The EU will have to resume dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the Ukraine conflict, the European Commission’s chief spokesperson has admitted.
The bloc reduced its contacts with Moscow since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 in an effort to “isolate” Russia. This approach led to the EU being virtually sidelined from the negotiating table since last February, when US President Donald Trump launched efforts to mediate peace between Moscow and Kiev.
“Obviously, at some point, there will have to be talks also with President Putin,” Paula Pinho stated on Monday, claiming that the EU was “working very, very hard for peace.” She also blamed Moscow for the slow progress of the peace talks by asserting that Brussels was “not seeing any signs” of Russia engaging in any negotiations.
Russian officials have met their US counterparts at various levels on numerous occasions since February, including a summit between Putin and Trump in Alaska last August. The American president said last month that the peace talks were in the “final stages.”
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators also held several rounds of direct talks in Türkiye last year, after early negotiations between the parties stalled in spring 2022 after Kiev withdrew.
Moscow has also repeatedly stated it is ready to engage in peace talks with Kiev and its European backers. In December, presidential aide Yury Ushakov told journalists that Western leaders were welcome in Moscow for talks, but maintained that “the Europeans are refusing all contacts.”
Several European leaders have changed their rhetoric on Russia over the past months. In December, French President Emmanuel Macron stated it would be “useful” to reengage in talks with Putin. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni supported the idea last week by saying it was time for the EU to talk to Russia.
January 13, 2026
Posted by aletho |
Militarism | European Union, Russia, Ukraine |
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In May 2000, at a Workshop on Aluminum in Vaccines held in Puerto Rico, Dr. Michael Gerber from the National Institutes of Health posed a question to Dr. Norman Baylor of the Food and Drug Administration. The exchange, preserved in the workshop transcript, deserves to be read in full:
Dr. Gerber: “The standard of 0.85 milligrams of aluminum per dose set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations—can you tell us where that came from and how that was determined?”
Dr. Baylor: “Unfortunately, I could not. I mean, we have been trying to figure that out. We have been trying to figure that out as far going back in the historical records and determining how they came up with that and going back to the preamble to the regulation. We just have been unsuccessful with that but we are still trying to figure that out.”
A senior FDA official publicly admitted the agency could not explain the basis for its own regulation on aluminum content in vaccines. This was not a fringe question posed by an outsider. It came from an NIH official at an official government workshop. And the FDA’s answer was that they had searched their historical records and come up empty.
That was twenty-five years ago. In the intervening decades, the 0.85 mg limit has remained unchanged. It continues to govern vaccines administered to infants, children, and adults worldwide. And the question of where it came from—the foundational safety studies that would justify exposing newborns to this amount of injected aluminum—has never been answered.
Until now, no one had followed the documentary trail that regulators themselves claimed existed.
The Documents That Exist
In 2025, a team of French researchers—Loïc Angrand, Romain K. Gherardi, and Guillemette Crépeaux—published the results of a detailed investigation into the regulatory history of aluminum limits in vaccines. Their paper, appearing in Environmental Toxicology and Pharmacology, traces the documentary trail that regulatory agencies had apparently never followed.
The researchers began with the 2011 Federal Register, where they found this statement: “The aluminum content per dose in the formulation of a licensed biological product, as specified in § 610.15(a), reflects the NIH Minimum Requirements for Diphtheria Toxoid (1947) and Tetanus Toxoid (1952).”
These two documents—the 1947 and 1952 NIH Minimum Requirements—are the foundational texts cited as the basis for current aluminum limits. The researchers set out to obtain them.
A Freedom of Information Act request (Case Number 63550) was submitted to NIH and the National Library of Medicine in February 2025, requesting copies of these documents. On March 7, 2025, the NLM responded: “The NLM and Office of NIH History and Stetten Museum searched its files and no records responsive to your request were located.”
The recommendation was to check with the FDA History Office, “as the Department of Biological Standards became the FDA.” When contacted, the FDA’s Foreign Regulatory Communications Coordinator replied: “I was unable to find the information that you are seeking. You may be able to obtain the requested documents by submitting a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the National Institutes of Health (NIH).”
A circular response: NIH directing them to FDA, FDA directing them back to NIH.
Eventually, after persistent efforts, the researchers obtained both documents from the FDA—8 pages and 19 pages respectively.
What the Documents Actually Say
The analysis of these foundational texts reveals something straightforward: they are not about aluminum safety. They are not about aluminum toxicity. They are about manufacturing diphtheria and tetanus toxoids.
The 1947 document on diphtheria toxoid and the 1952 document on tetanus toxoid describe composition, production methods, and quality criteria for the toxoids themselves. They address cultivation techniques, detoxification using formaldehyde, identity tests, and sterility requirements.
The only reference to general safety testing describes a brief animal observation: “A safety test shall be made on the contents of a final container… The parenteral injection… shall cause neither significant symptoms nor death. At least 2 animals of each species are used and the observation period is not less than 7 days.”
Seven days. Two animals per species. This is the extent of safety testing described in the documents that supposedly establish safe aluminum limits for human infants.
On the subject of aluminum itself, the documents contain a single relevant statement: “In all instances the amount of aluminum used shall be the minimum needed to accomplish the purpose intended.”
This is a statement about efficacy—using enough aluminum to achieve the desired immune response—not about the maximum amount that can be safely injected. The documents do not evaluate aluminum toxicity. They do not establish a toxicological threshold. They do not consider cumulative exposure, developmental windows, or long-term effects.
The researchers’ conclusion is direct: “Neither document discusses Al toxicity.”
From Efficacy Limit to “Safety Standard”
The historical record allows us to trace how an efficacy-based recommendation became encoded as regulatory law and eventually treated as a validated safety threshold.
In 1966, a Canadian study referenced allowances by British, Canadian, and American regulators for 15 mg of potassium alum per dose of toxoid—corresponding to 0.85 mg of elemental aluminum. This amount was derived from data on immunological effectiveness, not toxicological safety.
In 1968, the NIH codified this figure in the Federal Register, stating that an adjuvant “shall not contain more than 0.85 milligrams of aluminum.”
In 1972, regulatory authority over biological products transferred from NIH to FDA. The maximum aluminum levels remained unchanged.
In 1981, the FDA aligned regulations with World Health Organization standards for hepatitis B vaccines, maintaining the 0.85 mg limit while permitting up to 1.25 mg in certain circumstances with approval.
The 2011 Federal Register explicitly cited the 1947 and 1952 NIH documents as the basis for current standards—the same documents that, as we now know, contain no toxicological evaluation of aluminum.
At no point in this seven-decade regulatory history did anyone conduct or cite studies establishing safe thresholds for injected aluminum in humans. The limit was set based on what worked immunologically. It was transferred between agencies. It was aligned with international standards. And it came to be treated as a safety benchmark—a threshold below which harm is assumed not to occur.
Two years after Baylor’s admission that the FDA could not explain the origin of the 0.85 mg standard, he co-authored a paper with two other FDA officials stating: “The amount of 15 mg of alum or 0.85 mg aluminum per dose was selected empirically from data that demonstrated that this amount of aluminum enhanced the antigenicity and effectiveness of the vaccine.”
Selected empirically for efficacy. Not derived from toxicological studies. Not validated for safety. The FDA itself acknowledges the standard was set based on what boosted immune response, not on what was proven safe to inject.
The Studies That Were Never Conducted
The absence of foundational safety studies is not merely a historical artifact. It reflects an ongoing gap that regulatory agencies have acknowledged but never filled.
In 2015, researchers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published a paper examining cumulative and episodic vaccine aluminum exposure in young children. The paper, led by Jason Glanz, contained a remarkable admission: there was “complete absence, in children as well as in adults, of population-based studies on the long-term tolerance” of aluminum-based adjuvants.
The CDC was not claiming such studies had been conducted and showed safety. They were acknowledging such studies had never been done—while demonstrating that the data to conduct them existed.
In 2019, FOIA requests were submitted to both NIH and CDC asking for “copies of any human or animal studies involving the subcutaneous or intramuscular injection of aluminum adjuvant relied upon by the NIH to establish the safety of injecting infants and children with aluminum hydroxide, aluminum phosphate or amorphous aluminum hydroxyphosphate sulfate.”
The NIH response: “The NIH Office of Intramural Research (OIR), National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) searched their files and no records responsive to your request were located.”
The CDC and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry response: “A search of [the agency’s] records failed to reveal any documents pertaining to your request.”
No records. From either agency. For studies establishing the safety of a practice that has continued for a century.
What Happens When Someone Runs the Study
The rarity of proper safety studies makes the exceptions worth examining closely.
In 2010, Chinese researchers published a large multicenter, double-blind, randomized trial comparing anti-H1N1 vaccines with and without aluminum hydroxide, alongside an aluminum-free placebo. This study—involving 12,961 participants—represents the only major trial to have included a true neutral placebo when evaluating aluminum-adjuvanted vaccines.
The results were unambiguous. Across all tested antigen doses, the vaccine containing aluminum produced significantly more adverse events than both the placebo and the same vaccine formulated without aluminum. The methodologist Peter Gøtzsche calculated from this data that aluminum-based adjuvant increased the frequency of severe adverse events by 2.5 to 3 times.
The study had limitations—it observed participants for only three days after each dose and therefore could not assess long-term or cumulative effects. But within its observational window, it demonstrated measurable harm attributable specifically to the aluminum adjuvant.
This finding stands largely alone. The standard practice in vaccine trials is to use aluminum-containing solutions as “placebos”—a methodology that renders the specific effects of aluminum invisible by comparison. When both test and control groups receive aluminum, any adverse effects common to both will not appear as a signal.
Dr Christopher Exley, a leading aluminum researcher, has argued that aluminum adjuvants should not be used as placebos in clinical trials for precisely this reason: it eliminates the baseline needed to detect adjuvant-specific harms.
The predictable response to concerns about injected aluminum is comparison to dietary intake—the argument that 0.85 mg is trivial relative to what we consume in food and water. This comparison is pharmacokinetically meaningless. Ingested aluminum passes through the gastrointestinal tract, where the vast majority is excreted without absorption. Injected aluminum bypasses this barrier entirely, entering tissue directly as particulate matter that immune cells engulf and transport throughout the body, including to the brain. These are not equivalent exposures.
In 2022, a systematic review pooled 102 randomized controlled trials comparing aluminum adjuvants to placebo or no intervention. The conclusion: serious adverse events may be increased, with a risk ratio of 1.18—but the evidence was graded “very low certainty” and the trials were underpowered to detect rare harms. After nearly a century of use in billions of doses, the best available meta-analysis cannot determine whether aluminum adjuvants cause serious harm. The authors of that review did not frame this as reassuring. They framed it as uncertainty. The field has simply never produced the high-quality, adequately powered trials that would be standard for any other long-term injected product.
January 13, 2026
Posted by aletho |
Science and Pseudo-Science, Timeless or most popular | FDA, NIH, United States |
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