US President Donald Trump has said he hopes to hold talks with Russia and China about reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles. According to Trump, the idea of denuclearization was previously backed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Trump made the remarks on Thursday during an address via video link to the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland.
Recalling talks he had with Putin ahead of the 2020 US election about denuclearization, Trump said “I can tell you that President Putin wanted to do it, he and I wanted to do it.”
“We had a good conversation with China, they would have been involved, and that would have been an unbelievable thing for the planet,” he added.
Trump also pointed to the expense of keeping up America’s nuclear arsenal as a motivating factor behind the idea to limit how many weapons are deployed.
“Tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear, and the destructive capability is something that we don’t even want to talk about,” he said.
In May 2019, Trump told reporters he and Putin had discussed the possibility of a new accord limiting nuclear arms that could eventually include China, in what would be a major deal between the world’s top three atomic powers.
That meeting was held as the ‘New START’ treaty – the only arms control pact between Moscow and Washington that required them to cut their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in decades – was about to expire in February 2021. The treaty was extended for five years to expire in 2026.
However, Russia formally suspended its participation in the treaty in 2023 due to Washington’s military support for Ukraine. Moscow then said it would continue to abide by the limits set out in the treaty.
Since then, the Kremlin has warned that a continued US military buildup near its borders and the deployment of nuclear-capable missiles globally could trigger a proportional response.
Moscow has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, though Russian officials, including Putin, have repeatedly stated that they consider the use of such weapons to be a “last resort.”
Last year, Russia announced updates to its nuclear doctrine after the US and several Western nations allowed Ukraine to use foreign-made long-range weapons for strikes deep into Russia. The revised doctrine now states that aggression by a non-nuclear state or by a group of states supported by a nuclear state, could be viewed as a “joint attack” on Russia.
The idea of inflicting “strategic defeats” on Russia has been a cornerstone of US policy for a long time. It transcends party lines and is implemented regardless of which administration occupies the White House. The only real differences lie in the methods used to achieve this objective. In this era of global transformation, it is critical for Moscow to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of its opponents. By understanding the nuances of US President Donald Trump’s administration – now back in power – Russia must craft its own strategy of resilience and development, rooted in sovereign interests.
This is not a new game. In 2014, Foreign Affairs published an article by John Mearsheimer, the renowned American political scientist behind the theory of offensive realism. In his piece, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, Mearsheimer argued that NATO’s strategic ambitions in Eastern Europe provoked Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine. His insights, dismissed at the time, have since been vindicated by events.
Fast forward to December 2024: Mearsheimer’s skepticism resurfaced in an interview with Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, published by UnHerd. Mearsheimer doubted that Trump, despite his unconventional rhetoric, would bring meaningful change to US policy. “Trump is surrounded by hawks with deeply entrenched Russophobia,” he observed. While Trump’s personal views might differ from Washington orthodoxy, the forces shaping his administration remain aligned with America’s long-standing ambitions of hegemony.
Trump’s first term demonstrated this paradox clearly. Despite his campaign promises to “get along with Russia” and even consider recognizing Crimea, little changed. While Trump and President Vladimir Putin met six times and engaged in what seemed like constructive dialogue, US policy continued to push Russia out of global energy markets, impose sanctions, and arm Ukraine. At a 2023 rally, Trump himself dismissed accusations of being “soft on Russia,” boasting that he had sent “hundreds of Javelins” to Ukraine while the Obama administration sent “pillows.”
Expecting Trump’s second term to usher in a multipolar and equitable global order would be naive. The real power behind Trump’s administration – interest groups, corporations, and donors – has little incentive to pursue peace. His 2023-2024 campaign received significant backing from military-industrial giants like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, as well as Silicon Valley’s venture capital elite. These forces thrive on perpetual conflict, where war is repackaged as “peace through strength.”
Trump’s geopolitical priorities are clear: undermine China’s rise as an economic and technological powerhouse while maintaining pressure on Russia. Elbridge Colby, a key figure in Trump’s foreign policy team, has articulated this strategy bluntly. Writing in May 2024, Colby argued that America must prioritize Asia – specifically China – over Europe and Russia. “The logic of Cold War strategy,” he wrote, “once led America to Europe; today it suggests that America should focus on Asia. China is the main rival.”
The inclusion of Marco Rubio in Trump’s foreign policy apparatus reinforces this anti-China focus. Rubio, a staunch critic of Beijing, has long warned of China’s ambitions to become the world’s dominant power “at the expense of everyone else.” Trump’s pivot to Asia is clear, but his strategy remains rooted in American exceptionalism and hegemony.
Domestically, Trump’s team envisions America as a “subcontinental fortress,” invoking a modernized Monroe Doctrine. This vision includes greater control over Canada, Greenland, and Panama, and a tighter grip on Central and South America. The goal? To secure America’s dominance in the Western Hemisphere while sidelining external powers like China and Russia.
Technology and military innovation are central to this vision. Trump’s administration aims to leverage artificial intelligence and cutting-edge dual-use technologies to maintain global superiority. This requires a complete reboot of the US military-industrial complex and a closer alignment between civilian industries and defense objectives. However, the question remains: can Washington, with its internal divisions and waning influence, successfully implement such an ambitious strategy?
For Russia, this geopolitical landscape poses serious challenges but also offers opportunities. The unipolar world order led by the US is undeniably weakening. Multipolarity is no longer just an aspiration; it is becoming a reality. However, the US and its allies are not retreating quietly. Instead, they are intensifying hybrid warfare against nations like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea – countries labeled as “revisionist regimes.”
Trump’s rhetoric may appear bold and unconventional, but his administration’s actions are predictable. The MAGA doctrine of 2024 is less about genuine transformation and more about reasserting US dominance at any cost. Whether through economic coercion, military intervention, or ideological posturing, the goal remains the same: enforce a world order dictated by Washington.
For Russia, the path forward is clear. We must remain steadfast in defending our sovereignty and values. Unlike the West, which prioritizes hegemony, Russia stands for a multipolar world where nations have the right to determine their own destinies. The challenges are immense, but so are the opportunities. In this new era of great power competition, Russia’s resolve will be tested, but our commitment to our people and our principles will guide us through.
Andrey Ilnitsky is a member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and senior research fellow at the Military University of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
This article was first published by the newspaper Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.
Following the US hype of the so-called “Volt Typhoon” false narrative to discredit China in the first half of 2024, by the end of 2024, the US fabricated another so-called “hacker group associated with the Chinese government” – the “Salt Typhoon,” promoting the narrative of “Chinese cyber threats.” However, professionals in the field of cyberspace told the Global Times that the so-called “Salt Typhoon” not only lacks any substantial evidence but also exposes the fact that US intelligence agencies are conducting large-scale surveillance and espionage against their own citizens.
On Friday, the Global Times learned from a source that during discussions with their American counterparts, China’s diplomats on cyber affairs firmly rejected the US accusations against China regarding the individual cases such as “Salt Typhoon” and “Volt Typhoon” in the absence of evidence. They also expressed concerns about the US large-scale cyber espionage activities targeting China and the threats posed to China’s critical information infrastructure.
On the same day, China’s National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team Center of China (known as CNCERT) released two investigative reports, exposing two recent cyberattacks by US intelligence agencies targeting major Chinese technology firms to steal trade secrets.
‘Salt Typhoon’ – new farce to smear China
On September 25, 2024, an “exclusive” report by Wall Street Journal claimed that “hackers linked to the Chinese government have broken into a handful of US internet-service providers in recent months in pursuit of sensitive information” for preparation of future cyberattacks.
Then on October 25, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) sent a joint statement, claiming that the US government is investigating the unauthorized access to commercial telecommunications infrastructure by actors affiliated with China.
However, a separate report by American media on October 27 denied the aforementioned hype and revealed the underlying motives behind the US media’s sensationalism regarding “Salt Typhoon.” A report by The Washington Post said, “the Salt Typhoon group is also thought to have targeted the system that tracks lawful requests for wiretaps made by the federal government of carriers. The motive there could be to figure out who the FBI and other federal agencies have under surveillance.”
It is not difficult to see that the key behind the “Salt Typhoon” is the “private eavesdropping and surveillance system” that American telecommunications companies have specifically established for federal law enforcement agencies, Li Yan, director of Institute of Technology and Cybersecurity, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the Global Times.
The essence of the so-called “Salt Typhoon” is the large-scale wiretapping and intelligence-gathering activities conducted by US intelligence agencies on its own citizens, including political figures. The breadth and scale of the surveillance targets are astonishing, Li Yan said.
Ironically, the US government has never been able to provide solid and credible evidence linking the “Salt Typhoon” to the Chinese government, and the various pieces of information in the media are vague, Li Yan noted.
The expert said that it is not difficult to see that their goal is to muddle the public discourse and divert attention because once the accusation is substantiated, the US government cannot escape responsibility. The key issue is that the authorization and legality of domestic surveillance by US intelligence agencies would provoke backlash both domestically and internationally.
Li Yan added that in this context, diverting attention and shifting blame is of utmost urgency for the perpetrators. Moreover, US intelligence agencies could continue to hype the so-called national security threats under the pretext of “Chinese hackers,” carry out large-scale surveillance, and seek to gain more departmental interests.
Zuo Xiaodong, a professor at the School of Cybersecurity at the University of Science and Technology of China, told a Global Times that the so-called “Salt Typhoon” incident is a complete fabrication with no substantial evidence, and it is suspected to be a self-directed and self-performed operation by the US.
In simple terms, “Salt Typhoon” refers to claims made by US media that hackers have stolen data from US telecommunications agencies regarding surveillance on American citizens, which precisely exposes “the tip of the iceberg” of the large-scale surveillance conducted by US intelligence agencies, Zuo Xiaodong said.
The expert believed the US fabricating and sensationalizing the “Salt Typhoon” is to elevate the “China threat theory” to the “China cyber threat theory,” attempting to isolate China globally and create momentum for establishing international rules in cyberspace that are favorable to the US.
Latest reports: US cyberattacks China’s tech firms
Despite the US’ ongoing efforts to smear China by accusing it of “cyberattacks,” the fact is that the US is the largest source of cyberattacks in the world. According to media reports, on December 18, 2024, China’s National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team Center of China (known as CNCERT) reported two incidents of cyber espionage by US intelligence agencies targeting large technology enterprises in our country. On Friday, the CNCERT released detailed investigation findings regarding these incidents.
In one case, it said that starting from August 2024, a certain advanced materials design research unit in China was suspected to have been targeted by a cyberattack from US intelligence agencies. Analysis revealed that the attackers exploited a vulnerability in a domestic electronic document security management system to infiltrate the company’s software upgrade management server. Through the software upgrade service, they delivered control trojans to over 270 host machines of the company, stealing a large amount of commercial secrets and intellectual property.
“The attacks mainly occurred from Monday to Friday US time, with no attacks reported during major US holidays,” the report stated. “The five proxy IPs used by the attackers were completely unique and located in Germany, Romania, and other places, reflecting their high awareness of anti-tracing and a rich reserve of attack resources.”
In addition, starting from May 2023, a large high-tech enterprise in China specializing in smart energy and digital information was suspected to have been attacked by US intelligence agencies. Analysis revealed that the attackers used multiple overseas proxies to exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange, infiltrating and taking control of the company’s email server and implanting backdoor programs to continuously steal email data. At the same time, the attackers used the email server as a springboard to attack and control more than 30 devices belonging to the company and its subsidiaries, stealing a large amount of the company’s trade secrets.
Multiple facts indicate that documents previously disclosed by Snowden further reveal that the US has conducted the broadest range of cyber espionage and surveillance operations against China and the entire world to date. According to reports from Chinese security agencies and enterprises, the US has been conducting cyberattacks and espionage globally, including against China and the US’ own allies. Furthermore, it has deliberately inserted strings in Chinese and other languages to mislead attribution analysis and frame other countries, Zuo Xiaodong said.
‘US should maintain cybersecurity with responsible attitude’
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated at Friday’s press briefing that the report by CNCERT brought to light again the attempts by the US government to conduct cyberattacks and theft of trade secrets and intellectual property targeting China.
Guo expressed serious concerns about such attempts, and urged the US to immediately stop the malicious activities. China will take necessary measures to safeguard its own cyber security and interests, Guo said.
Cyberspace bears on national security and economic prosperity of all countries. The US should reflect on what it’s doing, and stop its political smears. The US should live up to its standards first before asking other countries to do the same, responsibly observe the same international rules respected by other countries, and work with the international community to maintain peace and security in cyberspace, Guo said.
By the time most of you read this column, we will have a new US President. Donald J. Trump will be inaugurated for his second term today at 11:30 AM, Eastern time, and many Americans are hopeful that the disastrous foreign policy of the past four years under Biden will be improved. There is good news and bad news.
First the good news. It is no surprise that Trump’s appointees to foreign policy and national security positions are to the person very hawkish on China. However Trump, as he often does, has defied conventional wisdom on what his China policy might be by not only inviting Chinese leader Xi Jinping to attend the inauguration, but actually picking up the telephone and having a conversation with his Chinese counterpart.
According to a read-out of the call, the two discussed “trade, fentanyl, TikTok, and other subjects” and agreed to remain in regular contact. Winston Churchill is often (inaccurately) credited with the phrase “jaw-jaw is better than war-war,” but nonetheless it is an accurate statement. It is much better to engage even with “adversaries” than to refuse contact and add more sanctions. Those who prefer sanctions over communications are the true isolationists.
On TikTok, the popular application has credited Trump with preventing the Congressional ban from taking effect. If true, it is another good Trump move in favor of our Constitutional free speech guarantees.
Likewise with Russia, media reports suggest that holding a conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin will be among the first things Trump does as President. That is great news for all of humanity, as Biden’s dangerous proxy war in Ukraine and refusal to communicate with the Russian president has brought us to the very edge of a once-unimaginable nuclear exchange. When the end of life on earth is at stake, it is reckless to ignore the possibility of de-escalation.
In the Middle East, incoming President Trump is being credited with securing a ceasefire in Gaza, an achievement the Biden Administration seemed incapable of or uninterested in seriously attempting for the past year. Does Trump deserve all the credit? We don’t know. But we do know that thousands have been needlessly slaughtered while Biden dithered and sent more weapons. The wholesale destruction of Gaza with US bombs and financial support will be Biden’s enduring legacy and a stain on everyone involved.
The bad news is that because of President Trump’s decision to appoint the most hawkish advisors, he will be surrounded by individuals who will constantly encourage him to confront rather than disengage. For example, his special envoy on the Ukraine war has recently boxed Trump in on Iran by declaring a return to the failed “maximum pressure” campaign of his first Administration. The policy failed to achieve the desired results when first implemented and it will fail again if adopted again. Why? Iran has developed far more extensive trade ties outside the influence of the US government, for example among the BRICS countries. It is not possible to isolate Iran as it has been in the past. As with China and others, with Iran it would be far better to jaw-jaw than to war-war. Let’s hope President Trump understands that.
We will no doubt see some disappointments in incoming President Trump’s foreign policy, but there are solid reasons to be cautiously optimistic. Particularly when measured against his predecessor.
I had a conversation with Alexander Mercouris and Ambassador Chas Freeman, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Besides being a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Freeman’s career included opening China with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in the 1970s and developing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.
We discussed the messy world that the Biden Administration is handing over to Trump. There is seemingly a genuine desire to end the proxy war in Ukraine, and Trump may also achieve a ceasefire in Palestine. However, NATO’s escalations in Ukraine to sabotage possible negotiations and the reckless support for HTS in Syria have reduced the possibilities available to Trump. Will the Ukraine War be resolved by a Russian victory or a political settlement?
“I see Australia as the beachhead to counter China… That’s why AUKUS is so important,” said Michael McCaul, the chairman of the Republican House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a roundtable meeting on Wednesday.
The term “beachhead,” according to the dictionary, refers to an area on a hostile shore occupied to secure further landing of troops and supplies. This is how the US views Australia: as a frontline base in the Asia-Pacific to maintain US’ strategic and military presence in the region and to serve the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” aimed at countering China’s rise.
With the thawing of China-Australia relations, the US is growing anxious. Even the Australian media has noticed this: “McCaul’s remarks add to impressions that with Republicans controlling Washington, Australia may be asked to do more to challenge China in the Asia-Pacific, despite the stabilization of relations achieved by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.”
“This once again highlights how Australia is being instrumentalized and weaponized by the US, at the sacrifice of Australia’s political, economic and security interests, disregarding its sovereignty to serve US national interests,” Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times.
Recently, Australia has been promoting the stabilization, improvement and enhancement of its relationship with China. In June last year, Albanese published an opinion piece, saying, “Working productively with China will benefit everyone in the region.” Three months later, before the visit of Australian Treasurer Jim Chalmers to China, he made it clear that the discussions would focus on “stabilizing the economic relationship with China.”
The Asia-Pacific region has maintained relative peace and stability. Clearly, this is a situation the US doesn’t want to see, so it once again uses AUKUS to remind Australia: Your role is simply to serve as America’s “beachhead.”
But from its inception, AUKUS has been a burden and a liability for Australia. On September 15, 2021, the US, the UK and Australia announced the creation of AUKUS. Australia’s total investment in the plan is a staggering 368 billion AUD (about $242 billion), with an additional 555 million EUR (about $585 million) to be paid to France as compensation for the cancellation of a previous submarine deal.
What’s worse, due to the US’ limited submarine production capacity and inadequate investment in UK and Australian shipyards, the AUKUS agreement is currently facing several challenges. More and more Australians believe that the US will ultimately fail to deliver the Virginia-class nuclear submarines. A possible alternative is that the US may station its nuclear submarines in Australian ports. Given that a US official has previously declined to explicitly guarantee that Australia will have full control of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines, Australia may ultimately face the loss of sovereignty over its submarine capabilities.
More importantly, Chen said the nuclear submarine fleet under the AUKUS framework is not tailored to Australia’s defense needs but serves the US’ military adventure plans against China. McCaul’s remarks about the US’ vision for the Asia-Pacific further support this point. “A third world war – if it occurred – would most likely break out in the Indo Pacific region… That’s why Australia, in my view, is the power in the Pacific that we need to fortify,” he said.
Albanese concluded his June article with the words, “Building a more prosperous and secure future for all who call the Indo-Pacific home.” This contrasts sharply with McCaul’s statement. For Australia, this is a strategic issue that requires deep thought and reflection: To what extent should Australia achieve its strategic autonomy and truly serve its own interests? Is the vision of the Asia-Pacific in the US blueprint the future Australia wants?
I discussed on BreakthroughNews how NATO lost the Ukraine War. NATO has also discredited itself as a security provider by provoking the war, rejecting what were initially reasonable Russian security concerns, and then boycotting all diplomacy and negotiations for three years.
In 2014, NATO based the coup in Kiev despite knowing that pulling Ukraine into NATO’s orbit would likely trigger a war and only 20% of Ukrainians even wanted NATO membership. From the Minsk peace agreement to the Istanbul negotiations, every path to peace since was rejected and sabotaged by NATO due to maximalist objectives. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, NATO could not defeat Russia on the battleground, it could not collapse the Russian economy, and it could not isolate Russia in the international system. Russia has now aligned itself closer with China and a just peace in Ukraine is likely not achievable.
For the next decades, Russia’s economic connectivity will be directed to the East and its increasingly powerful military will be primarily tasked to deter the West. While the Ukrainians suffered the most in this war, Europe also suffered a great defeat as its security, economy, political stability, and geopolitical relevance will continue to decline.
Taiwan faces mounting challenges as the Trump administration reshapes U.S. foreign policy, demanding greater defense spending while signaling reduced military support against China.
Trump’s anti-China politics will unlikely translate automatically into more defence cooperation with Taiwan. Looking to boost the American economy and reduce the American military footprint worldwide, the Trump administration’s fiscal demands from Taiwan are putting the latter in a bind that might force it to devise a new policy towards Beijing.
Trump’s Expectations From Taiwan
While it might have been usual for Taiwanese leaders to continue to expect US military and diplomatic support against China, Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House may go a long way in reversing the pattern of expectations in place since the 1950s. As it stands, Trump wants Taiwan to spend more on defence than the latter has been spending lately. In other words, while Trump may be inclined to offer Taiwan help against China, the framework within which this help can take place is going to change. This is turning into a major issue for Taiwan.
In October 2024, even before Trump became US president, he made sure that Taiwan will need to spend more on defence. Trump’s demand came despite the assurance he received that Taiwan was committed to spending about 2.5 per cent of its GDP. Trump, the candidate, disagreed to emphasise at least 10 per cent of GDP spending by Taiwan. (This is certainly much more than what, for instance, Trump wants NATO members to spend.) Trump, the president-elect, has not changed this position. This demand does not come out of nowhere. Trump sees this as to balance out with Taiwan. As it stands, Trump has a set of his own grievances against Taiwan. In an interview in July 2024, he said that the reason why Taiwan must pay more is because “They did take 100% of our chip business”. In 2023, he went to the extent of accusing Taiwan of “stealing American jobs”.
Trump, therefore, does not necessarily see Taiwan as a crucial ally against China. In addition to that, he also wants to ensure that this alliance brings material benefit to the US. In fact, he has complicated the scenario even more ever since winning the presidential race. In an interview given on December 8, Trump did not commit to militarily defending Taiwan – a major indicator of a shift in the policy of the Biden administration. On the contrary, he said that he has a very good relationship with China’s Xi and that the two have been communicating ever since his victory. Even if China attacked Taiwan to reclaim it, Trump, unlike Biden, made it clear that the US would not militarily defend it. Instead, his weapon of choice is economic: he aims to impose tariffs on China of up to 150% to 200% in case of a war.
That is certainly not good enough for Taiwan insofar as the policy of imposing tariffs – which is not certain to work always – will not help reverse China i.e., if it decides to militarily retake Taiwan and unify the territory. Where does it leave Taiwan? What can it do to prevent this from happening?
Taiwan’s Choices
A logical step for Taiwan would have been to connect with the US policymakers to impress on them the imperative of continuing to support them against China. This is what the Taiwanese leader is doing. US House Speaker Mike Johnson recently had a phone call with Taiwan’s president Lai. After this, the Taiwanese leader arrived in the US territories of Hawaii and Guam in early December. This trip – Lai’s first ever as President of Taiwan – was designed to garner support from the Trump administration. Although it is highly unusual for sitting Taiwanese leaders to visit the US, whether this visit will work to garner the necessary support from Washington or not is, however, questionable.
Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, Republican Senator Marco Rubio, a prominent China hawk, is known to have sponsored legislation supporting high-level visits by Taiwanese officials to the US. But he recently expressed confidence that a solution to any outstanding issues with China can be found, thus dampening the extent of support he can expect in the near future. What else can Taiwan do amidst such ambiguity?
The China Option
Lai’s visit to the US territories was as much meant to draw support from Washington as a provocation to China. But, in the wake of Trump withdrawing proactive support that characterised the Biden era, Taiwan could benefit from a policy of rapprochement with China. Earlier in 2024, Lai called on China to have a dialogue, but this call carried little importance insofar as it was overshadowed by Taiwan’s continuing militarization under the US auspices. For instance, the US approved US$2 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, including the first-time delivery of an advanced surface-to-air missile defence system. In late December, Joe Biden authorised another $571 million in Defense Department material and services and military education and training. Militarization tends to nullify offers of talk.
To give talks a genuine chance, Taiwan needs to take a different step. No one is advocating a complete demilitarisation but stopping further military aid and purchase of advanced weapons systems from the US for the moment – and when getting that support is already going to become quite costly due to Trump’s demand for spending 10 per cent of GDP – might create useful space for even China to pause and rethink its Taiwan strategy. China fears US support will allow Taiwan to formally declare independence. A pause in further militarization could be the appropriate message saying that formal independence is not on the cards. In short, Taiwan needs to excite China for talks. One proper step in that direction can make a huge difference.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
In early 2023, the head of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Christopher Cavoli, remarked, “precision can beat mass.”1 This is true; precision can beat mass. But some countries now have the capability to render Western precision much less precise, both by “hard kill” (kinetic) and by “soft kill” (electronic). More to the point, these countries now possess both precision and mass, whereas the West is left to rely on a degraded version of the former and has long since abandoned the latter.
Power Projection versus National Defense
The “unipolar moment” of the post-Cold War period has led to thoroughly misguided notions about the nature of military power. Here it is important to understand the difference between power projection and national defense. Most militaries exist to provide the latter, i.e., the means by which to protect their nations from threats in their respective regions. Very few ever hold the ability to project power far from home.
But the US military primacy of recent decades, specifically the ability to wage and sustain war in far-flung locations, has become to many the hallmark of military power writ large. In this view, any nation unable to project power globally—essentially everyone except the US—is therefore inferior on the whole. This view is incorrect. What matters ultimately in war is the force that can be brought to bear, both the attacker’s and the defender’s, at the specific time and place it is needed.
Consider the conclusion many drew about Russia in the wake of the Assad regime’s collapse. “Russia is a paper tiger with nukes!” According to such thinking, Russia’s inability to continue propping up Assad, or its decision not to do so, somehow translated into weakness elsewhere, most notably in Ukraine. This, too, is incorrect.
When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, it was entirely uncontroversial to conclude that this operation was likely the limit of Russia’s power projection capabilities. Yes, the country has formidable strategic air, naval, and rocket forces, but these serve mainly as a deterrent. The primary focus of all other Russian forces is to defend Russia, especially on its Western and Southern borders opposite NATO. Here Russia remains incredibly strong. Similar logic applies to China. For instance, those who mock the country’s lack of a true “blue water” naval capability overlook the potency of that force in the waters that line China’s shores.
Operation Desert Storm was the watershed moment for the brief period of US military primacy. It occurred shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is an ongoing debate in military circles over the significance of Desert Storm. Both critics and supporters continue to misunderstand several key takeaways.
Critics point out that the US-led coalition had many months to amass a force in Saudi Arabia, did so uncontested (save the Scud missile attacks), and then smashed an inferior enemy. These things are all true. What critics fail to realize is that the ability to do all of this—diplomatically, economically, logistically, militarily, etc.—was itself an expression of extraordinary power. Moreover, they downplay the fact that this coalition really did possess operational technologies that others, including Russia and China, did not have at the time, as well as the innovations these asymmetries would prompt in weapons development in the years to follow. This was especially the case in Moscow and Beijing.
The primary failure of the war’s admirers, including many current rank and file in the US defense establishment, is to think such an operation is replicable today. They brush aside the fact that most members of the coalition still maintained their enormous Cold War-era forces, but have long since abandoned them. They exaggerate the current reach Western diplomatic influence and industrial capacity. Lastly, they cling unflinchingly to the notion of superior Western military technology. Such people are frozen in the amber of 1991.
The Fluid Nature of Capability Gaps
For decades, the US effectively had monopolies on many decisive capabilities, particularly in terms of deploying them at scale and with broad geographic reach. These included precision-guided munitions, night-vision, global strike, and others. The absence of high-intensity conflict between the US and other nations underscored this reality.
But the list of nations with advanced capabilities continues to grow, and capability gaps continue to narrow. In some cases, these gaps have closed, particularly in missile technology (including hypersonics), air defense, electronic warfare, and, more recently, unmanned systems. More importantly, and to the persistent disbelief of naysayers, some countries now have an edge over the US and its allies in some areas.
Push back hard enough on the arguments of NATO evangelists and one will find, eventually, the sole pillar on which their belief system rests. Such an exchange might begin with their boasting about Tomahawk cruise missiles. By the time these projectiles lazily make their way to their intended targets, and assuming most are not shot down or defeated electronically, Russian missiles—superior in speed, range, and payload—will have already been launched. Some will have already struck, and the others will trail behind them.
Consider the Oreshnik, for which there are no publicly known countermeasures. The prevailing theory is that the Oreshnik is a redesigned intermediate-range ballistic missile that carries six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, each of which carries six projectiles. It is capable of striking targets across Europe, and elsewhere, within minutes. Although the Oreshnik is nuclear capable, such warheads would be unnecessary—short of Armageddon—given the missile’s range, speed, and destructive power. This is a key point. Russia is trying to achieve strategic overmatch while removing the need for nuclear weapons. Perhaps it already has. This would be checkmate, at least in terms of a conventional war.
Of what use is the Oreshnik? There are the obvious answers, like striking NATO’s missile systems, bases, and factories, but there is a much more significant target set. Central to NATO’s plan for a defense of Europe is the expectation that American and Canadian troops and materiel would reinforce the continent, and the US was always the long pole in this tent by far. But how would they get there? Airlift would be insufficient; it simply lacks the necessary throughput. Such a conflict would require mass, and mass moves by sea. One could assume Russia keeps European ports under persistence surveillance, including on the ground. With the Oreshnik and other missiles, Russia could destroy the ports within a half hour, supplying follow-on strikes as necessary. The continent would be left with whatever it had on hand. The weakest link would become the primary one, and everything in Europe would remain vulnerable to continued strikes from Russia’s over-the-horizon systems.
Here NATO’s defenders play their perceived trump card, airpower. However, many of these aircraft are outdated while many of Russia’s have grown more advanced. Furthermore, along its periphery with NATO, Russia has the most advanced air defense network and electronic warfare complex in existence. The latter has already proven effective against many of the very technologies on which NATO’s entire way of war depends, particularly GPS-guided bombs.
All of their hopes appear to be pinned on the F-35. It all comes down to this plane, an aircraft dubbed Lightning even though it has demonstrated difficulty flying in that very weather. Could the F-35 defeat all these many threats? No one knows and that is the most honest answer anyone could provide. Neither the US nor anyone else has flown against such formidable threats—ever. Doing so would be an extraordinary gamble and ought to be understood explicitly as such. Here many suffer from a potentially terminal case of “F-35 brain” for which catastrophic defeat might be the only remedy.
Anyone who thinks China lacks similar capabilities, perhaps with the exception of an Oreshnik analogue, is a fool. Consider the possibility of a US-led defense, or even a resupply, of Taiwan in the event of a war with China, a wildly popular fantasy within the US foreign policy establishment. China has built a robust sensor-to-shooter capability that links spaced-based and terrestrial surveillance with many thousands of missiles capable of striking targets well into the adjacent skies and seas. Even if the US had sufficient armaments to support such a war (it does not), the country lacks the sealift and the ability to penetrate Chinese defenses. The entire notion of such an operation is militarily and logistically illiterate. It belongs mostly to the polished history obsessives with no real-world operational experience who populate the thinktank ecosystem.
Contrary to Western talking points, Iran possesses at least some of these capabilities. Yes, much of Iran’s war machine is rickety, but these lackluster elements coexist alongside advanced capabilities. Western governments and media celebrated the “defense” of Israel in April and October of 2024. They derided Iran’s missiles as “crude” despite the fact that the projectiles penetrated Israel’s air defense en masse and struck sensitive targets. That Iran did not execute a wide-ranging, catastrophic assault was wrongly interpreted as a lack of ability instead of as a sign of restraint. Iran responded to Israel’s provocations by messaging that it did not want a wider war and, critically, by previewing some of its high-end offensive capabilities. Regarding Israel, one should also consider the Houthi’s ability to send missiles to Tel Aviv even in the presence of the US’s premier air defense systems, known as THAAD.
Forces and Sustainment
It is common in the West, particularly among NATO member nations, to point to charts that display collective strengths in men and materiel. These graphics depict total personnel, including reservists, and tallies of a range of vehicles, artillery pieces, aircraft, and other tools of war. Such things display nicely on a PowerPoint slide. The assumption here is that synergy would occur in a conflict, that together these disparate factors would form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. While the thirty-thousand-foot view can be instructive in some instances, this is not one of them.
Individually, most Western militaries possess combat power similar to or only marginally greater than that of gendarmeries (militarized police forces capable of dealing with extensive, internal civil disturbances). As such, their suitability for foreign deployment is limited to peacekeeping operations and the provision of humanitarian aid—and, even then, only under conditions in which the warring parties are sufficiently weak or disinclined to engage them in combat. The ability of such militaries to defend their own countries from foreign threats faces similar limitations. Even the once-mighty British Army could field, at most, three brigades.
To be clear, a handful of Western militaries are larger and more capable than their anemic brothers, though none possesses its former mass. What then of their collective ability, the large and the small? Such a thing is difficult to establish, much less to maintain, without frequent, large-scale exercises in which participants stress-test every step of the “road to war” and do so as a collective. This would include: the mobilization, training, and equipping of reservists; the deployment of forces from garrisons to staging areas to front lines; fire and maneuver across wide geographic areas; and many other things. This last happened during Exercise Campaign Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) in 1993. NATO has since opted for small, infrequent exercises, often involving only command elements or limited operational forces. Even then, the exercises revealed further deficiencies. Yes, these countries have since gained many years of experience in peacekeeping in the Balkans and in low-intensity combat in Afghanistan, but such experiences occurred under ideal conditions, most notably air superiority and uncontested supply lines.
A far more pressing problem is the current state of defense industrial production throughout the West. Though some of us have made this point for years, reality has finally begun to make its way into the mainstream discourse beyond the confines of the defense and foreign policy commentariat. In December 2024, The Atlantic published an article titled, “The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military.”2 The piece noted, correctly, that the US is incapable of supplying Ukraine with sufficient weapons and ammunition to sustain high-intensity combat against Russia. This would be true even if Ukraine had the necessary manpower (it does not). It went on to question, again correctly, whether the US could manufacture enough materiel to fight a high-intensity war of its own. The US could not do this at present or at any point in the immediate years to come, and its allies are in an even more perilous position.
Like with the charts that show aggregate strengths in Western manpower, vehicles, etc., many derive the wrong conclusions from total Western economic might. Think of this as “collective delusion over collective GDP.” The years of fighting in Ukraine have revealed shortfalls in both production and stockpiles throughout the West. Yet, many persist in the belief that the sum of Western economic power means victory against Russia—whether in the proxy war in Ukraine or a potential direct war with NATO—is assured. “Russia is an economic dwarf!,” they shout.
GDP is but one measure of economic mass, and often a misleading one. For instance, except in extreme comparisons between the richest and poorest nations, GDP says little about the economic wellbeing and day-to-day quality of life of a regular person. It says even less about a country’s capacity to make war. Again, what matters in combat is the force that can be brought to bear and at the specific time and place it is needed. A similar logic applies to the production and distribution of armaments. In Western nations, GDP consists largely of things like professional services, real estate, and non-military government spending. In other words, collective GDP cannot be loaded into a howitzer and fired at the enemy.
The relationship between GDP and military power exists only to the extent a nation can turn wealth into weapons. The height of America’s ability to do this was during World War II, a conflict from which incorrectly-derived lessons continue to plague us. The US turned Detroit into a massive armaments factory, and did much the same throughout the rest of the country. Not only did the US have the factories at the time to do this, it also had the know-how. With the loss of domestic manufacturing came the disappearance of many of its necessary skill-sets. Then there are the supply-chain realities, which are just as stark. Those who claim the US could fight a war against China need to explain how the country could produce sufficient weapons and ammunition while also relying on its enemy for so many of the necessary material inputs. Then, of course, there is the question of how to pay for all of this.
Reckoning with Reality
A common criticism of arguments such as mine is the supposed implication that the West’s adversaries are somehow omnipotent or invincible. This is a misunderstanding at best and a strawman at worst. Again, one must consider the intended purpose of a military and its associated design. The US’s post-World War II military was sufficient to contest Soviet influence. The post-Cold War era enabled the growth of the “rules-based international order,” particularly as former foes struggled through the stages of domestic strife and economic reorientation. But the game has changed.
In more recent years, the US’s most powerful competitors built formidable national defenses capable of contesting Western power projection. These nations correctly identified and adapted to the asymmetries between their own forces and those of the hegemon. They did not dismantle and outsource the industrial machinery necessary to sustain the defense of their respective homelands. Thus, their rise occurred in tandem with imperial decline. But throughout the West, so strong was the perception of perpetual US military primacy that America’s allies willingly accepted their own decades-long slide into military impotence.
The current balance of military power between the US and its adversaries reveals a symbiosis. The US is incapable of projecting power sufficient to subjugate its adversaries, but these adversaries are even less capable of projecting power against the US homeland—at least for n
This piece belongs to the thematic series, “Flipping the Board.”
Liberal theory suggests that economic interdependence creates peace as both sides gain economically from peaceful relations. However, liberal theory is deeply flawed as it assumes states prioritise absolute gain (both sides gain, and it does not matter who gains the most). Due to the security competition in the international system, states must focus on relative gain (who gains more). As Friedrich List recognised: “As long as the division of the human race into independent nations exists, political economy will as often be at variance with cosmopolitan principles”.[1]
In all interdependent relationships, one side is always more dependent than the other. Asymmetrical interdependence empowers the less dependent state to set favourable economic conditions and obtain political concessions from a more dependent one. For example, the EU and Moldova are interdependent, but the asymmetrical interdependence results in the EU preserving its autonomy and gaining influence.
The “balance of dependence” refers to a geoeconomic understanding of the realist balance of power. In an asymmetrical interdependent partnership, the more powerful and less reliant side can extract political power. The more dependent side therefore has systemic incentives to restore a balance of dependence by enhancing strategic autonomy and diversifying economic partnerships to reduce reliance on the more powerful actor.
Geoeconomic rivalry entails competing for power by skewing the symmetry within interdependent economic partnerships to enhance both influence and autonomy. In other words, to make oneself less reliant on others while increasing the dependence by others. Diversifying economic partnerships can reduce one’s own reliance on a state or region, while asserting control over strategic markets diminishes the capacity of other states to diversify and lessen their dependence.
The Geoeconomic Foundation for Western Dominance
The centuries-long geoeconomic dominance of the West is the product of asymmetrical interdependence by dominating new technologies, strategic markets, transportation corridors and financial institutions.
Following the disintegration of the Mongol Empire, the land-based transportation corridors of the ancient Silk Road that had fuelled trade and growth vanished. Subsequently, Western maritime powers rose to prominence from the early 1500s by asserting control over the main maritime transportation corridors and establishing “Trading-Post empires”. Leading naval powers, such as Britain, have therefore historically been more inclined towards free trade as they had more to gain and risked less by controlling the trade routes. The maritime strategies of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late 1800s were founded on this strategic reasoning, as controlling the oceans and Eurasian continent from the periphery laid the basis for US military and economic power.
The advancements in the Industrial Revolution created an even more favourable balance of dependence in favour of the West. Adam Smith noted that the discovery of America and the East Indies were the “two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind”.[2] However, he also recognised that the extreme concentration of power in Europe created an exploitative and destructive relationship:
“To the natives however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from anything in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”.[3]
Samuel Huntington similarly wrote:
“For four hundred years, intercivilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization… The immediate source of Western expansion, however, was technological: the invention of the means of ocean navigation for reaching distant peoples and the development of the military capabilities for conquering those peoples… The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do”.[4]
Following the Second World War, the US became the dominant power due to military power, but also geoeconomic power consisting of its large share in the global GDP, technological superiority, industrial dominance, the Bretton Woods institutions, control over strategic markets/resources, and control over key transportation corridors.
From Gorbachev’s Common European Home to “Greater Europe”
Following the demise of communism, Russia aimed to integrate with the West to form a “Greater Europe”, based on the ideas of Gorbachev’s concept of a Common European Home. Economic development and prosperity required integration with the West as the main economic centre in the international system.
However, the Americans and Europeans had no incentives to accept a Greater Europe. The West aimed to construct a new Europe without Russia, which required reviving bloc politics. The ultimatum to Russia was to either accept a subordinated position as the permanent apprentice of the West or be isolated and thus become economically underdeveloped and irrelevant. The West supported only European institutions such as NATO and the EU that incrementally augmented the collective bargaining power of the West to maximise asymmetrical interdependence with Russia. Making Russia obey the European institutions where Russia does not have a seat at the table is possible under extreme asymmetrical interdependence. Cooperation then entails unilateral concessions and Russia would have to accept decisions by the West.
The alienation of Russia would not matter if it kept getting weaker. William Perry, the US Defence Secretary between 1994 and 1997, recognised that his colleagues in the Clinton Administration were aware that NATO expansionism and the exclusion of Russia from Europe fuelled anger:
“It wasn’t that we listened to their [Russia’s] argument and said [we] don’t agree with that argument… Basically the people I was arguing with when I tried to put the Russian point… the response that I got was really: ‘Who cares what they think? They’re a third-rate power.’ And of course that point of view got across to the Russians as well. That was when we started sliding down that path”.[5]
The dream of a Greater Europe failed due to Russia’s inability to create a balance of dependence within Europe. Moscow’s Greater Europe initiative aimed to obtain a proportional representation at the European table. Instead, the unfavourably asymmetrical partnerships with the West that followed enabled Western unilateralism veiled as multilateralism, in which the West could maximise both its autonomy and influence.
“Cooperation” was subsequently conceptualised by the West within a teacher-student/subject-object format, in which the West would be a “socialiser” and Russia would have to accept unilateral concessions. Russia’s decline would be managed as expanding the EU and NATO sphere of influence in the east gradually diminished the role of Russia in Europe. “European integration” became a zero-sum geostrategic project, and states in the shared neighbourhood were presented with a “civilizational choice” of aligning either with Russia or the West.
Moscow’s “Greater Europe” project was always destined to fail. The “leaning-to-one-side” policy by Yeltsin was not rewarded and reciprocated by the West, rather it made Russia vulnerable and exposed. Russia neglected its partners in the east, which deprived Russia of the bargaining power required to negotiate a more favourable format for Europe. Brzezinski noted that cooperation with the West was “Russia’s only choice – even if tactical”, and it “provided the West with a strategic opportunity. It created the preconditions for the progressive geopolitical expansion of the Western community deeper and deeper into Eurasia”.[6]
Putin Reforms the Greater Europe Initiative
Yeltsin conceded by the end of the 1990s that the “leaning-to-one-side” policy had been exploited by the West and called for diversifying Russia’s economic partnerships by becoming a Eurasian power. However, there were no powers in the East with the intentions or capabilities to challenge Western dominance. Putin attempted to revive the Greater Europe Initiative by ending the era of unilateral concessions and instead strengthening Russia’s negotiation power. Russia would not integrate into the West through unilateral concession, but integrate with the West as an equal.
Moscow began to embrace economic statecraft as the principal tool for restoring Russian power, and pursue incremental integration with the West. Re-nationalising energy resources ensured that the strategic industries of Russia worked in the interest of the state rather than oligarchs, who were courted by the West and tended to use these industries to impose their control on the state. However, the West resisted energy dependence on Russia as it risked creating more symmetry in relations and even giving Russia a voice in Europe. The narrative of the Russian “energy-weapon” was born as Europeans were told to reduce all dependence on Russia as the requirement for a more obedient Kremlin.
The Greater Eurasia Initiative
Russia’s Greater Europe Initiative eventually died when the West supported the coup in Kiev in 2014 to pull Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic orbit. By making Ukraine a frontline instead of a bridge, it was evident that any incremental integration with Europe had been a utopian dream. Furthermore, the anti-Russian sanctions made it necessary for Russia to diversify its economic connectivity. Rather than seeking to resolve the Ukraine crisis by implementing the Minsk peace agreement, NATO began to build a Ukrainian army to change realities on the ground. Russia began to prepare for a future clash by making its economy sanctions-proof.
With the rise of Asia, Russia found a solution. Russia began to diversify away from excessive reliance on the West and embrace the new Greater Eurasia Initiative. Instead of being isolated at the periphery of Europe, Russia acquired economic strength and influence by developing new strategic industries, transportation corridors and international financial institutions in cooperation with countries in the East. While Russia is met with hostility in the stagnant West, it was embraced in the more dynamic East. Not only have the ambitions of Gorbachev’s Common European Home been abandoned, but the 300-year-long Western-centric policy since Peter the Great has also ended.
A strategic partnership with China is indispensable to construct a Greater Eurasia. Yet, Russia has learned the lessons from the failure of Greater Europe by avoiding excessive dependence on an economically stronger China. The asymmetrical interdependence that emerges in the framework of such a partnership enables China to extract political concessions, which would make it untenable for Russia in the long term. Moscow seeks a balance of dependence in its strategic partnership with Beijing, which entails diversifying economic partnerships across Greater Eurasia. As China does not seek a hegemonic role in Greater Eurasia, it has welcomed Russia’s efforts to diversify its economic partnerships.
Under the Greater Europe Initiative, the Europeans had access to cheap Russian energy and enjoyed a huge Russian market for exports of manufactured goods. Furthermore, Russia’s geoeconomic strategy to integrate with the West resulted in preferential treatment for Western corporations. Under Greater Eurasia, Europe will undergo deindustrialization as the cheap Russian energy and market opportunities go to Asia, which also enhances the competitiveness of Asia vis-a-vis Europe. The Europeans continue setting their own house on fire with reckless sanctions, in the hope that it will also hurt the Russian economy. However, while Europe cannot diversify away from Russia, Russia can diversify away from Europe.
Ideally, Europe would be one of Russia’s many economic partners in the Greater Eurasia Initiative. The revival of militarised dividing lines on the European continent makes the Europeans excessively reliant on the US and Russia becomes too dependent on China. Therefore, there are strong systemic incentives to restore some economic connectivity between the Europeans and Russians after the Ukraine War, although it will be within a Greater Eurasian format as Greater Europe can no longer be revived.
[1] List, F. 1827. Outlines of American Political Economy, in a Series of Letters. Samuel Parker, Philadelphia.
[2] A. Smith, An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1863, p.282
[3] J. Borger, ‘Russian hostility ‘partly caused by west’, claims former US defence head’, The Guardian, 9 March 2016.
[4] S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996, p.51.
[6] Z. Brzezinski. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. Basic Books, New York. 2009. P. 102.
The article is based on excerpts from my previous article with the same title: Glenn Diesen, ‘Russia, China and the “Balance of Dependence” in Greater Eurasia’, Valdai Dicussion Club, March 2017
Whether it’s Greenland, Ukraine, West Africa or East Asia, rare earths are an element of the global geopolitical competition hiding just below the surface. What are the rare earth elements, where are they concentrated, and what are their major uses? Check out our explainer for a detailed breakdown.
Basic Facts
Rare earth minerals are a group of 17 silvery-white soft heavy metals, mostly consisting of the lanthanides, a family of 15 elements grouped together in the Periodic Table, plus scandium and yttrium, which have similar chemical properties and are often found in deposits alongside the others.
Despite their name, rare earths aren’t especially rare, with one of the rarest – lutetium, some 200 times more common than gold. Rather, what makes the resources rare is finding them in large, easy to find and mine clusters.
Rare Earths and Their Uses
Lanthanum (La): Used in nickel-metal hydride batteries for hybrid vehicles, lighting, camera lenses and other special glass, and as a catalyst for petroleum refining.
Cerium (Ce): Added to an array of alloys for increased strength and corrosion protection, magnets, for burn treatments, glass polishing agents, lightbulbs and household wares including ceramics.
Praseodymium (Pr): Key component for aircraft engine-grade high-strength alloys, powerful magnets (including for use in wind turbines), tough didymium glass, and fiberoptic cables.
Neodymium (Nd): Used for everything from magnetotherapy to magnetic motors, microwave communications, microphones, headphones, loudspeakers, hard drives, automotive electronics, fluorescent and energy-saving lamps and lasers.
Promethium (Pm): Key component for luminous paint, portable X-rays, and atomic batteries for critical electronics, from the military and aerospace to pacemakers.
Samarium (Sm): Active ingredient in a popular cancer-cell killing agent; used in combination with other elements in magnets, lasers and nuclear reactor control rods for neutron absorption.
Europium (Eu): Another excellent neutron absorber, as well as red phosphor for TVs, blue color in LEDs, and therapeutics tool.
Gadolinium (Gd): Active ingredient for MRI drugs. Also used in nuclear propulsion systems, metallurgy, microwave and magnetic refrigeration.
Terbium (Tb): Key tool for chemical screening; green phosphor for TVs and monitors, used in lighting, military grade sonar and other sensors.
Dysprosium (Dy): Used to make powerful permanent magnets, lasers and lighting, electric drive motors for EVs and wind turbines, transducers, resonators, and dosimeters for measuring ionizing radiation.
Holmium (Ho): Another neutron-absorber useful for radioimmunotherapy, magnets, as well as optics, microwave, medical, dental and laser surgery equipment.
Erbium (Er): Added to lasers and optics used in medicine, as well as optical communications, with strong neutron-absorbing qualities. Also useful for chemical analysis and crystal growth.
Thulium (Tm): Used in military and industrial-grade lasers, as a source of radiation for portable X-rays, for meteorology and high-temperature superconducting tools, and popular anti-counterfeiting agent.
Ytterbium (Yb): Key element in X-ray components, memory devices, tunable lasers, amps and displays; metal-strengthening component and burnable poison for controlling nuclear reactions.
Lutetium (Lu): Used in petroleum refining, polymerization, lithography, tomography, as a phosphor for some light bulbs. Also used for tumor treatment, and to build the world’s most accurate atomic clocks.
Scandium (Sc): Key ingredient for high-grade lightweight alloys for everything from military and commercial aircraft to sporting equipment, small arms, high intensity discharge lamps, dentistry, and as an oil refinery tracing agent.
Yttrium (Y): Another metal-strengthening alloy. Also used for high-temperature superconducting, a surprising array of medical applications (from drug labeling and cancer treatment to surgical needles) as deoxidizer and nodulizer, the red color in cathode ray tubes, radar and synthetic gems.
The Kevin Barrett-Chomsky Dispute in Historical Perspective – 10th part of the series “9/11 and the Zionist Question”
Prof. Tony Hall | American Herald Tribune | August 9, 2016
… In Among The Truthers Kay repeats the core idea of The Volunteer: A Canadian’s Secret Life in the Mossad. As Kay would have it, 9/11 confirms the role of Israel as the West’s primary bulwark against Islamic savagery. In making this case Kay repeats the assertion of Benjamin Netanyahu that 9/11 was good for Israel.
Kay asserts, “Following the attacks supporters of Israel spoke of a silver lining. The war against militant Islam suddenly was a global one. Now the whole world would see and understand the sort of nihilistic hatred that Israelis confront every day.” As Kay sees it, Jews are being enlisted en masse to serve as primary soldiers in a war of civilizations.
He writes, “The Jew was the perfect anti-Islamist, whose zeal and reliability was hard-wired into his political DNA thanks to six decades of Israeli warfare against Islamic terrorists in the Middle East.” … Read full article
This site is provided as a research and reference tool. Although we make every reasonable effort to ensure that the information and data provided at this site are useful, accurate, and current, we cannot guarantee that the information and data provided here will be error-free. By using this site, you assume all responsibility for and risk arising from your use of and reliance upon the contents of this site.
This site and the information available through it do not, and are not intended to constitute legal advice. Should you require legal advice, you should consult your own attorney.
Nothing within this site or linked to by this site constitutes investment advice or medical advice.
Materials accessible from or added to this site by third parties, such as comments posted, are strictly the responsibility of the third party who added such materials or made them accessible and we neither endorse nor undertake to control, monitor, edit or assume responsibility for any such third-party material.
The posting of stories, commentaries, reports, documents and links (embedded or otherwise) on this site does not in any way, shape or form, implied or otherwise, necessarily express or suggest endorsement or support of any of such posted material or parts therein.
The word “alleged” is deemed to occur before the word “fraud.” Since the rule of law still applies. To peasants, at least.
Fair Use
This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more info go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use’, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
DMCA Contact
This is information for anyone that wishes to challenge our “fair use” of copyrighted material.
If you are a legal copyright holder or a designated agent for such and you believe that content residing on or accessible through our website infringes a copyright and falls outside the boundaries of “Fair Use”, please send a notice of infringement by contacting atheonews@gmail.com.
We will respond and take necessary action immediately.
If notice is given of an alleged copyright violation we will act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material(s) in question.
All 3rd party material posted on this website is copyright the respective owners / authors. Aletho News makes no claim of copyright on such material.
Aletho News 