German opposition slams Ukraine aid
RT | July 21, 2025
Frustration is growing in Germany over increased aid to Ukraine while domestic spending lags, co-chair of opposition party Alternative for Germany (AfD) Alice Weidel has said.
Berlin has been one of Kiev’s largest military backers since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. Earlier this year, the German Defense Ministry announced that it would provide €5 billion ($5.6 billion) to finance long-range weapons production in Ukraine.
In an interview with the broadcaster ARD on Sunday, Weidel criticized the allocation of funds to Kiev, citing unmet domestic needs. Asked about alternative uses for public funds, she pointed to a shelved proposal to abolish electricity taxes, which would have cost the state €5.4 billion – comparable to what Berlin is spending on weapons for Ukraine, she argued.
“And then our government, the Friedrich Merz government, gives Ukraine nine billion in German tax money and now wants to buy Patriot missiles for Ukraine for five billion. Nobody understands that anymore,” Weidel said.
She was referencing a US-backed plan to funnel Patriot air defense systems to Kiev via NATO members, with Germany covering the costs. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said after meeting US counterpart Pete Hegseth in Washington last week that the terms of the arrangement could be finalized “within days or weeks,” though the actual transfer of the missile systems to Ukraine might take months. Berlin has indicated its readiness to cover the cost of at least two Patriot batteries to Ukraine – estimated at approximately $1 billion each.
Since taking office in May, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pursued a hardline stance against Russia. Earlier this month, he declared that diplomatic options in the Ukraine conflict were “exhausted” and doubled down on his policy of providing weapons to Kiev. In response, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Merz of choosing escalation by abandoning diplomacy.
Last week, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova suggested that European nations are funding the “death” of Ukraine by paying for weapons sent to Kiev. Russia has consistently denounced Western weapons deliveries, saying they do not change the overall course of the conflict and merely serve to prolong the bloodshed and risk further escalation.
E3 violated JCPOA, lost right to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran: Russian envoy
Press TV – July 21, 2025
A senior Russian diplomat says Britain, France, and Germany, known as the E3, have repeatedly violated the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal, and thus forfeited their right to trigger the snapback mechanism that would re-impose all UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.
Russia’s Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, made the remarks in an interview with Izvestia newspaper on Monday, days after the E3, in coordination with the US, threatened to initiate the 30-day snapback process if there is no progress on Iran’s nuclear talks by the end of August.
“As for the threats of Westerners to initiate a mechanism for restoring sanctions, it is quite rightly noted that this idea is illegitimate,” Ulyanov said.
“The Americans themselves withdrew from the JCPOA, renouncing the rights and obligations of a participant in the nuclear deal, and the United Kingdom, Germany and France are violators of both the JCPOA and UN Security Council resolution 2231. This means that they have also deprived themselves of the right to initiate a ‘snapback.’”
He was referring to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the official name of the Iran nuclear accord, which the US ditched in 2018 before returning the illegal sanctions that it had lifted against Iran and launching the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign.
Following the US withdrawal, the European signatories to the JCPOA failed to uphold their commitments and made no efforts to save the agreement.
Also in his remarks, the Russian envoy criticized the Europeans and Americans for using “the tactics of forceful pressure” against Tehran, saying such an approach has no chance of success.
“The habit of Europeans and Americans to set certain deadlines all the time is quite counterproductive,” he said, citing the negotiations aimed at restoring the JCPOA in 2021-2022 as an example.
In an X post on Sunday, Ulyanov emphasized that the E3 “has no legal or moral right” to activate the snapback procedure.
Earlier, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter to the UN chief, the Security Council president, and the top EU diplomat, saying the E3 have relinquished their role as “participants” in the JCPOA, rendering any attempt to trigger the snapback mechanism “null and void.”
Is Azerbaijan Considering Hosting a Turkish Military Base?
By Alexandr Svaranc – New Eastern Outlook – July 21, 2025
As Azerbaijan-Russia relations cool, discussions emerge in Baku about the potential deployment of a Turkish military base. Is this a random development — or is chance merely revealing an underlying pattern?
Between Iran and Russia, Azerbaijan chooses Turkey. At one point, when describing the political geography of modern Azerbaijan, Geidar Dzhemal — a Russian Islamic political and public figure, philosopher, and poet — characterized it as extremely vulnerable, considering its southern border with Iran and northern border with Russia. At the time, the Karabakh issue remained unresolved for Baku, and the goal of regaining full control over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory was still pending. In other words, despite being technically at war with Armenia, Baku did not perceive it as an existential threat.
Dzhemal’s assessment reflected Azerbaijan’s geopolitical choice to align with NATO-member Turkey, and to build partnerships with the UK, Israel, and the US. These allies, carefully selected by Baku, have political and economic agendas that are at odds with those of Russia and Iran.
Despite historical ties with Iran and its shared Shia Islamic heritage, Azerbaijan opted in the 1990s for an alliance with Sunni-majority Turkey. Turkey became a key facilitator in the implementation of the so-called “contracts of the century” in the oil and gas sector, with Britain playing a leading role.
Recognizing the deep-rooted tensions between Israel and Iran, Baku forged a pragmatic partnership with Tel Aviv. Azerbaijani oil — making up 60% of Israel’s overall oil imports — in exchange for Israeli weaponry and military technologies laid the foundation for robust bilateral relations. Israel, for its part, assisted Azerbaijan in strengthening ties with the US and Europe, both directly and through lobbying by the Jewish diaspora.
In return, Azerbaijan did not hinder the activities of Israeli intelligence services on its territory, particularly when directed at Iran. Azerbaijan’s military success in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, with direct Israeli support (weapons deliveries, intelligence sharing, UAV operations), significantly expanded the operational scope of Israeli intelligence targeting Iran. The results of the twelve-day Israel-Iran war in June 2025 have once again raised questions about Israeli security structures potentially using Azerbaijani territory.
Today, Tehran is unlikely to escalate tensions with Baku. On one hand, both sides have only recently emerged from a serious diplomatic crisis (following the terrorist attack at Azerbaijan’s embassy in Iran, the withdrawal of Baku’s ambassador, and the later restoration of ties). On the other hand, Iran’s conflict with Israel remains unresolved and without a peace agreement.
Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia in the post-Soviet era has fluctuated — swinging between partnership and hostility. Moscow initially adopted a neutral stance in the Karabakh conflict, trying to retain both Armenia and Azerbaijan within its sphere of influence, and took the lead in conflict resolution efforts. Indeed, both Karabakh wars ended under Russian mediation, but with radically different outcomes. From the 2000s onwards, Russia began pursuing a more pragmatic approach in the South Caucasus, shifting toward a strategic partnership with Baku. As a result, Azerbaijan secured access to $5 billion worth of modern Russian weapons, expanded its business presence in Russia, and acted as a mediator — particularly after the 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 by Turkish forces — in restoring and advancing Russian-Turkish ties.
Russia’s distant approach during the Second Karabakh War and the Azerbaijan-Armenia tensions of 2021–2023 allowed Baku to achieve military success and regain lost territories in Karabakh. Following its pragmatic logic, Azerbaijan did not join anti-Russian sanctions and, like Turkey, has maintained business ties with Russia, receiving considerable benefits from transit and re-export arrangements.
However, despite its strategic partnership with Russia, Turkey has not hastened to implement the Russian-proposed gas hub project in Eastern Thrace. Ankara continues to demand favorable financial terms (lower gas prices, deferred payments, joint trade) and also seeks Russian consent for its plans to access Central Asia via the Caspian Sea and tap into Turkmen gas.
Since autumn 2020, the “Turan Project” has begun to take more tangible shape. Ankara envisions the creation of an alternative alliance to the EAEU and the EU, involving Turkic states and Pakistan.
Iran opposes the Zangezur Corridor, Russia — due to Armenia’s position — cannot establish control over the project, and Azerbaijan may reconsider its support for the North–South International Transport Corridor, possibly obstructing Russia’s access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This scenario could trigger new diplomatic — or worse, military-political — crises in the South Caucasus.
Amid all this, Azerbaijan is placing its hopes on Turkish military bases. Following the latest escalation in Azerbaijan-Russia relations — sparked by Baku’s harsh reaction to the tragic downing of a civilian aircraft and the detention of Azerbaijani diaspora members in Yekaterinburg (with investigations still ongoing) — former presidential aide Eldar Namazov raised the prospect of hosting a major Turkish military base in Azerbaijan. He even suggested that part of the base could be leased to the Pakistani Air Force as a potential deterrent against alleged provocations from Russia and Iran.
Namazov is far from a fringe figure, and his statements are likely aligned with the presidential administration — at the very least, with the President’s foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev.
In fact, Turkey has long been involved in Azerbaijan’s defense and security — from the two Karabakh wars to military reforms and personnel training. Joint military drills are held regularly. After the Second Karabakh War, a Turkish-staffed monitoring center operated in Aghdam from November 2020 (Russian peacekeepers have since left the region, but no official information suggests Turkish forces have followed suit). Turkish military advisers remain active in Baku. The 2021 Shusha Declaration explicitly provides for mutual military assistance upon request. Iran is acutely aware that any attack on Azerbaijan would trigger Turkish intervention.
Should Azerbaijan decide to host a Turkish NATO base on its territory, it would usher in a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus. This would compel Russia and Iran to take additional security measures, plunging the region into uncertainty. Baku, while not necessarily hoping for a repeat of its Karabakh victory, risks forfeiting significant advantages — namely, threats to transit routes vital to its economy, and potentially even the loss of its hard-won control over Karabakh.
In chess, logic demands the elimination of reckless moves that may lead to failure. In political chess, the stakes are even higher: a miscalculated diplomatic move can result not only in defeat, but in far more serious consequences — human, material, and strategic. Sadly, history has shown that wars often spell the downfall of some states, while paving the way for the birth of others. President Aliyev, a diplomat by training with years of presidential experience and a cool, calculated approach, is unlikely to let the Azerbaijan–Russia crisis escalate unchecked. Most likely, this period of tension will soon give way to renewed cooperation — perhaps even in the form of a formal declaration of alliance.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
Trump’s ultimatum to Russia is bluster and bluff to hide proxy war defeat
Strategic Culture Foundation | July 18, 2025
What’s behind Trump’s angry ultimatum to Russia this week? The short answer: failure and frustration. Donald Trump promised American voters that he would end the Ukraine war in 24 hours upon his election in November 2024. Six months into his presidency, Trump has failed to deliver on his boastful promises.
This week, Trump flipped his pacemaker image by pledging billions of dollars worth of new American weaponry to Ukraine. He also issued a warning to Russia to call a ceasefire within 50 days or else face severe secondary tariffs on its oil and gas exports. The tariffs, quoted at 100 percent, will be applied to nations purchasing Russian exports, primarily Brazil, China, and India. The latter move indicates that the U.S.-led proxy war in Ukraine against Russia is really part of a bigger geopolitical confrontation to maintain American global hegemony.
In any case, Moscow dismissed Trump’s ultimatum. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that Moscow would not comply with pressure and that Russia would not back down from its strategic goals in Ukraine to counter NATO’s historic aggression.
It is clear that Trump and his administration have failed to understand Russia’s strategic position and the root causes of the conflict.
Trump’s supposed diplomacy is seen to operate on a superficial basis more akin to showbiz, with no substance. He wants a peace deal with Russia to show off his vaunted skills as a business negotiator and to grab the limelight, headlines, and adulation.
Resolving a conflict like Ukraine requires deep historical understanding and genuine commitment to due diligence. Moscow has repeatedly stated the need to address the root causes of the conflict: the expansion of NATO on its borders, the CIA-sponsored coup in Kiev in 2014, and the nature of the NATO-weaponized Neo-Nazi regime over the past decade.
Trump and his administration have failed to appreciate Russia’s viewpoint. Thus, expecting a peace deal based on nothing but rhetoric and vacuous claims about “ending the killing” is futile. It won’t happen.
This failure, based on unrealistic expectations, has led Trump to adopt an increasingly bitter attitude towards Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks. Ironically, Trump has accused Putin of duplicity and procrastination when, in reality, it is Trump who has shown no serious commitment to resolving the conflict.
Now, with chagrin and bruised ego, Trump has reacted with frustration over what are his own failings by issuing ultimatums to Russia. Trump’s 50-day deadline for a Russian response to his demands has a similarity to the 60-day deadline he threatened Iran with, after which he carried out a massive bombing attack on that country. Trump’s aggression towards Iran has turned out to be a fiasco and failure. Threatening Russia is even more useless.
This proclivity for threatening other nations has the hallmark of a Mafiosa megalomaniac. It is also causing Trump to lose support among his voter base, who believed he was going to end “endless wars.” It’s shambolic. Biden’s war is becoming Trump’s war because, at the end of the day, it is the U.S. imperial deep state that rules.
Trump’s mercurial switch from professing peace in Ukraine to ramping up the promise of weapons shows that his previous aspirations were always hollow and contingent on other interests.
It seems that the 47th American president did not want peace after all. What was driving his apparent desire to end the conflict in Ukraine – what he deprecated as “Biden’s war” – was simply to cut American financial costs.
What has appealed to Trump is that the proposed new supplies of American weapons to Ukraine will be paid for by Europe. Money and profit are all that matter to him. It is significant that when Trump announced the new arms racket scheme, he was sitting beside NATO chief Mark Rutte in the Oval Office. Rutte has a knack for wheedling, previously referring to Trump as “daddy” and this week absurdly praising the U.S. as the world’s policeman for securing peace. It seems that the NATO and transatlantic ruling establishment have found a way to manipulate Trump. Tell him that the Europeans will henceforth directly subsidize the U.S. military-industrial complex.
The trouble for Trump and the NATO establishment is that it is all an unworkable bluff. For a start, the U.S. arsenal of Patriot missiles and other munitions has been depleted and destroyed by Russia over the past three years in Ukraine. There are no “wonder weapons” that can alter the battlefield dominance of Russia.
Secondly, the European economies are broke and can hardly sustain the proposed purchase of U.S. weapons for Ukraine, even if such supplies were feasible, which they are not. At least four European states, including France, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Hungary, have said they will not engage in any scheme of buying American weapons for Ukraine.
Thirdly, Trump’s threat of secondary sanctions against Brazil, China, India, and others for doing business with Russia is a blatant assault on the BRICS and Global South that will only garner international contempt. Trump’s bullying is neither viable nor credible. His earlier trade war against China has already failed and shown that the United States is an impotent giant whose power is a thing of the past. Trump had to climb down from his hobby horse towards China.
So, threatening to hit China and others with 100 percent tariffs for doing business with Russia is like a former prizefighter shaking a feeble fist while sitting in a wheelchair. He is liable to incur more self-harm.
Lastly, Russia is decisively winning the NATO-led proxy war in Ukraine. The Kiev regime’s air defenses are non-existent at this stage. Therefore, Russia can and will press its strategic terms to end the conflict because it is the military victor.
Trump’s ultimatum to Russia is nothing but bluster and bluff. He once mocked Ukraine’s puppet president Zelensky, that he had no cards to play. Trump, for all his bravado, has only a couple of deuces himself.
In 50 days, Trump will have a serious amount of egg on his face when Russia’s defeat of the NATO proxy war becomes more evident.
Brazil slams NATO’s Russia sanctions threats
RT | July 18, 2025
Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira has slammed comments by the head of NATO about potential secondary sanctions on BRICS nations who trade with Russia.
Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Tuesday declared that Brazil, India, and China would face “consequences” if they maintained business ties with Russia. He singled out oil and gas trade, and urged the countries’ leaders to call Russian President Vladimir Putin and push him to engage “serious[ly]” in Ukraine peace talks.
Brazil is a founding member of BRICS, formed in 2006 with Russia, India, and China. The economic bloc has since expanded to include South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Indonesia. Last year, BRICS approved a new ‘partner country’ status in response to growing membership interest shown by more than 30 countries.
Speaking to CNN Brazil on Friday, Vieira dismissed Rutte’s comments as “totally absurd,” pointing out that NATO is a military bloc, not a trade body, and that Brazil is not a member.
“Brazil, like all other countries, handles commercial matters bilaterally or within the WTO framework. Therefore, these statements by Rutte are utterly unfounded and irrelevant,” Vieira said.
He also noted that the EU – many of whose members are part of NATO – is a significant buyer of Russian energy. Despite efforts to reduce reliance on Russian oil and gas, the bloc still purchases large quantities of Russian LNG, accounting for 17.5% of its imports in 2024, industry data shows.
Rutte’s warnings follow a similar threat from US President Donald Trump, who this week announced new military aid for Ukraine and threatened 100% tariffs on nations trading with Russia, unless a peace deal is reached within 50 days.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has criticized EU and NATO leaders for applying “improper pressure” on Trump to adopt a hardline stance on the conflict.
Moscow says it remains open to negotiations with Kiev but is still waiting for a response on when talks will resume. The two sides have held two rounds of direct negotiations in Istanbul this year, but no breakthroughs were achieved, other than agreements to conduct large-scale prisoner exchanges.
Between China & USA: Australia chooses trade over geopolitics
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – July 17, 2025
While the Trump administration doubles down on its ‘America First’ approach to reshaping global power dynamics, key allies like Australia are quietly charting their own course—rebalancing relations with China in ways that may diverge from Washington’s long-term strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albances was supposed to meet Donald Trump on the sidelines of G7 summit in Canada. The meeting did not take place, as Trump left the summit in the middle of Iran-Israel war. While such diplomatic snubs would normally raise eyebrows, Canberra seemed unperturbed. Instead, Albanese’s subsequent high-profile visit to Beijing sent a clear message: for Australia, economic pragmatism continues to trump imperatives of ideological or geopolitical alignment. With trade relations with China showing signs of recovery after years of friction, the visit underscored Australia’s effort to navigate a delicate path between its largest trading partner and its key strategic ally.
This calibrated diplomacy comes at a time of renewed uncertainty surrounding the AUKUS pact—a trilateral security agreement between Australia, the US, and the UK aimed at equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines to bolster its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific to check Chinese advances. The deal, worth tens of billions of dollars, is currently under review by the Trump administration in Washington. This review includes calls for Australia by the Trump administration to increase its defense spending and overall contributions to the pact, further highlighting Canberra’s growing dependence on the whims of US domestic politics.
This visit comes against the backdrop of the fact that AUKUS, while it offers an unprecedented opportunity to Australia to acquire modern systems, also exposes a deeper vulnerability: Australia’s limited ability to shape the strategic direction of its own neighborhood, caught as it is between economic ties with China and defense commitments to an America that may no longer see alliances as sacrosanct. In this shifting landscape, Australia’s challenge is not just about balancing Beijing and Washington. It’s about asserting agency in an Indo-Pacific increasingly shaped by volatility, mistrust, and great-power rivalry. This assertion has once led it to redefine its ties with China.
Australia’s recalibration is not taking place in a vacuum. There is considerable domestic political support for this policy. Despite how Washington portrays China as a ‘threat’, within Australia, only a minority considers China to be a threat. A majority of the Australians see ties with China as a complex configuration that nonetheless should—and can be—managed because it is ultimately beneficial. Even within China, this publicly backed support for better ties with China and Canberra’s efforts to mutually balance ties between the US and China is clearly well received and understood. China’s state newspaper Global Times says Albanese’s visit “carries special significance” and shows “Australia’s desire to seek more reliable partners in an uncertain world order… with China being the obvious choice”. There is little denying this. China is Australia’s largest trading partner, and Albanese’ visit is about furthering these ties. As reports indicate, Albanese is accompanied by a business delegation to the cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu for his six-day trip. His official itinerary included meetings with groups involved in business, tourism and sports.
From AUKUS to new forms of bilateral and multilateral trade
In this context, therefore, many observers view the Australian Prime Minister’s recent visit to China as a strategic step toward reinvigorating economic ties and potentially paving the way for China’s entry into the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Australia, which currently chairs the CPTPP, plays a central role in shaping the pact’s direction. The CPTPP evolved from the original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the United States withdrew in 2017 under President Trump. China formally applied for CPTPP membership in 2021 and continues to lobby for inclusion.
Beijing is increasingly framing its engagement with Canberra within the broader context of a new multilateralism represented by the CPTPP—one that spans beyond the Indo-Pacific to include countries like Canada and the United Kingdom. Underscoring its commitment to deepening trade ties in all possible ways, the Chinese ambassador to Australia has published op-eds in major Australian newspapers emphasizing Beijing’s willingness to deepen bilateral economic partnership, even highlighting emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence as potential areas of collaboration.
The core message from Chinese officials has been consistent: China does not view Australia as an adversary, and there is ample room for peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. With no direct territorial disputes or major political conflicts between the two nations, this message has found a receptive audience in parts of the Australian political landscape. Labor senator Raff Ciccone, who chairs the Australian Parliament’s security committee in Australia, recently stated that economic engagement with China can play a stabilizing role. “When there’s trade, when there’s dialogue, when there’s economic interests at play,” he said, “countries are less likely to engage in the worst-case scenario, which is war.” In other words, Australia, too, does not necessarily view China as a foe. Albanese’ visit may thus not only reset diplomatic relations but also signal Australia’s openness to a broader regional vision where economic pragmatism and strategic dialogue can go hand-in-hand.
This will not go unnoticed in the White House as well. However, what matters is how the Trump administration responds or can possibly respond. Either it could threaten to withdraw from AUKUS and focus more on developing its own resources or it could double down on its commitment to shoring up Australian naval capability. However, as long as Washington continues to lack a viable programme to reverse China’s economic dominance in Australia specifically and the Indo-Pacific generally, countries like Australia will continue to maneuver in ways that best serve their interests. It is increasingly clear in Australia that their trade interests are best served by having stable ties with China. There is a growing appreciation of the fact that Australia’s ties with China and the US must not be mutually exclusive. This, for China, is a major victory.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
China Ready to Work With SCO Countries to Restore Peace in Middle East
Sputnik – 17.07.2025
China is ready to cooperate with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries and the international community to promote a political settlement and the speedy restoration of peace in the Middle East, the Chinese Foreign Ministry told Sputnik on Thursday.
On Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the SCO to promptly consider the situation with Israel’s aggression against the Islamic Republic, as well as to provide Tehran with political support in light of the June conflict with the Jewish state.
“The peoples of China and Iran are bound by traditional friendship. China is committed to maintaining friendly cooperation with Iran in order to benefit the peoples of both countries and bring positive factors to maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East,” the ministry said when asked to comment on Iran’s request to the SCO.
The ministry noted that “the situation in the region currently remains complex and sensitive.”
“China is ready to cooperate with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the international community to uphold peace, promote a political settlement and quickly restore peace and stability in the Middle East, which meets the common interests of the countries in the region and the international community,” the ministry added.
Yemen’s naval blockade forces closure of Israel’s only Red Sea port
Press TV – July 16, 2025
Israel says its only Red Sea port in Eilat will shut down next week, as a deepening debt crisis—triggered by a months-long naval blockade by Yemen’s Ansarullah movement—brings the strategic facility to a standstill.
The regime’s Ports and Shipping Authority said in a statement Wednesday that the port will permanently close on July 20.
Authorities acknowledged that the crippling blockade by Yemeni forces has effectively paralyzed operations at Eilat, once a key hub for maritime trade.
“Due to the shutdown of the Port of Eilat and its deteriorating financial situation amid the ongoing crisis, the Eilat Municipality has notified port management of the seizure of all bank accounts over unpaid debts,” Israel’s National Emergency Authority said in a memo.
“As a result, the Shipping and Ports Authority announced that the port will cease all operations starting this Sunday.”
Local media described the move as “a dramatic step” that could severely undermine Israel’s maritime logistics in the Red Sea.
Situated at Israel’s southernmost tip, the Port of Eilat has long functioned as a vital alternative to the Suez Canal. But since late last year, after Yemen’s Ansarullah resistance movement imposed a naval blockade in response to Israel’s war on Gaza, commercial activity at the port has come to a halt.
Shortly after the Gaza war began in November 2023, Ansarullah enforced a blockade on key maritime routes—the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea—aimed at disrupting military shipments to Israel.
Yemeni forces have since stepped up drone and missile attacks on Israeli and commercial vessels, vowing that operations will not stop until Israel ends its devastating war on Gaza.
Deal or sanctions: West threaten Iran ahead of August deadline
Al Mayadeen | July 16, 2025
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, along with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, has agreed to set an end-of-August deadline for reaching a new nuclear agreement with Iran.
The decision, discussed during a joint call on Monday, could trigger a full reimposition of United Nations sanctions if no deal is reached, Axios reported, citing three sources familiar with the matter.
If Iran fails to meet the so-called “deadline,” the European trio plans to activate the “snapback” mechanism, an automatic reinstatement of all UN Security Council sanctions that were lifted under the 2015 nuclear agreement. The mechanism is intended to respond to ‘Iranian noncompliance’ and is set to expire in October.
The move is time-sensitive. The snapback process takes 30 days to complete, and European diplomats are keen to initiate it before Russia assumes the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council this October. Western officials see the snapback as both a diplomatic pressure tool and a contingency plan if ongoing negotiations collapse, as per the report.
Iran, however, maintains there is no legal basis for the snapback and has warned that triggering it could prompt Tehran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated on Tuesday his administration’s continued commitment to a peaceful resolution and diplomatic engagement. In a post published Monday night on X, Pezeshkian stated: “To open new horizons, we must take a critical look at the past. What will lead us toward a better future is rebuilding hope, being ready to learn and change, and forging a new path through consensus, empathy, and rational thinking.”
‘Russia doesn’t respond to pressure’: How Moscow sees Trump’s ultimatum
From skepticism to strategic recalculations, Russian analysts interpret Washington’s new pressure campaign – and its limits
By Georgiy Berezovsky | RT | July 15, 2025
On Monday, July 14, US President Donald Trump issued a stark ultimatum: Russia has 50 days to reach a peace agreement, or face “very severe” tariffs on its exports – potentially as high as 100%. The move signals a shift from rhetorical posturing to a time-bound strategy aimed at forcing negotiations.
While Trump’s statement made waves in Washington and Europe, it is the reaction from Moscow that may prove most consequential. In this roundup, RT presents a cross-section of views from Russian political analysts, foreign policy scholars, and institutional insiders – voices that provide a window into how the American ultimatum is being interpreted in Russia.
Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at HSE University:
Trump’s remarks are a major setback for any meaningful progress on Ukraine and will likely freeze US-Russia normalization for the foreseeable future. Zelensky now has no incentive to engage in serious negotiations with Moscow or consider the terms outlined in the Russian ceasefire memorandum.
Meanwhile, the European ‘party of war’ will seize on Trump’s statements as cover to promise Ukraine an endless stream of military aid – further escalating the conflict. The result? No truce, no talks, just a deepening of hostilities. Kiev may even walk away from the Istanbul peace process in the coming months – unless the battlefield situation shifts dramatically in Ukraine’s favor.
As for US-Russia relations, they were already at a standstill. Washington had effectively put dialogue on hold. Now, that pause could drag on indefinitely. When Trump issues ultimatums, sets arbitrary deadlines, and threatens Russia’s key trading partners with 100% tariffs, it’s clear there’s no space for normalization – or cooperation.
That said, unlike the Biden administration, Trump’s team appears committed to keeping diplomatic channels open with Moscow, regardless of whether there’s progress on Ukraine. But this isn’t an opening for a settlement on Russia’s terms. Trump’s goal is to pressure Moscow into compromise – something that simply isn’t going to happen.
His statement also signals that he has no intention of letting Congress dictate US foreign policy. He wants full control over tariffs – their size, timing, and structure. That’s why it’s entirely possible he’ll tweak or delay his self-imposed deadline.
Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Valdai Club:
1. Trump is frustrated with Moscow’s position on Ukraine.
Russia has refused to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to the US and Kiev – a signal that Trump sees dialogue as having hit a dead end.
2. The Lindsey Graham sanctions bill is now much more likely to pass.
Among other things, it would authorize secondary tariffs of up to 500% on countries that import Russian oil and other raw materials. While the US president already has the power to impose these measures unilaterally under IEEPA, the bill would bring Congress into alignment and add yet another layer to the already sprawling legal web of sanctions on Russia.
3. Trump would have full discretion over these secondary tariffs.
That could mean 100%, 500%, or anything in between – and he could calibrate them differently depending on bilateral relations. For example, India might face lower tariffs, China higher ones – or he might apply them uniformly. The Iran sanctions precedent shows that countries which reduced oil purchases were granted exemptions as a reward for ‘good behavior’.
4. A coordinated pushback from the Global South is unlikely.
Trump has already been pressuring both allies and neutral countries with new tariffs since April – and most are caving. Even China is treading carefully. So in the short term, we may see reduced purchases of Russian commodities simply out of a desire to avoid Trump’s wrath. Alternatively, countries may demand a higher risk premium. While there’s a lot of rhetorical support for Russia in the Global South, few are willing to stick their necks out when it comes to action.
5. Trump’s 50-day deadline amounts to an ultimatum.
Moscow will almost certainly ignore it, making the imposition of secondary tariffs a highly probable – perhaps even default – scenario. That said, Russia isn’t without leverage, limited though it may be. And it’s clearly preparing for a hardline path. Tight global commodity markets and well-established export channels work in Russia’s favor.
6. This may mark the end of backchannel diplomacy on Ukraine.
Sanctions will be ramped up, and arms deliveries to Kiev are likely to intensify. Russia, for its part, will maintain military pressure. We’re back to a familiar standoff: The West betting on economic collapse in Russia, while Moscow counts on Ukraine’s military defeat and the West’s internal turmoil. But after three years, it’s clear neither side’s assumptions have panned out. Sanctions haven’t broken Russia’s resolve, and the war effort is now on a new long-term footing.
7. The optimism in Russian markets is puzzling.
Yes, sanctions haven’t been imposed just yet – which some investors may have hoped for – but the risk landscape has only worsened. The current rally looks short-lived. Those banking on a quick end to sanctions may be in for a long wait.
Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics:
In theater or film, ‘playing a scene’ means performing a role convincingly – conveying emotions, building a character, advancing the plot. Donald Trump does that rather well. He seems to grasp a fundamental truth: Bold moves between nuclear superpowers are dangerous precisely because they are impossible. They risk the irreversible – and Trump clearly wants no part of that. On some level, he understands that the diplomatic chess match will drag on indefinitely, and that there are no clean resolutions. Still, the show must go on – and the audience must be entertained.
That’s why Trump substitutes real strategy with theatrics: Shifting arms deliveries to NATO, proposing a new financing scheme for Kiev, tossing around tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners. It’s about constantly filling the political space with action – or at least the illusion of it – to avoid the impression of paralysis or failure. If no progress is made on Ukraine within 50 days, he’ll unveil a new plan that overwrites the old one.
None of these announcements should be treated as final or irreversible – and in that, Trump is perfectly in tune with the nature of today’s international politics. His behavior isn’t a deviation – it’s a reflection of the system.
Maxim Suchkov, director of the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO University:
Trump’s statement brings both good and bad news for Moscow. The good news is that the final decision was largely predictable – no surprises, no sudden turns. As is often the case with Trump, the ‘teaser’ for his policy was more dramatic than the main act. Europe wants to continue the war – and Trump is happy to let it pay the price. For now, he’s held back from embracing the more radical measures proposed by the hawks in his circle, which means dialogue with Washington is still on the table.
The bad news: After six months in office, Trump still hasn’t grasped Russia’s position or understood President Putin’s logic. It’s as if the repeated visits to Moscow by Steve Witkoff never even registered with him. More broadly, Trump seems to have learned very little about this conflict. And that’s a problem – because without some form of resolution and a working relationship with Moscow, key elements of Trump’s domestic agenda simply aren’t achievable.
Either he genuinely believes the Ukraine conflict can be settled by setting a deadline and hoping for the best – or he just doesn’t care. Maybe this is just his way of playing global peacemaker: Making noise, tossing out promises to fix everything, knowing full well there will be no political consequences if he fails. American voters won’t judge him on Ukraine.
Which scenario is worse is anyone’s guess. But one thing is clear: If anyone still had hopes for this administration to play a serious role in ending the conflict, those hopes look misplaced. Whether they were premature – or already outdated – we’ll find out in 50 days.
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:
If you strip Trump’s latest White House remarks down to their essence, one thing stands out: He still desperately wants to avoid becoming a full party to the conflict – in other words, he doesn’t want a head-on confrontation with Russia. That’s why he keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war,” not his. From Trump’s perspective, what he announced is a cautious, compromise-driven approach.
First, the tariffs he’s threatening on Russian commodities – and let’s be clear, these aren’t ‘sanctions’ in his lexicon – have been postponed until the fall. Just like in other cases, the offer of negotiations remains open.
Second, the US won’t be sending weapons to Ukraine directly. Deliveries will go through Europe, and only on a full-cost basis – meaning the Europeans will foot the bill. To Trump, that’s not direct confrontation with Moscow – it’s a way to nudge the parties toward talks.
We can set aside the usual flood of self-congratulation and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s over-the-top flattery – that’s all part of the ritual now.
Russia is unlikely to see this as a genuine invitation to dialogue. It’s pressure – and the Russian leadership doesn’t respond to pressure. It’s also a worsening, though perhaps not a dramatic one, of the military situation for Russian forces, which naturally elicits a response. But Moscow won’t engage in verbal sparring. There’s no point. The conversation is now happening on the battlefield.
Most likely, we’ve reached the end of the first phase of US-Russia relations under Trump – a six-month stretch now drawing to a close. When the next phase begins, and what it looks like, remains anyone’s guess.
Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics:
Trump’s bombastic statement – supplemented by his Q&A with reporters – boils down to three core messages.
First, the objective hasn’t changed: Washington still wants a deal on Ukraine, but only on terms acceptable to the US.
Second, the carrot for Moscow remains the same: Promises of good political relations (‘talking to Putin is always pleasant’) and vague suggestions of future economic cooperation (‘Russia has enormous potential’).
Third, the stick – for now – isn’t particularly impressive. The announcement of Patriot systems for Ukraine is just the latest iteration of something Trump and his team have floated before: Boosting Kiev’s air defenses to protect against Russian strikes. And that, it seems, bothers Trump more than the frontline situation itself. He’s criticized Russia before for deep strikes into Ukrainian territory, and he did it again this time – presumably after being shown some grim images.
As for other weapons, there were no specifics – just the familiar ‘billions of dollars in military aid’ line.
The introduction of 100% secondary tariffs, delayed by 50 days, appears to be Trump’s main instrument of coercion. As an economic determinist, he likely believes this is his most powerful and effective threat. But whether it will actually be implemented is unclear. Previous efforts to squeeze Russian energy exports – price caps, import bans – didn’t exactly shut the flow. Russia adapted.
In essence, the message is more psychological than strategic: You’ve got 50 days. After that, I’ll ‘get serious’.
But Trump left one key question unanswered: How far is the US actually willing to go if there’s no progress after 50 days? If tariffs are the endgame, and Washington backs off after that, that’s one scenario. But if those tariffs are just the prelude to broader military or political escalation, that’s something else entirely.
Trump deliberately keeps things murky, leaning on the old idea that ‘a threat is more powerful than an attack’. He seems to be counting on Moscow to imagine the worst.
Nikolai Topornin, director of the Center for European Information:
With his latest statement, Trump didn’t just leave a crack open for Russia – he threw the window wide. He made clear he expects a practical response from Moscow within the next 50 days. As things stand, nothing prevents Russia from acting on the terms previously discussed with Trump: Initiating a 30-day ceasefire and entering talks with Kiev to start hashing out a concrete peace agreement.
Of course, the problem remains that many of Russia’s proposals are fundamentally at odds with Ukraine’s position. Still, from a diplomatic standpoint, the ball is now in Moscow’s court. And Kiev, in the meantime, comes out as the clear short-term beneficiary of Trump’s announcement.
We can expect the usual statements from Moscow rejecting the pressure – that sanctions don’t scare Russia. And it’s true that US-Russia trade is already near zero. There are no billion-dollar contracts left to speak of. Most economic ties were severed back in the Biden era. Washington has already imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian businesses and the financial sector.
So if nothing changes over the next 50 days, the US will likely continue expanding military aid to Ukraine – but on a pragmatic basis. In doing so, Washington can channel European funding to keep its own defense industry running at full speed.
Sergey Oznobishchev, head of the Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects Section at IMEMO RAS:
Trump needs to save face. He once vowed to end the conflict in a single day – but that hasn’t happened. Russia isn’t backing down, isn’t agreeing to a ceasefire with Ukraine, and isn’t halting its offensive. There’s nothing Trump can point to and sell as even a partial fulfillment of that campaign promise. So now he’s under pressure to act.
He’s signaling to Moscow that he expects some kind of reciprocal move – and he’s trying to extract it through a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic threats.
What exactly Trump discussed with the Russian president remains unclear. But it’s likely that Russia’s core position was laid out: Full control over the territories now enshrined in its constitution. Russia simply cannot walk away from those claims. It’s even possible that Trump’s 50-day deadline is meant as a tacit acknowledgment of that reality – a window for Russia to consolidate its hold before talks resume. That would be his version of compromise.
Trump often opens negotiations with bold, hardline offers – the kind you ‘can’t refuse’, as American political lore puts it – only to walk them back later and land somewhere in the middle. That’s his style, drawn straight from the world of business deals: Apply pressure first, then strike a bargain.
Of course, these latest announcements – especially the pledge to send weapons – will only increase criticism of Trump within Russia. Still, this isn’t the harshest stance he could have taken. It’s a tough message, but one that still leaves room for maneuver.
Nikolai Silayev, senior research fellow at the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University:
I wouldn’t say we’re standing at the brink of a new escalation. Trump hasn’t endorsed the sanctions bill currently under discussion in Congress. Instead, he’s talking about imposing 100% tariffs by executive order – just as he’s done in the past. In doing so, he’s clearly distancing himself from that legislation.
There are no immediate sanctions coming. The 50-day timeline he mentioned is just the latest in a series of deadlines he’s floated before.
On the one hand, Trump wants to avoid sliding back into the kind of confrontation with Russia that defined the Biden era. On the other, he doesn’t want to see Ukraine defeated – nor is he willing to accept a Russian ceasefire on Moscow’s terms, since that could be spun as a US loss, and by extension, a personal failure. He keeps repeating that this is “Biden’s war” – but the longer it drags on, the more it becomes his own.
As for the Patriots, it’s Europe that will be footing the bill. Trump didn’t promise any new funding from the US budget. What remains to be seen is how many systems and missiles the US defense industry can actually produce – and how many European countries are willing to buy.
From Moscow’s perspective, this is still the US arming Ukraine. Washington is also continuing to share intelligence and support logistics. No one in the Kremlin is going to say, ‘Thank you, Grandpa Trump – now you’re just a vendor’. That’s not how this will be seen.
Sergey Poletaev, political commentator:
The scale of this conflict is such that no single move – not by the US, not by Russia, not by anyone – can produce a sudden breakthrough. The only person who could do that is Vladimir Zelensky – by surrendering. There’s no weapon system that could fundamentally change the course of this war, short of nuclear arms. And the only other game-changer would be direct involvement by the US or NATO – but if they’d wanted that, they would’ve intervened long ago.
As for Trump’s tariff threats against Russia and its trading partners – that’s really just kicking the can down the road for another 50 days. Classic Trump.
From Russia’s standpoint, we’re not shipping anything to the US anyway. As for our trading partners – yes, we’re talking about China and India. But this move would only add to the contradictions in Trump’s chaotic tariff diplomacy, where every issue is approached through economic threats. I don’t think it’s going to work.
I don’t see how Trump thinks he can pressure India. China – maybe. But Beijing is already staring down a whole slew of tariff threats. One more won’t make things easier – just worse. If anything, it will reinforce the idea that the US sees China as vulnerable to pressure. And that’s not a message China will take lightly.
Konstantin Kosachev, Russian senator and foreign affairs specialist:
If this is all Trump had to say about Ukraine today, then the hype was definitely overblown. Most of Lindsey Graham’s alarmist fantasies remain just that – fantasies. A 500% sanctions package makes little practical sense.
As for Europe, it looks like they’ll keep picking up the tab – again and again. What they thought was free cheese turned out to be a trap. The only true beneficiary here is the US defense industry.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is left to fight until the last Ukrainian – a fate they seem to have chosen for themselves.
But 50 days is a long time. A lot can change – on the battlefield, in Washington, and in NATO capitals. What matters most, though, is that none of this has any real impact on our own determination. At least, that’s how I see it.
Alexander Dugin, political philosopher and commentator:
Trump has given Russia 50 days to complete the job: To fully liberate our four regions, take Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk – and ideally, Kiev. After that, he’s promised to get truly angry and hit back with 100% tariffs on our key oil buyers – India and China. That’s a serious threat.
So now we have 50 days to finish what we’ve left unfinished over the past 25 years.
This is precisely the kind of moment captured in the old Russian saying: ‘We take a long time to harness the horses, but we ride fast’. Given the circumstances, I believe any weapons can be used, against any targets. We have 50 days to win.
Moldova’s ‘Victory’ Bloc Seeks Union State With Russia – Opposition Leader

Moldova’s opposition bloc Pobeda (Victory) and Sor party leader Ilan Shor
Sputnik – 14.07.2025
CHISINAU – On Monday, Ilan Shor, leader of Moldova’s opposition Pobeda (Victory) bloc, announced the bloc’s support for establishing a Union State between Moldova and Russia, along with greater cooperation between the country and the Eurasian Economic Union.
“Pobeda will fight for the right to represent a free Moldova in parliament. We believe in our strength, because we have the votes of hundreds of thousands of people, and we will never betray their trust. Pobeda offers a clear and transparent program: for the Union State with Russia; for trade and economic cooperation with the EAEU countries; for cheap gas and fair prices; for the preservation of national identity and sovereignty,” Shor wrote on Telegram.
According to him, the bloc will closely monitor the actions of the Central Election Commission, acknowledging that the authorities may attempt to prevent the registration of the political formation.
Trump issues threat to Russia over Ukraine conflict
RT | July 14, 2025
US President Donald Trump has threatened to impose “severe” tariffs of up to 100% on Russia’s trading partners unless a deal is reached to end the Ukraine conflict within 50 days.
Trump issued the warning on Monday during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office.
“We’re very, very unhappy – I am – with [Russia], and we’re going to be doing very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in about 50 days,” he stated.
Trump blamed his predecessor Joe Biden for dragging Washington into the conflict, saying the US had spent approximately $350 billion on aid for Ukraine.
The US president also mentioned a congressional bill that would impose tougher sanctions on Russia, saying, “I’m not sure we need it, but it’s good they’re doing it… could be very useful.” A Senate vote is expected next week.
He noted that, if there was no progress on Ukraine, slapping Russia with secondary US tariffs would not require congressional approval.
Secondary tariffs are sometimes introduced on countries that do business with a sanctioned country.
Trump also announced that the US will send weapons to Ukraine through NATO, which would handle both payment and distribution.
“We’ve made a deal today where we are going to be sending them weapons, and they’re going to be paying for them,” he said.
Russia has repeatedly denounced the West for supplying Ukraine with weapons, warning that this only serves to prolong the conflict and makes no impact on its outcome.
The Russian stock market soared on Trump’s remarks, with the main index jumping nearly 3%, according to data from the Moscow Exchange.
