Angela Lipps Spent 108 Days in Jail Because a Facial Recognition Algorithm Was Wrong
By Regina Morrison | Reclaim The Net | March 20, 2026
Angela Lipps spent nearly six months in jail because an algorithm looked at surveillance footage and decided she matched the suspect. She had never been to North Dakota. She had never been on a plane. A facial recognition system said otherwise, and police took that as enough.
Lipps, a 50-year-old mother and grandmother from north-central Tennessee, was arrested at her home in July while babysitting four children. US marshals arrived with guns drawn. She was booked as a fugitive from justice.
“I’ve never been to North Dakota, I don’t know anyone from North Dakota,” she told WDAY News.
The case began with bank fraud in Fargo.
Between April and May 2025, someone used a fake US Army military ID to withdraw tens of thousands of dollars from banks across the city. Detectives pulled surveillance footage of a woman at the counters. They fed that footage into facial recognition software. The software returned a name: Angela Lipps.
A detective wrote in court documents that Lipps appeared to match the suspect based on facial features, body type, and hairstyle.
That assessment, made by software and rubber-stamped in a report, was treated as sufficient cause for arrest. Nobody from the Fargo police called Lipps before the marshals showed up at her door.
She sat in a Tennessee county jail for 108 days waiting for North Dakota to arrange her transport. No bail. Four counts of unauthorized use of personal identifying information. Four counts of theft. The algorithm had spoken.
Her attorney, Jay Greenwood, told InForum: “If the only thing you have is facial recognition, I might want to dig a little deeper.”
Fargo police did not dig deeper. What eventually cleared Lipps was her bank records, which showed she had been more than 1,200 miles away in Tennessee during every transaction investigators said she committed in North Dakota. Greenwood obtained those records and brought them to the investigators. Lipps was released on Christmas Eve.
The story didn’t end there. While locked up and unable to pay bills, Lipps lost her home, her car, and her dog. When Fargo police released her, they didn’t arrange her trip back to Tennessee. Defense attorneys helped cover a hotel room and food over Christmas. A local nonprofit, the F5 Project, got her home.
As of the reporting from InForum, nobody from the Fargo police department had apologized.
This is how facial recognition operates: it generates a match, law enforcement acts on it, and the burden of disproving a computer’s guess falls entirely on the person whose life gets upended.
Lipps had to produce documentary evidence of her own location to escape charges based on software that was simply wrong.
The Lipps case is not unusual. Last October, an AI system at a Baltimore school identified a bag of Doritos as a firearm and notified police.
Officers arrived armed at Kenwood High School, forced student Taki Allen to his knees, handcuffed him, and searched him. They found nothing.
In the UK, Shaun Thompson, 39, had just finished a volunteer shift with Street Fathers, a group dedicated to steering young people away from knife crime, when the Metropolitan Police’s live facial recognition cameras flagged him outside London Bridge station.
Officers detained him for nearly half an hour, demanded his fingerprints, and threatened arrest, even as he produced multiple forms of ID proving he wasn’t the person they were looking for. “They were telling me I was a wanted man, trying to get my fingerprints and trying to scare me with arrest, even though I knew and they knew the computer had got it wrong,” he said.
Thompson is now bringing the first legal challenge of its kind against the Metropolitan Police’s use of live facial recognition. The man the algorithm flagged as a criminal was spending his evening trying to prevent crime. The technology made no distinction.
What these cases share is a common architecture. A system makes an identification, human oversight treats that identification as reliable, and the person flagged has no recourse until significant damage has already been done.
IRAN: The Three Islands Unmaking American Unipolar Sea Power in the Persian Gulf
By Freddie Ponton – 21st Century Wire – March 20, 2026
For half a century, the Strait of Hormuz has been sold as an American lake. “Freedom of navigation” meant US carrier groups on one side, pliant Gulf monarchies on the other, and anyone who challenged that arrangement cast as a rogue. That era is dying in real time, and three tiny islands at the mouth of the strait in the Persian Gulf explain why.
Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb. On most Western maps, they’re a footnote about an Iranian–UAE “dispute.” In the real world, they sit astride the deep‑water lanes that carry a huge share of the planet’s oil and gas. Whoever holds these islands doesn’t just watch the traffic; they sit on its windpipe. Iran controls them. And after US‑Israeli strikes on its territory, including reported HIMARS and missile attacks on Abu Musa and Kharg launched from Emirati soil in mid‑March, Tehran is no longer treating them as bargaining chips. It is fortifying them as unsinkable enforcement platforms and folding them into a new doctrine for Hormuz. Tehran’s doctrine is not American “open seas,” but Iranian‑managed passage under conditions set by Tehran as the state that actually lives on the coastline.

IMAGE: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Iranian forces positioned around the Strait of Hormuz (Source: Alma Research & Education Center)
The official Western question is still, “Is Hormuz closed?” and that’s a dodge. The real question is closed for whom, open for whom, and who gets to decide. Since the war phase began in late February, tanker traffic has collapsed, and commercial sailings have been rerouted or halted as war‑risk insurance is withdrawn. Where roughly a hundred tankers might normally cross in a comparable period, only about ninety have reportedly transited so far in March, with hundreds of other vessels backed up west of the strait and close to ninety percent of “normal” commercial passages gone. What still moves is a thin, carefully curated stream, including Iranian‑linked tonnage, a handful of politically vetted vessels that Tehran has agreed to let through via its own corridor, and tankers using intermittent AIS transmissions and complex ownership structures to move sanctioned or restricted oil toward Asia.

MAPS: Left – pre‑war tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Right – post‑war traffic, showing vessels (mainly bulk carriers) looping around Larak Island inside Iranian territorial waters. In the right‑hand map, every bulker except the purple one (which follows the old Strait route) has come from Iran (Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence / Seasearcher | via Lloydslist)
Two India‑flagged gas carriers, namely the Shivalik and Nanda Devi, were tracked in mid‑March hugging the Iranian coastline and looping around Larak Island inside Iranian waters on their outbound run, an unusual detour that only makes sense if you understand that “safe passage” now means “Iran‑approved route.” At least one non‑Iranian tanker is reported to have paid a two-million-dollar fee for safe transit. This shouldn’t be seen as random, but more as the contour of a policy. Iran has built, in wartime, a selective corridor through its own waters—a route that non‑hostile states can use if they accept Iranian security conditions and that belligerent‑linked ships enter at their own risk. Vetting, advance disclosure of ownership and cargo, a narrow lane close to Iranian‑controlled islands, visual confirmation by IRGC units enforcing routing instructions, all of this adds up to a regional‑power‑managed maritime security framework.
For Washington, that’s intolerable, but for Tehran, it is common sense. An attacked coastal state asserts control over waters it must defend and refuses to guarantee safe passage to the very powers bombing its soil. The US dressed this principle up as “rules‑based order” when it applied to itself; Iran is now applying it at home.
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, states have an “inherent right of individual or collective self‑defence”, especially when armed attack occurs. Under the Law of the Sea, coastal states retain sovereign rights in territorial waters and can regulate security‑related uses of those waters even where foreign ships enjoy transit passage in principle. Put bluntly, a state whose islands and infrastructure are under missile and drone fire is not obliged to offer safe, unconditional transit through adjacent straits to the forces attacking it. Iran’s position is that this legal language applies in the Gulf as much as it does off the coasts of NATO states. and not only when the flag on the defending warship is American.
This is why Abu Musa and the Tunbs can’t be treated as scenery. They are where law, geography and war intersect. Iran now openly says US rockets and missiles have hit Abu Musa and Kharg from launch sites in the UAE, and has warned that concealed US “hideouts” on Emirati soil could become targets. Tehran is stating, in plain language, that its islands are under attack from US forces using Gulf territory as a staging ground, and that any security regime in Hormuz must start from that reality. When Iran reinforces Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb with systems like the Khordad‑15 air‑defence network and integrated radar deployments and hardened garrisons, this is not random muscle‑flexing, but a military posture and a legal argument built together. These islands are Iranian territory; they have been directly targeted, and Iran claims the right and the obligation to control what passes under their guns.
Once you see that, the narrative of “Iran weaponising Hormuz” looks like what it is: projection. The unipolar maritime architecture is disintegrating. The old model rested on US naval dominance in the Gulf dressed up as “freedom of navigation”, Western insurers and P&I clubs underwriting risk, and a political fiction that all of this was neutral. All three pillars are failing at once. US warships can still fire missiles and intercept drones; however, they cannot restore normal traffic, and certainly have failed to convince owners, crews and insurers that sailing through a de facto war zone ringed by Iranian missiles, drones and fast boats is “safe” because the Pentagon says so. Iranian warnings are being enforced with fire and shrapnel on decks near the UAE. Owners and captains have diverted voyages or refused to enter the area altogether. Whatever carefully crafted talking points say, the calculus on the water has changed.
On the financial side, the retreat is even starker. Major mutuals like Gard and other big clubs have cancelled or sharply restricted war‑risk cover in Iranian and Gulf waters. Reinsurers have pulled back. War‑risk premia have surged, with brokers citing mark‑ups in the tens of percentage points over pre‑crisis levels. A US destroyer on the horizon is one thing; a captain whose vessel requires uninsured or state‑guaranteed passage is another. Once you understand that, the sudden enthusiasm in London and at the UN for “safe maritime corridors” to evacuate stranded ships and seafarers looks less like confident crisis management and more like a rear‑guard action. Institutions are scrambling to sketch out a neutral evacuation lane for stranded ships and tens of thousands of trapped seafarers, only after Iran has already imposed a functioning framework of selective passage.
Hormuz today is not an open‑or‑closed switch; it is a three‑tier system where the old, war‑risk‑insured, and the West‑governed traffic has largely fled. The vessels that still move under a veneer of normality are those that have obtained Iranian approval, accepted Iranian routing through Iranian waters and, in some cases, paid for the privilege. Beyond that are tankers often described in Western reporting as a ‘shadow fleet’ that move oil targeted by US and EU sanctions to Asia. The United States built the first tier and tried to pretend the other two were aberrations. The war has inverted that hierarchy as the US‑designed layer is barely functioning, and Iran’s own corridor, together with the parallel fleet of non‑Western‑insured tankers, now carries most of the barrels that still move.
That is why the question “who pays the bill” is not a technical afterthought. When major P&I clubs exit, when fringe insurers and state guarantees step in to keep some trade moving, when Turkish officials say openly that only governments can now provide adequate cover, we are watching the monetisation of geopolitics. The price of sailing through Hormuz is no longer set by neutral actuarial tables in London; it is set by political risk and Iranian veto power. The reported multimillion‑dollar “approval fee” is not just a one‑off toll. In the current context, it should be viewed as an early manifestation of a deeper shift from Western‑priced risk to regionally priced power.
For the Gulf monarchies, this is a nightmare written in their own geography. Officially, they repeat Washington’s language about Iranian aggression and the sanctity of free navigation. In practice, they sit under the shadow of Iranian missiles capable of striking across the Gulf, on top of US bases that make their territory a launchpad, with economies that cannot absorb a prolonged throttling of Hormuz. The strikes on Abu Musa and Kharg, allegedly from positions in the UAE, lay this contradiction bare.
The United Arab Emirates hosts US military assets that can be used to strike Iranian islands. Iran’s answer is blunt: if you turn your territory into a launchpad, you turn it into a battlefield. Tehran has already demonstrated this logic by hitting ports and energy infrastructure elsewhere around the Gulf with missiles and drones, and insurers have responded by treating Emirati lanes as anything but routine. Caught in the middle, Gulf rulers are squeezed from above by US and Israeli pressure to “hold the line,” from below by the basic fact that their economies depend on exports through Hormuz, and from the side by Iran’s ability to ratchet risk up or down via its island‑based enforcement grid and corridor approvals. They cannot acknowledge this publicly, but shipping patterns, quiet outreach to Tehran and renewed focus on bypass routes such as Iraqi lines to Ceyhan and the UAE’s Fujairah outlet, tell their own story. The era of outsourcing maritime security to an external hegemon is coming to an end, and the bill for that dependency has arrived.
For Washington and Tel Aviv, this is not just inconvenient; it is structurally humiliating. They can escalate strikes on Iranian soil and assets. They can float carrier groups and talk about keeping the lanes open. Nonetheless, the facts are brutal, as we witness the collapse of normal commercial traffic, key insurers walking away, and Iran still in a position to hit or detain ships that ignore its instructions. Every move now risks one of two outcomes, both bad from their point of view. Either they tacitly accept Iran as a gatekeeper, admitting that the local power they tried to isolate now decides who moves safely through the world’s most important energy chokepoint. Or they try to smash that gatekeeper, at the cost of a much wider war in waters Iran has spent decades preparing to fight in with anti‑ship missiles, mines and swarming boats, with a global economy built on the assumption that nobody would be reckless enough to test it. The mythology of neutral US maritime hegemony never allowed for this choice.
The real Gulf, anchored in islands like Abu Musa and the Tunbs, always did. Strip away the propaganda, and what remains is stark. Iran has been attacked by the US and Israel, including strikes on key islands and infrastructure, and has invoked its right to self‑defence. It controls strategic islands that command the Hormuz lanes. It uses that control to build a selective passage regime that rewards non‑belligerents, punishes or deters aggressors, and forces everyone else to choose. This is not irrational behaviour, it is not even chaos. It is what happens when a regional state that understands geography stops accepting US control of its maritime neighbourhood as a law of nature.
That is the story the Strait of Hormuz is telling now. This is not another abstract crisis in “global shipping.” It is an autopsy of the “open seas under US protection” fable and a close‑up of the Iranian alternative taking shape where it matters most: at the narrow throat of the Gulf, under the guns and radars of three small islands most of the world has never heard of, but soon will have to reckon with.
Trump’s dispatch of Marine Expeditionary Unit signals desperation for any symbolic success
By Samuel Geddes | Al Mayadeen | March 20, 2026
In mid-week, the 31st US Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the USS Tripoli was sighted transiting the Straits of Malacca en route to the Gulf. Its crew and detachment, reportedly 2200 to 5000-strong, has been summoned from its station in Japan after President Trump’s dawning realization that the Islamic Republic of Iran would not meekly collapse after he assassinated its leader, Sayyed Ali Khamenei.
Given that he initiated the war by crossing the ultimate red line, Trump’s options for further escalation are vanishing quickly. He is caught between what he knows to be the universal unpopularity of the war among Americans, especially over its disastrous economic consequences, and the knowledge that if he washes his hands of the situation and walks away, Iran will almost certainly continue retaliating and end up in a vastly more powerful position than it had been in before the war.
These equal opposing forces, the need for an off-ramp and the need to demonstrate any kind of tangible success, have shifted the calculus to include US ground operations on Iranian soil. It is in this context that the Marine Corps’ dispatch to the region is widely interpreted.
What would 5000 US Marines, at most, realistically achieve in a ground operation in Iran?
The idea of a large-scale ground invasion of Iran was never seriously on the table to begin with. Besides the fact that the Trump administration has been uncharacteristically consistent that this will not happen, the entire active US military, 1.3 million personnel, would be required, along with at least as many conscripts, for such a thing to even be attempted. Iran is a 1.6 million square kilometer mountain fortress, holding more mountains, deserts, and over 90 million mobilized citizens within. The United States has never occupied or even attempted to occupy a country of this size. It is simply not happening.
With large-scale ground incursions eliminated, the one “boots-on-the-ground” scenario with at least some initial plausibility would be for the US to seize one or more of the Iranian islands in the Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz. These islands range from Hormuz and Qeshm in the east, westward to Kharg, where 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports originate.
Upon genuine examination, however, the force currently on its way is woefully insufficient even for this objective by several orders of magnitude. The closest analogue for such an operation, in scale and required manpower, would be the Volcano and Ryukyu islands campaign against Japan in World War II, the bloodiest theatre of the US war in the Pacific. In fact, Qeshm Island is only slightly larger than Okinawa, which required between 250,000 and 540,000 American soldiers to occupy. Success there came only at the cost of 12,500 Americans killed in action and 50,000 wounded. Taking the Island of Iwo Jima alone, famously the most intense engagement of the Pacific, required 110,000 troops and took the lives of 6,800, with 20,000 wounded. Iran’s smaller islands in the Strait, Hormuz, Larak, and Hengam are comparable in size (and presumably the density of their defenses) to the Japanese outer islands but compressed within a single theatre of only a few hundred kilometers across. Anyone seriously proposing such an operation would be looking at the most intensive and costly amphibious campaign since World War II, plausibly seeing US losses equaling those of the entire wars in Korea or Vietnam within a matter of weeks or months. Here too, the enormity of the operation places it far outside the US military’s current capacities. It is certainly outside the means of 5,000 American soldiers, assuming they are not being willfully sent to their deaths.
If the Marines on the USS Tripoli are insufficient to even take and hold a small island, the last remaining possibility is that they are intended to infiltrate Iranian territory to carry out some form of high-stakes, largely symbolic operation that Trump intends to publicize as him “winning” the war and unilaterally ceasing US involvement.
Other than standard acts of sabotage, it has been suggested that the Marines may be tasked with locating and capturing Tehran’s enriched uranium stockpile. Such an objective is almost certainly fanciful. There is no reason to assume the Americans have any idea where it is, or that even 5000 marines would be sufficient to seize it if they did. However, given this administration’s amply demonstrated detachment from reality, its utter lack of shame or respect for international law, Trump’s assertion alone that such a mission was successful, even if it failed or never occurred at all, might be the one “success” that the president could consider sufficient to end his part in this catastrophe. That such a “success” would be illusory and utterly devoid of any strategic value is at this point an entirely secondary consideration.
It may well be that when the expeditionary unit reaches the Strait of Hormuz within the next week, it will simply do nothing – its purpose being pure posturing. Whatever its true role, its size relative to the strength of the Islamic Republic all but guarantees that it will serve a solely symbolic function. Its real mission is to lessen the US president’s humiliation when he ultimately does, in the fashion of a mad Roman emperor, admit defeat to the Iranians.
Iran Proposes Creating Middle East Security Structure With All Regional States – President
Sputnik – 20.03.2026
TEHRAN – Iran proposes creating a Middle East security structure with the participation of regional countries, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Friday.
“We are ready to resolve all problems with you. In order to ensure peace in the region, we propose to create a security structure in the Middle East, which will include Islamic countries, in order to ensure peace, stability and security,” Pezeshkian said in an address on the occasion of the Iranian New Year.
Middle Eastern countries do not need the presence of “outsiders,” the president said.
Pezeshkian said that the United States and Israel had no reason to assassinate late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
“They killed our leader and our commanders without any reason or logic,” Pezeshkian said in a speech marking the upcoming Iranian New Year.
Washington approves billions in new arms sales to Gulf states as concerns grow over stocks of air defenses
The Cradle | March 20, 2026
Washington has approved around $7 billion in arms to the UAE – as part of a larger package for Gulf states hosting US bases and currently facing retaliatory Iranian strikes, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported.
The US State Department is “not required” to announce the billions in arms to the UAE “under the rules governing U.S. arms exports, which use different modalities for different types of sales,” the report said.
“The Trump administration on Thursday moved forward with $23 billion in weapons sales to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan,” in order to “bolster those countries militarily during the conflict with Iran,” US officials told WSJ.
“The proposed weapons sales include more than $16 billion announced earlier on Thursday by the State Department, including air-defense systems, bombs, and radar for the UAE, and $8 billion in air-defense equipment for Kuwait,” the report added.
The officials said the deals include the sale of Patriot PAC-3 Missiles (worth $5.6 billion) and CH-47 Chinook helicopters (worth $1.32 billion) to the UAE.
“The US also approved $37 million in so-called Direct Commercial Sales of Predator XP drones and sustainment programs for light B-250/350 aircraft with an unspecified dollar value,” the officials went on to tell WSJ.
Washington has invoked an emergency clause in the US arms control law for the part of the sales to the UAE. As a result, deals can “bypass” the congressional review protocol, WSJ added.
The State Department said on 19 March that sales to the UAE will improve the Gulf state’s “capability to meet current and future threats.”
According to an Anadolu Agency (AA) report from early March, Gulf countries spent over $3 billion in the first four days of the war alone.
WSJ reported on 2 March that Washington’s Arab allies were in a “race against time” due to quickly depleting stockpiles of US-made interceptors.
“The intensity of interceptor usage that we have seen over the last couple of days can’t be maintained for more than another week – probably a couple of days at most, and then they will feel the pain of interceptor shortage,” Fabian Hoffmann, a missile expert at the University of Oslo, told the outlet at the time.
The report, citing another expert, stated that these countries will have to “ration” their defenses and “change tactics” to a “much more judicious use of those incredibly high-demand interceptors that are running low, and using them only against the highest-value targets, the ballistic missiles.”
The brutal US-Israeli war on Iran has reached the end of its third week.
Tehran has continued its massive and unprecedented campaign of retaliatory strikes on Israel as well as US military assets across the region. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to Washington and its allies, and is targeting vessels that attempt to cross in violation of its warnings.
The global price of oil has now shot up past $119.
Tehran struck several major energy facilities across the Gulf on Wednesday: the Ras Laffan site in Qatar, Habshan Gas Facility in the UAE, and SAMREF Refinery in Saudi Arabia.
An Iranian missile also struck Israel’s Haifa Oil Refinery on Thursday.
Israel had bombed Iran’s South Pars Gas Field earlier this week, with direct approval from US President Donald Trump.
Iran War: Pentagon’s $200B Budget Could Run Out in Just Five Months
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 20.03.2026
The funds requested by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth would last roughly 160 days—or about five months, Sputnik calculates.
As of March 20, the expenditures exceeded $25.5 billion, according to the real-time Iran War Cost Tracker.
Tracker bases its estimate on a Pentagon briefing: $11.3 billion for the first six days, then about $1 billion a day—roughly $11,500 per second. But the real cost may be much higher.
Pentagon ‘Has No Idea of Real Cost’
US may have spent over $10 billion on air-defense systems in the first 48 hours, argues Jennifer Kavanagh of the Defense Priorities think tank, as quoted by The New York Times.
That’s because Iran’s low‑cost, asymmetric attacks are forcing expensive defenses like THAAD (about $12.7 million per interceptor) and Patriot (about $3.7 million) to be used to shoot down drones and missiles.
Three-week conflict could cost taxpayers $60–130 billion, five weeks up to $175 billion, and eight weeks around $250 billion, two anonymous US officials told The Intercept. The Pentagon “has no idea of the real cost,” one added, and the operation’s duration remains uncertain.
US Weapon Systems Lost So Far
While the Pentagon hasn’t confirmed total equipment losses, media reports offer a glimpse:
- $1.1B—AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar system destroyed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar
- $282M—three F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets lost in Kuwait
- $20M—two AN/GSC-52B satellite communications terminals destroyed at the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet HQ in Manama, Bahrain
- $30M—three additional radar domes were destroyed at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
- $500M—AN/TPY-2 radar, part of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system
- $300M/$500M—AN/TPY-2 radar and support equipment destroyed at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, Jordan
- $330M+—11 MQ-9 Reaper drones lost
- $560M—seven KC-135 Stratotankers: one crashed in Iraq, another damaged in a supposed collision; five reportedly damaged at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia
- ~$100M—F-35 fighter jet, recently damaged by Iranian fire
Total: $3.42 billion
Seven US allies endorse Hormuz ‘coalition,’ offer ‘no commitment’ for military action
The Cradle | March 20, 2026
The UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada issued a joint statement on 20 March in support of a potential “coalition” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while specifying “no commitment” to a concrete military role.
“We express our readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the strait,” the close US allies announced.
The joint statement did not, however, touch on any military involvement or the commitment of any forces to the initiative.
One political reporter writing for Axios said the statement was “largely a gesture to placate [US] President [Donald] Trump, who has railed against allies for declining to help secure the strait and warned that a failure to do so could undermine the future of NATO.”
The allies condemned attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure, citing “the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian forces,” and called on Tehran to “cease immediately its threats, laying of mines, drone and missile attacks and other attempts to block the strait.”
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said no state is considering “a military mission to forcibly break the Iranian blockade,” adding the EU favors “diplomacy and de-escalation.”
She clarified that any contribution would apply to a “post-conflict phase” and require agreement among all parties.
Other governments echoed this position, with Germany confirming “no military participation,” while France said its deployments remain strictly defensive.
The UK ruled out a NATO mission, focusing instead on negotiations, though it has sent planners to coordinate options.
Despite the political backing and global panic over soaring energy prices , maritime data shows the strait is only partially restricted, as roughly 90 vessels crossed in early March.
Iran has established a controlled “safe” shipping corridor through its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz, allowing only approved vessels – mainly from countries like India, Pakistan, China, Iraq, and Malaysia – to transit after IRGC vetting, while ships linked to the US or Israel are effectively excluded.
Access is currently negotiated on a case-by-case basis but is moving toward a formal system requiring detailed disclosures of ownership and cargo, often coordinated through intermediaries and, in at least one case, involving a reported $2-million payment.
So far, at least nine vessels have used the route, which passes near Larak Island for inspection, but traffic remains minimal.
The US remains largely the only country carrying out direct military operations, deploying forces and striking Iranian positions along the strait, as well as conducting offensive strikes inside Iran.
Earlier US-led efforts to secure regional shipping routes followed a similar trajectory, with coalitions struggling to gain meaningful participation as several allies refused or limited involvement, leaving only a small number of naval deployments.
Efforts to secure maritime routes during the Israeli genocide on Gaza in 2024 faced the same constraints, as US and EU resources proved insufficient to deter Yemeni strikes across the Red Sea.
Officials had warned that strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” while Yemeni attacks on vessels continued, raising pressure on global trade routes.
Yemeni forces maintained their stance as a support front for Gaza, persisting with attacks until Washington ended its campaign under an Omani-brokered truce, with President Trump claiming Yemeni forces “don’t want to fight anymore.”
‘Safe’ corridor opening up through Strait of Hormuz: What we know so far
RT | March 20, 2026
Iran has signaled that it is ready to allow passage through the Strait of Hormuz to vessels from certain countries. Media reports and tracker data also suggest that a handful of pre-vetted tankers have already sailed smoothly through the “safe” corridor, with at least one shipping company allegedly paying Iran $2 million.
The development comes as more than 15 tankers have been hit by drones and projectiles in the strait since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran in late February.
As the Middle East escalation has roiled energy markets, the impact of a few tankers passing through has so far remained limited. Brent is still trading well above $100.
Here is what to know about the latest developments in the Strait of Hormuz.
Who is allowed to pass?
In short, not everyone and not everywhere.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the strait is open to all except the US and Israel, while adding that some ships from “different countries” had already been allowed through. In practice, however, Western-linked vessels face significant hurdles in securing safe passage.
According to Lloyd’s List, India, Pakistan, China, Iraq, and Malaysia are discussing transit plans directly with Tehran, with officials in the first three countries as well as Türkiye confirming clearance.
The Financial Times reported, citing maritime data, that at least eight ships – including oil tankers and bulk carriers tied to India, Pakistan and Greece, as well as Iran’s own fleet – have sailed through the strait but used an unusual route around the island of Larak, which is close to the Iranian coast and where waters are much shallower than in the middle of the strait.
The actual number of ships – some of which may have turned off automatic tracking systems – could be higher, the report said.
According to the FT, at least nine Chinese oil and fuel tankers are also amassing in the Gulf, apparently preparing to traverse the Hormuz Strait.
Clearance is being granted on a case-by-case basis, Lloyd’s List reported, adding that the Iranian authorities are working on a “more formalized vessel approval process” expected in the coming days.
Is it free of charge?
On paper, international transit is not supposed to work like a toll road, but the current situation appears to be evolving under wartime conditions.
Lloyd’s List reported that at least one tanker operator paid about $2 million to transit, while saying it could not establish whether payments were made in other cases. It also remains unclear how such payments could be processed, given the sanctions on Iran.
In addition, several media reports indicated that Iran’s parliament was considering a bill aimed at taxing ships that cross the strait. The Wall Street Journal noted, however, that such a policy would “require a regional buy” from Iran’s Gulf neighbors.
What did Hormuz look like before the war?
Hormuz was one of the world’s busiest and consequential chokepoints, with an average of 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and oil products moved through in 2025, equal to around 25% of global seaborne oil trade. About 80% of the flows went to Asian countries, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
About 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96% of the UAE’s LNG exports also passed through Hormuz, representing roughly 19% of global LNG trade.
Before the war, around 138 vessels transited the strait daily; that figure has now dropped to roughly 3–5 ships per day, according to estimates.
The strait is just 29 nautical miles (54km) wide, with two-mile-wide inbound and outbound shipping lanes separated by a two-mile buffer. Ships using the Larak route must contend with shallower waters than in the central channel, though depths are still generally sufficient for most vessel types.
What impact is this having on energy prices?
The trickle of oil tankers is seemingly having a limited effect on the oil market, with Brent trading at $107 per barrel, down from a peak of almost $120. WTI crude slid from the $100 benchmark to $94.
European natural gas futures (TTF) slightly fell to €60 per MWh after spiking by more than 30% after Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars gas field, triggering a retaliation on energy infrastructure in Qatar.
What does Europe have to say on Hormuz safety?
European leaders have demanded “the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz,” as well as “de-escalation and maximum restraint” from the belligerents. European NATO members, however, have been reluctant to send their navies to the strait. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that his country could help in keeping the shipping lanes clear only when the guns go silent.
What impact on the US?
As oil prices skyrocketed, gasoline prices in the US also soared, reaching $3.90 per gallon on average. US President Donald Trump has sought to downplay the market panic, saying he thought that oil prices would be “much worse,” adding that they were certain to come down once the hostilities end.
In addition, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signaled that Washington could waive sanctions on the Iranian oil stranded on tankers in a bid to dampen prices. Earlier this week, he also said that the US had been allowing Iranian tankers to transit the strait “to supply the rest of the world.”
Hormuz disruption exposes hidden strain on US military supply chains
Al Mayadeen | March 20, 2026
The disruption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is beginning to reverberate far beyond energy markets, with new analysis warning that the effects could directly constrain the United States’ ability to sustain and replenish its military operations.
A report by the Modern War Institute, cited by The Guardian, describes the situation as a “paralyzing, real-time problem” for any attempt to expand US defense manufacturing, as well as for repairing equipment damaged in recent Iranian retaliations.
At the center of the concern is sulphur, a largely overlooked commodity that plays a foundational role in industrial production. According to the analysis, seaborne trade in sulphur passing through Hormuz, which accounts for roughly half of global shipments, has been nearly halted. Prices have already surged by around 25 percent since the start of the war, with year-on-year increases reaching 165 percent.
Sulphur’s hidden war role
While sulphur is widely associated with fertilizer production, its strategic importance lies deeper in the industrial chain. It is used to produce sulphuric acid, a critical component in extracting key minerals such as copper and cobalt from lower-grade ores.
These materials are indispensable to modern military systems. From microprocessors and communications hardware to jet engines and drone batteries, copper and cobalt underpin the infrastructure that enables both weapons production and operational capability.
The report argues that these inputs “dictate how fast things can be built and scaled under the pressure of an ongoing war,” warning that the consequences of a sudden disruption in supply have not previously been factored into military planning.
Jahara “Franky” Matisek, a US Air Force lieutenant colonel and nonresident fellow at the US Naval War College, described the situation as a compounding crisis. “It’s a cascading issue,” he told The Guardian, noting that replacement costs for damaged systems could rise sharply. “A knock-on effect of this war is that it may cost double or more than double to replace all these weapons because all the mineral demand is going to go way up.”
He added that supply constraints may go beyond pricing pressures. “Markets are not going to be able to provide the amount of minerals that are needed to replace all these radars that have been destroyed and all these munitions that have to be replaced. It’s a really precarious spot to be in right now.”
The Middle East accounts for roughly a quarter of global sulphur production, much of it generated as a byproduct of oil refining. With shipping routes now disrupted, the supply shock is already feeding into downstream sectors.
Sulphur shock, war strain
Beyond defense, the report notes that reduced sulphur availability could also affect agriculture, as farmers worldwide compete for fertilizer inputs. This raises the possibility of broader food supply pressures, particularly in lower-income countries.
However, the military implications remain the primary concern. The authors estimate that replacing just two major US radar systems destroyed in the early phase of the war would require more than 30,000 kilograms of copper, with additional thousands needed to restore other damaged communications and sensor systems across multiple regional bases.
“The current sulfur shock is becoming a copper problem, and that copper problem risks quickly becoming a readiness and resilience problem,” the report states.
The analysis frames the situation as a “prelogistical crisis”, arguing that conventional planning has largely ignored vulnerabilities in the upstream supply of raw materials. Rather than transportation or distribution bottlenecks, the issue lies in the availability of the inputs required to manufacture critical systems in the first place.
A separate study published in February, also co-authored by Matisek, found that only 6 percent of US defense contractors maintain fully transparent supply chains. The latest report suggests that this lack of visibility is now constraining operational capacity.
Industrial dependence
According to the authors, the US military is increasingly dependent on industrial systems it does not fully control, leaving it exposed to disruptions originating far beyond the battlefield.
What is emerging, they argue, is a structural limitation on combat endurance, where the pace of war is determined not only by strategy or firepower, but by access to the underlying materials needed to sustain it.
Allowing US to use UK bases amounts to participation in war: Araghchi
Al Mayadeen | March 20, 2026
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, has warned the United Kingdom that permitting the United States to use British military bases amounts to “participation in aggression.”
In a phone call with UK Home Secretary Yvette Cooper, Araghchi criticized Britain’s “negative and biased approach” toward ongoing US-Israeli military actions against Iran. He also condemned London’s decision to grant the US access to key military installations for operations targeting Iranian missile sites.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer had authorized the use of RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire and the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean for what officials described as “defensive” strikes against Iranian positions.
In a statement posted in Farsi on Telegram, Araghchi said he had conveyed to Cooper that such actions “will definitely be considered as participation in aggression and will be recorded in the history of relations between the two countries,” adding that Iran “reserves its inherent right to defend the country’s sovereignty and independence.”
Britain’s role in the war
While the United Kingdom did not participate in the initial attacks on Iran, it later permitted the United States to use British military bases to conduct what officials claimed were “defensive operations”, the BBC reported.
British fighter jets have also been deployed to the region, where they have reportedly intercepted missiles and drones launched by Iran toward regional countries allied with the United States.
The UK aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales has been placed on advanced readiness, though Cooper declined to confirm whether it would be sent to the Middle East.
Another British warship, HMS Dragon, which has air-defense capabilities, is expected to be deployed to the Mediterranean to strengthen protection around RAF Akrotiri, the UK’s strategic air base in Cyprus.
The deployment plans come after a small drone reportedly struck a runway at RAF Akrotiri earlier this week, causing what the British Ministry of Defense described as minimal damage.


