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Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have

By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 17, 2026

The ugly truth is that an end of the Ukraine war may have as devastating economic and political consequences for Europe as its continuance.

Ukraine already faces a $63 billion U.S. dollar funding shortfall in 2026 and I would be surprised if this figure doesn’t increase if the war continues. Ukraine’s massive fiscal splurge is driven by two factors

  • The enormous cost of maintaining a standing army of almost one million people;
  • The vast expense of importing weapons from the west to fight the war.

Weapon purchases are not sources of productive investment as they are literally burned in the heat of battle. The same, of course, is true for Russia. Both countries saw reducing economic growth in 2025, with Ukraine’s at 2.1% and 1.5%. And, western pundits would point to this as evidence that Ukraine’s economy is performing better.

But the opposite is true. Russia’s economy is around twelve times larger than Ukraine’s nominally and just over ten times larger when you look at GDP using purchasing power parity.

You can see this in the defence spending numbers.

Russia spent a record $143 billion on defence in 2025 compared to around $60 billion for Ukraine, so around 2.3 times higher. Yet, Russian defence spending amounted to just 6.3% of its GDP whereas for Ukraine it was 31.7%. So, massive spending on defence is a much less pivotal issue for Russia in terms of its economic fortunes.

Defence spending represents a far smaller proportion of total economic activity than it does for Ukraine. And Russia can afford to pay for its defence needs with its own finances, while Ukraine is entirely dependent on money from western donors to keep the war going.

Despite the massive cost of war, Russia ran a fiscal deficit of just 1.7% of GDP in 2025. That is still well below the EU fiscal rule of 3% of GDP with some countries like France and Poland having deficits at or more than double that figure.

Ukraine’s fiscal deficit on the other hand was around 20% of GDP. That gap had to be filled by foreign funding as it has debt of 107% of GDP and is cut off from foreign lending.

So, hence the EU stepping up with a loan of 90 billion Euros, two thirds of which is earmarked for defence.

Russia on the other hand has debt of around 15% of GDP and doesn’t really need to borrow heavily to keep its war effort afloat. By the way, 15% of GDP is far lower than the U.S. or any European nation, many of which, like Ukraine, have debt levels of over 100% of GDP.

Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have.

Despite the shock of sanctions, Russia doesn’t have to break the bank nor boost its lending significantly.

This also means that when the war eventually ends, Russia will be able to make the economic transition back to peace in a less painful way. Russia will be under no pressure to impose massive cuts to defence spending to live within its means and can instead do so gradually.

Ukraine on the other hand faces a massive financial cliff edge when the war ends.

Ukrainian economic growth according to the OECD is set to fall further to 1.7% in 2027 if the war continues.

And that assumes continued large injections of capital from outside countries. In 2025, Ukrainian defence spending made up 31.1% of Ukrainian GDP, and two thirds of state budgetary expenditure. None of that spending goes into improving Ukraine’s weak economy.

With all of the support that it receives, Ukraine’s GDP in 2025 amounted to just under $210 billion according to the IMF.

Bear in mind here that Ukraine received $52.4 billion in external financing in 2025, or around one quarter of its GDP at the end of the year.

Take away foreign funding and Ukraine suddenly sees its economy shrink by over 20%.

Or, put it another way, take away the war and Ukraine sees its economy shrink by over 20%.

Russia simply does not face the same problem.

Rather, an end to the war may help Russia to get inflation – perhaps its biggest economic challenge – under control as economic activity returns to its normal rhythm.

But still the question arises, how come Ukraine has grown so little when it received so much foreign funding?

One big reason is that Ukraine recorded a trade deficit of $30 billion over the same period, a record according to the National Bank of Ukraine.

So, $52 billion in foreign money came into Ukraine during the year and $30 billion went straight back out again. Because Ukraine’s massive trade deficit is fuelled by two things.

First, a huge increase in the import of weapons from western suppliers which have doubled since 2022, not least as they are no longer being provided free of charge.

Second, Ukraine has increased its imports of natural resources, in particular a massive increase in gas imports, because domestic production has been hit hard by the war. Coal is another area, as Russia has swallowed up important coal mines in the Donbas.

Not all of that deficit in trade will be recoverable even after the war ends, even if Ukraine was able to reduce the overall size of its trade deficit.

By comparison, Russia’s surplus of trade in goods was already at over $100 billion by October 2025, although the overall trade picture is narrower, at around $36 billion because of a significant deficit in services trade, including from large numbers of Russians who have moved overseas since the war started.

An end to the war, if anything, may allow Russia’s trade surpluses to grow further. A future relaxation on the import of natural resources into Europe could mean that Russia benefits from already increased trade with Asia and renewed trade with Europe.

In any case, the consistent surpluses that Russia pulls in both help shore up economic growth and foreign exchange reserves, which in 2025 grew by over $135 billion to a whopping $734 billion.

And just to be clear, Russia put their reserve funds almost completely into gold which now stand at over $310 billion.

One big reason for Russia storing its reserves in gold is to keep them clear of the stealing hands of western bureaucrats, who froze around $300 billion in reserves at the start of the war.

This means that Russia has a surplus of $434 billion in foreign exchange reserves which is almost completely insulated from western expropriation. The $10 billion rise in foreign currency reserves in 2025 was undoubtedly caused by an accumulation of reserves in non-dollar, Euro and sterling currencies, suggesting the move to greater trade in Chinese Yuan and Indian rupees.

An end to the war may at some point lead to the unfreezing of immobilised Russian assets in the U.S., Europe and Japan.

Ukraine’s reserve position is also comparatively strong, at $57.3 billion at the start of 2026, a record figure. However, that rise is completely down to inflows of foreign capital to fund the war effort. An end to the war would likely shrink Ukraine’s reserves as its stubborn trade deficit was not being offset by foreign inflows of funds as they had been during war.

But it’s the sudden and shocking loss of foreign funding that accompanies an end to the war which will cause Ukraine’s economy to shrink dramatically.

But fear not, Europe is determined that Ukraine maintain an army of 800,000 personnel when the war ends. However, this seems more about economic survival than about security.

Ukraine would not be able to pay for such as large army with its own money, as it doesn’t have any money. So, once again, Europe will be forced to step in to meet Ukraine’s financing needs to pay the salaries of soldiers who are no longer in war fighting mode.

This will lead to debt and taxes rising in Europe, according to a recent Kiel Institute study. But it will also lead to a loss of business for European defence firms. Because peace time will inevitably mean a sharp drop in the munitions and military material being burned on a daily basis in the fog of war.

Two thirds of the EU’s recent 90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine will be spent on military support, including weaponry. That has sparked an argument between Germany and France over a proposed ‘buy European’ clause, with France wanting to prevent Ukrainian purchases of U.S. equipment. Perhaps with one eye on the future, the French in typical fashion, are trying to ensure that their firms get a decent share of what could amount to dwindling Ukrainian orders for weapons.

A bit like the French army, Europe is reversing itself inevitably into economic defeat when the war ends.

Obligated to keep an economically failed Ukraine on life support.

Having to increase its debt and taxes to support bad foreign policy decisions it has been taking since 2014.

Trying to boost its defence industrial complex but losing business with the end of war.

For the mainstream political parties in Europe, this adds to the trend of them heading towards electoral Armageddon when they start putting themselves to the polls from 2027 onward.

Until then, they are stuck, knowing that continuing the war will kill them electorally, and knowing that ending the war will too. To quote my old British soldier dad, they are like the mythical oozlum bird, continually going round in circles until they disappear up their own backsides.

January 17, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

Why are EU leaders suddenly being nice to Russia?

By Tarik Cyril Amar | RT | January 16, 2026

Sometimes a surprising statement made almost in passing on a minor occasion can pack a lot of political oomph. And sometimes, it’s just a slip and won’t tell you much about either the present or the future. But how do you know?

That is the challenge posed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent – and very unusual – talk about a “compromise”  (“Ausgleich” in German) with Russia, which, he also stressed, is “a European country,” indeed “our greatest European neighbor.”

Outside the context of current Western and, in particular, German and EU politics, such a statement may seem almost commonplace. Obviously, it would make sense for Berlin – and Brussels, too – to work toward a peaceful, productive, mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow. Equally obviously, this is not merely an option but, in reality, a vital necessity (as Merz may have been hinting at when emphasizing that Russia is Germany’s greatest European neighbor: Greatest as in indispensable?).

Yet once you add the actual context of escalating German and EU policies toward Russia since 2014 at the very latest, Merz’s sudden insight into the obvious appears almost sensational. For over a decade, German and EU policy toward Moscow has been based on three simple – and self-damagingly insane – ideas: First, Russia is our enemy by default and “forever” (see the refreshingly frank admission by German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul). Second, using Ukraine (and a lot of Ukrainians), we can defeat that enemy with a combination of economic and diplomatic warfare and a very bloody proxy war on the ground. Finally, there is no alternative: it is VERBOTEN to even think about genuine give-and-take negotiations and any compromise that would also be good enough for Moscow.

Merz, moreover, has no record as a doubter of these moronic dogmas. On the contrary, he has been a consistent uber-hawk, combining the requisite constant Russophobic undertone with a long series of hardline initiatives and positions. Just a few months ago, for instance, Merz fought tooth and nail for confiscating Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU. That he lost that fight was due to resistance from Belgium – which would have been exposed to absurdly irrational risks by permitting that robbery – and France and Italy, whose leaders tripped up their hapless German “ally” at the last minute.

In a similar combination of public belligerence and final futility, Merz had long been a proponent of delivering advanced German Taurus cruise missiles – particularly well-suited for destroying things such as Russia’s Kerch Bridge – to Ukraine, before abandoning that awful idea. Ultimately and wisely, he shied away from involving Germany even more deeply in the proxy fight against Russia, most likely under the impression of very firm warnings from Moscow.

Just this month, the German chancellor declared he is ready to send German soldiers to secure a “ceasefire” in Ukraine. Yes, that would be that ceasefire that Moscow has ruled out as a dishonest half-measure. It is true that Merz hedged this announcement with conditions that make it irrelevant. But, nonetheless, it was not a contribution to de-escalation with Russia.

Yet here we are. Speaking not in Berlin, but the provincial metropolis of Halle in Eastern Germany, Merz used the occasion of a fairly humdrum meeting under the auspices of a regional IHK (Industrie und Handelskammer) meeting to speak about Germany’s relationship with Russia.

The IHK is a chamber of industry and commerce, an economic association of some weight. But it is not the parliament in Berlin or, for instance, even a foreign-policy information war outfit/think tank. Most of Merz’s remarks, unsurprisingly, concerned the German economy, which, he had to admit, is not in a good state, but, he promised, will be better soon. He also gave his word to fight and reduce bureaucracy, not only in Germany but the EU as well. That sort of stuff, nothing special, political potboiler.

But then, in the middle of the absolutely predictable and rather boring meeting, the chancellor suddenly extended a hand to Moscow. Or did he? Merz himself knows that his having anything to say about Russia that comes without foam at the mouth is extraordinary: he took care to assure his listeners that it was not the location “in the East” (that is, the former East Germany) that made him strike such a new tone regarding Russia.

His audience may or may not have been convinced by that all-too-quick denial. Halle is not only a major city in Germany’s East, but also, more specifically, the second-largest conurbation in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt. That is where, polls suggest, the new-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party may well win a crucial election in September, particularly by outdistancing Merz’s own mainstream conservatives (CDU). A similar scenario is possible in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, also in Germany’s East.

In both places, even a relative (not absolute) AfD majority, which seems certain at this point, would expose the traditional parties and especially the CDU to one of their worst nightmares: the end of the so-called “firewall,” that is, the harebrained and undemocratic policy of simply freezing the AfD out of the building of ruling coalitions. Merz personally has been an iron proponent of the “firewall.” Razing it, even regionally, will cost him his political career or force him into a brutal, humiliating 180-degree turn.

One important reason voters in Germany’s East are unhappy with the traditional parties is their policy of relentless, self-damaging confrontation toward Russia and equally relentless, really masochistic support for Zelensky’s regime in Ukraine. Just now, one of Germany’s highest courts has finally, in essence, recognized the fact that Ukraine was deeply involved in the worst vital-infrastructure attack in postwar German history, the destruction of most of the Nord Stream pipelines. Many Germans have had enough, not only but especially in Germany’s East.

That is why Merz knows that any apparent concessions to Moscow will meet healthy skepticism there. He also has a solid and well-deserved reputation for breaking his promises. His listeners in Halle may well have dismissed the new Merz sound as nothing but cheap pre-electoral manipulation.

And perhaps that is all it was. But there are good reasons to keep an open mind. For one thing, Merz has not been the only EU leader striking a more conciliatory note recently. As the Russian government has noted, similar statements have been made in France and Italy. The leaders of both countries, Emmanuel Macron and Georgia Meloni, have been no less bold than Merz in stating the obvious, namely – to summarize – that not even talking to Moscow is a daft policy.

It is not hard to see why EU politicians may be prepared to pursue diplomacy again. Their imperial overlord in Washington has made it clear that the Ukraine war will be their problem and theirs alone, while also displaying a brutality towards the world, including the clients/vassals in Europe, that is unusually open even by American standards.

After the tariff wars, the new US National Security Strategy, Venezuela, and the threats against Denmark over Greenland, could it be that, at very long last, some in Europe are slowly waking up to the fact that the worst threat to the sorry remains of their sovereignty, their economies, and also their traditional political elites is Washington, not Moscow? It would be very rash to assume so. But we can hope.

Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Russophobia | , , | Leave a comment

France Escalates Warmongering by Expanding Intelligence Support for Ukraine

Sputnik – 16.01.2026

While last year, Ukraine was overwhelmingly dependent on American intelligence, today “two-thirds of those capabilities are provided by France,” revealed French President Emmanuel Macron speaking to BFMTV.

France has readily stepped in to make sure the West’s proxy war doesn’t lose steam — even if the US hesitates.

Last November, reports indicated that US officials had warned the Zelensky regime that intelligence support could be halted if Ukraine rejected Donald Trump’s proposed peace framework.

While Western leaders talk relentlessly about “peace,” in reality France and its allies in the so-called Coalition of the Willing are doubling down on escalation, doing everything to keep the conflict kept alive.

In the event of a ceasefire, Europe’s hawks are planning ‘military hubs’ in Ukraine – even though Russia has repeatedly emphasized any NATO troop presence there is unacceptable and would be viewed as a direct threat.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Venezuela Has Right to Have Relations With China, Russia, Cuba, Iran – Acting President

Sputnik – 16.01.2026

Venezuela has the right to relations with all countries of the world, including China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran, and will exercise this right in compliance with international norms, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodriguez said on Thursday.

Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said the country’s energy dialogue with the United States is not new, but stressed that it is now taking place amid “aggression and a fierce threat.”

“Venezuela has the right to relations with China, with Russia, with Cuba, with Iran — with all the peoples of the world,” Rodríguez said while presenting the government’s 2025 annual report.

She said Caracas is shaping energy cooperation based on “decency, dignity and independence,” rejecting both internal and external constraints aimed at influencing Venezuela’s foreign policy.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Attacks in the Black Sea aim to destabilize relations between Russia and the Turkic world

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 16, 2026

The recent indirect offensive against vessels and assets belonging to Russia’s partner countries in the Black Sea reveals a strategy that goes far beyond the immediate military dimension of the Ukrainian conflict. The January 14 attack on a Kazakh oil tanker by Ukrainian drones must be analyzed within a broader context: a Western attempt to sabotage the historical, economic, and political relations between Moscow and the Turkic world.

The vessel that was struck was operating on behalf of KazMunayGas, transporting oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk as part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). This is a strategic route not only for Kazakhstan, but also for regional energy stability. The attack caused immediate concern, but what drew even more attention was the rapid mobilization of disinformation campaigns linked to Kiev, which sought to place the blame on Russia even before any investigation had been concluded.

This pattern has already become recurrent. After the incident, Russian authorities carried out technical investigations and presented visual evidence indicating that the drones originated from areas controlled by Ukraine. In light of this, the silence of the Ukrainian government was telling. Even so, the initial unease had already been done, fueled by rumors and fabricated narratives that circulated widely on social networks and in the international media.

The case of the Kazakh oil tanker is not an isolated one. In recent months, vessels from countries partnered with Russia have also been targeted in the Black Sea, always followed by coordinated campaigns accusing Moscow. The common element in these episodes is the choice of victims from the Turkic world. Turkey and Kazakhstan share cultural, linguistic, and political ties, including through the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, they maintain strategic relations with Russia, based on economic interdependence, energy cooperation, and regional security.

Turkey is an emblematic example. Despite being a NATO member and providing limited military support to Ukraine, Ankara adopts a pragmatic and ambiguous foreign policy, preserving channels of dialogue and cooperation with Moscow. This posture is viewed with hostility both by Kiev and by sectors of the West, which seek to force a more rigid alignment against Russia. Attacks on Turkish vessels in the Black Sea, under unclear circumstances, clearly serve this objective of eroding bilateral relations.

Outside the maritime environment, the ethnic logic is similar. The episode involving Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024 illustrates how poorly clarified incidents can be politically exploited. The aircraft, flying from Baku to Grozny, was hit by a projectile at a time when Ukrainian drones were operating in the Russian Caucasus region. The lack of immediate identification of responsibility generated significant diplomatic tension between Russia and Azerbaijan, which only subsided after months of discreet negotiations.

These events should not be seen as mere “collateral effects” of the war. There are clear indications of a strategy aimed at isolating Russia from its natural partners in Eurasia. Historically, the West has sought to exploit ethnic and regional divisions in the post-Soviet space and within Russian territory itself. Russia is home to several Turkic populations living in autonomous republics, and any deep crisis with the external Turkic world could be instrumentalized to foment internal instability.

In this context, information warfare is as relevant as military action. Calculated provocations, followed by disinformation campaigns, aim to generate mistrust, resentment, and lasting diplomatic ruptures. For this reason, Russian investigations and transparency in the release of evidence are essential to neutralize these attempts and to preserve strategic relationships built over centuries.

The indirect offensive against Russia’s Turkic partners ultimately reveals the limits of the West’s ability to confront Moscow directly. Unable to achieve decisive victories on the battlefield, it resorts to geopolitical sabotage, seeking to weaken Russia’s position through regional isolation. Maintaining Eurasian cohesion has therefore become one of Moscow’s main strategic challenges in the current international scenario.

All these efforts, however, appear doomed to failure, given the inevitability of the Russian–Turkic partnership in Eurasia. Despite fluctuations and periods of tension over time, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia share a solid history of cooperation that certainly cannot be shaken by futile provocations.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Deception, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

The Ukraine Snare Still Beckons

By Ted Galen Carpenter | The Libertarian Institute | January 14, 2026

Despite the widespread expectation that President Donald Trump would end Washington’s entanglement in NATO’s proxy war using Ukraine against Russia, it is increasingly evident that the fundamental features of U.S. policy remain unaltered. Trump personally has sent an array of mixed signals about his intentions. Although he has pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept the reality that Kiev must be willing to make territorial concessions to Moscow in any peace accord, he also has been receptive to Zelensky’s demand that Ukraine be given reliable “security guarantees” in such a settlement. Indeed, during the recent summit meeting between the two leaders, the main point of disagreement appeared to be that Zelensky wanted a commitment lasting fifty years, whereas Trump was prepared to offer only fifteen years.

Not only is Kiev insisting on a firm, detailed guarantee of protection, but also Ukraine’s European supporters in NATO are doing so. Worse, Trump seemed to sign onto a new 20-point “peace plan” being pushed by Zelensky and his European backers. Only Russia’s curt rejection of the scheme has so far prevented it from further consideration.

A potentially deadly snare lies in wait for the United States which our leaders must avoid at all costs. Throughout the years of the Ukraine crisis, most attention has focused on Kiev’s desire for formal membership in NATO and Russia’s repeated refusal to tolerate that option. Indeed, the principal cause of the current war was the clash between Russia and NATO regarding that issue.

However, the substantive issue has never been merely the prospect of Ukraine’s formal membership in NATO. Instead, the real threat to Russia’s security, from Moscow’s viewpoint, has been NATO’s attempt to turn Ukraine into a significant military asset for the alliance. It matters little whether that development occurs because of Kiev’s official membership in NATO or because of new, separate Western security guarantees.

Indeed, the ties would not have to be all that formal to constitute a dangerous provocation toward Moscow. Several NATO governments have repeatedly engaged in loose talk about sending their troops as “peacekeeping personnel” to Ukraine to enforce a settlement. Indeed, some of those countries appear willing to incur such a risky commitment to implement a mere “truce” between the feuding parties. Both Great Britain and France have stated that they intend to establish “military hubs” across Ukraine with their forces. In one of his more reckless, irresponsible moments, President Trump expressed his willingness to consider having the United States “backstop” such European efforts.

Washington must emphatically reject any attempted ploys of that nature. Even a paper security guarantee to Kiev would put any and all guarantor powers at risk. A decision to deploy so-called peacekeeping forces would be even worse. The Kremlin has made it emphatically clear that the presence of any troops by a NATO member in Ukraine is intolerable. Moscow likely would view a troop presence by NATO’s European contingent, much less the United States, as an existential threat to Russia’s security.

It would be folly for U.S. policymakers to rely excessively on the language contained in the North Atlantic Treaty to limit the danger of an undesirable military entanglement. Article 5 obliges NATO signatories to regard an act of aggression against any NATO member state as an attack against them all. The actual language regarding the obligation under Article 5, though, is so vague as to be meaningless, if a member seeks to evade taking serious action. The provision merely requires allies to render (undefined) assistance to the victim of aggression. Crucially, there is no commitment to launch military strikes against the alleged aggressor or to send troops into combat to aid the beleaguered ally. Merely providing logistical aid could fulfill a member’s obligation. The NATO countries that have sent weaponry or provided targeting and other intelligence data to Ukraine have easily met or exceeded any implied Article 5 obligation, even if Kiev had been a member of the alliance.

But in the real world, multiple NATO governments would seek to inflate the U.S. commitment under Article 5 to deepen Washington’s entanglement in the Alliance’s proxy war against Moscow. A pervasive myth persists in America and the rest of the world that the United States has an official treaty obligation to go to war if another NATO country comes under attack. Giving Ukraine a security guarantee would consolidate and strengthen that myth. In other words, U.S. leaders would find themselves under enormous pressure to launch a direct military intervention to support NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine regardless of the actual language contained in Article 5.

That is why any NATO troop presence in Ukraine, or any official security guarantee to Kiev, would be so dangerous. Given the enormous political and military pressures that would be coming from Kiev’s fan club throughout the West, it is highly improbable that U.S. leaders could avoid an armed clash with Russian forces merely by citing the limited, conditional language in Article 5. Legalistic quibbling is not the way events proceed when raw, wartime emotions are in play.

Trump administration officials need to spurn proposals for any alliance security guarantee to Ukraine, much less a deployment of NATO peacekeepers. Washington must emphatically reject schemes that would include a U.S. military presence of any size or nature in Ukraine. President Trump’s casual musings about supporting a NATO peacekeeping contingent not only are irresponsible, but also constitute a betrayal of his political supporters in the last election. They believed that their candidate was committed to extricating the United States from an unnecessary and debilitating geopolitical venture. Unfortunately, Donald Trump appears to be on course to disappoint advocates of a more prudent U.S. foreign policy yet again.

January 14, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Rare Earths—or Arctic Control? Greenland’s Riches May Just Be Excuse

By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 13.01.2026

Greenland holds the world’s eighth-largest rare earth reserves—1.5 million tons—but US interests extend far beyond minerals, Ruslan Dimukhamedov, chairman of the Association of Producers and Consumers of Rare and Rare-Earth Metals, tells Sputnik.

Greenland is rich in iron ore, graphite, tungsten, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper, and oil. It also hosts two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits—Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly signaled US ambitions to secure leadership in rare earths to advance semiconductors, AI, and robotics. Against this backdrop, it seems like it’s no coincidence that he set his sights on Greenland.

“That means permanent magnets—for electric vehicles, drones, and robotics,” Dimukhamedov says. “If we’re talking about the so-called magnetic group, that includes dysprosium and terbium. If we look at lanthanum and cerium, those are used in petrochemicals and optics.”

Greenland’s rare earths are technologically complex and relatively poor deposits, located in challenging conditions—not just climatically, but geographically as well, in mountainous terrain, the pundit explains.

“If we’re talking about commercial extraction—that is, mining that is economically viable at today’s price levels, rather than production for appearances’ sake,” Greenland’s rare earths hold limited appeal for US companies, according to Dimukhamedov.

His experience in the rare earth industry shows that the conditions of these deposits indicate that rare earth metals themselves are not the main object of the US’ interest. What is it then?

“Territorial control? Yes. Control of the Arctic? Yes. Preventing Russia from freely using the Northern Sea Route, making our lives difficult with military bases? Yes,” the expert says.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics | , , | Leave a comment

Drone hits Kazakh tanker en route to Russian port

RT | January 13, 2026

An oil tanker commissioned to transport crude from an internationally-owned terminal located at a Russian Black Sea port has been attacked by a drone, Kazakhstan’s state-owned oil company KazMunayGas (KMG) reported on Tuesday.

The ship ‘Matilda’ was hit earlier in the day on its way to pick up cargo at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal this coming Sunday, the statement said. No crew members were hurt, KMG added, noting that the tanker remains seaworthy.

Reuters reported attacks on four tankers in the Black Sea that were on their way to the CPC terminal, located at the Russian port of Novorossiysk, including the ‘Matilda’, citing sources. The report suggested that Ukraine may have been responsible for the attacks, citing Kiev’s history of targeting the consortium’s assets in Russia, but said that Ukrainian officials have not commented on the situation.

CPC is a pipeline operator owned by Kazakh, Russian, and Western private firms and the government of Kazakhstan, which transports crude from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk terminal. The Russian military has in the past reported Ukrainian attacks on the infrastructure, as Kiev seeks to undermine Moscow’s international oil trade.

Although Kiev does not officially claim credit for attacks on civilian infrastructure, the role of Ukrainian special services in several incidents has been broadly reported in domestic and international media. Moscow has described them as an element in a global Ukrainian campaign of sabotage and terrorism targeting Russian interests.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

EU admits it will have to talk with Putin

RT | January 12, 2026

The EU will have to resume dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the Ukraine conflict, the European Commission’s chief spokesperson has admitted.

The bloc reduced its contacts with Moscow since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 in an effort to “isolate” Russia. This approach led to the EU being virtually sidelined from the negotiating table since last February, when US President Donald Trump launched efforts to mediate peace between Moscow and Kiev.

“Obviously, at some point, there will have to be talks also with President Putin,” Paula Pinho stated on Monday, claiming that the EU was “working very, very hard for peace.” She also blamed Moscow for the slow progress of the peace talks by asserting that Brussels was “not seeing any signs” of Russia engaging in any negotiations.

Russian officials have met their US counterparts at various levels on numerous occasions since February, including a summit between Putin and Trump in Alaska last August. The American president said last month that the peace talks were in the “final stages.”

Russian and Ukrainian negotiators also held several rounds of direct talks in Türkiye last year, after early negotiations between the parties stalled in spring 2022 after Kiev withdrew.

Moscow has also repeatedly stated it is ready to engage in peace talks with Kiev and its European backers. In December, presidential aide Yury Ushakov told journalists that Western leaders were welcome in Moscow for talks, but maintained that “the Europeans are refusing all contacts.”

Several European leaders have changed their rhetoric on Russia over the past months. In December, French President Emmanuel Macron stated it would be “useful” to reengage in talks with Putin. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni supported the idea last week by saying it was time for the EU to talk to Russia.

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Leave a comment

UK believes it can seize any tanker under Russia sanctions – BBC

RT | January 12, 2026

The British government believes it has found a legal way for its military to seize any vessels in UK waters that it suspects of being part of a so-called ‘shadow fleet’, state broadcaster BBC has reported.

The move is expected to target Russia, Iran and Venezuela, all of whom the UK claims use third-party vessels to circumvent Western sanctions, according to the report.

Britain’s 2018 Sanctions and Money Laundering Act initially allowed London to impose sanctions in line with UN Security Council resolutions but was later expanded to allow entities London has accused of human rights violations to be targeted.

The law states that the government can detain “specified ships” in its territorial waters or prevent them from entering. This can affect vessels going through the English Channel – one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. It also says that any ships can be targeted, except for those of the navies of foreign nations. The legislation does not explicitly mention the use of military force, though.

According to BBC, it is unclear when the UK could launch an operation targeting a foreign vessel. The British military have not boarded any vessels so far, the broadcaster said, adding that the UK did aid the US in seizing the ‘Marinera’ oil tanker last week.

The ship was intercepted in international waters northwest of Scotland. Moscow, which granted the tanker a temporary sailing permit, condemned the seizure as a gross violation of international rules.

Since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, Western governments have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia, targeting its oil trade and what they call its “shadow fleet” in particular.

According to BBC, London has imposed restrictions against more than 500 suspected “shadow fleet” vessels. The UK also imported oil products from refineries processing Russian crude worth £3 billion ($4.04 billion) over a period between 2022 and the second quarter of 2025, according to a June report by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). That generated £510 million ($687 million) in revenue for Moscow.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Illegal Occupation, Militarism | , , , | 1 Comment

Pirates of the Caribbean

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 12, 2026

So many things are happening in such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep track of them all. Certainly, one of the most “entertaining” is the return of piracy, which the United States of America inaugurated at the beginning of 2026.

We are talking about a new and particularly controversial phase of their economic and strategic pressure policy: the direct seizure of oil tankers on the high seas, believed to be involved in the transport of crude oil on behalf of states subject to unilateral U.S. sanctions, in particular Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. This practice, which Washington presents as a legitimate enforcement activity against illegal trafficking, is raising profound questions about international maritime law and the balance between state sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and the use of force.

From the Caribbean to the icy North Seas, the most emblematic case is that of the oil tanker Mariner, seized a few days ago after a long chase in the North Atlantic by the U.S. Coast Guard, while the ship was being joined by Russian naval forces. According to U.S. authorities, the ship was part of the so-called shadow fleet, an informal network of oil tankers that operate through frequent changes of name, flag, and management company in order to evade sanctions regimes. This operation is accompanied by other significant seizures or interceptions, including the tankers Sophia, Skipper, and Centuries, stopped in various maritime areas on similar charges of sanctioned oil trafficking and fraudulent use of flags of convenience. In short, a cinematic-style raid. Donald “Sparrow” Trump has found a new hobby.

As for the Mariner, to be fair, it is a VLCC oil tanker built in 2002. Its gross tonnage is over 318,000 tons, making it one of the largest types of oil tankers used in the global crude oil trade. In terms of age and technical characteristics, it is an ordinary working ship, designed to operate for 25-30 years, provided it passes inspections. Since its construction, the ship has not had a stable “nationality.”

Over the course of more than twenty years, it has changed its name, flag, and owners several times, a practice typical of tankers operating in sanctioned and semi-sanctioned segments of the market. The ship was successively named Overseas Mulan, Seaways Mulan, Xiao Zhu Shan, Yannis, Neofit, Timimus, Bella 1, and finally Marinera. Each name change was accompanied by a change of jurisdiction or management company. The flags also changed regularly. The ship flew the flags of the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Palau, and Panama. According to international databases, there was a period when the ship flew the flag of Guyana, indicating an incorrect or unconfirmed registration. This episode was subsequently used as a formal pretext for intervention by the U.S. Coast Guard.

After the persecution began, the ship obtained temporary registration under the flag of the Russian Federation with Sochi as its port of registry, as recorded in official ship registers. The history of the ship’s ownership and management also indicates its commercial rather than state nature. Over the years, the ship has been managed by companies registered in Asia and offshore jurisdictions, including structures linked to Chinese and Singaporean operators. Between 2022 and 2023, the owner and manager of the ship was Neofit Shipping Ltd, then Louis Marine Shipholding ENT. Since the end of December 2025, the owner and commercial operator of the ship has been the Russian company Burevestmarin LLC. This is a private entity, not linked to state-owned oil companies and not part of any “state fleet.”

In recent years, the ship has been used in the classic sanctions evasion scheme linked to the Iran-Venezuela-China routes. A crucial turning point came in mid-December 2025, when the United States announced an effective maritime blockade of Venezuela. The tanker, then called Bella 1, had left the Iranian port in November and was approaching the Venezuelan coast just as these measures were introduced. The attempt to enter the port was interrupted by the U.S., after which the ship set course for the Atlantic Ocean. The composition of the crew also clearly shows the commercial nature of the ship. Most of the sailors on board are Ukrainian citizens, while there were also Georgian citizens and only two Russians on board. The Mariner proved to be a convenient demonstration target for the U.S. as part of its new strategy of forcibly disrupting Venezuelan oil routes.

The owner’s attempt to hide under the Russian flag was a logical commercial move, but it did not change the intentions of the U.S. Russia was formally involved in the situation as the flag state and because of the presence of Russian citizens in the crew. The ship was not of strategic value to Russia and was not part of its oil logistics. Any escalation around a private tanker, which had been operating for decades on gray routes, would have made no rational sense.

From Washington’s point of view, the legitimacy of such actions rests on two main pillars. The first is the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions: seized tankers are considered assets directly involved in violations of Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations and are therefore subject to confiscation. The second pillar is the doctrine of the stateless vessel, according to which a ship that cannot credibly prove its nationality—due to irregular registrations, false flags, or contradictory documentation—loses the legal protection guaranteed by the flag state and can be stopped by any other state on the high seas.

Bye-bye Law of the Sea

It is precisely this second point that is the focus of much of the legal debate. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes that, on the high seas, a ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Exceptions to this principle are limited and strict: piracy, slave trade, unauthorized radio transmissions, absence of nationality, or express authorization from the UN Security Council. The extension of these exceptions to the application of unilateral sanctions, not approved by the United Nations, is a highly contested interpretation.

Russia and China have reacted harshly to the seizures, calling them a blatant violation of international law and, in some cases, an act comparable to state piracy. Moscow argues that the seized tankers were flying regular flags and that the use of force against commercial vessels in peacetime, outside a UN mandate, constitutes a breach of the maritime legal order. Beijing, for its part, has emphasized the illegitimate nature of unilateral sanctions and the risk that such practices create dangerous precedents, normalizing the armed interdiction of commercial shipping.

The implications of this new phase are significant. On the legal front, there is growing tension between a law of the sea based on the neutrality of routes and freedom of navigation, and a power practice that tends to transform economic sanctions into instruments of military coercion. On the geopolitical front, there is a risk of maritime escalation, with possible countermeasures by the affected states and a progressive militarization of global energy routes.

On the other hand, all this is consistent with what the U.S. administration is doing: creating rapid chaos that distracts the world, while surgically targeting certain elements within the American system and, on the other hand, applying the Donroe Doctrine and establishing control over the Western Hemisphere.

The seizure of oil tankers is not just an isolated episode of conflict between states, but a sign of a deeper transformation of the international order. The U.S. has set out with conviction and has no intention of stopping. If this practice were to become established, international maritime law would risk being very quickly stripped of its fundamental principles, leaving room for a logic of force in which naval supremacy replaces shared legality. The issue, therefore, is not only about the seized ships, but the entire future of global maritime governance.

The U.S. has said it: Venezuela is American property and from now on will be its new backyard. Greenland will be next.

Piracy elevated to the rank of military strategy and international relations.

And remember: in just 11 months of government, since the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump has bombed seven sovereign countries: Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela. He has kidnapped one head of state (Maduro) and threatened to kill three others: Khamenei, Petro, and Rodriguez. He has threatened to invade five countries: Iran, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Greenland (i.e., Denmark). He has done everything in his power to prevent the international community from passing resolutions against Israel and its prime minister Netanyahu during and after the massacres in Gaza.

Anyone with a modicum of common sense, who is not misled by political preconceptions, can draw the most basic conclusions from these actions.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, War Crimes | , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Coalition of the Willing has achieved nothing

By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 11, 2026

The war in Ukraine happened because western nations insisted that Ukraine be allowed to join NATO but were never willing to fight to guarantee that right.

That reality has never changed. This week’s latest Summit of the Coalition of the Willing has confirmed that it will not change any time soon.

The only countries that appear remotely willing to deploy troops to Ukraine in a vague and most certainly limited way are the British and French.

Both would need parliamentary approval which can’t be guaranteed. Reform Leader Nigel Farage has already come out to say that he wouldn’t back a vote to deploy British troops to Ukraine because we simply don’t have enough men or equipment. And even though Keir Starmer has the parliamentary numbers to pass any future vote on deploying British troops, it would almost certainly damage his already catastrophic polling numbers.

Macron is clinging on to his political life and would probably face a tougher tussle to get his parliament to approve the French sending their troops to Ukraine, potentially leaving the UK on its own.

In any case, it is completely obvious that Russia won’t agree to any deployment in Ukraine by NATO troops. This shows once again that western leaders have learned absolutely nothing over the past decade. It will never be possible to insist that Russia sues for peace under terms which is has long made clear are unacceptable at a time when it was winning on the battlefield, and European nations refuse to fight with their own troops.

Hawkish British journalist Edward Lucas, with whom I disagree on most things, summed it up well in an opinion in the Times newspaper when he said:

We are promising forces we do not have, to enforce a ceasefire that does not exist, under a plan that has yet to be drawn up, endorsed by a superpower (read the U.S.) that is no longer our ally, to deter an adversary that has far greater willpower than we do.

President Putin has shown an absolute determination not to back down until his core aims, namely to prevent NATO expansion, are achieved. And as I have said many times, the west can’t win a war by committee.

All of these pointless Coalition of the Willing meetings happen in circumstances where Europe refuses to talk to Russia upon whom an end to the war depends. Peace will only break out after Ukraine and Russia sign a deal, and the west appears deliberately to be doing everything possible to ensure that Russia never signs.

Instead, we entertain Zelensky with hugs and handshakes, reassuring him that we will do anything he wants for as long as he needs, only to offer insufficient help all of the time.

And, as Zelensky is in any case unelected, not likely to win elections in Ukraine as and when they happen, overseeing a corrupt regime that is adopting increasingly repressive tactics to keep a losing war going, it is not in his interest to see the war end anyway.

His calculus continues to be that, if he clings on for long enough, the west will finally be dragged into a direct war with Russia. So, he’s happy to drag out an endless cycle of death by committee in which European leaders never agree to give him exactly what he wants and he uses that as a pretext not to settle.

Zelensky went on from Paris to Cyprus where, among other things, he has been pushing for more sanctions against Russia. At no point since 2014 have sanctions looked remotely likely to work against Russia, for reasons I have outlined many times.

The European Commission is now planning its twentieth round of sanctions to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the war on 24 February 2026. So with peace talks ongoing, Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas as always are doing their bit to ensure that nothing gets agreed.

None of this brings the war any closer to an end nor does it provide any security guarantees to Ukraine. As always, the biggest security guarantee should be the offer by European allies to intervene militarily in Ukraine should Russia decide to reinvade after any future peace deal.

But that was not agreed in Paris. Instead, the Paris Declaration said, ‘we agreed to finalise binding commitments setting out our approach to support Ukraine in the case of a future armed attack by Russia. These may include, military capabilities, intelligence and so on.’

In diplomatic parlance, agreeing to ‘finalise commitments that may include’ basically means that nothing has been agreed.

The declaration also said:

We stand ready to commit to a system of politically and legally binding guarantees. However, the final communique gave individual countries opt outs from those guarantees by saying that any guarantees would be, ‘in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional arrangements’.

So, again, in diplomatic parlance, what this means is that some coalition members may be able to opt out of the security guarantees if they decide that their domestic framework does not allow for such an arrangement, thinking here in particular of Hungary, Italy and Spain, for example.

What the declaration does achieve is to commit European nations to paying Ukraine to maintain an army of 800,000 personnel after the war ends which, by the way, is significantly higher than the total number of armed forces personnel of Germany, France and Britain combined.

Even though these are Ukrainian troops, not European, Russia will undoubtedly see EU funding of a large Ukrainian army on its border as a form of NATO lite. Which, of course, Zelensky would welcome.

So the process of holding near weekly Coalition of the Willing summits is entirely pointless, though perhaps that is the point. Since 2022, western leaders have been completely unable to say no to Zelensky, either through guilt or stupidity, or both.

Yet at some point, if only for their own political survival, Starmer and others will have to politely decline to offer more support and make it clear to Zelensky that he has no choice but to sue for peace. To me, at least, the European offer to Zelensky follows these lines:

Ukraine cannot join NATO (sorry we lied to you about that) but you can join the European Union and we will help you make the reforms you need to do so.

You will get significant investment when the war ends that boosts your economy. As your people return home, we believe Ukraine has potential to grow quickly and reconstruct.

However, it may still be many years before you receive EU subsidies on the level of other European Members, and you possibly may not receive them at all.

And you will have to become financially sustainable, including meeting the EU’s fiscal deficit like other EU member states.

I’m afraid that means that you won’t be able to maintain an army of 800,000 people at Europe’s expense (sorry we reassured you that you could).

But, as a European Union member you would have a security guarantee by virtue of your membership of this community, even though only Macron’s France has said it would send you troops (je m’excuse).

You should also be aware that Europe sees benefit in a normalised economic relationship with Russia, that includes purchasing cheap Russian energy. We can’t go on buying massively expensive U.S. LNG just to avoid hurting your feelings.

Sanctions may have been a policy or war, but they won’t be a policy of peace, and you will need to accept that we will drop them too.

We have now reached the limit of the financial support that we can provide to you so we have reached the point of now or never in your signing a peace deal.

That requires you to make hard choices about de facto recognition of land on the lines of the peace deal that the U.S. is trying right now to finalise with Russia.

Without that, he will simply continue this charade of endless pointless Summits and the war will drag Europe even further into the mire.

That’s a lot to take in and we’ve already apologised enough as it is. Look, we lied to you okay, but everyone makes mistakes.

Somehow, though, I predict the Europeans will continue to drift in circles. I wonder where the next Coalition of the Willing Summit will be? I hope it’s soon, as Zelensky might actually have to spend some time inside of Ukraine if there’s a delay. And he likes it in Europe as it’s the only place where everyone seems to love him.

January 11, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

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