Aletho News

ΑΛΗΘΩΣ

Seyed Mohammad Marandi: Israel Pressures US Toward War With Iran

Glenn Diesen | April 22, 2025

Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor, an analyst and an advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi argues that Iran is ready for war, as the US and Israel disagree over attacking Iran.

Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen:

Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/

Support the channel: PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenn…

Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: https://gofund.me/09ea012f

April 23, 2025 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Trump’s NSC Director for Israel and Iran Previously Worked for Israeli Ministry of Defense

By Ryan Grim and Saagar Enjeti | Drop Site News | April 21, 2025

The American official overseeing White House policy toward both Israel and Iran inside the National Security Council formerly worked for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Drop Site News has learned. Merav Ceren’s appointment as Director for Israel and Iran at the NSC has not previously been reported, but her work with Israel’s MoD is well known among GOP circles.

Ceren’s appointment gives Israel an unusual advantage in internal policy discussions just as the Israeli government has launched a new campaign to pressure the American government to start a war with Iran rather than continue with negotiations toward a nuclear deal.

NSC spokesperson Brian Hughes confirmed that Ceren is now an official at the NSC and defended her as “a patriotic American.”

“Merav is a patriotic American who has served in the United States government for years, including for President Trump, Senator Ted Cruz, and Congressman James Comer,” said Hughes. “We are thrilled to have her expertise in the NSC, where she carries out the President’s agenda on a range of Middle East issues.”

Ceren includes her time with Israel’s Ministry of Defense in her bio at the pro-Israel think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

The Israeli campaign has forced the issue into the top echelons of government. At a high-level meeting reported on recently by the New York Times, Vice President J.D. Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth all pushed back against Israel’s plan for a major strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. They were even joined by NSC Director Michael Waltz, who warned that Israel’s effort would not succeed without ample U.S. support. Waltz and CENTCOM commander, Gen. Michael Kurilla, the Times reported, had previously been open to entertaining the Israeli idea and were briefed by Israeli military officials on a range of plans.

It’s rare for a foreign country to be able to pitch American policymakers on a joint war effort and look across the table to see a former member of their own Ministry of Defense working for the Americans. As Trump debates his tariff policy, for instance, there are no high-level officials who previously worked for the Chinese Communist Party present.

Ceren’s FDD bio says that while working for the Israeli military she participated in negotiations in the West Bank between Israel’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Palestinian Authority. COGAT is the Israeli agency now refusing entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, sparking a humanitarian crisis of unspeakable proportions. Ceren is the sister of Omri Ceren, a bellicose neoconservative and longtime foreign policy adviser to Sen. Ted Cruz.

In 2021, she authored the article “The Moral Case for High-Tech Weapons” for The New Atlantis, a long-form style publication that seeks to “understand the core anxiety about tech as the threat of dehumanization.”

April 22, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Will Yemen turn its missiles on the UAE and Saudi Arabia?

By Bandar Hetar | The Cradle | April 16, 2025

The US war on Yemen, now in its second round, has passed the one-month mark with no clear gains and no timeline for success. What is emerging instead is the growing risk of escalation – one that could force regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, into direct confrontation.

Still, several factors may delay or even prevent such a scenario, much like what played out last year. Understanding where this war may be headed requires a clear grasp of the terrain: how Yemen views the conflict, how its Persian Gulf neighbors are reacting, and what could trigger a wider eruption or a negotiated backtrack.

Sanaa ties its military strategy to Gaza’s resistance

Even in western circles, there’s little dispute that the war on Yemen is now deeply intertwined with Israel’s brutal war on Gaza. Washington tried, under former US president Joe Biden, to separate the two. But the reality on the ground tells a different story – one where Sanaa’s military operations were in lockstep with events in Palestine.

That link became even clearer after the January 2025 ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, which prompted a pause in Yemen’s attacks – until Tel Aviv predictably walked back its commitments. US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House brought with it a resumption of strikes on Yemen, under the pretext of defending international shipping.

Yet those attacks would not have taken place had the US not already committed to shielding Israeli vessels. The new administration, unlike the last, makes no real attempt to disguise the overlap between the two fronts.

Yemen’s strategy has been clear from the outset: Its military activity is calibrated with the resistance in Gaza. Palestinian factions determine the pace of escalation or calm, while Yemen remains prepared to absorb the fallout.

Sanaa has paid a steep price for this stance. Washington has moved to freeze economic negotiations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, effectively punishing the former for refusing to abandon its military support for Gaza. The US has dangled economic incentives in exchange for neutrality – offers readily accepted by Arab states across the region – but Sanaa has refused to fold.

Faced with a binary choice – either maintain its support for Palestine and accept a freeze on domestic arrangements, or open a second front with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – Yemen chose to stay the course.

That decision was rooted in three core beliefs: that Palestine must be supported unconditionally, even if it means sacrificing urgent national interests; that Ansarallah’s political identity is grounded in opposition to Israeli hegemony and thus incompatible with any alignment with Persian Gulf normalization; and that Yemen must deny Washington and Tel Aviv the opportunity to distract it with side wars designed to weaken its strategic focus.

Gulf frustration builds over Yemen’s defiance

Arab coalition partners Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not taken kindly to Yemen’s decision. Both countries have used the moment to begin backpedaling on the April 2022 truce and to impose punitive costs on Sanaa for throwing its weight behind Gaza.

The optics have not favored either of the Gulf monarchies. Abu Dhabi is fully normalized with Israel, while Riyadh is edging ever closer. Yemen, meanwhile – still scarred from years of Saudi–Emirati aggression – has moved swiftly to back the Palestinian cause. The contrast could not be more stark: The Arab state most brutalized by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is now standing up for Palestine while the aggressors look away.

Yemen’s stance also clashes with the broader geopolitical alignment of both Persian Gulf states, which remain deeply embedded in Washington’s orbit. But their frustration has remained mostly rhetorical.

Despite their roles in the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has made major military moves against Yemen since the new round of US airstrikes began. Initially, Riyadh attempted to tie Yemen’s maritime operations in the Red Sea to the Gaza war, but that framing soon gave way to vague talk of threats to commercial shipping – code for backpedaling.

Saudi political messaging shifted sharply in January when it refused to take part in joint US–UK bombing raids. Its defense ministry moved quickly to deny reports that Saudi airspace had been opened for US strikes, and later distanced itself from any Israeli involvement. The message from Riyadh was clear: It does not want to be dragged into another full-scale war with Yemen – not now.

Yemen counters with a policy of containment 

Despite Saudi Arabia’s retreat from its prior commitments, Yemen has actively encouraged Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to maintain a posture of neutrality. This is not out of optimism but pragmatism: Avoiding a wider war with the Persian Gulf would prevent a dangerous regional blowout. Sanaa’s goal has been to steer Saudi and Emirati decision-making away from military confrontation, proxy mobilization, or economic escalation.

That last point nearly tipped the balance in July 2024, when Riyadh instructed its puppet government in Aden to relocate Yemen’s central banks from Sanaa. It was a clear economic provocation – and a red line.

Within days, Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi delivered a sharp warning, framing the Saudi move as part of an Israeli–American playbook.

“The Americans are trying to entangle you [Saudi Arabia], and if you want that, then try it … The move towards aggressive escalation against our country is something we can never accept,” he revealed in a 7 July 2024 speech.

He warned Riyadh that falling for this trap would be “a terrible mistake and a great failure, and it is our natural right to counter any aggressive step.”

Sanaa responded with an unmistakable deterrent equation: “banks for banks, Riyadh Airport for Sanaa Airport, ports for ports.”

The Saudi maneuver may have been a test of Yemen’s resolve, possibly based on the assumption that Sanaa was too overextended – facing down a US-led coalition and spiraling domestic hardships – to respond decisively.

If so, Riyadh miscalculated. Houthi’s reply was blunt:

“This is not a matter of allowing you to destroy this people and push it to complete collapse so that no problems arise. Let a thousand problems arise. Let matters escalate as far as they may.”

No appetite in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi for a war without guarantees

The day after Houthi’s warning, massive protests erupted across Yemen. Millions marched in condemnation of Saudi provocations, offering the clearest signal yet that public opinion was firmly aligned behind the resistance – and willing to escalate.

Riyadh knows this. Even before the latest crisis, much of Yemeni society held Saudi Arabia and the UAE responsible for what even the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Any new conflict would only deepen that anger.

Faced with the threat of direct retaliation, Riyadh backed off its banking gambit. The memory of past Yemeni strikes on Saudi oil facilities – particularly those between 2019 and 2021 –still haunts the Saudi leadership.

Today, Yemen’s capabilities have expanded. It now possesses hypersonic missiles and increasingly sophisticated drone technologies. And it is precisely because of these advances that Washington has failed to strong-arm the Gulf into renewed warfare. There are no meaningful US security guarantees on the table – nothing that would shield Saudi oil fields, critical infrastructure, or commercial shipping lanes from blowback.

The failures are already evident. The “Prosperity Guardian” coalition has done little to stop Yemeni strikes on Israeli-linked vessels, and US–UK airstrikes have failed to stem Yemen’s ability to hit deep inside Israel. These battlefield realities have changed the calculus in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Escalation, for now, is off the table.

Yemen’s red lines are expanding

That does not mean Washington has stopped trying to drag Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the fight. The Biden administration failed to do so. The Trump team, however, is seen as more aggressive and more likely to provide advanced weapons systems that might tempt Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to take the plunge.

There is also the perception among Gulf elites that this is a strategic opening: Syria’s collapse, Hezbollah’s supposed decline, and shifting regional dynamics may provide a rare window to redraw the map.

But for the Saudis, Yemen remains the central concern. A liberated, ideologically defiant state on their southern border is an existential threat – not only to security, but to the cultural rebranding project that the Kingdom has invested so heavily in. The UAE shares similar anxieties. A rising Yemeni Resistance Axis threatens its carefully curated image as a regional player in sync with Israeli and western interests.

That is why Sanaa has placed its forces on high alert. Ansarallah is monitoring every move by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and their local proxies – many of whom are eager to join the war. These groups have signaled readiness to participate in an international coalition to “protect shipping,” and have already held direct meetings with US military and political officials.

But the Sanaa government knows these factions would not act without orders. If they are mobilized for a broad ground offensive, Yemen will respond by targeting the powers behind them. Any ground war will be seen as a Saudi–Emirati initiative, not a local one. The same logic applies to renewed airstrikes or deeper economic war. These are Sanaa’s red lines.

A warning to the Axis of Normalization 

Abdul Malik al-Houthi laid it out clearly during a 4 April address:

“I advise you all [Arab states neighboring Yemen], and we warn you at the same time: Do not get involved with the Americans in supporting the Israelis. The American enemy is in aggression against our country in support of the Israeli enemy. The battle is between us and the Israeli enemy.

The Americans support it, protect it, and back it. Do not get involved in supporting the Israeli enemy … any cooperation with the Americans in aggression against our country, in any form, is support for the Israeli enemy, it is cooperation with the Israeli enemy, it is conspiracy against the Palestinian cause.”

He went further:

“If you cooperate with the Americans: Either by allowing him to attack us from bases in your countries. Or with financial support. Or logistical support. Or information support. It is support for the Israeli enemy, advocacy for the Israeli enemy, and backing for the Israeli enemy.”

This was not just a warning. It was a strategic declaration. Any country crossing these lines will be treated as an active participant in the war – and subject to retaliation.

The message is aimed not just at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but at other Arab and African states that might be tempted to join the fray under the guise of “protecting international navigation.”

Yemen is preparing for all scenarios. It will not be caught off guard. And this time, it won’t be fighting alone.

April 16, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Below the radar: Is the Trump-Netanyahu ‘unthinkable’ about to happen?

By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | April 15, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest trip to Washington was no ordinary visit. The consensus among Israeli analysts, barring a few remaining loyalists, is that Netanyahu was not invited; he was summoned by US President Donald Trump.

All of the evidence supports this assertion. Netanyahu rarely travels to the US without extensive Israeli media fanfare, leveraging his touted relationships with various US administrations as a “hasbara” opportunity to reinforce his image as Israel’s strongman.

This time, there was no room for such propaganda.

Netanyahu was informed of Trump’s summons while on an official trip to Hungary, where he was received by Hungarian President Viktor Orban with exaggerated diplomatic accolades. This was a signal of defiance against international condemnation of Netanyahu, an alleged war criminal wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Orban’s open arms welcome portrayed him as anything but an isolated leader of an increasingly pariah state.

The capstone of Netanyahu’s short-lived Hungarian victory lap was Orban’s announcement of Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC, a move with profoundly unsettling implications.

It would have been convenient for Netanyahu to use his Washington visit to divert attention from his failed war in Gaza and internal strife in Israel. However, as the Arabic saying goes, “The wind often blows contrary to the ship’s desires.”

The notion that Netanyahu was summoned by Trump rather than invited, is corroborated by Israeli media reports that he attempted to postpone the visit under various pretexts. He failed, and flew to Washington on the date determined by the White House. Initially, reports circulated that no press conference would be held, denying Netanyahu the platform to tout for Washington’s unwavering support for his military actions and to expound on the “special relationship” between the two countries.

A press conference was held, although it was dominated largely by Trump’s contradictory messages and typical rhetoric. Netanyahu spoke briefly, attempting to project the same confident body language observed during his previous Washington visit, where he sat straight-backed with legs splayed out, as if he was in full command of all around him.

This time, though, Netanyahu’s body language betrayed him.

His eyes shifted nervously, and he appeared stiff and surprised, particularly when Trump announced that the US and Iran were about to begin direct talks in Oman.

Trump also mentioned the need to end the war in Gaza, but the Iran announcement clearly shocked Netanyahu. He desperately tried to align his discourse with Trump’s, referencing Libya’s disarmament under Muammar Gaddafi. But that was never part of Israel’s official regional plan. Israel has advocated consistently for US military intervention against Iran, despite the certainty that such a war would destabilise the entire region, potentially drawing the US into a conflict far more protracted and devastating than the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Further evidence of the US divergence of views from Israel’s regional ambitions — which are centred on perpetual war, territorial expansion and geopolitical dominance — lies in the fact that key political and intellectual figures within the Trump administration recognise the futility of such conflicts. In leaked exchanges on the encrypted messaging platform Signal, Vice President JD Vance protested that escalating the war in Yemen benefits Europe, not the US, a continent with which the US is increasingly decoupling, if not actually engaging in a trade war.

The Yemen war, like a potential conflict with Iran, is perceived widely as being waged on Israel’s behalf.

Figures like Tucker Carlson, a prominent commentator, articulated the growing frustration among right-wing intellectuals in the US, tweeting that, “Anyone advocating for conflict with Iran is not an ally of the United States, but an enemy.”

Trump’s willingness to challenge Netanyahu’s policies openly remains unclear. His conflicting statements, such as calling for an end to the Gaza war while simultaneously advocating for the expulsion of Palestinians, add to the ambiguity. However, recent reports suggest a determined US intention to end the war in Gaza as part of a broader strategy, linking Gaza to Yemen, Lebanon and Iran. This aligns with Washington’s need to stabilise the region as it prepares for a new phase of competition with China, requiring comprehensive economic, political and military readiness.

Should Trump prove capable of doing what others could not, will Netanyahu finally submit to American pressure?

In 2015, the Israeli leader demonstrated Israel’s unparalleled influence on US foreign and domestic policy when he addressed both chambers of Congress. Despite a few insignificant protests, Republican and Democratic policymakers applauded enthusiastically as Netanyahu criticised the then President Barack Obama, who did not attend and appeared to be isolated by his own political class.

However, if Netanyahu believes that he can replicate that moment, he is mistaken. Those years are long gone. Trump is a populist leader who is not beholden to political balances in Congress. Now in his second and final term, he could, in theory, abandon America’s ingrained reliance on the approval of Israel and its aggressively influential lobby in Washington.

Moreover, Netanyahu’s political standing is diminished. He is perceived as a failed political leader and military strategist, unable to secure decisive victories or extract political concessions from his adversaries. He is a leader without a clear plan, grappling with a legitimacy crisis unlike any faced by his predecessors.

Ultimately, the outcome hinges on Trump’s willingness to confront Netanyahu. If he does, and sustains the pressure, Netanyahu could find himself in an unenviable position, marking a rare instance in modern history where the US dictates the terms, and Israel listens. Is the unthinkable about to happen? Let’s wait and see.

April 15, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | 1 Comment

The US and Iran: March to war – or a backroom deal?

The Cradle | April 14, 2025

The rhetoric surrounding a potential US–Israeli strike on Iran has intensified, fueled by veiled threats, media leaks, and what appeared to be an unofficial ultimatum from the Trump administration to Tehran. While no concrete consequences were outlined, the implication of direct military action looms large.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution – and especially after the Iran–Iraq War – Iran has lived under constant threat of US-led military intervention. These threats have fluctuated depending on regional dynamics and shifting US priorities.

In the aftermath of the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran and Syria appeared to be next in line for American-style regime-change. But the protracted insurgency in Iraq and the cost of occupation deterred further US military adventures – particularly against a civilization-state like Iran, whose size and geography pose significant challenges.

Republican leaders, and especially US President Donald Trump, have typically leaned toward employing open threats and economic strangulation policies against perceived US adversaries, rather than pursuing quiet diplomatic solutions. Today, they sense a unique opportunity to strike a deadly blow against Tehran given the recent weakening of Iran’s allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian state, both of which have faced military setbacks and political isolation under western pressure and US-backed Israeli aggression.

Hezbollah, long viewed as Iran’s forward line of defense, now faces internal Lebanese constraints and sustained Israeli aggression, limiting its capacity to act preemptively should Iran be targeted. Meanwhile, Syria’s logistical value to the Axis of Resistance has diminished under sanctions, military exhaustion, and the toppling of former president Bashar al-Assad’s government by foreign-backed extremists under its self-appointed Al Qaeda-linked President Ahmad al-Sharaa.

Exploiting the regional moment

With the Axis of Resistance on the defensive, Washington and Tel Aviv see a fleeting opportunity to consolidate their gains. Yet despite their saber-rattling, Iran retains significant deterrence capabilities and appears prepared to retaliate if provoked.

Trump’s strategy, it must also be noted, extends well beyond Iran and its indigenous nuclear program. These foreign policy postures are part of a broader bid to isolate China, reset regional conflicts, distance Beijing from Moscow, and redirect global energy flows and prices, all while propping up Israel as Washington’s local enforcer.

In this context, West Asia becomes both a proving ground and a potential quagmire. Trump seeks to finalize the so-called “normalization” process between Israel and Arab states, neutralize Palestinian resistance, and pressure Iran to concede its regional role.

While he casts himself as a pragmatist open to deals, this posture serves a dual purpose: securing domestic political capital and forging a regional alliance rooted in US dependency.

Still, for such a deal to materialize, Iran would have to abandon core ideological and strategic pillars – namely, its regional alliances and missile deterrence. This is unlikely. Iran knows that surrendering these elements would strip the Islamic Republic not only of its ideological foundation but of any meaningful regional influence.

Iran’s multi-layered deterrence

Tehran’s defense strategy rests on several pillars. First is its alliance network stretching from Iraq to Yemen and Lebanon, forming a buffer against western hegemony. Second is its growing arsenal of precision missiles, drones, and domestically developed air defense systems. Third is geography: Iran’s control over key chokepoints in the Persian Gulf and its capacity to disrupt global oil supply grants it substantial leverage.

The final line of defense remains Iran’s nuclear program. While officially peaceful, there have been sporadic signals that suggest Tehran may recalibrate its doctrine in response to a major direct attack. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly at Fordow – a fortified facility deep beneath a mountain – underscores this strategic depth.

Despite recent blows, Hezbollah is unlikely to remain passive if Iran faces an existential threat. Likewise, US interests in Iraq and bases in the region, particularly Djibouti, could become targets for retaliatory strikes from Yemen’s Ansarallah movement.

Iran’s weapons development program has made extraordinary strides post-2011, with multiple lines of ballistic missiles like the Khyber Shakan and Fattah series, and more basic but highly producible systems like Imad and Radwan.

Meanwhile, Iran’s drones have proven effective in theaters from Ukraine to the Red Sea, while its layered air defenses – Khordad, Power-373, and Majid systems – make sustained air campaigns costly for adversaries. Its naval strategy hinges on asymmetric warfare and control of the Strait of Hormuz, a lifeline for global energy trade.

American options – and constraints 

The US maintains around 60,000 troops across West Asia, mainly in Persian Gulf bases, and has shifted assets – including aircraft carriers and Patriot systems – from the Pacific to the region. Washington can certainly initiate a campaign to damage Iran’s infrastructure, but sustaining it would be difficult.

All regional US bases are within range of Iranian missiles, meaning any engagement could mark the first conventional war for the US with real counter-fire in decades.

Expect Washington to lean heavily on cyberwarfare and covert operations targeting civilian and military infrastructure alike to sow chaos inside Iran. Yet, a limited strike risks triggering a protracted conflict – something Iran is arguably more prepared for.

Iran’s strategy of attrition suits its asymmetric strengths and the fragility of US supply chains for munitions such as Patriots, SM-series interceptors, and cruise missiles.

The ongoing engagement in the Red Sea has already strained American resources. US aircraft carriers are operating from positions well beyond effective range, and stockpiles of precision munitions are running low – many earmarked for future conflict with China.

Manufacturing limitations, not cost, are the real bottleneck in sustaining a prolonged campaign. Despite these constraints, the US could still inflict serious initial damage. But sustaining such an operation, especially in the face of regional retaliation, would exact a high political and economic cost.

Between brinkmanship and bargaining 

Both sides have much to lose – and much to bargain with. For Washington, a limited conflict could serve immediate strategic aims. For Tehran, dragging the US into a drawn-out war could shift pressure back onto American decision-makers already grappling with economic turbulence at home.

While the rhetoric of war dominates headlines, the path to direct conflict remains uncertain. Much depends on the outcome of indirect negotiations, particularly the recent round of indirect talks in Muscat, Oman.

Trump’s theatrics – threats, military build-up, and erratic messaging – are better understood as negotiating tactics than a clear march to war. Notably, Trump’s insistence that the occupation state should take the lead in any war on Iran reveals his reluctance to entangle the US in yet another West Asian quagmire.

His preference remains a deal, on his terms, allowing him to parade a foreign policy ‘win’ without bloodshed. In sum, war is neither inevitable nor necessarily decisive. The US needs a strategic pause in West Asia to refocus on other global priorities.

Iran, meanwhile, seeks time to rebuild internally and block Israel from exploiting current momentum. The coming weeks may decide whether this standoff ends in confrontation, or compromise.

April 15, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Standing at the Edge of the Iran War Cliff

By Ron Paul | April 14, 2025

Millions of people around the world were at the edge of their seats over the weekend, waiting to hear whether Trump special envoy Steve Witkoff’s indirect talks with the Iranian foreign minister would ratchet down tensions or would break down and bring on a major Middle East war.

If it seems bizarre that the outcome of a meeting between a US president’s designated negotiator and a foreign government minister could determine whether we plunge into possibly our biggest war since World War II, that’s because it is bizarre. In fact, this is an excellent example of why our Founders were so determined to keep warmaking authority out of the Executive Branch of government. No one person – much less his aide – should have the power to take this country to war.

That is why the Constitution places the authority to go to war firmly and exclusively in the hands of the representatives of the people: the US Congress. After all, it is the US people who will be expected to fight the wars and to pay for the wars and to bear the burden of the outcome of the wars. When that incredible power is placed in the hands of one individual – even if that individual is elected – the temptation to use it is far too great. Our Founders recognized this weakness in the system they were rebelling against – the British monarchy – so they wisely corrected it when they drafted our Constitution.

Unless the US is under direct attack or is facing imminent direct attack, the Constitution requires Congress to deliberate, discuss, and decide whether a conflict or potential conflict is worth bringing the weight of the US military to bear. They wanted it harder, not easier, to take us to war.

When wars can be started by presidents with no authority granted by Congress, the results can be the kinds of endless military engagements with ever-shifting, unachievable objectives such as we’ve seen in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We are currently seeing another such endless conflict brewing with President Trump’s decision to start bombing Yemen last month. The stated objectives– to end Houthi interference with Israeli Red Sea shipping – are not being achieved so, as usually happens, the bombing expands and creates more death and destruction for the civilian population. In the last week or so, US bombs have struck the water supply facilities for 50,000 civilians and have apparently blown up a civilian tribal gathering.

Starting a war with Iran was the furthest thing from the minds of American voters last November, and certainly those who voted for Donald Trump were at least partly motivated by his promise to end current wars and start no new wars. However, there is a strange logic that to fulfill the promise of no new wars, the US must saber rattle around the world to intimidate others from crossing the White House. This is what the recycled phrase “peace through strength” seems to have come to mean. But the real strength that it takes to make and keep peace is the strength to just walk away. It is the strength to stop meddling in conflicts that have nothing to do with the United States.

That is where Congress comes in. Except they are not coming in. They are nowhere to be found. And that is not a good thing.

April 14, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Gulf-backed genocide: How Arab monarchies fuel Israel’s war machine

By Mawadda Iskandar | The Cradle | April 10, 2025

The Persian Gulf states’ silence – and in many cases, complicity – during Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza has not come as a shock. These governments, long detached from the Palestinian struggle, have for years cultivated warm, if discreet, ties with Tel Aviv.

While Bahrain and the UAE made normalization of ties with Tel Aviv official through the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords, other states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played quieter but equally pivotal roles. Riyadh, often described as the architect behind normalization, and Doha, hiding behind its “mediator” label, have each aided the occupation state in crucial ways.

Though much of this assistance remains behind the scenes, it has been repeatedly acknowledged by US and Israeli officials. During his first term, US President Donald Trump once warned that “Israel would be in big trouble without Saudi Arabia,” while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Arab leaders now view Israel “not as their enemy, but their greatest ally,” adding that they “want to see us defeat Hamas.”

Such statements offer a glimpse into the vast, opaque network of regional cooperation propping up the occupation state’s war machine.

Economic complicity 

Despite overwhelming popular support throughout the Arab world for Palestine, and growing calls for grassroots boycotts, Persian Gulf–Israeli trade has only surged. The UAE now ranks as Israel’s top Arab trade partner, while Bahrain’s commerce with Tel Aviv spiked by a staggering 950 percent during the first 10 months of the Gaza war.

Even amid war and boycott efforts, “kosher-certified” goods from Arab countries continue to enter Israeli markets. UAE-based brands like Al Barakah Dates and Hunter Foods, along with Saudi Arabia’s Durra (a sugar supplier), have maintained trade channels.

Qatar has exported crude materials for plastics used in Israeli industries. Bahrain went so far as to officially recognize goods produced in illegal West Bank settlements as Israeli in origin.

More insidiously, Persian Gulf investments are directly fueling Israeli settlement expansion. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have funneled money into Avenue Partners, a firm chaired by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who remains involved in advising the Trump administration from afar.

That money flows into Phoenix Holdings, which finances key banks involved in settlement construction – LeumiHapoalim, and Discount Bank – as well as telecom firms like Cellcom and Partner, and construction companies like Electra and Shapir, all of which operate inside occupied Palestinian territory.

When Yemen’s blockade disrupted shipping lanes for Israeli-linked cargo in the Red Sea, cutting off 70 percent of Tel Aviv’s food imports, it was the Persian Gulf states that rushed to patch the breach. The UAE created an overland logistics corridor from Dubai to Tel Aviv via Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and Bahrain repurposed its ports to serve as alternate shipping hubs for Israeli goods arriving from India and China.

Military ties beneath the surface

From the earliest days of Israel’s onslaught on Gaza, the UAE has doubled down on its strategic military relationship with the occupation state. In 2024, Balkan Insight revealed that a UAE-linked firm, Yugoimport-SDPR, exported $17.1 million worth of weapons to Israel via military aircraft directly involved in bombing Gaza.

But the arms trade is only part of this treacherous picture. The UAE’s state-owned defense giant EDGE holds shares in Israeli military contractors like Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), companies that retrofit Emirati planes into military freighters. Abu Dhabi has also welcomed offices from Israeli weapons manufacturers like Bayt Systems and Third Eye Systems, and proudly hosted 34 Israeli defense firms at IDEX 2025 – a major arms expo used to secure deals with the occupation army.

Though not formally normalized, Saudi Arabia is militarizing its ties with Israel through indirect channels. One method: purchasing Israeli systems like the TOW missile through US-based subsidiaries of Elbit Systems. Another: acquiring surveillance drones from South Africa, which are disassembled and reassembled in the kingdom to mask their Israeli origins.

A recent anti-drone system – suspected to be designed by Israeli firm RADA – was spotted at the Royal Saudi Air Defense base in Tabuk, near King Faisal Air Base.

Meanwhile, Qatar has quietly boosted its military coordination with Tel Aviv. Doha continues to source spare parts for tanks, armored vehicles, and aerial tankers from Israeli suppliers, and its military has participated in joint drills involving Israel and other Persian Gulf states – including exercises in Greece held just over a week ago.

Logistical lifelines to Tel Aviv

Beyond military and economic ties, Persian Gulf states have facilitated the flow of weapons to Israel through logistical support channels. As the US ramped up its “unprecedented airlift” of tens of thousands of missiles, munitions, and Iron Dome components, the Gulf’s airspace and bases became critical.

US arms shipments passed through Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, and especially Qatar, where the Al-Udeid Air Base – home to US Central Command – served as a hub for at least 18 documented transfers. Several were routed through Cyprus to avoid direct flight tracking.

In the UAE, Dubai International Airport became a waypoint for Israeli reservists flying in from Asia. Coordinated through the Israeli consulate in Dubai, these flights funneled soldiers into the war in Gaza. Emirati authorities also arranged leisure retreats for Israeli troops between deployments and allowed Jewish organizations in Dubai to send care packages to the occupation military.

Pipeline diplomacy and energy normalization

Earlier this month, as Trump prepared to visit Saudi Arabia seeking investment in US infrastructure, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen unveiled plans for a regional oil pipeline stretching from Ashkelon to Saudi Arabia via Eilat.

The project falls under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with links running through the UAE, Jordan, and occupied Palestinian lands.

In a related move, Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa – son of the Bahraini king and chair of Bapco Energy – announced the sale of a pipeline stake to BlackRock, the US investment giant notorious for its financial ties to Israeli settlements. This deal cannot be separated from the broader normalization agenda.

Spycraft and surveillance

In one of the clearest signs of deepening security cooperation, Axios revealed a secret 2024 meeting in Bahrain between Israeli army chief Herzi Halevi and senior military officials from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt.

Overseen by US Central Command, the summit focused on countering Iranian retaliation and disrupting weapons flows to Gaza from resistance forces in Iraq and Yemen – operations that often transit through Persian Gulf-controlled airspace.

Bahrain’s role was particularly overt: Nasser bin Hamad openly declared his country’s commitment to disrupting Iranian response operations in coordination with the US Fifth Fleet stationed in Manama. Analysts now speculate that Tel Aviv could be granted permanent naval access to strategic Gulf waters.

This growing security convergence has also opened the door for Israeli tech to penetrate Persian Gulf infrastructure. Bahrain now relies on Israeli firms for anti-drone systems, satellite surveillance, and cybersecurity. One notable collaboration involves Bahraini company Crescent Technologies and Israeli cyber defense powerhouse CyberArk.

The UAE is pushing the envelope even further. Emirati firms have signed deals with XM Cyber – co-founded by a former Mossad chief – to secure national energy infrastructure. XM Cyber works in tandem with Rafael and other elite Israeli military firms as part of a consortium targeting sensitive Gulf markets, including oil, energy, and data. Meanwhile, Orpak Systems, another Israeli company, has quietly entered Arab oil sectors under nondescript branding to avoid detection.

Despite their public posturing and periodic statements of support for Palestine, the Persian Gulf states have quietly entrenched themselves in Tel Aviv’s war effort. Through investment flows, arms deals, intelligence cooperation, and energy infrastructure, they have become vital enablers of the genocide in Gaza.

This alliance – crafted in backrooms and sealed with economic interests – has allowed Israel to prosecute its war on Gaza with Gulf assistance at every logistical and financial juncture.

Far from being passive actors, these states are now active partners in a conflict that has devastated an entire people.

April 10, 2025 Posted by | Deception, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, War Crimes | , , , , | Leave a comment

The Seventh Nation

By Přemysl Janýr | April 8, 2025

Vienna – On the 16th of March, President Donald Trump ordered strikes on the Houthi rebels in Yemen. On Tuesday, he gave Israel the ‘green light’ to proceed with its genocide in Gaza, which had previously experienced a period of relative tranquility for approximately six weeks. This decision precipitated a fresh round of brutal attacks in the region. On Thursday, the President issued an ultimatum to Iran and is preparing the U.S. military for war.

The sudden shift in the peacemaker Trump’s stance towards peace-oriented policies, particularly in light of his earlier campaign promises and multiple nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize, has left both his supporters and political analysts perplexed.

In my considered opinion, the impending conflict with Iran exhibits noteworthy parallels and connections to the origins of the 2003 war with Iraq.

The roots of both can be traced back to Oded Yinon’s 1982 article A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s in the Hebrew publication Kivunim, which outlined an Israeli plan to fragment the neighboring Arab states. This vision was later complemented by the 1996 Clean Break strategy paper, developed under the aegis of Richard Perle, and the 2006 New Middle East initiative introduced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Both the Iraq War and the impending conflict with Iran have been the subject of extensive strategic planning. The removal of Saddam Hussein was envisioned in the 1988 Yinon Plan, as well as the subsequent Clean Break strategy and the neoconservative manifesto, Project for a New American Century (PNAC), published in 1997. The persistent efforts of Benjamin Netanyahu to persuade the U.S. to engage in military action against Iran since 1992 underscore the long-standing intentions behind these strategies.

In both scenarios, the prevalent challenge is the convergence of public and presidential reluctance. The PNAC’s declaration elucidates the issue succinctly: further the process of transformation … is likely to be a long one-absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event- like a new Pearl Harbor.

As of January 2001, ten of the original twenty-five signatories of the PNAC doctrine are situated in pivotal roles within the nascent George W. Bush administration. In September of that year, the awaited catalytic event materializes. The responsible parties are attributed to Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network, thereby eliminating any potential obstacles to the swift military intervention in Afghanistan, where they are presumed to be harbored.

Following the general panic that ensued after the collapse of the three World Trade Center structures, it was imperative to present the necessity of invading Iraq to the populace in a manner that was both coherent and well-substantiated. Consequently, a media campaign was initiated, focusing on the purported development of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein, his alleged support for international terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaeda, and his ostensible efforts to acquire atomic weaponry. This particular instance of disinformation is noteworthy in that it was later acknowledged as such by Western media outlets, yet without any subsequent analysis regarding the instigators, their underlying intentions, or their broader actions and the ensuing culpability.

Persuading the citizenry is one challenge; persuading a head of state is quite another. George W. Bush, while not renowned for his intellectual acuity or strategic foresight, was known to be an emotionally driven individual, but he was certainly not a hawk. Despite being surrounded by influential figures such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Blair, who were staunch advocates of interventionist policies, a distinct personal motivation was still required to propel both the media campaign and the war on terrorism.

In April of 1993, authorities in Kuwait apprehended a contingent of individuals engaged in the illicit trafficking of alcohol, who were purportedly acting under the auspices of Hussein and formulating a plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush. Although the credibility of the case may be subject to scrutiny, its presentation served as a potent impetus, further compounded by the alleged (and denied) unfulfilled ambition to finish what father had begun and the asserted divine mandate: Saddam tried to kill my dad.

Nevertheless, Iraq constituted merely the initial component of a series of seven countries – adversaries of Israel – earmarked for annihilation over the subsequent five-year period (seven nations greater and mightier than you, and when the Lord your God gives them over to you and you defeat them, then you shall utterly destroy themDeuteronomy 7, 1-2). Following suit were Syria (2011 and 2025), Lebanon (1982 ongoing), Libya (2011), Somalia (2006 and 2012), Sudan (2011) and finally Iran.

With respect to Iran, a catalyzing event has not as yet transpired. Drawing parallels from the precedent established by the Iraq War, such an occurrence is likely to manifest in the foreseeable future. A plausible scenario for this could be an event similar to the hypothetical assassination of Donald Trump, for which Iran might be held accountable.

The endeavor to provide rationale for the impending military action is currently underway with vigor. Iran is purported to be engaging in the development of a nuclear weapon, acts of international terrorism via a network of intermediaries under its command, and planning an assassination attempt targeting Donald Trump, with the specific modus operandi involving the use of a surface-to-air missile to take down Trump’s plane. It is noteworthy that despite the U.S. intelligence community’s refutation of Iran’s pursuit of atomic weaponry (akin to the earlier dismissals of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction), this contention serves merely as a pretext for the issuance of unattainable ultimatums.

Despite President Trump’s emotional disposition and lack of a reputation for profound insight or foresight, he does not embody the hawkish persona. Instead, he is often portrayed as a transactional figure with a quid pro quo philosophy, steeped in the real estate sector including its gangster-like methods. Despite not claiming Jewish ancestry himself, his immediate circle, including his family and professional network, is comprised of ardent Zionists. The relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem during his initial term in 2019 was a personal favor to his substantial political donor, Sheldon Adelson, and the cessation of hostilities in Gaza was instigated by the pressure of Mr. Adelson’s widow, Miriam.

As in the case concerning President George W. Bush, it is imperative to incorporate individual motives into the discourse surrounding the atomic bomb and terrorist networks. Among these factors is President Trump’s evident aspiration to belong to the community of chosen people. His coterie endorses his inclination, with some even hailing him as the first American Jewish president or even the Second Non-Jewish Messiah for Israel. It is essential to recognize that Iran stands as a preeminent adversary to Israel, and the reports of a planned assassination should be viewed through this particular lens. President Trump has explicitly stated that if it assassinates him, Iran will be ‘obliterated’.

Moving beyond the realm of established facts and delving into potential future developments, one conceivable scenario, informed by the precedents of the Iraqi episode, may unfold as follows:

The escalation of anti-Iranian rhetoric and tensions, driven by President Trump’s influence, will persist for a certain period. Eventually, the aircraft carrying the President, Air Force One, may indeed be targeted and brought down by a surface-to-air missile. This incident would then be akin to historical catalyzing events such as the sinking of the Lusitania, the Pearl Harbor bombing, the Gulf of Tonkin affair, as well as 9/11, serving as a pivotal moment in the annals of American history with anticipated repercussions. Despite the anticipated recrimination regarding the failure of intelligence agencies and aerial defense mechanisms, the consensus in the Western world will attribute responsibility to Iran (while to the Global South, it will be patently clear that the Mossad had done it).

This kills three birds with one stone. It is anticipated to alleviate the escalating reluctance to support Israel and mitigate the internal political strains that could potentially precipitate civil war and the fragmentation of the country. The demographic segment of the populace that would view President Trump’s death favorably will likely find unity with the remaining portion of his supporters through a shared hatred towards Iran and an imperative for just retribution.

Consequently, the previously prevalent opposition to engaging in novel international ventures is surmounted. This paves the way for the finishing of the strategic seven-countries plan. Moreover, it is not envisioned that Israel will be the initial aggressor in confronting its most significant adversary; rather, it is the United States that will lead the charge with its own military capabilities. Israel can exercise a degree of restraint from a position of relative distance.

I’m not trying to guess how countries like Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the Arab League, along with big players Turkey, Russia, and China, will react. What I can say for sure is that if things go haywire, the whole Middle East is looking at a serious destabilization, possibly even the start of another world war. Now, if chaos does break out, it’s like a golden opportunity for Israel to move in and take over large chunks of Lebanon, Syria, maybe even of Iraq and Egypt, not speaking about Gaza and the West Bank, and they’re not likely to give any of it back. Benjamin Netanyahu could become a legend in Israel’s history books – that is, until all the internal bickering leads to Erez Israel falling apart at the seams.

Should the course of events follow the outlined scenario, the reader may consider themselves forewarned. In the event of divergence, one may attribute it to the writer’s inherent biases. However, a scenario that promises a positive trajectory and a favorable resolution currently remains elusive.

The Czech original: https://www.janyr.eu/120-sedma-zeme, April 3th, 2025

April 8, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, False Flag Terrorism, Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah denies Reuters’ report citing ‘commander’

Al Mayadeen | April 7, 2025

Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah stated that the remarks attributed by Reuters to an individual described as a “Kataib Hezbollah commander” do not reflect the group’s principles or positions.

The brigades emphasized that all official media statements are made solely by their official and military spokespersons.

Any claims made in the name of Kataib Hezbollah by individuals other than these spokespersons are considered false and defamatory, it stressed.

Reuters had reported that Iraqi armed groups are ready to dismantle amid fears of a Trump strike, citing senior Iraqi commanders and officials.

Kataib Hezbollah, a group active under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, took part in the military operations against Israeli targets in response to “Israel’s” war on the Gaza Strip.

US-Iran war would set entire region ablaze: Iraqi official

Last week, the Secretary-General of Iraq’s Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, cautioned that a war between Iran and the United States would not be a “walk in the park” or a simple affair but would set the entire region on fire.

“The outbreak of war with Iran does not mean it will be a walk in the park; rather, it will set the entire region ablaze,” al-Amiri warned during a meeting with tribal leaders and dignitaries from Diyala province at the headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ Diyala Operations Command.

The Iraqi politician stressed that “no one should assume that we and other countries of the region will stand idly by if war breaks out between Iran and the US.”

His remarks come two days after US President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Iran if no agreement was reached on its nuclear program.

Ali Larijani, senior advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Sayyed Ali Khamenei, warned that any US or Israeli attack on Iran under the pretext of its nuclear program would force Tehran to move toward producing a nuclear bomb.

Iranian officials have also rejected negotiations under pressure or threats, affirming Tehran’s readiness to respond firmly to any attack.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Tehran was open to indirect negotiations with Washington but pointed out that the US approach would determine the course of the discussions.

April 7, 2025 Posted by | Deception, Fake News, Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

‘Break-a-Leg’ (that old Mafia warning) – Trump has threatened Iran over an ultimatum that likely cannot be met

By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 7, 2025

Trump’s ultimatum to Iran? Colonel Doug Macgregor compares the Trump ultimatum to Iran to that which Austria-Hungary delivered to Serbia in 1914: An offer, in short, that ‘could not be refused’. Serbia accepted nine out of the ten demands. But it refused one – and Austria-Hungary immediately declared war.

On 4 February, shortly after his Inauguration, President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM); that is to say, a legally binding directive requiring government agencies to carry out the specified actions precisely.

The demands are that Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon; denied inter-continental missiles, and denied too other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. All these demands go beyond the NPT and the existing JCPOA. To this end, the NSPM directs maximum economic pressure be imposed; that the U.S. Treasury act to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero; that the U.S. work to trigger JCPOA Snapback of sanctions; and that Iran’s “malign influence abroad” – its “proxies” – be neutralised.

The UN sanctions snapback expires in October, so time is short to fulfil the procedural requirements to Snapback. All this suggests why Trump and Israeli officials give Spring as the deadline to a negotiated agreement.

Trump’s ultimatum to Iran appears to be moving the U.S. down a path to where war is the only outcome, as occurred in 1914 – an outcome which ultimately triggered WW1.

Might this just be Trump bluster? Possibly, but it does sound as if Trump is issuing legally binding demands such that he must expect cannot be met. Acceptance of Trump’s demands would leave Iran neutered and stripped of its sovereignty, at the very least. There is an implicit ‘tone’ to these demands too, that is one of threatening and expecting regime change in Iran as its outcome.

It may be Trump bluster, but the President has ‘form’ (past convictions) on this issue. He has unabashedly hewed to the Netanyahu line on Iran that the JCPOA (or any deal with Iran) was ‘bad’. In May 2014, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA at Netanyahu’s behest and instead issued a new set of 12 demands to Iran – including permanently and verifiably abandoning its nuclear programme in perpetuity and ceasing all uranium enrichment.

What is the difference between those earlier Trump demands and those of this February? Essentially they are the same, except today he says: If Iran “doesn’t make a deal, there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before”.

Thus, there is both history, and the fact that Trump is surrounded – on this issue at least – by a hostile cabal of Israeli Firsters and Super Hawks. Witkoff is there, but is poorly grounded on the issues. Trump too, has shown himself virtually totalitarian in terms of any and all criticism of Israel in American Academia. And in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, he is fully supportive of Netanyahu’s far-right provocative and expansionist agenda.

These present demands regarding Iran also run counter to the 25 March 2025 latest annual U.S. Intelligence Threat Assessment that Iran is NOT building a nuclear weapon. This Intelligence Assessment is effectively disregarded. A few days before its release, Trump’s National Security Adviser, Mike Waltz clearly stated that the Trump Administration is seeking the “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear energy program: “Iran has to give up its program in a way that the entire world can see”, Waltz said. “It is time for Iran to walk away completely from its desire to have a nuclear weapon”.

On the one hand, it seems that behind these ultimata stands a President made “pissed off and angry” at his inability to end the Ukraine war almost immediately – as he first mooted – together with pressures from a bitterly fractured Israel and a volatile Netanyahu to compress the timeline for the speedy ‘finishing off’ of the Iranian ‘regime’ (which, it is claimed, has never been weaker). All so that Israel can normalise with Lebanon –and even Syria. And with Iran supposedly ‘disabled’, pursue implementation of the Greater Israel project to be normalised across the Middle East.

Which, on the other hand, will enable Trump to pursue the ‘long-overdue’ grand pivot to China. (And China is energy-vulnerable – regime change in Tehran would be a calamity, from the Chinese perspective).

To be plain, Trump’s China strategy needs to be in place too, in order to advance Trump’s financial system re-balancing plans. For, should China feel itself besieged, it could well act as a spoiler to Trump’s re-working of the American and global financial system.

The Washington Post reports on a ‘secret’ Pentagon memo from Hegseth that “China [now] is the Department’s sole pacing threat, [together] with denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland”.

The ‘force planning construct’ (a concept of how the Pentagon will build and resource the armed services to take on perceived threats) will only consider conflict with Beijing when planning contingencies for a major power war, the Pentagon memo says, leaving the threat from Moscow largely to be attended by European allies.

Trump wants to be powerful enough credibly to threaten China militarily, and therefore wants Putin to agree speedily to a ceasefire in Ukraine, so that military resources can quickly be moved to the China theatre.

On his flight back to Washington last Sunday evening, Trump reiterated his annoyance toward Putin, but added “I don’t think he’s going to go back on his word, I’ve known him for a long time. We’ve always gotten along well”. Asked when he wanted Russia to agree to a ceasefire, Trump said there was a “psychological deadline” – “If I think they’re tapping us along, I will not be happy about it”.

Trump’s venting against Russia may, perhaps, have an element of reality-TV to it. For his domestic audience, he needs to be perceived as bringing ‘peace through strength’ – to keep up the Alpha-Male appearance, lest the truth of his lack of leverage over Putin becomes all too apparent for the American public and to the world.

Part of the reason for Trump’s frustration too, may be his cultural formation as a New York businessman; that a deal is about first dominating the negotiations, and then quickly ‘splitting the difference’. This, however, is not how diplomacy works. The transactional approach also reflects deep conceptual flaws.

The Ukraine ceasefire process is stalled, not because of Russian intransigence, but rather because Team Trump has determined that achieving a settlement in Ukraine comes firstly through insisting on a unilateral and immediate ceasefire – without introducing temporary governance to enable elections in Ukraine, nor addressing the root causes of the conflict. And secondly, because Trump rushed in, without listening to what the Russians were saying, and/or without hearing it.

Now that initial pleasantries are over, and Russia is saying flatly that current ‘ceasefire’ proposals simply are inadequate and unacceptable, Trump becomes angry and lashes out at Putin, saying that 25% tariffs on Russian oil could happen ANY moment.

Putin and Iran are both now under ‘deadlines’ (a ‘psychological’ one in Putin’s case), so as to enable Trump to proceed with credibly threatening China to come to a ‘deal’ soon – as the global economy is already wobbling.

Trump fumes and spits fire. He tries to hurry matters along by making a big show of bombing the Houthis, boasting that they have been hit hard, with many Houthi leaders killed. Yet, such callousness towards Yemeni civilian deaths sits awkwardly with his claimed heart-rendering empathy for the thousands of ‘handsome’ Ukrainian young men needlessly dying on the front lines.

It all becomes reality-TV.

Trump threatens Iran with “bombing [the] likes of which they have never seen before” over an ultimatum that likely cannot be met. Simply put, this threat (which includes the possible use of nuclear weapons) is not given because Iran poses a threat to the U.S. It does not. But it is given as an option. A plan; a ‘thing’ placed calmly on the geo-political table and intended to spread fear. “Cities full of children, women, and the elderly to be killed: Not morally wrong. Not a war crime”.

No. Just the ‘reality’ that Trump takes the Iranian nuclear programme to be an existential threat to Israel. And that the U.S. is committed to using military force to eliminate existential threats to Israel.

This is the heart to Trump’s ultimatum. It owes to the fact that it is Israel – not America, and not the U.S. intelligence community – that views Iran as an existential threat. Professor Hudson, speaking with direct knowledge of the background policy (see here and here) says, “it’s NOT just that Israel as we know it – must be safe and secure and free from terrorism”. That’s Trump and his Team’s ‘line’; that’s the Israeli and its supporters narrative too. “But the mentality [behind it] is different”, Hudson says.

There are some 2-3 million Israelis who see themselves as destined to control all of what we now call the Middle East, the Levant, what some call West Asia – and others call “Greater Israel”. These Zionists believe that they are mandated by God to take this land – and that all who oppose them are Amalek. They believe the Amalek to be consumed with an overwhelming desire to kill Jews, and who therefore should be annihilated.

The Torah records the story of Amalek: Parshat Ki Teitzei, when the Torah states, machoh timcheh et zecher Amalek—that we must erase Amalek’s memory. “Every year we [Jews] are obligated to read – not how God will destroy Amalek – but how we should destroy Amalek”. (Though many Jews puzzle how to reconcile this mitzvah with their ingrained contrarian values of compassion and mercy).

This commandment in the Torah is in fact one of the key factors that lies at the root of Israel’s obsession with Iran. Israelis perceive Iran as an Amalek tribe plotting to kill Jews. No deal, no compromise therefore is possible. It is also, of course, about Iran’s strategic challenge (albeit secular) to the Israeli state.

And what has made the Trump ultimatum so pressing in Washington’s view – apart from the China-pivot considerations – was the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. That assassination marked a big shift in U.S. thinking, because, before that, we inhabited an era of careful calculation; incremental moves up an escalator ladder. What is understood now is that ‘we’re no longer playing chess’. There are no rules anymore.

Israel (Netanyahu) is going hell-for-leather on all fronts to mitigate the divisions and turmoil at home in Israel through igniting the Iranian front – even though this course might well threaten Israel’s destruction.

This latter prospect marks the reddest of ‘red lines’ to ingrained Deep State structures.

April 7, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

David’s Corridor: Israel’s shadow project to redraw the Levant

Through ‘David’s Corridor,’ Israel aims to forge a geopolitical artery stretching from occupied Golan to Iraqi Kurdistan, reshaping West Asia

By Mahdi Yaghi | The Cradle | April 4, 2025

In recent years, the Zionist idea of “David’s Corridor” has surfaced in Tel Aviv’s strategic and political discourse on the reshaping of its geopolitical influence in the Levant. Though the Israelis have made no official announcement, analysts have pointed to this corridor as a covert project aimed at linking Kurdish-controlled northern Syria – backed by the US – to Israel via a continuous land route.

The so-called David’s Corridor refers to an alleged Israeli project to establish a land corridor stretching from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights through southern Syria to the Euphrates River. This hypothetical route would traverse the governorates of Deraa, Suwayda, Al-Tanf, Deir Ezzor, and the Iraqi–Syrian border area of Albu Kamal, providing the occupation state with a strategic overland channel into the heart of West Asia.

A biblical blueprint

Ideologically, the project is rooted in the vision of “Greater Israel,” an expansionist concept attributed to Zionism’s founder, Theodor Herzl. The vision draws on a biblical map extending from Egypt’s Nile to Iraq’s Euphrates.

Dr Leila Nicola, professor of international relations at the Lebanese University, tells The Cradle that David’s Corridor embodies a theological vision requiring Israeli control over Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – a triad central to both biblical lore and regional dominance. Regional affairs scholar Dr Talal Atrissi echoes this view, believing that developments in Syria have lent new geopolitical realism to Israel’s historical ambitions.

Unsurprisingly, the proposed corridor is a lightning rod for controversy, seen by many as a strategic bid to expand Israeli hegemony. Yet significant barriers stand in its way. As Atrissi notes, the corridor cuts through volatile terrain, where actors like Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) remain formidable spoilers. Even a minor act of sabotage could disrupt the project, particularly given the absence of a stable regional environment needed to sustain such a sensitive and expansive route.

Strategically, David’s Corridor aligns with Israel’s enduring policy of cultivating ties with regional minorities – Kurds, Druze, and others – to offset hostility from Arab states. This decades-old “peripheral alliance” strategy has underpinned Israeli support for Kurdish autonomy since the 1960s. The project’s biblical symbolism of expanding “Israel” to the Euphrates, and its strategic calculus, combine to make the corridor both a mythological promise and a geopolitical asset.

Nicola further contextualizes this within the framework of the “ocean doctrine,” a policy Israel pursued by courting non-Arab or peripheral powers like the Shah’s Iran and Turkiye, and forging alliances with ethnic and sectarian minorities in neighboring states.

The doctrine aimed to pierce the Arab wall encircling Israel and extend its geopolitical reach. David’s Corridor fits snugly within this paradigm, drawing on both spiritual mythology and strategic necessity.

Syria’s fragmentation: A gateway

The collapse of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s Al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have accelerated Syria’s internal fragmentation. Sharaa’s administration inked deals with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), integrating Kurdish-controlled areas into the nominal Syrian state while cementing Kurdish autonomy. In Suwayda, a separate agreement preserved Druze administrative independence in exchange for nominal state integration.

But Atrissi warns that such sectarian autonomy, even if pragmatic for containing tensions in the short term, risks entrenching divisions and inviting foreign meddling. He notes that the trauma of massacres on Syria’s coast has left minorities, especially the Alawites, deeply skeptical of the central authority in Damascus, pushing them toward local power arrangements. Israel, with its historical penchant for minority alliances, sees an opportunity to entrench its influence under the guise of protection.

Israel’s longstanding partnership with Iraqi Kurdistan is a case in point – a strategic relationship that offers a blueprint for replication in Syria. David’s Corridor, in this reading, is less a logistical imperative and more a political ambition. Should conditions allow, the occupation state may leverage the corridor to encircle Iran and redraw regional fault lines.

A map of the proposed David’s Corridor

A corridor of influence, not infrastructure

From Tel Aviv’s perspective, southern Syria is now a strategic vacuum: Syria’s army is weakened, Turkiye is entangled in its own Kurdish dilemmas, and Iran is overstretched. This power void offers fertile ground for Israel to assert dominance, particularly if regional dynamics continue to favor decentralized, weak governance.

Despite Washington’s reduced military footprint, the US remains committed to containing Iran. Key outposts like the Al-Tanf base on the Syrian–Iraqi border are instrumental in severing the so-called Iranian land bridge from Tehran to Beirut.

Nicola argues that while David’s Corridor is not an explicit US policy, Washington is likely to support Israeli initiatives that align with American strategic goals:

“The United States does not mind Israel implementing the project if it serves its interests, even though it is not part of its immediate strategy. It focuses on reducing Iran’s influence and dismantling its nuclear program, while supporting the path of regional normalization with Tel Aviv.”

The 2020 Abraham Accords, by easing Israel’s diplomatic isolation, have created additional maneuvering space. David’s Corridor – once a fantasy – now appears more plausible amid the regional flux.

Israeli leaders have sent unmistakable signals. On 23 February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected any Syrian military presence south of Damascus, insisting on demilitarized zones in Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda under the pretext of protecting Syria’s Druze minority.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar openly advocated for a federal Syria – a euphemism for fragmentation. Defense Minister Israel Katz vowed that Israeli troops would remain indefinitely in Mount Hermon and the Golan, and called for the dismantling of Syria into federal entities. Media leaks of corridor maps have only fueled speculation.

These moves have triggered outrage in southern Syria, with protests erupting in Khan Arnaba, Quneitra, Nawa, Busra al-Sham, and Suwayda. Yet, as Nicola notes, the new Syrian leadership appears remarkably disinterested in confronting Israel, and Arab states remain largely indifferent, even as the project edges toward realization. Turkiye, by contrast, stands firmly opposed to any Kurdish-led partition of Syria.

Geopolitical stakes and final frontiers

Ultimately, David’s Corridor signals a broader Israeli project to reengineer Syria’s geopolitics: isolate the south militarily, bind the Kurds in alliance, shift the balance of power, and carve a corridor of influence through fractured terrain.

Israel’s objectives are layered. Militarily, the corridor provides strategic depth and disrupts Iran’s land routes to Hezbollah. It enables the flow of arms and intelligence support to allies, especially Kurdish forces.

Economically, it opens a potential oil pipeline from Kirkuk or Erbil – Kurdish-majority, oil-rich areas – to Haifa, bypassing Turkish routes and maritime threats from actors like Yemen’s Ansarallah-allied army. Politically, it solidifies Israeli–Kurdish ties, undermines Syrian and Iraqi sovereignty, and advances the vision of Greater Israel, with the Euphrates as a symbolic frontier.

Yet the corridor is not without risk. It threatens to deepen the region’s instability, antagonize Syria, Turkiye, Iran, and Iraq, and trigger new fronts of resistance. Whether Israel can realize this project depends on the fluid regional calculus and its ability to maneuver within it.

David’s Corridor may still be a project in the shadows – but its implications are already casting a long one across the region.

April 5, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Policy Reversal: Why Is the U.S. Softening Its Position on Iran?

By Viktor Mikhin – New Eastern Outlook – April 5, 2025

In Recent Days, the Trump Administration—Known for Its Hardline Stance on Iran—Has Shown Unexpected Shifts in Rhetoric.

U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Steven Whitcoff, who previously advocated for a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, now speaks of the need for “confidence-building” and “resolving disagreements.” This sharp turn in foreign policy strategy raises many questions: What exactly prompted Washington to change its approach? What factors influenced the decision to soften its stance? And most importantly—does the U.S. have a real plan of action, or is this just a temporary tactical maneuver?

An analysis of the situation suggests that the policy shift is tied to a combination of factors—from the failure of sanctions to the Trump administration’s domestic political calculations. Additionally, Iran’s response and that of the international community play a key role in determining how events will unfold.

The Failure of “Maximum Pressure”

In 2018, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), expecting that harsh sanctions would force Iran to make concessions. The Trump administration believed economic strangulation would either lead to regime change in Tehran or its surrender on the nuclear issue. However, these calculations proved wrong.

Instead of backing down, Iran responded by escalating its nuclear activities. According to the IAEA, Tehran has significantly increased its stockpile of enriched uranium and begun developing more advanced centrifuges. Moreover, the country strengthened ties with Russia and China, finding alternative ways to bypass sanctions. As a result, the “maximum pressure” policy not only failed to achieve its goals but, from Washington’s perspective, worsened the situation by bringing Iran closer to developing nuclear weapons.

Now, Washington seems to have realized that isolating Iran hasn’t worked and is attempting to shift to diplomatic methods. The question, however, is whether it’s too late—Tehran, hardened by bitter experience, is unlikely to agree to new negotiations without serious guarantees.

Another reason for the policy shift may be domestic U.S. issues. Facing economic challenges and a lack of clear successes, President Trump urgently needs a foreign policy win that can be framed as a major achievement of his so-called “new approach.” A full-scale war with Iran is too risky—a scenario that could spell disaster for both the region and the U.S. itself. Thus, the administration is likely betting on a temporary agreement that can be marketed as a “diplomatic breakthrough.” However, this approach risks new problems—if the deal proves short-lived, it will further erode international trust in the U.S.

Internal Divisions in U.S. Leadership

The rhetorical shift also reflects deep divisions within the American leadership. While some officials, like Steven Whitcoff, advocate for negotiations, others—including National Security Advisor Mike Waltz—continue to insist on Iran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear program. These contradictions indicate a lack of a unified strategy.

Part of the administration appears to recognize the futility of further pressure, while another faction remains committed to a hardline approach. This division makes any long-term U.S. strategy unstable—a change in administration or even a shift in Congressional power dynamics could undo any agreements reached. Such confusion weakens the effectiveness of U.S. policy and gives Iran additional leverage.

Iran’s Response: Why Tehran Doesn’t Trust the U.S.

Iranian leaders remain deeply skeptical of Washington’s new overtures. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly stated that “threats and bribes do not work on Iran.” The experience of the 2015 JCPOA showed that the U.S. could abandon the deal at any moment, even if Iran fully complied.

After Washington’s unilateral withdrawal, Tehran lost faith in American guarantees. Now, Iran’s leadership demands not only sanctions relief but also legally binding commitments to prevent the U.S. from reneging again.

The situation is further complicated by internal political struggles in Iran. Conservative factions, empowered after the JCPOA’s collapse, oppose any concessions to the West. Additionally, Iran has adapted to sanctions by finding alternative oil markets and deepening cooperation with China and Russia. This reduces the effectiveness of U.S. pressure and diminishes Tehran’s incentives to compromise.

Even Washington’s closest allies, like Israel, have expressed discontent with the policy shift. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated he distrusts new negotiations with Iran and views any concessions as dangerous.

European nations, however, have long called for renewed dialogue. Germany, France, and the UK—who remained in the JCPOA after the U.S. exit—hope for de-escalation. Yet their influence is limited, as key decisions are made in Washington and Tehran.

Currently, negotiations remain at an impasse. The U.S. offers dialogue but maintains sanctions, while Iran refuses concessions without guarantees. Experts believe Trump is attempting a “good cop, bad cop” tactic, similar to his approach with North Korea. However, unlike in 2015, Tehran is no longer willing to negotiate under pressure. Iranian leaders recognize that time is on their side—the longer the U.S. fails to achieve its goals, the weaker its position becomes.

A Way Out?

An exit from the deadlock—which the U.S. created in its relations with Iran—was discussed during recent trilateral talks between China, Russia, and Iran in Beijing. The meeting produced a comprehensive initiative to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, based on five principles:

  1. Peaceful Solutions Over Sanctions: All parties must reject coercive pressure and illegal restrictions, prioritizing dialogue. Conditions for renewed negotiations must be created while avoiding escalatory steps.
  2. Balancing Rights and Obligations: Iran must uphold its commitment against nuclear weapons development, while the international community recognizes its right to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT.
  3. Returning to the JCPOA as a Foundation: The initiative calls for renewed focus on the JCPOA, urging the U.S. to demonstrate goodwill and rejoin the process.
  4. Dialogue Over UN Pressure: Premature involvement of the UN Security Council would undermine trust and stall progress. Confrontational mechanisms would negate years of diplomacy.
  5. Gradual Steps and Mutual Compromises: Forceful methods are ineffective—only equal consultations can produce a compromise respecting all parties’ interests and global demands.

The softening of U.S. rhetoric is a clear sign that “maximum pressure” has failed. Yet without real concessions and guarantees, negotiations are unlikely to yield a breakthrough. Iran has learned to play the long game, leaving Washington with a choice: serious, equal-footed dialogue or further escalation with unpredictable consequences. For now, the situation remains in limbo, with neither side willing to make the first move.

Viktor Mikhin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RAEN), Expert on Arab World Affairs

April 5, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | 1 Comment