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Explainer: What makes Iran’s Rezvan and Raad loitering munitions prized assets?

By Ivan Kesic | Press TV | January 15, 2025

During the Great Prophet 19 military drills, Iranian armed forces displayed and tested cutting-edge loitering munitions, highlighting rapidly advancing capabilities.

At an important military facility, the Rezvan loitering munition was officially unveiled in the presence of the media alongside new-age combat drones and precision-guided missiles.

At the same time, the Raad loitering munition underwent testing in western Kermanshah province.

Just days later, the Iranian military announced the delivery of a new fleet of 1,000 domestically produced drones. These advanced drones boast radar-evading capabilities and can strike targets over 2,000 kilometers away, further solidifying Iran’s growing defense prowess.

What is a loitering munition?

Loitering munitions, a class of expendable drones equipped with built-in warheads, are designed to “loiter” over a target area, waiting patiently for the perfect moment to strike by crashing into it.

Often referred to as suicide, kamikaze, or one-way-attack (OWA) drones, these weapons differ from their basic counterparts. Unlike preprogrammed kamikaze drones that function as mini-cruise missiles, loitering munitions can alter their mission mid-flight or even return to base if no target is detected.

Outfitted with sophisticated sensors, precision guidance systems, and versatile warheads, loitering munitions can search, identify, track, and engage both static and mobile targets with precision.

Depending on their model and design, they can hover for several minutes or even longer, with target acquisition managed either by a ground operator using real-time imagery or autonomously, without human intervention.

Compact, transportable, and easy to deploy, loitering munitions are extremely difficult to detect or intercept, making them a powerful tool for crippling enemy forces and morale.

In recent years, these drones have seen a surge in use, demand, and technological development, becoming a cost-effective, reliable alternative to traditional high-value platforms.

The Russia-Ukraine war highlighted their versatility, with long-range loitering munitions striking targets hundreds of kilometers away and tactical variants reshaping frontline battles.

Despite their growing prominence, there remains no foolproof defense against loitering munitions, particularly on the tactical battlefield. Existing countermeasures are expensive, limited in availability, and often unreliable, according to military experts.

The evolution of loitering munitions presses on, incorporating cutting-edge advancements such as enhanced sensors, AI-driven capabilities, jamming resistance, quieter and more efficient engines, and aerodynamic designs for seamless flight and agile dives.

These innovations continue to solidify their place as a game-changing weapon in modern warfare.

What are the characteristics of Raad and Rezvan?

Iranian military sources have unveiled the Raad and Rezvan loitering munition systems, providing their names, photos, and footage, though technical specifications remain sparse.

Footage of the Raad test was first shown in February last year, then as an unnamed weapon, while its name was revealed in recent days.

Last April, based on similarities to the Russian Lancet system, Iranian media estimated a flight endurance of 30 to 60 minutes, a range of 40 kilometers, and a warhead of 3 to 6 kilograms.

Rezvan, however, made its debut just last Thursday. Only its front half was visible, protruding from a cylindrical launcher. With a reported range of 20 kilometers and a 20-minute flight duration, it’s positioned as a short-range tactical drone.

Both drones feature tactical X-wings for enhanced maneuverability during dives but differ in launch methods. Raad utilizes a booster and is launched from a tripod, distinguishing it from Russia’s catapult-launched Lancet and Scalpel systems, which feature a different wing configuration.

Raad boasts four fixed lifting wings and four smaller tail fins, manually mounted before launch. Rezvan, on the other hand, has foldable wings that deploy mid-launch.

It is not known what kind of tail fins Rezvan has, as there are configurations without them, such as the Russian Izdeliye-53, nor what kind of propulsion it uses, but it is most likely a propeller.

Also, considering the aforementioned range, it is expected to have an electric motor that is significantly quieter than a fuel-powered piston engine, making it a greater surprise for the enemy when diving.

Raad and Rezvan have a similar rotatable pod with cameras and sensors positioned in the lower half of the nose, which distinguishes them from similar foreign drones.

One notable difference compared to last year’s and the recent launch of Raad is that the latter features an antenna installed vertically on the frame.

Both loitering munitions were developed by Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) military experts in cooperation with domestic knowledge-based companies.

Raad and Rezvan are ideal tactical equipment for protecting Iran’s borders in mountainous areas, especially in the northwest and southeast where foreign-backed terrorist groups operate.

In recent years, these groups, with knowledge of the local geography, have tried to bring their sabotage teams inside the country and in most cases were ambushed.

The newest loitering munition systems provide a more effective way to deal with such terrorist and sabotage groups at safe distances, without fear of human casualties.

What are similar Iranian and foreign systems?

The IRGC has made a big investment in the development of loitering munitions in recent years and a range of advanced systems have been employed in various military exercises across Iran.

Shahed-131, Shahed-136, Shahed-238 and Omid belong to the category of loitering munitions, but they differ in many ways from tactical Raad and Rezvan because they use gasoline engines, have a cropped delta-wing shape, a long-range (from 1,000 to 2,500 km) and are intended for strategic targets.

The latter category also includes Ababil-2, Raad-85, Arash-1 and Arash-2, cylindrical blunt-nosed fuselage designs, with different wing and fin configurations.

Smaller tactical drones similar to Raad and Rezvan are Shahin-1, Meraj 521, and Sina, all launched from tubes and with foldable wings and fins.

Partial similarities also exist with the 358 missile, a loitering munition intended for searching for and destroying air targets.

Of the foreign drones, the most similar based on the X-wing design are the Russian drones Lancet, Scalpel and Izdeliye-53, the German HX-2 and an unnamed North Korean loitering munition.

The Zionist regime’s media claimed that the Rezvan is an alleged “copy” of one of their X-wing Hero loitering munitions, however, there are significant differences in the design details, including frame, rotating pod, wings, tubes, etc.

Tactical tube-launched loitering munitions have multiple obstacles and are limited to a few basic designs, so there is not much room for radical new ones.

There is also no evidence that Rezvan does not predate its so-called archetypes and was developed long ago, as was the case with numerous other systems such as the Shahed-136 and 358-class missile, which were publicly presented years after the first sightings.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | | Leave a comment

Iranian President Addresses Trump Assassination Claims and Nuclear Stance

Sputnik – 15.01.2025

Iran has never tried to assassinate US President-elect Donald Trump, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Wednesday.

“This is another one of those schemes that Israel and other countries are designing to promote Iranophobia. … Iran has never attempted to nor does it plan to assassinate anyone. At least as far as I know,” Pezeshkian told the NBC news broadcaster.

Trump earlier accused Iran of what he called specific steps against him, adding that “the entire US military is watching and waiting.”

In September, the Trump campaign said in a press release that Trump had been briefed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence concerning possible assassination attempts by Iran on his life, adding that Iran is “terrified” of Trump’s strength and resolve and wants then-Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris to win the election because of her “weakness.”

On Trump’s Role in Middle East Conflict

“I do hope that Trump will conduce to peace in the region and the world, not conversely, contribute to bloodshed and war,” the president said.

On Possible US-Israeli Attack

When asked about Tehran’s response to a possible US-Israeli attack aimed at halting the Iranian nuclear program, Pezeshkian said that the country is ready for any development.
“Naturally enough, we will react to any action. We do not fear war, but we do not seek it,” the president said.

He also expressed hope that the situation would not deteriorate that far, as an open conflict would be “detrimental” to all actors.

On Nuclear Weapons

The president emphasized that the country does not seek to build nuclear weapons, though Iran is accused of creating it.

“We upheld all the commitments that we had to commit to,” he said when asked about Iran’s talks with major powers about its nuclear program. “But unfortunately, it was the other party that did not live up to its promises and obligations.”

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , | Leave a comment

Spend More, Expect Little: Trump Offers Taiwan an Uncertain Future

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – January 15, 2025

Taiwan faces mounting challenges as the Trump administration reshapes U.S. foreign policy, demanding greater defense spending while signaling reduced military support against China.

Trump’s anti-China politics will unlikely translate automatically into more defence cooperation with Taiwan. Looking to boost the American economy and reduce the American military footprint worldwide, the Trump administration’s fiscal demands from Taiwan are putting the latter in a bind that might force it to devise a new policy towards Beijing.

Trump’s Expectations From Taiwan

While it might have been usual for Taiwanese leaders to continue to expect US military and diplomatic support against China, Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House may go a long way in reversing the pattern of expectations in place since the 1950s. As it stands, Trump wants Taiwan to spend more on defence than the latter has been spending lately. In other words, while Trump may be inclined to offer Taiwan help against China, the framework within which this help can take place is going to change. This is turning into a major issue for Taiwan.

In October 2024, even before Trump became US president, he made sure that Taiwan will need to spend more on defence. Trump’s demand came despite the assurance he received that Taiwan was committed to spending about 2.5 per cent of its GDP. Trump, the candidate, disagreed to emphasise at least 10 per cent of GDP spending by Taiwan. (This is certainly much more than what, for instance, Trump wants NATO members to spend.) Trump, the president-elect, has not changed this position. This demand does not come out of nowhere. Trump sees this as to balance out with Taiwan. As it stands, Trump has a set of his own grievances against Taiwan. In an interview in July 2024, he said that the reason why Taiwan must pay more is because “They did take 100% of our chip business”. In 2023, he went to the extent of accusing Taiwan of “stealing American jobs”.

Trump, therefore, does not necessarily see Taiwan as a crucial ally against China. In addition to that, he also wants to ensure that this alliance brings material benefit to the US. In fact, he has complicated the scenario even more ever since winning the presidential race. In an interview given on December 8, Trump did not commit to militarily defending Taiwan – a major indicator of a shift in the policy of the Biden administration. On the contrary, he said that he has a very good relationship with China’s Xi and that the two have been communicating ever since his victory. Even if China attacked Taiwan to reclaim it, Trump, unlike Biden, made it clear that the US would not militarily defend it. Instead, his weapon of choice is economic: he aims to impose tariffs on China of up to 150% to 200% in case of a war.

That is certainly not good enough for Taiwan insofar as the policy of imposing tariffs – which is not certain to work always – will not help reverse China i.e., if it decides to militarily retake Taiwan and unify the territory. Where does it leave Taiwan? What can it do to prevent this from happening?

Taiwan’s Choices

A logical step for Taiwan would have been to connect with the US policymakers to impress on them the imperative of continuing to support them against China. This is what the Taiwanese leader is doing. US House Speaker Mike Johnson recently had a phone call with Taiwan’s president Lai. After this, the Taiwanese leader arrived in the US territories of Hawaii and Guam in early December. This trip – Lai’s first ever as President of Taiwan – was designed to garner support from the Trump administration. Although it is highly unusual for sitting Taiwanese leaders to visit the US, whether this visit will work to garner the necessary support from Washington or not is, however, questionable.

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, Republican Senator Marco Rubio, a prominent China hawk, is known to have sponsored legislation supporting high-level visits by Taiwanese officials to the US.  But he recently expressed confidence that a solution to any outstanding issues with China can be found, thus dampening the extent of support he can expect in the near future. What else can Taiwan do amidst such ambiguity?

The China Option

Lai’s visit to the US territories was as much meant to draw support from Washington as a provocation to China. But, in the wake of Trump withdrawing proactive support that characterised the Biden era, Taiwan could benefit from a policy of rapprochement with China. Earlier in 2024, Lai called on China to have a dialogue, but this call carried little importance insofar as it was overshadowed by Taiwan’s continuing militarization under the US auspices. For instance, the US approved US$2 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, including the first-time delivery of an advanced surface-to-air missile defence system. In late December, Joe Biden authorised another $571 million in Defense Department material and services and military education and training. Militarization tends to nullify offers of talk.

To give talks a genuine chance, Taiwan needs to take a different step. No one is advocating a complete demilitarisation but stopping further military aid and purchase of advanced weapons systems from the US for the moment – and when getting that support is already going to become quite costly due to Trump’s demand for spending 10 per cent of GDP – might create useful space for even China to pause and rethink its Taiwan strategy. China fears US support will allow Taiwan to formally declare independence. A pause in further militarization could be the appropriate message saying that formal independence is not on the cards. In short, Taiwan needs to excite China for talks. One proper step in that direction can make a huge difference.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Türkiye confirms attempt to attack key gas pipeline

RT | January 15, 2025

Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has confirmed that an attempted attack took place on the TurkStream natural gas pipeline last weekend.

The Russian Defense Ministry had earlier reported that Ukraine targeted the compressor station in Russia’s Krasnodar Region, which supplies gas to TurkStream. The attempted sabotage took place on Saturday and involved nine kamikaze drones launched by Ukrainian forces. According to the ministry, the attack was largely thwarted. One fixed-wing drone crashed close to a gas meter and caused minor damage, which was swiftly addressed by the facility’s personnel, it said.

Speaking to journalists at the Turkish parliament on Wednesday, Bayraktar confirmed that an attack had taken place and provided assurance that the pipeline’s operations had not been affected.

“There was no interruption in gas flow after the attack. The pipeline continues to deliver gas at the same capacity,” he said.

TurkStream is a critical energy corridor, transporting natural gas from Russia to Türkiye under the Black Sea. It also remains the sole route supplying Russian natural gas to southern and southeastern Europe after Ukraine refused to extend a gas transit agreement with Moscow this year.

In 2024, gas shipments via the pipeline increased by 23%, reaching 16.7 billion cubic meters (bcm). The pipeline comprises two sections: one serving Türkiye’s domestic needs, while the other transits gas to Bulgaria through the Strandzha station. This Balkan route extends through Bulgaria and Serbia to Hungary, with connections facilitating the distribution of Russian gas to other EU states. With a total capacity of 31.5 bcm annually, TurkStream plays a vital role in regional energy security.

Russian officials have accused Kiev of attempting to sabotage the energy link on multiple occasions in recent years. In response to the latest attack, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of continuing with its policy of “energy terrorism.”

READ MORE: Lavrov blames US for TurkStream attack
During a press conference on Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested that the US may have been involved in an attempt to sabotage the gas facility.

“I have a firm belief that the US needs no competitor in any fields, starting with energy,” Lavrov stated.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

The State of Western Warcraft

Deep Dive with Lee Slusher | January 12, 2025

In early 2023, the head of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Christopher Cavoli, remarked, “precision can beat mass.”1 This is true; precision can beat mass. But some countries now have the capability to render Western precision much less precise, both by “hard kill” (kinetic) and by “soft kill” (electronic). More to the point, these countries now possess both precision and mass, whereas the West is left to rely on a degraded version of the former and has long since abandoned the latter.

Power Projection versus National Defense

The “unipolar moment” of the post-Cold War period has led to thoroughly misguided notions about the nature of military power. Here it is important to understand the difference between power projection and national defense. Most militaries exist to provide the latter, i.e., the means by which to protect their nations from threats in their respective regions. Very few ever hold the ability to project power far from home.

But the US military primacy of recent decades, specifically the ability to wage and sustain war in far-flung locations, has become to many the hallmark of military power writ large. In this view, any nation unable to project power globally—essentially everyone except the US—is therefore inferior on the whole. This view is incorrect. What matters ultimately in war is the force that can be brought to bear, both the attacker’s and the defender’s, at the specific time and place it is needed.

Consider the conclusion many drew about Russia in the wake of the Assad regime’s collapse. “Russia is a paper tiger with nukes!” According to such thinking, Russia’s inability to continue propping up Assad, or its decision not to do so, somehow translated into weakness elsewhere, most notably in Ukraine. This, too, is incorrect.

When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, it was entirely uncontroversial to conclude that this operation was likely the limit of Russia’s power projection capabilities. Yes, the country has formidable strategic air, naval, and rocket forces, but these serve mainly as a deterrent. The primary focus of all other Russian forces is to defend Russia, especially on its Western and Southern borders opposite NATO. Here Russia remains incredibly strong. Similar logic applies to China. For instance, those who mock the country’s lack of a true “blue water” naval capability overlook the potency of that force in the waters that line China’s shores.

Operation Desert Storm was the watershed moment for the brief period of US military primacy. It occurred shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is an ongoing debate in military circles over the significance of Desert Storm. Both critics and supporters continue to misunderstand several key takeaways.

Critics point out that the US-led coalition had many months to amass a force in Saudi Arabia, did so uncontested (save the Scud missile attacks), and then smashed an inferior enemy. These things are all true. What critics fail to realize is that the ability to do all of this—diplomatically, economically, logistically, militarily, etc.—was itself an expression of extraordinary power. Moreover, they downplay the fact that this coalition really did possess operational technologies that others, including Russia and China, did not have at the time, as well as the innovations these asymmetries would prompt in weapons development in the years to follow. This was especially the case in Moscow and Beijing.

The primary failure of the war’s admirers, including many current rank and file in the US defense establishment, is to think such an operation is replicable today. They brush aside the fact that most members of the coalition still maintained their enormous Cold War-era forces, but have long since abandoned them. They exaggerate the current reach Western diplomatic influence and industrial capacity. Lastly, they cling unflinchingly to the notion of superior Western military technology. Such people are frozen in the amber of 1991.

The Fluid Nature of Capability Gaps

For decades, the US effectively had monopolies on many decisive capabilities, particularly in terms of deploying them at scale and with broad geographic reach. These included precision-guided munitions, night-vision, global strike, and others. The absence of high-intensity conflict between the US and other nations underscored this reality.

But the list of nations with advanced capabilities continues to grow, and capability gaps continue to narrow. In some cases, these gaps have closed, particularly in missile technology (including hypersonics), air defense, electronic warfare, and, more recently, unmanned systems. More importantly, and to the persistent disbelief of naysayers, some countries now have an edge over the US and its allies in some areas.

Push back hard enough on the arguments of NATO evangelists and one will find, eventually, the sole pillar on which their belief system rests. Such an exchange might begin with their boasting about Tomahawk cruise missiles. By the time these projectiles lazily make their way to their intended targets, and assuming most are not shot down or defeated electronically, Russian missiles—superior in speed, range, and payload—will have already been launched. Some will have already struck, and the others will trail behind them.

Consider the Oreshnik, for which there are no publicly known countermeasures. The prevailing theory is that the Oreshnik is a redesigned intermediate-range ballistic missile that carries six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, each of which carries six projectiles. It is capable of striking targets across Europe, and elsewhere, within minutes. Although the Oreshnik is nuclear capable, such warheads would be unnecessary—short of Armageddon—given the missile’s range, speed, and destructive power. This is a key point. Russia is trying to achieve strategic overmatch while removing the need for nuclear weapons. Perhaps it already has. This would be checkmate, at least in terms of a conventional war.

Of what use is the Oreshnik? There are the obvious answers, like striking NATO’s missile systems, bases, and factories, but there is a much more significant target set. Central to NATO’s plan for a defense of Europe is the expectation that American and Canadian troops and materiel would reinforce the continent, and the US was always the long pole in this tent by far. But how would they get there? Airlift would be insufficient; it simply lacks the necessary throughput. Such a conflict would require mass, and mass moves by sea. One could assume Russia keeps European ports under persistence surveillance, including on the ground. With the Oreshnik and other missiles, Russia could destroy the ports within a half hour, supplying follow-on strikes as necessary. The continent would be left with whatever it had on hand. The weakest link would become the primary one, and everything in Europe would remain vulnerable to continued strikes from Russia’s over-the-horizon systems.

Here NATO’s defenders play their perceived trump card, airpower. However, many of these aircraft are outdated while many of Russia’s have grown more advanced. Furthermore, along its periphery with NATO, Russia has the most advanced air defense network and electronic warfare complex in existence. The latter has already proven effective against many of the very technologies on which NATO’s entire way of war depends, particularly GPS-guided bombs.

All of their hopes appear to be pinned on the F-35. It all comes down to this plane, an aircraft dubbed Lightning even though it has demonstrated difficulty flying in that very weather. Could the F-35 defeat all these many threats? No one knows and that is the most honest answer anyone could provide. Neither the US nor anyone else has flown against such formidable threats—ever. Doing so would be an extraordinary gamble and ought to be understood explicitly as such. Here many suffer from a potentially terminal case of “F-35 brain” for which catastrophic defeat might be the only remedy.

Anyone who thinks China lacks similar capabilities, perhaps with the exception of an Oreshnik analogue, is a fool. Consider the possibility of a US-led defense, or even a resupply, of Taiwan in the event of a war with China, a wildly popular fantasy within the US foreign policy establishment. China has built a robust sensor-to-shooter capability that links spaced-based and terrestrial surveillance with many thousands of missiles capable of striking targets well into the adjacent skies and seas. Even if the US had sufficient armaments to support such a war (it does not), the country lacks the sealift and the ability to penetrate Chinese defenses. The entire notion of such an operation is militarily and logistically illiterate. It belongs mostly to the polished history obsessives with no real-world operational experience who populate the thinktank ecosystem.

Contrary to Western talking points, Iran possesses at least some of these capabilities. Yes, much of Iran’s war machine is rickety, but these lackluster elements coexist alongside advanced capabilities. Western governments and media celebrated the “defense” of Israel in April and October of 2024. They derided Iran’s missiles as “crude” despite the fact that the projectiles penetrated Israel’s air defense en masse and struck sensitive targets. That Iran did not execute a wide-ranging, catastrophic assault was wrongly interpreted as a lack of ability instead of as a sign of restraint. Iran responded to Israel’s provocations by messaging that it did not want a wider war and, critically, by previewing some of its high-end offensive capabilities. Regarding Israel, one should also consider the Houthi’s ability to send missiles to Tel Aviv even in the presence of the US’s premier air defense systems, known as THAAD.

Forces and Sustainment

It is common in the West, particularly among NATO member nations, to point to charts that display collective strengths in men and materiel. These graphics depict total personnel, including reservists, and tallies of a range of vehicles, artillery pieces, aircraft, and other tools of war. Such things display nicely on a PowerPoint slide. The assumption here is that synergy would occur in a conflict, that together these disparate factors would form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. While the thirty-thousand-foot view can be instructive in some instances, this is not one of them.

Individually, most Western militaries possess combat power similar to or only marginally greater than that of gendarmeries (militarized police forces capable of dealing with extensive, internal civil disturbances). As such, their suitability for foreign deployment is limited to peacekeeping operations and the provision of humanitarian aid—and, even then, only under conditions in which the warring parties are sufficiently weak or disinclined to engage them in combat. The ability of such militaries to defend their own countries from foreign threats faces similar limitations. Even the once-mighty British Army could field, at most, three brigades.

To be clear, a handful of Western militaries are larger and more capable than their anemic brothers, though none possesses its former mass. What then of their collective ability, the large and the small? Such a thing is difficult to establish, much less to maintain, without frequent, large-scale exercises in which participants stress-test every step of the “road to war” and do so as a collective. This would include: the mobilization, training, and equipping of reservists; the deployment of forces from garrisons to staging areas to front lines; fire and maneuver across wide geographic areas; and many other things. This last happened during Exercise Campaign Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) in 1993. NATO has since opted for small, infrequent exercises, often involving only command elements or limited operational forces. Even then, the exercises revealed further deficiencies. Yes, these countries have since gained many years of experience in peacekeeping in the Balkans and in low-intensity combat in Afghanistan, but such experiences occurred under ideal conditions, most notably air superiority and uncontested supply lines.

A far more pressing problem is the current state of defense industrial production throughout the West. Though some of us have made this point for years, reality has finally begun to make its way into the mainstream discourse beyond the confines of the defense and foreign policy commentariat. In December 2024, The Atlantic published an article titled, “The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military.”2 The piece noted, correctly, that the US is incapable of supplying Ukraine with sufficient weapons and ammunition to sustain high-intensity combat against Russia. This would be true even if Ukraine had the necessary manpower (it does not). It went on to question, again correctly, whether the US could manufacture enough materiel to fight a high-intensity war of its own. The US could not do this at present or at any point in the immediate years to come, and its allies are in an even more perilous position.

Like with the charts that show aggregate strengths in Western manpower, vehicles, etc., many derive the wrong conclusions from total Western economic might. Think of this as “collective delusion over collective GDP.” The years of fighting in Ukraine have revealed shortfalls in both production and stockpiles throughout the West. Yet, many persist in the belief that the sum of Western economic power means victory against Russia—whether in the proxy war in Ukraine or a potential direct war with NATO—is assured. “Russia is an economic dwarf!,” they shout.

GDP is but one measure of economic mass, and often a misleading one. For instance, except in extreme comparisons between the richest and poorest nations, GDP says little about the economic wellbeing and day-to-day quality of life of a regular person. It says even less about a country’s capacity to make war. Again, what matters in combat is the force that can be brought to bear and at the specific time and place it is needed. A similar logic applies to the production and distribution of armaments. In Western nations, GDP consists largely of things like professional services, real estate, and non-military government spending. In other words, collective GDP cannot be loaded into a howitzer and fired at the enemy.

The relationship between GDP and military power exists only to the extent a nation can turn wealth into weapons. The height of America’s ability to do this was during World War II, a conflict from which incorrectly-derived lessons continue to plague us. The US turned Detroit into a massive armaments factory, and did much the same throughout the rest of the country. Not only did the US have the factories at the time to do this, it also had the know-how. With the loss of domestic manufacturing came the disappearance of many of its necessary skill-sets. Then there are the supply-chain realities, which are just as stark. Those who claim the US could fight a war against China need to explain how the country could produce sufficient weapons and ammunition while also relying on its enemy for so many of the necessary material inputs. Then, of course, there is the question of how to pay for all of this.

Reckoning with Reality

A common criticism of arguments such as mine is the supposed implication that the West’s adversaries are somehow omnipotent or invincible. This is a misunderstanding at best and a strawman at worst. Again, one must consider the intended purpose of a military and its associated design. The US’s post-World War II military was sufficient to contest Soviet influence. The post-Cold War era enabled the growth of the “rules-based international order,” particularly as former foes struggled through the stages of domestic strife and economic reorientation. But the game has changed.

In more recent years, the US’s most powerful competitors built formidable national defenses capable of contesting Western power projection. These nations correctly identified and adapted to the asymmetries between their own forces and those of the hegemon. They did not dismantle and outsource the industrial machinery necessary to sustain the defense of their respective homelands. Thus, their rise occurred in tandem with imperial decline. But throughout the West, so strong was the perception of perpetual US military primacy that America’s allies willingly accepted their own decades-long slide into military impotence.

The current balance of military power between the US and its adversaries reveals a symbiosis. The US is incapable of projecting power sufficient to subjugate its adversaries, but these adversaries are even less capable of projecting power against the US homeland—at least for n


This piece belongs to the thematic series, “Flipping the Board.”

(1) https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-war-scale-out-of-proportion-with-nato-planning-cavoli-2023-2

(2) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/12/weapons-production-munitions-shortfall-ukraine-democracy/680867/

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

The Predictable Collapse of Pan-European Security

By Professor Glenn Diesen | January 15, 2025

The international system during the Cold War was organised under extremely zero-sum conditions. There were two centres of power with two incompatible ideologies that relied on continued tensions between two rival military alliances to preserve bloc discipline and security dependence among allies. Without other centres of power or an ideological middle ground, the loss for one was a gain for the other. Yet, faced with the possibility of nuclear war, there were also incentives to reduce the rivalry and overcome the zero-sum bloc politics.

The foundation for a pan-European security architecture to mitigate security competition was born with the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which established common rules of the game for the capitalist West and the communist East in Europe. The subsequent development of trust inspired Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and his Gaullist vision of a Common European Home to unify the continent.

In his famous speech at the UN in December 1988, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would cut its military forces by 500,000 soldiers, and 50,000 Soviet soldiers would be removed from the territory of Warsaw Pact allies. In November 1989, Moscow allowed the fall of the Berlin Wall without intervening. In December 1989, Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta and declared an end to the Cold War.

In November 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed, an agreement based on the principles of the Helsinki Accords. The charter laid the foundation for a new inclusive pan-European security that recognised the principle of “the ending of the division of Europe” and pursuit of indivisible security (security for all or security for none):

“With the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in our security relations while fully respecting each other’s freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others”.

An inclusive pan-European security institution based on the Helsinki Accords (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) was eventually established in 1994 with the foundation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE Bucharest Document of December 1994 reaffirmed:

“They remain convinced that security is indivisible and that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States”.

NATO Expansion Cancels Pan-European Security

Yet, security in Europe came in direct conflict with America’s ambitions for global hegemony. As Charles de Gaulle had famously noted, NATO was an instrument for US primacy from across the Atlantic. Preserving and expanding NATO would serve that purpose as the US could perpetuate Russia’s weakness and reviving tensions would ensure that Europe’s security dependence could be converted into economic and political obedience.

Why manage security competition when there is one dominant side? The decision to expand NATO cancelled the pan-European security agreements as the continent was redivided, and indivisible security was abandoned by expanding NATO’s security at the expense of Russia’s security. US Secretary of Defence William Perry considered resigning from his position in opposition to NATO expansion. Perry also argued that his colleagues in the Clinton administration recognised NATO expansion would cancel the post-Cold War peace with Russia, yet the prevailing sentiment was that it did not matter as Russia was now weak. However, George Kennan, the architect of the US containment policy against the Soviet Union, warned in 1997:

“Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom”.[1]

NATO was continuously described as the “insurance guarantee” that would deal with Russia if NATO expansion would create conflicts with Russia. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained in April 1997: “On the off-chance that in fact Russia doesn’t work out the way that we are hoping it will… NATO is there”.[2] In 1997, then-Senator Joe Biden predicted that NATO membership for the Baltic States would cause a “vigorous and hostile” response from Russia. However, Biden argued that Russia’s alienation did not matter as they did not have any alternative partners. Biden mocked Moscow’s warnings that Russia would be compelled to look towards China in response to NATO expansion and joked that if the partnership with China failed to deliver, then Russia could alternatively form a partnership with Iran.[3]

Russia Continued to Push for a Greater Europe

When it became evident that NATO expansionism would make the inclusive OSCE irrelevant, President Yeltsin and later President Putin attempted to explore the opportunity for Russia to join NATO. They were both met with a cold shoulder in the West. Putin also attempted to establish Russia as America’s reliable partner in the Global War on Terror, but in return, the US pushed another round of NATO expansion and “colour revolutions” along Russia’s borders.

In 2008, Moscow proposed constructing a new pan-European security architecture. It was opposed by Western states as it would weaken the primacy of NATO.[4] In 2010, Moscow proposed an EU-Russia Free Trade Zone to facilitate a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which would provide mutual economic benefits and mitigate the zero-sum format of the European security architecture. However, all proposals for a Helsinki-II agreement were ignored or criticised as a sinister ploy to divide the West.

Ukraine was “the brightest of all redlines” for Russia and would likely trigger a war, according to the current CIA Director William Burns.[5] Nonetheless, in February 2014, NATO-backed a coup in Kiev to pull Ukraine into NATO’s orbit. As predicted by Burns, a war began over Ukraine. The Minsk agreement could have resolved the conflict between NATO and Russia, although the NATO countries later admitted that the agreement was merely intended to buy time to arm Ukraine.

The Collapse of Pan-European Security

Gorbachev concluded that NATO expansionism betrayed the Helsinki Accords, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and the OSCE as agreements for pan-European security:

NATO’s eastward expansion has destroyed the European security architecture as it was defined in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The eastern expansion was a 180-degree reversal, a departure from the decision of the Paris Charter in 1990 taken together by all the European states to put the Cold War behind us for good. Russian proposals, like the one by former President Dmitri Medvedev that we should sit down together to work on a new security architecture, were arrogantly ignored by the West. We are now seeing the results.[6]

Putin agreed with Gorbachev’s analysis:

We have done everything wrong…. From the beginning, we failed to overcome Europe’s division. Twenty-five years ago, the Berlin Wall fell, but invisible walls were moved to the East of Europe. This has led to mutual misunderstandings and assignments of guilt. They are the cause of all crises ever since.[7]

George Kennan predicted in 1998 that when conflicts eventually start as a result of NATO expansionism, then NATO would be celebrated for defending against an aggressive Russia:

I think it is the beginning of a new cold war… There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves…. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are —but this is just wrong.[8]

Within the West, it has been nearly impossible to warn against the predictable collapse of European security. The only acceptable narrative has been that NATO expansion was merely “European integration”, as countries in the shared neighbourhood between NATO and Russia were compelled to decouple from the largest state in Europe. It was evident that redividing the continent would recreate the logic of the Cold War, and it was equally evident that a divided Europe would be less prosperous, less secure, less stable, and less relevant in the world. Yet, arguing for not dividing the continent is consistently demonised as taking Russia’s side in a divided Europe. Any deviation from NATO’s narratives comes with a high social cost as dissidents are smeared, censored and cancelled. The combination of ignorance and dishonesty by the Western political-media elites has thus prevented any course correction.


[1] G.F., Kennan, ‘A Fateful Error’, The New York Times, 5 February 1997.

[2] T.G. Carpenter and B. Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality. Cato Institute, 1998, p.205.

[3] G. Kaonga, ‘Video of Joe Biden Warning of Russian Hostility if NATO Expands Resurfaces’, Newsweek, 8 March 2022.

[4] G. Diesen and S. Wood, ‘Russia’s proposal for a new security system: confirming diverse perspectives’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.66, no.4, 2012, pp.450-467.

[5] W.J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal, New York, Random House, 2019, p.233.

[6] M. Schepp and B. Sandberg, ‘Gorbachev Interview: ‘I Am Truly and Deeply Concerned’’, Spiegel, 16 January 2015.

[7] N. Bertrand, ‘PUTIN: The deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West is the result of many ‘mistakes’’, Business Insider, 11 January 2016.

[8] T.L. Friedman, ‘Foreign Affairs; Now a Word From X.’, The New York Times, 2 May 1998.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Timeless or most popular | , , | Leave a comment

Prepare for war – NATO chief

RT | January 15, 2025

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has called on members of the US-led military bloc to adopt a “wartime mindset” and significantly increase defense spending, citing supposed threats from Russia and other nations.

The bloc’s “future security is at stake,” Rutte claimed in his opening remarks at a meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Defense in Brussels on Wednesday. He accused Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran of attempting to “weaken our democracies and chip away at our freedom.”

“To prevent war, we need to prepare for it. It is time to shift to a wartime mindset,” Rutte asserted, urging NATO states to fund “more and better defense capabilities.”

Rutte noted that while NATO members have increased defense investments and intensified military exercises these efforts are “not sufficient to deal with the dangers coming our way in the next four to five years.”

Rutte also prioritized backing Ukraine to “change the trajectory of the war,” in a tacit recognition of Kiev’s reversals on the conflict front line.

Moscow has repeatedly denied assertions that it represents a threat to any NATO member states and has instead accused the US-led bloc of waging a proxy war against Russia and encroaching on its territory.

Last month, President Vladimir Putin said that practically all NATO states are currently at war with Russia. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also noted on Tuesday that history appears to be repeating itself, suggesting that there were “obvious parallels” between Moscow’s current confrontation with NATO and the attempts of Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler to take over Russia after subjugating dozens of European countries.

On Tuesday, Rutte announced that NATO would bolster its presence in the Baltic Sea – a strategic area for Russian naval operations and energy exports – by launching a new mission under the pretext of protecting undersea infrastructure.

The NATO chief revealed that this presence will involve frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and a “small fleet of naval drones” that are expected to provide “enhanced surveillance and deterrence.”

The announcement follows an incident involving a Cook Islands-registered oil tanker, the Eagle S, which allegedly damaged the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland and Estonia last month. The EU has warned that it could impose sanctions on Moscow over what EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has described as the “deliberate destruction of Europe’s critical infrastructure” using a “shadow fleet” of tankers, which supposedly includes the Eagle S.

While the tanker has been detained by Finnish authorities, no conclusive evidence has been presented regarding its involvement in the alleged sabotage.

Moscow has not commented on the incident.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Progressive Hypocrite | , | Leave a comment

Without job opportunities in their homeland, Colombians are recruited by Kiev

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 14, 2025

NATO’s proxy war against Russia through Ukraine has shown significant changes in various aspects, particularly regarding the participation of foreign mercenaries. While, at the start of the war, the flow of fighters was predominantly composed of individuals from Europe and the United States, a notable shift occurred throughout 2024, with a considerable increase in mercenaries from Latin America, especially Colombia. The driving factor behind this growing presence of Latin American fighters is not ideological, but rather economic, with many of these soldiers seeking a way to survive financially abroad, considering the extreme poverty in their home countries.

Colombia, one of the nations most affected by economic inequality in Latin America, serves as an example to understand this reality. With a large portion of the population living below the poverty line, many Colombians see themselves with few viable alternatives to improve their financial situation. For many Colombians, military service appears to be one of the few legal options that guarantees some level of financial stability, albeit modest. However, with scarce job opportunities and a struggling economy that fails to offer appealing alternatives, the chance to participate in the war in Ukraine, where mercenaries’ payments can be much higher, becomes attractive to many ex-soldiers who were previously trained in the Colombian armed forces.

The situation in Ukraine, however, does not turn out to be a “simple battlefield” for these mercenaries, as it might have seemed initially. When the first foreign fighters arrived, particularly Europeans and Americans, many saw the war as an opportunity to test their skills or even to partake in an “adventure.” However, as the conflict intensified, it became clear that the reality of the Ukrainian battlefield was far more brutal than many had imagined. Modern warfare, with its predominant use of heavy artillery, airstrikes, and large-scale exhausting confrontations, is an environment unfamiliar to soldiers who, like many Colombians – as well as Brazilians and other Latin soldier – were used to urban combat and guerrilla warfare, where the use of light weapons at short distances is common.

The transition to this type of combat, where air superiority and the constant use of long-range artillery are key determinants, shocked many of these mercenaries, turning their participation in the war into a true nightmare. The lack of air support, the difficulty of evacuation, and the constant presence of well-equipped and well-trained Russian forces in various directions made the combat experience far more dangerous than expected. Many of these mercenaries, especially those with little experience in high-intensity combat, ended up becoming easy targets. The losses are immense, and, according to some reports, a large portion of the Colombian mercenaries sent to Ukraine did not survive.

Despite the rising casualties, the Ukrainian government has tried to mask the difficulties faced by foreign mercenaries, disguising the losses and the lack of effectiveness of these fighters. However, the reality on the ground is far less favorable. The mercenaries have failed to change the game in Ukraine’s favor, and the promised financial gains for participating in the conflict seem to have been an illusion for many. The harsh conditions of combat, the human losses, and the lack of concrete results make the situation for the mercenaries, particularly the Latin Americans, increasingly bitter.

The loss of life among Colombian mercenaries, who represented a significant portion of the foreign fighters, reflects not only the failure of the strategies adopted by the West but also the human costs of this war as a whole. While political and military elites in Western countries remain distant from the suffering on the battlefield, the reality for mercenaries is a direct confrontation with death, often without prior reconnaissance or appropriate support.

And the problems go beyond that. For Colombia, a country already marked by decades of internal conflict, this new generation of mercenaries, who, if they survive, may return to their homeland radicalized and experienced in combat, could become a real ticking time bomb. In the same vein, recent news has emerged about pro-Ukrainian Colombian mercenaries being arrested in Venezuela for a conspiracy to assassinate Nicolás Maduro. In practice, the surviving mercenaries will likely become professional criminals, willing to serve Western interests for money anywhere in the world – especially in their home region.

From all perspectives, the involvement of Latin American mercenaries in Ukraine is a human, social, and economic tragedy. It is urgent to develop efficient mechanisms to prevent ordinary people from Global South countries from accepting to participate in foreign wars defending the interests of hostile powers.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

January 15, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , | 1 Comment

MAINSTREAM STOKES FEAR OVER BIRD FLU

The HighWire with Del Bigtree | January 10, 2025

Legacy media and world health agencies continue to ratchet up the bird flu fear factor, despite the fact not a single human death has been caused from the virus. With mere days left for the Biden Administration in office and stockpiles of outdated H1N1 vaccines at the ready, skeptics are concerned it’s not just coincidence.

January 14, 2025 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Science and Pseudo-Science, Video | | Leave a comment

No Proof MMR Vaccine Is ‘Safer’ than Measles, Mumps or Rubella Infection, Physician Group Says

By Suzanne Burdick, Ph.D. | The Defender | January 14, 2025

The risk of permanent disability or death from the MMR vaccine may be greater than the risk posed by measles, mumps or rubella infection because large enough vaccine safety studies haven’t been done, according to a collection of new documents released by Physicians for Informed Consent (PIC).

The collection includes disease information statements for measles, mumps and rubella, and a vaccine risk statement for the MMR vaccine.

According to the Mayo Clinic, measles is a viral infection typically accompanied by a skin rash, fever, cough, runny nose, sore throat, inflamed eyes and tiny white spots on the inner cheek.

Mumps and rubella also are viral infections. According to PIC, all three viral infections typically resolve on their own with proper rest and hydration in almost all cases.

Dr. Shira Miller, PIC’s founder and president, told The Defender, “The main takeaway is that the MMR vaccine has not been proven safer than measles, mumps and rubella.”

PIC is a nonprofit that delivers data to doctors and the public so they can “evaluate the data on infectious diseases and vaccines objectively, and voluntarily engage in informed decision-making about vaccination.”

Miller explained that the MMR vaccine clinical trials didn’t include enough subjects to be able to prove that the risk of permanent disability or death from the vaccine is less than the risk of permanent disability or death from measles, mumps or rubella.

The number of measles, mumps or rubella infections that result in permanent disability or death is so low that researchers would need to have at least 50,000 subjects in a clinical trial to be able to show that the vaccine is safer than the disease.

The MMR vaccine’s clinical trials fall very short of that benchmark, according to PIC’s statement on MMR vaccine risk.

Prelicensure clinical trials for vaccines, including the MMR shot, are “relatively small and usually last no longer than a few years,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) 2024 “Manual for the Surveillance of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases.”

The 2024 edition of the CDC manual doesn’t specify exactly how many subjects are in these “relatively small” trials. However, the 2011 edition stated that “relatively small” meant that such trials are “usually limited to a few thousand subjects.”

The rate of disability or death among healthy children from any of those three diseases is incredibly rare. PIC wrote:

“For children under age 10 at normal risk (i.e., with normal levels of vitamin A and infected after birth), the pre-vaccine annual risk of death or permanent disability from measles, mumps, and rubella respectively was 1 in 1 million, 1 in 1.6 million, and 1 in 2.1 million. …

“Therefore, the cumulative annual risk of a fatal or permanently disabling case of any of those diseases was about 1 in 500,000, and the risk over a 10-year span was 1 in 50,000.”

In other words, clinical trials would need at least 50,000 subjects to detect one case of death or disability from a measles, mumps or rubella infection.

Meanwhile, no safety studies on the MMR vaccine have been done that looked for possible genetic mutations, impaired fertility or cancer, according to the product’s package insert.

Also, seizures from the MMR vaccine occur five times more often than measles-related seizures.

Dr. Liz Mumper, a pediatrician, praised PIC for releasing the collection of data on measles, mumps and rubella, and on the MMR vaccine.

“Most parents have not had access to the information contained in the thoughtful analysis done by Physicians for Informed Consent. Parents should recognize that the risk of bad outcomes from a measles infection — if their child lives in a developed country with clean water and is not immune-deficient — is extraordinarily rare, as PIC reports.”

Unfortunately, she added, recent U.S. media reports “sensationalized” the risks of measles.

What’s typically missing from measles media reports

PIC’s statement on measles cited numerous facts commonly overlooked in many media reports on measles outbreaks, including:

  • The U.S. measles mortality rate dropped dramatically before a measles vaccine was introduced in 1963.
  • Immunity from the MMR vaccine wanes so that by age 15, roughly 60% of vaccinated children are susceptible to subclinical measles virus infections.
  • Studies have suggested a link between a naturally acquired measles infection and a reduced risk of Hodgkin’s and non-Hodgkin’s lymphomas.
  • Studies also suggested a link between a naturally acquired measles infection and a lower risk of asthma, eczema and hay fever.
  • Malnutrition — particularly vitamin A deficiency — is a primary cause of over 100,000 measles deaths in underdeveloped countries.

Mumper said that the risk of bad outcomes from a measles infection drastically declined with improved public health and better nutrition long before MMR vaccines were available.

“The risk of bad outcomes has always been more for children in developing countries who are more likely to have nutritional deficiencies including vitamin A and lack access to clean water,” Mumper added.

This article was originally published by The Defender — Children’s Health Defense’s News & Views Website under Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please consider subscribing to The Defender or donating to Children’s Health Defense.

January 14, 2025 Posted by | Science and Pseudo-Science | , , , | Leave a comment

What will a “European Armenia” bring?

By Erkin Oncan | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 14, 2025

The Armenian government has approved a draft law to initiate the country’s accession process to the European Union (EU). This proposal will be discussed in parliament before being put to a referendum.

European Parliament rapporteur Miriam Lexmann celebrated this development, stating, “I wholeheartedly welcome the Armenian government’s decision to begin the EU accession process.”

However, the Russian side has reacted negatively to this decision. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Armenia cannot simultaneously be a member of both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk also commented, “We interpret this as the beginning of Armenia’s withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union. The Russian Federation will shape its economic policy toward Armenia accordingly,” comparing EU membership to “purchasing a ticket for the Titanic.”

Armenia’s Journey Towards Europe

Armenia and the EU have a long history of interaction.

In 1996, Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, and in 2001 it became a member of the Council of Europe. Moreover, Armenia has benefited from the TACIS program, a European Commission initiative that provided technical assistance to former Soviet states to adapt to market-oriented economic systems.

In 2004, Armenia strengthened its ties with the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), joined the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009, and, despite joining the Eurasian Economic Union in 2013, approved the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU in 2017. In 2018, the Velvet Revolution brought Nikol Pashinyan to power, accelerating democratic reforms.

Armenia has now become the seventh former Soviet country to initiate European integration. This political shift mirrors the tug-of-war between the EU and EAEU, as well as NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Can Armenia Join the EU?

Although Armenia is not geographically part of Europe, like Georgia, it strives to align itself with “European values and cooperation processes.” From a European perspective, Armenia’s significance stems not from its adherence to these values but from its geographic proximity to Russia and Iran.

EU membership is a challenging and lengthy process—a path that only three former Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have successfully completed. Other countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have long been politically shaped by their EU aspirations, experiencing intense internal conflicts between pro-Russian and pro-EU factions, often tied to so-called “color revolutions.” These parallels suggest that Armenia’s membership process could also stretch over many years. Furthermore, Armenia’s economic ties with Russia present significant challenges.

According to data from the Armenian Statistical Committee covering January-April 2024, trade between Armenia and Russia increased 3.1 times, while trade with EU countries decreased by 24.3%. During this period, Armenia’s trade volume with Russia reached $6.3 billion, whereas its trade volume with the EU was $695.5 million—making trade with Russia nearly nine times greater than that with the EU. Military ties between Armenia and Russia also remain a major topic of public debate.

For Armenia to fully “Europeanize,” it must entirely overhaul its economic system. However, the insistence of both the EU and Pashinyan’s administration on this path could lead to a deep economic crisis and political instability. This might result in Armenia entering the EU as a weakened state, perceived as a burden by EU leadership.

The EU’s primary objective appears to be not Armenia’s full membership but the continuation of the accession process, using it to advance strategic interests. A “European” Armenia would serve as a geopolitical defeat for Russia.

Broader Implications

Discussions around Armenia’s regional and international dynamics are often shaped in Turkey by nationalist narratives sown by imperialist forces, perpetuating historical prejudices that undermine solidarity among neighboring peoples. However, developments in Armenia carry significant clues about the future of the broader region.

Erkin Öncan, Turkish journalist focusing on war zones and social movements around the world.

Twitter: https://twitter.com/erknoncn Telegram: https://t.me/erknoncn

January 14, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

New Book – LONG LIVE NOVICHOK!

By John Helmer • Unz Review • January 14, 2025

Novichok is the notorious warfighting poison which has killed no one but fooled everyone.

At least that’s how British Government officials, their scientists, chemical warfighters, policemen, media reporters, and trailing after them all, their judges, intend the story to be told.

Theirs is the story of the assassination, ordered by President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and attempted on March 4, 2018, by two military officers tracked and filmed to every location but not the murder scene; with a weapon not detected at the scene nor in the blood streams and bodily tissues of their murder targets.

The victims, Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal, have been made to disappear and are either incommunicado in prison or dead. The only direct testimony which has been recorded voluntarily in front of witnesses was given by Yulia Skripal, in hospital four days after the attack, when she identified the assassination attempt as having been carried out with poison spray by an attacker who was not Russian, just minutes before she and her father collapsed. She meant the poison was British; the assassin British.

The motive for the Novichok crime turns out to be hearsay by British government against the Russian government.

In political and military terms, the Novichok poison story is propaganda between enemies at war. Judgement of what happened to the Skripals is a weapon of this war. And so it has turned out that there has been no court trial or test of the Novichok narrative, according to British law. Instead, there has been a proceeding which looked like a court trial but wasn’t; in which the Skripals were represented by police interrogators and by lawyers who said nothing; presided over by a judge who wasn’t.

In other words, a show trial in a time of war.

The truth of what happened has no military or political value, certainly not to the prosecuting British side; not much to the defending Russian side. But as the evidence has surfaced piecemeal over the past five years since the first investigation was published in February 2020 as Skripal in Prison, the truth reveals that Novichok was ineffective as a poison, but very successful as a deception operation by the British. They reversed the hands of the assassin, planted a British-made chemical weapon to look like a Russian one; invented the death of bystander Dawn Sturgess to substitute for Sergei and Yulia Skripal who didn’t die; and suppressed the evidence of what had happened – witnesses, videotapes, toxicology, autopsy records.

Not quite all the evidence, however. This book has been written to reveal new evidence to conclude that Sergei Skripal was a triple agent attempting to return to Russia. His rescue, the exfiltration operation by the Russian military intelligence organisation (GRU), used decoys to mislead the British surveillance and conceal the escape plan. But the British anticipated and decided to act preemptively, attacking both Skripals, reversing culpability, and convicting the Russians for the British crime.

Not one of the legal, medical, police, or government officials engaged in the Novichok story — neither the Skripal nor the Sturgess parts of the narrative — answered the many questions put to them during the seven-year course of the case and of this book. The three lawyers purportedly engaged to represent Sergei and Yulia Skripal were the most silentious of all; their names don’t warrant repeating. Not much better were the lawyers representing Dawn Sturgess’s family’s money claim, especially their lead counsel Michael Mansfield.

This blanket of misrepresentation, evasion, and silence which they have thrown over themselves and over the evidence in the case is proof of the intention to deceive. So determined is this intention, the deceivers don’t realize how preposterous are the results. The colour of Novichok, for example, reported as a state secret in Chapter 74.

A direct request to researchers publishing on A-234 around the world has revealed that the Iranians who reported synthesizing the chemical agent in 2016, reply that it is colourless. The British, Americans, Czechs, and Koreans who have done the same laboratory work, refuse to answer. And yet, despite all the preliminary vetting by British intelligence agents, years of double-checking by British officials, and months of closed-door sessions and redactions ordered by Lord Hughes, chairman of the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry, the truth managed to slip out. A man named Josep Vivas, a Spaniard living in Barcelona, was the unintended, unguarded source.

Vivas was a vice president of Puig, the company which manufactures and sells the bottled perfume which in the British Novichok story has been turned into the Russian murder weapon. “I am making this statement,” Vivas signed for the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry on February 12, 2024, “in addition to a letter I provided on 27 July 2018. Prior to me writing and signing that letter, I was shown a number of images of a small perfume bottle branded ‘Nina Ricci Premier Jour Perfume’. The images I viewed were under police exhibit reference [redaction tagged VN551/10]. I was shown further images of a perfume box labelled as ‘Premier Jour Nina Ricci’. This was under police exhibit reference [redaction tagged VN521/3]. On Friday 2nd February 2024, I was again shown the images of [redaction tagged VN551/10] and [redaction tagged VN521/3] before signing this statement and I set out my observations on them below.”

The photographs of the poison bottle shown in the public hearing on November 28, 2024, were censored — a large black mark was pasted across the bottle contents. But British agents had shown Vivas the photographs just days after July 11, 2018, when the bottle was purportedly discovered at the Sturgess crime scene. Vivas was shown the photographs again more than five years later, just before he testified before Hughes. He saw the bottle without the black mark.

Censored police photograph of Novichok poison weapon, a perfume atomizer bottle, allegedly found on a kitchen bench at Rowley-Sturgess home eleven days after Sturgess and Rowley were hospitalized. The black mark conceals the British Government’s lie.

The key observation Vivas confirmed he had seen on both occasions was this: “The liquid inside the bottle. Premier Jour perfume is pale pink, and from the photos I observe that the liquid contained in the bottle is yellow.”

If the perfume is pink; if Novichok is colourless; if the liquid in the murder weapon was yellow, then the liquid in the murder weapon cannot have been Novichok. QED — Quod erat demonstrandum, as the ancient lawyers and logicians used to conclude their proofs. The colour yellow was a British fabrication; the black mark was British camouflage. The secret slipped out into the open by British mistake.

From whom are the British keeping their secret? Can it be the Russians who, according to the official Novichok narrative, have made, stored, and used it against the Skripals, but have yet to learn what colour it is?

The Russian handling of the Skripal affair is a different story. It has been defensive on the evidence claimed by the British government; ineffective in breaking the silence imposed on the Skripals.

These outcomes were inevitable once it is concluded, in retrospect, that Sergei Skripal was attacked to prevent his return to Moscow as a triple agent; and that the Russian military operation to rescue him had been thwarted by the British.

These two truths, if published officially, leaked to the press, or reported in independent investigations, stood little chance of being believed outside Russia. More certainly, official Russian admission of the two truths, if it had been made, would have condemned the Skripals to the death that was attempted by the British against them on March 4, 2018.

Less explicable is the outcome that for seven years now, Russian press reporting of the case has ignored the investigative reporting published in English in the UK and US, and then the evidence revealed during the Hughes hearings in London between October and December 2024. This is an understandable result of the line dictated by the Kremlin’s and Foreign Ministry’s media departments for protecting the lives of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, and for salvaging what remained of Anglo-Russian relations on the road to war in the Ukraine.

In the chapters to follow, President Putin’s and Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statements can be examined in the political context and news sequence in which they were made.

From the beginning, the Russian Embassy in London issued formal requests for consular access to the Skripals and protest notes when this was denied by the Foreign Office. In reply to British stonewalling on access and propagandizing the allegations against the Russian government, the Embassy issued a detailed summary of every action Russian officials had taken and the statements they made.

The one option the Embassy in London did not take was to engage British lawyers to obtain a hearing and an order of habeas corpus in the High Court to compel the appearance of the Skripals to testify for themselves. This option was obvious to the Embassy and lawyers in London between March 21, 2018, when the Home Office went to the court for legal authority to allow blood testing of the Skripals, and April 9, when Salisbury District Hospital announced that Yulia Skripal had been released; and then on May 18 when Sergei Skripal was also discharged from hospital.

During this period it was reported that Yulia was able to telephone her cousin Viktoria in Russia. Years later, as Chapters 67, 71, and 73 reveal, it became clear in retrospect that Yulia had recovered consciousness in hospital much earlier than the hospital allowed to be known, and that doctors had then forcibly sedated her. At the time the Russian Embassy was announcing it “questioned the authenticity” of the statements issued by the London police and media on Yulia’s behalf. The Embassy was right; it was not believed.

It is possible the Embassy did attempt to engage barristers to go to court for a habeas corpus hearing for the Skripals, but learned that no one would take the case. At the time I made an independent request for this engagement to the well-known human rights barristers in London; the outcome was that none agreed to represent the Skripals. The refusals were point-blank – no one would give a reason.

British officials anticipated that an effort might succeed in forcing a High Court hearing, however. So, on May 24, 2018, a one minute fifty-five second speech by Yulia Skripal was presented on video in which she spoke from a script and appeared to sign a statement. Referring to “offers of assistance from the Russian Embassy,” she claimed “at the moment I do not wish to avail myself of their services.” Skripal’s Russian text spoke of “help” from the Russian Embassy: “now I don’t want and [I am] not ready to use it.”

“Obviously, Yulia was reading a pre-written text,” the Russian Embassy responded publicly. “[This] was a translation from English and had been initially written by a native English-speaker… With all respect for Yulia’s privacy and security, this video does not discharge the UK authorities from their obligations under Consular Conventions.”

Excerpted frames from Yulia Skripal’s brief videotaped appearance at a US nuclear bomber base in England on May 2018; watch the tape in full here.

By subtle signals, Skripal indicated she was being made to speak and to sign under duress. Two script pages were visible on a side table during the filming; the one on top Skripal was filmed signing. The two papers were in a different handwriting from Skripal’s signature and in a different pen from the pen she is seen to use. On the top page, apparently the Russian language text, Skripal added words after her signature; these are her first and family names in Russian, but without her patronymic, as Russians usually record their names in official documents. The handwriting of that name and the handwriting of the Russian statement are not the same. Nor the pen and ink used. Ten weeks earlier, on March 8, 2018, Yulia had woken from a coma in hospital and signaled to the doctor at her bedside that she had been attacked by the British, not by the Russians. Read this evidence for the first time in the new book.

At first, Putin he seemed unprepared on the facts of the case – the Russian facts – and unprepared for the British government’s propaganda blitz.

The president cannot have been unprepared. On March 15, 2018, the Kremlin revealed that at a Security Council meeting on that day Putin was briefed by the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the intelligence chiefs. “While talking about international affairs,” the official communiqué said, “the Council members held an in-depth discussion on Russia-UK relations against the backdrop of Sergei Skripal’s case. They expressed grave concern over the destructive and provocative position of the British side.”

The line which Putin and his advisers decided at that meeting they planned to follow in public was revealed by Putin three days later at a press conference. He tried to feign ignorance himself, and then dissimulated on the weapon, the motive, and the opportunity. “Regarding the tragedy you have mentioned,” Putin told reporters, “I learned about it from the media. The first thing that comes to mind is that, had it been a warfare agent, the victims would have died immediately. It is an obvious fact which must be taken into account. This is first.”

“The second is that Russia does not have such chemical agents. We destroyed all our chemical weapons, and international observers monitored the destruction process. Moreover, we were the first to do this, unlike some of our partners who promised to destroy their chemical weapons but have not done so to this day, regrettably. Therefore, we are ready for cooperation, as we said immediately. We are ready to take part in any investigations necessary, provided the other side wants this too. We do not see their interest so far, but we have not removed the possibility of cooperation on this matter from the agenda.”

“As for the overall situation, I believe that any reasonable person can see that this is total nonsense. It is unthinkable that anyone on Russia would do such a thing ahead of the presidential election and the FIFA World Cup. Absolutely unthinkable. However, we are ready for cooperation despite the above things. We are ready to discuss any issues and to deal with any problems.”

On April 4, 2018, he said: “We do not expect anything other than for common sense to ultimately prevail and for international relations not to be damaged the way we have seen recently. This goes not only for this case, the attempt on Skripal’s life. This has to do with other aspects of international relations as well. We should stay within the framework of healthy political processes based on fundamental norms of international law, and then the situation in the world will become more stable and predictable.”

On May 18, at a news conference following a meeting with then-Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, Putin said: “Now regarding Mr Skripal. Yes, I also heard from the media today that he has been released from hospital. We wish him the best of health, we are really very happy. I have several considerations in this respect. First. I think if a combat-grade nerve agent had been used, as claimed by our British colleagues, the man would have died on the spot. A nerve agent is so powerful that a person dies instantly or within several seconds or minutes. Fortunately, he is alive, he got well, was released from hospital and I hope he will live a healthy and safe life.”

“As to the investigation, on our part we offered every assistance in the investigation to our British partners on a number of occasions, and asked for access to this investigation. There has been no response so far. Our proposals remain in place.”

Putin was accusing the British government of a cover-up, but softly, by innuendo. “The most objective explanation to what happened”, he said on May 25, “can be only provided as a result of a thorough, unbiased and joint – the latter is very important – investigation. We proposed working on it together from the very beginning, but as you know, the British side rejected our offer and investigated the incident alone. It is also a fact, as this was announced at the very beginning, that the victims were poisoned – if it was a poisoning – with a chemical warfare agent. I have spoken about this before, but I will say again that although I am not an expert on chemical warfare agents, I can imagine that the use of such agents should result in the almost instantaneous death of the victims. Thank God, nothing like this happened in the case of the Skripals, and that Skripal himself and his daughter are alive, have been discharged from hospital and, as we have seen on television, his daughter looks quite well. Thank God, they are alive and healthy.”

“Therefore, I believe it would be wrong to say that it was a chemical warfare agent. If so, everything the British side has said can be called into question. How can we settle this? We should either conduct a comprehensive and objective joint investigation, or stop talking about it because it will only worsen our relations.”

If Putin was trying to ameliorate these relations with London, he tried, six months later, to appear to be condemning Sergei Skripal, burying both him and the reciprocal espionage the two governments were conducting against each other. Was Putin calculating that if the British had tried but failed to kill both Skripals, he might yet save their lives? Understandably, no Russian could acknowledge this — certainly not then and not now.

In a Moscow forum in October 2018, six months after the Salisbury incidents, Putin responded to questions from a US journalist. “As regards the Skripals and all that, this latest spy scandal is being artificially inflated. I have seen some media outlets and your colleagues push the idea that Skripal is almost a human rights activist. But he is just a spy, a traitor to the motherland. There is such a term, a ‘traitor to the motherland,’ and that’s what he is. Imagine you are a citizen of a country, and suddenly somebody comes along who betrays your country. How would you, or anybody present here, a representative of any country, feel about such a person? He is scum, that’s all. But a whole information campaign has been deployed around it.”

“I think it will come to an end, I hope it will, and the sooner the better. We have repeatedly told our colleagues to show us the documents. We will see what can be done and conduct an investigation. We probably have an agreement with the UK on assistance in criminal cases that outlines the procedure. Well, submit the documents to the Prosecutor General’s Office as required. We will see what actually happened there. The fuss between security services did not start yesterday. As you know, espionage, just like prostitution, is one of the most ‘important’ jobs in the world. So what? Nobody shut it down and nobody can shut it down yet.”

“[Question] Ryan Chilcote: Espionage aside, I think there are two other issues. One is the use of chemical weapons, and let’s not forget that in addition to the Skripal family being affected in that attack, there was also a homeless person [Dawn Sturgess] who was killed when they came in contact with the nerve agent Novichok.”

“[Answer] Vladimir Putin: Listen, since we are talking about poisoning Skripal, are you saying that we also poisoned a homeless person there? Sometimes I look at what is happening around this case and it amazes me. Some guys came to England and started poisoning homeless people. Such nonsense. What is this all about? Are they working for cleaning services? Nobody wanted to poison… This Skripal is a traitor, as I said. He was caught and punished. He spent a total of five years in prison. We released him. That’s it. He left. He continued to cooperate with and consult some security services. So what? What are we talking about right now? Oil, gas or espionage? What is your question? Let’s move on to the other oldest profession and discuss the latest developments in that business. (Laughter.)”

The British Prime Minister Theresa May and her ambitious rival, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, ignored Putin’s request to put the Skripal affair aside. Instead, they escalated, publishing photographs of police and intelligence agency surveillance of the Russian military officers who were then charged with the attempted Novichok murder. Putin was put on the defensive again.

The British inventors of Novichok – left to right — Alexander Younger, head of MI6, and Mark Sedwill, National Security Advisor and Cabinet Secretary, created the Novichok plot to prevent Sergei Skripal returning to Moscow and to persuade Prime Minister Theresa May, then her successor Boris Johnson, to escalate their war against Russia.

On September 12, 2018 – seven days after the Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service announced their charges against Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov – Putin was asked who were they were. “Either they deliberately poked their faces towards the camera in order to be photographed, or they are completely unprofessional to have their images captured by all the cameras. Perhaps you have a third theory?”

“Vladimir Putin: Actually, we have, of course, taken a look at these people. We already know who they are, and we have located them. I hope they will show up and tell everyone about themselves. This would be better for everyone. I assure you that there is nothing special or criminal here. We will see shortly.”

“Sergei Brilyov: Are they civilians?”

“Vladimir Putin: Of course, they are civilians.”

“Sergei Brilyov: All right, we will wait.”

“Vladimir Putin: I would like to address them, so they can hear us today. Let them come to a media outlet and tell everything.”

The results followed swiftly – an interview by Russia Today (RT), the state media agency, with the two accused Russians pretending to have been innocent tourists; then British and US intelligence data leaked through the Bellingcat organization. These propaganda episodes can be followed in Part I of the book. Putin decided not to add fuel to this fire; he ignored questions about the Skripal case for seven months, until June of 2019.

“Do you think that there is a possibility of some improvement in Anglo-Russian relations,” he was asked by the editor of the Financial Times of London on June 27, 2019, “– and that we can move on from some of these issues that are obviously of great sensitivity, like the Skripal affair?”

“As a matter of fact,” Putin answered, “treason is the gravest crime possible and traitors must be punished. I am not saying that the Salisbury incident is the way to do it. Not at all. But traitors must be punished. This gentleman, Skripal, had already been punished. He was arrested, sentenced and then served time in prison. He received his punishment. For that matter, he was off the radar. Why would anybody be interested in him? He got punished. He was detained, arrested, sentenced and then spent five years in prison. Then he was released and that was it. As concerns treason, of course, it must be punishable. It is the most despicable crime that one can imagine.”

The president had promoted Skripal from “scum” who deserved his fate to “gentleman” who had been punished enough. Putin’s purpose was to propose again to the British that they set aside the Novichok narrative and opt instead for improving the bilateral relationship at the government level, and sticking to business as usual; by that Putin meant oligarch business.

“Listen, all this fuss about spies and counter-spies, it is not worth serious interstate relations. This spy story, as we say, it is not worth five kopecks. Or even five pounds, for that matter. And the issues concerning interstate relations, they are measured in billions and the fate of millions of people. How can we compare one with the other? The list of accusations and allegations against one another could go on and on. They say, ‘You poisoned the Skripals.’ Firstly, this must be proved.”

“Secondly, the average person listens and says, ‘Who are these Skripals?’ And it turns out that Skripal was engaged in espionage against us [Russia]. So this person asks the next question, ‘Why did you spy on us using Skripal? Maybe you should not have done that?’ You know, these questions are infinite. We need to just leave it alone and let security agencies deal with it. But we know that businesses in the United Kingdom (by the way, I had a meeting with our British colleagues in this same room), they want to work with us, they are working with us and intend to continue doing so. And we support this intent.”

“I think that Mrs May, despite her resignation, could not help but be concerned that these spy scandals made our relations reach a deadlock so we could not develop our ties normally and support business people, who are doing what? They do not only earn money, this is what is on the outside. They create jobs and added value, plus they provide revenue at all levels of the tax system of their countries. This is a serious and multifaceted job, with the same risks you mentioned, including risks related to business operations. And if we add an unpredictable political situation, they will not be able to work at all. I think that both Russia and the United Kingdom are interested in fully restoring our relations. At least I hope that a few preliminary steps will be made. I think it would be easier for Mrs May, maybe, because she is leaving and is free to do what she thinks is right, important and necessary and not to bother about some domestic political consequences.”

Putin believed that through the Financial Times he was appealing to the business lobbies in London to push back against the war faction in Whitehall. The appeal was in vain.

In parallel, in an elaborately staged dialogue with the US filmmaker Oliver Stone, Putin allowed some of the truth to slip out. “What has happened to Skripal? Where is he?” Stone asked.

President Putin with Oliver Stone at the Kremlin. The interview was recorded on June 19, 2019; it was delayed in release for a month until July 19, 2019.

“Vladimir Putin: I have no idea. He is a spy, after all. He is always in hiding.”

“Oliver Stone: They say he was going to come back to Russia. He had some information.”

“Vladimir Putin: Yes, I have been told that he wants to make a written request to come back.”

“Oliver Stone: He knew still and he wanted to come back. He had information that he could give to the world press here in Russia.”

“Vladimir Putin: I doubt it. He has broken the ranks already. What kind of information can he possess?”

“Oliver Stone: Who poisoned him? They say English secret services did not want Sergei Skripal to come back to Russia?”

“Vladimir Putin: To be honest, I do not quite believe this. I do not believe this is the case.”

“Oliver Stone: Makes sense. You do not agree with me?”

“Vladimir Putin: If they had wanted to poison him, they would have done so.”

“Oliver Stone: Ok, that makes sense. I don’t know. Who did then?”

“Vladimir Putin: After all, this is not a hard thing to do in today’s world. In fact, a fraction of a milligram would have been enough to do the job. And if they had him in their hands, there was nothing complicated about it. No, this does not make sense. Maybe they just wanted to provoke a scandal.”

“Oliver Stone: I think it is more complicated. You know, you think I am much too much of a conspiracy guy.”

“Vladimir Putin: I do not believe this.”

In the Kremlin record of Putin’s references to the Skripal affair, these remarks of mid-2019 were the final word from the president. Putin and Stone were telling the truth of what had happened, and why.

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January 14, 2025 Posted by | Book Review, Deception | , | 1 Comment