour. Incredibly, some outlets still tried to spin the story – the Daily Mail hinted that 10 performers rumored to have been shot alongside her were actually dead, citing South Korea’s intelligence director as their source in a way that implied only Hyon had managed to (literally) dodge the executioner’s bullets.
Yet “numerous” individuals reported executed in South Korean media have later surfaced very much alive, News.com.au admitted last year… before repeating unverified claims that multiple North Korean officials had been executed over the failed US-DPRK peace talks in Vietnam. Why do these outlets keep repeating South Korean propaganda if they know it’s false?
It’s easy for western media to run the most lurid horror stories about the ‘hermit kingdom,’ confident that the only denials will come from state-run media and will be summarily dismissed as the controlled rantings of an ‘Evil Dictator’. Who are you going to believe, a charter member of the Axis of Evil or good old CNN? At a time when the media establishment is widely distrusted and loathed almost as much as politicians, atrocity propaganda is always good for ratings and patriotic sentiment, and there’s no risk of an inconvenient fact-checker bumbling in and making life difficult.
It’s worth noting that trying something similar with other heads of state lasts about five minutes. When UK PM Boris Johnson was hospitalized with coronavirus last month, RIA Novosti published an anonymous NHS source’s claim that he was more seriously ill than the public knew and was to be placed on a ventilator. This was immediately slapped down as “Russian disinformation” (even though it was later admitted that Johnson’s condition had worsened significantly while in hospital). But if the mainstream media is willing to perpetrate this level of disinformation about North Korea, it’s long past time to reconsider trusting their reporting on other countries as well.
Follow Helen Buyniski on Twitter @velocirapture23
South Korean bank submits to US fine over Iran transactions
Press TV – April 21, 2020
South Korea’s Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) says it has submitted to the US demand to pay $86 million in fine for processing Iranian transactions.
The compromise includes paying $51 million to US prosecutors and $35 million to the New York State Department of Financial Services, the lender said Tuesday.
South Korea’s Yonhap news agency cited Geoffrey S. Berman, the US attorney for the Southern District of New York, as saying that IBK’s branch in New York had failed to detect and report $10 million in US dollar payments from South Korean entities to Iranian banks.
Authorities said IBK entered a two-year deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice and a nonprosecution agreement with New York Attorney General Letitia James.
South Korea was among Iran’s major trade partners before falling in line with US guidelines after Washington withdrew from an international nuclear deal with Tehran in 2015 and imposed unilateral sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Iran was South Korea’s third biggest export market in the Middle East and companies such as Samsung and LG Electronics were among popular brands for TV sets, air conditioners, telecommunications equipment and washing machines.
Samsung’s sales also notably covered about half of Iran’s lucrative android phone market, with almost 18 million Iranians having Samsung devices as of February 2018, according to a report published by Iran’s largest app market Café Bazaar.
In February, Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that foreign companies leaving the country due to the US sanctions would not be able to return to the country’s market easily after Samsung and LG Electronics pulled down their last advertisement banners in Iran.
According to a statement by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in Seoul, Iran was once the sixth largest market in terms of orders won by South Korean builders before the 2011 sanctions.
South Korea was also the biggest client of Iranian condensate with 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) on top of 100,000 bpd of crude oil, but it stopped shipments two months before the sanctions kicked in.
South Korean companies have mostly even refused to fulfill Iran’s orders for medicine and medical equipment which is supposedly not subject to the US sanctions.
According to Iranian companies, South Korean banks are refusing to process payments related to Iran’s imports of pharmaceuticals for fear of falling foul of the sanctions.
Iran’s Health Ministry said Saturday South Korea had rejected a SWIFT payment request by Tehran for purchase of coronavirus testing kits.
Ministry spokesman Kianoush Jahanpour disclosed an international financial message recently sent by South Korea’s Woori Bank to Iran’s Keshavarzi Bank, noting that it could not take over an import letter of credit for 5.3 billion won issued by the Iranian bank.
As a result Iran was unable to import the kits because the Korean exporter could not receive payment after Woori Bank’s refusal to take over the import letter of credit.
“This shows claims of medicine and medical equipment not being subject to sanctions are lies. The bank has officially stated that the purchase is not possible due to the sanctions,” Jahanpour said.
The US government has intensified its sanctions on Iran despite international calls on Washington to suspend them to allow the Islamic Republic to secure necessary medicine and equipment in the midst of the coronavirus fight.
Washington claims the sanctions do not target medicine for Iran, but they make it all but impossible for importers to obtain letters of credit or conduct international transfers of funds through banks.
Last week, Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York dismissed the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA) which the Europeans belatedly announced with much fanfare to have made operational in coordination with the US to barter medicine and food with Iran.
The mission said the United States has forced SHTA to pursue a very tight and tough procedure, making it practically very difficult for companies to trade with Iran.
According to the mission, several companies that supply the medical equipment required to fight the coronavirus have recently stopped shipping to Iran because the current US sanctions regime makes the shipping of such items to Iran almost impossible.
The only message the US is sending with intensifying its sanctions amid the coronavirus is that companies must avoid doing any business with Iran, even if their work is humanitarian in nature, it said.
More on “North Korean Hackers”
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – 14.04.2020
North Korean hackers are an unavoidable subject of discussions considering the recent hype about them yet again. Hence, it is worth looking into the wrongdoings they have been accused of and to what extent they are guilty once more.
On 30 May 2019, radio station Voice of America reported that in the opinion of US intelligence agencies, the DPRK, facing economic difficulties due to imposed sanctions, was engaging in cyberattacks against banks and other financial institutions in order to obtain money. Erin Cho, the head of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (an agency of the Department of Homeland Security), pointed out that North Korean cyber attacks were targeting virtual currency, a relatively new means of stealing money.
Former US State Department senior adviser Balbina Hwang also generated publicity with her statements in August 2019. The visiting professor at Georgetown University talked about a story by the Associated Press that “cited a report from the United Nations Security Council” about North Korea’s use of cyberspace to launch “increasingly sophisticated attacks to steal funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to generate income. The hardest-hit was South Korea, the victim of 10 North Korean cyberattacks, followed by India with three attacks and Bangladesh and Chile with two each”.
As it turns out, “South Korea’s Bithumb, one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges in the world, was reportedly attacked at least four times”. Two attacks occurred in February and July 2017, each resulting in losses of approximately $7 million, “while a June 2018 attack led to a $31 million loss and a March 2019 attack to a $20 million loss”.
13 September 2019, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions against hacking groups from the DPRK: the Lazarus Group and two of its subsidiaries, Bluenoroff and Andariel. According to the Treasury Department, in 2014, the Lazarus Group was responsible for the cyber attack against Sony Pictures and also for infecting 300,000 computers with viruses in 150 nations world-wide. Bluenoroff managed to steal $1.1 billion from various financial institutions, including $80 million from the central bank of Bangladesh. Andariel is suspected of crimes targeting the South Korean government and infrastructure, and also of attempting to steal classified military information.
At the end of September 2019, experts from the Kaspersky cybersecurity company detected previously unheard of spyware Dtrack, designed by the Lazarus Group, in networks of Indian finance organizations and research centers. This malware can provide access to a device it has infected allowing data to be either uploaded to it or downloaded from it. The spyware is somewhat similar to DarkSeoul, linked to a cyber attack against South Korea in 2013.
In October 2019, Patrick Wardle, the Principal Security Researcher at Jamf (a software provider for the Apple platform), said that hackers, believed to be sponsored by North Korea, had “found a novel way to attack Apple Macs”. They did so by using a fake cryptocurrency trading app. To add legitimacy to the software, the group even created JMT Trading, a front company “complete with an official-looking website”.
In January 2020, Russian cybersecurity company Kaspersky reported that the Lazarus Group had accrued large amounts of cryptocurrency by using Telegram, a popular messaging app that uses its own proprietary security protocol. In fact, links to groups hosted by malicious Telegram users can be found on many fake websites. In addition, the Lazarus Group continues to design and launch numerous fraudulent websites (as for instance, Union Crypto Trader) that appear to be trading platforms for cryptocurrency or ICO hosts (Initial Coin Offering) but, in reality, they are used to steal users’ confidential information. The malware developed by the Lazarus group is also “capable of loading in devices’ memory (RAM) exclusively, bypassing hard drives”, which makes it even more dangerous.
The latest incident possibly related to hackers from the DPRK occurred in January 2020 when 16 North Korean computer programmers were “found to have been working in Cambodia illegally” and were subsequently ordered to leave the country. However, soon it came to light that they were not hackers but temporary IT staff working for a “Chinese online gambling operation”.
On 17 February 2020, ESTsecurity (a cyber security company based in Seoul) reported that a North Korea-linked group was probably responsible for hacking the smartphone belonging to Thae Yong-ho, a former DPRK diplomat who defected to South Korea in 2016. The hackers used “spear phishing” to access his new name, text messages, photographs and other information. According to security experts, their attack patterns “were similar to those formerly used by North Korean hacking groups”, such as Geumseong121, that targeted “the websites of government departments, North Korea-related organizations and media officials”. The name of the group is fairly patriotic. There is also a possibility that some other team of hackers “used such attack patterns to give the impression of being a North Korean group.” According to Mun Chong-hyun from ESTsecurity, Geumseong 121, believed, in the opinion of South Korean experts, to be backed by DPRK intelligence agencies, was capable of hacking mobile phones of a number of ROK citizens, such as Thae Yong-ho, whose work is related to North Korea and foreign policy. Mun Chong-hyun also pointed out that phishing emails and messages contained, for example, “an attachment that, when clicked, directed the reader to a website masquerading as the website of a North Korean human rights organization based in the US”. Once users were lured to such a website, their devices were infected with malicious files or software that then accessed “systems and sensitive data”.
2 March 2020 The US Department of Justice charged two Chinese citizens, Tian Yinyin, and Li Jiadong, with money laundering. They were indicted for stealing more than $100 million as a result of two cyber attacks. But, according to a joint investigation conducted by U.S. intelligence and South Korean law enforcement agencies, starting at the end of 2017, North Korean hackers have stolen cryptocurrency from exchanges, and have then laundered approximately $250 million with the aid of the Chinese nationals. The funds are believed to have been used to finance North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. It was not the first time such accusations were made. In 2017, the United States alleged that Chinese company Mingzheng International Trading Ltd “facilitated prohibited” monetary transactions on behalf of a North Korean bank. Prosecutors “said they would seek $1.9 million in civil penalties”.
On 23 March 2020, the Cyprus Police issued a public warning saying they had received a number of complaints regarding telephone calls that appeared to come from North Korea, as the numbers started with 00850 (the DPRK country code). There were grounds to believe that it was a “scam leading to recipients” being overcharged.
Unfortunately, all of these disconcerting reports do not provide any evidence to support their claims. And some time ago, the author conducted his own investigation into such incidents. And we would simply like to remind our readers about its outcomes.
- The claim that the attack patterns were similar to those used by other North Korean groups is unjustified. After all, since there are few unique hacking tools, most hackers have a limited arsenal at their disposal. It is common practice for them to use each other’s attack patterns to not only save time but also misdirect and shift the blame elsewhere. Considering the fact that North Korea’s involvement in the previous attacks was not proven, the so-called evidence could actually turn out to be an extrapolation. A vicious cycle is thus created, as one “highly likely” claim multiplies, and for some reason, this uncertainty is not reflected in conclusions drawn, and DPRK involvement is then viewed as an “incontrovertible” fact.
- The hackers’ use of typically North Korean linguistic expressions also does not prove DPRK involvement. After all, any criminal group may choose to utilize such language (e.g. Chollima) in order to cover up their tracks and deceive law enforcement agencies.
- Hiding IP addresses or caller ID spoofing are common tools used by scammers. In fact, a VPN (a Virtual Private Network) allows you to change your apparent location.
- Discussions about hacking seemingly secure networks not connected to the internet (as for instance, banking systems) usually prompt the question “But how is that possible?” A virus needs to be introduced somehow, and this is possible when a device is connected to the internet. If a network cannot be infected in this manner, then a saboteur (not malware) is probably involved. Another possibility is that the system in question was not completely secure or isolated from the outside world due to a high level of incompetence.
- Public accusations along the lines of ‘X could have been involved in Y’ are mere speculation if they are not supported by evidence. Statements, such as ‘groups with ties to Pyongyang’, also fall into the same category, as it is important to prove such a relationship. After all, simply saying ‘hackers target enemies of the DPRK’ is not evidence. In addition, the Lazarus Group, Bluenoroff and Andariel are highly unusual names for hacker groups, in comparison to Geumseong121, taking into account how isolated North Korea is as a nation.
- In fact, there are ongoing debates about where the Lazarus Group is from among experts. It is especially enjoyable to hear the word “Chollima” in reference to its subgroups. Chollima is a mythical winged horse capable of travelling 1,000 li (400 km) per day. For a long time, the animal symbolized the speed of North Korea’s economic development, which, over a period of at least two years, has increased 10-fold. Hence, nowadays, it is customary to refer to such progress with the expression “Mallima”.
Interestingly, it is not only cyber crime that is on the rise in North Korea itself, where there are over 600,000 mobile phone users, telephone scams are spreading there too. According to defectors from the DPRK, criminals often “pretend to be law enforcers or financial supervisors” who threaten to arrest people they target if they do not pay up. “Such classic scams still work because victims do not dare question the identity of the purported government officials”.
In all likelihood, the DPRK and pro-North Korea hackers are responsible for the so called “phishing campaigns designed to obtain passwords and other personal information” once a victim opens a link or an attachment sent in a message. In September 2019, such correspondence with malware was sent to “people working in the North Korea field.” These types of attacks, using email addresses that appear to belong to “people working on North Korea issues”, started as far back as 2010.
According to a report by Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (a cybersecurity company) issued in January 2020, “a group of hackers suspected to be linked to North Korea” had attacked “a U.S. government agency and researchers working on DPRK issues with a new type of malware”. They “sent emails with six different Microsoft Word documents in Russian that contained malicious macros aiming to give attackers control over the recipients’ computers.”
The latest “malicious email campaigns” occurred at the end of February 2020.
In summary, an interesting situation is seemingly taking shape. Sanctions imposed against the DPRK are forcing the nation to look for new ways of generating income. And since the use of digital technologies is not prohibited by them and is also difficult to monitor, North Korea has seemingly started to bank on this sector. Any work performed by DPRK IT specialists and software developed by them are not covered by sanctions. And Pyongyang has begun to take advantage of this by, for example, using money transfer apps (designed similarly to Chinese analogues) that allow users to bypass standard bank procedures to send and receive money.
Clearly, there is a push to shut down such tools and tighten the digital blockade, hence, the reports about hackers. But for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction, and it is possible that, just as in self-fulfilling prophecies, myths about North Korean hackers may just become a reality.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History is a Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
A Year after the North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit: Expectations for the Next One
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – 23.03.2020
Just over a year has gone by since US President Donald Trump met with Chairman of the DPRK State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un in Hanoi. It was the second North Korean-American summit to be held, following on from the first 2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit. Many were surprised that the meeting ended without any concrete agreements being made, due to a variety of reasons. The primary disagreements between the two sides were made more difficult to resolve due to actions taken by American conservatives and domestic politics in the United States at the time, which prevented Trump from making any concessions.
The talks which followed between working groups and high-level officials also ended without any visible results. A brief meeting between the Supreme leader of the DPRK and the US President on the sidelines of Trump’s visit to South Korea was little more than a media photo op, and the working-level talks in Stockholm got off to a bad start: North Korea demanded that Washington come up with a new plan by the end of 2019 if the US wants denuclearization talks.
Towards the end of 2019, the North Korean leader gave a clear delineation of relations between the two countries, yet Kim Jong-un did not keep his promise to deliver a “Christmas gift”, by which he meant a demonstration of North Korea’s new strategic weapons. As it was put at the time, “the door is closed, but not locked.” There are several different explanations given for this. Pro-Pyongyang experts say Kim made a gesture of goodwill. Others believe that China used its leverage to make North Korea call off the demonstration and avoid exasperating the situation. We would like to add that given the increased attention the DPRK was receiving during this period (due to its satellites, constant use of reconnaissance aircraft, etc.), it would not have made sense for Pyongyang to “show its cards” at the time.
Failed efforts to impeach Donald Trump did not help them make any progress either, and the DPRK conducted a planned short-range missile launch which almost coincided with the anniversary of the summit. This missile test and others have yet to quell discussions over whether North Korea’s defense industry is modern, or whether its rusty missiles have been cobbled together using stolen technologies from Ukraine, China or Russia.
The outcome has been summed up in the South Korean media: “One year on since the meeting in Hanoi, the North Korean situation seems to have reverted back to its former state”. Given the current situation, I would like to discuss the prospects for this dialog between the United States and North Korea based on a series of quotes made on March 4-6, 2020.
Let’s start with Trump, who was posed a question on his 2020 presidential campaign trail about what he would do with North Korea if re-elected. The question sparked an enthusiastic response: the US President stressed that his relationship with Kim is “very good,” but insisted that he has not given anything to the communist regime and that sanctions have not been lifted. At the same time, Donald Trump reiterated that the policies being put forward by his opponents would lead to a big war with the DPRK, and also took credit for the beginning of inter-Korean rapprochement.
The US President actually dismissed the fact that a short-range missile was launched: “No reaction,” was what he had to say. Unlike at previous events, he did not even try to play this card in the UN Security Council. On March 5, the Security Council discussed this issue, but the North Korean issue was raised in a separate category for additional topics at a meeting about Syria. Immediately after the meeting, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium and Estonia adopted a joint statement condemning the actions of the DPRK and calling on Pyongyang to resume negotiations on denuclearization, but it should be noted that this statement is meaningless from a legal point of view, and the United States did not participate in it.
Interestingly, the South Korean authorities took a more right-wing position. During a speech at South Korea’s Air Force Academy on March 4, President Moon Jae-in pointed out the unpredictability of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and underlined the importance of an impregnable defense. The South Korean media also rebuked Trump. They say the US President “brushed off North Korea’s missile tests, even though they are prohibited by U.N. Security Council resolutions” and instead took credit for Pyongyang’s suspension of its long-range missile tests and nuclear tests.
Meanwhile, US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities pose an “increasingly complicated” threat, as the regime seeks to modernize its missile systems. When asked whether North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles pose a threat to the United States, his answer was affirmative.
But on a tactical level, the United States “stands ready to resume denuclearization negotiations with North Korea as soon as possible and hopes to hear back from the regime.” Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation Christopher Ford made this comment on March 5: “From a State Department perspective, it remains true that we are ready and willing and prepared for the beginning of working-level discussions with North Korea – in which they will, one hopes, implement the commitments made in Singapore.”
Lastly, we will consider the public opinion on this issue in the United States. A recent poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 52% of Americans view North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a critical threat. That is a large amount of people, but this figure had been 75% at the height of tensions in 2017.
When asked which country poses the greatest threat to the United States, 13% of respondents chose North Korea. The DPRK came in behind Iran (34%), Russia (28%) and China (16%). In 2017, North Korea ranked the highest among these four countries at 59%.
Out of the list of options on how to deal with the North’s nuclear program, tighter economic sanctions received the most support, with 73%.
According to Chicago Council on Global Affairs who conducted the poll, these results are not so much a reflection of the lack of progress that has been made on the diplomatic front, but rather stem from the prolonged absence of noticeable tension and a weakening of the perception of North Korea as a threat.
What can we expect? According to the information the Chicago think tank has gleaned from respondents, there is a sort of informal directive being followed in Washington: make no sudden movements in any direction before the November elections. Amid the race for the White House, fussing over the relations between the United States and North Korea would hardly have a positive effect on Trump’s approval ratings, and certainly should not see them fall.
It became clear to both sides during the working talks that with the time that has passed since Hanoi, the DPRK is prepared to make a certain number of concessions, but Pyongyang is demanding that they are met with proportionate actions in return. Washington is not prepared to take these steps, because the idea of easing sanctions flies in the face of American dogma, and according to this dogma, Kim Jong-un did not cooperate as a gesture of goodwill, but because he was pressured into doing so by an unprecedented level of sanctions. The belief is therefore that this is the main leverage America has to force North Korea into negotiations, and they cannot let up on it.
In the run-up to the election, it is therefore very important “not to get on Kim Jong-un’s nerves”, because any sort of tough response from North Korea will hurt Trump’s campaign, who is still selling his electorate the idea that relations between Washington and Pyongyang would be much worse under any other American president.
Of course, Trump could hardly say no to another photo-op meeting, but both sides know that they can only hold so many of these purely symbolic events, and they have already reached their limit, now they must have something to show for all those handshakes, posing in front of flashing cameras.
This is where we should note the debate among experts regarding the motives of each side. One theory is that Kim and Trump would both like to get more out of the talks, but are prepared to settle for a minor victory, where no answer can be found, but the search for one can continue once the process is put on pause. The view other experts take is that Trump believes the denuclearization of North Korea is a real possibility, but it has been put on hold while he is busy with his re-election campaign, and he is working according to his belief that during the next ten years, something could happen that could change North Korea’s position. However, we must not forget that nuclear weapons are seen in Pyongyang as an unambiguous guarantee of the regime’s survival. This is not only a lesson for Libya, but Iran should also take note (be it the American actions on the Iran nuclear deal or the assassination of General Soleimani).
The pause is likely to go on until the US presidential election is held, but then what? If Trump wins, American political analysts have two theories. One is that Kim will continue the “period of peaceful respite”, devoting his energy to making a few final arrangements so that the economy will be more prepared if it is hit with another round of sanctions. The moratorium will remain abandoned, especially given that it had only ever been a verbal promise, and it was the ultimate failure of the summit in Hanoi that prevented it from being transformed into a written commitment.
The second theory is that North Korea is truly disappointed with the strategic prospects of the dialog. Kim had hoped that it could lead to sanctions being lifted, but it turned out that the materials from the December 2019 plenum ruled this out as something he cannot even dream about, and he now sees the need to move as quickly as possible to increase the country’s military might with nuclear weapons and missiles, in order to ensure a guaranteed level of deterrence. In this context, we can expect to hear about ICBM launches with missiles fired on a flat trajectory, or the hypothetical Hwasong-20, which is said to have no problem reaching anywhere on US territory.
The long-awaited North Korean Navy’s Sinpo class submarine is no less likely to make an appearance, capable of carrying 3-4 missiles with nuclear warheads. We believe it could be revealed as North Korea’s “new strategic weapon”.
What if the Democrats win? There may not necessarily be a radical change of course under a slogan like “anything but what Trump did.” A large number of officials from the Democratic Party who write the bills that are then signed by politicians in government are gradually coming around to the idea that we will have to live with a nuclear North Korea.
Therefore, after weighing up the best and worst options in comparison with the current status quo, we hope that the dialog will continue after November 2020, or that the two sides will finally meet again by the next anniversary of the Hanoi summit.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, is a Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
COVID-USA: Targeting Italy and South Korea?
By Larry Romanoff | Global Research | March 21, 2020
A high-level Italian virologist, Giuseppe Remuzzi, has published papers in the Lancet and other articles in which he states facts not hitherto known. (1)
The doctor stated that Italian physicians now recall having seen:
“a very strange and very severe pneumonia, particularly in old people in December and even November [2019]. This suggests that the virus was circulating, at least in Lombardy, and before we were aware of this outbreak occurring in China.“(2)
Chinese medical authorities have determined the same underlying phenomenon, that the virus had been circulating among the population for perhaps two months before it finally broke out into the open.
Further, according to the Italian National Health Service (ISS):
“It is not possible to reconstruct, for all patients, the chain of transmission of infection. Most cases reported in Italy report an epidemiological link with other cases diagnosed in Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto, the areas most affected by the epidemic.” [translation from Italian] (3)
The above statement is of crucial importance since it supports in itself the assertion of several simultaneous infection clusters and several ‘patients zero’. There are cases in Lombardy that could not be placed in an infection chain, and this must also be true for other areas. (see below) Given that the virus broke out separately in disparate regions of Italy, we can expect the identification of independent infectious clusters in those regions as well. That would mean Italy was hit by at least several individual ‘seedings’ of the virus.
China’s outbreak of consequence was primarily in the city of Wuhan but with multiple sources in the city and multiple patients zero, with a minor outbreak in Guangdong that was easily contained. China had multiple clusters in Wuhan. There was no single source, and no patient zero has been identified which is similar to those of Italy.
The mystery of Italy’s “Patient No. 4”
Was the Italian outbreak caused by infections from China? Yes, and no.
Before February 20, 2020, there were only three cases of coronavirus infection in Italy, two tourists from Wuhan, China, confirmed on January 30th, and an Italian man who returned to Rome from Wuhan on February 6th. These were clearly imported cases with Italy experiencing no new infections during the next two weeks.
Then suddenly there appeared new infections that were unrelated to China. On February 19, the Lombardy Health Region issued a statement that a 38-year-old Italian man was diagnosed with the new coronavirus, becoming the fourth confirmed case in Italy. The man had never traveled to China and had no contact with the confirmed Chinese patients.
Immediately after this patient was diagnosed, Italy experienced a major outbreak. In one day, the number of confirmed cases increased to 20 and, after little more than three weeks, Italy had 17,660 confirmed cases.
The Italians were not idle in searching for their patient zero. They renamed the “patient 4” “Italian No. 1”, and attempted to learn how he became infected. The search was apparently fruitless, the article stating that “America’s pandemic of the century has become the subject of suspicion by Italians“.(4)
The mystery of South Korea’s “Patient No. 31”
South Korea’s experience was eerily similar to that of Italy, and also to that of China. The country had experienced 30 imported cases which began on January 20, I believe all of which were traceable to contact with Hubei and/or Wuhan.
But then South Korea discovered a “Patient No. 31”, a 61 year-old South Korean woman diagnosed with the new coronavirus on February 18. This ‘local’ patient had no ties to China, had had no contact with any Chinese, and no contact whatever with any of the infected South Koreans. Her infection was a South Korean source.
Just as with Italy, the outbreak in South Korea exploded rapidly after the discovery of Patient 31. By the next day, February 19 (Italy was February 21, for comparison), there were 58 confirmed cases in South Korea, reaching 1,000 in less than a week. After little more than three weeks, South Korea had 8,086 confirmed cases. It would now seem likely (yet to corroborated) that South Korea and Italy could have been ‘seeded’ at approximately the same time.
Like the Italians, South Korea performed a massive hunt for the source of the infection of their “Korean No. 1”, combing the country for evidence, but without success. They discovered the confirmed cases in South Korea were mainly concentrated in two separate clusters in Daegu and Gyeongsang North Road, most of which – but not all – could be related to “Patient 31”. As with Italy, multiple clusters and multiple simultaneous infections spreading like wildfire – and without the assistance of a seafood market selling bats and pangolins.
For both Italy and South Korea, I could also add that there is no supposed “bio-weapons lab” anywhere within reach (as was claimed for China), but that wouldn’t be accurate. There are indeed bio-weapons labs easily within reach of the stricken areas in both Italy and South Korea – but they belong to the US Military.
Korea is particularly notable in this regard because it was proven likely that MERS resulted from a leak at the American military base at Osan. The official Western narrative for the MERS outbreak in South Korea was that a Korean businessman became infected in the Middle East then returned to his home in Gyeonggi Province and spread the infection. But there was never any documentation or evidence to support that claim, and to my best knowledge it was never verified by the South Korean Government.
Pertinent to this story is that according to the Korean Yonhap News Service, at the onset of the outbreak about 100 South Korean military personnel were suddenly quarantined at the USAF Osan Air Base. The Osan base is home to the JUPITR ATD military biological program that is closely related to the lab at Fort Detrick, MD, both being US military bio-weapons research labs.
There is also a (very secretive) WHO-sponsored International Vaccine Institute nearby, which is (or at least was) managed by US military biological weapons personnel. At the time, and given the quarantine mentioned above, the event sequence accepted as most likely was that of a leak from a JUPITR biowarfare project. (5) (6)
The Korean path is similar with that of Italy. If we look at a map of the virus-stricken areas of Italy, there is a US military base within almost a stone’s throw of all of them. This is of course merely a case of circumstance arousing suspicion, and by no means constitutes proof of anything at all.
However, there is a major point here which cannot be overlooked, namely the fact of simultaneous eruptions of a new virus in three different countries, and in all three cases no clear epidemiology, and an inability to identify either the original source or a patient zero.
Multiple experts on biological weapons are in unanimous agreement that eruptions in a human population of a new and unusual pathogen in multiple locations simultaneously, with no clear idea of source and cases with no proven links, is virtually prima facie evidence of a pathogen deliberately released, since natural outbreaks can almost always be resolved to one location and one patient zero. The possibility of a deliberate leak is as strong in Italy and South Korea as in China, all three nations apparently sharing the same suspicions.
Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West.
He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
He can be contacted at: 2186604556@qq.com
Notes
(A) This is an aside, but Italy has experienced a fatality rate nearly twice that of Wuhan, but there may be an external contributing factor. Observations were made that, in most cases especially among the elderly in Italy, ibuprophen was widely used as a painkiller. The Lancet published an article demonstrating that the use of ibuprophen can markedly facilitate the ability of the virus to infect and therefore to increase the risk of serious and fatal infection. (YY)
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600(20)30116-8/fulltext
(B) “The mean age of those who died in Italy was 81 years and more than two-thirds of these patients had . . . underlying health conditions, but it is also worth noting that they had acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) caused by . . . SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia, needed respiratory support, and “would not have died otherwise.”
(3) https://www.iss.it/web/guest/primo-piano/-/asset_publisher/o4oGR9qmvUz9/content/id/5293226
(4) http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/F7N756430514G9GF.html
(5) https://www.21cir.com/2015/06/south-korea-mers-emerged-out-of-the-pentagons-biowarfare-labs-2/
(6) https://www.businessinsider.com/almost-200-north-korean-soldiers-died-coronavirus-2020-3
Copyright © Larry Romanoff, Global Research, 2020
US Military Accuses North Korea of Lying About Coronavirus Infection Rate of Zero
Sputnik – March 17, 2020
North Korea, whose contacts with the outside world remain limited even in a normal situation, was one of the first countries to introduce tough inspection and quarantine measures, canceling tourist visits, cutting off flights and rail travel and quarantining all workers coming home from abroad.
Nearly three months into the COVID-19 outbreak, North Korean health officials maintain that the country has zero cases of the virus.
The Korean Central News Agency reported last week that it there were no cases of COVID-19 in the country, but urged the public to remain vigilant. The agency reported that the country has enforced “strict, top-class anti-epidemic measures,” to intensify its coronavirus response, including the tightening of inspection and quarantine of imports from abroad. The measures are said to include comprehensive “inspection and disinfection of vehicles, vessels and goods,” and a 10-day quarantine of imports.
The World Health Organization too has indicated that it’s not aware of any cases of the virus in the self-isolating country, although the organization does plan to send equipment and supplies to help Pyongyang battle COVID-19. North Korea had previously asked the WHO for material assistance including disposable gowns, gloves and hazmat suits.
The popular Coronavirus Resource Center map run by Johns Hopkins’ University School of Medicine, which depends on credible sources including the WHO and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, also reports zero cases for North Korea thus far.
However, US officials believe Pyongyang, which is required to report on any outbreak of contagious viruses as part of its WHO membership obligations, is lying.
Speaking to reporters last week, US Forces Korea commander Gen. Robert Abrams said the Pentagon was “fairly certain” that the country had coronavirus cases given the lack of noticeable military activity. According to the US commander, the North Korean military only recently restarted training following a month-long lockdown.
Keith Luse, executive director of the National Committee on North Korea, a Washington-based think tank, told Bloomberg that it “it’s hard to imagine that North Korea could dodge the COVID-19 bullet.”
Western media have similarly spread stories suggesting that the virus was quietly raging throughout the country, with one report by the US National Endowment for Democracy-sponsored Daily NK online newspaper claiming that as many as 200 soldiers had already died, and that another 4,000 people were in quarantine. These claims, citing anonymous sources, were never verified, but have been spread widely by English-language media.
North Korea, which is thought to have successfully weathered both the SARS and Ebola outbreaks in 2003 and 2014, became one of the first countries in the world to mount a nation-wide emergency response to COVID-19 amid rising infection rates in neighbouring China, South Korea and Japan.
These measures included a ban on all foreign tourists in late January, quarantine for travellers from China exhibiting potential symptoms of the virus in Sinuiju in the country’s west, and the declaration of a “state emergency” to deal with the epidemic on January 30, including the creation of a special ‘Central Emergency Anti-Epidemic Headquarters’.
North Korea’s presumed infection rate stands in sharp contrast to those of its neighbours, with China, where the virus originated, reporting over 81,000 cases, including some 218 cases in the North-Korea neighbouring regions of Liaoning and Jilin. South Korea has 8,320 confirmed cases. Japan has reported 833 cases. Russia, meanwhile, has 93 confirmed cases.
North Korea: Kim Jong-un’s Aunt Appears Alive After Six Years of Media Saying He Killed Her
By Alan Macleod | MintPress News | January 27, 2020
It’s well past Halloween, but people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are rising from the dead (again). That is according to our media, who have for six years been claiming Kim Kyong-hui, the aunt of current ruler Kim Jong-un and daughter of the father of the nation Kim Il-sung, was dead, only for her to be spotted beside her nephew enjoying the Lunar New Year festivities in Pyongyang at the weekend.
CNN and the Daily Telegraph both reported that Kim Jong-un had her poisoned in 2014. Or perhaps she died of a stroke? Or was it a heart attack? Or was she in a permanent vegetative state? The media couldn’t decide, yet they all agreed she was definitely gone. The press appeared unsurprised by the government’s apparent ability with necromancy, covering her reappearance merely as an “isn’t this crazy” story, merely “a reminder of how weird and brutal North Korea is” (BBC). While that statement might be accurate (Kyong-hui’s husband, a top official, was executed by the state, after all), across the media, there was little self-reflection at all as to how and why they had been reporting fake news for six years.

According to media, Kim Kyong-hui, has been poisoned, died of a stroke, had a heart attack or could be in a vegetative state
This is hardly the first time that the press has breathlessly reported that members of the DPRK’s elite have been killed, only for their untimely reappearance to spoil the narrative. Last year corporate media claimed that Korean negotiators were executed for failing to achieve a deal with the U.S. at the nuclear disarmament summit in Vietnam, something CNBC called part of a “massive purge to divert attention away from internal turmoil and discontent.” But barely a few days after the media deluge, the negotiating team’s leader appeared at a performance alongside Kim Jong-un.
In 2013, it was widely reported that Hyon Song-wol, a popular musician and reputed love interest of the DPRK’s supreme leader was executed in a “hail of machine gun fire while members of her orchestra looked on” (BBC). Unfortunately for this narrative, Song-wol is very much alive and singing, continuing to publicly perform to this day. And there is a cavalcade of military officials the corporate press has insisted were killed, often in comically over-the-top ways who turn up later seemingly unharmed. For example, in 2018 General Ri Yong-gil, the officer Donald Trump awkwardly saluted, was promoted to Chief of General Staff, this, despite having been “executed” in 2016 as part of a “brutal consolidation of power,” according to CNN.
Another North Korean figure rising from the dead is national soccer coach Yun Jong-su. After the country lost 7-0 to Portugal at the 2010 World Cup, media reported that he had been shot. This narrative was only dropped after a journalist ran into him at an airport. Ten years later, not only is Jong-su alive, but he is still the national team’s coach.
The problem with these stories is that they largely emanate from one source: notorious conservative South Korean daily the Chosun Ilbo, which has a long and detailed history of printing lurid fake news. Yet Western press are dependent on the Chosun Ilbo for much of their reporting. As Business Insider said while falsely reporting that Kim Kyong-hui, aunt of Kim Jong-un was dead, “the Chosun Ilbo is generally considered a reliable source.”
Other stories are based on testimonies from defectors, who are paid in cash for their stories, something that the poor, isolated and jobless dissidents themselves complain gives them a perverse incentive to exaggerate. The saying, in journalism, goes: “if it bleeds it leads,” i.e. the more shocking a story is, the more likely it is to be published, meaning that defectors who do not offer the sordid details journalists, intelligence agencies or human rights groups want, will not be paid. Defectors are not necessarily trustworthy sources either. One Korean defector who was praised for his heroic actions later admitted that he was actually on the run for a murder he confessed he committed.

Adam Johnson’s North Korea law of journalism. Credit | FAIR
The perverse incentive also exists for media, too, who live in a hyper-competitive world driven by the need to get clicks. Careful, nuanced analysis does not pay. Added to that is the fact that the DPRK is an official enemy of the United States. The United States killed up to one quarter of the Korean race in bombing during the 1950s, using chemical weapons against them and committing other war crimes such as bombing civilian targets. Media analyst Adam Johnson put forward his theory of the “North Korea law of journalism,” where, he says, “editorial standards are inversely proportional to a country’s enemy status.” While the U.S. or friendly countries are covered favorably, the most lurid fantasies can be printed with regards to enemy states like Venezuela, Bolivia or the DPRK, as there is no penalty for being incorrect. Publishing stories claiming Donald Trump had thrown General Michael Flynn into a tank of ravenous piranhas would result in outlets being shut down, re-ranked and delisted by search engines and social media, and perhaps even journalists being arrested. But the same story run about North Korea is a money-spinner.
Thus, the same orientalist tropes are used again and again when it comes to reporting on Korea – that there is only one haircut allowed, that it has “banned sarcasm,” that there is no electricity or tall buildings in the country– are endlessly repeated by journalists reproducing imperial propaganda. As Kim Kyong-hui’s case shows, in North Korea, stories are often too bad to be true.
Alan MacLeod is a Staff Writer for MintPress News. After completing his PhD in 2017 he published two books: Bad News From Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting and Propaganda in the Information Age: Still Manufacturing Consent.
‘Middle East Will Become a Graveyard for US’: Pyongyang Apprehensively Eyes Iran Crisis

Sputnik – January 6, 2020
Following the US assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has taken measure of the international situation, which is expected to excercise new caution. However, North Korean dailies noted Washington’s course was destined for disaster.
North Korean cultural publication Arirang Meari put the issue in no uncertain terms, saying on Sunday that the “Middle East will become a graveyard for the US.”
“Global military experts recently analyzed that the US is being bogged down in a war in the Middle East,” Meari wrote, according to the South Korean-based Yonhap News Agency. “Even pro-American countries have been passively answering the US’s request for sending troops on account of their internal politics and economic challenges, driving the US into despair.”
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the DPRK’s state-run news outlet, noted on Monday that Moscow and Beijing had taken strong stances against the US drone strike that killed Soleimani in Baghdad early Friday morning.
“China and Russia emphasized that they not only object to abuse of military power in international relations but also cannot tolerate adventurous military acts,” KCNA wrote, according to Yonhap, describing a Saturday phone call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, noting they “expressed concerns over regional situations being worsened by the US’ illegal acts.”
Kim ‘Pressured Psychologically’ by Soleimani Killing
However, despite the rhetoric, experts have noted the episode is likely to shake Pyongyang’s leaders.
Yang Moo Jin, a professor at Seoul’s University of North Korean Studies, told the Korea Herald that as a result of the Baghdad airstrike, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un “will be pressured psychologically.”
Former South Korean Unification Minister Jeong Se Hyun said during a television appearance on Sunday the DPRK would be even more careful than before about revealing Kim’s precise whereabouts.
Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar and expert on Korean affairs, noted in NK News on Sunday that Soleimani’s assassination showed US President Donald Trump was willing to take greater risks than North Korean strategists had previously believed, casting the “fire and fury” rhetoric of his presidency’s earlier years in a much starker light.
“As time went by, more and more observers were inclined to see the 2017 as a simple bluff, and it became widely accepted that Donald Trump did not have the guts to deliver on his threats of a military operation in a highly unstable part of the world,” Lankov wrote. “But last week’s killing of General Soleimani demonstrated that the world has underestimated Trump’s desire to take risks (or, perhaps, overestimated his ability to make rational decisions).”
“No doubt the North Koreans have taken note, and, most likely, see it as a warning sign.
Soleimani’s death reminded them that excessively risky behavior might result in a US drone quietly approaching some targets in Pyongyang suburbs,” Lankov added.
A Cautious But Steadfast Approach in 2020
As 2019 drew to a close, so did Pyongyang’s patience for negotiations with Washington, which after 18 months of talks had failed to yield significant results beyond a June 12, 2018, promise from Trump at his first summit with Kim in Singapore. In his New Year’s address, given several days before Soleimani’s killing, Kim had already taken a more cautious tone than in December, when North Korean publications promised a return to bellicose posturing.
Kim had previously promised a “Christmas gift” to Washington, which analysts widely predicted would be Pyongyang’s first long-range ballistic missile test since its self-imposed moratorium in 2017. However, no such “present” was delivered. Instead, Kim noted Washington’s delaying tactics were designed to prolong the harmful effects of economic sanctions on the DPRK, advising North Koreans to buckle their belts more tightly, since relief seemed unlikely anytime soon.
“If the US fails to keep the promises it made before the world, if it misjudges the patience of our people and continues to use sanctions and pressure against our republic, then we’ll have no choice except to seek a new path to secure the sovereignty and interests of our country,” Kim said on January 1.
Similar Struggles in Iran, DPRK
Like Pyongyang, Tehran has been engaged in a prolonged struggle to forge an independent path from Washington amid attempts to frustrate its ability to ensure its self-defense. Both countries have been subjected to strangling economic sanctions in an effort to force them into compliance, but unlike Iran, the DPRK has nuclear weapons as well as means of delivering them.

Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, meets with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in August 2018
Iranian leaders have long been accused by Washington of pursuing an atomic bomb and not merely nuclear power and medical research, as they have claimed. Tehran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 to lower those sanctions in exchange for accepting tight constraints on the volume of nuclear fuel it could possess, but Trump reimposed them in 2018, accusing Iran of secretly pursuing a nuclear bomb – a conclusion not shared by other signatories to the agreement.
As a consequence, Tehran has slowly stepped back from the commitments it made in the 2015 deal, announcing on Sunday it would scrap the last ones it still followed.
The two countries’ experiences negotiating with Washington have long informed each other, and in the face of intransigence and doubletalk by the Trump administration, experts like Lankov have predicted US belligerence toward Iran, despite its obedience to the 2015 deal, was likely only to embolden those who hold hard-line positions in Pyongyang, opposing negotiations and concessions to Washington.
Why Trump is Winding Up Tensions with North Korea
By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | December 25, 2019
After 18 months of on-off diplomacy with North Korea, the Trump administration seems determined now to jettison the fragile talk about peace, reverting to its earlier campaign of “maximum pressure” and hostility. It’s a retrograde move risking a disastrous war.
In a visit to China this week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chinese leader Xi Jinping both urged for greater momentum in the diplomatic process with North Korea, saying that renewed tensions benefit no-one. The two leaders may need to revise that assertion. Tensions greatly benefit someone – Washington.
Why Trump is winding up tensions again with Pyongyang appears to involve a two-fold calculation. It gives Washington greater leverage to extort more money from South Korea for the presence of US military forces on its territory; secondly, the Trump administration can use the tensions as cover for increasing its regional forces aimed at confronting China.
In recent weeks, the rhetoric has deteriorated sharply between Washington and Pyongyang. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has resumed references to Trump being a senile “dotard”, while the US president earlier this month at the NATO summit near London dusted off his old disparaging name for Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, calling him “rocket man”.
On December 7 and 15, North Korea tested rocket engines at its Sohae satellite launching site which are believed to be preparation for the imminent test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea unilaterally halted ICBM test-launches in April 2018 as a gesture for diplomacy with the US. Its last launch was on July 4, 2017, when Pyongyang mockingly called it a “gift” for America’s Independence Day.
Earlier this month, Pyongyang said it was preparing a “Christmas gift” for Washington. That was taken as referring to resumption of ICBM test launches. However, Pyongyang said it was up to the US to decide which gift it would deliver.
On the engine testing, Trump said he was “watching closely” on what North Korea did next, warning that he was prepared to use military force against Pyongyang and that Kim Jong-un had “everything to lose”.
The turning away from diplomacy may seem odd. Trump first met Kim in June 2018 in Singapore at a breakthrough summit, the first time a sitting US president met with a North Korean leader. There were two more summits, in Hanoi in February 2019, and at the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean border in June 2019. The latter occasion was a splendid photo-opportunity for Trump, being the first American president to have stepped on North Korean soil.
During this diplomatic embrace, Trump has lavished Kim with praise and thanked him for “beautiful letters”. Back in September 2017 when hostile rhetoric was flying both ways, Trump told the UN general assembly he would “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatened the US. How fickle are the ways of Trump.
What’s happened is the initial promises of engagement have gone nowhere, indicating the superficiality of Trump’s diplomacy. It seems clear now that the US president was only interested in public relations gimmickry, boasting to the American public that he had reined in North Korea’s nuclear activities.
When Trump met Kim for the third time in June 2019, they reportedly vowed to resume negotiations on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea had up until recently stuck to its commitment to halt ICBM testing. However, for that, Pyongyang expected reciprocation from the US side on the issue of sanctions relief, at least a partial lifting of sanctions. Kim gave Trump a deadline by the end of this year to make some concession on sanctions.
Russia and China last week proposed an easing of UN sanctions on North Korea. But Washington rebuffed that proposal, categorically saying it was a “premature” move, and that North Korea must first make irreversible steps towards complete decommissioning of its nuclear arsenal. The high-handed attitude is hardly conducive to progress.
The lack of diplomatic reciprocation from Washington over the past six months has led Pyongyang to angrily repudiate further talks. It has hit out at what it calls Trump’s renewed demeaning name-calling of Kim. There is also a palpable sense of frustration on North Korea’s part for having been used as a prop for Trump’s electioneering.
The fact that Washington has adopted an intransigent position with regard to sanctions would indicate that it never was serious about pursuing meaningful diplomacy with Pyongyang.
Admittedly, Trump did cancel large-scale US war games conducted with South Korea as a gesture towards North Korea, which views these exercises as provocative rehearsals for war. This was an easy concession to make by Trump who no doubt primarily saw the cessation of military drills as a cost-cutting opportunity for the US.
Significantly, this month US special forces along with South Korean counterparts conducted a “decapitation” exercise in which they simulated a commando raid to capture a foreign target. Furthermore, the operation was given unusual public media attention.
As the Yonhap news agency reported: “A YouTube video by the Defense Flash News shows more details of the operation, with service personnel throwing a smoke bomb, raiding an office inside the building, shooting at enemy soldiers over the course, and a fighter jet flying over the building… It is unusual for the US military to make public such materials… according to officials.”
The Trump administration appears to have run out of further use for the diplomatic track with North Korea. The PR value has been milked. The policy shift is now back to hostility. The instability that generates is beneficial for Washington in two ways.
Trump is currently trying to get South Korea to boost its financial contribution towards maintaining US forces on its territory. Trump wants Seoul to cough up an eye-watering five-fold increase in payments “for US protection” to an annual $5 billion bill. South Korea is understandably reluctant to fork out such a massive whack from its fiscal budget. Talks on the matter are stalemated, but expected to resume in January.
If US relations with North Korea were progressing through diplomacy then the lowered tensions on the peninsula would obviously not benefit Washington’s demand on South Korea for more “protection money”. Therefore, it pays Washington to ramp up the hostilities and the dangers of war as a lever for emptying Seoul’s coffers.
The other bigger strategic issue shaping US intentions with North Korea is of course Washington’s longer-term collision course with China. US officials and defense planning documents have repeatedly targeted China as the main geopolitical adversary. American forces in South Korea comprising 28,500 troops, nuclear-capable bombers, warships and its anti-missile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system are not about protecting South Korea from North Korea. They are really about encircling China (and Russia). Washington hardly wants to scale back its military assets on the Korea Peninsula. It is driven by the strategic desire to expand them.
In media comments earlier this month, Pentagon chief Mark Esper made a curious slip-up when referring to withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan. He said they would be redeployed in Asia to confront China.
Esper said: “I would like to go down to a lower number [in Afghanistan] because I want to either bring those troops home, so they can refit and retrain for other missions or/and be redeployed to the Indo-Pacific to face off our greatest challenge in terms of the great power competition that’s vis-a-vis China.”
The logic of war profits and strategic conflict with China mean that Trump and the Washington establishment do not want to find a peaceful resolution with North Korea. Hence a return to the hostile wind-up of tensions.

