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From Industrial Power to Military Keynesianism: Germany’s Engineered Collapse

By Gerry Nolan | Ron Paul Institute | January 8, 2026

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz now admits that “parts of Germany’s economy are in very critical condition” and that his government “hasn’t done enough.” That phrasing is an evasion. Germany did not drift into this collapse. The numbers were visible in real time. The warnings were explicit. And suicidal decisions were made anyway.

Start with energy, because everything downstream flows from it.

Before the 2022 launch of Russia’s special military operation (SMO), Germany’s industrial model rested on stable Russian pipeline gas priced roughly €15–25 per MWh. Wholesale electricity averaged €30–50 per MWh. That price stability, and not hysterical slogans, powered German competitiveness. It allowed long planning cycles, protected margins, and kept energy-intensive manufacturing viable. It also kept household bills manageable, wages meaningful, and social cohesion intact.

Post Russian SMO, that foundation was deliberately dismantled.

Gas prices predictably exploded, peaking above €300 per MWh in 2022 — a 12–20× increase at the height of the engineered crisis. Electricity followed. German wholesale power prices averaged ~€235 per MWh that year, with intraday spikes well north of €400 per MWh. Even after emergency subsidies, rationing, and accounting tricks, prices today still sit around €100–130 per MWh, approx three to four times the pre-SMO norm.

This cannot be blamed on volatility. This is permanent repricing of German industry — the direct result of Berlin going along with the Nord Stream sabotage, ending the era of cheap, reliable Russian energy without protest, without investigation, and without dignity.

That humiliation solely laid at the feet of supplicant German elite. It was downloaded directly onto German households via higher heating bills, higher electricity costs, higher food prices, shrinking real wages, all while being told this was the price of “standing with Ukraine.” Germans paid more to live worse, and were instructed to feel morally superior about it.

Berlin knew exactly what this would do.

Energy-intensive industrial output has fallen by 20% from pre-SMO levels. Chemical production shrank. Auto suppliers cut jobs at double-digit rates. BASF downsized at home and expanded abroad. New industrial investment increasingly flows to the United States and Asia, not Germany. The costs were socialized downward; the consequences localized.

Then came the autos, the core of the economy.

German carmakers have lost close to half of their China market position since 2020, with market share falling from the high-20s into the mid-teens. Porsche’s China sales are down ~25–30%. Volkswagen’s operating margins have collapsed toward 4%. Employment across the auto-supplier ecosystem has fallen by high single digits, with major firms cutting 10% or more of their workforce. These weren’t hidden trends. China was Germany’s largest trading partner. Berlin chose ideological obedience over industrial reality and paid the price.

And still, the policies continued. Why?

Because collapse below coincided with profit above.

While Germany’s civilian manufacturing base contracted, its military-industrial sector surged. Germany’s defense budget has ballooned as a share of federal outlays, with the Bundestag approving record arms contracts worth around €50–€52 billion in late-2025 alone, including 29 major procurement orders for vehicles, missiles, and satellites, one of the largest such spending decisions in the nation’s history.

At the center of that boom sits Rheinmetall, once a marginal player, now the engine of the continent’s rearmament. Its order backlog hit a new high of roughly €63 billion, with incoming framework agreements jumping 181 % year-on-year in early 2025, and sales surging 36 % in 2024 as defense demand exploded.

Rheinmetall’s stock performance answers the question of who profits. Its shares have more than doubled and at times tripled in value in recent years as markets priced in Europe’s structural defense spending shift, even as the broader economy languished.

Defense equities across the continent have followed suit. European defense indices returned well into the double digits in 2025, making military contractors some of the best-performing assets even as traditional industrial sectors faded.

Rearmament became the one form of “growth” Brussels would never question: losses socialized, gains concentrated. Civilian factories closed and exports faltered, but state-backed military contracts flowed like a firehose. De-industrialization for thee (Germans), weapons profits for me (Germany’s MIC).

Contrast this with Russia and China, and the comparison becomes merciless.

Russia ring-fenced energy, secured domestic supply, redirected trade flows east and south, and surged industrial output under sanctions designed to cripple it. China did the opposite of austerity theater by doubling down on production, scaled EVs, batteries, and supply chains, and absorbed global shocks without blowing up its own infrastructure or pricing its industry out of existence.

Neither country sacrificed its economic base to signal virtue and moralized itself into decline. But Germany did.

So when Merz says “we haven’t done enough,” the timeline exposes the lie. Enough for whom? The households rationing heat? German workers losing jobs? The firms closing plants? Or the protection racket (alliance) managers who demanded compliance regardless of cost?

Ask the question Berlin refuses to ask… If the energy calculus was known, if the China dependence was obvious, if the auto collapse was measurable in real time — at what point does failure become design?

Germany didn’t lose competitiveness by accident or incompetence alone. It surrendered it, to expensive LNG, to trade self-sabotage with China, to an EU architecture that rewards submission over outcomes and treats war as a military Keynesianism.

This was betrayal of the German people. An EU structure that treats Germans as an invoice, not a constituency. A population forced to absorb humiliation, higher bills, and industrial decay — while being told this sacrifice makes them morally superior.

But the bill has arrived. The damage is done.

And that is precisely why Merz and his fellow Eurocrats will cling to this war against Russia at all costs. Not because peace is dangerous, but because peace would bring a reckoning. Not from Moscow, but from German streets. From workers, households, and industries that would finally ask why their prosperity was sacrificed, who profited, and who signed the orders.

No letter to lawmakers, no partial confession, will erase who made these choices, or who paid for them.

Gerry Nolan is a political analyst, writer, and strategist focused on geopolitics, security affairs, and the structural dynamics of global power. He is the founder and editor of The Islander, an independent media platform examining war, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and the accelerating shift toward a multipolar world.

January 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | | Leave a comment

Offshore wind turbines steal each other’s wind: yields greatly overestimated

By Bert Weteringe – clintel – December 30, 2025

The energy yields of offshore wind turbines are overestimated by up to 50% in national policy documents. This conclusion is based on an analysis of operational data from 72 wind farms.

In order to meet the net-zero targets set out in the European Green Deal, offshore wind turbines will have to make a significant contribution to Europe’s future energy supply – at least, that is the plan of European governments. However, these plans are facing setbacks due to high investment costs and uncertainty about returns, as demand is lower than expected. On October 30, outgoing Minister Hermans of the Dutch Ministry of Climate & Green Growth (KGG) announced in a letter to the House of Representatives that no applications for a permit had been received for the tender for the Nederwiek I-A wind farm, which has an installed capacity of 1–1.15 gigawatts. This is a trend that is not limited to the Netherlands. In August, for example, there were no bids for the ten gigawatts of tenders that the German government had put out for offshore wind projects. On top of that, there is now another setback: the energy yields of offshore wind turbines appear to be much lower than assumed in most national policy plans.

“National policy targets show expectations of energy production up to 50% higher than can realistically be achieved”, concludes Carlos Simao Ferreira, professor of Wind Energy Science at Delft University of Technology. He published, together with Danish colleagues Gunner Chr. Larsen and Jens Nørkær Sørensen from the Technical University of Denmark (DTU), an article in the latest journal Cell Reports Sustainability, on November 21. “This study establishes a physically grounded upper limit on wind farm performance, demonstrating that aerodynamic constraints impose a fundamental ceiling on the energy extractable from the marine Atmospheric Boundary Layer”, the scientists continue.

According to the article, the ever-growing wind farms, which are also becoming increasingly denser, extract energy from the lower part of the atmospheric boundary layer, affecting this boundary layer up to several kilometres above the Earth’s surface. The energy extracted from the airflow must be replenished from the higher layers of the atmosphere, but this is only possible to a limited extent due to atmospheric limitations determined by physical principles known from meteorology and geophysics. This means that wind turbines literally steal each other’s wind, which means that the efficiency of wind turbines will decrease even further as their number increases. The scientists demonstrate this with a validated analytical model that defines the physical upper limit of offshore wind farm production.

They built their model based on the actual yields of 72 large wind farms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and compared the actual yields of the wind farms with the theoretically expected yields set out in national policy documents in a number of case studies. In seven of the nine case studies, the national policy targets for offshore wind yields turned out to be way overestimated. Two German wind farms were slightly underestimated.

The limitations of offshore wind revealed in the publication are not new. Scientists from the Danish university and the German Max Planck Institute have previously warned that the expected yields from offshore wind energy could fall by a third or more if offshore wind is scaled up further. In a 2020 publication by the German organization Agora Energiewende, an interdisciplinary and international team that develops scientifically sound and politically feasible strategies for the transformation towards climate neutrality, they showed how the efficiency of wind turbines decreases as the use of wind energy increases in scale. In addition, Axel Kleidon, physicist and group leader at the Max Planck Institute, states in a 2021 publication in the ‘Meteorologische Zeitschrift’ that the energy yields of areas with wind turbines covering more than 100 square kilometres, are up to twelve times lower than those of small wind farms in prominent locations, regardless of the technological advances made in wind turbines. The Cell Reports publication now confirms these earlier findings with hard figures.

The Netherlands stands out most conspicuously: with an overestimation of revenues of 49%, the scientists have labelled the Dutch government’s policy as “internally inconsistent”. The North Sea Wind Energy Infrastructure Plan (WIN), published by the Dutch government in July, assumes a capacity factor of 51 to 56 percent—this is the ratio between the actual electricity production of a wind turbine and the maximum possible yield in the same period. This is despite figures from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) showing that the capacity factor of wind turbines in the Dutch part of the North Sea was 37% and 38% in 2023 and 2024, respectively. The Delft publication cites this as a striking example of how “changing targets, spatial planning, and assumed performance can become misaligned with physical constraints.”

“Such overestimation not only hides true energy costs but also underestimates power variability, integration, and curtailment risks, and it distorts policy pathways”, the scientists argue. They further note that the resulting shortfall in electricity revenues “could have a profound impact on society and the economy.” The effectiveness of large-scale investments in the flexibility of the power grid and in wind energy storage—such as batteries and hydrogen production—depends to a large extent on the actual capacity factor of offshore wind turbines. According to the scientists, the underutilization of these investments in the future will have an impact on several generations. “The heavy demands on society, the economy, and the environment mean that corrective paths may become costly or unfeasible for a country or region”, they state.

Simão Ferreira et al., A theoretical upper limit for offshore wind energy extraction, Cell Reports Sustainability (2025), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2025.100573 

Bert Weteringe is a Dutch aeronautical engineer and the author of the book Downwind (2023), in which he informs readers about the devastating effects of the climate agenda on society and nature, specifically the impact of large-scale energy generation using wind turbines. As an independent investigative journalist, his focus is primarily on the energy transition. Through his website, he publishes news about the energy transition and wind turbines in particular.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Science and Pseudo-Science | | Leave a comment

The Year Ahead in Sino-American Relations

By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | January 8, 2026

From trade frictions to security flashpoints, the new year ahead promises a mix of continuity and potential volatility in U.S.-China relations. While Beijing’s growth in relative power—economic, technological, and military—continues, it is not aimed at “taking over the world.” Instead, it reflects a pragmatic pursuit of stability and influence in Asia. Washington would benefit from strategic empathy, recognizing China’s core concerns to avoid counterproductive escalations that could harm both nations in the long-term.

With that said, here’s what to be on the lookout for in Sino-American relations in 2026.

A hallmark of the U.S.-China rivalry since Donald Trump first took office in 2017, the current round of trade war enters 2026 on shaky ground following the one-year truce brokered in October 2025 during Presidents Trump and Xi’s meeting in Busan, South Korea. This agreement paused escalating tariffs—peaking at 145% on some Chinese goods and 125% on American products earlier in 2025—and committed China to resuming purchases of American soybeans (twelve million tons by year’s end—though American farmers are apparently in need of another bailout) while easing rare earth export curbs. In return, Washington suspended expansions of export controls on advanced tech affiliates.

Bilateral trade, which plummeted 44% year-on-year to $324 billion in the first nine months of 2025, could stabilize if the truce holds, benefiting U.S. farmers and manufacturers reliant on Chinese components.

Yet, fractures are already apparent. No formal written agreement has materialized two months post-summit, leaving commitments vague, vulnerable to misinterpretation, and doing little to dissipate the regime uncertainty plaguing the planning of businesses.

Beijing, focused on resilience, has diversified exports and boosted domestic consumption, reducing reliance on the U.S. market. If the truce unravels, expect tit-for-tat measures, but China’s strategic patience could expose U.S. domestic pressures, pushing Trump toward concessions to avoid economic fallout ahead of midterms.

Longer-term, this dynamic underscores the counterproductive nature of Washington’s escalations. The growth of Beijing’s relative power in Asia is virtually inevitable, but alienating the region with trade wars only accelerates this process, harming American competitiveness without altering the regional balance.

While tensions have decreased over the past year, particularly when measured against the trade and economic categories, security remains the most dangerous and volatile arena, with Taiwan and the South China Sea as perennial hotspots. And while improvements have been made, things have been a mixed bag.

On the one hand, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has toned down its language on China, and the administration has avoided the outlandish statements the Joe Biden administration was perpetually walking back; until recently, Trump hadn’t approved any arms sales to Taiwan since taking office; and Republicans and Democrats alike have avoided the high level visits that occurred multiple times over the course of the previous administration. At the same time, Beijing has kept its objections to U.S. naval operations in its area pro forma and has continued to signal its desire to work with Washington to keep disputes over conflicting maritime claims beneath the threshold.

On the other, frankly less promising, hand, there have been plenty of causes for concern on both sides. In Washington, there is little appetite for revisiting the key provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act that mandate arming the island, a longstanding point of continuing friction. U.S. troops are still present on Taiwan and the offshore islands, some of which are within sight of the mainland; having spent the previous several years busily clarifying commitments to allies such as the Philippines regarding their claims to sandy spits in the South China Sea, clashes that could draw Washington into direct conflict with Beijing have continued. On that note, besides Chinese coast guard harassment of Philippine fishing vessels, Beijing has declared a new “nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal institutionalizing its claims. While People Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) incursions since Taiwanese President William Lai’s 2024 inauguration have continued, highlighting Beijing’s resolve to counter perceived independence moves, Beijing recently conducted its second major blockade simulation around Taiwan (“Justice Mission 2025”).

Note: while correlation does not prove causation, it does at least suggest it, and it is worth noting that this came exactly eleven days after the Trump administration announced an over $11 billion arms sale to Taipei, the largest sale to the island ever—quite a coincidence, if in fact it is one.

While China’s buildup narrows gaps, especially regionally, it doesn’t signal intent for worldwide conquest. Beijing prioritizes deterring U.S. intervention in Taiwan, not challenging America globally.

Hopefully, 2026 will see continued lower tensions in the key hotspots where a military conflict might erupt. Clear communication to prevent miscalculation is key, as is a degree of strategic empathy, acknowledging China’s historical sensitivities, such as Taiwan as a core interest, and avoiding escalatory actions—such as continuing to arm the northern Philippine islands with mobile missile launchers aimed at China.

Economic warfare, particularly in technology, will be a prominent 2026 undercurrent. The Busan truce temporarily halted expansions of U.S. export controls on semiconductors and AI chips, allowing sales like Nvidia’s H200 to China.

Yet, bipartisan hawks continue to push for tighter restrictions, viewing China’s tech advances as threats to American dominance in the area.

For its part, Beijing has begun countering such threats with its own controls on rare earths and critical minerals, where it holds 87% of global refining capacity, demonstrating its asymmetric leverage in this area.

Such tit-for-tat exchanges are counterproductive: U.S. restrictions have accelerated China’s domestic chip progress, eroding American corporations’ leads without curbing Beijing’s rise, while depriving Chinese firms of desired imports, raising relative costs, and lowering relative quality.

Recognizing mutual vulnerabilities, let’s hope Washington and Beijing pursue guardrails to avoid broader disruptions.

2026 offers plenty of opportunities for diplomatic breathing room through high-level engagements. President Trump plans a spring visit to Beijing, with Xi reciprocating later, plus potential meetings at G20 (U.S.-hosted) and APEC (China-hosted in Shenzhen).

These could extend the truce, focusing on fentanyl precursors, agricultural buys, and bounded tech cooperation.

Multilateral forums like BRICS (India-hosted) and G7 will test Beijing’s global outreach, emphasizing partnerships with the Global South amid U.S. tariffs.

Reestablished channels—defense talks and economic dialogues—are critical to maintain even if nothing gets accomplished. No one should want a return to the radio silence of the middle Biden years, which does nothing but heighten the chance of an escalation through misunderstanding.

Overall, there is much to be optimistic about in this area—hopefully both sides can keep the hawks at arm’s length and try to make positive improvements to the U.S.-China relationship, which is still near its post-Cold War nadir.

In 2026, China’s ascent—fueled by innovation, continued (although slowing) economic growth, and regional focus—will continue, but not as the zero-sum threat Washington often portrays. Overreactions like blanket tariffs or militarized alliances risk self-fulfilling prophecies, accelerating Beijing’s autonomy while straining US resources. Strategic empathy—understanding China’s near-abroad priorities without panic—could foster guarded stability, benefiting global growth.

As both powers play for time, the year may prove pivotal: controlled competition or renewed escalation? The choice lies more in Washington’s hands than it admits. Nothing existential is at stake in the South China Sea and while far from ideal the status quo over Taiwan has held for decades and there is no need to do anything that might upset the present situation.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Venezuela to Buy Only US-Made Products Under New ‘Oil Deal’ – Trump

Sputnik – 08.01.2026

WASHINGTON – US President Donald Trump said Venezuela would only purchase American-made products as part of a “deal” with Washington to sell the Latin American country’s oil.

“I have just been informed that Venezuela is going to be purchasing ONLY American Made Products, with the money they receive from our new Oil Deal. These purchases will include, among other things, American Agricultural Products, and American Made Medicines, Medical Devices, and Equipment to improve Venezuela’s Electric Grid and Energy Facilities. In other words, Venezuela is committing to doing business with the United States of America as their principal partner,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

He said it is a “wise choice,” and a good thing for Venezuelans and Americans.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , | Leave a comment

President Trump’s Cross of Iron

By Adam Dick | Peace and Prosperity Blog | January 8, 2026

On Wednesday, United States President Donald Trump declared in a post at Truth Social that he has determined the military budget for the next fiscal year should be hiked to 1.5 trillion dollars.

A Thursday Reuters article by Costas Pitas and Andrea Shalal quantifies Trumps proposed spending increase as amounting to a 66 percent increase over what the US Congress approved for 2026. The Reuters article further relates that this proposed increase in spending is, historically speaking, very large. The article states:

Byron Callan, a defense analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, said Trump’s post raised questions about where the funds would be directed and whether they could even be absorbed by the defense sector.

He said the last time the U.S. Defense Department saw an increase higher than 50% was in 1951 during the Korean War, with even huge surges in military spending under former President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1982 amounting to 25% and 20%.

An analysis of the cost of this spending should go beyond dollars alone and consider as well what economists term the opportunity costs — what is foregone because of Trump’s proposed military buildup. President Dwight D. Eisenhower provided such an analysis in his April 16, 1953 “The Chance for Peace” speech. Summing up his tabulation of opportunity costs of military spending, Eisenhower in the speech related spending on the military to “humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” Eisenhower warned:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road. the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

Each Congress member would do well to read or listen to Eisenhower’s speech and give it thoughtful consideration before voting on Trump’s proposed military spending increase.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | | Leave a comment

China Slams U.S. Pressure on Venezuela and Vows to Deepen Trade Ties

teleSUR | January 8, 2026

On Thursday, He Yadong, a spokesperson for China’s Commerce Ministry (MOFCOM), questioned the United States for attempting to restrict Venezuela’s international economic relations and reaffirmed his country’s willingness to maintain trade ties with the South American nation.

“The hegemonic actions of the U.S. seriously violate international law, infringe on Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America. China firmly opposes such actions,” He said.

“Economic and trade cooperation between China and Venezuela is conducted between sovereign states and is protected by international law and the laws of both countries. No other country has the right to interfere.”

“Regardless of changes in Venezuela’s political situation, China’s willingness to continuously deepen bilateral economic and trade relations remains unchanged,” the MOFCOM official stressed.

“China’s economic and trade cooperation with Latin American countries has always adhered to the principles of mutual respect and win-win outcomes. China does not seek spheres of influence, nor does it target any specific party. Economic complementarity serves as a solid foundation for China–Latin America cooperation, with openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit as its defining features.”

“China will continue to work with Latin American countries to address international uncertainties through unity and collaboration, promote economic and trade cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and achieve shared development,” He concluded.

The remarks by the MOFCOM spokesperson come after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump informed Venezuela that it must end its relations with China, Russia, Iran and Cuba as part of a series of demands before it can extract and market its oil.

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , | Leave a comment

Tucker Carlson reports on Paul Singer (2019)

January 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Timeless or most popular, Video | | Leave a comment

US to ease Venezuela oil sanctions after Maduro kidnapping: CNBC

Al Mayadeen | January 7, 2026

The United States is preparing “to recalibrate” its unilateral sanctions regime on Venezuelan oil, CNBC reported. Washington says the move would allow crude exports to continue without a fixed end date, a claim Caracas and several international observers reject as part of a coercive campaign to seize control over the country’s strategic resources.

The reported policy shift comes amid extraordinary tensions following the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro by US forces, an operation carried out without an extradition process, a United Nations mandate, or consent from Venezuelan institutions. Caracas has described the act as a grave breach of sovereignty and international law, while allied governments have warned it marks a dangerous escalation from sanctions enforcement to outright military intervention.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump is expected to meet executives from major American oil companies on Friday to discuss what the White House has described as the “future” of Venezuela’s energy resources. Fox Business, citing a senior US official, said the talks will focus on managing Venezuelan oil flows as sanctions are selectively eased.

Oil Coercion Campaign

The discussions follow reports that US authorities have instructed Venezuela’s what it blatantly described as “interim leadership” to prioritize American buyers and partner exclusively with US firms in oil production, while simultaneously demanding that Caracas cut economic and security ties with key allies, including China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba.

Beijing has condemned the demands as “typical bullying,” warning that Washington is attempting to reshape Venezuela’s foreign relations and economic model through force and pressure.

Trump earlier claimed that Venezuela’s interim authorities had agreed to supply the United States with between 30 million and 50 million barrels of oil, pledging that the proceeds would be used for the benefit of both countries.

“We’re talking about 30 to 50 million barrels of oil being turned over,” Trump said. “We’re going to use the money for the benefit of the people of both countries.”

Caracas and its allies reject that framing, arguing that any such transfers, announced in the aftermath of military pressure, maritime interdictions, and the kidnapping of the country’s head of state, amount to resource extraction under duress, regardless of claims that transactions would occur at “market prices.”

Venezuelan officials note that Washington has simultaneously enforced seizures of tankers, restricted access to non-US buyers, and threatened senior political and military figures with similar treatment, narrowing Caracas’ options while portraying the outcome as voluntary trade.

Sovereignty Under Assault

The White House has yet to release full details on the scope or conditions of the sanctions rollback. Critics, however, say the sequence of events, including military escalation, leadership seizure, recognition of an interim authority, threats against remaining officials, and rapid moves to redirect oil exports, reflects a longstanding US strategy of using sanctions and force to assert control over energy assets in resource-rich states.

For Venezuela, which holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, officials insist that oil belongs to the Venezuelan state and its people. They argue that Washington’s actions represent an escalation from economic warfare to outright aggression, setting a precedent that threatens international norms governing sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibition on the use of force to secure economic advantage.

January 7, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

US seizes Russian oil tanker

RT | January 7, 2026

The US military on Wednesday seized the Russian-flagged oil tanker Marinera in the North Atlantic, after pursuing it all the way from the Caribbean Sea.

The vessel, previously named Bella 1, was intercepted for alleged “violation of US sanctions” in the international waters to the northwest of Scotland.

The action was taken by the US Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security in coordination with the military, the US European Command has announced.

“The vessel was seized in the North Atlantic pursuant to a warrant issued by a U.S. federal court after being tracked by USCGC Munro,” it said.

The action against the tanker supports US President Donald Trump’s “proclamation targeting sanctioned vessels that threaten the security and stability of the Western Hemisphere,” the command noted. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth confirmed that the seizure of the vessel was related to the “blockade of sanctioned and illicit Venezuelan oil.”

The tanker first came into the US crosshairs after reportedly trying to approach Venezuela late last year. The US Coast Guard attempted to detain the vessel, yet the crew declined to let the Americans on board, and headed for the Atlantic. During the pursuit, the vessel changed its name and switched to the Russian flag.

Shortly after the capture of the Marinera, the US Southern Command said it had seized another vessel in the Caribbean Sea, describing it as “a stateless, sanctioned dark fleet motor tanker.”

“The interdicted vessel, M/T Sophia, was operating in international waters and conducting illicit activities in the Caribbean Sea. The US Coast Guard is escorting M/T Sophia to the US for final disposition,” the command stated.

January 7, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, War Crimes | , , | Leave a comment

US Actions in Venezuela Threaten Global Supply Chain Stability – Chinese Foreign Ministry

Sputnik – 07.01.2026

BEIJING – The US military operation against Venezuela has threatened the stability of the global supply chain and the economic situation in the country, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said on Wednesday.

Earlier in the day, the ABC TV channel reported, citing sources familiar with the White House’s position, that the US had required Venezuela to “agree” to an exclusive partnership with the US on oil and give preference to Washington in the sale of heavy oil. US President Donald Trump has previously called himself a key figure in the governance of Venezuela after the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US forces.

“The blatant use of force against Venezuela has seriously affected Venezuela’s economic and social order and threatens the stability of the global supply chain. China strongly condemns this,” Mao said.

Cooperation between China and Venezuela is cooperation between sovereign states, protected by international law and the laws of both countries, Mao added when asked about Beijing’s plans to protect its energy interests in Venezuela.

On January 3, the US launched a massive attack on Venezuela that led to the capture of Maduro and his wife. The presidential couple was flown to New York to be tried under US laws on charges of “narco-terrorism.” On Monday, the Venezuelan Supreme Court temporarily transferred the presidency to Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who was sworn in before the National Assembly.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people, calling for Maduro and his wife to be released and for the situation not to be allowed to escalate further. Following Moscow, Beijing called for the immediate release of Maduro and his wife, stressing that the US actions violate international law. The North Korean Foreign Ministry has also criticized the US actions.

January 7, 2026 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , , | Leave a comment

Recession-Hit Europe to Harm Own People by Giving Ukraine €800 Billion – Orban

Sputnik – 06.01.2026

Europe, which is currently in recession, will harm its own population if it provides Ukraine with the €800 billion demanded by the country, and European citizens will begin to resist such a policy, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said.

“Ukraine is asking for €800 billion over the next decade while Europe is in recession. Those who pay this price are harming their own people, and societies will eventually push back against policies that destroy living standards,” Orban was quoted as saying on the social network X by Hungarian government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs.

On January 3, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said that Ukraine would need $800 billion over the next 10 years for recovery and economic growth. According to her, Ukraine expects to secure these funds through grants, loans, and private investment.

Ukraine’s 2026 budget was adopted with a record deficit. According to Verkhovna Rada lawmaker Dmytro Razumkov, funds—including for military salaries and weapons—could begin to run out as early as February. At the same time, official Kiev expects to “patch budget holes” with aid from Western partners, which has been gradually declining.

Ending the fighting and reducing the size of Ukraine’s military could provide relief, a point repeatedly raised by Russia. However, the Ukrainian authorities continue to ignore calls for peace, despite common sense and a lack of funds, including for maintaining the armed forces.

January 6, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Iran’s collapsing currency exposes the profiteers behind the crisis

By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | January 5, 2026

In the final days of 2025, as the rial plunged to unprecedented lows, Tehran’s bustling Jomhuri (Republic) Avenue transformed into a corridor of defiance.

‘Bazaaris’ (traditional merchant class with deep political and economic influence) and cellphone shopkeepers, cornered by a collapsing currency and punishing tariffs, shuttered their stores and poured into the streets.

Their outrage ignited a fire that quickly spread to the Grand Bazaar, long considered Iran’s economic barometer. Unlike the 2022 protests over social freedoms or the 2009 unrest sparked by electoral disputes, this wave of demonstrations is driven squarely by economic collapse and long-festering mismanagement.

What began as a merchants’ revolt against an unworkable trade environment soon revealed the deeper rot of decades-long economic mismanagement, institutional corruption, and a sanctions-choked system that punishes the people to sustain itself.

Sanctions, sabotage, and a vanishing economy

Iran, a nation of over 86 million, registered a meager 0.3 percent economic growth in summer 2025, while inflation soared past 42 percent by December. Labor force participation remains abysmally low, trailing nearly 20 points behind the global average. These dire metrics have steadily worsened under the weight of relentless US sanctions, first re-imposed by President Donald Trump in 2018 during his first term, and have intensified through two presidential terms.

The rial’s spectacular collapse – breaking the 1,445,000 mark against the US dollar – did not occur in a vacuum. It marked a 47.8 percent surge in just six months.

The higher the rate was going up, the angrier were businesses whose sales are directly dependent on the dollar-rial change rate. The first spark of protests was ignited by the shopkeepers at two cellphone shopping malls in downtown Tehran. They started a strike, saying they were unable to do business because they were struggling with a new cellphone registry tariff the government had imposed on devices priced at $600 and more.

The next day, shopkeepers did not just close their shops but took to the famous Republic Avenue, protesting against the situation. The dollar dealers at Ferdowsi Avenue joined the protests too, and in the Grand Bazaar, gold and silversmiths brought their shutters down in fear of chaos.

A shopkeeper at Lalezar Street tells The Cradle that, “we were forced to close our shops as some protesters attacked us verbally and threatened to ransack our shops by hurling stones at our windows.”

In addition to sanctioning traditional routes such as banks, firms and individuals, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), has been targeting digital currency addresses it accuses of being used by a financial network to transfer Iran’s oil and non-oil money.

According to Gholma-Reza Taj Gardoun, chairman of the parliamentary budget committee, “the Iranian government only received 13 out of $21 billion oil revenues in the last eight months”. He added that “the remaining $8 billion is the cause of the current turmoil, the shortage of dollar bills in the market and the rising exchange rate.”

A rigged system of profiteers

Taj Gardoun is not alone in exposing how oil and non-oil export revenues have failed to return to Iran. At the heart of the crisis lies a parasitic class of semi-governmental enterprises and politically-connected traders who profit from Iran’s fiscal dysfunction.

Former finance minister and current lawmaker Hussein Samsami estimates that “117 out of $335 billion non-oil export revenues have not returned to the country, since the US re-imposed sanctions in 2018.” Much of this capital, he says, was siphoned off by ‘khosulati’ entities – quasi-governmental firms benefiting from state ownership yet operating without transparency or oversight.

Equally troubling is the shadowy role of “trustees” – a secretive network tasked with circumventing sanctions to sell Iranian oil.

Former Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Governor Valiollah Seif acknowledged “they are trusted people, Iranians and non-Iranians, who transfer money (for Iran),” adding “money transfer is a very risky process and the payment of these so-called trustees and the money changers working with them is high.” Seif revealed “sometimes a trustee siphons off the funds.”

Apart from the trustees, the quasi-governmental entities are also blamed for refusing to give back the non-oil export money to the central bank and sell it at rates higher than the regular CBI-approved rate at the official market.

These companies are owned by various funds affiliated with the Iranian government. The petroleum and the social welfare ministries gained a majority of the shares in these funds through the privatization process in different governments.

The third group that has not returned the export money is individuals or firms with special business permits. A deputy CBI governor reports that “Individuals who own or rented 900 special licenses must return some $16 billion to the central bank, (but they didn’t).”

The result is a liquidity trap in which foreign exchange vanishes from official markets, feeding a vicious cycle of inflation and speculation.

State paralysis and political deflection

For months, the government of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared paralyzed, watching as the currency spiralled and public rage mounted. While some suggest the state deliberately allowed the rial to slide to ease its budget deficits, others cite institutional chaos and a lack of cohesive economic policy.

They refer to a confession made by former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani in 2020, “The foreign currency belongs to the government, the price is decided by the government and we can bring it down, if we decide it.”

In reaction to the voices of dissatisfaction, Pezeshkian tasked his interior minister with meeting the representatives of the protesters and listening to their grievances.

He sat with merchants and replaced CBI governor Mohammad-Reza Farzin with former finance minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. Nevertheless, the latter, who was impeached 10 months ago over his mismanagement of the foreign exchange market, said “he has no responsibility regarding the currency market and his task is to control imbalanced banks and reduce inflation.”

Austerity in a powder keg

In the streets, the demonstrations have morphed into sporadic riots, mostly in western provinces, marked by attacks on police stations and arson against state buildings. Casualties have been reported, including among security forces, as the protests shift from organized dissent to expressions of raw frustration.

Demonstrations in Tehran that were not large in essence have subsided, but morphed into sporadic riots. Smaller cities or towns in western Iran are now the scene of riots, with the number of rioters limited to dozens, not even hundreds.

Arson attacks against government buildings or rioters storming police stations to capture their armory have been reported. About a dozen, including police forces, have been killed countrywide, and arrests have been made.

Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 3 January, admitted that the ‘bazaaris’ have legitimate complaints regarding economic instability. Still, he made it clear that the Islamic Republic “will not yield to the enemy” and will deal seriously with violent protesters; “rioters must be put in their place.”

The Iranian leader’s comments were a response to Trump after he threw his weight behind the protesters, threatening the Islamic Republic with military intervention “if protesters are killed.” The Reformist Front joined in rejecting foreign threats, warning that any interference in the protests would escalate violence and distort the people’s demands.

In a last-ditch bid to regain economic control, an Iranian official from the Budget and Planning Organization says “the Trustees will be asked to return billions of dollars in their overseas accounts to the country.” A lawmaker cautions, “the parliament will question the oil minister over the issue of the Trustees.”

Iran’s minister of economy said that positive results have been achieved from negotiations with several countries, including the release of part of Iran’s financial resources and the opening of funding channels for importing essential goods, along with gradual efforts to unify the exchange rate into a single rate.

Simultaneously, Pezeshkian is pushing ahead with plans to phase out subsidies for essential imports – a move he dubs an “economic surgery” that will be offset by targeted vouchers for lower-income citizens. But austerity in the midst of currency collapse, inflation, and a credibility crisis is a combustible formula.

Iranian officials are closely tracking the situation in Venezuela, where the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and rising US aggression offer chilling parallels. For now, Tehran’s street protests remain contained. But if the economic pain persists and reforms deepen inequality, the next wave may not be as easily quelled.

January 5, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

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