The Rebirth of ISIS, Israel and the Continuation of Syria’s Civil War
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | December 25, 2025
The chaotic predicament in which Syria now finds itself was, in many ways, predictable, yet this makes it nonetheless tragic. Despite the recent removal of the US’s crushing Caesar Act sanctions, the challenges ahead are so numerous as to render this a minor victory for the country.
In order to begin to understand what is happening inside Syria, we first have to begin to comprehend what happened following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Although the moment that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered Damascus, and Ahmed al-Shara’a declared himself leader, was dubbed a liberation of the country, thus interpreted as the end to the nation’s civil war, what had really happened was the birth of a new chapter in the Syrian war.
On December 8, 2024, the Israeli air force saw its opportunity and hatched a long-planned strategy to destroy Syria’s strategic arsenal and occupy key portions of territory in the south of the nation. That day, however, much of the Arabic language world’s media completely ignored the historic event and refused to cover its ramifications.
Another key point was that, beyond Israel’s land grab, the country’s territory still remained divided, as the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintained its control over the northeast of the country. This movement believes that the territory it controls, with Washington’s backing, is called Rojava and is part of the land of Kurdistan.
Türkiye, to the north, views the Kurdish movement as a strategic threat and treats the SDF as an extension of other Kurdish organizations it deems terrorist groups. The majority of the people living inside SDF-controlled territory are Arabs, an issue that can also not be overlooked.
HTS Ascendant and the Collapse of the State
Then we have the HTS government that took over Damascus, which originally pledged to rule for all Syrians and not just the Sunni majority. However, HTS is a rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot. Understanding this fact is key, because HTS was the de facto government in the territory called Idlib, in northwestern Syria; although a secular leadership was on paper, supposed to be the ruling authority.
In 2018, when Bashar al-Assad’s forces halted their offensive and sent all the armed groups opposing them on “Green Buses” to the Idlib enclave, Ahmed al-Shara’a, who called himself Abu Mohammed al-Jolani at the time, had started to consolidate power. This led to HTS establishing its own prisons and undergoing a process whereby it managed to control various al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafist armed groups inside the territory.
When HTS took Damascus, it did so with a ragtag army composed of militants from dozens of armed groups from inside Idlib, including many former ISIS fighters and others from different groups that were given the options to join forces with HTS, lay down their weapons, or face fierce crackdowns.
The way these crackdowns on dissidents were carried out, along with corruption in the governance of Idlib, even led to protests inside the province against HTS. Many hardline militants had also accused al-Shara’a of providing the US with details on the whereabouts of former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Keep in mind now that when HTS took over Damascus, they did so without a fight and the former regime simply collapsed in on itself. So here was HTS, now tasked with managing the majority of Syria and had to do so without any army, because the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had been disbanded.
Many elements of the former government, intelligence, and military under Bashar al-Assad were told they had been granted amnesty, yet forces aligned with HTS, and in some cases those within it, decided to take the law into their own hands through brutal field executions.
This eventually led to a group of former SAA fighters in the coastal region taking up arms against the new HTS security forces, triggering a response from a broad range of sectarian groups and others who were seeking “revenge” in blood feuds. The result was the mass murder of Alawite civilians across the coast.
Israel, the Druze File, and Syria’s External Fronts
Earlier this year, Israel also took advantage of tensions between Syria’s Druze community and sectarian militants aligned with Damascus, backing Druze separatist militias. This had been a strategy that Tel Aviv attempted to implement all the way back in 2013, when Israel began backing some dozen opposition groups, including al-Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants that were committing massacres against the Druze.
The Syrian Druze population is primarily situated in the Sweida province in southern Syria. Israel long sought to create a Druze rump state there, which would serve as a land bridge to the Euphrates and allow for the total Israeli domination of the south. The Israelis are also allied with the SDF, although not as overtly as the Americans are, meaning that if their strategy works, then they have secured their domination all the way through to the Iraqi border.
This Monday, tensions again flared up between the Syrian forces aligned with Damascus and HTS in eastern Aleppo, with both sides blaming each other for the violence. Periodically, tensions continue to escalate in Sweida, yet come short of the large-scale sectarian battles we saw earlier this year.
Meanwhile, US forces have now expanded their footprint throughout Syria and have taken over more military air bases, even working alongside Damascus as a partner in the “fight against ISIS,” or “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
On December 13, an attack that killed three US servicemembers was blamed on a lone-wolf ISIS fighter. In response, the US then declared it was launching a retaliatory bombing campaign across the country.
The narratives of both Washington and Damascus make little sense, regarding this being a lone-wolf ISIS attack. Instead, the evidence suggests that the attack was carried out by a member of the HTS security forces, but this is perhaps a story for another day.
Now we hear report after report about the rise of ISIS. And while it is certainly true that ISIS is on its way back, even if in a weaker state, the context is never mentioned.
Internal Fractures, ISIS, and an Unstable Future
Not only has the current Syrian administration managed to play right into Israel’s hands with the management of the situation in Sweida, set up a shadow governance model that is even more corrupt than the previous regime, while isolating all of Syria’s minority communities in one way or another, but it has also effectively turned many of its own allies against it.
There is no actual “Syrian Army” to be spoken of right now, at least there isn’t one that is professionally trained or big enough to handle any major war. Instead, the Syrian state will rely on its allies, like major tribes and a range of militant groups. However, as time goes on, more and more of HTS’s allies and even many who now fill the ranks of its own security forces are growing tired of the government’s antics.
A large component of their anger comes from issues concerning tight Syrian relations with the US, leading to the hunting down of Sunni militants across the country, but particularly in and around Idlib. As mentioned above, HTS had integrated many ISIS fighters and those belonging to other hardline Salafist Takfiri fighting groups, but many of these militants have never been willing to sacrifice their core beliefs for a secular state.
For years, the man they knew as Jolani had preached against the United States and Israel, yet, after taking power, he began cozying up with them and targeting Sunni militants alongside the US military. In addition to this, the large number of foreign fighters inside the country have not been granted citizenship and feel as if their futures are threatened.
In other words, the conditions are ripe for some kind of revolt, and Ahmed al-Shara’a is surrounded by countless threats. If ISIS were to begin gaining traction, there is a good chance many of these fighters, currently allying themselves with the Damascus government, will switch sides. In fact, this is something that has already been happening, although in small numbers and isolated cases.
What we see is a recipe for disaster, one which could explode in any direction, triggering a much larger chain of events in its wake. So far, it appears as if there are four primary threats to the stability of the HTS government. These are the Sweida front, the Israel front, the SDF front, and the potential for an internal insurgency.
Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, recently gave an interview during which he commented that Ahmed al-Shara’a “does know that any pathway for stability in Syria, his pathway for survival, is that he has to be able to have peace with Israel.”
It is important to understand that the two most powerful influences on Damascus are Washington and Ankara, yet it is clear that the US has the edge and could quickly overthrow the HTS regime at any time of its choosing.
Türkiye now has enormous influence inside Syria, where it is competing with the Israelis and attempting to set red lines, yet has failed to impose any equations as of yet. Perhaps the only way that the Turkish state could deter the Israelis is through backing a resistance front in the south of the country, yet it is clear that the US will not allow such a scenario to develop.
Even if a rather weak resistance group, or collection of groups, were to be formed and pose little strategic threat to Israel, this could also end up presenting a challenge to the rule of HTS in the long run. This is because such a resistance organization would enjoy enormous popular support and likely encourage other armed actors inside the country to join forces, creating a Lebanon-style system, whereby the forces of the state are incapable of confronting the occupier, and instead a resistance group would handle security.
The United States and Israel would never permit something like this to evolve, likely moving to commit regime change before such a plot is even conceived.
This leaves Ahmed al-Shara’a in an impossible position. He has no confidence in him as a ruler from the country’s minorities, growing anguish amongst the majority Sunni population, and no real army to be spoken of. Instead of resisting the Israelis, as his men and population at large seek, he sends his officials to sit around the table with them, while Syria’s official social media pages publish images of Syria without including the occupied Golan Heights.
Since 1967, most of the Syrian Druze living in the occupied Golan Heights had refused to take Israeli citizenship. After the sectarian bloodshed that occurred earlier this year, these Syrian Druze began applying for Israeli citizenship en masse. This is the impact that the rulers in Damascus have had on their own people; they have pushed Syrians who resisted Israeli citizenship for decades to switch sides, playing right into Tel Aviv’s hands.
Meanwhile, little is being done to reassure the disillusioned militants who had fought alongside HTS and believed they were fighting for a liberation cause and/or Islamic Caliphate, only to realize that they fought for a regime that negotiates with Israel and bows to the White House. Therefore, it is no wonder that when a group like ISIS appeals to them through its propaganda, it manages to convince them to join the organization’s fight.
What’s more is that this outcome was barely difficult to predict; only days after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, militants from Idlib were posting photos on Facebook of themselves holding up pictures of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the Umayyad Mosque, the most important mosque to Sunni Muslims in Syria.
Not only this, while ISIS networks on social media were, in the past, blocked almost instantly, they began popping up in the open on places like Facebook again. This begs the question as to why such obvious ISIS glorification and supporters were permitted to begin operating so openly online during this period.
When it comes to Takfiri Salafist doctrine, whether someone is affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaeda offshoots, they do not simply abandon this ideology overnight because of changing political circumstances.
Now, Takfiri militants idolize a man named Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which is why these Salafi groups are often referred to as Wahhabis. Historically speaking, this ideology was the bedrock on which the Saudi family launched their offensives to conquer Arabia, declaring the Ottomans kafir (disbelievers) and justifying their alliance with Britain, against other Muslims, on this basis. Therefore, some may justify the actions of al-Shara’a on the basis of their doctrine, but only to a certain extent.
When HTS began killing fellow Sunni Muslims, alongside the United States and cozying up to individuals responsible for the mass murder of their co-religionists, this started to become a major problem. It could no longer be branded an “alliance with the people of the book,” especially when fellow Salafists were kidnapped and killed by HTS government forces.
Some attention has recently been placed on the comments of the US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, who remarked that Syria should not be a democracy and instead a monarchy, even explicitly stating that this plan could include merging Syria with Lebanon. Such a system would certainly please many allies of al-Shara’a, and comments like these could be made in the interest of restoring faith in the leader.
Nonetheless, the current system is still operating on a knife-edge and is far from achieving a monarchy that rules the northern Sham region. In the distance, the Israelis are watching on and simply waiting for the next opportunity to achieve even more of their goals.
This is all because the war in Syria never truly ended; the only thing that changed is that Bashar al-Assad’s government fell, and perhaps if that had occurred during the first years of the war, there wouldn’t have been so many issues.
As is normally the case with human psychology, we seek to frame things in a favorable way to our worldview, meaning that we simply ignore evidence to the contrary. Yet, the case of Syria is really not all that dissimilar from the post-US-backed regime change realities currently existing in Libya, although there are key differences, of course.
So long as Syria remains without an effective resistance front against the Israelis, it will never recover and remain trapped. In Lebanon, it took years before such a resistance force truly took off in the south, and even then, it took decades to expel and then deter the Israelis. Syria is a much more complex picture, which makes predicting outcomes even more difficult.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Hungary Warns EU’s Support for Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Energy Could Set Dangerous Precedent
Sputnik – 10.12.2025
The European Union is threatening global security by openly praising and welcoming Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy facilities, as this could set a dangerous precedent, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said on Wednesday.
“The European attitude threatens global security. Just consider that EU leaders are glorifying actual attacks on energy infrastructure facilities. The Ukrainians attacked the Druzhba oil pipeline, which did not hurt Russia, but harmed Hungary and Slovakia, and European leaders are praising these actions. This is an extremely dangerous attitude, as others may deem that attacks on infrastructure facilities are something positive,'” Szijjarto said at a meeting of the energy ministers of the Organization of Turkic States.
The top Hungarian diplomat recalled the attack on the Nord Stream gas pipelines, saying that “glorifying government terrorism” was unacceptable. It is said that “allegedly responsible European politicians make such statements,” he added.
Szijjarto also condemned the recent attacks on tankers in the Black Sea.
In August, Slovakia and Hungary stopped receiving oil from Russia via the Druzhba pipeline for several days following a Ukrainian attack on the facility. Budapest subsequently banned Robert Brovdi, the commander of the Ukrainian unmanned systems forces and the person responsible for the Druzhba attacks, from entering the country and the Schengen Area.
Russia has strongly condemned Kiev’s recent attacks on tankers in the Black Sea and on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) infrastructure near the city of Novorossiysk, urging all reasonable actors to denounce the Kiev regime’s destructive actions. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has said that the same forces behind the Black Sea sabotage, previously implicated in derailing peace talks, are now seeking renewed armed escalation.
Kiev’s Black Sea attack infringed on NATO state’s sovereignty – Kremlin
RT | December 1, 2025
Ukraine’s attacks on commercial tankers in the Black Sea last week constituted an “outrageous” infringement of Turkish sovereignty, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said.
His comments follow several strikes by explosives-laden sea drones on two Gambian-flagged tankers, Kairos and Virat, which were sailing off the Turkish coast en route to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. On Saturday, another drone attacked a crude hub on Russia’s Black Sea coast belonging to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), operated by Russia, Kazakhstan, the US, and several Western European nations.
Speaking to journalists on Monday, Peskov stated that the attacks on the tankers represent a direct violation of the rights of the vessels’ owners and an encroachment on the sovereignty of the Turkish republic.
He told reporters that the Kremlin views the incidents as serious and noted that such attacks could have implications for ongoing diplomatic efforts.
Peskov added that the strikes showed “the essence of the Kiev regime,” adding that attacks on international energy-related assets damage commercial property and maritime security.
Previously, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova also condemned Kiev for the “terrorist attacks” on international civilian energy infrastructure. She suggested that they may have been an effort by Kiev to undermine international peace efforts and divert attention away from a major corruption scandal involving the country’s senior officials, as well as Ukraine’s continued battlefield setbacks.
Türkiye has also voiced concern about the attacks, saying they occurred within its exclusive economic zone and posed “serious risks” to navigation and the environment.
While Kiev has not officially claimed responsibility for the attacks, several Ukrainian and Western news outlets have reported, citing sources, that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) orchestrated the strikes.
Türkiye condemns alleged Ukrainian attacks on tankers
RT | November 30, 2025
Türkiye has condemned recent drone attacks on two sanctioned oil tankers off its Black Sea coast, which Ukraine has reportedly claimed responsibility for.
According to Turkish officials, the Kairos and the Virat, both Gambian-flagged vessels, were struck on Friday while en route to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The ships caught fire and at least one sustained hull damage. The crews were rescued by the Turkish Coast Guard.
Multiple Ukrainian and Western news outlets reported that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy had carried out the attack using Sea Baby drones previously deployed against Russian warships.
Ankara condemned the strikes on Saturday without blaming any country. “These incidents, which took place within our Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black Sea, have posed serious risks to navigation, human life, property, and the environment,” Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Oncu Keceli wrote on X.
Keceli added that Türkiye was communicating with all parties to “prevent the spread of war and further escalation in the Black Sea.”
The West has blacklisted the Kairos and the Virat for allegedly transporting Russian oil in violation of sanctions. Moscow has denied operating a ‘shadow fleet’ designed to skirt restrictions.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which handles around 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, said on Saturday that it suspended operations after a mooring at its terminal near Novorossiysk was heavily damaged by sea drones. The operator, whose shareholders include the US companies Chevron and Exxon Mobil, described the strikes as a “targeted terrorist attack.”
Russia to re-establish nine military positions in Syria’s Quneitra
The Cradle | November 19, 2025
A high-level Russian delegation visited Syria’s Quneitra Governorate on 17 November, The Cradle has learned from private sources, indicating Moscow’s intention to reinforce its military presence in the sensitive region adjacent to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The Russian delegation included officers from field commands operating in Syria, accompanied by a committee from the Syrian Ministry of Defense. The delegation conducted an extensive tour of several military sites from which Russian forces had previously withdrawn.
Contrary to some leaks suggesting trilateral coordination or a Turkish role in restructuring the military presence in the south, the delegation did not include any Turkish officers.
According to the sources speaking with The Cradle, the absence of the Turkish side reflects a Russian desire to manage the southern file exclusively through channels between Damascus and Moscow.
The tour included several military positions where Russia deployed its forces in 2018 as the Syrian war ended. That year, foreign-backed militants from the former Al-Qaeda affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reached agreements with Syrian and Russian forces to evacuate the area and leave toward the HTS stronghold of Idlib Governorate in northwest Syria.
Moscow reduced its presence in Quneitra after HTS, led by Syria’s current self-appointed President Ahmad al-Sharaa, toppled the government of former president Bashar al-Assad in December of last year.
Among the most prominent of the sites toured by the delegation on Monday was the Tulul al-Hamr, one of the most sensitive military positions in the region due to its proximity to the 1973 ceasefire line and its importance for monitoring and surveillance operations towards Israeli forces occupying the Golan Heights.
According to information obtained by The Cradle, the Russian command has decided to redeploy its forces to nine military positions in southern Syria, mainly in the Quneitra and Deraa countryside.
These are the positions from which it withdrew during the transitional phase following the ousting of Assad. This move is part of a new Russian strategy to reposition its military influence along the southern border and ensure that no vacuum is created that could be exploited by regional or local powers.
According to informed sources, the Russian delegation maintained a permanent logistics post in Quneitra after concluding its tour. The post aims to assess technical and engineering needs and to submit detailed reports on redeployment requirements, including the rehabilitation of infrastructure and supply lines, and the necessary readiness to activate these points in the coming period.
This development follows a series of reciprocal Russian–Syrian moves, the most recent being the arrival of a large delegation from the Russian Ministry of Defense in Damascus a few days ago.
This was in addition to the telephone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which followed the visit of President Sharaa to Moscow. It is estimated that southern Syria was a key topic in these communications.
According to The Cradle sources, practical steps for redeployment in southern Syria are expected to begin in the coming weeks, with Moscow gradually announcing the reopening of some of its military posts before the end of the year.
Analysts believe the Russian return to Quneitra has strategic dimensions that extend beyond military considerations. Moscow seeks to consolidate its influence in the country as regional alliances are being rebuilt and the balance of power shifts following the transitional phase in Damascus.
In particular, Russia wishes to keep its naval base in Tartous and its air base in Hmeimim on the Syrian coast to project power in the Mediterranean and toward Africa.
A tacit relationship between Russia and Israel was revealed in February, when Netanyahu visited Washington to present a “white paper” regarding Syria to US officials.
After Netanyahu’s visit, Reuters reported that “Israel is lobbying the United States to keep Syria weak and decentralized, including by letting Russia keep its military bases there to counter Turkey’s influence.”
The Times of Israel later commented that Tel Aviv was lobbying the “US to buck Sharaa’s fledgling government in favor of establishing a decentralized series of autonomous ethnic regions, with the southern one bordering Israel being demilitarized.”
In its effort to divide Syria, Israel is seeking to create autonomous regions in Druze-majority Suwayda and the Alawite-dominated Syrian coast.
Syria pledges to hand over hundreds of Uyghur militants to China: Report
The Cradle | November 17, 2025
The Syrian government plans to hand over Uyghur foreign fighters within its security forces to China, AFP reported on 17 November, ahead of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s first visit to Beijing.
The issue of the extremist foreign fighters from China’s majority Muslim Xinjiang province was expected to be on the agenda for Shaibani’s meeting with Chinese officials, a Syrian government source told AFP on condition of anonymity.
“Based on China’s request, Damascus intends to hand over the fighters in batches,” the source stated.
A Syrian diplomatic source elaborated further, telling AFP that “Syria intends to hand over 400 Uyghur fighters to China in the coming period.”
Shaibani became foreign minister after the group he helped found, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), took power in Damascus in December of last year with help from the Turkiye, Israel, and the US.
Large numbers of extremist Muslim fighters traveled from Europe, Arab countries, Turkiye, and China to assist HTS, the former Al-Qaeda affiliate, to topple the government of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.
The CIA-led operation to topple Assad, known as Timber Sycamore, began in 2011. The effort involved sparking anti-government protests and flooding Syria with heavily armed and well-funded militants from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
Fighters from the Uyghur religious minority belong to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a group that aims to establish an Islamic state spanning Xinjiang and other parts of Central Asia.
After coming to Syria with the help of Turkish intelligence, the group helped HTS (formerly the Nusra Front) conquer Idlib governorate in northwest Syria in 2015.
In 2017, Syria’s ambassador to China said that between 4,000 and 5,000 Uyghurs were fighting in the country.
Uyghur fighters often took over homes of Christians and Druze, who were ethnically cleansed from Idlib, which became the base from which HTS launched its campaign to topple Assad last year.
The new Syrian army gave a prominent Uyghur militant from TIP a high-ranking position as brigadier general, while also integrating thousands of the group’s fighters.
The Chinese government has for years expressed concern about the TIP’s presence in Syria. On 31 December, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson called on all countries to “recognize the violent nature” of the TIP and “crack down on it.”
Western governments and rights groups claim that the Chinese government is repressing the Uyghur Muslims in China, including imprisoning large numbers in internment camps and prisons.
Turkish Hercules Crashes on Azerbaijan-Georgia Border
By Alexandr Svaranc – New Eastern Outlook – November 17, 2025
Unfortunately, airplane crashes are becoming a common feature of our time that leads to human casualties. Such incidents are caused by technical failures, human error, or external interference. It seemed nothing foreshadowed the destruction of the Turkish C-130 military transport aircraft, but…
Why did the Turks fly to Azerbaijan, and what happened on the journey back?
Türkiye is a strategic ally of Azerbaijan and made an exceptional (military and political) contribution to the success of the Azerbaijani side in the Second Karabakh War.
Incidentally, after 2020, Türkiye, Israel, and a few others began competing over who provided more support to Azerbaijan and played the key role in Baku’s victory. In the fall of 2024, President Recep Tayypi Erdoğan, verbally threatening Israel and the West with a “night invasion” by the heirs of Ottoman askeri, repeatedly recalled Türkiye’s experience in Nagorno-Karabakh. For instance, on the eve of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, as reported by the Turkish publication Al Ain Türkçe, Erdoğan stated: “Türkiye can enter Israel just like it entered Karabakh and Libya. We will do the same to them. There is no reason not to do it. We just need to be strong so we can take these steps.”
In turn, President Ilham Aliyev publicly tried to convince everyone that, allegedly, nobody provided military assistance to Azerbaijan and that he alone secured the victory. Nevertheless, Baku always emphasized the moral and political support of Türkiye and Pakistan.
On the Israeli side, certain people, e.g., blogger Roman Tsypin, express a certain resentment in this regard. Tsypin believes that the decisive role in Azerbaijan’s military success in Karabakh belongs to Israel, thanks to its weapons, specialists, and medical assistance. However, Aliyev did not invite Netanyahu to the parade celebrating the 5th anniversary of the victory (although on November 8 he demonstrated his army’s power, equipped predominantly with Israeli weaponry: the Harop loitering drone and the Orbiter mini UAV, the Lora long-range tactical ballistic missile system, etc.). The Israeli expert forgot, however, to mention how Aliyev could have invited Netanyahu to Baku if seats on the podium next to him were “reserved” for Israel’s sworn enemies, namely Erdoğan and Sharif?
A group of Turkish military personnel arrived in Baku along with Turkish President R. Erdoğan (including an F-16 flight group with the Chief of the Air Force Staff, Sergeant Major General Ilker Aykut) to attend the parade at Azadliq Square on November 8. The group of the Turkish Air Force in F-16 fighters, which have been stationed at the Ganja airbase since the summer of 2020, participated in demonstration flights in the sky over the Azerbaijani capital, demonstrating Turkic solidarity and collective strength. But the celebration ended, and it was time for the guests to depart.
Groups of officers and technical staff of the Turkish Air Force who participated in the Baku parade returned home in two groups. The first group completed the journey as planned. The second group, consisting of 20 people, was returning on November 11 on a C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft (tail number 68-1609) from Ganja, which had delivered spare parts and technicians for servicing the F-16s to Azerbaijan. However, in Georgia, in the Signagi area, very close to the border of brotherly Azerbaijan (5 km), the Turkish military aircraft disappeared from radars 27 minutes after takeoff and reaching cruising speed, unexpectedly went into a spin, and crashed. The entire crew of 20 people perished (including the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Air Force, Sergeant Major General Aykut). What happened?
Probable causes and speculation
Regarding this aviation accident, Georgian law enforcement agencies initiated a criminal case under the article on violation of air transport safety rules resulting in death. Search and rescue operations were conducted at the scene, the bodies of the deceased Turkish military personnel were found, and the black boxes were delivered to the Kayseri airbase for a subsequent investigation into possible causes by Turkish specialists.
Recep Erdoğan called this tragedy a “heavy blow for the country,” demanding its cause be thoroughly investigated by examining all versions, and also called on the public for political vigilance, to avoid panic, and to exclude all speculation regarding assumptions about the military aircraft’s crash.
According to data from the Turkish newspaper Sözcü, the Turkish Air Force aircraft had a history of over half a century (57 years); it was manufactured in 1968 and initially served in the Saudi Arabian Air Force. In 2010, it was purchased for the Turkish Air Force and included in the 222nd “Rhinoceros” Squadron of the 12th Air Base in Kayseri, and in 2020, it underwent a scheduled major overhaul. Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft have been in service with Türkiyr since the 1960s and are considered the most reliable in their class. However, many of them have reached the end of their service life (50-60 years), are possibly technically obsolete, and recently (in October), the Turkish Ministry of Defense announced plans to replace the outdated C-130s with new C-130J Super Hercules models.
Theories regarding the incident’s causes may be split into three categories: technical malfunctions, human factors, and external impact.
In an interview with Milliyet, Turkish security expert Joshkun Bashbug ruled out pilot error, as the aircraft’s pilot was an experienced pilot, the flight took place during the day, the crew was well-rested, the technical personnel of the Turkish Air Force are professionally “one of the best in the world,” and the weather was good. In other words, the Turkish expert confidently denies human error.
Regarding technical malfunctions of the aircraft, considering its long service life, expert opinions differ. Video footage of the crash online shows the Turkish C-130 falling like a rock without its nose and tail sections. Former C-130 pilot Bulent Borali, in an interview with the Turkish TV channel A Haber, suggested that the rupture in the aircraft’s fuselage could be related to “corrosion, rust, or oxidation of the outdated metal,” or that the special cargo in the cabin was not properly secured and broke loose during flight, destroying the airframe.
However, this particular aircraft was, firstly, serviced by a highly qualified technical group of the Turkish military. Secondly, if the special equipment being transported shifted during turbulence, it could have torn off the tail section, but how did it damage the cockpit? Thirdly, the C-130 is not a supersonic aircraft by design and was not in critical flight conditions (i.e., it did not experience overloads, which, according to Russian military expert Alexey Levonkov, does not indicate wear and “metal fatigue”). Due to the absence of fire during the fall and smoke coming from the wings, Levonkov does not rule out technical issues in the C-130’s four engines.
As for suggestions of external impact, a variety of versions – even mystical ones – have emerged. Among Turkish experts, there is an opinion that the aircraft could have been shot down. In particular, this is noted by expert Abdulkadir Selvi of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet.
Joshkun Bashbug does not rule out “a collision between two aircraft, sabotage, or any other attack.” Considering the unstable nature of the Caucasus and the absence of a peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, his colleague Ibrahim Keles did not exclude accidental (unintentional) external interference. Since the C-130’s flight route did not enter Armenian airspace and ran directly from Azerbaijan to Georgia, but crashed 5 km from the border, the Azerbaijani air defense systems located in the border area may have been automatically activated, failing to recognize the friend-or-foe system, and become the cause of the lethal fire.
It should be noted that President Aliyev was the first foreign representative to offer his condolences to Erdoğan and express readiness to provide all possible assistance in search and rescue operations and the investigation of the incident. The prompt reaction of the Azerbaijani leader is, of course, primarily related to special relations with Türkiye. Meanwhile, there is obviously a moral aftertaste that the tragedy happened in connection with the invitation to the victory parade over Armenia in Karabakh (the war itself ended on the night of November 9-10, but for some reason Aliyev held the parade on November 8). Finally, President Aliyev has often been the first to express condolences when similar aviation tragedies occurred (for example, the downing of a Russian military helicopter on November 9, 2020, in the sky over Armenia by an Azerbaijani missile from Nakhchivan, or the crash of an Iranian military helicopter on May 19, 2024, carrying Iranian President Raisi after returning from a meeting with Aliyev in Nakhchivan).
The host of the Armenian publication ProArmenia, Nver Mnatsakanyan, notes that some Azerbaijani media outlets have begun spreading unbelievable versions about the causes of the Turkish plane’s crash in the sky over Georgia. An opinion is being floated (for example, by military expert Abuzer Abilov) about the alleged involvement of a Russian missile launched from the 102nd military base in Gyumri (Armenia), supposedly due to the recent escalation of Russian-Azerbaijani relations. But why would Russia so primitively spoil such effective partner relations with Türkiye, which has effectively become our “southern gateway” to Southeastern Europe against the background of SMO-related sanctions?
Finally, in Armenia itself, a number of experts (Araiyk Sargsyan, Vladimir Poghosyan) believe that the main cause of the Turkish C-130 aviation tragedy is mysticism—divine wrath in response to the aggression and mass deportation of the Armenian population of Karabakh—that it is revenge for the 4,000 dead soldiers for the shameful attack by the anti-Armenian coalition. Let us leave mysticism to mystics.
However, considering that the Armenian authorities are making all conceivable and inconceivable concessions in favor of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, expressing readiness to restore interstate relations and open communications, there is great dissatisfaction with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s policy. Today, it is unlikely that the Armenian special services, which are under Pashinyan’s strict control, are capable of and would engage in sabotage operations against the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem and drag the republic into another provocation and catastrophe. But nobody can rule out the involvement of special services of interested foreign states (for example, from Middle Eastern and Asian countries) and radical representatives of the Armenian opposition.
If there was any external damage (or an explosion inside the aircraft), then the technical expertise should reveal its trace and mechanism. I hope a thorough investigation by the Turkish side will reveal the true causes of the tragedy, which, in peacetime, is especially regrettable.
Alexander SVARANTS, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Turkologist, expert on Middle Eastern countries
Trump considers skipping disarmament phase of Gaza plan amid deadlock: Report
The Cradle | November 16, 2025
The US is looking to “forgo” the stage of the Gaza ceasefire initiative, which involves deploying an international security force to the strip to disarm Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions, Israeli media reported over the weekend.
The October ceasefire agreement remains in its first stage as talks continue to stall over the issue of Hamas’s disarmament and post-war administration of Gaza.
This potential change in US direction is causing ongoing negotiations to “deadlock,” an Israeli security source told Hebrew news outlet Channel 13.
The source said Washington is struggling to get commitments from countries to directly participate in disarming the factions.
As a result, it has started to look for “interim solutions, which are currently unacceptable to Israel.”
“This interim solution is the worst there is,” the source added, referring to the plan to forgo disarmament and skip ahead to reconstruction.
“Hamas has been strengthening in recent weeks since the end of the war. There can be no rehabilitation before demilitarization. It is contrary to Trump’s plan. Gaza must be demilitarized,” the Israeli source went on to say.
Channel 13 notes that there has been a collapse in ceasefire talks over Washington’s inability to form the international force – referred to in Donald Trump’s ‘peace plan’ as the International Stabilization Force (ISF).
The US recently submitted a draft for the establishment of the force, and is seeking UN backing to implement the plan along with the rest of Trump’s 20-point ceasefire initiative.
The draft includes a broad mandate for Washington to govern Gaza for at least two years. It also mentions that the ISF will be established in coordination with the Gaza ‘Board of Peace,’ which Trump will head.
Russia has proposed its own draft, which entirely removes the ‘Board of Peace’ clause and calls on the UN to identify “options” for the ISF.
The US draft is expected to be put to a vote at the UN on Monday. On 14 November, the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkiye issued a joint statement backing the US draft. That day, Indonesia said it had readied 20,000 troops for the plan.
Arab and Islamic states have “leaned toward supporting the US draft because Washington is the only party capable of enforcing its resolution on the ground and pressuring Israel to implement it,” a source told Asharq al-Awsat, adding that there is “firm American intent to deploy forces soon, even if that requires sending a multinational force should Moscow use its veto.”
However, multiple reports in western and Hebrew media over the past several days have revealed an Arab unwillingness to directly force Hamas’s disarmament through a confrontation.
“Most countries that have expressed interest in participating in the ISF have said they would not be willing to enforce the disarmament … and would only act as a peacekeeping force,” Times of Israel wrote.
Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported on Saturday that Tel Aviv is expecting the resolution to pass, and is preparing for the entry of thousands of foreign soldiers into Gaza.
The global Zionist organ trafficking conspiracy
By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | November 15, 2025
In early October, Israeli-Ukrainian Boris Wolfman was arrested in Russia. He is charged with masterminding a criminal organ trafficking scheme. His capture, wholly ignored by the Western media, raises the prospect that at long last, some justice will be served in a number of major organ trafficking scandals, dating back many years. Wolfman’s apprehension also highlights Tel Aviv’s little-scrutinised role as the world’s centre of illegal organ harvesting and trafficking. Grimly, the Gaza genocide may have greatly facilitated this perverse commerce.
Ever since October 7th, credible allegations have widely circulated that Zionist Occupation Forces are illegally harvesting the organs of slain Palestinians. In November 2023, the Euro-Med Monitor published a report documenting how Israeli soldiers confiscated dozens of corpses from major hospitals in Gaza, to the extent of digging up and raiding mass graves built in their grounds to accommodate the never-ending influx of slaughtered civilians. While some bodies were subsequently handed over to the Red Cross, many were and remain withheld.
Euro-Med Monitor records how many corpses exhibited clear indications of organ harvesting, including missing cochleas and corneas, as well as hearts, kidneys, and livers. Since then, the Zionist entity has released token numbers of murdered Palestinians at intermittent intervals to their surviving relatives. Frequently, the bodies are decomposed beyond recognition, making conducting professional autopsies – and identifying whether organs have been stolen – difficult if not impossible. Sometimes, the corpses are frozen solid, again greatly complicating medical examinations, and potentially obscuring organ theft.
The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention mandates respect for the dignity of dead civilians, and explicitly prohibits the looting or mutilation of their bodies during wartime. However, the Zionist entity has not only failed to ratify the treaty, but expressly rejects its applicability to Gaza and the illegally-occupied West Bank. Moreover, repulsive local laws and legal precedents unique to Tel Aviv grant authorities the power to refuse to release dead Palestinians to their families.
Their bodies can be used as grisly bargaining chips – or their organs looted with impunity. For decades, the Zionist entity has been the illicit organ trade’s international nucleus. While Palestinians have long-raised alarm over Tel Aviv’s theft of their fallen comrades’ organs, it was not until the early 2000s that the practice was officially admitted. Yehuda Hiss, head of “Israel’s” Abu Kabir Institute, openly boasted of harvesting skin, bones, and other human materials during autopsies. He was never punished, suggesting his macabre activities were state-sanctioned.
This interpretation is amply reinforced by former Institute employee Meira Weiss’ 2014 work Over Their Dead Bodies. She reveals how, during the First Intifada 1987 – 1993, ZOF officials directed the centre “to harvest organs from Palestinians using a military regulation that an autopsy must be conducted on every killed Palestinian.” This gave them free rein to seize whatever they wished from bodies in their care. Institute apparatchiks nostalgically referred to these years as the “good days”, as they could pilfer organs “consistently and freely”.
Disturbingly, the Gaza genocide’s catastrophic death toll may represent the dawning of a new era of “good days” for the Zionist entity’s organ trade. Wolfman’s arrest, and the collapse of the conspiracies he oversaw, are unlikely to dent Tel Aviv’s operations in the field. He was but one player in a world-spanning nexus of Israeli traffickers. In the manner of a hydra, Wolfman’s removal will simply lead to others taking his place. After all, the returns are high, and risks mysteriously low.
‘Organ Broker’
In July 2015, the European Parliament issued a landmark report on organ trafficking. Its introduction notes, “before 2000, the problem of trafficking in human organs…was primarily limited to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.” However, the report noted that following the turn of the millennium, “trafficking in organs has seemingly started to spread globally, to a large extent driven by Israeli doctors.” The document went on to detail a number of high-profile organ trafficking cases.
In all but one, the evidentiary trail led directly back to the Zionist entity. An accompanying map of international organ trade routes places Tel Aviv at the very core, with its citizens both being leading customers, and heading the gangs that supply organs to overseas buyers. One cited case was the exposure in 2003 of a leading South African hospital performing over 100 illegal transplants on overseas patients – “the majority” from “Israel”.
Local law enforcement uncovered how a criminal syndicate led by well-connected Israeli Ilan Perry recruited poor, desperate individuals from Brazil, Romania, and elsewhere who were willing to sell their organs for a token sum, then transported them to South Africa. Customers would pay vast amounts for the transplants – Perry, the “organ broker”, and his associates would pocket the bulk, with the rest paid to ‘donors’ and hospital staff to perform the illegal procedures, then keep quiet about the connivance.
Another cited case is the Medicus Clinic scandal in Pristina, Kosovo. It erupted in October 2008, when a young Turkish man collapsed at the city’s airport. After a fresh surgical scar was found on his abdomen, he explained his kidney had been removed at the clinic, leading to a police raid. Medicus was already on local law enforcement’s radar due to the profusion of foreigners arriving in Pristina with letters of invitation to the clinic for heart treatment, which Medicus was not known to provide.
Subsequent investigations revealed Israeli Moshe Harel and Turkish doctor Yusuf Sonmez – known as “the world’s most renowned organ trafficker” – were responsible for sourcing clientele, who paid in excess of $100,000 for transplants. The surgeries were primarily conducted by local Kosovo Albanian medical professionals. Patients spent a short period in recovery before being discharged, provided with “information on their treatment to present to doctors in their home countries.” Donors did not enjoy such charity.
As the EU report notes, suppliers were forced to sign documents attesting they were donating their organs “voluntarily to a relative or altruistically to a stranger.” These documents were written in Albanian, and not translated to them. While in some cases they were promised fees of up to $30,000, “a number of them received only part of the money and some nothing at all.” Those given a portion were told they’d get the remainder “on condition that they themselves would recruit other ‘donors’.”
‘Notable Price’
Boris Wolfman was also centrally embroiled in Medicus. While a wanted man in multiple jurisdictions and subject to an Interpol red notice, he remained at large in Turkey for years until his recent deportation to Russia. Incredibly, he kickstarted another organ trafficking venture in the meantime, exploiting vulnerable Kenyans for small sums, selling their kidneys et al. to wealthy buyers from Germany and “Israel” for up to $200,000. As in Kosovo, donors were not given the money promised, or provided with appropriate medical care post-procedure.
It remains to be seen what, if any light, his prosecution will shed on the wider criminal network in which he operated, or whether the Zionist entity might be directly implicated in Wolfman’s venture. Still, that he is facing trial at all is somewhat miraculous. His confederates in the Medicus horror have proven suspiciously impervious to legal repercussions for their monstrous activities. Sonmez likewise lived freely and openly in Turkey for some years after the conspiracy’s unravelling, despite facing criminal charges in multiple countries.
Turkish prosecutors sought to jail him for 171 years, but Sonmez never served a day in prison, and appears to have vanished without a trace. Meanwhile, Harel was arrested by Israeli police in 2012, only to be released. He was nabbed again in Cyprus six years later on an Interpol warrant, but demands from Kosovo authorities he be extradited inexplicably appear to have not been acted upon. Whether the pair’s continuing liberty is indicative of state protection is an open, obvious question.
The Zionist entity’s 21st-century Holocaust in Gaza, and disastrously failed wars against Hezbollah and Iran, have “exacted a notable price” on its finances, Focus Economics has recorded. For example, tourism – once a core component of “Israel’s” income – has shrunk from millions of visitors annually to almost literally zero. “A full recovery could take multiple years and is likely dependent on a permanent end to hostilities with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran,” the outlet forecasts – fantastically, given the Resistance cannot peacefully coexist with Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, the Zionist entity continues to suffer mass brain drain, foreign investor flight, diplomatic isolation, and a huge drop in confidence among its largest overseas trading partners. Grotesquely, organ trafficking might represent one of Tel Aviv’s few dependable profit sources at this stage. With thousands of Palestinians both dead and alive in its custody, “Israel” certainly has ample resources to fuel the trade. Mainstream blackout on Wolfman’s long-overdue arrest may indicate the entity’s overseas puppet masters are relaxed about the prospect.
Constructing chaos: Tel Aviv’s hand in Syria’s sectarian slaughter
The Cradle | October 29, 2025
On 7 March, Syrian security forces and affiliated armed factions perpetrated the massacre of more than 1,500 Alawite civilians, including many elderly, women, and children, in 58 separate locations on the Syrian coast.
Though the killings were executed by sectarian forces loyal to Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), a former Al-Qaeda commander, the path to the massacre was paved by a covert Israeli strategy aimed at inciting an Alawite uprising.
Israel’s plan hinged on pushing Alawites into the “trap” of launching an armed rebellion, with false promises of external support, only to give Sharaa’s forces the pretext to carry out the mass slaughter of Alawite civilians in “response.”
Israel’s goal was consistent with its long-standing aim, articulated in the infamous Yinon Plan: to dismantle Syria and reshape it into “weak, decentralized ethnic regions,” following former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s fall.
Netanyahu goes to Washington
After 14 years of sustained support from the US, Israel, and regional allies, the extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly the Al-Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front – seized control of Damascus in December 2024. Its leader, Julani, rebranded as Ahmad al-Sharaa, swiftly assumed the presidency.
On the very day of this power shift, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took credit for Assad’s fall and began a mass bombing campaign to destroy what was left of the country’s military capabilities.
However, toppling Syria’s government and destroying its army was not the end of Israel’s plan for Syria.
On 9 January, Netanyahu’s cabinet met to discuss organizing an international conference to “divide Syria into cantons,” Israeli news outlet i24 News reported.
“Any proposal deemed Israeli will be viewed unfavorably in Syria, which necessitates an international conference to advance the matter,” the outlet noted.
In other words, to be successful, Israel’s project to divide Syria needed to originate, or seem to originate, from Syrians themselves.
Less than a month later, on 2 February, Netanyahu visited Washington to present a “white paper” regarding Syria to US officials.
After Netanyahu’s visit, Reuters reported that “Israel is lobbying the United States to keep Syria weak and decentralized, including by letting Russia keep its military bases there to counter Turkey’s influence.”
The Times of Israel later commented that Israel was lobbying the “US to buck Sharaa’s fledgling government in favor of establishing a decentralized series of autonomous ethnic regions, with the southern one bordering Israel being demilitarized.”
Reports later leaked into political circles about a meeting two days later, on 4 February, between US officials and a representative of the most influential Druze religious leader in Syria, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, in Washington, DC.
Al-Jumhuriya reported that according to Syrian and American sources with direct knowledge of the meetings, discussions revolved around “a plan for an armed rebellion against the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa.”
The rebellion would reportedly include Hijri’s Druze forces from Suwayda, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from northeast Syria, and Alawite groups from the Syrian coast, but with “Israeli support.”
When asked about the meeting, Hijri’s representative confirmed to Al-Jumhuriya that it had taken place but stated that the proposal for a rebellion had not come from the Druze.
“The proposal originated from a state, not from any Syrian faction,” Hijri’s representative clarified, in a likely reference to Israel.
Inventing the insurgency: Meqdad Fatiha
Just two days later, on 6 February, an Alawite resistance group, the “Coastal Shield Brigade,” was allegedly formed.
A video announcing the group’s establishment claimed its fighters would respond to sectarian massacres carried out by HTS-led security forces against Alawites since December, including in the village of Fahel, where 15 former officers in the Syrian army were killed, and the village of Arzeh, where 15 people were killed as well, including a child and an elderly woman.
In both villages, former officers in Assad’s army had given up their weapons and completed a reconciliation process with the new authorities in Damascus, but were nevertheless murdered in their homes by militants linked to Syria’s new extremist-led security forces.
The Coastal Shield Brigades was allegedly led by Meqdad Fatiha, a former member of the 25th Special Forces and the Republican Guard of the Assad government.
Activists on social media circulated the video, which allegedly showed Fatiha declaring the establishment of the brigade from a base in the Latakia Mountains.
However, there was no evidence that the group was real. Fatiha’s face was covered by a black balaclava in the video, making it impossible to verify whether he was really the person speaking. This was odd, given that his appearance was already known from his Facebook profile.
The theatrics pointed to an intelligence fabrication – likely Israeli – designed to present the illusion of an organic Alawite insurgency.
A meeting in Najaf?
Just five days later, the narrative of an organized Alawite insurgency was reinforced by reports in Turkiye Gazetesi, an Islamist-leaning pro-government newspaper in Turkiye.
The report claimed that Iranian generals and former commanders in the Syrian army under Assad had met in the Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq to plan a major uprising against Sharaa in Syria.
The scheme reportedly involved Druze factions, the Kurdish-led SDF, Alawite insurgents on the coast, Lebanese Hezbollah, and, improbably, ISIS.
Large amounts of weapons were allegedly being sent by land from Iraq and by sea from Lebanon to the Syrian coast, the report added.
“Some surprising events were expected to occur in Syria in the near future,” the Iranian generals allegedly in attendance said.
While “surprising events” did occur one month later with the massacre of Alawites on 7 March, the reports of the Najaf meeting are likely fabricated.
It is unlikely that a Turkish newspaper would have access to a detailed account of a secret meeting taking place between top Iranian generals and former Syrian officers.
It is also unlikely, and even ridiculous, that Iran and Hezbollah would be coordinating with their long-time enemy, ISIS, or with the US-backed SDF.
Kurdish-Syrian commentator Samir Matini amplified the narrative through widely viewed livestreams, pushing the idea of “surprising events” to come. The aim: to pin Israel’s plan on Iran and Hezbollah and create a smokescreen of chaos.
Sectarian killings fuel resistance
Amid the propaganda claiming a foreign-backed Alawite insurgency was being organized, Julani’s security forces stepped up attacks against Alawite civilians in the coastal region.
Syrian journalist Ammar Dayoub reported in Al-Araby al-Jadeed that Alawites were often targeted solely based on their religious identity, rather than because they were “remnants of the regime.”
Dayoub observed that “these violations have targeted people who opposed the previous regime, and young people who were only children in that period, as well as academics and women.”
In response to the sectarian killings, Alawites began to defend themselves.
One key event occurred on 8 January, when armed men linked to the Damascus government killed three Alawite farmers in the village of Ain al-Sharqiyah in the coastal region of Jableh. The men were working their lands across from the Brigade 107 base when they were killed.
In response, a local man named Bassam Hossam al-Din gathered a group of local men, arming them with light weapons. They attacked members of Julani’s internal security forces, known as General Security, killing one and abducting seven more, before barricading themselves in an Alawite religious shrine.
The General Security launched a campaign against them, swiftly killing Hossam al-Din and his group.
A former intelligence officer of the Assad government, speaking with The Cradle, says these killings motivated him and others to fight back:
“All this fueled enormous resentment in the area, which grew worse day by day. After Bassam Hossam al-Din’s death, some people here – including former government military personnel and civilians – began to gather.”
Crucially, they were “encouraged by reports and promises [of help] they received from outside.”
They were told they would receive support, including by sea, from the US-led international coalition, in coordination with the Druze in Suwayda and Kurds in northeastern Syria.
“They were given hope of escaping this miserable situation,” the former intelligence officer tells The Cradle.
In the following weeks, Alawites continued to clash with Syrian security forces in an effort to defend themselves from raids and arrests.
In late February, Alawite insurgents attacked a police station in Assad’s hometown of Qardaha, located in the mountains overlooking the coastal town of Latakia.
According to Qardaha residents and activists who spoke to Reuters, “the incident began when members of security forces tried to enter a house without permission, sparking opposition from residents.”
“One person was killed by gunfire, with locals accusing the security forces of the shooting,” Reuters added, further suggesting that local Alawite men were acting in self-defense.
What happened in Datour?
The simmering conflict escalated further on 4 March. Reuters reported that, according to Syrian state media, two members of the Defense Ministry had been killed in the Datour neighborhood in Latakia city by “groups of Assad militia remnants,” and that security forces had mounted a campaign to arrest them.
One Datour resident told Reuters there had been heavy gunfire in the early hours and that security forces in numerous vehicles had surrounded the neighborhood.
A security source speaking with the news agency blamed the violence on a “proliferation of arms” among former security and army personnel who had refused to enter into reconciliation agreements with the new authorities.
The source said that local Alawite leaders had, in some cases, cooperated with security forces to hand over former personnel suspected of committing crimes during the period of Assad’s rule in hopes of staving off “crack downs and potential civil unrest.”
Testimonies from residents of Datour collected by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) indicated that security forces carried out random arrests in Datour and indiscriminately fired at civilian homes, resulting in several deaths, including that of a child.
The campaign was “marked by sectarian rhetoric and intense hate speech directed against the Alawite sect,” STJ added.
A source from Datour speaking with The Cradle reveals that Julani’s government used a prominent local Alawite family to create the proliferation of weapons needed to justify a crackdown.
The Aslan family had previously been close to Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother and commander of the army’s elite 4th Division, but quickly established good relations with the new government after it came to power in December.
It became common to see General Security members from Idlib spending time at the Aslan-owned businesses on Thawra Street at the entrance to Datour.
When residents complained to the General Security about criminal activity by the Aslan family, such as stealing money and confiscating homes, the General Security took no action against the family.
The source speaking with The Cradle says that on 4 and 5 March, members of the Aslan family distributed weapons to Alawite men in the neighborhood, encouraging them to take up arms against the General Security.
This was, of course, strange given the close relationship between the Aslans and the General Security, as well as because such a rebellion had little chance of success.
“Why would the Aslan family distribute weapons to fellow Alawites in Datour while knowing a rebellion would fail?” the source asks.
What happened in Daliyah?
On 6 March, a major clash erupted in the Alawite villages of Daliyah and Beit Ana, which lie adjacent to one another in the mountains of the Jableh countryside.
Sources from Daliyah speaking with The Cradle confirm that a large General Security convoy entered the village that morning to arrest a local man, Ali Ahmad, who had written posts against the Julani government on Facebook.
General Security members took Ahmad from his work at the local mini bus station and executed him at the entrance of the village.
The General Security members then entered the nearby house of a retired army officer, Taha Saad, in the adjacent village of Beit Ana, killing his two adult sons.
In response to the killings, local men from the village gathered light weapons and attacked the General Security members. After the General Security called for reinforcements, a convoy of 20 vehicles arrived to assist the government forces in the fight.
The sources in Daliyah speaking with The Cradle state that around 20 members of the General Security and 17 men from the village were killed in the gun battle.
As the clashes continued, Damascus sent helicopters to drop bombs on Daliyah and Beit Ana until a Russian plane forced the helicopters to withdraw.
Julani’s army escalated further by firing artillery at multiple Alawite villages in the mountain areas from the military academy in Rumaylah on the coast, near Jableh city.
A source from Jableh speaking to The Cradle says that the bombings made Alawites “go crazy,” especially because Daliyah is home to an important Alawite religious shrine.
The massacre and its beneficiaries
When the Russian plane appeared over Daliyah and Beit Ana, “People thought that this was ‘the moment,’ so they rose up on that basis,” stated the former intelligence officer speaking with The Cradle.
Alawite insurgents attacked General Security and army positions in various areas across the coast, including Brigade 107 near Ayn al-Sharqiyah, where Bassam Hossam al-Din’s group abducted the General Security members before being killed in January.
“There was no Meqdad Fatiha or anyone else from outside, no Iranians or any others. It was purely a popular force rising up against this situation,” the former intelligence officer explains.
However, they were emboldened by promises of outside help from the US-led coalition, the Druze, and the Kurds.
The clashes at the Brigade 107 base lasted all night, but the Alawite insurgents paused the attack early the next morning, on 7 March, thinking that coalition forces would come to their aid and bomb the brigade.
“They waited two hours, but no strikes came, no support arrived. Their morale collapsed, they realized it was all lies, just a trap,” the source goes on to say.
After the fighting stopped, disillusionment spread, and the Alawite insurgents attacking the base withdrew and returned to their villages.
Al Jazeera’s role
As the fighting still raged on 6 March, Al Jazeera repeated the false reports from Turkish media claiming Alawite insurgents were receiving massive external support from Iran, Hezbollah, the Kurdish SDF, and even Assad.
The news outlet’s propaganda gave Damascus the pretext to mobilize not only formal members of military units from the Ministry of Defense, but also many informal armed factions who responded to calls from mosques to fight “jihad” against Alawites.
On the morning of 7 March, convoys of military vehicles filled with tens of thousands of Sharaa’s extremist fighters began arriving at the coast.
Because the Alawite insurgency was weak and disorganized, with no help from abroad, it was not able to provide any protection to Alawite civilians as the massacres unfolded.
Facing no resistance, Julani’s forces began systematically slaughtering any Alawite men they could find, as well as many women and children, in cities, towns, and villages across the coast, including in Jableh, Al-Mukhtariyah, Snobar, Al-Shir, and the neighborhoods of Al-Qusour in Baniyas and Datour in Latakia.
The massive scope and systematic nature of the massacres, involving such large numbers of armed men in so many locations, suggests pre-planning by Julani and his Defense Minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra – a former commander-in-chief of the HTS military wing.
A media creation
The mobilization of Julani’s forces was also aided on 6 March by new videos appearing online claiming to show Meqdad Fatiha and members of the Coastal Shield Brigade vowing to fight against the new government.
In one video, the man claiming to be Fatiha was masked (this time dressed like a character from the popular video game, Mortal Kombat, and standing against a blank background), making it impossible to know who he was and whether he was in the mountains of Latakia or in a television studio in Tel Aviv or Doha.
In a separate video, Fatiha was masked and dressed just like an ISIS militant beheading Christians on video in Libya in 2015, leading to speculation the video was fake and had been created using artificial intelligence (AI).
Another video was later released in which Fatiha appeared without a mask, saying that previous videos of him were indeed real, and not created using AI. However, the new video also appeared fake, his face, shoulders, and eyes moving in an unnatural way as he spoke.
During multiple visits to the Syrian coast, The Cradle was not able to find any Alawites who expressed support for Fatiha or believed his group was real.
The source from Daliyah states that, “No one here supports Meqdad Fatiha. We all believe he works for Julani. The Coastal Shield Brigade is fabricated.”
A former Alawite officer in Assad’s army from the Syrian coast tells The Cradle, “We only see videos of Meqdad Fatiha online. We believe he is just a media creation.”
After showing The Cradle his rotting teeth, the former officer remarks, “Do you think we are getting help from Iran or Hezbollah? I don’t even have money to fix my teeth.”
An Alawite woman whose husband and two grown sons were murdered on 7 March suggests to The Cradle that Fatiha is a fictitious person, only existing on Facebook and created by the authorities to justify the massacres.
“Who is he? Julani created him. It’s a lie,” she explains.
General Security fatalities
The mobilization of Sharaa’s extremist forces from across the country was also aided by claims that Alawite insurgents had killed 236 members of the General Security in attacks on 6 April.
Some General Security members were certainly killed, but Syrian authorities never provided any evidence for this large number, suggesting it was vastly inflated to heighten sectarian anger. When Reuters requested the names or an updated tally, Syrian officials refused to provide them.
In one case, the pro-HTS “Euphrates Shield” Telegram channel published a photo collage allegedly showing General Security members killed by “regime remnants” during the fighting.
However, one of the fighters shown in the photos quickly posted a story on his Instagram with a “laugh out loud” emoji to show he was still alive, the Syrian Democratic Observatory showed.
Israeli ambitions
On 10 March, before the victims of the massacres had been buried, i24 News published a letter claiming to be written by Alawite leaders, asking Netanyahu to send his military to protect them.
“If you come to the Syrian coast, which is predominantly Alawite, you will be greeted with songs and flowers,” the letter stated.
It also called on Israel to unite against the “Islamic tide led by Turkiye,” while asking for help in separating from “this extremist state.”
When Israel secretly “greenlit” Julani’s massacre of Druze in Suwayda in July, the goal of dividing Syria was further advanced. Many Druze are aware of the covert relationship between Damascus and Tel Aviv, but, fearing extermination, feel they have little choice but to call on Israel for protection and to establish an autonomous region in south Syria.
Three weeks after the massacres of Alawites in March, an Israeli general quietly admitted that sectarian violence in Syria benefits Tel Aviv.
“This thing where everyone is fighting everyone, and there’s an agreement with the Kurds one day, and a massacre of the Alawites the second day, and a threat to the Druze on the third day, and Israeli strikes in the south. All this chaos is, to some extent, actually good for Israel,” stated Tamir Hayman while speaking with Israeli Army Radio.
“Wish all sides good luck (but) do it quietly. Don’t talk about it,” the general added.
Turkey prepares its historic turn: from NATO sentinel to Eurasian protagonist
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 19, 2025
For decades, Turkey was considered a pillar of NATO’s eastern flank — a key piece on the chessboard of containing Russia. Since joining the alliance in 1952, the country has played a dual role: on one hand, a strategic partner of the West; on the other, a regional power with ambitions of its own. This balance was always unstable — and now, it is beginning to undergo substantial change.
What was once whispered behind closed doors is now being openly voiced by central figures in Turkish politics. In September 2025, an unexpected statement from the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, sent shockwaves through Ankara and beyond: he openly proposed the formation of a strategic alliance between Turkey, Russia, and China, directly opposing what he called the “US-Israel evil coalition.”
Though shocking to some Western observers, this proposal did not emerge in a vacuum. According to analyst Farhad Ibragimov, Bahçeli’s remarks mark “the deepest ideological shift in Turkish nationalism since the Cold War.” A nationalism traditionally aligned with the West now appears skeptical — if not openly antagonistic — to the Washington-led structure.
It is important to note that Bahçeli is not alone in this shift. The idea is echoed with enthusiasm by other sectors of Turkish political life, such as Doğu Perinçek, leader of the Patriotic Party. For him, this reorientation is neither a tactical maneuver nor a veiled threat to NATO — it is, rather, a “civilizational project.” In his words, it is a historic decision: either Turkey remains a satellite of the Atlantic powers, or it fully integrates into the Eurasian civilization, alongside Russia, China, and Iran.
In this context, the suggested alliance should not be seen merely as a military or diplomatic pact, but as an attempt to redefine Turkey’s role in the 21st century. The proposal carries an implicit — and at times explicit — critique of the decadent, domineering, and unsustainable liberal world order.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s position has been more ambiguous. He stated he was “not fully familiar” with Bahçeli’s idea, but added: “Whatever is good, let it happen.” This phrase summarizes Erdoğan’s strategy in recent years: keeping the country in a bargaining position, flirting with Moscow and Beijing while still participating in Western institutions. However, there are signs that even this balancing act may be giving way to more definitive choices.
The growing instability in the Middle East, the erosion of European institutions, and constant pressure from the U.S. have pushed Turkey toward a new posture. As Perinçek aptly put it, “this is not a choice, but a necessity.” Remaining within the Atlantic system, in his view, offers no guarantees of sovereignty, economic development, or territorial security.
Although short-term technical obstacles remain, Turkey’s path toward Eurasian integration is not only viable — it is necessary. The country’s economic dependence on the West, inherited from decades of participation in the liberal-globalist architecture, is not a fixed destiny — but a chain that must be broken. Remaining in NATO, far from providing security, leaves Ankara a passive target of American strategy. In contrast, a strategic alliance with Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran — while demanding structural adjustments — offers something the Atlantic has never guaranteed: full sovereignty, mutual respect, and active participation in building a new international order based on multipolarity.
More than a geopolitical alignment, the proposals of Bahçeli and Perinçek carry a profound civilizational dimension. By drawing closer to Russia, China, and Iran, Turkey is not merely seeking strategic partners but also reconnecting with the historical and cultural space of Turkic populations within those countries — from the Arctic-Siberian frontiers in Sakha to the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang and Iranian Azerbaijan. This reconnection creates fertile ground for a broader alliance that could also involve the Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan — and Mongolia itself. This is, therefore, not just a political axis, but an identity-based one, capable of forming a cohesive civilizational bloc with shared roots and converging interests in the face of the moral and structural decline of the liberal West.
The trend is clear: a significant part of Turkey’s political and military elite no longer believes the country’s future lies in Brussels or Washington. Instead, they look to the heart of Eurasia — where emerging powers are gradually drawing the contours of a new multipolar world.
At this moment, Turkey seems to be standing in front of a mirror: it can continue acting as a peripheral extension of Western will, or it can take a more independent course. The statements from Bahçeli and Perinçek may be just the beginning of a turn that, if consolidated, will shift the geopolitical balance of the region for decades to come.
Russia accuses UK, Ukraine of sabotage plot against TurkStream
Al Mayadeen | October 16, 2025
Russia has accused the United Kingdom and Ukraine of attempting coordinated sabotage operations against the TurkStream gas pipeline, a vital conduit transporting Russian natural gas to Turkey and European markets.
During the 57th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) session in Uzbekistan, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov revealed some of the details behind the plot.
According to Bortnikov, British instructors from the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), in coordination with Ukrainian intelligence, are actively planning a series of attacks targeting Russian energy infrastructure. These operations reportedly include drone strikes on the TurkStream pipeline, as well as attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, a multi-national venture with Russian, Kazakh, and US shareholders.
Bortnikov said that the UK has been directly involved in training and coordinating these sabotage groups.
“Together with MI6, they are coordinating Ukrainian sabotage groups to carry out raids in Russia’s border regions, targeting critical infrastructure using drones, unmanned boats, and combat divers,” FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov stated.
The FSB director further revealed that British intelligence orchestrated Ukraine’s SBU “Spider Web” operation conducted on June 2, 2025, prior to Ukraine–Russia talks in Istanbul. Bortnikov said the UK managed a propaganda campaign exaggerating the operation’s impact and attributing it solely to Ukraine. In addition, Russian authorities reported a series of FPV drone attacks in June on airfields across Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions.
Failed attacks on TurkStream
These remarks follow earlier reports of Ukrainian plans to target TurkStream. In November 2024, German media outlet Der Spiegel reported that former Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander Valerii Zaluzhny had proposed a plan codenamed “Diameter,” modeled on the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage, to target the pipeline. The plan reportedly failed, and no independent evidence has confirmed its execution.
Russia has also intercepted multiple drone attacks on TurkStream infrastructure in January 2025, which were described by Moscow as acts of “energy terrorism,” though the facilities continued normal operations. Additionally, Russian forces shot down three more Ukrainian drones in early March following another attempted strike on a TurkStream compressor station.
TurkStream remains a strategic energy artery for Europe, delivering Russian natural gas to Turkey and several European nations. Any disruption to its operation could have serious consequences for regional energy security.

