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Lasha Kasradze: Azerbaijan as the Next Frontline Against Russia & Iran?

Glenn Diesen | July 13, 2025

As Azerbaijan takes an increasingly hostile approach to both Russia and Iran, it risks becoming a proxy in a wider regional war. Azerbaijan’s Zangezur corridor connects Azerbaijan closer to Turkey, and thus NATO. Many uncertainties emerge in terms of what happens to Armenia, to what extent Turkey and NATO can project power that deep into the South Caucasus, and how Russia and Iran will react. Lasha Kasradze is an international affairs analyst from Georgia, and an expert on the wider region.

July 14, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Video | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Syria’s Jolani is a US-Israeli ‘intelligence tool’ working to advance their interests: Activist

By Sally Ahmed | Press TV | July 1, 2025

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the head of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led regime in Damascus, is a US-Israeli “intelligence tool” working to advance their interests, according to a Syrian political activist.

In an interview with the Press TV website, activist Mohammed al-Jajeh described the situation in Syria roughly six months after the collapse of the Assad government as “catastrophic by all measures” and said “no one” in the country, including ethnic and religious minorities, is safe.

The country, he said, has descended into “a dangerous slide into chaos,” marked by “ethnic and sectarian purges,” particularly targeting minorities such as Alawites, Christians, Ismailis, Shias, and even moderate Sunni Muslims.

Al-Jajeh noted that members of the former Syrian president’s Alawite sect have been subjected to a “fierce campaign of revenge,” citing reports of “horrific” massacres in Syria’s western coastal region.

Among the incidents he referenced was the killing of more than 70 civilians in the village of Ain al-Tinah, adding that thousands of Alawites have been forcibly displaced, with their homes and properties seized in the provinces of Tartus and Latakia.

‘Minorities as easy targets’

In reference to pledges made by the HTS regime to uphold the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, the Sweden-based Syrian political activist dismissed those promises as “empty.”

“Christians have become easy targets for militias and extremist Salafi groups,” he said, referring to the latest attack on Mar Elias church in Damascus.

On June 22, a man with a rifle entered the church and shot at worshippers, killing 25 people and wounding dozens of others, before blowing himself up.

The activist said Christians’ homes have been ransacked and monasteries have been looted, adding that cases of abductions among Christians and mass exodus from towns like Maaloula and Sednaya have been reported, due to the inaction of the Jolani regime.

Al-Jajeh noted that people from the Ismaili sect have also been a target for kidnappings and attacks since Assad’s fall, adding that a civil activist named Hilal Samaan was assassinated “just for calling for coexistence”.

Speaking about the violence targeting Shia Muslims, al-Jajeh said that sectarian killings have become routine. Individuals are often questioned about their religious affiliation at checkpoints, and in some cases, he noted, they are killed solely because of their names or how they pronounce certain words.

He added that even moderate Sunni Muslims, who make up the majority of Syria’s population, are not spared from violence and intimidation.

According to al-Jajeh, religious scholars and preachers who oppose extremism or foreign intervention have been either assassinated or forcibly removed from their mosques.

Stressing that the state “has collapsed”, al-Jajeh said “the institutions are absent, the law is not enforced, and power is divided among warring factions, some of which are loyal to Turkey and some others to the [Persian] Gulf [Arab] states and foreign militant groups of various nationalities.”

Since Assad’s fall, the activist said, rights groups have recorded “more than 1,200 sectarian violations”, “over 30,000 people” have been trapped in prisons with an unknown fate and “more than 5,000” abducted girls have been taken as captives.

“Syria after Assad: No one is safe,” he emphasized.

‘Jolani is a trained agent’

Amid Israel’s expansion of its occupation into Syrian territories beyond the already-occupied Golan Heights following the fall of the Assad government, al-Jajeh said this further proves Jolani is merely an American-Israeli intelligence asset, positioned in Syria to advance a broader agenda.

Referring to Jolani’s public statements expressing a willingness to normalize relations with Israel and declaring that his top priority is fighting the former Syrian government.

“This is the language of a trained agent who knows what the West wants to hear, and sends reassuring messages to Tel Aviv,” he stated.

Al-Jajeh emphasized that Jolani, who was previously affiliated with al-Qaeda and Daesh, is ultimately “just a tool” and “a minor detail” in what he described as the U.S.-led project for a “new Middle East.”

“Abu Mohamad al-Jolani is neither a revolutionary, a rebel, nor a warlord. He is a carefully trained American-Israeli intelligence tool, speaking in measured language and acting within defined boundaries,” he remarked.

Despite Jolani’s offer to normalize ties with Israel, the activist noted that the regime continues to attack Syria because it “knows its real size and continues to strike Syria because it simply despises the agents even if they serve it.”

‘It’s a gang, not an army’

Commenting on the Jolani regime’s plan to incorporate thousands of foreign Takfiri militants into the country’s new military, al-Jajeh said this move is aimed at tightening Jolani’s grip on power, slamming it as “the most dangerous, unannounced demographic change process”.

The activist said the decision comes as the new ruler “doesn’t trust the Syrian people” and seeks to recruit foreigners “who don’t speak Arabic, don’t know the geography [of the country] and have not any belonging to the territory” to just carry weapons and “obey his orders without question”.

He described those militants as “tools ready for killing, in exchange for salaries, housing and insurance”.

“This army is not built to protect Syria, but to protect the ruler from the Syrians themselves.”

To stay in power, the activist said Jolani aims to create “a personal army that owes him complete loyalty” and “does not hesitate to open fire at Syrians simply because they are not ‘one of them’.”

“Whoever brings in strangers to rule over their people does not run a state; rather, they run a gang, that’s waiting for the moment of explosion,” he added.

‘Syria as part of new regional deal’

Commenting on recent remarks by Turkey’s defense minister where he announced that Ankara has no immediate plans to withdraw from Syria, al-Jajeh said this is “a declaration of actual occupation and a direct message stating: ‘This land is no longer yours, but it has become part of the new regional deal’.”

The activist referred to the role played by Turkey in the foreign-backed militancy that erupted in Syria in 2011, saying Ankara “was not a ‘supporter of the revolution’ as it claimed, but rather one of its architects”. This was “tailored to its national interests”, he added.

Al-Jajeh noted that Turkey facilitated the passage of thousands of foreign militants into Syria in the very early days of the militancy, allowed the entry of weapons to the al-Nusra Front, trained the Takfiri militants in camps on its territory, and provided them with medical and logistical support.

“What is happening today is a clear implementation of a soft partition plan,” he stated.

Al-Jajeh also referred to “the imposition of Turkish education” in the schools of Idlib, Afrin and al-Bab, the raising of Turkish flags in institutions, the changing of streets names to Turkish names, the issuance of temporary identity cards to residents, the use of Turkish language in administrative dealings, and the establishment of large military bases in Aleppo.

“These are not emergency measures to protect ‘the borders’, but rather complete practices of political and administrative occupation,” he said.

The security situation in Syria remains tenuous after militant factions, led by HTS, toppled President Assad’s government and took control of Damascus on December 8, 2024.

July 1, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation | , , , | Leave a comment

A narrative shatters: Syrian refugees refuse to return despite Assad’s ouster

By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan | The Cradle | June 11, 2025

The fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was expected to trigger a mass return of Syrian refugees. It did not. Six months on, UN figures show fewer than eight percent of Syrians abroad have made the journey home. The promise of a new era in Damascus has collided with the harsh realities of insecurity, poverty, and heightened foreign interference.

The Syrian refugee crisis – now in its 14th year – was born of war, western-imposed economic blockade, and the disintegration of state institutions that started in March 2011. What began as internal displacement soon morphed into a mass exodus across West Asia and into Europe, producing one of the most severe refugee crises of the 21st century.

Life after Assad: The enduring refugee crisis

Despite the fall of the Assad government, the Syrian refugee crisis remains unresolved. As of early 2025, the UN reports that approximately 6.2 million Syrians remain registered as refugees abroad – primarily in Turkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt – with millions more residing in Europe and North America. Only a fraction have returned since the Syrian opposition assumed power.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that about 400,000 refugees returned between December 2024 and April 2025. This number rose slightly to 481,730 by May, still below eight percent of the total refugees abroad. This disparity underlines a stark reality: The fall of Assad did not translate into mass return as the west suggested for years, which reveals that there are deeper, unresolved issues that keep Syrians away from Syria.

In West Asia’s key host countries, Turkiye hosts between 2.7 and three million Syrian refugees under a temporary protection regime, in addition to roughly one million unregistered Syrians. Lebanon hosts around 750,000 registered refugees, though Beirut places the actual figure closer to 1.5 million. Jordan houses approximately 650,000 Syrian refugees.

While many refugees may dream of returning, reality intervenes. A mid-2024 survey found 57 percent hoped to return one day, yet fewer than two percent believed this was feasible within the following year. UNHCR identifies safety concerns and the lack of stable livelihoods as the most significant obstacles. These core issues shape the calculus of return – a calculus that has not shifted meaningfully since Assad was in power.

Why Syrians aren’t going back

A May poll cited critical return deterrents: housing and property conditions (69 percent), service availability (40 percent), safety (45 percent), and economic hardship (54 percent). Fourteen years of war have left Syria fractured, devastated, and distrustful. There is no unified, trustworthy security or governance structure. The post-Assad era remains deeply uncertain to Syrian refugees.

The current political set-up in Damascus is a patchwork of domestic and foreign-influenced actors. Despite Assad’s ousting, returnees consistently cite improved security and essential services as prerequisites. A recent survey indicated that 58 percent of Syrians abroad would return only under “safe and dignified conditions,” while 31 percent remain undecided.

Governance challenges are equally daunting. The new leadership, installed on 8 December 2024 and headed by Al Qaeda-linked Ahmad al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani), has pledged reform. But memories of infighting among rebel groups linger. Many Syrian refugees are alarmed by the ascension of militant factions, including former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) affiliates, fueling fears of sectarian reprisals and authoritarianism.

Beyond Syria’s borders, refugee networks now serve as lifelines. After more than a decade abroad, Syrian refugees have established enduring community ties. In Turkiye, 60 percent of working-age Syrians are employed, mostly in informal sectors. These jobs, although low-paid, offer stability compared to war-torn Syria.

Yet, most Syrians in Turkiye remain socially unanchored: Over half report feeling disconnected from Turkish society, where racism has become rife, while 84 percent still feel moderately connected to Syria. This duality reflects a long-term migration trend where refugees retain ties to their homeland while integrating abroad.

A recent survey shows that just seven percent of Syrians in Turkiye have concrete plans to leave. Others express the desire to relocate, but without actionable steps. Citizenship also affects permanence: Around 238,000 Syrians had been naturalized in Turkiye by mid-2024, granting them full legal protections, including immunity from deportation. Turkish opposition sources, however, estimate this figure could be as high as 2.5 million.

The return paradox: Poor conditions in host nations, yet no return?

Even deteriorating conditions in host countries have not significantly altered return patterns. Economic collapse in Lebanon, rising costs in Turkiye, and recent conflict along the Lebanese border have not pushed Syrians homeward. Studies consistently show return decisions hinge more on improvements in Syria – security, jobs, services – than on hardships abroad.

Divisions among external powers inside Syria further complicate matters. Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and western states continue to prioritize their respective geopolitical gains over stability. The result is a fragmented political order dominated by armed factions and foreign patrons, with little accountability to actual Syrians.

This instability has real consequences. The massacres along Syria’s coast last March, reportedly instigated by UAE-backed elements, required intervention by the new Damascus authority. Such events erode trust and deter return.

Economically, Syria remains in free fall. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 90 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line. The World Bank projects an additional one percent GDP contraction in 2025. The World Food Programme (WFP) says 9.1 million are food insecure, with 3.6 million reliant on aid.

Electricity is available just two to three hours a day, crippling industry and inflating living costs. Despite promises by the transitional government to reform banking and attract Persian Gulf investment, remaining sanctions and market isolation are still serious hurdles, even after Washington lifted most restrictions in May 2025.

Unemployment is rampant, fuel and transport costs are surging, and social safety nets are vanishing. Monthly incomes in many regions fall below $40, while basic food baskets cost twice that amount. The exodus of Syrian professionals continues to deplete the labor market, deepening reliance on remittances in the absence of a coherent reconstruction plan.

Syria remains a high-risk return

The reluctance of millions of Syrians to repatriate was never actually about leadership change – credible data simply does not exist on this. It is about the cumulative consequences of war: insecurity, economic collapse, political fragmentation, and the absence of justice or reconciliation.

Unless those in power focus on rebuilding credible institutions and securing livelihoods – not just reshuffling elites – the prospect of return will remain a perilous gamble.

June 11, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Economics | , , , | Leave a comment

Most people across 24 surveyed countries have negative views of Israel and Netanyahu

By Laura Silver | Pew Research Center | June 3, 2025 

International views of Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are much more negative than positive, according to a Pew Research Center survey of 24 countries conducted this spring.

Israelis, for their part, tend to say their country is not respected internationally: 58% say Israel is not too or not at all respected around the world, while 39% think it is.

In 20 of the 24 countries surveyed, around half of adults or more have an unfavorable view of Israel. Around three-quarters or more hold this view in Australia, Greece, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.

Views of Israel are fairly divided in India (34% favorable, 29% unfavorable).

In Kenya and Nigeria, around half of adults or more have a favorable view of Israel.

How views have changed in recent years

The recent survey is not the first time Pew Research Center has asked about international views of Israel. We have asked about views of Israel before in some countries – including in the United States, where the share of adults with a negative view of Israel rose 11 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2025.

In 10 other countries, we last asked this question in 2013. In seven of these countries, the share of adults with a negative view of Israel has increased significantly. In the United Kingdom, for example, 44% had an unfavorable view of Israel in 2013, compared with 61% now. (In Nigeria, both the share of adults with a negative view of Israel and the share with a positive view have increased since 2013, due to a decline in the share saying they don’t know.)

Views by age

In some countries, younger people are more likely than older people to have an unfavorable view of Israel. This is particularly the case in the high-income countries surveyed: Australia, Canada, France, Poland and South Korea and the U.S. In fact, the U.S. has one of the largest age gaps in views of Israel. … Full article

June 9, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation, Subjugation - Torture, War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

Syria’s ancient sites looted as artifacts flood online markets

Al Mayadeen | June 8, 2025

Syria’s archaeological heritage is under mounting threat as looters descend on ancient sites like Palmyra, digging for artifacts that are quickly trafficked and sold online. A recent report by The Guardian reveals that antiquities theft has surged dramatically since the December collapse of the Assad regime, with online sales accelerating through platforms like Facebook.

Palmyra, which had already been subjected to destruction in 2015 at the hands of ISIS, is now being ravaged again, this time by opportunistic grave robbers and organized networks. Armed with tools, looters target 2,000-year-old crypts, leaving behind craters and shattered remains. “Once the archaeological layers are disturbed, it becomes impossible to reconstruct the past,” said Mohammed al-Fares, a local activist and member of Heritage for Peace.

According to the Antiquities Trafficking and Heritage Anthropology Research Project (ATHAR), more than 30% of the 1,500 documented Syrian antiquities cases since 2012 have occurred in just the last few months. The group says this is the largest and fastest wave of trafficking they’ve recorded from any country to date.

Western demand driving artifact theft

ATHAR co-director Katie Paul highlighted the role of social media, especially Facebook, in facilitating these illicit transactions. Despite Facebook’s 2020 ban on antiquities trading, Paul says the platform still hosts dozens of active groups selling ancient coins, mosaics, and statues, many operating in public view. In one case, a seller livestreamed from an excavation site, asking viewers for digging advice.

“This is the fastest we’ve ever seen artifacts move,” Paul noted. “What used to take a year now takes just two weeks.”

Many looters are ordinary Syrians driven by poverty, but others are part of criminal operations using heavy machinery to excavate entire sites. Videos from areas like Tall Shaykh Ali show rows of deep, uniform pits, which are evidence of professional digging. Once removed, antiquities are smuggled to neighboring countries such as Jordan and Turkey, then laundered with fake paperwork before entering Western auction houses and museums.

Syria’s interim government has responded with limited tools, threatening looters with prison time and offering rewards for turning in artifacts, though enforcement remains weak. With 90% of the population living in poverty and the country still recovering from 15 years of war, authorities face immense challenges in protecting cultural sites.

Experts like Paul and ATHAR co-founder Amr al-Azm argue that the ultimate solution lies outside Syria. “We focus too much on the supply side,” Azm said. “If there were no demand in the West, there would be far less incentive to destroy Syria’s heritage.”

June 8, 2025 Posted by | Corruption | , | 2 Comments

Turkey Proposes Law to Censor and Delete Unapproved Quran Translations

By Cindy Harper | Reclaim The Net | June 2, 2025

A legislative push in Turkey is drawing sharp rebuke over what many view as a direct assault on religious freedom: a proposed law that would empower the state’s top religious institution to confiscate and destroy Quran translations it deems theologically unacceptable.

The bill, recently approved by the Turkish Parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee, would grant the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) the authority to initiate legal action against any Quran translation it considers to contradict Islam’s “core principles.” If the Diyanet-appointed board flags a translation, it could petition a court to halt its publication, remove existing copies, and in the case of online content, block or delete it entirely.

Under the proposed changes, the judicial process offers little protection to publishers. Even if an appeal is filed within the mandated 15-day window, the order to destroy or suppress the materials would go into effect immediately. If no challenge is mounted or if the appeal fails, the targeted translation would be permanently eliminated.

Independent MP Mustafa Yeneroğlu condemned the move, warning it opens the door to ideological policing of scripture. “This turns the Diyanet into a censorship body,” he stated, asserting that religious interpretation should not be filtered through a government-approved lens. “No one has the right to classify the Quran according to an official ideology as ‘acceptable’ or ‘objectionable.’”

Yeneroğlu also flagged the bill’s broad language as a threat to legal consistency, calling the criteria for banning a translation dangerously vague. He argued that the measure undercuts constitutional protections on religious practice by allowing the state to determine what constitutes correct belief.

The proposed law fits within a wider campaign by Turkish authorities to tighten control over religious narratives. Since the failed 2016 coup attempt, the government has systematically purged books and materials associated with the Gülen movement, including numerous religious texts and commentaries. Though Ankara blames the group for orchestrating the coup, its followers and Fethullah Gülen himself have denied any role in the events.

The Diyanet, with a budget exceeding that of many key ministries, is already deeply entrenched in regulating religious life, overseeing sermons in more than 80,000 mosques and issuing official religious rulings. This new legislation would allow it to silence divergent interpretations by labeling them as doctrinal violations, bypassing any real public or theological debate.

Should the bill pass the full parliament, where the ruling AKP and its allies maintain a legislative majority, it would cement the Diyanet’s power to act as a gatekeeper of permissible religious thought. Such a move risks criminalizing theological diversity under the guise of defending orthodoxy, with minimal legal safeguards to protect against misuse.

Lawmakers are expected to begin formal discussions on the bill in the near future.

June 2, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance | , | Leave a comment

Are US-Israel ‘special relations’ about to end?

By Murad Sadygzade | RT | May 19, 2025

Last week, US President Donald Trump embarked on his first official overseas tour since taking office, choosing to visit three key Gulf nations – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

This itinerary was both unexpected and, in many ways, unprecedented. Unlike his predecessors, who traditionally began their foreign policy engagements with visits to long-standing Western allies, Trump opted to prioritize America’s Arab partners, deliberately bypassing Israel – Washington’s principal strategic ally in the region. This marked the first time in decades that a sitting US president visiting the Middle East consciously excluded it from the agenda.

This decision signaled a potential recalibration of Washington’s priorities in the region. Relations between the Trump administration and the Israeli leadership, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were already strained in the early stages – largely due to Israel’s growing intransigence on the Palestinian question and the increasing influence of far-right factions within the Israeli government. Faced with mounting frustration over Israel’s hardline policies, the White House appeared to pivot toward a more pragmatic, less confrontational, and economically advantageous partnership with the Gulf monarchies.

However, the rationale behind this shift extended beyond political calculation. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long played a pivotal role in sustaining American influence in the Middle East – not only because of their strategic geography but also due to their substantial investments in the US economy and multi-billion-dollar arms contracts. For a business-minded president eager to showcase the profitability of foreign policy through economic deals, these nations represented ideal counterparts.

The lavish receptions afforded to Trump during his Gulf tour might have been dismissed as mere pageantry were it not for their deeper symbolic resonance. The true significance of the visit lay in what it revealed about broader geopolitical currents: namely, the transformation of the Gulf monarchies from regional players into increasingly assertive global actors.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are no longer content with being perceived as passive participants in American-led regional frameworks. Instead, they are positioning themselves as independent centers of power in an emerging multipolar world order. Their growing international stature stems from several interrelated factors.

First, these countries have embraced ambitious and forward-looking development strategies, investing heavily in infrastructure, clean energy transitions, technological innovation, and global finance. No longer simply hydrocarbon exporters, they are becoming hubs of digital transformation, international logistics, Islamic finance, and global policy discourse on issues ranging from security to sustainable development.

Second, the Gulf states have pioneered a distinctive model of governance that blends traditionalism with modernization. While maintaining deep-rooted commitments to Islamic and tribal values, they have achieved remarkable progress in building diversified and globally competitive economies. This synthesis has not only enabled them to thrive amid intensifying global competition but, in some respects, to outpace certain Western nations grappling with internal divisions and economic stagnation.

Equally noteworthy is the political resilience of these monarchies. Western narratives often portray them simplistically as ‘absolute monarchies,’ failing to appreciate the internal mechanisms of governance that underpin their stability. In reality, the political architecture of the Gulf is more accurately described as ‘sheikhism’ – a system rooted in consensus among tribal and familial elites, structured around a balance of obligations, reciprocal loyalties, and ongoing consultation. This model, which integrates Islamic principles such as shura (consultation) with practical statecraft, has proven remarkably adaptive and resilient.

In this context, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar can no longer be viewed merely as privileged US allies or energy suppliers. They are emerging as autonomous actors in global politics – capable of forging regional alliances, shaping international agendas across energy, media, and technology, and mediating in global conflicts. Their evolving role reflects not dependence on external security guarantees, but the outcome of deliberate, long-term strategies to consolidate sovereignty, enhance prestige, and assert influence in the 21st century.

Money above all: Trump’s deal-based diplomacy

President Donald Trump’s visit to the Gulf states was far more than his first foreign trip as head of state. It was a bold, highly symbolic debut of a new US foreign economic doctrine rooted in pragmatism, transactionalism, and strategic capitalism. Unlike previous administrations, which typically foregrounded diplomacy, security alliances, and value-based partnerships, Trump approached this tour as a high-stakes business deal. His mindset was that of a dealmaker, not a traditional statesman. The objective was clear: to restore America’s economic dominance by leveraging the vast wealth and strategic ambitions of the Middle East’s richest monarchies.

Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” found tangible expression in this tour. His mission was to bring back jobs, reindustrialize key sectors, boost the US high-tech ecosystem, and enhance national competitiveness – all fueled by a surge in foreign direct investment. In this pursuit, the oil-rich, capital-heavy Gulf monarchies – endowed with massive sovereign wealth funds and seeking greater global visibility – emerged as ideal partners.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump signed an unprecedented economic package worth over $600 billion, including the largest arms deal in US history – $142 billion covering missile defense systems, advanced aviation platforms, cybersecurity capabilities, and military-grade AI technologies. Equally significant was the launch of a new tech alliance: Saudi-based DataVolt committed $20 billion to build data centers and energy facilities in the US, while a consortium led by Nvidia, AMD, and Amazon Web Services will co-develop an AI innovation hub within the Kingdom. A $50 billion venture fund was also established to support US-based startups in renewable energy and cybersecurity.

In Qatar, the results were even more staggering: agreements totaling $1.2 trillion, the largest single-country deal package in US diplomatic history. Central to this was Qatar Airways’ order for 210 Boeing aircraft valued at $96 billion, making it the most lucrative deal ever for the American aerospace giant. Qatar also pledged tens of billions of dollars for joint ventures in quantum computing, smart energy networks, and STEM education programs for engineers and IT specialists in the US. In a provocative symbolic gesture, Qatar proposed gifting President Trump a custom-built Air Force One, sparking intense debate in the American media landscape.

In the United Arab Emirates, new agreements totaling $200 billion were signed – in addition to a previously negotiated $1.4 trillion package. Key components included the construction of an aluminum plant in Oklahoma, expansion of oil and gas infrastructure with US firms, and a landmark $100 billion commitment to American companies specializing in artificial intelligence over the next three years.

In total, Trump’s Gulf tour yielded over $2 trillion in contracts and investment pledges – an economic windfall of historic proportions. But beyond the numbers, the trip marked a fundamental redefinition of American foreign policy: from projecting power through military force and ideological alignment, to securing influence through economic penetration and transactional partnerships. Trump unveiled a new image of the US – not as a global policeman, but as a global entrepreneur. A nation that negotiates not with declarations, but with data, contracts, and employment metrics.

This new model resonated deeply with the Gulf monarchies themselves, which are undergoing profound transformations. Once reliant solely on oil exports, these states are rapidly evolving into tech-driven economies with ambitions to become global hubs of innovation, finance, and logistics. In Trump’s America, they found not just a security guarantor, but a strategic co-architect of a post-oil economic order – one where capital, innovation, and mutual profit outweigh traditional diplomatic protocol and ideological rhetoric.

Trump’s message was unambiguous: the era of foreign policy as charity is over. What now matters are mutual returns, strategic alignments, and economic gains. The Gulf states, driven by their own visions of modernization and diversification, eagerly embraced this shift. Together, they reimagined international relations not as a sphere of obligations, but as a marketplace of opportunities.

What about Israel?

One of the most significant – albeit unofficial – outcomes of Donald Trump’s Middle East tour could be discerned even before the journey began: the US President conspicuously bypassed Israel. This omission became all the more striking given that even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who had initially planned a visit to Tel Aviv, abruptly cancelled his trip at the last moment. The message did not go unnoticed in either Washington or Jerusalem: nearly all observers interpreted the move as a clear sign of a cooling relationship between the US and Israel – more precisely, between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The rift between the two leaders appears less personal than strategic, rooted in diverging visions of the region’s future. Tensions had been mounting for months. The first major flashpoint came when Trump unilaterally announced the withdrawal of American forces from operations against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, citing the group’s supposed commitment to halt attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes. The decision, made without prior consultation with Israel – which continues to endure daily rocket fire from the Houthis – dealt a blow not only to diplomatic norms but also to the foundational trust between Israel and its closest ally.

An even more sensitive issue has been the quiet resumption of US contacts with Iran. With Oman acting as mediator, Washington has been exploring the outlines of a possible new nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, Israel remains steadfast in its conviction that no negotiations with Tehran should occur until decisive military action is taken against its nuclear and military facilities – a show of force intended to compel concessions. Netanyahu failed to persuade Trump of this hardline approach, and the US president has increasingly charted his own, more flexible course.

Tensions have also sharpened over the future of Syria. Israel refuses to recognize the country’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, branding him a former al-Qaeda affiliate and a dangerous actor. Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory continue, the buffer zone in the Golan Heights remains under Israeli control, and the Druze population has formally been placed under Israeli protection. While Israel promotes the vision of a weak, decentralized Syria, Washington is embracing the opposite: al-Sharaa was invited to meet with Trump in Saudi Arabia, and following those talks, the US signaled its intent to lift sanctions on Damascus. Even more striking was the revelation that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – previously restrained by US pressure – are now prepared to invest in Syria’s reconstruction, viewing it as both a stabilizing opportunity and a chance to expand their regional influence.

Israeli frustration has been further stoked by Washington’s evolving stance on the Palestinian issue. Despite Israel’s ongoing military operation in Gaza, Trump has increasingly expressed a desire – even a demand – for a resolution to the conflict. His Gaza reconstruction plan, unveiled in February, sent shockwaves through Washington: it proposed the complete depopulation of Palestinians from the enclave and the transformation of the territory into a luxury international resort zone under US control. Not only was this radical proposal never coordinated with Israel, but it also raised fundamental questions about the future of the US-Israel alliance.

To make matters more complex, credible reports have emerged that the US has been engaged in direct negotiations with Hamas, without informing Israel. The recent release of an American citizen, IDF soldier Idan Alexander, who was captured in October 2023, was reportedly achieved through these covert channels – of which the Israeli government only became aware through its own intelligence services.

Against this backdrop, speculation is growing that the White House is seriously considering formally recognizing an independent Palestinian state. Such a move would not be a mere diplomatic gesture – it would reshape the strategic architecture of the Middle East. Should Washington proceed down this path, Israel could find itself in strategic isolation, while the center of regional gravity shifts toward Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Türkiye – countries with which Trump is building pragmatic, mutually beneficial, and business-driven relations.

None of these states demand unconditional support from Washington, meddle in its internal politics, or leverage domestic crises for influence. More importantly, they offer Trump what he values most: investment, trade, strategic partnership based on reciprocal interest, and freedom from ideological constraints.

Thus, a new geopolitical reality is taking shape before our eyes. In this emerging landscape, Donald Trump appears less inclined to view Israel as an indispensable ally and more drawn to politically agile, economically potent, and regionally assertive actors across the Arab world – and Türkiye. If rumors of Palestinian state recognition prove true, it will mark the end of the long-standing era of “special relations” between the US and Israel and signal the dawn of a new chapter in American Middle East policy – one governed not by ideological loyalty, but by unambiguous political and economic rationality.

Murad Sadygzade is President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).

May 19, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Russia, Ukraine prepare for peace by getting ready for war

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | May 17, 2025 

May 16 will stand out as a turning point, for good or bad, in the Ukraine conflict. The main thing is, Russia-Ukraine ‘peace talks’ have resumed in Istanbul and will hopefully carry forward the threads of the draft agreement negotiated in March 2022. But caveats must be added. The fact that it took Turkish President Recep Erdogan three hours to persuade Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to green light the negotiations speaks for itself. 

On the other hand, Zelensky showed remarkable flexibility by violating his own presidential decree banning any such negotiations on the part of Ukrainian officials other than himself with Russian officials. Turkey showed again that it remains a significant influencer in the Ukraine conflict. 

The result was an extraordinary spectacle. Reports mention that the Russian delegation had not one but three meetings, in fact — with a Turkish-American team followed by a Turkish-American-Ukrainian team and culminating in an exclusive huddle with the Ukrainian team. 

The ‘bilateral’ Russian-Ukrainian negotiations reportedly touched on the topics of ceasefire options in the Ukraine conflict; a major prisoner exchange; a potential meeting between Zelensky and Russian president Vladimir Putin; an agreement in principle to hold a follow-up meeting and so on. 

The Ukrainian media reported that the Russian side repeated their demands for Kiev’s forces to vacate the remaining parts of the four eastern and southern regions that Moscow has annexed. Ukraine of course rejected the demand. Indeed, these talking points at the Istanbul meeting would have been a plateful for a meeting that lasted only for an hour and forty minutes. 

Turkiye has joined as a stakeholder, as the pacemaking in Ukraine provides an opportunity for it to work closely with the US, which could have positive fallouts for the two main discords that put strains on it in the recent years — Syria and the Kurdish problem. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has taken a historic decision on May 12 to give up armed struggle and dissolve itself, which opens the possibility to end decades of political violence in Turkiye. The ‘peacemaker president’ in the White House can help Ankara to mediate a Kurdish settlement. 

Turkiye has promoted the US’ normalisation with the Islamist government in Damascus. Trump’s meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh on Wednesday alongside the lifting of Washington’s sanctions against Syria, which shake up the geopolitics of the Middle East, will bring Turkiye and the US on the same page. 

Notably, all this is happening against the backdrop of a ‘westernist’ tilt in the Turkish foreign policies during the past year following Erdogan’s re-election as president. Traditionally, the equations between Trump and Erdogan remained cordial and friendly. Suffice to say, Trump can expect Erdogan’s cooperation in the peacemaking in Ukraine talks, where the Turkish leader’s excellent equations with Zelensky are an added factor, which was on display in Ankara yesterday. 

Erdogan held Zelensky’s hand through thick and thin. The high-tech Turkish drones supplied to Ukraine, which are to be manufactured locally,  will significantly boost Kiev’s military capability. Turkiye, as the inheritor of the Ottoman legacy, is home away from home for an influential Tatar community. Tatar language is an Oghuz language descended from Ottoman Turkish. In fact, Turkey has refused to recognise Crimea as part of Russia. Ukrainian Defence Minister, a close associate of Zelensky, is an ethnic Tatar.   

Moscow understands all this. Putin hastened to put behind the friction in Russo-Turkish relations in the downstream of the regime change in Syria last December to reach out to Erdogan on May 11 to discuss the direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul. The Kremlin readout said Erdogan “expressed his full support for Russia’s proposal and emphasised his willingness to provide a venue for the talks in Istanbul. The Turkish side will offer all possible assistance in organising and holding talks aimed at achieving sustainable peace… The leaders have also expressed mutual interest in further expanding the bilateral ties in trade and investment and, in particular, implementing joint strategic projects in energy.”

Erdogan is a difficult interlocutor to handle but Putin has been largely successful in keeping the relationship stable and (mostly) predictable. The Turkish factor can be a game changer if at some point Zelensky ceases to be the captive of the CoW4 (the four European musketeers of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ — Britain, France, Germany and Poland.) Trust Erdogan to shift gears to an activist role. 

On the whole, Russia has scored a diplomatic victory insofar as its initiative on ‘Ukraine direct talks without preconditions’ has found acceptability with Trump. The format of yesterday’s talks implied a resumption of the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul in 2022. Putin manoeuvred brilliantly to scatter the game plan of the CoW4 which strove to pull aside Trump incrementally and become party to continuing the war in Ukraine. 

The CoW4 felt encouraged lately by a certain perception that Trump  may impose draconian sanctions if Russia lacked sincerity of purpose. But so far, Trump has remained engaged with Putin. Last week, Trump stated that a breakthrough in the Ukraine conflict will be possible only out of a summit between him and Putin. Suffice to say, the dramatic happenings in Turkey yesterday signify a setback to the CoW4. 

The leader of the Russian delegation and presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky (who also headed the Russian team at the talks in Istanbul in 2022) has told the media that Moscow is “satisfied” with the results of the talks and is ready to “resume contacts” with Kiev. 

That said, Moscow will not let down its guard either. Putin held a briefing session on May 15 with the permanent members of the Security Council, Russia’s highest policymaking body, to deliberate on the upcoming Istanbul talks, which was attended by the members of the Russian negotiating group. The Kremlin readout stated that Putin “set tasks and charted the negotiating position” of the Russian delegation in Istanbul.

On the other hand, the Kremlin also asserted simultaneously that no matter the talks in Istanbul, Russia’s military operations in Ukraine shall continue. With immaculate timing, Putin chose May 15 to also make the stunning announcement of the appointment of Colonel-General Andrey Mordvichev (nicknamed “General Breakthrough”) as the Commander of the Russian Ground Forces. 

Gen. Mordvichev has a tough reputation as the commander of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army of Russia’s Southern Military District, which was heavily involved in the devastating 2022 siege of Mariupol, and in the Battle of Avdiivka in 2023-2024, a turning point in the conflict in Ukraine. Gen. Mordvichev’s appointment comes amidst reports claiming that Russia is preparing to launch a major new offensive in Ukraine. Ukraine claims that over 600,000 Russian troops are presently deployed in Ukraine.

But then, Zelensky is also moving on a dual track. Ukraine’s Finance Minister Sergeii Marchenko, 43, told a high-level panel at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development annual meeting on March 14 in London, “To prepare for peace, you have to get ready for war. We have to plan. You may call me a cynic, but actually I’m just a Finance Minister.”  

May 17, 2025 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | 1 Comment

Bulgaria denies joining Croatia, Albania and Kosovo in encircling Serbia

By Ahmed Adel | April 22, 2025

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georg Georgiev denied that Bulgaria is interested in joining a military alliance to encircle Serbia, comprising Croatia, Albania, and the Albanian-majority breakaway Serbian province of Kosovo. Bulgaria’s disinterest was expected, considering it would not want to join a localized alliance with Albania, the country serving as Turkey’s gateway into the Balkans to pursue irredentist ambitions, including against Bulgaria.

Georgiev responded in writing to MPs Djipo Djipov and Elisaveta Belobradova that Bulgaria is aware of the initiative of Croatia, Albania and Kosovo and that it is carefully analyzing the text of the Joint Declaration signed by the defense ministers of the three countries in Tirana on March 18.

“The information in the public suggesting that Bulgaria has expressed an unofficial interest in joining the declaration is incorrect,” Georgiev stressed.

The anti-Serbia coalition resembles a mini-NATO within the Balkans and is backed by Turkey, which is militarily present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo. Turkey has greater ambitions after achieving successes in Syria and the South Caucasus and has now turned their attention to the Balkans too.

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote in “Strategic Depth,” his comprehensive and influential work on Turkish foreign policy and geopolitics strategic doctrine, that Serbia and Greece, or the Belgrade-Athens axis, are the main obstacles to the Turkish return to Europe. NATO and the European Union, except for Greece, do not oppose Turkey’s ambitions in the Balkans as the Turks can challenge Russian influence in the region.

However, the West does not want a war between Greece and Turkey to break out. Despite being NATO member states, this is a real possibility, especially as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not hidden his ambitions for the Greek islands and northern Greece. Nonetheless, conflicts could very easily be provoked at several points within the former Yugoslavia, and then Turkey and a number of other sponsors would be involved, where Greece would support the opposing side, just as happened in Bosnia in the 1990s.

A big problem in the EU is that unelected technocrats are leading the bloc into a war against Russia, and in that sense, the Balkans could be one of the peripheral points of that crisis. For this reason, Serbia needs a quick Russian victory in Ukraine to turn the tide of events in their strategic favor. If not, Serbia would be in a very unfavorable position, surrounded by NATO countries with weak alliances. Serbia has partnerships with only two regional countries, ironically also in NATO: Greece and Hungary.

Bulgaria has been in a transition phase for 30 years, practically under Western occupation, and it cannot be said that it has an independent foreign policy. Therefore, if Brussels or Washington ordered them to join an alliance against the Serbs, the Bulgarians would do so. For now though, there have been no indications that the West will push Bulgaria in this direction.

At the same time, Turkey is also Bulgaria’s biggest strategic challenge, especially considering that more than 8% of the country is ethnic Turks who can be weaponized against Sofia. Therefore, Bulgaria will face pressure to join the anti-Serbian military alliance of Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo, especially since Turkey is the main military patron of Albania and Kosovo.

To deal with Turkey as a rising challenge, military departments in Bulgaria have begun distributing mass mobilization calls to military conscripts. Citizens are sharing photos on social media of the documents they received. Some documents show a call from the Military Department in Varna, dated April 9, 2025, and the exact time to report. Mobilization calls for reservists in Bulgaria have not been issued for more than 30 years.

The Bulgarian military recently received its first American F-16 fighter jet. Although the Bulgarians announced that they had received a new one, this is not true because it is a second-hand aircraft that has been overhauled. Bulgaria otherwise does not have large quantities of weapons and military equipment because they emptied their warehouses at the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine.

Bulgaria also gave Ukraine most of its T-72 tanks and some Mi-8 transport helicopters, which ended in 2023. Bulgaria’s last deliveries from its stocks were more than a hundred BTR 60 armored personnel carriers that belonged to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were extremely well preserved.

Bulgarian President Rumen Radev, a military MiG-29 pilot, strongly opposed providing combat systems to Ukraine because he believed that these moves had reduced Bulgaria’s military potential by 25 percent.

Now with Bulgaria significantly weakened for the sake of Ukraine’s futile war against Russia, the Balkans country cannot consider any military adventures against the Serbs, even if they do have historical territorial issues, and must instead rebuild its depleted forces, reservists and military equipment in face of a growing Turkish threat in the region.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

April 22, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Anger in Israel as US says it’s withdrawing from Syria

MEMO | April 16, 2025

Anger has mounted in Tel Aviv as the United States informed Israel of its decision to begin a gradual withdrawal from Syria in the coming period, according to Israeli media reports yesterday.

The Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth reported that American security officials notified the Israeli occupation army that the withdrawal is set to commence within two months.

Israeli officials quoted by the paper said that Tel Aviv is still pressing Washington to delay the pullout, fearing that “Turkiye will take over more strategic assets in the new Syria” once US troops leave.

The report clarified that the decision by President Donald Trump to withdraw American forces from Syria does not come as a surprise. Trump had announced his intention to pull troops out of the region on 20 January.

The paper noted that Israel is concerned about heightened tensions with Turkiye, which has been openly working to expand its influence in the region following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

It added that “Israel believes the withdrawal of American forces could embolden Turkiye to take control of additional strategic military assets on the ground.”

Since a coalition of opposition factions ousted Al-Assad in late 2024, the Israeli occupation’s military has launched hundreds of strikes in Syria, under the pretext of targeting military installations, naval bases and air bases to prevent the new administration from seizing the former army’s arsenal.

Israeli forces have also infiltrated the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and expanded their occupation of Syrian land.

Israel has expressed concerns over Ankara’s growing influence in Damascus, especially given Turkiye’s alliance with the interim Syrian government.

Last week Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he has “great relations” with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, adding that “Any problem that you have with Turkiye, I think I can solve. I mean, as long as you’re reasonable, you have to be reasonable. We have to be reasonable.”

April 16, 2025 Posted by | Illegal Occupation, Wars for Israel | , , , , | 3 Comments

Netanyahu’s D.C. trip: All optics, no outcomes – Israeli media

Al Mayadeen | April 8, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on Monday, becoming the first foreign leader to personally appeal for relief from newly imposed US tariffs that have caused global concern.

Trump welcomed Netanyahu outside the West Wing with a fist pump before both entered the Oval Office for their meeting. In an unusual move, a planned joint press conference was canceled at the last minute without any explanation. During Netanyahu’s previous visit, the two had addressed the media in the Oval Office and held a formal press event.

In the wake of the visit, Israeli media burst with speculation and criticism over how Netanyahu’s White House trip ended in humiliation, as he left with no gains and was publicly sidelined by President Trump—highlighting his waning influence and deepening reliance on Washington.

Trump’s curveballs leave Netanyahu swinging

Israeli media likened Netanyahu’s White House visit to a political strikeout. Borrowing a baseball metaphor, commentators said Trump pitched a series of curveballs on issues vital to “Israel”—from security and trade to regional geopolitics—and Netanyahu missed every single one.

Furthermore, observers in “Israel” were quick to highlight the stark contrast in Netanyahu’s behavior during this meeting compared to past interactions with US presidents.

While he had often been confrontational and assertive, this time, seated beside Trump under the cameras’ scrutiny, Netanyahu merely smiled and absorbed the blows in silence.

The optics were hard to ignore: A figure once known for his strong stance was now reduced to a passive observer, underscoring his political vulnerability, diminishing influence over Trump, and growing dependence on the US president’s whims, as per the Israeli press.

Netanyahu cast as a prop, not a partner

Israeli commentators noted that while the private tone between the two leaders may have differed behind closed doors, the public optics told a harsher story. In coverage across Israeli outlets, Netanyahu was described as more of a stage prop than a strategic partner—ironically echoing his own past jab about being treated like “a flowerpot.” For over 30 minutes, Trump answered questions solo, with Netanyahu largely sidelined and silent.

Israeli media also pointed to the bitter irony of Netanyahu boasting about being the first foreign figure invited to Washington after the announcement of sweeping US tariffs on over 60 countries, including “Israel”. The prime minister had hoped to secure ‘a diplomatic victory’—perhaps a tariff exemption—but left with nothing to show.

In a moment of performative diplomacy, Netanyahu promised Trump he would “eliminate the trade deficit with the US,” a vow many doubt he can fulfill. Trump, unfazed, deflected the gesture by reminding everyone of America’s $4 billion annual military aid to “Israel”: “We give Israel four billion dollars a year. That’s a lot. By the way—congratulations. That’s not bad,” he quipped.

A diplomatic misfire

Israeli media were quick to contrast Netanyahu’s incompatible moods during his recent meetings with US President Donald Trump. Just two months ago, he stood ‘triumphantly’ beside Trump when the US president unveiled his “Riviera in Gaza” plan. But this time, Israeli outlets noted, the atmosphere was decidedly different.

Trump’s surprise announcement of direct talks with Iran visibly rattled Netanyahu, who had expected tougher rhetoric or a potential military commitment. Instead, he offered a subdued response, calling for a deal to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program “completely, as in the case of Libya.”

The Israeli press also highlighted Netanyahu’s concerns over Turkiye’s growing influence in Syria, yet Trump’s response was less than reassuring. Trump downplayed Netanyahu’s concerns with a lighthearted monologue about his close relationship with Erdogan, even suggesting that he could resolve Turkiye-related issues as long as Netanyahu “acted logically.”

Israeli commentators were left questioning the purpose of Netanyahu’s visit, with many concluding that it was a diplomatic failure. They argued that Netanyahu returned from Washington empty-handed—his influence diminished and his political position further weakened.

April 8, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

David’s Corridor: Israel’s shadow project to redraw the Levant

Through ‘David’s Corridor,’ Israel aims to forge a geopolitical artery stretching from occupied Golan to Iraqi Kurdistan, reshaping West Asia

By Mahdi Yaghi | The Cradle | April 4, 2025

In recent years, the Zionist idea of “David’s Corridor” has surfaced in Tel Aviv’s strategic and political discourse on the reshaping of its geopolitical influence in the Levant. Though the Israelis have made no official announcement, analysts have pointed to this corridor as a covert project aimed at linking Kurdish-controlled northern Syria – backed by the US – to Israel via a continuous land route.

The so-called David’s Corridor refers to an alleged Israeli project to establish a land corridor stretching from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights through southern Syria to the Euphrates River. This hypothetical route would traverse the governorates of Deraa, Suwayda, Al-Tanf, Deir Ezzor, and the Iraqi–Syrian border area of Albu Kamal, providing the occupation state with a strategic overland channel into the heart of West Asia.

A biblical blueprint

Ideologically, the project is rooted in the vision of “Greater Israel,” an expansionist concept attributed to Zionism’s founder, Theodor Herzl. The vision draws on a biblical map extending from Egypt’s Nile to Iraq’s Euphrates.

Dr Leila Nicola, professor of international relations at the Lebanese University, tells The Cradle that David’s Corridor embodies a theological vision requiring Israeli control over Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – a triad central to both biblical lore and regional dominance. Regional affairs scholar Dr Talal Atrissi echoes this view, believing that developments in Syria have lent new geopolitical realism to Israel’s historical ambitions.

Unsurprisingly, the proposed corridor is a lightning rod for controversy, seen by many as a strategic bid to expand Israeli hegemony. Yet significant barriers stand in its way. As Atrissi notes, the corridor cuts through volatile terrain, where actors like Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) remain formidable spoilers. Even a minor act of sabotage could disrupt the project, particularly given the absence of a stable regional environment needed to sustain such a sensitive and expansive route.

Strategically, David’s Corridor aligns with Israel’s enduring policy of cultivating ties with regional minorities – Kurds, Druze, and others – to offset hostility from Arab states. This decades-old “peripheral alliance” strategy has underpinned Israeli support for Kurdish autonomy since the 1960s. The project’s biblical symbolism of expanding “Israel” to the Euphrates, and its strategic calculus, combine to make the corridor both a mythological promise and a geopolitical asset.

Nicola further contextualizes this within the framework of the “ocean doctrine,” a policy Israel pursued by courting non-Arab or peripheral powers like the Shah’s Iran and Turkiye, and forging alliances with ethnic and sectarian minorities in neighboring states.

The doctrine aimed to pierce the Arab wall encircling Israel and extend its geopolitical reach. David’s Corridor fits snugly within this paradigm, drawing on both spiritual mythology and strategic necessity.

Syria’s fragmentation: A gateway

The collapse of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s Al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have accelerated Syria’s internal fragmentation. Sharaa’s administration inked deals with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), integrating Kurdish-controlled areas into the nominal Syrian state while cementing Kurdish autonomy. In Suwayda, a separate agreement preserved Druze administrative independence in exchange for nominal state integration.

But Atrissi warns that such sectarian autonomy, even if pragmatic for containing tensions in the short term, risks entrenching divisions and inviting foreign meddling. He notes that the trauma of massacres on Syria’s coast has left minorities, especially the Alawites, deeply skeptical of the central authority in Damascus, pushing them toward local power arrangements. Israel, with its historical penchant for minority alliances, sees an opportunity to entrench its influence under the guise of protection.

Israel’s longstanding partnership with Iraqi Kurdistan is a case in point – a strategic relationship that offers a blueprint for replication in Syria. David’s Corridor, in this reading, is less a logistical imperative and more a political ambition. Should conditions allow, the occupation state may leverage the corridor to encircle Iran and redraw regional fault lines.

A map of the proposed David’s Corridor

A corridor of influence, not infrastructure

From Tel Aviv’s perspective, southern Syria is now a strategic vacuum: Syria’s army is weakened, Turkiye is entangled in its own Kurdish dilemmas, and Iran is overstretched. This power void offers fertile ground for Israel to assert dominance, particularly if regional dynamics continue to favor decentralized, weak governance.

Despite Washington’s reduced military footprint, the US remains committed to containing Iran. Key outposts like the Al-Tanf base on the Syrian–Iraqi border are instrumental in severing the so-called Iranian land bridge from Tehran to Beirut.

Nicola argues that while David’s Corridor is not an explicit US policy, Washington is likely to support Israeli initiatives that align with American strategic goals:

“The United States does not mind Israel implementing the project if it serves its interests, even though it is not part of its immediate strategy. It focuses on reducing Iran’s influence and dismantling its nuclear program, while supporting the path of regional normalization with Tel Aviv.”

The 2020 Abraham Accords, by easing Israel’s diplomatic isolation, have created additional maneuvering space. David’s Corridor – once a fantasy – now appears more plausible amid the regional flux.

Israeli leaders have sent unmistakable signals. On 23 February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected any Syrian military presence south of Damascus, insisting on demilitarized zones in Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda under the pretext of protecting Syria’s Druze minority.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar openly advocated for a federal Syria – a euphemism for fragmentation. Defense Minister Israel Katz vowed that Israeli troops would remain indefinitely in Mount Hermon and the Golan, and called for the dismantling of Syria into federal entities. Media leaks of corridor maps have only fueled speculation.

These moves have triggered outrage in southern Syria, with protests erupting in Khan Arnaba, Quneitra, Nawa, Busra al-Sham, and Suwayda. Yet, as Nicola notes, the new Syrian leadership appears remarkably disinterested in confronting Israel, and Arab states remain largely indifferent, even as the project edges toward realization. Turkiye, by contrast, stands firmly opposed to any Kurdish-led partition of Syria.

Geopolitical stakes and final frontiers

Ultimately, David’s Corridor signals a broader Israeli project to reengineer Syria’s geopolitics: isolate the south militarily, bind the Kurds in alliance, shift the balance of power, and carve a corridor of influence through fractured terrain.

Israel’s objectives are layered. Militarily, the corridor provides strategic depth and disrupts Iran’s land routes to Hezbollah. It enables the flow of arms and intelligence support to allies, especially Kurdish forces.

Economically, it opens a potential oil pipeline from Kirkuk or Erbil – Kurdish-majority, oil-rich areas – to Haifa, bypassing Turkish routes and maritime threats from actors like Yemen’s Ansarallah-allied army. Politically, it solidifies Israeli–Kurdish ties, undermines Syrian and Iraqi sovereignty, and advances the vision of Greater Israel, with the Euphrates as a symbolic frontier.

Yet the corridor is not without risk. It threatens to deepen the region’s instability, antagonize Syria, Turkiye, Iran, and Iraq, and trigger new fronts of resistance. Whether Israel can realize this project depends on the fluid regional calculus and its ability to maneuver within it.

David’s Corridor may still be a project in the shadows – but its implications are already casting a long one across the region.

April 5, 2025 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

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