NATO To Take ‘Quantum Leap’ in Military Spending, Pledging 5% of GDP Baseline
By Connor Freeman | The Libertarian Institute | June 24, 2025
Each member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is expected to ink a pledge to raise military spending to 5% of GDP over the next ten years. This is more than double the current 2% goal. Responding to President Donald Trump’s demands for greater spending, member states will agree to the new baseline in the Netherlands during an alliance summit this week. On Monday, the eve before the summit, this proposal was referred to as a “quantum leap” by Secretary General Mark Rutte.
Under the compromise deal, by 2035, each member state will commit a minimum of 3.5% of their GDP to “core military needs,” along with 1.5% to be earmarked for cybersecurity, infrastructure, and other security components.
“The defense investment plan that allies will agree [to] in The Hague introduces a new baseline, five percent of GDP to be invested in defense,” Rutte told reporters.Despite alliance concerns over Madrid’s refusal to commit to the 5% spending figure, which would necessitate a military yearly budget of nearly $90 billion, Rutte emphasized Spain will not be allowed to “opt-out.” He said, “NATO does not have as an alliance opt-outs, side deals, etcetera, because we all have to chip in.”
Moreover, Rutte insists the new spending will go toward producing thousands of tanks and a five fold increase in the production of air defenses. The NATO chief declared, “Our focus is ensuring that we have all we need to deter and defend against any threat.” Rutte added the summit will see strong support for Ukraine and noted the “most significant and direct threat facing this alliance remains the Russian Federation.”
The alliance has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine that has seen hundreds of thousands of casualties with Ukraine losing roughly 20% of its territory.
With the US taking the lead, by 2021, defying Russia’s core security concerns and provoking conflict, Ukraine was being treated as a de facto NATO member. Rutte’s predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg, admitted that, under his leadership in the lead up to the war, the Washington-led bloc refused to take potential membership for Kiev off the table in negotiations even though Moscow had made clear that would prevent an invasion.
The policy has not changed. “Last year in Washington, NATO allies agreed that for Ukraine there is an irreversible path of Ukraine to enter NATO. And that is still true today, and it will still be true on Thursday after this summit,” Rutte told reporters.
However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly will be “largely sidelined” at the summit’s main event. With Biden gone and Trump now in office, Rutte said Europe will work to cover the difference in US spending on the Ukraine war. He added that Europe and Canada have spent $40 billion on the war thus far this year. Washington is still providing Kiev with military and other aid, along with targeting intelligence.
Rutte’s comments also took aim at Tehran, the NATO chief said his “greatest fear” is Iran gaining a nuclear weapon that would give it a “stranglehold” over Israel. Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and prior to Tel Aviv’s unprovoked war against the Islamic Republic, the consensus among US intelligence agencies was Tehran is not trying to build nuclear weapons. Israel – which is not a party to the NPT – has an undeclared nuclear arsenal estimated to contain as many as 300 warheads.
The US carried out an illegal act of war, bombing Iran’s internationally safeguarded nuclear energy facilities over the weekend. This is a blatant violation of the UN charter. Trump ordered the massive attack without congressional authorization as required per the US Constitution. When questioned about the legality of the strikes, Rutte proclaimed “I would not agree that [what the US did] is against international law.”
Trump is demanding a $1 trillion US military budget. While Rutte is currently focused on Moscow and fueling the Ukraine war, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth recently boasted he is preparing the American military to defend the island of Taiwan, to “fight and win — decisively” a war with China.
EU member states block new Russia sanctions
RT | June 23, 2025
Hungary and Slovakia have blocked the European Union’s 18th sanctions package against Moscow, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto has announced. The bloc’s proposal to cut Russian energy imports would deal a major blow to his country’s energy security, he explained.
Budapest has opposed EU sanctions on Russian energy since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, saying the imports are vital to its national interests. The country has a long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom and receives the bulk of its oil and gas from Russia. Slovakia has also voiced similar concerns.
Speaking at a press conference following a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday, Szijjarto said that “we, together with Slovakia, prevented the adoption of the [18th] sanctions package today,” which would mostly have focused on Russia’s energy sector.
The diplomat clarified that Budapest and Bratislava vetoed the sanctions package because in separate trade legislation, Brussels has proposed phasing out all remaining Russian gas flows to the EU by the end of 2027. The minister argued that this would severely undermine Budapest’s energy security and lead to a sharp spike in energy costs for Hungarians.
”We are not willing to have the Hungarian people pay the price for supporting Ukraine,” Szijjarto insisted.
The EU-wide phasing-out plan that Szijjarto referred to was announced by EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen last Tuesday, with the backing of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The proposal, which is currently opposed by Hungary, Austria and Slovakia, and reportedly by Italy, is expected to be introduced as trade legislation, which under EU rules does not require unanimity among bloc members to become law, but merely the support of at least 15 of the EU’s 27 member states.
Commenting on the plan, Russian presidential envoy Kirill Dmitriev, said that “EU Commission bureaucrats seem obsessed – with making the EU as uncompetitive as possible on the global stage.”
While pipeline flows have dropped sharply since 2022, EU imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) have soared. Russia supplied 17.5% of the bloc’s LNG in 2024, trailing only the US at 45.3%, according to industry data. France, Spain, and Belgium accounted for 85% of the EU’s LNG imports from the sanctioned country, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
Russia maintains that it is still a reliable energy supplier, while denouncing Western sanctions and trade restrictions targeting its exports as illegal under international law.
Miliband ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’
By Paul Homewood | Not A Lot Of People Know That | June 23, 2025
Net Zero Watch has belittled the government’s announcement that it will cut electricity bills for large industrial users by 25%. The campaign group has pointed out that the cost of the discount has to be paid somehow. Newspaper reports suggest that industrial gas users will be footing the bill, although details are scarce.
Net Zero Watch director Andrew Montford said:
Ed Miliband is once again merely proposing to shuffle costs from one energy user to another. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is all he has to offer, because his mad fixation on decarbonisation means he will not look at the underlying problem, namely the gross inefficiency of a renewables-based grid.
And Mr Montford warned that any relief would be temporary:
This latest wheeze will bring temporary relief for sectors favoured by the Secretary of State, but at the expense of others, who can ill afford it. And in the medium term, bills will continue to rise for everyone. The country can’t afford this madness any longer.
The Telegraph report:
“From 2027, they will no longer have to pay the net zero levies that are normally added to their power bills, such as the renewables obligation, the feed-in-tariff and capacity market charges.
This will be paid for by financial reforms to the energy market and a raid on companies that burn natural gas, through higher carbon taxes, the Government said.”
A spokesman for the business department added that “energy market reforms” will also pay for the changes, including longer subsidy agreements with wind farms – aimed at bringing the overall cost for power down.
Higher carbon taxes will not only punish industrial gas users, many of whom don’t qualify as “large industrial users”, they will also increase the wholesale price of electricity, meaning that while large industries will be better off, the rest of us will have to pay the bill instead.
This gives the lie to Starmer’s claim that “it would not be paid for via extra charges on households”.
The claim about “energy market reforms” is just smoke and mirrors. They will have no effect on existing subsidies for renewable energy, and longer term CfDs are only being considered because nobody wants to build offshore wind farms at the prices on offer. Inevitably the next round will see much higher prices, so there will be no “savings” to divvie out.
As is now routine with this wretched Government, policies are announced which cannot be funded and are sold to the public on the basis of a lie.
It is fantasy economics, something we have seen time and again in the last year.
Electricity prices are higher because of the £20+ billion paid out every year to subsidise renewable energy and deal with the extra costs it imposes.
Until this Government gets a grip with the real problem, nothing will change, no matter what smoke and mirror tactics they employ.
Europe’s risky war on Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’
By Anatol Lieven | Responsible Statecraft | June 16, 2025
The European Union’s latest moves (as part of its 17th package of sanctions against Russia declared in May) to target much more intensively Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and other vessels illustrate the danger that, as long as the Ukraine war continues, so will the risk of an incident that will draw NATO and the EU into a direct military clash with Russia.
The EU sanctions involve bans on access to the ports, national waters and maritime economic zones of EU states. Ships that enter these waters risk seizure and confiscation. It does not appear that Washington was consulted about this decision, despite the obvious risks to the U.S.
As part of this strategy, on May 15, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to stop and inspect a tanker in the Gulf of Finland. Russia sent up a fighter jet that flew over the Estonian vessel (allegedly briefly trespassing into Estonian waters), and the Estonians backed off — this time. In January, the German navy seized a Panamanian-flagged tanker, the Eventin, in the Baltic after its engines failed and it drifted into German territorial waters.
Sweden has now announced that starting on July 1 its navy will stop, inspect and potentially seize all suspect vessels transiting its exclusive economic zone, and is deploying the Swedish air force to back up this threat. Since the combined maritime economic zones of Sweden and the three Baltic states cover the whole of the central Baltic Sea, this amounts to a virtual threat to cut off all Russian trade exiting Russia via the Baltic — which would indeed be a very serious economic blow to Moscow.
It would also threaten to cut off Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by Poland, from access to Russia by sea.
This is the kind of action that has traditionally led to war. The Swedish assumption seems to be that the Russian navy and air force in the Baltic are now so weak — and so surrounded by NATO territory — that there is nothing Moscow can do about this. However, it is very unlikely that the Swedes would take this step unless they also believe that in the event of a clash, Washington will come to Sweden’s defense — even though the EU and Swedish decisions were made without U.S. approval and are not strictly covered by NATO’s Article 5 commitment.
And despite all the hysterical language about Russia being “at war” with NATO countries, these moves by the EU and Sweden are also based on an assumption that Russia will not in fact lose its temper and react with military force. European policymakers might however want to think about a number of things: for example, what would the U.S. do if ships carrying U.S. cargo were intercepted by foreign warships? We know perfectly well that the U.S. would blow the warships concerned out of the water and declare that it had done so in defense of the sacred rule of free navigation — in which the EU also professes to believe.
EU leaders, and admirals, should also spend some time on Russian social media, and read the incessant attacks on the Putin administration by hardliners arguing precisely that Moscow has been far too soft and restrained in its response to Western provocations, and that this restraint has encouraged the West to escalate more and more. Such hardliners (especially within the security forces) are by far the greatest internal political threat that Putin faces.
It is important to note in this regard that moves to damage Russia’s “shadow fleet” have not been restricted to sanctions. In recent months there have been a string of attacks on such vessels in the Mediterranean with limpet mines and other explosive devices — developments that have been virtually ignored by Western media.
In December 2024, the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major sank off Libya after an explosion in which two crewmembers were killed. The Reuters headline reporting these attacks was rather characteristic: “Three tankers damaged by blasts in Mediterranean in the last month, causes unknown, sources say.” Unknown, really? Who do we think were the likely perpetrators? Laotian special forces? Martians? And what are European governments doing to investigate these causes?
If the Russians do sink a Swedish or Estonian warship, the Trump administration will face a terribly difficult decision on how to respond to a crisis that is not of its own choosing: intervene and risk a direct war with Russia, or stand aside and ensure a deep crisis with Europe. The U.S. administration would therefore be both wise and entirely within its rights to state publicly that it does not endorse and will not help to enforce this decision.
Washington also needs — finally — to pay attention to what the rest of the world thinks about all this. The overwhelming majority of senators who are proposing to impose 500% tariffs on any country that buys Russian energy have apparently not realized that one of the two biggest countries in this category is India — now universally regarded in Washington as a vital U.S. partner in Asia. And now America’s European allies are relying on U.S. support to seize ships providing that energy to India.
The U.S. administration would also be wise to warn European countries that if this strategy leads to maritime clashes with Russia, they will have to deal with the consequences themselves. Especially given the new risk of war with Iran, the last thing Washington needs now is a new flare-up of tension with Moscow necessitating major U.S. military deployments to Europe. And the last thing the world economy needs are moves likely to lead to a still greater surge in world energy prices.
European governments and establishments seem to have lost any ability to analyze the possible wider consequences of their actions. So — not for the first time — America will have to do their thinking for them.
Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
‘Israel’ burning $200 mln daily in costly Iran response: WSJ
Al Mayadeen | June 20, 2025
The Wall Street Journal on Friday reported that “Israel” is facing a mounting financial burden as a result of its military confrontation with Iran, with estimates suggesting the cost of the war is draining the Israeli economy by hundreds of millions of dollars per day. The staggering expenses are raising doubts about “Israel’s” ability to sustain a prolonged offensive.
Central to the cost is the deployment of high-end missile defense systems used to counter Iranian retaliatory strikes. According to experts, the daily price of launching interceptors alone may reach up to $200 million. Added to this are expenditures on munitions, aerial missions, and the extensive damage caused by Iranian missile strikes on Israeli infrastructure. Preliminary figures place the cost of reconstruction at no less than $400 million.
Though Israeli officials claim their military campaign may last two weeks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shown no sign of retreating before achieving long-standing political goals, such as dismantling Iran’s defensive capabilities and its sovereign nuclear program, which is internationally monitored and confirmed to be peaceful.
But economic realities may force a rethink, according to WSJ. “The main factor which will really determine the cost of the war will be the duration,” said Karnit Flug, former Bank of Israel governor. “If it is a week, it is one thing. If it is two weeks or a month, it is a very different story.”
Deterrence costs rise
Iran’s missile response, logging over 400 missiles launched in recent days, has exposed the immense cost of attempting to neutralize such deterrent power. Each interception using the David’s Sling system costs around $700,000, and the Arrow 3, meant to intercept ballistic missiles in space, runs up to $4 million per launch. Even older Arrow 2 interceptors cost roughly $3 million.
Beyond security matters, “Israel’s” offensive operations come with their own price tag. Keeping advanced F-35 jets in the air for long-distance missions, targeting Iranian territory over 1,600 km away, costs about $10,000 per hour per jet, according to security analyst Yehoshua Kalisky. The cost of fuel, precision bombs, and support operations only amplifies the daily burden.
“Per day it is much more expensive than the war in Gaza or with Hezbollah. And it all comes from the ammunition. That’s the big expense,” noted Zvi Eckstein of Reichman University. His institute estimates a one-month war with Iran would cost “Israel” approximately $12 billion.
Despite this massive outlay, analysts say “Israel’s” economy remains vulnerable. Many sectors have been paralyzed by the Iranian response: the main airport was shut down, businesses shuttered, and only essential services permitted to function. Meanwhile, global credit rating agency S&P issued a warning, though it stopped short of revising “Israel’s” credit outlook. Investors, for now, appear to be betting on a short war, an assumption that may prove misguided.
Illusion of invincibility
On the ground, Iranian precision strikes have shattered the illusion of Israeli invulnerability. Engineers and first responders describe destruction not seen in decades. “It would cost at least tens of millions of dollars to repair a single newly-built skyscraper in central Tel Aviv,” said structural engineer Eyal Shalev.
More than 5,000 Israelis have been evacuated from missile-damaged neighborhoods and are now temporarily housed in state-funded hotels. Iranian targeting of critical infrastructure has been effective, including two strikes on “Israel’s” largest oil refinery in the north, which forced a shutdown and left three settlers dead. Workers in key sectors have been instructed to remain at home amid growing instability.
Iran’s response has not only shifted the military balance but also exposed the deep vulnerability of “Israel’s” economy and civil infrastructure. With growing costs, damaged public morale, and uncertainty mounting, the war’s continuation may prove more costly to Tel Aviv than it anticipated.
AfD demands parliamentary inquiry into €600 million German state loan handed to now-bankrupt Northvolt
By Thomas Brooke | Remix News | June 19, 2025
The German Federal Audit Office (BRH) has delivered a scathing assessment of former Greens Economics Minister Robert Habeck over his handling of a €600 million loan to the Swedish battery manufacturer Northvolt, which has since filed for bankruptcy.
In a classified 50-page report, the auditors accuse Habeck and his ministry of grave failures in risk assessment and oversight, warning that taxpayers could now face a total loss.
As reported by Bild, the 2023 state loan was intended to help Northvolt establish a major battery factory in Heide, Schleswig-Holstein, with support from additional German subsidies. But the BRH now alleges that Habeck’s ministry “systematically underestimated the risks” involved and approved the funding without sufficient scrutiny.
Earlier this year, Northvolt filed for bankruptcy, and the chances of German taxpayers recouping even a percentage of the funds handed over are slim to none.
The report highlights that the usual checks and balances were ignored. Instead, Habeck’s officials assessed the risks of the massive convertible bond unilaterally, without independent or interdepartmental review. The auditors accuse the ministry of acting “largely according to the principle of hope.”
Adding to the scandal, the BRH said that essential decision-making steps were poorly documented or not recorded at all, especially in video calls with the auditing firm PwC. This lack of documentation, it warned, means key actions “elude traceability and external control.” The report also noted that these omissions are particularly serious given the size and political sensitivity of the case.
Criticism from across the political spectrum is now piling up. CDU budget spokesman Andreas Mattfeldt said the revelations go beyond negligence: “One gets the impression that not only gross negligence is at play here. It seems that it was presumably intentional.” He called the affair “one of the major financial affairs of the republic” and warned of its explosive political potential.
The right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD), now the main opposition to the Grand Coalition government in the Bundestag, has called for a full parliamentary inquiry into the dealings.
“Habeck is said to have single-handedly approved €600 million of taxpayers’ money for Northvolt. Especially in view of the fact that the CDU continues Habeck’s policy identically, the citizens have a right to transparent clarification — so that such a scenario is not repeated!” she wrote on X.
Michael Espendiller, the budget spokesman of the AfD parliamentary group, added, “A committee of inquiry is unavoidable here, and we call on the Union to make this possible together with us.” The politician criticized “burning millions of euros of taxpayers’ money,” “conflicts of interest,” sloppy file management,” and state action “without adequate risk assessment.”
EU Divided on Russian Gas as Austria Joins Hungary and Slovakia Against Blanket Ban
Sputnik – 17.06.2025
The Austrian energy ministry believes that the European Union should be open to resuming imports of natural gas from Russia after the end of the Ukraine conflict, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday.
“[Brussels] must maintain the option to reassess the situation once the war has ended,” the ministry told the Financial Times.
Austria is the third EU nation after Hungary and Slovakia to openly suggest resuming imports of Russian gas after the conflict ends.
The European Commission will propose on Tuesday that the EU ban new gas contracts with Russia. The Commission will use trade law to bypass potential vetoes by Hungary and Slovakia. According to the summary of the proposal seen by the Financial Times, the current short-term contracts are to be terminated starting 2026, while long-term contracts are to come to an end on January 1, 2028.
On June 12, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said that Hungary and Slovakia believed that a ban on Russian energy imports to the EU was unacceptable interference in their energy sovereignty. Szijjarto said that Hungary and Slovakia had blocked the Commission’s proposal to this effect during the meeting of EU energy ministers in Luxembourg on Monday.
In early May, the EU Commission presented a draft roadmap to stop Russian energy imports to the EU by the end of 2027. It includes a ban on imports from Russia under new Russian gas contracts and existing spot contracts, which is to come into effect by the end of 2025. The ban can also affect remaining imports of pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas from Russia under long-term contracts.
Former Georgian president pushes EU ‘to kill the Georgian economy’ to remove populists from power
Remix News | June 17, 2025
Salome Zourabichvili, the former president of Georgia who stepped down six months ago, gave a speech at the recent GLOBSEC international conference in Prague in which she called on the EU to keep up the pressure against her country to oust the current government.
The populist, conservative Georgian Dream party won the election in Georgia last autumn, with incumbent Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze remaining in power, much to the dismay of liberals in Brussels.
“European sanctions against Georgia need to be stepped up. We need more and stronger European sanctions. Why? Because sanctions work against a small country like Georgia. They cause damage. They hurt. They kill the Georgian economy and private sector. In other words, in the long run, they will bring down the Georgian government,” Mandiner quotes her as saying.
Salome Zourabichvili continued: “The EU must continue to do what it has been doing towards Georgia for the past year: not to recognize the Georgian government and (its) rule and to stop their European accession as long as the Georgian Dream party is in power.”
Calling attention to her comments on social media, Anton Bendarjevskiy, director of the Oeconomus Institute, commented: “So the former Georgian president, who only left office six months ago, goes to an international forum and demands that as many and stronger sanctions be imposed on her country as possible, because that will kill the Georgian economy, and then she and the political forces that support him can take power in the country.”
Hungary has faced a similar situation, with the opposition Tisza Party MEP Kinga Kollár celebrating the fact that sanctions have hurt her country by way of withholding needed funds and thus helped increase the chances of her party ousting Prime Minister Viktor Orbán from power.
The Georgian Dream party has long been under scrutiny for its close ties to and preference for Russia, accusations of helping Putin evade sanctions, and its anti-Western stances, including Irakli Kobakhidze’s battle against what he has called a “Global War Party.”
What if Iran Closes the Hormuz Strait?
Sputnik – 16.06.2025
With the Israel-Iranian conflict in full swing, oil producers and oil consumers alike are wondering: could Iran resort to shutting down maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and if so, how it might affect oil prices?
Oil could hit $130 per barrel, or even $300, if Iran does close the strait, warns Dr. Tilak Doshi from the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center.
It is very likely that such high prices would not be “favored by the US administration, and they will try to arrive at a resolution of the war as soon as possible,” he notes.
“Historically, in 2008, oil prices briefly reached $147 per barrel without any major geopolitical conflict, driven solely by financial speculation and tight supply-demand dynamics,” muses energy economist Dr. Kazi Sohag.
“During the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, triggered by the Yom Kippur War, oil prices increased by 300%, demonstrating how quickly markets can react to political shocks,” he adds.
Even without the strait’s closure, targeting Iran’s oil export and refining facilities could push prices to $80 or even $90, predicts Marc Ayoub, energy policy researcher.
“If things continue like they are currently, we would stay on the same norm, and we might reach a level or a ceiling of $80 per barrel maximum,” he elaborates.
“And also, if Israeli Kareesh or Leviathan are targeted as well, we might see increases for up to $5, between $5 and $10. That means we might reach… $90 or something.”
A narrative shatters: Syrian refugees refuse to return despite Assad’s ouster
By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan | The Cradle | June 11, 2025
The fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was expected to trigger a mass return of Syrian refugees. It did not. Six months on, UN figures show fewer than eight percent of Syrians abroad have made the journey home. The promise of a new era in Damascus has collided with the harsh realities of insecurity, poverty, and heightened foreign interference.
The Syrian refugee crisis – now in its 14th year – was born of war, western-imposed economic blockade, and the disintegration of state institutions that started in March 2011. What began as internal displacement soon morphed into a mass exodus across West Asia and into Europe, producing one of the most severe refugee crises of the 21st century.
Life after Assad: The enduring refugee crisis
Despite the fall of the Assad government, the Syrian refugee crisis remains unresolved. As of early 2025, the UN reports that approximately 6.2 million Syrians remain registered as refugees abroad – primarily in Turkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt – with millions more residing in Europe and North America. Only a fraction have returned since the Syrian opposition assumed power.
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that about 400,000 refugees returned between December 2024 and April 2025. This number rose slightly to 481,730 by May, still below eight percent of the total refugees abroad. This disparity underlines a stark reality: The fall of Assad did not translate into mass return as the west suggested for years, which reveals that there are deeper, unresolved issues that keep Syrians away from Syria.
In West Asia’s key host countries, Turkiye hosts between 2.7 and three million Syrian refugees under a temporary protection regime, in addition to roughly one million unregistered Syrians. Lebanon hosts around 750,000 registered refugees, though Beirut places the actual figure closer to 1.5 million. Jordan houses approximately 650,000 Syrian refugees.
While many refugees may dream of returning, reality intervenes. A mid-2024 survey found 57 percent hoped to return one day, yet fewer than two percent believed this was feasible within the following year. UNHCR identifies safety concerns and the lack of stable livelihoods as the most significant obstacles. These core issues shape the calculus of return – a calculus that has not shifted meaningfully since Assad was in power.
Why Syrians aren’t going back
A May poll cited critical return deterrents: housing and property conditions (69 percent), service availability (40 percent), safety (45 percent), and economic hardship (54 percent). Fourteen years of war have left Syria fractured, devastated, and distrustful. There is no unified, trustworthy security or governance structure. The post-Assad era remains deeply uncertain to Syrian refugees.
The current political set-up in Damascus is a patchwork of domestic and foreign-influenced actors. Despite Assad’s ousting, returnees consistently cite improved security and essential services as prerequisites. A recent survey indicated that 58 percent of Syrians abroad would return only under “safe and dignified conditions,” while 31 percent remain undecided.
Governance challenges are equally daunting. The new leadership, installed on 8 December 2024 and headed by Al Qaeda-linked Ahmad al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani), has pledged reform. But memories of infighting among rebel groups linger. Many Syrian refugees are alarmed by the ascension of militant factions, including former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) affiliates, fueling fears of sectarian reprisals and authoritarianism.
Beyond Syria’s borders, refugee networks now serve as lifelines. After more than a decade abroad, Syrian refugees have established enduring community ties. In Turkiye, 60 percent of working-age Syrians are employed, mostly in informal sectors. These jobs, although low-paid, offer stability compared to war-torn Syria.
Yet, most Syrians in Turkiye remain socially unanchored: Over half report feeling disconnected from Turkish society, where racism has become rife, while 84 percent still feel moderately connected to Syria. This duality reflects a long-term migration trend where refugees retain ties to their homeland while integrating abroad.
A recent survey shows that just seven percent of Syrians in Turkiye have concrete plans to leave. Others express the desire to relocate, but without actionable steps. Citizenship also affects permanence: Around 238,000 Syrians had been naturalized in Turkiye by mid-2024, granting them full legal protections, including immunity from deportation. Turkish opposition sources, however, estimate this figure could be as high as 2.5 million.
The return paradox: Poor conditions in host nations, yet no return?
Even deteriorating conditions in host countries have not significantly altered return patterns. Economic collapse in Lebanon, rising costs in Turkiye, and recent conflict along the Lebanese border have not pushed Syrians homeward. Studies consistently show return decisions hinge more on improvements in Syria – security, jobs, services – than on hardships abroad.
Divisions among external powers inside Syria further complicate matters. Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and western states continue to prioritize their respective geopolitical gains over stability. The result is a fragmented political order dominated by armed factions and foreign patrons, with little accountability to actual Syrians.
This instability has real consequences. The massacres along Syria’s coast last March, reportedly instigated by UAE-backed elements, required intervention by the new Damascus authority. Such events erode trust and deter return.
Economically, Syria remains in free fall. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 90 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line. The World Bank projects an additional one percent GDP contraction in 2025. The World Food Programme (WFP) says 9.1 million are food insecure, with 3.6 million reliant on aid.
Electricity is available just two to three hours a day, crippling industry and inflating living costs. Despite promises by the transitional government to reform banking and attract Persian Gulf investment, remaining sanctions and market isolation are still serious hurdles, even after Washington lifted most restrictions in May 2025.
Unemployment is rampant, fuel and transport costs are surging, and social safety nets are vanishing. Monthly incomes in many regions fall below $40, while basic food baskets cost twice that amount. The exodus of Syrian professionals continues to deplete the labor market, deepening reliance on remittances in the absence of a coherent reconstruction plan.
Syria remains a high-risk return
The reluctance of millions of Syrians to repatriate was never actually about leadership change – credible data simply does not exist on this. It is about the cumulative consequences of war: insecurity, economic collapse, political fragmentation, and the absence of justice or reconciliation.
Unless those in power focus on rebuilding credible institutions and securing livelihoods – not just reshuffling elites – the prospect of return will remain a perilous gamble.
EU to sanction Nord Stream
RT | June 10, 2025
The European Commission has proposed a ban on the use of Nord Stream gas infrastructure and a reduction of the price cap on Russian oil in its 18th sanctions package against Moscow, EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Tuesday.
“No EU operator will be able to engage directly or indirectly in any transaction regarding the Nord Stream pipelines. There is no return to the past,” she stated.
Both pipelines were severely damaged in a series of underwater explosions in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. Since the sabotage, the pipelines have been out of service.
The commission also intends to lower the price cap on Russian crude oil exports from the current $60 per barrel to $45. The cap, which was introduced in December 2022 by the G7, EU, and Australia, aimed to curb Russia’s oil revenue while maintaining global supply.
The new sanctions package also proposes a ban on the import of all refined goods based on Russian crude oil and sanctions on 77 vessels that are allegedly part of Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet’, which Brussels claims is used to circumvent oil trade restrictions.
The commission has also suggested expanding the EU sanctions list to include additional Russian banks and implementing a “complete transaction ban” alongside existing restrictions on the use of the SWIFT financial messaging system. The restrictions would also apply to banks in third countries that “finance trade to Russia in circumvention of sanctions,” according to the EC president.
The draft sanctions package will next be put up for discussion among EU members and must be approved by all 27 EU states in order to pass. Previous rounds of sanctions faced resistance from countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, which argue that the restrictions harm the EU economy.
Russia has dismissed the Western sanctions as illegitimate, saying pressure tactics are counterproductive. President Vladimir Putin has said the removal of sanctions is among the conditions for a settlement of the Ukraine conflict.
France can’t afford military spending splurge – FT
RT | June 10, 2025
French President Emmanuel Macron and Chief of the Defense Staff General Thierry Burkhard at the VE Day parade, Paris, France, May 08, 2025. © Getty Images / Pierre Suu
France may not be able to afford to ramp up defense spending under a broader EU militarization drive, the Financial Times reported on Saturday, citing experts. The country’s growing national debt and large budget deficit present major obstacles to its rearmament goals, the newspaper noted.
President Emmanuel Macron earlier proposed raising defense spending to 3-3.5% of GDP by 2030 – nearly double the current level – which would require an extra €30 billion ($34 billion) annually. However, experts told the FT that France’s fiscal position is too precarious to go through with the plan. They noted that debt-to-GDP ratio hit 113% in 2024, one of the highest in the EU, while the budget deficit reached 5.8%, almost twice the EU’s 3% cap. Interest payments on debt totaled €59 billion last year and are expected to reach €62 billion in 2025 – roughly the combined annual cost of defense and education.
Experts also noted that the government is struggling to pass a deficit-reduction package, which reportedly features unpopular moves such as cuts to social spending, including pension tax breaks and healthcare subsidies.
“In France, and this is probably different than elsewhere, we cannot go back on our deficit reduction goals, nor can we raise taxes since they are already very high,” Clement Beaune, a former minister for Europe and Macron ally, who heads a government think tank, the told FT.
Experts said France could apply for the EU’s “escape clause,” which allows countries to exceed deficit caps to boost defense budgets by 1.5% of GDP. However, they warned that the move is unlikely, as it could spook bond markets and drive up borrowing costs. Paris could also join another EU scheme offering loans for joint arms purchases. Experts, however, said that rising costs and inflation could mean France would end up with fewer weapons even if it boosts spending. Some described it as a “bonsai army” – broad in scope, but limited in scale.
France’s rearmament plans come as the EU pushes for more spending and less reliance on US weapons, citing a supposed Russian threat. Moscow has repeatedly dismissed the claims as “nonsense,” accusing the West of using fear to justify funneling public funds into arms. Russian officials have warned the EU’s buildup risks wider conflict. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova recently said the bloc “has degraded into an openly militarized entity.”
