John Mearsheimer | November 22, 2025
The Monroe Doctrine is DEAD. Russian warships in Venezuelan waters just shattered 200 years of American hemispheric dominance. Prof. John Mearsheimer breaks down how Washington’s own policies created this historic shift.
John Mearsheimer | November 23, 2025
Russian hypersonic anti-ship missiles are now targeting U.S. Navy warships in the Caribbean. Prof. John Mearsheimer reveals how America’s own sanctions policy created this deadly threat in our own hemisphere.
Al-Manar | November 23, 2025
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei stated on Sunday that Washington’s professed willingness for dialogue lacks credibility, asserting that US claims are fundamentally inconsistent with its actions.
Speaking at a weekly press conference, Baqaei referenced recent remarks by the US president, stating that America has demonstrated in practice that it is not serious about negotiations.
The spokesman suggested that Washington either misunderstands the very concept of negotiation or approaches talks with a mindset that reduces them to dictation. He emphasized that such claims must be measured against the United States’ actual conduct.
Commenting on Tehran’s conditions for any potential talks with the US, Baqaei underscored that safeguarding Iran’s national interests remains the central and guiding principle.
“The other side has shown no genuine belief in negotiations,” he said, adding that as long as dialogue is treated as an imposition, the necessary conditions for genuine talks do not exist.
“What matters is that the US government has destroyed any basis for trust through its actions,” Baqaei stated. He cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and subsequent “unfaithful” actions during the Biden administration, despite earlier progress.
He further argued that the US decision to accompany the Zionist regime in its military aggression against Iran this past June provided further proof of Washington’s lack of intent to reach a reasonable and fair solution.
Addressing other diplomatic matters, the spokesman firmly dismissed speculation that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s upcoming trip to the Netherlands would involve negotiations with the three European countries (the E3). He clarified that the visit’s sole purpose is participation in a conference for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
Baqaei conceded that consultations with other foreign ministers might occur on the sidelines in The Hague, but he explicitly labeled reports of negotiations with the European troika as untrue.
Press TV – November 23, 2025
On Saturday it was announced that Iranian companies will soon begin drilling at the strategically important Farzad B gas field in the middle of the Persian Gulf.
The development marks a rare breakthrough for the country’s energy sector after years of delays, sanctions pressure and missed opportunities.
It signals that Iran has finally gained the technical confidence and institutional capacity to push ahead with one of its most complicated shared fields without relying on hesitant foreign partners.
Farzad B lies near the maritime border with Saudi Arabia, close to Farsi Island, in a geologically difficult zone known for high pressures, high temperatures and fractured formations. Those conditions make it significantly more challenging to develop than South Pars, the country’s flagship offshore field.
Yet for nearly two decades, Farzad B remained stuck in negotiations, mostly with Indian companies that once planned to produce gas there and turn it into LNG for export. Each time political conditions shifted, the project stalled.
India pulled out during the first round of sanctions, returned briefly once sanctions were eased, and again withdrew during the Trump-era restrictions even after Tehran accepted New Delhi’s terms, including dropping its LNG ambitions, to keep the partnership alive.
While Iran waited, Saudi Arabia moved forward. Working with a Canadian-led consortium, it began producing gas from the shared field in 2015 and lifted output to roughly 34 million cubic meters a day the following year.
That imbalance carried economic consequences. Iran holds about 70% of the reservoir, and in shared fields, the country that produces less risks losing pressure in its part of the formation, allowing gas to migrate toward the neighbor extracting more aggressively.
In a period when Iran’s domestic demand has been rising and supply strains have become increasingly visible during winter peaks, the long delay at Farzad B was more than a strategic concern. It risked turning a national asset into a gradually shrinking one.
The administration’s response has been to push a broader strategy that focuses on shared fields as part of strengthening economic resilience. It has already delivered results in South Pars, where Iran eventually overtook Qatar in daily extraction, and in the West Karun region along the Iraqi border.
Bringing Farzad B into full development is now seen as a key part of that policy. With foreign partners unable or unwilling to commit, the government turned inward.
In 2017, the National Iranian Oil Company assigned Petropars to manage the project under a master contract covering subsurface analysis, conceptual design, drilling oversight and preparation for full field development.
The decision was a gamble on domestic capacity at a time when sanctions limited access to global finance, equipment and specialist technology.
But it also reflected a shift in economic planning; rather than wait for sanctions relief and return of foreign investors, authorities pushed national contractors to take the lead on the $1.78 billion project.
Over the past two years, that shift has produced visible results. Most notable is the completion and offshore installation of the 2,650-tonne jacked designed and built inside Iran by local companies.
The operation, led by Petropars and executed by the Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, required a level of engineering competence that industry analysts once assumed was out of reach for domestic firms working without international support.
The roll-up and installation at sea under demanding conditions demonstrates that Iran can carry out heavy offshore construction at a standard that matches global norms.
The technical hurdles go beyond the platform. The gas composition at Farzad B requires advanced metallurgy and specialized alloys for safe transmission. Laying the offshore pipeline is considered one of the most difficult marine engineering challenges attempted in the country.
Processing the high-pressure, high-temperature gas adds another layer of complexity. Yet Iranian engineers say they have now developed the design, equipment sourcing and operational planning needed to manage those conditions.
For a sector accustomed to relying on international contractors for the most complex offshore work, this represents a meaningful shift.
There is also momentum onshore. Officials have finalized the site of the gas processing plant after a series of environmental, geotechnical and risk assessments that included natural hazards, social and economic impact, access to infrastructure and proximity to offshore installations.
The level of preparatory work reflects a determination to avoid the kind of planning weaknesses that contributed to earlier delays.
The expected economic impact is significant. Once operational, Farzad B is projected to add roughly one billion cubic feet of gas per day to Iran’s supply.
That increase matters for a country that has struggled at times to meet domestic demand, manage seasonal shortages and maintain output in aging fields. It also reduces the risk of further reservoir losses to Saudi Arabia and helps safeguard Iran’s majority share of the field.
The project has become a symbol of the benefits of investing in domestic engineering capacity rather than waiting for foreign partnerships that may be derailed by geopolitics.
Petropars, once a secondary contractor in joint projects, has emerged as the emblem of that approach. Its leadership of Farzad B is evidence that Iranian firms can handle highly complex offshore developments even under sanctions and with restricted access to global suppliers.
The recent progress has pushed Farzad B past the stage of plans and declarations into active development.
For an economy navigating sanctions, rising energy needs and long-term pressure on shared fields, that shift marks a phenomenal achievement.
By Ivan Kesic | Press TV | November 23, 2025
Iran’s drone technology has evolved from a domestic defense initiative into a formidable presence on the global stage, demonstrating a distinctive and effective approach to aerospace development that resonates with a diverse array of international partners.
Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry has undergone a remarkable transformation, progressing from a localized capability to a significant global force.
This rise is not necessarily due to groundbreaking new technologies, but rather a pragmatic and strategic philosophy that defines the country’s aerospace engineering program.
Iran’s astounding success lies in its intelligent integration of existing commercial technologies, combining them into simple, reliable, and cost-effective platforms that are mass-produced to meet the specific demands of modern asymmetric warfare.
This approach has produced three notable UAV systems: the Shahed-136 loitering munition, the Mohajer-6 multi-role combat drone, and the Ababil-3 reconnaissance platform.
Each model reflects a distinct phase of Iran’s technological evolution and operational doctrine, addressing a wide spectrum of military needs.
From the plains of Africa to the skies of South America, these drones serve as instruments of strategic influence, extending Iran’s geopolitical reach and cementing its role as a prominent manufacturer and exporter of military-grade drone technology.
Their widespread adoption underscores a global demand for capable, affordable unmanned systems and highlights the effectiveness of Iran’s tailored development strategy.
Strategic philosophy: Pragmatism as a cornerstone
The foundational strength of Iran’s burgeoning drone program lies in its purposeful and pragmatic design philosophy, which prioritizes functionality, cost-effectiveness, and reliability over cutting-edge complexity.
This strategy reflects a conscious effort to maximize operational output while minimizing technological input, resulting in systems that are both easy to produce and challenging to counter.
At its core, the program optimizes the use of commercially available, dual-use components, engineered into robust platforms tailored for specific battlefield roles.
By focusing on simplicity, Iran facilitates rapid mass production, enabling the deployment of large numbers of drones to achieve strategic effects.
This approach aligns with an asymmetric warfare doctrine, where overwhelming an adversary with numerous, affordable, and capable assets neutralizes the technological advantage of costlier, limited platforms.
This philosophy has allowed Iran to build a sustainable and scalable aerospace industry from the ground up, bypassing restrictions on access to specialized military-grade technology.
The resulting product line precisely meets the operational needs of a diverse client base, providing practical, cost-effective solutions to real-world security challenges without the prohibitive expenses of advanced Western drone systems.
Shahed-136: The archetype of asymmetric warfare
The Shahed-136 epitomizes Iran’s strategic approach – a loitering munition designed for long-range, one-way missions where simplicity and affordability are paramount.
Its design is a masterclass in minimalist engineering that achieves devastating strategic impact.
Featuring a delta wing and single fuselage, the drone’s airframe is inherently stable and durable, manufactured from inexpensive composite materials like fiberglass.
Complex landing gear is eliminated, replaced by a simple rocket-assisted launch system that reduces weight, cost, and mechanical complexity.
Powering the Shahed-136 is a commercial MADO MD 550 two-stroke piston engine, widely used in light aviation and prized for its low cost and easy maintenance.
Although its distinctive loud acoustic signature is notable, it is tactically mitigated by doctrines deploying these drones in large, saturating swarms designed to overwhelm enemy air defenses.
The guidance system combines a commercial GPS receiver with a basic inertial navigation system (INS), allowing pre-programmed target coordinates.
Even under GPS jamming, the INS maintains sufficient accuracy to engage large, stationary infrastructure targets.
The Shahed-136’s design effectiveness is underscored by its widespread replication and licensed production in countries such as Russia and Yemen, alongside imitation projects reported in China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Ukraine, Poland, France, and even the United States—a testament to the enduring influence of Iran’s foundational drone design philosophy.
Mohajer-6: A leap into advanced multi-role combat drones
Representing a more advanced tier of Iran’s drone capabilities, the Mohajer-6 marks the industry’s maturity and successful transition into the realm of multi-role, medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) combat UAVs.
This platform showcases significant technological evolution, moving beyond simple, single-use munitions to a sophisticated system capable of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions as well as precision strikes.
Its airframe features a classic, proven aerodynamic design with straight wings optimized for extended loiter times and an H-tail configuration for enhanced stability, highlighting a balance between reliability and performance.
The Mohajer-6 is believed to be powered by a version of the highly reliable Rotax 912/914 series four-stroke engine, or an Iranian equivalent, reflecting Iran’s continued emphasis on leveraging dependable commercial technology as the foundation for military-grade systems.
The platform’s key technological advancements lie in its secure communications suite and advanced sensor and weapons payload.
Equipped with a secure line-of-sight data link for real-time video transmission and command, some variants reportedly possess satellite communication capabilities, dramatically extending operational range.
Its stabilized electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) gimbal, combined with a laser designator, enables accurate target identification, tracking, and guidance of precision munitions such as the Qaem series bombs and Almas anti-tank missiles.
The Mohajer-6’s operational adoption by countries including Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Iraq, alongside reports of licensed production, underscores its competitive standing as a sought-after platform in the global combat drone market.
Ababil-3: Pillar of reliable battlefield surveillance
Serving as a vital link in Iran’s drone lineage, the Ababil-3 is a dedicated and reliable tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform.
Though less complex than the Mohajer-6, it significantly surpasses basic reconnaissance drones, demonstrating Iran’s proficiency in producing effective, long-endurance surveillance systems.
Purpose-built for its role, the Ababil-3 features a classic aerodynamic layout with a rear-mounted engine and propeller, providing an unobstructed field of view for its nose-mounted sensor payload, essential for capturing clear, stable imagery.
Its twin-tail design enhances flight stability, a crucial factor for effective surveillance missions.
Like its counterparts, the Ababil-3 employs a simple, reliable piston engine prioritizing flight endurance over high speed, allowing several hours of operation.
The platform’s primary technological focus is its reconnaissance payload, typically an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) system capable of rotation and zoom to track ground targets.
Live video feeds are transmitted to ground control stations via data links with ranges reported up to 250 kilometers, making it invaluable for frontline monitoring, artillery coordination, and border patrol.
Its versatility extends to armed variants, capable of carrying light bombs and missiles.
The Ababil-3’s proven service with nations such as Syria and Sudan, and licensed production as the Zagil-3 in Sudan, further cement its reputation as a robust and effective tool for persistent battlefield situational awareness.
Global reach and strategic influence
The international reach of Iranian UAV technology stands as a defining pillar of its success, extending well beyond the West Asia region to establish a presence across Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe.
This global dispersal is multifaceted, operating through a variety of channels including direct state-to-state sales, licensed production agreements, and observable technology transfers, reflecting a flexible and adaptive export strategy.
The deployment of these systems in different environments has provided real-world validation of their capabilities, further fueling international interest and demand.
This expansion carries significant geopolitical weight, positioning Iran as an emerging partner for countries seeking to enhance their defense capabilities outside traditional Western or Russian arms markets.
By providing these drones, Tehran fosters new defense partnerships and wields strategic influence, extending its diplomatic reach through technology-driven relationships.
Iranian UAVs offer a compelling value proposition for many countries, delivering capable military assets that are affordable, accessible, and often free from the political strings commonly attached to other suppliers.
This growing network of users and producers fosters a form of technological solidarity, reinforcing Iran’s narrative of self-reliance and strategic independence, and cementing its role as a prominent actor within the global defense technology landscape.
A model of purposeful innovation
Iran’s rise in the global drone market is a compelling example of how a deliberate and pragmatic technological strategy can yield outsized strategic influence.
The Shahed-136, Mohajer-6, and Ababil-3 collectively reflect a sophisticated grasp of modern warfare demands, offering a tiered portfolio of systems ranging from low-cost saturation weapons to advanced intelligence and precision-strike platforms.
Iran’s achievement lies in its consistent ability to identify and integrate mature, accessible technologies into coherent, effective military systems tailored to the specific, often budget-conscious needs of a diverse international clientele.
This development model, which prioritizes reliability, affordability, and operational effectiveness over cutting-edge novelty, has proven highly successful.
It has not only secured Iran’s defensive capabilities but also enabled it to become a significant exporter of military technology, carving out a distinctive niche in a fiercely competitive global market.
The ongoing evolution and widespread adoption of these platforms indicate that Iran’s approach to drone warfare and defense industrialization has established a lasting and influential footprint, one poised to shape conflict dynamics and defense partnerships well into the future.
Press TV – November 21, 2025
Russia and China have, in the strongest terms, rebuked a recent anti-Iran resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), calling for the settlement of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear issue through dialogue and cooperation.
Drafted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and approved 19–3 with 12 abstentions on Thursday, the resolution sought to pressure Tehran by demanding it “without delay” account for its enriched uranium stocks and facilities damaged in the June attacks by the United States and Israel.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced at a press conference in Moscow that Russia continues to firmly emphasize finding political and diplomatic solutions to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
Asked about a recent telephone conversation between the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers, during which the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and related talks were discussed, Zakharova was cited by TASS as saying that Moscow is consistently committed to actively seeking political and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue.
The spokeswoman added that Moscow has repeatedly warned about the dangers of “military actions” that threaten the stability and security of West Asia, underlining that any military attack on nuclear facilities, especially those under the monitoring of the IAEA, is “unacceptable.”
Zakharova also said the US aggression against Iran’s nuclear sites undermined the principles the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — a treaty to which Iran has always been fully committed and which the IAEA has confirmed.
The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman went on to say that despite the efforts on the part of some foreign actors to create chaos and trouble in Iranian society, Tehran still prefers the path of dialogue over war and believes that national interests can be secured based on equal dialogue and by taking into account mutual concerns.
She stressed that in order to resume the talks, Iran needs “serious guarantees” that its nuclear facilities will not be targeted by missile or air attacks again.
Zakharova further underlined that the West must put aside threats of sanctions and military threats and return to diplomacy with Iran.
IAEA urged to create ‘favorable conditions for cooperation’
Li Song, China’s permanent representative to the IAEA, told the Board of Governors on Thursday that pushing through a counterproductive resolution against Iran will “only make things worse,” stressing that the US, Israel, and key European states are fueling the ongoing crisis surrounding Tehran’s nuclear file.
“Countries that have recklessly resorted to the use of force and obsessively pursued confrontation and pressure are responsible for the current situation of the Iranian nuclear issue,” Li said.
The Chinese envoy stressed that Israel and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities safeguarded by the IAEA in June, which led to a “fundamental change in the situation of the Iranian nuclear issue.”
“Such an act should be strongly condemned by the international community and the IAEA,” he said.
On the Cairo agreement reached between Iran and the IAEA in September, Li emphasized that the pact was “a positive development” and “an important opportunity” to fully revive safeguards cooperation.
He said the activation of the snapback mechanism by the UK, France, and Germany had “seriously undermined the good momentum of cooperation” between Tehran and the Agency.
Li added that the Iranian nuclear issue “can only be properly resolved” by respecting Iran’s legitimate NPT rights and ensuring the peaceful nature of its program through political, diplomatic, and safeguards mechanisms.
The envoy called on the BoG to “create favorable conditions for cooperation and dialogue” and to avoid “provoking confrontation.”
The Cradle | November 20, 2025
Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 20 November that it is terminating the cooperation agreement signed in Cairo in retaliation for the UN nuclear watchdog adopting a new resolution demanding expanded access and information on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Iran’s envoy to the agency, Reza Najafi, said the resolution “will not add anything to the current situation” and described it as “counterproductive” shortly after the Board of Governors approved the text.
He warned that it would have “a negative impact on the cooperation that has already started between Iran and the agency.”
According to diplomats who attended the closed session, the 35-member board passed the resolution with 19 votes in favor, three against, and 12 abstentions.
The text requires Iran to report “without delay” on the status of its enriched uranium stock and on its nuclear sites that were bombed by Israel and the US during the 12-day war on Iran in June.
It also urges Iran to “comply fully and without delay” with its obligations under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and to provide all information and access requested by the agency.
Western members of the board stated that “Iran must resolve its safeguards issues without delay” and called for “practical cooperation through access, answers, restoration of monitoring.”
Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and had earlier cautioned that the resolution would “adversely affect” ongoing cooperation. Najafi noted that Iran had already granted access to “all undamaged facilities,” while inspectors have not been to sites such as Fordow and Natanz since they were hit in the June war.
The agency says verification of Iran’s uranium stock is “long overdue,” and that it cannot inspect the bombed facilities until Tehran submits updated reports.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the IAEA resolution was “unlawful and politically motivated,” initiated by the US and the European troika, and pushed through despite the 15 members voting against or abstaining.
He said the move ignored Iran’s goodwill, undermined the agency’s credibility and independence, and would disrupt cooperation.
The Foreign Minister had previously said that the Cairo agreement with the IAEA was defunct after Europe triggered snapback sanctions, but added that a negotiated solution remains possible if the opposing side acts in good faith.
Araghchi confirmed that he informed IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in a formal letter that the agreement is now considered terminated.
When Israeli attacks began in June, the IAEA estimated Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent.
Iran and several allied states argued that issuing another resolution would jeopardize efforts to advance dialogue.
Tehran has declared that the September inspection agreement with the IAEA is void, and Najafi said the new resolution “will have its own consequences,” adding that Iran would announce them later.
Al Mayadeen | November 19, 2025
Efforts and consultations with Iran are ongoing in a bid to restore inspection activities in the country, Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), announced on Wednesday.
Addressing the IAEA Board of Governors, Grossi said, “I believe there has been some progress. We have returned to Iran, and over a dozen inspections have taken place so far.”
“However, there is still more work to be done in line with the relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements,” he added.
He noted that, in coordination with the Iranian foreign minister in Cairo, “significant technical understandings have been reached with Iran to facilitate inspections following the events of June,” emphasizing that “this is the path we need to continue on.”
“I remain convinced that there is no solution other than a diplomatic one to this issue, which requires engagement, understanding, and full compliance by Iran with its obligations,” Grossi added.
He continued, “If this does not happen, we will continue to face one challenge after another and will not reach the position we all aspire to. Nevertheless, our work must continue, and my stance has always been to act decisively and maintain ongoing communication with Iran to return inspection activities in a country with a critical nuclear program to their normal course, in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement—nothing more, nothing less.”
It is worth noting that Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA in June, citing the need to ensure the security of its nuclear facilities following US and Israeli actions against them. Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization criticized the IAEA, saying that attacks on its nuclear sites resulted from the agency’s failure to maintain professionalism and political neutrality.
Clash between Iran and the IAEA
Following the June airstrikes carried out by the Israeli occupation and the United States on numerous Iranian nuclear and military sites, Iran swiftly suspended full cooperation with the IAEA. In response, the Iranian parliament passed legislation barring further access to its nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors unless specifically approved by the Supreme National Security Council. Tehran accused the agency of failing to condemn the attacks and criticized it for lacking neutrality, arguing that this undermined the security of its nuclear infrastructure.
In the months that followed, particularly throughout July and August, the IAEA was unable to conduct its routine inspections in Iran. Iranian officials insisted that any resumption of IAEA activities required a renegotiation of the terms of engagement, emphasizing that previous frameworks had failed to protect Iran’s sovereign rights. This signaled a shift toward a more guarded stance, as Iran sought stronger guarantees before reopening its facilities to international scrutiny.
By September, however, progress was made when IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Iranian officials met in Cairo. The parties reached a preliminary technical understanding aimed at restoring monitoring mechanisms. As part of the deal, Iran agreed to provide detailed status reports on its affected nuclear sites and to resume IAEA inspections gradually. While this understanding marked a step forward, no firm timeline for full cooperation was established, leaving the situation tentative.
Despite the progress, the relationship between Iran and the IAEA remains fragile. Iran continues to demand that the agency uphold a politically neutral approach. At the same time, the IAEA insists that its role under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement must be respected.
IAEA role called into question
However, the IAEA’s role in the latest attack on the country was called into question as Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief, Mohammad Eslami, accused “Israel” of striking key nuclear facilities in Tehran, based on technical details provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The attack, according to Eslami, targeted a fuel production unit at the city’s research reactor, as well as a reactor used to manufacture vital radiopharmaceuticals.
Speaking at the Foreign Ministry’s conference “International Law Under Assault: Aggression and Defense,” Eslami emphasized that Iran has long maintained strict safety protocols to protect its nuclear experts, infrastructure, and the surrounding environment, ensuring no leaks or contamination.
Eslami stressed that the accuracy of the strikes suggests that classified technical details, information Iran had provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were exploited, noting that the only laboratory Iran built in full coordination with the agency was singled out in the attack.
Press TV – November 15, 2025
Iran has strongly dismissed allegations of sabotage operations raised by the head of Canada’s domestic Security Agency against the Islamic Republic, calling the claims baseless and fabricated.
On Thursday, Dan Rogers, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, claimed that the agency this year foiled potentially lethal threats by Iran directed against people whom Tehran sees as enemies.
He claimed that the agency countered actions by Iranian intelligence services and what he called their proxies, who allegedly targeted individuals they perceived as threats to Iran.
Rogers also alleged that his agents had blocked attempts by Russia to illegally acquire Canadian goods and technologies. He also levelled some accusations against China and India for espionage and transnational repression efforts against Canada.
Zahra Ershadi, Iran’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said in a statement on Friday that the allegations were aimed at shifting attention away from Israel’s ongoing actions in West Asia and Canada’s role in supporting them.
“The ridiculous accusations of the Canadian Security Organization against Iran have no purpose other than to divert attention from the ongoing violations and crimes committed by the Zionist regime in the West Asia region and Canada’s support for it,” she said.
Ershadi also criticized the obstruction of consular services for Iranians living in Canada, urging the Canadian government to reverse “irresponsible and unjustified” policies toward Tehran.
During the genocide in Gaza, Canada and several other Western countries continued to supply lethal weapons to the Israeli regime despite the enormous human toll in Palestinian territory.
Press TV – November 14, 2025
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program ahead of the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, focusing on uranium stockpile estimates while avoiding comment on recent illegal attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Press TV has obtained the unpublished report, dated November 12, which will be presented at the quarterly Board of Governors meeting beginning next week in Vienna.
It will be the first such session since the formal phase-out of the JCPOA, meaning Iran’s nuclear file will now be addressed solely under the NPT Safeguards Agreement rather than the defunct 2015 accord.
The report covers the period since the director general’s last assessment in early September and revisits the fallout from the June aggression on Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States.
The aggression led Tehran to halt all cooperation with the agency, citing “politically motivated” resolutions and the IAEA’s refusal to condemn terrorist attacks on its nuclear infrastructure and personnel.
Grossi has maintained his earlier stance; on September 8 he declined to denounce the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists during the June attacks, stating, “I believe this is not something that, as director general of the IAEA, falls within my purview.”
The new report similarly avoids comment on the June 13 Israeli aggression or the subsequent US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites—actions Tehran maintains violated the UN Charter, international law, and the NPT.
The director general instead focuses on verification issues that have arisen since Iran lawfully suspended cooperation in late June due to internal legislation and security concerns.
The report includes the agency’s estimate of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile as of June 13, shortly before cooperation was suspended. The IAEA assesses the total to be 9874.9 kg, of which 9040.5 kg is in the form of UF6.
This includes “2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.”
The report notes that the figure represents an estimate based on “information previously provided by Iran, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities.”
Iran says its nuclear materials remain under rubble from recent attacks. “What relates to our nuclear materials is all under the debris caused by attacks on the bombed facilities,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 11.
“Whether these materials are accessible or not, and the status of some of them, is currently being evaluated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” he added.
Araghchi said that once this evaluation is complete, the report will be submitted to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, which will decide on any subsequent actions considering Iran’s security concerns.
Despite the disruptions caused by the June attacks, the new IAEA report stresses that safeguard obligations remain unchanged.
It states: “The Director General has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances.”
At the same time, the agency acknowledges that “the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have created a situation which requires Iran and the Agency to cooperate constructively to implement safeguards.”
The Cairo agreement, reached on September 9 between Iran’s foreign minister and Grossi, is referenced as the basis for re-establishing some degree of procedural clarity.
According to the report, “the Cairo agreement provides a common understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation in Iran under the prevailing circumstances. While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures remain in line with the relevant provisions of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”
The report notes that Iran “has begun to facilitate” accounting reports and Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) updates for facilities unaffected by the US-Israeli attacks. It also urges reports on affected sites.
Grossi claimed his readiness “to work with Iran without delay in order to achieve non-mutually exclusive objectives: full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and with the recently adopted Iranian domestic legislation.”
On June 25—the day after Iran’s retaliatory operations halted the 12-day aggression — the country’s parliament unanimously passed legislation suspending all cooperation.
The move was rooted in concerns that IAEA resolutions, particularly the June 12 resolution by the Board of Governors, paved the way for the Israeli aggression.
Talks with the IAEA resumed in September, but Iran warned that the decision by Britain, France, and Germany to trigger the UN “snapback” mechanism after the Cairo agreement would create “new conditions” rendering that framework void.
The agency has issued no criticism of the E3 decision, even as it continues to insist that Iran uphold its safeguards obligations under all circumstances.
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | November 12, 2025
Since the conclusion of the Iranian-Israeli war this June, pro-war think tanks responsible for influencing US government policy have been signalling the need for a second round of attacks against Iran and its nuclear program. Now they are picking up the heat.
Despite the boisterous and triumphant remarks coming from officials within the Trump administration, confidently claiming the complete destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities, behind the scenes Washington’s key think tanks appear to uphold a consensus view that the job is not done.
Think tank panels, analysis, and policy recommendations for the US government’s next steps towards Iran have centred around the understanding that, short of an agreement which spells Iran’s declaration of regional defeat, another round of direct warfare will eventually be necessary. Yet, they often caveat this with the disclaimer that the next round must close the conflict for a long time and not drag things out until another round occurs.
In the interim period between wars, the role of these think tanks is crucial to shaping Washington’s understanding of the tasks at hand. Although by nature, what they are saying is always going to be propagandistic and pursuing a specific agenda; segments of their analyses and certain statements from conference panelists are far more useful than most stories published about Iran in the corporate media. If you pay attention to these think tanks, reading between the lines, it makes the logic behind US and Israeli policy make more sense.
On November 5, Kenneth M. Pollack and Reuel Marc Gerecht recently spoke at a panel hosted by the Washington-based pro-“Israel” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, where they addressed the issue of linking US lessons from Iraq, in the post-Gulf War setting, to Iran after the 12-day war.
A few takeaways here were that while regime change should be a target, they also commented on the differences in confronting Iran, drawing key distinctions between Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei and former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Gerecht, a resident FDD scholar, makes it clear that Khamenei’s strategic thinking is much more complex, intelligent, and hence difficult to deal with.
Instead of advocating a repeat of the invasion of Iraq, they focus on strategies to weaken and isolate the Islamic Republic, including the aggressive pursuit of disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon and getting heavily involved in Iraq through the upcoming election cycle.
A policy brief published by the FDD on November 7 specifically looks at the potential opportunities for the United States inside Iraq, framing the election as an influence battle between Tehran and Washington. It is clear that the ultimate goal is to pursue the disarmament of the Hashd al-Shaabi.
Interestingly, despite the propaganda often produced for think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, depicting the Islamic Republic as being at the brink of collapse and that the Iranian public will play a key role in this, the FDD’s Gerecht paints a starkly different picture. It appears as if his calculation is built on the assumption that the anti-government Iranian diaspora are not to be relied upon to achieve regime change.
Gerecht also labels the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, Shah Reza Pahlavi, “Baby Shah”, as neither of the panelists appear to put great faith in the pro-regime change Iranian opposition, expressing the frustrations that often come along with working with them.
Meanwhile, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) has argued that Iran must be confronted over its growing confidence following the June war with “Israel”. The policy analysis entitled “Iran’s Self-Confidence Returns?” lays out the argument that Tehran’s ballistic missile program appears to be the backbone of its defense strategy over that of using its allies.
This article centres around the public statements of Khamenei and the post-war assessments offered by senior Iranian officials, in addition to factoring in the strength and rebuilding process of Tehran’s ballistic missile program.
Without openly stating it, the WINEP piece appears to be getting at the idea that Iran must again be militarily punished due to its growing confidence and that a political deal, which Donald Trump voices interest in, is not a possibility. Overall, the piece makes a number of mistakes in its framing of Iranian confidence over the months, but also is a sober enough analysis to admit that Iran managed to land significant and damaging blows against the Israelis.
It is clear that the Israelis are currently in a difficult spot when it comes to carrying out a new series of attacks against Iran, and this comes down to the number of potential cards that Tehran has to play. This is especially the case in the event that the conflict expands and becomes regional.
Therefore, at least outwardly, the Israelis themselves appeared poised to target Lebanon next, an attempt to weaken the Lebanese Resistance significantly and thus isolate Iran in the event of a future prolonged confrontation.
Meanwhile, think tanks based in Washington are busy forging arguments as to why the United States must get involved in any future Israeli-Iranian war, understanding that this is necessary for “Tel Aviv” to achieve any kind of victory against an enemy that is too powerful for it to deal with alone.
Press TV – November 10, 2025
Iran’s top security official says the West is using the country’s missile capabilities as a means of pressure, stressing it is in no position to comment on the issue.
“The current debate on Iran’s missiles is not out of genuine security concerns but rather serves as a tool to exert pressure and restrict the country’s defensive power,” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said on Monday.
He added that it is irrelevant for the West to comment on the range of Iran’s missiles, questioning their involvement in the matter.
“What does it have to do with the West that it comments on the range of Iran’s missiles?” he asked.
Larijani, who was a former nuclear negotiator, emphasized that Western countries also use the nuclear issue as a pretext to harbor animosity towards the Iranian nation, saying the US and Europe are raising issues about the range of Iran’s missiles with the aim of imposing control and dominance.
“No country is entitled to interfere in the Iranian nation’s defensive power,” which is a matter of independence, Larijani pointed out.
The United States and its European allies have repeatedly called for any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities to include its ballistic missile program as well.
Tehran has consistently rejected that demand, saying its military capabilities are non-negotiable.
Iran held five rounds of talks on a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal prior to the US-Israeli airstrikes on the country and its nuclear facilities in mid-June.
In his remarks, Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither seeking control [over other nations] nor is submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither imperialistic nor submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has increased its trade relations with the East, Muslim countries, and the neighbors, although for years the West was Iran’s primary trading partner, the SNSC secretary noted.
He slammed the West’s arrogant policies with respect to political and security issues, saying the policy resulted in a crisis in its cooperation with Iran.
Larijani stressed the importance of maintaining Iran’s independence “because freedom, culture, and economy will not remain stable in the absence of independence.”
The West, under the guise of advocating human rights and peace, has been the main obstacle to the independence of nations for centuries, he asserted.
Iran’s top security official described national unity as the “greatest asset” of the country, warning of plots to weaken the will of the Iranian people.
He said the Iranian nation has proved over the past four decades, particularly during the US-Israeli war in mid-June, that it will never compromise over its independence.
“Iran will not retreat from its path of independence and dignity, even if it means facing full-scale confrontation,” he emphasized.
He reaffirmed the Iranian nation’s will to stand strong and rational in the face of “modern brutality.”
Long-delayed rail deal unlocks final segment of a Eurasian freight artery, bolstering Axis of Resistance and bypassing western sanctions
By Vali Kaleji | The Cradle | November 7, 2025
In a long-anticipated development, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, announced on 26 October that a final contract with Russia for the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway would be signed the following month.
This 164-kilometer line through Gilan province, hugging the southwestern Caspian Sea, marks the last missing segment in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and is poised to radically transform Eurasian trade routes.
Beyond economics, the project also represents an effort to re-establish Iran’s rail connection with the South Caucasus for the first time in 35 years.
During the Soviet era, the Tabriz–Jolfa Railway, which connected to the Jolfa (Nakhichevan)–Meghri–Zangilan–Baku–Moscow line as well as the Jolfa–Nakhichevan–Yerevan route, was considered one of Iran’s main transit routes with the Soviet Union.
But the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s ruptured the web of regional rail lines, isolating Nakhchivan and severing Iran’s decades-old railway link to the Caucasus.
Thirty-five years later, Iran reconnects to the Caucasus
Since the early 2000s, Tehran has explored multiple avenues to re-establish these lost links. A proposed Iran–Armenia route via Marand and Meghri never materialized. Efforts to revive the Soviet-era Jolfa–Nakhchivan–Zangilan line have stalled amid Yerevan and Baku’s ongoing dispute over the Zangezur corridor.
In contrast, the Rasht–Astara line, as part of the larger Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, is now the only active rail project linking Iran back to the Caucasus. It also extends further along the Astara–Baku–Dagestan route, reconnecting the Islamic Republic to a key segment of the Eurasian transport grid.
This idea is not new. The Soviet Union had extended its own railway network to Astara, Azerbaijan, in 1941, reaching the Iranian border. But within Iran, the crucial stretch from Astara to Qazvin remained incomplete.
Construction on the Rasht–Qazvin leg only began in 2009 and was completed a decade later, with an official launch in March 2019 attended by then-Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and Azerbaijan’s then-economy minister Shahin Mustafayev.
However, the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway encountered significant challenges. A 2016 deal with the International Bank of Azerbaijan for a $500-million loan was shelved after US President Donald Trump – during his first term – unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Fearing US secondary sanctions, Baku froze its financial commitments.
Tehran subsequently turned to Moscow. When the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Russia in January 2022, both sides finalized a $5-billion credit line to fund key Iranian infrastructure projects, including the Rasht–Astara Railway. Russia’s own trade needs had grown increasingly urgent under the weight of western sanctions, prompting Moscow to double down on the INSTC as a lifeline to India, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.
Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin, accompanied by Iranian railway officials, surveyed the route by helicopter in January 2023. Four months later, on 17 May, the two sides signed a $1.6-billion contract to complete the railway. Raisi presided over the ceremony in Tehran, with Russian President Vladimir Putin joining via video link.
Strategic rail link hinges on Russian capital and Iranian land
Despite the celebratory optics, the Rasht–Astara project faces formidable obstacles. The mountainous, forested, and ecologically fragile terrain in northern Iran presents serious engineering and environmental challenges. Specialized bridges, tunnels, and stabilization systems are required to navigate landslide-prone zones and protect sensitive ecosystems such as the Hyrcanian forests and regional wetlands.
Costs are steep. At an average of $10 million per kilometer, the entire line will cost an estimated $1.6 billion. Masoud Shakibaeifar, a transportation planning expert in Iran, believes that “the gross revenue of the project in this optimistic scenario could increase from $500 million in the first year of operation to $1 billion in subsequent years. In this case, a return on investment would be achievable within a 10-year period.”
But others, like Seyed Hossein Mirshafi, former infrastructure advisor to the Roads Ministry, argue Iranian contractors could complete the railway for under $700 million. It remains to be seen whether a new and different figure will be determined in the new Iran–Russia contract, which is set to be signed next month.
Land acquisition has been another sticking point. Much of the route runs through farmland, requiring time-consuming negotiations with private landowners. Under the current division of labor, Iran shoulders land procurement costs while Russia funds construction.
In this regard, Minister Sadegh stated: “Despite challenging climatic conditions and the constraints imposed by sanctions, approximately 80 kilometers of land along the route have so far been acquired and secured, and more than 30 kilometers have been handed over to the Russian side. We are prepared to transfer half of the route for the commencement of technical operations within the next few weeks.”
In addition, to overcome these challenges and mitigate environmental concerns in Iran, Hadi Haqshenas, the Governor of Gilan Province, announced that, following the emphasis of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the 160-kilometer Rasht–Astara route will be constructed on an elevated bridge.
These complexities make the Rasht–Astara Railway unlike any other infrastructure project in Iran’s recent history.
The North–South Corridor challenges Atlanticist chokeholds
The strategic weight of the Rasht–Astara line cannot be overstated. For Iran, under relentless sanctions, and for Russia, seeking alternatives to its embargoed European trade routes, the railway represents a crucial artery in the multipolar world order. It also restores Tehran’s long-lost rail link to the South Caucasus and, by extension, to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As such, it represents a major geoeconomic and geopolitical development.
Kamal Ebrahimi Kavori, a senior expert on Iran’s free trade and economic zones, believes that “the Rasht–Astara Railway project is not merely a simple rail line, but a vital artery linking Iran to major trade corridors – a route that connects the country’s northern and southern ports, free trade zones, and neighboring countries into an integrated and competitive transport chain.”
For Azerbaijan, which is not formally involved in the project, the completed rail link offers faster freight access to Pakistan – a key strategic ally – and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Given Baku’s expanding trade with these partners, the benefits are clear even without direct investment.
Currently, the lack of a direct rail connection at Astara means cargo has to be manually transferred between rail and road, clogging border terminals and slowing transit between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Once the Rasht–Astara line is operational, freight can move seamlessly from Russia’s northern cities to Iran’s southern port of Bandar Abbas.
An important point is that the North–South Corridor has three main routes: the eastern route (Central Asia), the central route (Caspian Sea), and the western route (South Caucasus). Although all three routes have gained significant momentum in recent years, particularly after the war in Ukraine and western sanctions on Russia, the main volume of transit and trade occurs along the western segment of the North–South Corridor, connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
Consequently, there is heavy truck traffic, especially at the Astara border terminals (Iran–Azerbaijan) and the Samur border terminal (Azerbaijan–Russia). Therefore, the construction and completion of the Rasht–Astara Railway could play a crucial role in reducing road congestion, lowering transportation costs, and accelerating transit and trade along this corridor.
In the first year of operation, the Rasht–Astara Railway is expected to handle up to approximately 10 million tons of cargo. In the long term, the cargo capacity of this route could reach approximately 15 million tons.
Adding momentum, Iran’s Preferential Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signed in October 2019, became a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025. While Azerbaijan is not part of the EAEU, it remains central to the INSTC’s westward stretch. The Rasht–Astara Railway will thus help streamline trade between Iran and major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Just days before the return of UN sanctions on Iran, Russia hosted a major nuclear deal with Iran on 24 September, and the two sides signed a $25-billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) to build four small-scale nuclear power plants in Sirik, in the southern Hormozgan Province. This was followed by the announcement of the Rasht–Astara Railway contract.
These moves signal a fundamental shift. Unlike in the 2006–2013 period when Russia backed UN sanctions against Iran, Moscow now stands aligned with Tehran against western coercion. Both reject the legitimacy of the UN snapback mechanism.
Far from being weakened by sanctions, the Iran–Russia partnership is expanding – anchored by energy cooperation, strategic transport corridors, and a shared challenge to western economic warfare.
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Instead of high-quality education, these institutions are fostering a global neo-feudal system reminiscent of the British Raj
By Dr. Mathew Maavak | RT | May 30, 2025
In a move that has ignited a global uproar, US President Donald Trump banned international students from Harvard University, citing “national security” and ideological infiltration. The decision, which has been widely condemned by academics and foreign governments alike, apparently threatens to undermine America’s “intellectual leadership and soft power.” At stake is not just Harvard’s global appeal, but the very premise of open academic exchange that has long defined elite higher education in the US.
But exactly how ‘open’ is Harvard’s admissions process? Every year, highly qualified students – many with top-tier SAT or GMAT test scores – are rejected, often with little explanation. Critics argue that behind the prestigious Ivy League brand lies an opaque system shaped by legacy preferences, DEI imperatives, geopolitical interests, and outright bribes. George Soros, for instance, once pledged $1 billion to open up elite university admissions to drones who would read from his Open Society script.
China’s swift condemnation of Trump’s policy added a layer of geopolitical irony to the debate. Why would Beijing feign concern for “America’s international standing” amid a bitter trade war? The international standing of US universities has long been tarnished by a woke psychosis which spread like cancer to all branches of the government.
So, what was behind China’s latest gripe? ... continue
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