Lavrov: Russia, China keep no technological secrets from each other
Al Mayadeen | September 8, 2026
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia and China have built an equal, strategic partnership in which neither side withholds technology from the other, in remarks published Tuesday.
Speaking to the online project Sama Menshova, Lavrov said the absence of technological secrecy between the two countries reflects the balanced and mutually beneficial character of their comprehensive strategic partnership, pointing to joint agreements as evidence.
Asked whether Russia risks slipping into the role of China’s “junior partner,” Lavrov rejected the framing outright, saying Moscow and Beijing have never approached the relationship in those terms.
The foreign minister praised China’s standing as a leading technological power across both applied and theoretical science, citing its output of high-tech goods, robotics and reusable spacecraft.
He said Russia’s own scientific tradition is equally strong, and that the two countries’ strengths complement one another, pointing to joint work underway in space exploration, advanced technology and artificial intelligence.
Maritime trade between the two countries climbs
Separately, Russia’s Transport Ministry said Tuesday that maritime cargo traffic between Russian and Chinese ports rose 19.2 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2026, reaching 109.5 million tonnes.
The ministry released the figures during the 30th plenary session of the Russian-Chinese Subcommission on Transport Cooperation, held as part of the Second Russian-Chinese Forum in Khabarovsk.
Officials noted that sea cargo volumes between the two countries had already grown 4.3 percent across all of 2025, reaching 196.75 million tonnes, before accelerating further in the opening months of this year.
Broader trade ties continue to expand
This technological and maritime cooperation comes against a backdrop of fast-growing overall trade between the two countries.
According to China’s General Administration of Customs, trade between Russia and China rose 28.4 percent in the first eight months of 2026 compared with the same period last year, reaching $185 billion.
Chinese exports to Russia totaled $84.675 billion between January and August, up 30.7 percent year-on-year, while Russian exports to China climbed 26.5 percent to $100.37 billion over the same period, customs data released Tuesday showed.
The figures leave Russia with a trade surplus of more than $15.6 billion over the eight-month period.
US Placing Missiles in Europe to Cancel Strategic Stability Talks Prerequisites – Russian MFA
Sputnik – 07.09.2026
MOSCOW – The deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, in particular in Norway, will nullify the prerequisites for a constructive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Monday.
“Steps such as the deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, which threaten Russia, will, to put it mildly, nullify the prerequisites for a constructive conversation with the United States on strategic issues,” Zakharova said in a statement.
Russia views the deployment of systems in Norway capable of launching medium- and short-range missiles as yet another step in a series of highly destabilizing actions by NATO, the statement read.
“As part of Russia’s response measures, the locations where US systems are deployed and controlled, as well as the infrastructure supporting them, are becoming the focus of special attention from Russia’s strategic deterrence forces, which includes planning the combat use of the relevant strike assets in the event of an armed conflict,” Zakharova said.
The ministry added that favorable conditions for a substantive and productive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability had not been established now.
How Britain built a war network around Russia
The UK is spinning a web of influence designed to survive any Ukraine peace deal
By Oleg Yanovsky | RT | September 5, 2026
Last week, UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced in Kiev that defense manufacturer MBDA had been authorized to disclose information concerning the British components of the SCALP missile, the French version of the long-range Storm Shadow, to Ukraine.
Officially, the decision concerns documentation required to organize local assembly, but in practice, it could facilitate the transfer of blueprints, components, assembly kits or finished missiles.
Moscow regards this technology transfer as the UK crossing a red line, as London hasn’t even attempted to shift responsibility onto intermediaries and the decision was publicly authorized by the prime minister. Britain has therefore assumed direct responsibility for the resulting escalation and deepened its involvement in military operations against Russia.
SCALP was developed through a joint British-French program and its assembly requires classified information about British components and French sub-assemblies, as well as access to a secure facility. Ukraine doesn’t possess a complete production cycle, but even a partial transfer of classified data would integrate Ukrainian assembly into the British-French manufacturing chain and bind all three parties together for years.
Before this decision, Britain had been far more careful about covering its tracks. For example, the Flamingo missile, marketed as a product of the Ukrainian company Fire Point, is identical to a design unveiled in 2025 by the British-Emirati Milanion Group. That arrangement allowed London to keep its distance, with formal responsibility for the missile’s development and deployment resting with Kiev.
Britain is also attempting to free future missile projects from the American vetting process, so under Project Brakestop, the Ministry of Defense has commissioned MBDA UK, MGI Engineering and Rotron Aerospace to produce three prototypes of long-range missiles for Ukraine. The purpose is to reduce dependence on US authorization and, consequently, on the position of the administration in Washington. London wants to determine for itself when and under what conditions such weapons are transferred.
British drones are already being used by Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia. They include the Nyan jet-powered drone, manufactured by Callen-Lenz, a subsidiary of BAE Systems. For its developers, the battlefield offers something particularly valuable: operational data with which to refine the weapon.
Russia has also repeatedly pointed to the direct involvement of British specialists in the deployment of Storm Shadow missiles.
On the same day as the SCALP announcement, London secured access to Avengers AI Labs, an extensive body of data gathered by Ukrainian frontline sensors, so now British companies will be able to use this information to train target-recognition and autonomous-control systems, greatly shortening the journey from development to battlefield deployment.
Five British governments have come and gone during the active phase of the Ukraine conflict, but the country’s anti-Russian course has remained remarkably consistent.
Boris Johnson began a program to develop the Ukrainian navy, Rishi Sunak signed a ten-year security agreement, Keir Starmer followed with the Centenary Partnership Agreement and Burnham has now authorized access to classified missile technology. Each government has built upon the commitments made by its predecessor.
The same continuity is visible in Britain’s strategic doctrine, where Sunak’s Conservative government described Russia in its 2023 Integrated Review Refresh as the “most acute threat” to British security and Starmer’s Labour government retained that position. The 2025 National Security Strategy called Russia “the most obvious and pressing example” of confrontation, while the Strategic Defence Review described it as an “immediate and pressing threat.”
That review established the principle of “NATO first, but not only NATO” and committed Britain to preparing for war.
These doctrines are supported by long-term financial obligations, given London has promised Ukraine £3 billion, approximately $4 billion, annually until at least the 2030-31 financial year. The century-long partnership agreement provides for joint production, technology transfers and cooperation in the Baltic, Black and Azov seas where Britain’s presence is intended to endure for decades, regardless of when the current military campaign ends.
The declaration signed by Britain, France and Ukraine on January 6, 2026, already outlines arrangements for the postwar period. These include multinational forces, military logistics hubs, secure facilities and a special legal regime for foreign personnel. In London’s calculations, a ceasefire wouldn’t end its involvement, but it would consolidate a new phase of Britain’s military and industrial presence.
To coordinate these efforts, Britain is assembling several overlapping structures, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Maritime Coalition, the “coalition of the willing,” the International Fund for Ukraine and Lancaster House 2.0. Meanwhile, a classified British-German program known as Deep Precision Strike also envisages developing weapons with a range exceeding 2,000 km during the 2030s.
The International Fund for Ukraine is financed by Britain and 15 other countries, while the British Ministry of Defense administers procurement. Participating states receive technology, contracts, guarantees and a place at the planning table while London turns the resources of its partners into instruments of British influence.
Ukraine is not the only front in this strategy, and across northern and eastern Europe, Britain’s coalition network already rests upon established military infrastructure.
The Joint Expeditionary Force coordinates national and NATO operations during the transition from crisis to conflict, at the same time Britain is doubling its contingent in Norway, expanding its presence in Estonia and deploying equipment stocks, command systems and targeting capabilities. A network of supply, communications and fire-control facilities is being constructed close to Russia’s borders to enable rapid combat deployment.
Britain also seeks a leading role in coordinating NATO defense initiatives. This allows London to shape allied plans, establish standards and monitor their implementation, while also influencing how other countries build their armed forces and prepare for a possible war against a specifically identified opponent. Yes, Russia, of course.
Britain’s elected governments merely provide public legitimacy for this strategic course, as beyond the electoral cycle, the same network of intelligence agencies, professional bureaucrats, City financial interests, defense corporations, foundations and think tanks continues to operate.
This network establishes the institutional framework, distributes contracts, attracts investment and moves personnel between government departments and corporate boards. Ukraine has become one of its principal hubs, bringing together British standards, European manufacturing, Western capital, defense conglomerates and Silicon Valley start-ups.
This is the essence of the British approach, where London compensates for its shortage of resources by coordinating the capabilities of others and turning that coordination into political power.
The British establishment understands two arguments, a threat to its status and the prospect of unacceptable costs, and this status gives the UK the ability to form coalitions, exclude opponents and write the rules, and fear arises only when the consequences of escalation reach Britain itself.
London will therefore support only a settlement that preserves its military and institutional position in Ukraine and it won’t accept any peace agreement that restricts British influence over the postwar order.
Russian attacks on port and logistics infrastructure in Yuzhny and Izmail affect more than supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces. For Britain, which leads the Maritime Coalition and has extended its century-long partnership to the Black and Azov seas, these ports possess particular strategic value, given that military logistics, export routes, insurance markets and future maritime programs all converge there.
Russian policy must recognize the networked character of Britain’s strategy and focus upon the coordination centers through which London harnesses foreign resources while diluting its own accountability. So long as Britain can raise the stakes while transferring the costs to its partners, its policy will not change.
Deterrence begins when the cost of a strategy is borne not only by those who execute it, but also by those who organize it.
This article was first published by Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.
The dangerous European illusion about a war with Russia
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 4, 2026
The Leipzig incident exposed something more troubling than the incident itself: the confidence with which German and European authorities seem to approach the possibility of a direct confrontation with Russia.
While German and European authorities go public, in what looks like a ridiculously rehearsed performance, accusing Russia of “hybrid attacks,” it seems clear to any attentive observer that Europeans are completely disconnected from reality.
The central question lies elsewhere: what would happen if Russia actually decided to attack Germany?
The answer would probably be very different from what Europeans seem to imagine.
First of all, the obvious needs to be repeated: Europe is not Ukraine.
The Special Military Operation in Ukraine is taking place in a specific territory, with its own military dynamics and within certain strategic limits. From the earliest stages of the conflict, Moscow established a clear list of strategic objectives to be achieved through conventional means of warfare, while respecting the civilian population and avoiding unnecessary escalation.
There are clear reasons for this approach in Ukraine. Despite the delusional Banderist attempts to rewrite history, the truth is that Russians and Ukrainians have always been one people, sharing common ethnic, cultural, and religious roots. Millions of Russians have Ukrainian relatives and vice versa. An unrestricted war against Ukraine would consequently affect millions of Russians. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about Russia’s strategy of military restraint.
None of this would happen in Europe.
A direct confrontation between Russia and a NATO member would produce completely different calculations. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries would not be regarded as fraternal nations occupied by coup juntas. On the contrary, they would be regarded as total enemies, against whom the use of force would face far fewer constraints, if any.
The idea that a potential Russian offensive against Europe would simply consist of more drones, sabotage, and limited attacks against infrastructure seems extremely comforting. And precisely for that reason, it is dangerous. Europeans are provoking Russia while taking the experience of Ukraine as an example of what could happen to them in a potential direct war.
But this calculation is wrong. Russian actions against Europe would be completely different. In Ukraine, Russia’s foremost concern is to spare civilians. Attacks against infrastructure are avoided, offensives are restrained, and even retaliation for Ukrainian provocations on Russian territory is often ignored simply because Russia does not want the violence of a potential escalation to result in the deaths of more Ukrainian civilians.
In Europe, the immediate and total destruction of every enemy target would be the highest priority, regardless of the humanitarian costs. Europeans are not Ukrainians, and the ties between Russia and Western Europe are not the same as the ties Russia has with Ukraine. There would be no comparable pressure within Russian public opinion for restraint in the use of force.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that restraint in the use of force in a war with Europe could actually be dangerous for Russia, since it would be dealing with countries belonging to a collective-defense bloc with nuclear capabilities. Russia would therefore be forced to launch attacks powerful enough to dismantle the offensive capabilities of its adversaries, regardless of the costs. It would be a matter of security.
This does not mean that Russia wants to start a war against Germany. Nor does it mean that every incident on German territory is automatically part of a Russian military campaign. It means that European governments should take much more seriously the consequences of turning every incident on European territory into another step toward escalation. And, of course, it means that Russia has nothing to do with the recent suspicious incidents in Europe – which could be either sabotage carried out by local militants or carefully prepared false-flag operations.
Berlin has already announced diplomatic measures against Moscow, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn and measures against Russian institutions on German territory. The European Union is discussing new sanctions. The more Europe turns incidents of this kind into direct political confrontation, the greater the need to understand where the limits of escalation lie. Russia certainly does not care about diplomatic actions, but Moscow is definitely growing tired of Europe’s participation in Ukrainian terrorism.
Europeans should ask themselves whether they are really prepared to discover, through their own experience, what the Russian response would be in the event of an open war.
They definitely should not try to see these consequences.
Norway seizes Russian Arctic science vessel at Kiev’s request
RT | September 3, 2026
Norwegian authorities have seized a Russian research vessel in Svalbard at the request of Ukraine’s state-owned energy company Naftogaz, amid growing tensions between Moscow and NATO states over access to and control of the Arctic.
The Professor Molchanov was detained on Wednesday while docked in Barentsburg, a Russian settlement on the Norwegian-administered archipelago. The Governor of Svalbard said the move followed an August 31 order by the Nord-Troms and Senja District Court granting Naftogaz the right to seize the ship. The vessel has been barred from leaving Barentsburg until further notice.
The crew and passengers aboard the vessel learned about the seizure from media reports, a TASS correspondent traveling with the expedition said. Russian Far East and Arctic Development Minister Aleksey Chekunkov said on Thursday that “the crew is safe,” adding that lawyers for the Arktikugol trust would soon issue a legal response and intended to challenge the seizure order.
The Professor Molchanov is a Russian state-owned research vessel operated by the country’s hydrometeorological service, Roshydromet. Alongside scientific expeditions, it has served since last year as a regular passenger and cargo link between Murmansk and Barentsburg, transporting scientists, employees of the state-owned Arktikugol, contractors, their families and supplies to the Russian settlements on Svalbard.
Direct air links between Russia and Svalbard ceased in 2020, while direct maritime passenger service was restored in 2025. The Professor Molchanov is currently the only vessel operating the route, with ten round trips between Murmansk and Barentsburg planned for 2026.
Under the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, Norway exercises sovereignty over the archipelago, while signatory nations are granted equal rights to engage in commercial and scientific activities there. Russia has maintained a presence on Svalbard for decades, with Arktikugol serving as its principal economic operator on the islands.
Naftogaz said it sought the seizure as part of an international effort to enforce a Hague arbitration award over assets it lost in Crimea following the peninsula’s reunification with Russia in 2014.
Russia has rejected the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute, arguing that the Crimean assets in question could not qualify as Ukrainian investments made on Russian territory under the relevant bilateral investment treaty.
Acting Naftogaz chief Sergey Fedorenko praised the move as “another important step toward restoring justice,” pledging to continue the hunt for Russian assets worldwide.
Naftogaz, which claims Moscow currently owes it approximately $4.22 billion, plus interest and legal costs, has previously pursued Russian state property elsewhere in Europe. Finnish authorities froze a number of Russian-owned properties in 2024 at the company’s request. The Kremlin vowed to challenge the measures, while the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced them as illegitimate and warned of possible retaliatory steps.
The latest seizure comes just weeks after Moscow issued unusually explicit warnings against Western attempts to detain Russian vessels.
President Vladimir Putin described plans to seize Russian ships and sell their property as “piracy and robbery,” warning that Moscow would respond in kind and could do so in whatever part of the world it considered appropriate. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov subsequently said Russia would choose its own targets, including vessels operating in the interests of countries that had made such seizures their policy.
Tensions have also been mounting in the Arctic itself. In an article published earlier this week, Lavrov accused NATO states of seeking to turn the region into a “new front” against Russia and its partners. He pointed to large-scale Western military exercises and expanding command infrastructure near Russia’s northern borders, warning that the buildup increased the risk of an armed confrontation with potentially disastrous consequences.
Lavrov maintained that Moscow wants the Arctic to remain an area of peace and cooperation, but warned that Russia would defend its interests “by all available means” if confronted with hostile actions.
The Bishkek Declaration: What the SCO Signed, and Why India’s Name on It Matters
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | September 2, 2026
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation closed its 26th heads-of-state summit in Bishkek on September 1 with a joint statement — the Bishkek Declaration — timed to the bloc’s 25th anniversary and signed by the leaders of all ten member states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the host, Kyrgyzstan. It is a long anniversary text, adopted alongside some 28 other outcome documents and amendments to the SCO Charter, and its language on the war in Iran is unambiguous. But the single most consequential fact about the declaration is not what it says. It is whose signature sits on it. Narendra Modi’s India — a Quad member, a US strategic partner, and a country the same declaration implicitly defends against Washington’s tariffs — put its name to a text condemning American and Israeli military action, mourning a dead Iranian supreme leader, and rejecting the sanctions architecture the United States has built. That signature is the story.
What the declaration says
On the war, the SCO condemned the military strikes on Iranian territory that it said caused numerous civilian casualties and significant damage to Iran’s economy, characterizing those strikes as violations of international law and the UN Charter that created serious risks to international peace and security. It expressed condolences on the death of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei — killed earlier in the war — reaffirmed support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved solely through political and diplomatic means. It extended the point to Gaza, calling a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question the only path to stability in the region.
On sanctions, without naming the United States, the members opposed “unilateral coercive measures” inconsistent with UN and WTO rules and damaging to the global economy — language that simultaneously covers US sanctions on Iran, Western sanctions on Russia, and the tariff pressure on India. On the nuclear question, they upheld Iran’s position directly, affirming every member’s “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy and declaring that measures restricting that right are contrary to international law.
The rest is familiar SCO scaffolding, weightier for the anniversary: an open, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system; implementation of the SCO economic and energy cooperation strategies to 2030; a push to reform global governance toward a multipolar order that “excludes bloc-based and confrontational” methods; responsible use of artificial intelligence; and the ritual condemnation of the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, with a pointed line that “double standards” in counterterrorism are unacceptable. Pakistan takes the rotating chairmanship for 2026–27 and will host the 2027 summit in Islamabad.
From the Knesset to Bishkek: the anatomy of a reversal
To read India’s signature as simple hedging understates it. Six months earlier, Modi had planted India firmly in the opposite camp — and the Bishkek text reverses, almost line for line, the position he took in February.
On February 25–26, 2026, Modi made a state visit to Israel: the first Indian prime minister to address the Knesset, honored with the Speaker’s Medal as the first foreign leader to receive it, presiding over the elevation of the India–Israel relationship to a “special strategic partnership” with 27 bilateral outcomes and a defense co-production track. Two days after he left, on February 28, the US and Israel opened their war on Iran. India’s response was conspicuous silence: it did not condemn the strikes on Iranian sovereignty, and it did not condole the killing of Iran’s supreme leader. New Delhi zeroed out its Chabahar port funding in the 2026–27 budget under US pressure, let bilateral trade with Iran collapse, and offered only a muted, “humanitarian” reaction when an Iranian frigate returning from joint exercises with India was sunk near Sri Lanka. Commentators summarized the moment cleanly — Modi had put India firmly in the Israel–US camp — while critics at home called it a strategic surrender. Among India’s BRICS and SCO partners, Russia, China, and Iran above all, the tilt bred real distrust.
What turned India back was oil. India imports roughly 85 percent of its fuel and draws a large share of its crude and LNG through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the 50 percent US tariff wall — half of it levied explicitly to punish Russian-crude purchases — New Delhi had spent early 2026 trimming Russian imports and leaning on Gulf suppliers, a quiet alignment with Washington. The Iran war detonated that arrangement: Hormuz disruption tightened supply, prices surged, the rupee came under pressure, and Modi was reduced to urging citizens to conserve fuel. With Gulf barrels suddenly unreliable and Washington’s tariffs making the alignment costly anyway, India turned back to discounted Russian crude out of straightforward energy necessity. As one analysis put it, the energy shock reordered India’s alignments — the tilt toward Washington of a few weeks earlier giving way to a familiar, interest-driven return to Moscow.
Modi was working two constituencies at once, and they pulled opposite ways. The influential Indian-American diaspora he has assiduously courted aligns comfortably with a pro-US, pro-Israel posture; against it stood the roughly ten million Indians in the Gulf and a domestic opinion for whom the image of India embracing Israel mid-war became a live political liability the opposition worked hard. Energy security and the Gulf-and-domestic pull won.
Seen against that arc, the Bishkek signature is the visible completion of a U-turn. The declaration made India condemn the strikes it had refused to condemn in February and mourn the supreme leader it had refused to mourn. The signature therefore reads less as conversion than as correction — an interest-driven snap back to the multi-aligned center after a six-month experiment in the Israel–US camp proved too expensive.
This is where strategic autonomy, not alignment, becomes the only coherent description, and the distinction matters for anyone tempted to call the SCO a consolidated anti-US front. India will lean toward Washington and Jerusalem when the terms are right and swing back toward Moscow and the Global South when its energy and standing require it, bending each forum to its own positions rather than adopting anyone’s line. Modi spent the Bishkek summit proving the point even as he signed the consensus: he demanded an end to “double standards” on terrorism in language every observer read as aimed at Pakistan, then sitting at the same table and about to take the SCO chair; he insisted connectivity projects respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, India’s standing refusal to bless China’s Belt and Road and the corridor it runs through territory India claims; and he pressed Putin directly to move from endless war toward a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine rather than echo Moscow.
And the timing is not incidental. India hosts the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12–13 — ten days after Bishkek — as BRICS chair for 2026, with Putin confirmed and Xi and Pezeshkian expected. A chair cannot antagonize the leaders it is about to receive, so part of the Bishkek signature is simply the housekeeping of a host keeping its room intact before its own showcase. Yet India deliberately themed its BRICS presidency around resilience and cooperation — a framing chosen to keep the focus on delivery rather than confrontation. The tell is in the gap: India signed a confrontational SCO text while steering its own BRICS summit deliberately away from confrontation. The New Delhi declaration on September 13 will be the better test of where India actually stands, and whether the correction that began at Bishkek holds.
The energy weight behind the declaration
A bloc’s communiqué is worth as much as the material power behind it, and on oil the SCO’s ten members carry more weight than the “regional talking shop” framing suggests. Taken together, and using the most recent 2026 figures, the member states produce on the order of 21 to 23 million barrels per day of crude and condensate — roughly a fifth of world output. Set against OPEC’s crude production of about 27 to 28 million barrels per day, the SCO membership produces somewhere near 80 percent of what the entire OPEC cartel pumps.
SCO member Crude + condensate (approx., 2026) Russia ~10.9 million bbl/d China ~4.3–5.0 million bbl/d Iran ~3.3 million bbl/d (war-depressed) Kazakhstan ~1.8 million bbl/d India ~0.7 million bbl/d Others (Uzbekistan, etc.) ~0.2 million bbl/d SCO total ~21–23 million bbl/d
Four caveats sharpen rather than soften the picture. First, Iran sits in both camps — it is the only country that is both an SCO member and an OPEC member — so the two blocs are not cleanly separable; strip Iran out to avoid double-counting and the SCO membership still produces roughly two-thirds of OPEC’s volume. Second, Russia alone, at nearly 11 million barrels per day, produces about 40 percent as much as all of OPEC combined and is the gravitational center of the SCO’s energy weight. Third, the figures are unusually soft this year because the war has curtailed Iranian output and repeatedly throttled Gulf flows through Hormuz — crude and liquids transiting the strait fell from about 21.6 million barrels per day before the conflict to under 5 million in the second quarter of 2026 — so actual regional production has swung well below capacity. Fourth, and most telling, several of OPEC’s Gulf heavyweights — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait — are not SCO members but SCO dialogue partners, drawn into the organization’s orbit since 2023. The bloc that just defended Iran and condemned the US-Iran war is steadily accreting the very Gulf producers on whom OPEC depends.
The deeper asymmetry is that OPEC is a supply cartel, while the SCO spans both ends of the oil market. Its members include not only Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan on the production side but China and India — the world’s largest and third-largest crude importers — on the demand side. No other grouping contains both the sellers and the biggest buyers of oil under one roof, and the declaration’s commitments to an SCO energy cooperation strategy to 2030, a proposed SCO Energy Consortium, and expanded settlement in national currencies are early scaffolding for exactly that: a producer-consumer bloc that could, over time, price and clear a meaningful share of Eurasian energy trade outside the dollar and outside OPEC’s writ. That ambition is nowhere near realized. But it is the material fact that gives an anniversary communiqué more heft than its boilerplate would suggest.
The Bishkek Declaration is, on its face, a predictable statement of Eurasian grievance: condemn the strikes on Iran, defend Iran’s nuclear rights, reject Western sanctions, call for a multipolar order. What lifts it above boilerplate is the combination of the signatory and the substance behind it. India signed a text that condemns the very strikes on Iran it pointedly declined to condemn in February, when Modi was in the Knesset — not because it has changed sides, but because a six-month tilt toward Israel and Washington collided with an energy shock and a tariff wall, and snapping back to the multi-aligned center became the rational course. The anti-coercion language now shields India too, and a BRICS summit India must host in ten days makes keeping the room intact its own necessity. And the bloc doing the signing controls something close to four-fifths of OPEC’s oil output, both of Asia’s giant import markets, and a growing roster of Gulf dialogue partners. The declaration’s rhetoric is cheap. The energy and demographic weight standing behind it is not.
Belgium blocks latest EU push to seize Russian assets
RT | September 2, 2026
Belgium has rejected an attempt by Sweden, Poland, Spain, and the Netherlands to resurrect the EU’s plan to seize frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine.
“This is non-negotiable,” Defense Minister Theo Francken told VRT on the weekend. “That door is closed.”
Kiev’s Western backers froze around $300 billion in Russian central bank assets following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, around $240 billion of which is held at Belgium-based Euroclear. The EU has already redirected profits generated by the funds to Kiev but has stopped short of confiscating the underlying assets.
Ukraine has warned of a €30 billion hole in its defense budget, despite receiving the first tranche of a €90 billion loan from Brussels.
Sweden, Poland, Spain, and the Netherlands urged the European Commission last week to once again explore ways of using the frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, while spreading the legal and financial risks among EU member states.
Belgium, which would bear much of the fallout because Euroclear holds the bulk of the assets, opposes confiscation. Francken said Prime Minister Bart De Wever will not change course and warned other EU members, particularly the Baltic states, against repeatedly putting Belgium “in a corner.”
“Our prime minister will stand firm,” he said.
De Wever has argued that outright confiscation would cross a dangerous legal and political line. “You cannot simply take someone else’s money. We are not at war with Russia. Europe is not at war with Russia,” he said earlier this year, adding that “immobilized money, even during WWII, was never confiscated.”
The Belgian prime minister warned that seizing the funds would amount to a declaration of war against Russia, and urged the EU to pursue negotiations instead.
De Wever was also instrumental in blocking an earlier proposal to use the assets as backing for a ‘reparations loan’ to Ukraine. EU members ultimately agreed on a €90 billion loan financed through joint borrowing.
Euroclear also opposes confiscation and warned that it could sue the EU if it attempts to seize the assets. Other EU officials have raised concerns that the move could undermine international law and damage the bloc’s reputation among global investors.
Moscow has denounced any attempt to appropriate its sovereign assets, calling it “theft” and warning that confiscation would trigger retaliation, potentially including measures against Western assets held in Russia.
SCO leaders sign Bishkek Declaration against ‘western unilateralism’
The Eurasian bloc condemned the US war on Iran as Washington widens secondary sanctions on Tehran’s trading partners
The Cradle | September 1, 2026
Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adopted the Bishkek Declaration on 1 September, marking the organization’s 25th anniversary and setting out a joint position on West Asia, global security, and economic cooperation.
The 10-member Eurasian bloc used the anniversary text to press for a “representative, democratic, and equitable multipolar world order,” rejecting bloc-based and confrontational approaches to international affairs.
Member states opposed unilateral coercive measures, such as banking restrictions, asset freezes, and secondary sanctions on third-country firms, that contradict the UN Charter and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. They also condemned the unlimited buildup of global missile defense systems, calling attempts to secure one state at the expense of others unacceptable.
The declaration reiterated the bloc’s condemnation of the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iranian territory, which have stretched on for 6 months and caused significant economic damage and disruption to global energy and shipping markets.
Member states called the attacks a violation of international law and the UN Charter that created “serious risks to international peace, security and stability.”
On Palestine, the declaration stated that a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question is the only possible route to peace and stability in the region.
Member states committed to expanding the use of national currencies in mutual settlements and backed reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to increase developing-country representation.
The declaration noted progress toward establishing an SCO Development Bank during Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, with leaders also supporting Iran’s expedited entry into the SCO Interbank Consortium.
Eight of the 10 SCO member states – Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – reaffirmed support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India declined to join the statement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping called on members to build “universal security” and prevent external interference in the internal affairs of states.
Meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines, Xi said unpredictability in the international situation had risen sharply and that Beijing was ready to work with Moscow to advance a multipolar order and reform of global governance.
Putin told the summit that national currencies now account for more than 98 percent of Russia’s trade payments with SCO partners, and named expanded intra-bloc trade as a priority.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov opened the meeting, saying member states account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and about a quarter of global GDP, and that the organization had grown from a border security mechanism into a global actor.
The summit convened six months into the US war on Iran, and four and a half years into the war in Ukraine, with Washington also pursuing trade disputes with China and India, and threatening to impose secondary sanctions on any country or company trading with Tehran.
Beijing, the main purchaser of Iranian crude, said it would firmly defend its interests.
Washington sanctions regime reaches its breaking point
By Samuel Geddes | Al Mayadeen | September 1, 2026
Trump’s desperate bid to crush Iran’s economy without military escalation places the US’ sanctions regime against Iran, Russia, China and all its other adversaries at existential risk.
So far, 2026 has been the most sobering year in living memory for the American self-image. Having at long last achieved the war against Tehran that has been sought since 1979, the Washington establishment is confronted not with the Islamic Republic’s collapse but its solidification.
Far from regaining its unquestioned dominion over the Persian Gulf region, it must now accept perpetual management by Tehran of the most critical waterway on Earth, or else face a global economic calamity. Instead of weakening Iranian leverage, the US-Israeli aggression has magnified it exponentially, needlessly handing it a level of global power and influence undreamt of in the more than five centuries of the Western world’s dominance.
As the administration flails ahead of the midterms and the imminent exhaustion of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which cushioned the true magnitude of the energy shock, it is soon to witness yet another previously unchallenged instrument of its power vaporize alongside its dwindling munitions stocks. That instrument is its economic sanctions policy.
This week ushered in the so-called “Operation Economic Outcast”, through which Washington hopes to throttle every avenue of economic contact between Iran and the outside world. Announced by the hapless Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who, along with his bemusement at the rising price of oil in response to the US’ actions, is also contending with the failure of the naval blockade of Iran’s southern coast, which has still not caused either Tehran’s collapse or capitulation. By switching back to tactics of blunt economic coercion, the Trump administration signaled an unprecedented escalation in the intensity of its secondary sanctions policy, namely that any company or state engaging in economic activity of any kind with Iran will share in its exclusion from the economic and financial system underpinned by the US dollar.
This threat, in addition to being levelled against regional and small-to-medium-sized economic partners of the Islamic Republic, is also explicitly aimed at China and Russia. In its desperation to force Iranian submission, Washington is escalating the war to the level of global economic blackmail, including against its only near-peer economy and potential challenger. Even Bessent, by his own admission, acknowledged that actual imposition of such sanctions would “blow up” the global financial system.
In addition to threatening every state that engages in any way with the Iranian economy, the Trump administration has, at “Israel’s” encouragement, also taken to the idea of imposing a total land blockade as well. This would require strong-arming systemically important regional actors such as Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan into sacrificing their own natural economic ties with their neighbor, to achieve the objectives of the very foreign power that has thrown their economic present and future into chaos.
Before the so-called “Economic D-Day” was even launched, Beijing called Trump and Bessent’s bluffs, assuring that any US sanctions against entities facilitating Chinese-Iranian exchange would trigger “all necessary measures” in response. The effects of increasing Chinese-US decoupling, the accumulating poison of the US tariff war against the rest of the world and now the apparent collapse of the North American economic bloc (formerly NAFTA), leave Washington in no position to incur the true costs of such retaliation, let alone the simultaneous countersanctions from the likes of Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan and any other country that depends more on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz than on trade with the US.
Neither are the Iranians anywhere near as bereft of economic weapons of their own, certainly not in comparison to the first Trump administration’s economic strangulation. Tehran has correctly greeted the US economic campaign as the desperate gamble that it is- and met it with an ultimatum of its own: that any participating state in this economic siege will be treated as an enemy.
Trump may believe that the US’ relative lesser exposure to the Strait gives him some sort of leverage. In fact, for the majority of states in the world whose economies run in whole or part due to the 20 percent of oil and natural gas, 30 percent of industrial helium, 40 percent of sulfur and 50 percent of fertilizer inputs that annually transit Hormuz, this reality gives them far more reason to accommodate the Islamic Republic than to join Washington and Tel-Aviv’s attempts to bring it to its knees.
This stunning level of economic hubris, if acted upon, will either fail and demonstrate the economic limits of US power along with those of its military, or it will succeed and split the globe into separate economic world-systems. Like almost every gambit of this unhinged presidency, success would be more damaging than failure. Washington will have so antagonized even its closest partners that whatever remains of the “global economy” centered around the Dollar will be very much less than “global” in its scope, compared to the parallel world economy its hostility will have birthed through sheer obstinate stupidity.
Arab states call US sanctions on Iran unrealistic: Report
Press TV – August 31, 2026
Leaders of the Arab Persian Gulf states have reportedly told Washington that sanctions imposed on Iran by the US Treasury Secretary are “unrealistic” and difficult for the countries to accommodate, citing their geographic proximity and close ties with Iran.
Officials from the Persian Gulf states formally conveyed to the US side that the directive issued by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, as part of an economic war against Iran, was “not realistic” and could not be tolerated given their geographic circumstances, neighboring status and proximity to Iran.
The regional newspaper Rai al-Youm reported that Western diplomatic circles believe the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar are unlikely to show the same willingness as European countries to comply with decisions and memoranda issued by the US Treasury Department.
According to the report, some foreign governments, including Qatar, may not adhere to US threats of economic sanctions, viewing them as unrealistic and evidence of the continued escalation of tensions in the region.
Such measures, the report said, could also undermine efforts to pursue scenarios aimed at reducing regional tensions.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the new “economic terrorism” campaign, absurdly comparing it to the D-Day Normandy landings of World War II.
Bessent claimed the measures target Iran’s financial networks worldwide and warned that no partner is beyond Washington’s reach.
He said the Trump administration has identified entities dealing with Iran and will impose deadlines for them to cut ties or face exclusion from the US dollar system.
China, Russia and Pakistan have also opposed US threats of sanctions against countries trading with Iran.
Abdolamir Rabihavi, director general of the West Asia Office of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, said Iran’s trading partners had largely disregarded the announcement of new US sanctions and that trade with these countries was continuing.
Rabihavi said expanding trade with neighboring countries as well as major Eastern economies could provide an opportunity to strengthen Iran’s foreign trade.
“One should not be overly influenced by unprofessional remarks by US officials, as many countries need Iranian goods and the country’s products are competitive in target markets in terms of quality and price,” he said.
The official said trade was a two-way, mutually beneficial relationship, noting that just as Iran seeks markets for its goods, its trading partners are also looking for suitable suppliers to meet their needs, and Iran can supply part of those requirements.
Rabihavi also stressed the need to diversify Iran’s export markets, saying Africa, with around 50 countries and a population of nearly 1.5 billion, represents an important and relatively underdeveloped market for Iranian exports of goods and services.
Alongside African countries, Rabihavi said, Central Asian states could also provide suitable markets for Iranian goods, particularly given their existing capacities and the opportunities offered by free-trade agreements, which Iran should seriously seek to utilize.
NATO creating new Arctic front against Russia – Lavrov
RT | August 31, 2026
NATO is seeking to turn the Arctic into a new “hotbed” of tensions with its active military buildup in the region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has warned. The bloc’s activities sow an atmosphere of distrust and risk a potentially dangerous armed confrontation not only with Moscow but with other nations as well, he warned in an article published by Arctic.ru on Monday.
The US-led military bloc ramped up its military activities in the Far North earlier this year by launching the Arctic Sentry initiative. The move was touted as a response to US President Donald Trump’s effort to annex the Danish autonomous territory of Greenland on the grounds that it was allegedly under threat from Russia and China.
Both Moscow and Beijing have repeatedly dismissed the accusations, with China arguing that the US was merely using the claims as a pretext for its own military buildup in the Arctic. Russia has also maintained that, although it has no stake in the feud over Greenland, it would defend its interests in the broader Arctic.
In his Monday article, Lavrov stated that Russia is mainly interested in “preserving the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation” while accusing NATO of “driving the region towards militarization.”
“Intensive military preparations are underway in close proximity to our northern borders. NATO is conducting large-scale military exercises involving non-regional countries and introducing new components of its command-and-control system,” the minister said.
Back in February, NATO nations held drills focused on Greenland and the broader Arctic, involving Swedish and Danish warplanes in particular. In March, the bloc staged a massive military exercise in Norway and Finland – two Nordic nations bordering Russia – involving a total of 32,500 troops from 14 nations. The troops trained on the territory of both countries, as well as “at sea and in the air,” under “harsh, Arctic conditions,” in what the Norwegian Armed Forces described as the nation’s “largest military exercise in 2026.”
Last week, US, UK and Norwegian forces kickstarted another drill on the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen. The operation is aimed at integrating “multinational sensors, command-and-control nodes and precision fires into a joint kill web,” according to a US Marine Corps release.
Jan Mayen – a remote volcanic island located 1,000 kilometers away from mainland Norway – is described by the US Naval Institute think tank as a key location in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap – a “chokepoint against entry into the Atlantic Ocean by Russian naval forces” and particularly its Northern Fleet.
“NATO members and other Western countries make no secret of their true motives, openly declaring their intention to turn the Arctic into a new front for opposing the development of Russia and its like-minded partners,” Lavrov said, commenting on the development and warning that such an approach “increases the risk of incidents that could trigger an armed confrontation with potentially disastrous consequences.”
The minister also stated that NATO and the EU not only pose a “direct threat” to Russian security but also seek to “undermine Russia’s legitimate rights in international cooperation” by targeting its partners with sanctions that affect Arctic projects in particular. He also named China and India as Moscow’s key partners in the region.
The EU has targeted Russia with numerous rounds of sanctions, including restrictions aimed specifically at the nation’s Arctic oil and gas development. The measures were designed to restrict Moscow’s access to technologies required for deep-water drilling and Arctic resource extraction, as well as to limit financing for such projects. According to an April report by the Institute for China-America Studies, the sanctions have made Arctic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing more complicated, as Chinese companies fear they could be targeted with secondary restrictions if they invest in large-scale joint projects.
However, despite NATO seeking to turn the Arctic into a new front, Lavrov maintained that Moscow is ready to work “with all constructively minded foreign countries displaying reciprocal readiness” to respect Russia’s interests.
Hydrocarbon Reserves in Russia’s Far East Comparable to World’s Largest Basins – Rosnedra
Sputnik – 30.08.2026
MOSCOW – The Russian Far East’s hydrocarbon reserves are comparable in volume to the world’s largest oil and gas basins, Russian Federal Agency for Mineral Resources (Rosnedra) head Oleg Kazanov said in an interview Sputnik ahead of the Eastern Economic Forum.
“The Far East’s hydrocarbon resource volumes are comparable to the world’s largest provinces,” he said.
The Persian Gulf basin is the world’s largest oil and gas province. Other major basins are the West Siberian, Mexican, Permian and Venezuelan.
Kazanov said that Russia’s Far East is often called a geological “gray spot.” He argued this was not entirely accurate since more than 7,800 mineral deposits have been discovered there.
At the same time, much of the territory is indeed less explored than Western Siberia. The main reasons are remoteness, lack of infrastructure, challenging climate and terrain, and the historical priority of investment in Western Siberia, the Rosnedra head said.
The Eastern Economic Forum will be held in Vladivostok from September 1-4. Sputnik is a general media partner of the forum.

