Three National Guard Officials Arrested After Fatal Shooting of Protester
By Rachael Boothroyd Rojas | Venezuelanalysis | June 21, 2017
Caracas – Three Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) soldiers have been arrested following the fatal shooting of an anti-government protester in Caracas this past Monday.
First sergeant Raymon Ávila León and second sergeants Johan Rojas Díaz and Jesús Baez Rojas will be charged with the misuse of a firearm, according to national ombudsman, William Saab.
On Monday, 17 year old Fabian Urbina died from gunshot wounds when GNB soldiers opened fire on a crowd of protesters in the eastern district of Altamira. Five other demonstrators were also injured in the incident.
In footage of the confrontation circulated by the private media channel La Patilla on social media, hundreds of violent protesters can be seen attempting to attack several GNB officials prior to the shooting. At least one of the protesters was armed, leading some pro-government observers to speculate that the soldiers were acting in self defense.
But Saab condemned the incident Wednesday and stated that the national guard must only employ “proportional, progressive and differentiated use of force” to ensure their own safety at protests.
In a series of tweets, the national ombudsman reminded the public that the GNB are banned from using live ammunition or rubber bullets to control unrest. He also called on opposition sectors to cease their violent protests.
“We once again call on the organizers of demonstrations to carry them out peacefully and without the use of weapons,” he tweeted.
Following the incident, President Nicolas Maduro replaced Antonio Benavides Torres as the commander of the National Bolivarian Guard. The former commander of the People’s Guard, Major General Sergio José Rivero Marcano, will now take up the position.
The president also changed the commander-in-chiefs of the armed forces, navy, airforce, and people’s militia, as well as put Major General Juan de Jesús García Toussaintt and Admiral Orlando Maneiro Gaspar in charge of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Fishing.
It is unknown if the high level reshuffle was related to Monday’s deadly shooting.
Eighty-four people have been killed since violence anti-government unrest broke out at the beginning of April. Protesters, national security personnel, pro-government activists and passersby are all amongst the dead.
How RCEP affects food and farmers
GRAIN | June 19, 2017
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a mega-regional trade deal being negotiated among 16 countries across Asia-Pacific. If adopted, RCEP will cover half the world’s population, including 420 million small family farms that produce 80% of the region’s food. RCEP is expected to create powerful new rights and lucrative business opportunities for food and agriculture corporations under the guise of boosting trade and investment. Several RCEP countries are also part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), another mega-regional agreement setting some of the most pro-big business terms seen in trade and investment deals so far. While the fate of the TPP is uncertain, these two agreements may have to co-exist and there is pressure to align them on numerous points. What will this mean for food and farmers in the region?
1. Land will be grabbed
Most RCEP countries do not allow foreigners to buy farmland. Instead, foreign investors can get leases, permits or concessions with varying types of restrictions. The stakes behind this issue are high because companies and investment funds have been aggressively buying up farmland as a new source of revenue in the last years. In the RCEP countries alone, 9.6 million hectares of farmland have been acquired by foreign companies since 2008. Ownership provides corporations far more control than use rights, but it also drives up land prices and speculation, pushing small farmers out.
Two chapters of RCEP could have a decisive impact on access to land. According to leaked drafts, the investment chapter proposes a rule that each government must give investors from other RCEP states the same treatment as domestic investors (‘national treatment’). That means they should have the same rights to purchase farmland as domestic investors, unless the government carves out a special exception for this. The draft chapter also contains proposed ‘standstill’ and ‘ratchet’ clauses which, if adopted, would mean that governments have to lock in their current levels of liberalisation, and if they liberalise more than they commit to in RCEP they cannot go back down to the level set by RCEP. The services chapter draft also proposes that foreign service suppliers not be treated less favourably than domestic companies (‘national treatment’). This includes the ability to own farmland for a service-related purpose. Again, countries may be able to squeeze in an exception for agricultural land, but any such exception would be subject to negotiation and have to be agreed to by all parties.
If governments do not make reservations on these provisions for farmland, RCEP could seriously aggravate land grabbing in the region and sabotage agrarian reform processes that are currently under way in some countries. Currently, farmers asserting their rights to land are being subjected to human rights abuses, criminalisation, incarceration and even assassination. For this reason, there are deep fears that if RCEP is adopted, it will intensify militarisation in rural communities.
2. Seeds will be privatised, GMOs may proliferate
Farmers regularly save seed from one harvest to plant a new crop. Big seed and agrochemical companies like Monsanto and Bayer want to end this practice and force farmers to buy seed each season, so they can boost sales. They do this by lobbying governments to extend intellectual property laws to cover plants and animals. The global seed industry is highly concentrated today with three companies representing more than 60% of global commercial sales. ChemChina is currently in the process of buying Syngenta, one of the world’s top three seed firms. This means that China has a new vested interest in seeing seed laws strengthened under RCEP.
Leaked drafts of RCEP’s intellectual property chapter show countries like Japan and South Korea pushing for all RCEP states to adopt “UPOV 1991”, a kind of patent system for seeds. Under UPOV 1991, farmers are generally not allowed to save seeds of protected varieties. Where limited exceptions are permitted, farmers must pay the seed companies royalties on farm-saved seed. Depending on the country and the crop, royalties can represent a markup of 10-40% over the price of regular commercial seeds, which are already more expensive than farmers’ seed. Civil society groups estimate that UPOV 1991 would raise the local price of seed by 200-600% in Thailand and by 400% in the Philippines.
It could get worse if RCEP moves closer to what was negotiated in the TPP, something which four RCEP states have already agreed to. TPP requires states to allow patents on inventions “derived from plants”, which means genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Right now, GMOs are illegal in all RCEP member countries except for Australia, India, Myanmar and Philippines, plus several provinces of China and Vietnam. And while it’s likely that RCEP will have a chapter aiming to harmonise food safety standards, we have not seen any drafts and do not know how it will regulate GMOs. All of these moves would lead not only to higher seed prices but a loss of biodiversity, greater corporate control and a possible lowering of standards for high risk products such as GMOs.
3. Small dairy and other farmers will go out of business
India is home to 100 million small farmers, most of whom keep livestock. Up until now they have been the backbone of India’s dairy sector, but that situation is now changing. Costs of production are going up while prices paid to farmers are going down, driving many small farmers into dire straits.
RCEP will make things much worse. Frustrated with New Zealand’s failure to conclude a bilateral trade deal with India, NZ dairy giant Fonterra — the world’s biggest dairy exporter — is now looking to RCEP as a way in to India’s massive dairy market. It has openly stated that RCEP would give the company important leverage to open up key markets that are currently protected such as India’s, where it would go head to head with India’s dairy cooperative Amul. As a result, many people fear that Indian dairy farmers will either have to work for Fonterra or go out of business. They will not be able to compete. Similar concerns face dairy farmers in Vietnam, where Fonterra has been investing heavily to increase its presence.
At the same time, some RCEP members like Japan and Australia not only subsidise their farmers tremendously, they also have food safety standards that are incompatible with the small-scale food production and processing systems that dominate in other RCEP countries. This may lead to the growth of mega food-park investments that target exports to such high value markets, as is already happening in India. These projects involve high tech farm-to-fork supply chains that exclude and may even displace small producers and household food processing businesses, which are the mainstay of rural and peri-urban communities across Asia.
4. Fertiliser and pesticide use will go up
Fertiliser and pesticide sales are expected to rise sharply in Asia-Pacific in the next few years, from $100 billion to $120 billion per year by 2021. Agrochemical use is heaviest in China and growing rapidly in India, while imports by the Mekong sub-region are also on the rise. China’s acquisition of Syngenta, the world’s top agrochemical company with more than 20% of the global pesticide market, puts the country in a particularly sensitive position within RCEP.
Beijing will want high levels of ‘market access’, being negotiated under the trade in goods chapter of RCEP, to capitalise on its new position. In January 2017, China already announced that it will scrap export tariffs on nitrogen and phosphorus fertiliser in order to boost its market share abroad. RCEP trade ministers have promised to deliver a deal that immediately cuts tariffs to zero on 65% of trade in goods, followed by a second phase to cut the rest. Farm chemicals are bound to be part of this, resulting in increased residues in food and water, more greenhouse gas emissions and further depletion of soil fertility.
Furthermore, if leaked intellectual property drafts are adopted, RCEP may increase the patenting of other inputs like veterinary medicines, farm machinery, microorganism-based products and agricultural chemicals, and extend their patent terms, making them more expensive.
5. Big retail will wipe out local markets
Over the past five years, Asia-Pacific accounted for more than half of the world’s new food retail sales. Japan is leading this trend, with 7-Eleven and Aeon at the top of food retail sales in the region. Aeon Agri Create, the agriculture production arm of Aeon, has been establishing farms in Japan and Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam. Aeon even aims to push ‘ICT farming’: the use of computers and communication technologies to manage farm operations. In India, the opening up of food retail, including e-commerce, to foreign direct investment (FDI) is almost complete, although many states are yet to adopt FDI in multibrand retail. RCEP would strengthen these trends further.
According to leaked drafts, RCEP’s services chapter may make it impossible for governments to limit the operation of supermarket chains that hail from other RCEP states (‘market access’). Furthermore, the trade agreement may make it illegal for a member government to require a service supplier like Alibaba or Aeon to have a ‘local presence’ in its country or to source food from local producers.
If precedents set by TPP are followed, ICT farming may be boosted under RCEP measures aimed at promoting regional supply chains and e-commerce. China’s Alibaba has just invested $1.25 billion in an online food delivery service, which will rely on more and more high tech facilities that are disconnected from seasons and from local markets. All of these developments pose a real threat to small traders and retailers in Asia.
What to do?
RCEP will usher in a wave of corporate concentration and take over of Asia’s food and agriculture sector. Corporate concentration, as experience in the other regions shows, brings less real choice and higher prices for consumers. In the food sector, it also brings important health and environmental costs from pesticides, excessive processing and chemicals, as well as downward pressure on wages and prices paid to farmers.
The answer is not to reform RCEP but to reject it because it relies on and pushes a corporate model of agriculture that no amount of tweaking will change. Instead, we need to implement policies and initiatives that enable people-led food and agricultural systems to flourish. Only then can trade policies be drawn up to serve these systems – not the other way around.
ACT NOW!
- Get more informed and organise discussions and debates about RCEP in your communities. One resource to check out is the collective open-publishing site http://bilaterals.org/rcep.
- Support the people’s call to stop RCEP and fight for a pro-people trading system that responds to people’s needs not to corporate elites. Contact groups in your country that also signed the call and join forces.
- Go to the RCEP meetings. Demand the public release of negotiating texts to better analyse and build awareness of how the agreement affects the livelihood of people in RCEP member countries. Voice your concerns, as groups have done over several rounds the past months in Perth, Jakarta, Kobe and Manila. The next rounds will be held in Hyderabad (July 2017) and Seoul (later this year).
- Join the region-wide people campaign on RCEP and trade justice, and participate in collective mobilisations like regional days of action
- Keep an eye on http://rceplegal.wordpress.com/, http://keionline.org/ and http://www.bilaterals.org/rcep-leaks for leaked texts and analysis of RCEP chapters.
GRAIN is a small international non-profit organisation that works to support small farmers and social movements in their struggles for community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems.
China may finance Russia’s natural gas pipeline to Europe
RT | June 22, 2017
Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline may get Chinese financing if European companies are forced out of the project by the latest round of US sanctions, business daily Vedomosti reports.
Russian officials have already contacted Chinese banks, sources have told the media.
“Nord Stream 2 has a good rate of return and low risks for creditors. Chinese banks may be interested,” explains Aleksey Grivach, deputy CEO at Russia’s National Energy Security Fund.
The extension will double the existing pipeline which delivers natural gas to Germany under the Baltic Sea and is estimated to cost €9.5 billion.
Initially, Engie, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall were to get a 50 percent stake minus one share in Nord Stream 2. However, red tape at the European Commission made Gazprom and its partners come up with another financing option. Under this plan, European companies will each provide an equal long-term loan to Gazprom, which will fully own the pipeline.
Financing of Nord Stream 2 may be affected by new US sanctions which target firms investing in Russian gas and oil projects. According to the new bill passed by the US Senate, and currently, before the House of Representatives, companies will be forbidden from making investments of over $1 million in the Russian energy sector.
On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin met the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, Ben van Beurden. Among other things, they discussed Nord Stream 2. Van Beurden told Interfax the new project “will be realized for the benefit of all parties – both Europeans and the Russian Federation.”
Japan Regards Russia as a Reliable Hydrocarbons Exporter
By Dmitry Bokarev – New Eastern Outlook – 22.06.2017
As you must know, Japan does not have enough natural resources to ensure its energy security without turning to any foreign players. At the same time, its closest neighbor – Russia possesses impressive hydrocarbon reserves and can be in the list of major exporters of those. Nevertheless, it is difficult to describe the volume of bilateral trade between the two states as impressive, in fact it’s the exact opposite. But it seems that the Japanese government has finally come to grips with the fact that it is missing out on enjoying the benefits of Japan’s geographic location, so Tokyo decided to step up its attempts to pursue economic cooperation with Russia.
In fact, talks about Japan’s increasing imports of hydrocarbons from Russia have been circulating for a long time. There’s no doubt that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster which resulted in the closure of the majority of nuclear power plants across Japan has made Russia even more attractive as a trade partner for Tokyo.
It’s true that Japan imports Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), on top of taking part in the development of Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 oil and gas fields, and taking part in the construction of a LNG plant within the framework of the Yamal-LNG project. However, the level of bilateral cooperation in that area is miles away from reaching its full potential. Mind you that Russia’s share in the entire volume of Japan’s LNG imports barely reaches 8%. To this date Tokyo has been importing most of the LNG that it buys from Australia, Indonesia and the Middle East, in spite of the mind boggling shipping costs.
This situation is taking a toll on Japan’s budget and there’s no guarantee that Japan could be sure that it would get what it has paid for, since distant sea shipping always goes hand-in-hand with certain risks. Also, it’s pretty much a gamble when you’re getting resources of strategic importance from a limited number of suppliers, as it makes you dangerously dependent on your partners. Even if good relations are maintained between countries, there is always a possibility of unforeseen complications that may hinder the vital supplies.
Japan’s JFE Holdings had to learn this lesson the hard way, in spite of the fact that this company ranks second among local steel producers. To maintain its production levels any company in the steel business needs a lot of fuel. The most commonly used fuel in the steel industry is coking coal, since it’s cheap and reliable. Back in 2016 JFE Holdings acquired a total 60 million tons of this mineral, with more than 70% of this amount purchased in Australia which has traditionally been among the major coal exporters to Southeast Asia. However, a natural disaster damaged the Australian railway network back in March 2017, which obstructed the deliveries that were meant for JFE Holdings, which forced it to turn to Canada, China and the United States. It goes without saying that it had to buy large shipments of coal at a disadvantageous price. After this unpleasant incident Japan has once again realized the need to expand the number of suppliers to reduce its dependency on Australia. In May 2017, JFE Holdings announced plans to diversify imports of coking coal. The company’s management stated that among candidates for future suppliers one can find Canada, Mozambique and Russia. It is noteworthy that these days the Russian Federation is developing new coal deposits in the Far East, not far from Japan.
However, Japan’s steel industry is hardly the only industry that requires large amounts of coal to function properly. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster resulted in Tokyo building a large number of coal-driven CHP plants. In the coming years, Japanese coal imports should increase significantly, and it would only be profitable for Japan to buy coal in Russia.
It should be recalled that as early as 2016 negotiations were held between Tokyo and Moscow about the former making investments in the development of Russia’s Far Eastern ports to ensure that they maintain high transportation levels. Japan wanted to import coal from Yakutia in large volumes thus it decided to sign a number of deals to ensure its energy security. However, the practical implementation of these plans is not going quite as as one would like. For example, the Japanese corporation Tosei Group, through a subsidiary in April 2016, became a resident of the Free Port of Vladivostok with a view to constructing a transshipment complex for coal worth 60 billion rubles. The project was to be financed by the Japanese side. Additionally, construction of a terminal, capable of receiving up to 20 million tons of coal per year, was scheduled for early 2017, but it never started. The beginning of the construction works was delayed for a year, and it can now be made even partially operational by 2020. Despite the delay, the project is likely to be implemented, because the incident with the disruption of supplies of Australian coal shows that Japan really needs diversification of imports.
In April 2017, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, that was attended by the Russian Energy Minister, Alexander Novak. It’s been reported that the parties were discussing such projects as the creation of the Sakhalin-Hokkaido gas pipeline, along with a maritime energy bridge for electricity transmission that could be constructed in the foreseeable future. Soon after this meeting, the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Hiroshige Seko said that Japan is not satisfied with its dependence on gas and oil shipments from the Middle East, since the political instability of the region has been constantly threatening Japan’s energy security. That is why Japan is really interested in increasing supplies of Russian LNG.
In conclusion, one can note that in spite of the slow development of Russian-Japanese relations in the energy sector, the countries have a great future ahead of them. Japan has already begun rebuilding its nuclear power capabilities, but the demand for electricity overshadows any measure that Tokyo has put in play so far. That is why one can be convinced that the Russian-Japanese energy trade and cooperation will reach a new level.
A warrior prince rises in Arabia as the monarch of all he surveys
By M K Bhadrakumar | Indian Punchline | June 22, 2017
The royal decree of June 21 by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman appointing his son Mohammed bin Salman as the Crown Prince and next in line to the throne is a watershed event in Middle East politics. Such a development has been expected for some time, but when it actually happened, it still looks momentous and somewhat awesome.
For a start, 31-year old MbS, whom many tend to deride as the “warrior prince”, has earned a reputation for being rash in the use of force. The extremely brutal war in Yemen is his signature foreign-policy project. Saudi Arabia, famous for its caution and its glacial pace of decision-making, has changed remarkably since MbS trooped in alongside King Salman to the centre stage of the Saudi regime in January 2015.
Considering King Salman’s age and health condition, MbS is being positioned in advance so that there will be no succession struggle. MbS has been steadily tightening his grip on the key instruments of power through the past 2-year period – national security apparatus and intelligence, armed forces and oil industry – in a grim power struggle with the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who has now lost the game and is retiring from the arena.
With the vast powers of patronage vested in MbS as the Crown Prince, make no mistake, the winner takes it all. In short, the Persian Gulf’s – nay, Middle East’s – power house is about to get a new ruler who is only 31 and he may lead Saudi Arabia for decades.
The timing of the shift in the power fulcrum cannot but be noted. It is exactly one month since US President Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia. Trump’s visit revived the Saudi-American alliance, which was adrift during the second term of President Barack Obama. MbS has emerged as the Trump administration’s number one interlocutor in the Saudi regime, superseding Nayef who used to be the favorite of the Obama administration.
MbS has forged links at personal level with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. In a rare gesture, the Prince invited Kushner and wife Ivanka Trump to his residence for a private meal during father-in-law Trump’s visit to Riyadh. So, Saudi-US relations from now onward will be a cozy, exclusive, secretive family affair imbued with a “win-win” spirit – as it used to be in the halcyon days when the Bush family was holding power in the US.
Trump’s visit to Riyadh signalled that Saudi Arabia has regained its stature as the US’ number one partner in the Muslim Middle East. Trump has publicly endorsed the Saudi stance in their standoff with Qatar, which, incidentally, is widely attributed to MbS.
MbS is widely regarded as the mastermind of the tough policy policy to isolate Qatar to make it submissive and has personally identified with the virulently anti-Iran thrust in the Saudi regional strategies. Therefore, MbS’ ascendancy impacts Middle East politics along the following fault lines:
· The war in Yemen;
· The standoff with Qatar;
· The Saudi-Iranian tensions;
· The nascent Saudi-Israeli regional axis;
· Situation in Syria and Gaza and/or Lebanon; and,
· The crackdown in Bahrain.
It remains to be seen whether the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can be preserved. MbS enjoys personal rapport with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. But other GCC states — Kuwait, Oman and Qatar — will have a profound sense of unease about the “warrior prince” and this may lead to some major realignments in the Persian Gulf.
On the one hand, MbS may advance a normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If that happens, Israel breaks out of isolation and the Arab-Israeli conflict can never be the same again. Again, it is conceivable that MbS may throw the Palestinians under the bus. On the other hand, Iran too may finally succeed in breaching the GCC cordon that Saudi Arabia had erected, which in turn, may somewhat blur the sectarian divide in the Muslim Middle East and bring about a convergence of interests with Qatar and Turkey as regards perceived Saudi hegemony.
MbS is a man in a hurry. He has radical ideas to transform Saudi society and its economy under the rubric of Vision 2030. He has brought in western-educated technocrats into the governmental apparatus, replacing the Old Guard. How the conservative religious establishment views these winds of change remains the big ‘unknown unknown’ — especially MbS’ management style such as his openness to out-of-the-box thinking, his uniquely public profile in a deeply conservative country, his risk-taking character and his willingness to break conventions.
There is indeed a lot of pent-up disaffection within Saudi Arabia, which makes the period of reform and transition very tricky. The example of Shah’s Iran readily comes to mind. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the big question is Who is the real MbS?
Clearly, his conduct so far cannot be the yardstick to fathom his personality, since it was primarily a swift, decisive action plan to elbow out the incumbent Crown Prince and take his job. Now that MbS’ actual hold over the levers of power is going to be unchallenged, his priorities can also change. Indeed, there are intriguing sides to his personality – his personal role in forging Saudi Arabia’s working relationships with Moscow, his determination to reduce the economy’s dependence on oil, his appeal to the Saudi youth as the harbinger of “change” and so on. The bottom line is that social and political stability in the country is vital for the success of Vision 2030, in which MbS has staked his prestige, envisaging wide-ranging structural reforms, geo-economic restructuring and the infusion of massive investments.
King Salman’s recent visit to China underscored that MbS understands the potential linkage between his Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Of course, China is highly receptive to the idea, too. Deals worth $65 billion were signed in Beijing during King Salman’s visit. Similarly, MbS has been a frequent visitor to the Kremlin and enjoys some degree of personal rapport with President Vladimir Putin. The OPEC decision on cut in oil production has been a joint enterprise in which Putin had a “hands-on” role. Rosneft has signalled interest in acquiring shares in Aramco when its “privatisation” begins next year, and at the recent meet of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the two countries agreed to set up a joint energy investment fund.
MbS, who is Saudi Defence Minister, has also intensified his country’s military cooperation with Russia and China. A notable project will be the Chinese drone factory to be set up in Saudi Arabia. Again, Russia is in talks currently for the sale of T-80 battle tanks to Saudi Arabia, among other weaponry.
Suffice to say, MbS is quite aware of the seamless possibilities that the multipolar world setting offers. It is useful to remember that MbS is a unique Saudi prince who never attended a western university. He is far from a greenhorn in the world of politics either, having begun as fulltime advisor to the council of ministers in 2007.
Indeed, his trademark is his assertiveness in foreign policies that stands in sharp contrast with the traditional Saudi style, and, which, therefore, looks aggressive. But then, it needs to be factored in that the war in Yemen and the strident anti-Iran outlook are immensely popular in the domestic opinion in terms of the surge of Saudi nationalism. The big question, therefore, will be how he deploys the surge of nationalism — amongst the youth, in particular — in his hugely ambitious plan to reform and modernise the country. Traditionally, Saudi rulers used to derive legitimacy from the approval of the Wahhabist religious establishment. (Read an Al Jazeera write-up on MbS’s profile here.)
Is ‘Tillerson Plan’ for Ties With Russia Connected to New US Sanctions Bill?
Sputnik | June 22, 2017
A leak of the “secret” document on developing US-Russian relations, which was supposedly prepared by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, has prompted a heated debate. Speaking to Sputnik, political analyst Viktor Olevich and Russian academic Andrei Sidorov shed light on what could lie behind “the Tillerson plan.”
A leak of the “secret plan” on developing a working relationship with Russia reportedly prepared by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson amid the increase in tensions with Moscow is by no means purely coincidental, experts told Sputnik, adding that one of the three paragraphs of the “plan” deserves special attention. On Monday John Hudson of BuzzFeed reported that the media outlet had obtained a document supposedly crafted by Tillerson which envisioned three major steps to further develop Russo-American relations.
The first step was to persuade Moscow to refrain from what the US sees as “aggressive” actions since it will be counterproductive for both sides. The second paragraph envisaged engagement with Russia on issues of strategic interest for the United States, including the ongoing war in Syria, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, cybersecurity and cyber espionage.
The third paragraph of Tillerson’s plan highlighted the importance of maintaining “strategic stability” with Russia.
“Right now, US-Russia relations are in the gutter. We want to make sure it doesn’t flush into the sewer,” a senior State Department official familiar with the document told the media outlet.
In his interview with Radio Sputnik, Russian political analyst Viktor Olevich noted that the third paragraph of Tillerson’s framework deserves special attention.
“This plan contains no original ideas. One should pay attention to the third point — the maintenance of strategic stability related to the nuclear programs of Russia and the United States; it is the most significant [part of the plan]. This is indeed the point of convergence, where both Moscow and Washington are interested in maintaining a constant dialogue,” Olevich said.
The political analyst noted that it was the US which made an attempt to upset the balance of power by installing elements of its global missile defense system in Europe, near Russia’s borders, following Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June, 2002. “This issue should become part of the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, because right now the US refuses to discuss it,” Olevich said, adding that one could only hope that the US position regarding these matters will change.
However, according to Olevich, as of yet there is no indication that Washington is interested in the normalization of Russo-American relations.
For instance, he referred to the downing of the Syrian Arab Army’s warplane in southern Raqqa by the US-led coalition’s aircraft.
The move prompted the Russian Defense Ministry to halt cooperation with the US within the framework of the Memorandum on the Prevention of Incidents and Ensuring Air Safety in Syria as of June 19.
Olevich added that the White House has yet to hand back two diplomatic compounds which were seized from Russia under Barack Obama. One is on Long Island and the other is located on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. The fact that the Trump administration has not yet settled this issue indicates that the US is not ready for the normalization of relations or a serious dialogue with Russia, the political analyst stressed.
For his part, the head of the Department of International Organizations and World Political Processes at Moscow State University, Andrei Sidorov, believes that the leak of the “secret plan” could be considered a signal to Congress that the White House is seeking room for maneuver.
Speaking to Sputnik, Sidorov highlighted that the leak coincided with the decision of House Republicans to block the Russian sanctions bill which had earlier passed the Senate. However, Sidorov assumed that it was not a coincidence. Citing Rep. Kevin Brady (R-Texas), The Hill reported that “the legislation has been flagged” by the House parliamentarian since it violated the constitutional requirement that “revenue bills originate in the House.”
“The development marks a major setback after the Senate overwhelmingly passed the legislation, which also includes new sanctions against Iran, last week in a 98-2 vote,” the media outlet pointed out.
The crux of the matter is that the bill envisions codifying the anti-Russian sanctions into law.
“By now [the anti-Russian sanctions] have been implemented as an executive order which could be canceled anytime by the US president. If they are adopted as a federal law, it would require Congressional approval to abolish them. These sanctions could remain in place for decades,” Russian academic Viktor Kheifets explained in his interview with Radio Sputnik last week.
The legislation targets Russia’s energy projects and debt-financing, most notably, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which is poised to deliver natural gas from Russia to Europe. According to Zero Hedge, an English-language financial blog, “if the House does pass [the bill], a huge diplomatic scandal would erupt only not between the US and Russia, but Washington and its European allies who have slammed this latest intervention by the US in European affairs… a scandal which the Democrats would also promptly blame on Trump.”
Indeed, Germany and Austria have already slammed the new anti-Russian sanctions, dubbing the US move as “an absolutely new and highly negative aspect of relations between the US and Europe.”
According to Sidorov, if the bill comes into force, it will significantly reduce the room for maneuver for the Trump administration in US-Russian relations and decision-making process.
“This is a good sign for the [Trump] administration that the process [of the consideration of the bill] was suspended in the House of Representatives, but the main task of combating this bill lies with the State Department,” Sidorov told Sputnik.
“Please note that some officials from the administration have already said that US President Donald Trump is not against the tightening of anti-Russian sanctions, but the State Department objects because it is necessary to build new relations. Therefore, the leak that the document [Tillerson’s plan] envisioning building new relations with the Russian Federation is being mulled [by the White House] refers to the internal political struggle within the US,” the Russian academic believes.
According to Sidorov, the document has sent a clear signal to Congress that the State Department is working on the issue of building new relations with Russia. What the Trump administration desperately needs is leeway in determining foreign policy, the academic stressed.
READ MORE:
White House Reportedly Seeks to Weaken Senate Bill on Russia Sanctions
US State Secretary Tillerson Reportedly Develops New Plan on Ties With Russia