Scott Ritter Hiding the Dominant Minority Behind Geopolitics?
Peace Activists Forced to Hide the Jewish Geopolitical Dots?
By Geurt de Wit | Ruling Elite Studies | January 18, 2026
Introduction
All political scientists and historians agree that some minorities have historically been able to dominate their host nations. Notable modern examples include the Spanish in South America, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and Tutsis in Central Africa. Sometimes host nations rise against a dominant minority, as seen in Southeast Asia, where local populations have implemented various quotas and measures—such as Malaysia’s Bumiputera policies—to curb the economic and social influence of the ethnic Chinese community.

Jews
There is another significant example of a dominant minority, yet naming it remains a taboo: the Jewish elite in the West. This group exerts influence through economic and media power, a “Culture of Critique,” and its maneuvers within the geopolitical “Great Game”. U.S. foreign policy, for instance, appears heavily influenced by Jewish Zionists, compelling even the supposedly “America First” Trump administration to adopt “Israel First” policies. While parts of the peace movement have begun to note the Jewish role in fomenting conflicts also beyond the Middle East, many activists still fail to see the broader connections. The conflicts in Ukraine and Taiwan are directly linked to the crisis in the Middle East.
The reason is simple: Jewish led neoconservative and neoliberal forces aligned with Israel seek to weaken Russia and China, both of which support Iran and the Shia “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East. Consequently, the West attempts to encircle Russia and China with military bases and hostile alliances while undermining their economies through sanctions and high tariffs to facilitate regime change.
This is nothing new. For centuries, Jews have viewed Russia and China as “antisemitic” for opposing Jewish attempts to become a dominant minority within their borders. Historically, this has manifested as a prolonged struggle. Jewish elite dynasties like the Rothschilds, Sassoons and Kadooreis, for example, pushed Western empires to subjugate China during its “Century of Humiliation.” Similarly, they managed to organize various wars against Russia including the first Crimean War in the 1850’s and then later the Jewish led Bolshevik and Oligarch takeovers in the 1920’s and 90’s. The present Ukraine War is just the latest in a series of conflicts and wars between Jews and Russia going back a millennium.
The obvious Jewish role in geopolitics and various wars has always been known to political scientists and historians. It is also common knowledge in many parts of the world such as in Eastern Europe, China and the Arab world. However, in America the Jewish dominant minority has achieved such power that both academia and media now avoid the subject entirely. Only occasionally does the American public hear about it through random outbursts, such as Mel Gibson’s criticism of the Jewish role in instigating wars.
Putin and Xi
Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, Russia and China have regained their independence and power. Their geopolitical support for the Axis of Resistance has drawn the ire of Zionist Jews running Great Game geopolitics, while their nationalist anti-liberal policies have alienated liberal Jewish factions running the Culture of Critique movements. As a result, the Jewish dominated Western academia and media has totally demonized both nations, while Jewish led neoconservatives and neoliberals push for their encirclement and the targeting of their global allies.
The influence of Jewish dominant minority behind these conflicts remains such a taboo that even peace activists often ignore it. This gives Zionists a carte blanche to pursue military and cultural wars, regime change operations and proxy wars aimed at isolating Russia and China. By refusing to “connect the dots,” Western peace activists effectively allow this dominant minority to continue pushing for perpetual war.
Scott Ritter
In recent years, the peace movement has been bolstered by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. A prolific advocate, Ritter has tirelessly warned against the dangers of nuclear war, organized demonstrations and personally lobbied Congress. Despite his background as a leftist philosemitic Democrat, he has significantly influenced the Republican “MAGA” movement toward anti-war policies.
Ritter has gained a massive following as a commentator on the Ukraine War. However, during the conflict’s first year, he remained silent on the Jewish and even Israeli connection, blaming only the CIA, MI6 and the U.S. and British governments. In this, he was joined by libertarian figures like Andrew Napolitano and Lew Rockwell, who focus on American “Primacists” rather than identifying a dominant minority.
Traditionally, both leftists and libertarians have avoided identifying the Jewish dominant minority to avoid being labeled as antisemitic. It was only during the recent genocide in Gaza that Ritter began to explicitly critique Israel’s geopolitical role, though he has yet to identify the dominant minority or even connect these dots to the broader global landscape.
Silent Peace Activists
Some suggest that platform policies, such as those on YouTube, drive this reticence. Peace activists like Andrew Napolitano, Alexander Mercouris, and Danny Haiphong reach hundreds of thousands of viewers daily through their Youtube channels. Openly discussing Jewish dominant minority and connecting Jewish geopolitical dots could lead to deplatforming and lost revenue. However, this doesn’t fully explain the silence, as they could simultaneously use alternative platforms like Rumble, X or Locals—a strategy successfully employed by the famous anti-Zionist, Candace Owens. Unsurprisingly she has been branded an “anti-Semite” by many Jewish organizations.
Alexander Mercouris
Another explanation is ideological. Many activists from leftist or libertarian backgrounds may instinctively view the concept of a “dominant minority” as inherently racist. The most dramatic example of this is the leftist peace activist and popular YouTube commentator Alexander Mercouris, who for years was oblivious to the Jewish connection. However, a few months ago, due to audience feedback, he admitted on his channel that he had never even thought about a possible connection between the Ukraine War and the Middle East Crises.
Afterward, he has not talked about the subject anymore, though he does seem to increasingly speak in code. For example, he repeatedly emphasizes that his channel will be shut down if he analyzes the Epstein case too deeply. At the same time, he seems to spell “Epstein” in the Jewish-German way, making Epstein’s ethnic background clearer. Mercouris also has the revealing habit of always following the arch-neocon warmonger Lindsey Graham’s name with the name Richard Blumenthal, possibly hinting that Graham is influenced by him and other Jews to a significant extent.
The third explanation for not openly noticing the dominant minority is that many prominent peace activists hope to attract the support of wealthy, anti-Zionist Jewish donors to finance the movement, a development that has yet to materialize.
Debanking
Certainly, the fourth and most important explanation is fear. Leading peace activists face tremendous pressure from various sides. Ironically, this pressure appears stronger in America than in Europe, despite stricter official censorship in Europe. However, Europeans benefit from strong employment and social security protections against firings and debanking. In America, people’s lives are more precarious and heavily dependent on high incomes, making it easier to intimidate them with threats to their reputation, job, income, or even bank accounts. The American media rarely discusses this, but hundreds of politically incorrect individuals have been debanked—not only in Canada but also in the U.S. Scott Ritter has now joined their ranks.
In the above video Scott Ritter recalls his days as a highly connected American intelligence operative, working closely with the CIA, Israelis, and even the White House. He emphasizes that he was once the “Golden Boy” of intelligence, privy to “everything.” Clearly, he must be aware of America’s dominant minority and their potential to ignite a nuclear war. Yet, despite recent escalations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Ritter in this video claims that the main problem is America itself, with Trump as a “prisoner of the CIA”—not the Mossad, Israel, or even the Zionists.
The next day, however, Ritter appeared in an interview with Andrew Napolitano. He admitted that after being debanked, he fell into depression and briefly felt hopeless, especially as his wife had grown weary of the persecution that had affected their entire family for decades. At that point, Napolitano played a clip of Jonathan Greenblatt, the Jewish ADL’s chairman, boasting about the organization’s role in training American police and officials. This ignited Ritter, who then openly declared that Zionists are running the American government.
Trump’s chess moves
At the same time, Ritter suggested there might still be hope. He noted that many parts of the government resent Zionist dominance, and even Donald Trump could be among them. That wouldn’t be surprising, given Trump’s ego—he can’t be pleased with how Netanyahu and many other Jews publicly humiliate him. Being Israel’s bitch cannot be fun.
It could even be that Trump is deliberately undermining American influence abroad through his erratic behavior, bullying threats, and tariffs. After all, U.S. foreign policy is thoroughly dominated by Zionists, so disrupting the entire system might be the only way to halt it. For instance, threatening to annex Greenland would certainly fracture or weaken NATO, making it harder for EU NATO countries to sustain their warmongering. Perhaps Trump truly seeks peace through a “Fortress America” approach, dividing the world among American, Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. Maybe he’s really playing four-dimensional chess, with method to his madness. Of course, the alternative is that he’s simply a madman. As Scott Ritter admits, he doesn’t know—and neither does anyone else. Probably not even Trump himself.
People worldwide are deeply divided over Donald Trump. Some view him as a mastermind playing four-dimensional chess to save the world, while others see him as a narcissistic bumbler who sows chaos wherever he goes. So, which perspective aligns more closely with the truth? We do not know but let’s first assume that Donald Trump is a rational player in do…
Conclusion
Many in the peace movement believe that concealing the Jewish dominant minority and obscuring its role in numerous wars is essential for peace. However, this strategy may backfire, giving that minority a free hand to escalate proxy conflicts and try again and again to push the world toward “limited” nuclear war.
People often demand perfection from their heroes, which is counterproductive. No one is a superman—not even Scott Ritter. Of course, he must consider his family. Of course, he has been reticent about exposing Jewish power. The same applies to all other peace activists. But gradually, things are changing on both the left and right. They are beginning to point out the man and group behind the curtain.
In any case, peace activists perform invaluable work and deserve unwavering support. After all, they do what they humanly can. Without them—especially Scott Ritter—a nuclear war might already have begun.
Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have
By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 17, 2026
The ugly truth is that an end of the Ukraine war may have as devastating economic and political consequences for Europe as its continuance.
Ukraine already faces a $63 billion U.S. dollar funding shortfall in 2026 and I would be surprised if this figure doesn’t increase if the war continues. Ukraine’s massive fiscal splurge is driven by two factors
- The enormous cost of maintaining a standing army of almost one million people;
- The vast expense of importing weapons from the west to fight the war.
Weapon purchases are not sources of productive investment as they are literally burned in the heat of battle. The same, of course, is true for Russia. Both countries saw reducing economic growth in 2025, with Ukraine’s at 2.1% and 1.5%. And, western pundits would point to this as evidence that Ukraine’s economy is performing better.
But the opposite is true. Russia’s economy is around twelve times larger than Ukraine’s nominally and just over ten times larger when you look at GDP using purchasing power parity.
You can see this in the defence spending numbers.
Russia spent a record $143 billion on defence in 2025 compared to around $60 billion for Ukraine, so around 2.3 times higher. Yet, Russian defence spending amounted to just 6.3% of its GDP whereas for Ukraine it was 31.7%. So, massive spending on defence is a much less pivotal issue for Russia in terms of its economic fortunes.
Defence spending represents a far smaller proportion of total economic activity than it does for Ukraine. And Russia can afford to pay for its defence needs with its own finances, while Ukraine is entirely dependent on money from western donors to keep the war going.
Despite the massive cost of war, Russia ran a fiscal deficit of just 1.7% of GDP in 2025. That is still well below the EU fiscal rule of 3% of GDP with some countries like France and Poland having deficits at or more than double that figure.
Ukraine’s fiscal deficit on the other hand was around 20% of GDP. That gap had to be filled by foreign funding as it has debt of 107% of GDP and is cut off from foreign lending.
So, hence the EU stepping up with a loan of 90 billion Euros, two thirds of which is earmarked for defence.
Russia on the other hand has debt of around 15% of GDP and doesn’t really need to borrow heavily to keep its war effort afloat. By the way, 15% of GDP is far lower than the U.S. or any European nation, many of which, like Ukraine, have debt levels of over 100% of GDP.
Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have.
Despite the shock of sanctions, Russia doesn’t have to break the bank nor boost its lending significantly.
This also means that when the war eventually ends, Russia will be able to make the economic transition back to peace in a less painful way. Russia will be under no pressure to impose massive cuts to defence spending to live within its means and can instead do so gradually.
Ukraine on the other hand faces a massive financial cliff edge when the war ends.
Ukrainian economic growth according to the OECD is set to fall further to 1.7% in 2027 if the war continues.
And that assumes continued large injections of capital from outside countries. In 2025, Ukrainian defence spending made up 31.1% of Ukrainian GDP, and two thirds of state budgetary expenditure. None of that spending goes into improving Ukraine’s weak economy.
With all of the support that it receives, Ukraine’s GDP in 2025 amounted to just under $210 billion according to the IMF.
Bear in mind here that Ukraine received $52.4 billion in external financing in 2025, or around one quarter of its GDP at the end of the year.
Take away foreign funding and Ukraine suddenly sees its economy shrink by over 20%.
Or, put it another way, take away the war and Ukraine sees its economy shrink by over 20%.
Russia simply does not face the same problem.
Rather, an end to the war may help Russia to get inflation – perhaps its biggest economic challenge – under control as economic activity returns to its normal rhythm.
But still the question arises, how come Ukraine has grown so little when it received so much foreign funding?
One big reason is that Ukraine recorded a trade deficit of $30 billion over the same period, a record according to the National Bank of Ukraine.
So, $52 billion in foreign money came into Ukraine during the year and $30 billion went straight back out again. Because Ukraine’s massive trade deficit is fuelled by two things.
First, a huge increase in the import of weapons from western suppliers which have doubled since 2022, not least as they are no longer being provided free of charge.
Second, Ukraine has increased its imports of natural resources, in particular a massive increase in gas imports, because domestic production has been hit hard by the war. Coal is another area, as Russia has swallowed up important coal mines in the Donbas.
Not all of that deficit in trade will be recoverable even after the war ends, even if Ukraine was able to reduce the overall size of its trade deficit.
By comparison, Russia’s surplus of trade in goods was already at over $100 billion by October 2025, although the overall trade picture is narrower, at around $36 billion because of a significant deficit in services trade, including from large numbers of Russians who have moved overseas since the war started.
An end to the war, if anything, may allow Russia’s trade surpluses to grow further. A future relaxation on the import of natural resources into Europe could mean that Russia benefits from already increased trade with Asia and renewed trade with Europe.
In any case, the consistent surpluses that Russia pulls in both help shore up economic growth and foreign exchange reserves, which in 2025 grew by over $135 billion to a whopping $734 billion.
And just to be clear, Russia put their reserve funds almost completely into gold which now stand at over $310 billion.
One big reason for Russia storing its reserves in gold is to keep them clear of the stealing hands of western bureaucrats, who froze around $300 billion in reserves at the start of the war.
This means that Russia has a surplus of $434 billion in foreign exchange reserves which is almost completely insulated from western expropriation. The $10 billion rise in foreign currency reserves in 2025 was undoubtedly caused by an accumulation of reserves in non-dollar, Euro and sterling currencies, suggesting the move to greater trade in Chinese Yuan and Indian rupees.
An end to the war may at some point lead to the unfreezing of immobilised Russian assets in the U.S., Europe and Japan.
Ukraine’s reserve position is also comparatively strong, at $57.3 billion at the start of 2026, a record figure. However, that rise is completely down to inflows of foreign capital to fund the war effort. An end to the war would likely shrink Ukraine’s reserves as its stubborn trade deficit was not being offset by foreign inflows of funds as they had been during war.
But it’s the sudden and shocking loss of foreign funding that accompanies an end to the war which will cause Ukraine’s economy to shrink dramatically.
But fear not, Europe is determined that Ukraine maintain an army of 800,000 personnel when the war ends. However, this seems more about economic survival than about security.
Ukraine would not be able to pay for such as large army with its own money, as it doesn’t have any money. So, once again, Europe will be forced to step in to meet Ukraine’s financing needs to pay the salaries of soldiers who are no longer in war fighting mode.
This will lead to debt and taxes rising in Europe, according to a recent Kiel Institute study. But it will also lead to a loss of business for European defence firms. Because peace time will inevitably mean a sharp drop in the munitions and military material being burned on a daily basis in the fog of war.
Two thirds of the EU’s recent 90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine will be spent on military support, including weaponry. That has sparked an argument between Germany and France over a proposed ‘buy European’ clause, with France wanting to prevent Ukrainian purchases of U.S. equipment. Perhaps with one eye on the future, the French in typical fashion, are trying to ensure that their firms get a decent share of what could amount to dwindling Ukrainian orders for weapons.
A bit like the French army, Europe is reversing itself inevitably into economic defeat when the war ends.
Obligated to keep an economically failed Ukraine on life support.
Having to increase its debt and taxes to support bad foreign policy decisions it has been taking since 2014.
Trying to boost its defence industrial complex but losing business with the end of war.
For the mainstream political parties in Europe, this adds to the trend of them heading towards electoral Armageddon when they start putting themselves to the polls from 2027 onward.
Until then, they are stuck, knowing that continuing the war will kill them electorally, and knowing that ending the war will too. To quote my old British soldier dad, they are like the mythical oozlum bird, continually going round in circles until they disappear up their own backsides.
Why are EU leaders suddenly being nice to Russia?
By Tarik Cyril Amar | RT | January 16, 2026
Sometimes a surprising statement made almost in passing on a minor occasion can pack a lot of political oomph. And sometimes, it’s just a slip and won’t tell you much about either the present or the future. But how do you know?
That is the challenge posed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent – and very unusual – talk about a “compromise” (“Ausgleich” in German) with Russia, which, he also stressed, is “a European country,” indeed “our greatest European neighbor.”
Outside the context of current Western and, in particular, German and EU politics, such a statement may seem almost commonplace. Obviously, it would make sense for Berlin – and Brussels, too – to work toward a peaceful, productive, mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow. Equally obviously, this is not merely an option but, in reality, a vital necessity (as Merz may have been hinting at when emphasizing that Russia is Germany’s greatest European neighbor: Greatest as in indispensable?).
Yet once you add the actual context of escalating German and EU policies toward Russia since 2014 at the very latest, Merz’s sudden insight into the obvious appears almost sensational. For over a decade, German and EU policy toward Moscow has been based on three simple – and self-damagingly insane – ideas: First, Russia is our enemy by default and “forever” (see the refreshingly frank admission by German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul). Second, using Ukraine (and a lot of Ukrainians), we can defeat that enemy with a combination of economic and diplomatic warfare and a very bloody proxy war on the ground. Finally, there is no alternative: it is VERBOTEN to even think about genuine give-and-take negotiations and any compromise that would also be good enough for Moscow.
Merz, moreover, has no record as a doubter of these moronic dogmas. On the contrary, he has been a consistent uber-hawk, combining the requisite constant Russophobic undertone with a long series of hardline initiatives and positions. Just a few months ago, for instance, Merz fought tooth and nail for confiscating Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU. That he lost that fight was due to resistance from Belgium – which would have been exposed to absurdly irrational risks by permitting that robbery – and France and Italy, whose leaders tripped up their hapless German “ally” at the last minute.
In a similar combination of public belligerence and final futility, Merz had long been a proponent of delivering advanced German Taurus cruise missiles – particularly well-suited for destroying things such as Russia’s Kerch Bridge – to Ukraine, before abandoning that awful idea. Ultimately and wisely, he shied away from involving Germany even more deeply in the proxy fight against Russia, most likely under the impression of very firm warnings from Moscow.
Just this month, the German chancellor declared he is ready to send German soldiers to secure a “ceasefire” in Ukraine. Yes, that would be that ceasefire that Moscow has ruled out as a dishonest half-measure. It is true that Merz hedged this announcement with conditions that make it irrelevant. But, nonetheless, it was not a contribution to de-escalation with Russia.
Yet here we are. Speaking not in Berlin, but the provincial metropolis of Halle in Eastern Germany, Merz used the occasion of a fairly humdrum meeting under the auspices of a regional IHK (Industrie und Handelskammer) meeting to speak about Germany’s relationship with Russia.
The IHK is a chamber of industry and commerce, an economic association of some weight. But it is not the parliament in Berlin or, for instance, even a foreign-policy information war outfit/think tank. Most of Merz’s remarks, unsurprisingly, concerned the German economy, which, he had to admit, is not in a good state, but, he promised, will be better soon. He also gave his word to fight and reduce bureaucracy, not only in Germany but the EU as well. That sort of stuff, nothing special, political potboiler.
But then, in the middle of the absolutely predictable and rather boring meeting, the chancellor suddenly extended a hand to Moscow. Or did he? Merz himself knows that his having anything to say about Russia that comes without foam at the mouth is extraordinary: he took care to assure his listeners that it was not the location “in the East” (that is, the former East Germany) that made him strike such a new tone regarding Russia.
His audience may or may not have been convinced by that all-too-quick denial. Halle is not only a major city in Germany’s East, but also, more specifically, the second-largest conurbation in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt. That is where, polls suggest, the new-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party may well win a crucial election in September, particularly by outdistancing Merz’s own mainstream conservatives (CDU). A similar scenario is possible in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, also in Germany’s East.
In both places, even a relative (not absolute) AfD majority, which seems certain at this point, would expose the traditional parties and especially the CDU to one of their worst nightmares: the end of the so-called “firewall,” that is, the harebrained and undemocratic policy of simply freezing the AfD out of the building of ruling coalitions. Merz personally has been an iron proponent of the “firewall.” Razing it, even regionally, will cost him his political career or force him into a brutal, humiliating 180-degree turn.
One important reason voters in Germany’s East are unhappy with the traditional parties is their policy of relentless, self-damaging confrontation toward Russia and equally relentless, really masochistic support for Zelensky’s regime in Ukraine. Just now, one of Germany’s highest courts has finally, in essence, recognized the fact that Ukraine was deeply involved in the worst vital-infrastructure attack in postwar German history, the destruction of most of the Nord Stream pipelines. Many Germans have had enough, not only but especially in Germany’s East.
That is why Merz knows that any apparent concessions to Moscow will meet healthy skepticism there. He also has a solid and well-deserved reputation for breaking his promises. His listeners in Halle may well have dismissed the new Merz sound as nothing but cheap pre-electoral manipulation.
And perhaps that is all it was. But there are good reasons to keep an open mind. For one thing, Merz has not been the only EU leader striking a more conciliatory note recently. As the Russian government has noted, similar statements have been made in France and Italy. The leaders of both countries, Emmanuel Macron and Georgia Meloni, have been no less bold than Merz in stating the obvious, namely – to summarize – that not even talking to Moscow is a daft policy.
It is not hard to see why EU politicians may be prepared to pursue diplomacy again. Their imperial overlord in Washington has made it clear that the Ukraine war will be their problem and theirs alone, while also displaying a brutality towards the world, including the clients/vassals in Europe, that is unusually open even by American standards.
After the tariff wars, the new US National Security Strategy, Venezuela, and the threats against Denmark over Greenland, could it be that, at very long last, some in Europe are slowly waking up to the fact that the worst threat to the sorry remains of their sovereignty, their economies, and also their traditional political elites is Washington, not Moscow? It would be very rash to assume so. But we can hope.
Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.
France Escalates Warmongering by Expanding Intelligence Support for Ukraine
Sputnik – 16.01.2026
While last year, Ukraine was overwhelmingly dependent on American intelligence, today “two-thirds of those capabilities are provided by France,” revealed French President Emmanuel Macron speaking to BFMTV.
France has readily stepped in to make sure the West’s proxy war doesn’t lose steam — even if the US hesitates.
Last November, reports indicated that US officials had warned the Zelensky regime that intelligence support could be halted if Ukraine rejected Donald Trump’s proposed peace framework.
While Western leaders talk relentlessly about “peace,” in reality France and its allies in the so-called Coalition of the Willing are doubling down on escalation, doing everything to keep the conflict kept alive.
In the event of a ceasefire, Europe’s hawks are planning ‘military hubs’ in Ukraine – even though Russia has repeatedly emphasized any NATO troop presence there is unacceptable and would be viewed as a direct threat.
Venezuela Has Right to Have Relations With China, Russia, Cuba, Iran – Acting President
Sputnik – 16.01.2026
Venezuela has the right to relations with all countries of the world, including China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran, and will exercise this right in compliance with international norms, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodriguez said on Thursday.
Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said the country’s energy dialogue with the United States is not new, but stressed that it is now taking place amid “aggression and a fierce threat.”
“Venezuela has the right to relations with China, with Russia, with Cuba, with Iran — with all the peoples of the world,” Rodríguez said while presenting the government’s 2025 annual report.
She said Caracas is shaping energy cooperation based on “decency, dignity and independence,” rejecting both internal and external constraints aimed at influencing Venezuela’s foreign policy.
Attacks in the Black Sea aim to destabilize relations between Russia and the Turkic world
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 16, 2026
The recent indirect offensive against vessels and assets belonging to Russia’s partner countries in the Black Sea reveals a strategy that goes far beyond the immediate military dimension of the Ukrainian conflict. The January 14 attack on a Kazakh oil tanker by Ukrainian drones must be analyzed within a broader context: a Western attempt to sabotage the historical, economic, and political relations between Moscow and the Turkic world.
The vessel that was struck was operating on behalf of KazMunayGas, transporting oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk as part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). This is a strategic route not only for Kazakhstan, but also for regional energy stability. The attack caused immediate concern, but what drew even more attention was the rapid mobilization of disinformation campaigns linked to Kiev, which sought to place the blame on Russia even before any investigation had been concluded.
This pattern has already become recurrent. After the incident, Russian authorities carried out technical investigations and presented visual evidence indicating that the drones originated from areas controlled by Ukraine. In light of this, the silence of the Ukrainian government was telling. Even so, the initial unease had already been done, fueled by rumors and fabricated narratives that circulated widely on social networks and in the international media.
The case of the Kazakh oil tanker is not an isolated one. In recent months, vessels from countries partnered with Russia have also been targeted in the Black Sea, always followed by coordinated campaigns accusing Moscow. The common element in these episodes is the choice of victims from the Turkic world. Turkey and Kazakhstan share cultural, linguistic, and political ties, including through the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, they maintain strategic relations with Russia, based on economic interdependence, energy cooperation, and regional security.
Turkey is an emblematic example. Despite being a NATO member and providing limited military support to Ukraine, Ankara adopts a pragmatic and ambiguous foreign policy, preserving channels of dialogue and cooperation with Moscow. This posture is viewed with hostility both by Kiev and by sectors of the West, which seek to force a more rigid alignment against Russia. Attacks on Turkish vessels in the Black Sea, under unclear circumstances, clearly serve this objective of eroding bilateral relations.
Outside the maritime environment, the ethnic logic is similar. The episode involving Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024 illustrates how poorly clarified incidents can be politically exploited. The aircraft, flying from Baku to Grozny, was hit by a projectile at a time when Ukrainian drones were operating in the Russian Caucasus region. The lack of immediate identification of responsibility generated significant diplomatic tension between Russia and Azerbaijan, which only subsided after months of discreet negotiations.
These events should not be seen as mere “collateral effects” of the war. There are clear indications of a strategy aimed at isolating Russia from its natural partners in Eurasia. Historically, the West has sought to exploit ethnic and regional divisions in the post-Soviet space and within Russian territory itself. Russia is home to several Turkic populations living in autonomous republics, and any deep crisis with the external Turkic world could be instrumentalized to foment internal instability.
In this context, information warfare is as relevant as military action. Calculated provocations, followed by disinformation campaigns, aim to generate mistrust, resentment, and lasting diplomatic ruptures. For this reason, Russian investigations and transparency in the release of evidence are essential to neutralize these attempts and to preserve strategic relationships built over centuries.
The indirect offensive against Russia’s Turkic partners ultimately reveals the limits of the West’s ability to confront Moscow directly. Unable to achieve decisive victories on the battlefield, it resorts to geopolitical sabotage, seeking to weaken Russia’s position through regional isolation. Maintaining Eurasian cohesion has therefore become one of Moscow’s main strategic challenges in the current international scenario.
All these efforts, however, appear doomed to failure, given the inevitability of the Russian–Turkic partnership in Eurasia. Despite fluctuations and periods of tension over time, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia share a solid history of cooperation that certainly cannot be shaken by futile provocations.
The Ukraine Snare Still Beckons
By Ted Galen Carpenter | The Libertarian Institute | January 14, 2026
Despite the widespread expectation that President Donald Trump would end Washington’s entanglement in NATO’s proxy war using Ukraine against Russia, it is increasingly evident that the fundamental features of U.S. policy remain unaltered. Trump personally has sent an array of mixed signals about his intentions. Although he has pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept the reality that Kiev must be willing to make territorial concessions to Moscow in any peace accord, he also has been receptive to Zelensky’s demand that Ukraine be given reliable “security guarantees” in such a settlement. Indeed, during the recent summit meeting between the two leaders, the main point of disagreement appeared to be that Zelensky wanted a commitment lasting fifty years, whereas Trump was prepared to offer only fifteen years.
Not only is Kiev insisting on a firm, detailed guarantee of protection, but also Ukraine’s European supporters in NATO are doing so. Worse, Trump seemed to sign onto a new 20-point “peace plan” being pushed by Zelensky and his European backers. Only Russia’s curt rejection of the scheme has so far prevented it from further consideration.
A potentially deadly snare lies in wait for the United States which our leaders must avoid at all costs. Throughout the years of the Ukraine crisis, most attention has focused on Kiev’s desire for formal membership in NATO and Russia’s repeated refusal to tolerate that option. Indeed, the principal cause of the current war was the clash between Russia and NATO regarding that issue.
However, the substantive issue has never been merely the prospect of Ukraine’s formal membership in NATO. Instead, the real threat to Russia’s security, from Moscow’s viewpoint, has been NATO’s attempt to turn Ukraine into a significant military asset for the alliance. It matters little whether that development occurs because of Kiev’s official membership in NATO or because of new, separate Western security guarantees.
Indeed, the ties would not have to be all that formal to constitute a dangerous provocation toward Moscow. Several NATO governments have repeatedly engaged in loose talk about sending their troops as “peacekeeping personnel” to Ukraine to enforce a settlement. Indeed, some of those countries appear willing to incur such a risky commitment to implement a mere “truce” between the feuding parties. Both Great Britain and France have stated that they intend to establish “military hubs” across Ukraine with their forces. In one of his more reckless, irresponsible moments, President Trump expressed his willingness to consider having the United States “backstop” such European efforts.
Washington must emphatically reject any attempted ploys of that nature. Even a paper security guarantee to Kiev would put any and all guarantor powers at risk. A decision to deploy so-called peacekeeping forces would be even worse. The Kremlin has made it emphatically clear that the presence of any troops by a NATO member in Ukraine is intolerable. Moscow likely would view a troop presence by NATO’s European contingent, much less the United States, as an existential threat to Russia’s security.
It would be folly for U.S. policymakers to rely excessively on the language contained in the North Atlantic Treaty to limit the danger of an undesirable military entanglement. Article 5 obliges NATO signatories to regard an act of aggression against any NATO member state as an attack against them all. The actual language regarding the obligation under Article 5, though, is so vague as to be meaningless, if a member seeks to evade taking serious action. The provision merely requires allies to render (undefined) assistance to the victim of aggression. Crucially, there is no commitment to launch military strikes against the alleged aggressor or to send troops into combat to aid the beleaguered ally. Merely providing logistical aid could fulfill a member’s obligation. The NATO countries that have sent weaponry or provided targeting and other intelligence data to Ukraine have easily met or exceeded any implied Article 5 obligation, even if Kiev had been a member of the alliance.
But in the real world, multiple NATO governments would seek to inflate the U.S. commitment under Article 5 to deepen Washington’s entanglement in the Alliance’s proxy war against Moscow. A pervasive myth persists in America and the rest of the world that the United States has an official treaty obligation to go to war if another NATO country comes under attack. Giving Ukraine a security guarantee would consolidate and strengthen that myth. In other words, U.S. leaders would find themselves under enormous pressure to launch a direct military intervention to support NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine regardless of the actual language contained in Article 5.
That is why any NATO troop presence in Ukraine, or any official security guarantee to Kiev, would be so dangerous. Given the enormous political and military pressures that would be coming from Kiev’s fan club throughout the West, it is highly improbable that U.S. leaders could avoid an armed clash with Russian forces merely by citing the limited, conditional language in Article 5. Legalistic quibbling is not the way events proceed when raw, wartime emotions are in play.
Trump administration officials need to spurn proposals for any alliance security guarantee to Ukraine, much less a deployment of NATO peacekeepers. Washington must emphatically reject schemes that would include a U.S. military presence of any size or nature in Ukraine. President Trump’s casual musings about supporting a NATO peacekeeping contingent not only are irresponsible, but also constitute a betrayal of his political supporters in the last election. They believed that their candidate was committed to extricating the United States from an unnecessary and debilitating geopolitical venture. Unfortunately, Donald Trump appears to be on course to disappoint advocates of a more prudent U.S. foreign policy yet again.
Rare Earths—or Arctic Control? Greenland’s Riches May Just Be Excuse
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 13.01.2026
Greenland holds the world’s eighth-largest rare earth reserves—1.5 million tons—but US interests extend far beyond minerals, Ruslan Dimukhamedov, chairman of the Association of Producers and Consumers of Rare and Rare-Earth Metals, tells Sputnik.
Greenland is rich in iron ore, graphite, tungsten, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper, and oil. It also hosts two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits—Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly signaled US ambitions to secure leadership in rare earths to advance semiconductors, AI, and robotics. Against this backdrop, it seems like it’s no coincidence that he set his sights on Greenland.
“That means permanent magnets—for electric vehicles, drones, and robotics,” Dimukhamedov says. “If we’re talking about the so-called magnetic group, that includes dysprosium and terbium. If we look at lanthanum and cerium, those are used in petrochemicals and optics.”
Greenland’s rare earths are technologically complex and relatively poor deposits, located in challenging conditions—not just climatically, but geographically as well, in mountainous terrain, the pundit explains.
“If we’re talking about commercial extraction—that is, mining that is economically viable at today’s price levels, rather than production for appearances’ sake,” Greenland’s rare earths hold limited appeal for US companies, according to Dimukhamedov.
His experience in the rare earth industry shows that the conditions of these deposits indicate that rare earth metals themselves are not the main object of the US’ interest. What is it then?
“Territorial control? Yes. Control of the Arctic? Yes. Preventing Russia from freely using the Northern Sea Route, making our lives difficult with military bases? Yes,” the expert says.
Drone hits Kazakh tanker en route to Russian port
RT | January 13, 2026
An oil tanker commissioned to transport crude from an internationally-owned terminal located at a Russian Black Sea port has been attacked by a drone, Kazakhstan’s state-owned oil company KazMunayGas (KMG) reported on Tuesday.
The ship ‘Matilda’ was hit earlier in the day on its way to pick up cargo at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal this coming Sunday, the statement said. No crew members were hurt, KMG added, noting that the tanker remains seaworthy.
Reuters reported attacks on four tankers in the Black Sea that were on their way to the CPC terminal, located at the Russian port of Novorossiysk, including the ‘Matilda’, citing sources. The report suggested that Ukraine may have been responsible for the attacks, citing Kiev’s history of targeting the consortium’s assets in Russia, but said that Ukrainian officials have not commented on the situation.
CPC is a pipeline operator owned by Kazakh, Russian, and Western private firms and the government of Kazakhstan, which transports crude from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk terminal. The Russian military has in the past reported Ukrainian attacks on the infrastructure, as Kiev seeks to undermine Moscow’s international oil trade.
Although Kiev does not officially claim credit for attacks on civilian infrastructure, the role of Ukrainian special services in several incidents has been broadly reported in domestic and international media. Moscow has described them as an element in a global Ukrainian campaign of sabotage and terrorism targeting Russian interests.
EU admits it will have to talk with Putin
RT | January 12, 2026
The EU will have to resume dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the Ukraine conflict, the European Commission’s chief spokesperson has admitted.
The bloc reduced its contacts with Moscow since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 in an effort to “isolate” Russia. This approach led to the EU being virtually sidelined from the negotiating table since last February, when US President Donald Trump launched efforts to mediate peace between Moscow and Kiev.
“Obviously, at some point, there will have to be talks also with President Putin,” Paula Pinho stated on Monday, claiming that the EU was “working very, very hard for peace.” She also blamed Moscow for the slow progress of the peace talks by asserting that Brussels was “not seeing any signs” of Russia engaging in any negotiations.
Russian officials have met their US counterparts at various levels on numerous occasions since February, including a summit between Putin and Trump in Alaska last August. The American president said last month that the peace talks were in the “final stages.”
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators also held several rounds of direct talks in Türkiye last year, after early negotiations between the parties stalled in spring 2022 after Kiev withdrew.
Moscow has also repeatedly stated it is ready to engage in peace talks with Kiev and its European backers. In December, presidential aide Yury Ushakov told journalists that Western leaders were welcome in Moscow for talks, but maintained that “the Europeans are refusing all contacts.”
Several European leaders have changed their rhetoric on Russia over the past months. In December, French President Emmanuel Macron stated it would be “useful” to reengage in talks with Putin. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni supported the idea last week by saying it was time for the EU to talk to Russia.
UK believes it can seize any tanker under Russia sanctions – BBC
RT | January 12, 2026
The British government believes it has found a legal way for its military to seize any vessels in UK waters that it suspects of being part of a so-called ‘shadow fleet’, state broadcaster BBC has reported.
The move is expected to target Russia, Iran and Venezuela, all of whom the UK claims use third-party vessels to circumvent Western sanctions, according to the report.
Britain’s 2018 Sanctions and Money Laundering Act initially allowed London to impose sanctions in line with UN Security Council resolutions but was later expanded to allow entities London has accused of human rights violations to be targeted.
The law states that the government can detain “specified ships” in its territorial waters or prevent them from entering. This can affect vessels going through the English Channel – one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. It also says that any ships can be targeted, except for those of the navies of foreign nations. The legislation does not explicitly mention the use of military force, though.
According to BBC, it is unclear when the UK could launch an operation targeting a foreign vessel. The British military have not boarded any vessels so far, the broadcaster said, adding that the UK did aid the US in seizing the ‘Marinera’ oil tanker last week.
The ship was intercepted in international waters northwest of Scotland. Moscow, which granted the tanker a temporary sailing permit, condemned the seizure as a gross violation of international rules.
Since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, Western governments have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia, targeting its oil trade and what they call its “shadow fleet” in particular.
According to BBC, London has imposed restrictions against more than 500 suspected “shadow fleet” vessels. The UK also imported oil products from refineries processing Russian crude worth £3 billion ($4.04 billion) over a period between 2022 and the second quarter of 2025, according to a June report by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). That generated £510 million ($687 million) in revenue for Moscow.





