No Ukraine Victory. Only Endure Russia’s Attacks! /Glenn Diesen
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 27, 2026
By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | October 28, 2026
The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.
For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.
Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.
Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.
On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.
The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.
The Mecca pact’s limits
Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.
For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.
In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.
Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.
These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.
The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.
The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.
Riyadh’s security dilemma
The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.
The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.
Kayhan was more scathing in its assessment, accusing Turkiye and Pakistan of having “milked Saudi Arabia and done nothing.”
Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.
Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.
The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.
Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.
These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.
For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.
Yemen cannot be traded
The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.
The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.
Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.
Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.
The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.
Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.
Israel’s declining leverage
The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.
Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.
The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.
Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.
The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.
Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.
Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.
Tehran’s next move
The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.
Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.
The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.
Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.
Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.
It’s the elephant in the international living room
By Kevin Barrett | October 28, 2026
On February 28, the US and Israel launched an unprovoked attack on Iran, killing its Supreme Leader alongside many other officials—and around 160 civilians, mostly schoolgirls, at Minab. The attack was an extreme case of the supreme war crime: aggression. Attacks on civilian targets are, of course, also highly illegal. The US and Israel routinely target civilians and civilian infrastructure, and Trump even brags about it.
Western media, dominated by co-ethnics of the genocidal pariah state of Israel, paints black as white, up as down, freedom as slavery, ignorance as strength, and victims as perpetrators. Though the media won’t say it plainly, Israel is the world’s worst outlaw nation in every possible way, including its de facto national mission of the genocide of Palestine and invasion of neighboring states, its outrageous terrorism and torture, its hundreds of ongoing violations of UN resolutions and international law, notably its flaunting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its threatening the whole world, including ostensible allies, with the nuclear “Samson option”—while whining about Iran’s NPT-compliant civilian program.
The US, too, is a serial international outlaw, kidnapping and murdering leaders of sovereign nations, shredding the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention Against Torture at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, refusing to recognize ICC jurisdiction, repeatedly threatening dozens of nations with aggression, refusing to allow delegations access to the UN, and on and on.
By contrast, Iran is one of the most law-abiding states in the world. It hasn’t attacked another nation in centuries. It signed and complies with the NPT, despite being repeatedly attacked, and threatened with nuclear weapons, by the US and Israel.
But Iran insists on the equal application of international law. If Saddam’s attack on Kuwait (and before that Iran) was aggression, so are US attacks on Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and elsewhere. If Iran must abide by the NPT, so too must Israel. If Turkey can charge service fees at the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Iran and Oman can charge similar fees at the Strait of Hormuz. If apartheid was unacceptable in South Africa, its vastly worse equivalent is unacceptable in Occupied Palestine. And if “Responsibility to Protect” law enforcement interventions are necessary, obviously the first group on Earth that needs one is the Palestinians.
In a recent seminar I argued that Iran should do its best to highlight the fact that it supports and abides by international law, while the US and Israel do not. It’s a true, powerful message, and it isn’t getting through the deaf ears of Western mainstream media. But if Iran repeats this talking point often enough and loudly enough, some of it will penetrate the world’s consciousness through social media and other alternative channels.
What follows is an extract from a seminar I recently joined on this topic.
-KB
ODVV.org
On Monday, 19 October 2026, the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV) held an online webinar titled “War, U.S. Sanctions, and Human Rights: The Humanitarian Impact on Iran.” The discussion examined the humanitarian consequences of U.S. sanctions and military attacks against Iran, the question of international accountability, possible avenues for legal action, and the role of media narratives in shaping public understanding of war.
Dr. Kevin Barrett, an American writer, journalist, and political commentator, holds a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His work has addressed the Middle East, international politics, media narratives, and the political and humanitarian consequences of war.
Professor Alfred-Maurice de Zayas is an international lawyer and Professor of International Law and History at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. From 2012 to 2018, he served as the United Nations Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order. He previously held senior positions at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and served as Secretary of the UN Human Rights Committee and Chief of its Petitions Department. His contribution to the webinar focused on the legal status of unilateral coercive measures, their humanitarian consequences, and possible avenues for accountability.
The views expressed by the speakers are their own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence.
Kevin Barrett: Sanctions, Civilian Harm, and the Definition of Terrorism
Barrett began by discussing the definition of terrorism. He described it as violence against civilians intended to create fear and achieve political or ideological objectives. Applying this definition to the issues under discussion, he argued that U.S. sanctions and military attacks on civilian targets should be examined in terms of the harm they inflict on ordinary people. He maintained that restrictions affecting access to medicine, medical equipment, and food place pressure directly on the civilian population. Barrett said he viewed these measures as an effort to make life increasingly difficult for Iranians and to pressure them into accepting political change.
Addressing the 40-day war against Iran, Barrett referred to the attack on the Minab school and the deaths of schoolchildren, as well as reported attacks on residential buildings, bridges, railway stations, communications towers, desalination and water facilities, wheat storage facilities, healthcare sites, and energy infrastructure. He characterized these as attacks on civilian infrastructure. He also described public threats by Donald Trump against Iran’s bridges, electricity grid, water facilities, and energy infrastructure as threats to commit war crimes.
During the question-and-answer session, Barrett was asked whether international courts could provide a meaningful path to justice when powerful states refuse to comply with international law. He criticized the practical limitations of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice in compelling the United States to accept adverse decisions. However, he clarified that this did not mean the courts should be abandoned. In his view, submitting evidence and pursuing legal cases remain important because they document alleged violations and bring them to the attention of global public opinion.
Barrett also emphasized the importance of presenting Iran consistently as a party seeking the equal application of international law. He argued that documented accounts of civilian harm, supported by independent reporting and public advocacy, could help challenge selective media narratives and strengthen demands for accountability…
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 27, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 27, 2026
Dialogue Works – October 26, 2026
Press TV – October 27, 2026
Members of the United Nations Security Council attend a meeting at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. (File photo)
China has denounced Washington’s policy toward Iran, blaming US and Israeli attacks for halting IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities, while Russia has challenged the legality of a UN Security Council meeting on Tehran’s peaceful nuclear program.
The UN Security Council held a meeting on Tuesday to discuss Iran’s nuclear program after the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to refer Tehran’s nuclear dossier to the council.
During the meeting on Tuesday, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Fu Cong criticized US and European policies toward Iran, saying military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities had directly blocked IAEA inspections.
“The US and Israeli military attacks on nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards are the direct reason the agency has been unable to conduct inspections,” the Chinese representative said.
He also blamed Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its subsequent “maximum-pressure” campaign for the current crisis.
“The unilateral US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the implementation of the maximum-pressure policy are the root causes of the current crisis,” Cong said.
The Chinese diplomat also criticized Britain, France and Germany, saying the three European countries had failed to fulfill their commitments.
The representative said the mechanism for re-imposing UN sanctions on Iran, commonly known as the snapback mechanism, had fundamental legal and procedural flaws.
Russia’s representative, Vassily Nebenzia, also challenged the legality of holding the meeting under the “non-proliferation” item of the Security Council’s agenda.
“We are compelled to take the floor on a point of order in connection with yet another attempt to flagrantly violate the Security Council’s rules of procedure and convene a meeting under a non-existent agenda item.”
He said that under Resolution 2231 the council had concluded its consideration of Iran’s nuclear program on October 18, 2025, and removed the “non-proliferation” item from its agenda.
He also rejected claims that earlier UN resolutions on sanctions against Iran had been reinstated, saying such claims “have no legal basis whatsoever.”
Nebenzia said Russia and China had proposed holding the briefing under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security,” arguing that “repeated strikes against Iran’s peaceful nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards” posed such threats.
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on September 9 proposed by the United States, France, Britain and Germany calling for Iran’s nuclear file to be referred to the Security Council. The resolution passed with 23 votes in favor, eight abstentions and three votes against.
The referral marked the first time in 20 years that Iran’s nuclear file had been sent to the Security Council over alleged violations of its non-proliferation obligations.
Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful. Tehran has also criticized the resolution, saying Western countries are disregarding its cooperation with the IAEA and the consequences of US and Israeli military attacks on nuclear facilities under agency safeguards.
Iran has also criticized the United States and the three European countries for pursuing the resolution, saying their actions undermine impartiality of the IAEA Board of Governors.
The Security Council meeting was requested by Western countries and Bahrain. Russia and China objected to holding it, prompting a procedural vote.
The proposal to convene the meeting passed with 11 votes in favor, two against and two abstentions. Russia and China voted against the proposal. As a procedural matter, the vote was not subject to the council’s veto mechanism.
The United States and Israel launched unprovoked aggression against Iran two times in June 2025 and February 28 amid indirect talks between Iran and the US.
Other than military and civilian facilities, including hospitals and schools, Iran’s safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities were targeted by the aggressors in both wars, as the international community and the IAEA were reticent.

By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | October 27, 2026
For nearly half a century, Iran’s adversaries have tried to isolate it, intimidate it, sanction it into submission and bomb it into irrelevance. Now, in a remarkable inversion of regional power politics, three countries historically invested in its containment have arrived in Tehran to discuss their security with the very state they were supposed to marginalise.
The country they could not defeat is becoming the country they cannot afford to ignore.
Yesterday, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın met Iranian officials in an encounter whose diplomatic courtesies barely concealed its strategic significance.
The Mecca Pact, the joint defence agreement that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed in Mecca in August, was supposed to consolidate a formidable Sunni-led defence alignment. Yet its representatives have come to Tehran confronting an inconvenient reality: Iran cannot be excluded from regional security merely because Washington and its partners find its independence intolerable.
Apparently, the Islamic Republic has become considerably more respectable since demonstrating that it cannot be conveniently eliminated.
This is the distinction between military destruction and strategic defeat that Washington and Israel persistently confuse. Overwhelming firepower can devastate infrastructure, assassinate officials and inflict enormous suffering. It cannot manufacture political submission.
Iran has survived military confrontation, retained retaliatory capabilities and forced neighbouring governments to reconsider the potentially catastrophic consequences of another war.
Survival becomes strategic victory when your adversaries must reorganise their calculations around it.
For Saudi Arabia, the reckoning is particularly humiliating. Riyadh spent decades treating American military supremacy as an insurance policy against Iranian influence. Yemen exposed the bankruptcy of that assumption.
Ansar Allah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, demonstrated that superior arsenals cannot guarantee security against an adversary capable of imposing disproportionate costs. The Saudi monarchy possesses spectacular weaponry, immense wealth and powerful patrons. Yet none of these has eliminated its vulnerability to Yemeni retaliation.
Now Riyadh finds itself seeking Tehran’s cooperation to manage a conflict that its military superiority has failed to resolve.
Evidently, purchasing American weapons is considerably easier than purchasing strategic security.
Pakistan’s predicament is scarcely less revealing. Munir presides over a military establishment accustomed to presenting strategic dependency as diplomatic sophistication. Islamabad’s defence commitments to Riyadh now threaten to entangle Pakistan in confrontations with Iran and Yemen that serve neither its geography nor its national interests.
The Mecca Pact promises collective security. Its less advertised feature is collective exposure to somebody else’s strategic miscalculations.
Munir must now reconcile his obligations to Saudi patrons with the inconvenient realities of Iranian power. It is an awkward assignment for an establishment that has repeatedly mistaken proximity to foreign power for genuine strategic independence.
Türkiye confronts a different calculation but reaches a similar conclusion. Ankara understands that NATO membership, military capabilities and regional ambitions cannot abolish geography. No credible security architecture can be constructed by pretending Iran is dispensable.
The deeper contradiction, however, lies within the Mecca Pact itself.
Its members seek the reassurance of collective defence while attempting to avoid being dragged into another American-Israeli confrontation. An attack on one may formally constitute an attack on all. But such commitments become considerably less attractive when Iranian retaliation, Yemeni escalation and vulnerable Gulf infrastructure enter the equation.
Collective defence sounds magnificent until someone presents the collective bill.
Iran’s achievement is not that its neighbours have embraced its revolutionary worldview. They have not. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to Washington, Pakistan continues its elaborate balancing act, and Türkiye remains embedded in NATO.
The significance runs deeper: these governments increasingly recognise that excluding Iran from regional security may expose them to greater dangers than engaging it.
That realisation strikes at the foundations of the American security paradigm.
For decades, Washington cultivated regional dependence on American protection while organising strategic anxieties around Iranian power. Now those same governments are exploring cooperation with the country they were encouraged to regard as an existential threat.
The irony is devastating. Decades of attempting to contain Iran may have helped establish its indispensability.
And Tehran, displaying the composure of a state conscious of its diplomatic leverage, has welcomed its visitors graciously. No triumphalist declarations are necessary. The spectacle speaks adequately for itself.
The Mecca Pact arrived ostensibly to discuss regional stability. What it encountered was the strategic consequence of its own failed assumptions.
Iran did not have to join the alliance. The alliance had to come to Iran.
Press TV – October 27, 2026
Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi has called for the formation of a non-aggression security pact involving six Persian Gulf states plus Iran and Iraq, slamming US attempts to demonize the Islamic Republic as a threat.
Speaking at Girton College, Cambridge, on Monday, Albusaidi stressed that Washington has promoted for almost half a century the false image of Tehran as a threat to the Persian Gulf states, holding back West Asia’s ability to solve its own problems.
The Omani foreign minister, speaking to break the deadlock over the region’s future, stressed that the US would no longer be the region’s primary security provider.
“Issues such as the Strait of Hormuz have become impossible to resolve because external powers continue to define the terms of engagement, while regional powers are unable to take collective responsibility for making their own security arrangements and reach a consensus on them,” Albusaidi noted.
Iran has so far refused to ease its restrictions on transit through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, saying the key international energy waterway will be fully reopened once the US permanently ends its aggression and lifts its maritime blockade and sanctions against Iran.
Iranian authorities have also indicated that the country would not back down from its conditions and would respond decisively to any new act of aggression against its territory.
“What holds us back is that issues which ought to be handled at a regional level by the states of the [Persian] Gulf themselves, are made more complex, more intractable and sometimes simply impossible to resolve because the region’s security arrangements are insufficiently developed,” Albusaidi further stressed.
“And they are insufficiently developed because they have relied for too long on the involvement of external powers,” he added.
Oman’s top diplomat noted that the Islamic Republic “had been systematically excluded from playing any meaningful role in the security arrangements of the region.
Albusaidi also stressed that such exclusion had led to “profoundly negative consequences, not just for Iran, but for the region as a whole”, including the imposition of priorities on the region by external powers such as “the entirely false perception that there is a fundamental regional antagonism between Iran and the Arab states of the [Persian] Gulf.”
According to the Omani foreign minister, the most “damaging” of the priorities imposed on the Persian Gulf region from the outside has been the requirement that the Islamic Republic be excluded.
“Not just excluded. Worse. Positioned as the threat against which regional security had to be organized,” Albusaidi stressed, speaking on the day high-level defense and intelligence officials from Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gathered in Tehran in an attempt to prevent a renewed act of aggression by the US against Iran.
Iran and Oman, both coastal states bordering the strategic waterway, engaged in intensive negotiations for months over arrangements for safe shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran and Oman finally reached a temporary agreement on how shipping traffic should be managed in the strait, but the plan is on hold as Iran keeps the waterway closed due to US acts of aggression and violations.
Roughly one-fifth of global oil demand passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making the waterway one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.
Oman’s foreign minister, without mentioning by name, also challenged US President Donald Trump’s case for a further war of aggression against Iran by saying that he believed the previous round of Oman-mediated negotiations between the US and Iran in February were “making significant progress, and that an agreement was within reach. We still stand by that judgment today.”
The US and the Israeli regime waged their first war of aggression against Iran, which lasted 12 days, in June 2025. Their second aggression began on February 28, 2026, and came to a halt in early April after 40 days.
Iran has been defending itself by targeting US bases and energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf states with missile strikes and drone attacks.
Press TV – October 27, 2026
US President Donald Trump has again resorted to brazen falsehoods while defending Washington’s ongoing war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, claiming Tehran initiated the war and dismissing an earlier ceasefire as a “waste of time.”
Speaking at a campaign rally in Corinth, Mississippi, on Monday, ahead of the November midterms, Trump echoed the talking points of hardline Republicans by asserting: “We didn’t start the war with Iran. Iran started the war with us.”
He further claimed the Islamic Republic had developed missiles capable of striking American cities, declaring that “they’d hit San Diego, they’d hit Los Angeles, they’d hit our cities too,” and argued that the military offensive “should’ve been done a long time ago.”
Trump’s remarks stand in stark contradiction to the established record. On February 28, the United States and the Israeli regime launched the unprovoked so-called “Operation Epic Fury,” a coordinated assault that assassinated Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, senior military commanders, and hundreds of civilians, including schoolchildren in Minab.
The aggression followed months of escalating threats and came amid stalled diplomatic efforts, consistent with the pattern of the earlier 12-day US-Israeli war in June 2025.
Iran responded immediately and decisively with Operation True Promise 4. In successive waves of precision missile and drone strikes, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and allied resistance forces targeted US military installations across West Asia, including bases in Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
These retaliatory operations inflicted significant damage on American radar systems, tanker aircraft, command facilities, and naval assets, exposing the vulnerability of the US military footprint in the region and forcing a recalculation in Washington.
A ceasefire was secured in early April after nearly 40 days of intense fighting, largely on Iranian terms and in the face of sustained resistance. Far from a “waste of time,” the pause reflected the failure of the initial US-Israeli maximalist objectives — unconditional surrender, elimination of Iran’s defensive missile capabilities, and control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump’s own administration has repeatedly shifted its stated justifications for the war, from preventing a nuclear weapons program (despite Iran’s longstanding fatwa and the absence of evidence of a military nuclear effort) to claims of imminent attack, regime change, and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran had restricted only to vessels linked to the aggressors.
Trump’s missile claims are equally baseless. Iran’s ballistic missile inventory, while advanced and regionally capable, consists primarily of systems with ranges of roughly 1,000–2,000 kilometers. These weapons have proven effective against US bases and Israeli targets in West Asia. They do not include intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States.
Independent assessments and US intelligence have consistently confirmed that Iran does not have the missiles to strike cities such as Los Angeles or San Diego. Trump’s assertion appears designed to manufacture fear and justify continued aggression rather than reflect military reality.
The economic consequences Trump now seeks to downplay stem directly from the US-initiated war of aggression and the resulting disruption in the Persian Gulf. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that any naval blockade or further attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure will be met with proportional and stronger responses.
President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi have emphasized that diplomacy remains possible only on the basis of mutual respect and an end to aggression, while warning that renewed strikes will not alter Iran’s positions.
Trump’s latest comments also highlight a deeper hypocrisy. He campaigned as a president who would avoid new wars, yet authorized a major military offensive that has neither achieved its shifting goals nor ended.
His repeated declarations of victory earlier in the year have been contradicted by Iran’s continued ability to conduct retaliatory operations and the persistence of the conflict more than seven months after it began.
As midterm elections approach, such rhetoric appears aimed at deflecting domestic criticism over rising costs and the lack of a clear exit strategy rather than presenting an accurate account of events.
By Arman Shariati | Press TV | October 26, 2026
Israeli regime’s airspace – the airspace over the occupied territories – is widely regarded as among the most heavily defended in the world.
Yet the scale of its protection cannot be explained by Israeli military technology alone. Russia, China and even the United States do not benefit from an equivalent network of allied support dedicated to intercepting threats before they reach their territory.
Israel’s own defenses are indeed formidable. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, while Arrow 2 targets ballistic missile threats within it. David’s Sling is built to counter medium-range threats, and Iron Dome intercepts rockets and other short-range projectiles.
These systems are backed by fighter jets and an extensive radar network, creating multiple layers of protection against incoming attacks.
But Israel’s air defense shield extends well beyond its own arsenal. From October 2023 through Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone operations in 2024, 2025 and 2026, a group of allied states has played an active role in protecting the regime.
They have provided interceptors, radar capabilities, fighter aircraft, military bases and personnel, helping the Tel Aviv regime detect, track and counter incoming threats.
What emerges is not simply a domestic air-defense network, but a wider umbrella sustained by the resources and involvement of powerful allies – from the US to Europe to Arab countries.
This ironclad commitment of regional and extra-regional countries to Israel’s protection has come at a considerable cost.
The price goes well beyond dollars and shekels. It includes depleted weapons stockpiles that could take years to replenish, damaged radars and military bases, soldiers killed or wounded, and governments facing domestic political backlash for a costly partnership that much of their own public fiercely opposes and protests against.
The burden, however, is not shared equally. The United States has shouldered the largest financial and military inventory costs. The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan have faced intense operational demands and direct security risks. European states have incurred more limited but still significant costs, particularly in munitions and the political fallout from a war that has driven up energy prices and compounded the cost-of-living pressures facing their populations.
The Israeli bill
The Israeli regime’s direct costs are the easiest to track because they fall on its own treasury. In April 2024, after Iran launched a large number of drones and missiles at the occupied territories, Brig. Gen. Reem Aminoach, an economic adviser to a former Israeli military chief of staff, estimated in an interview with Ynet that defending against the attack that night had cost 4-5 billion shekels, or roughly $1.1–$1.35 billion at the exchange rate at the time.
Haaretz later put the total cost of defending against the same retaliatory attack at around $1.5 billion. That was just one night. Many more retaliatory strikes have hit the occupied territories since then.
The cost structure follows a clear logic. Iran uses inexpensive drones and mass-produced missiles, while Israel relies on some of the world’s most expensive interceptors to defend against them.
This disparity lies at the heart of the war’s financial burden. Israel’s broader budget picture adds another dimension. Sustained, high-intensity defensive operations have forced the regime to spend far more than it did previously.
With a net budget of about 60 billion shekels in 2023, the Israeli military could not sustain repeated nights of interceptions without substantial increases in funding and continued US support.
Israel has been able to sustain this costly imbalance largely because of extensive financial backing from American taxpayers. Much of its interceptor production is funded or co-developed through US programs, and the Arrow missile defense system is produced with American participation.
US Congress has also repeatedly approved emergency supplemental funding for Israeli missile defense. These ties mean that Israel’s financial burden and America’s are deeply interconnected and difficult to separate, which explains the public anger in the US.
The American inventory crisis
No country has spent more on Israel’s defense than the United States, and no factor is more consequential than the state of its interceptor stockpiles. Washington may be willing to spend the tens of billions of dollars required to protect their genocidal ally, but willingness alone cannot resolve the US military’s primary challenge: replenishing its dwindling missile interceptors.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank, has published some of the most widely cited public estimates of US missile interceptor inventories.
Its analysis, updated following the 40-day war against Iran, found that American Patriot and THAAD inventories had declined dramatically.
According to CSIS estimates, the US inventory of Patriot interceptors fell from approximately 2,330 before the war began on February 27, 2026, to between 759 and 827 by July 27, 2026, marking a decline of roughly two-thirds.
The THAAD inventory also dropped sharply, falling from an estimated 452 interceptors before the war to between 239 and 257 by July 27, representing a decline of approximately 43 to 47 percent.

Many military experts believe CSIS’s estimates are overly optimistic. Some, for instance, argue that the United States may have fired as many as 290 of its roughly 360 THAAD interceptors during the early phase of the war. That would amount to more than 80 percent of its pre-war stockpile.
Whatever the exact figures, Washington’s decision to prioritize Israel’s defense has left the US military dangerously underprepared and more vulnerable to another round of war if it breaks out.
The cost of replenishing stockpiles
The US Army’s FY2027 figures put the unit cost of a PAC-3 MSE interceptor at roughly $5 million and that of a THAAD interceptor at nearly $12 million.
Based on these figures, replacing the Patriot and THAAD interceptors expended would cost an estimated $10 billion. The Congressional Budget Office has offered a higher estimate, putting the cost of replacing the depleted interceptors at approximately $13.1 billion.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in recent remarks noted that the US spent about $11 billion on missile defense for Israel over three years. In a post on X, quoting a tweet of a former Obama administration official, he said US forces had fired 609 interceptors in defense of the Israeli regime between October 2023 and June 2026, including SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Patriot, and THAAD missiles.
The naval picture
The US Navy’s missile interceptor inventories are also under severe strain. The SM-3 and SM-6 are among the principal naval weapons used to counter ballistic missiles and other high-speed threats.
Public estimates vary widely, with some reports placing combined naval inventories in the low hundreds. A figure of 150–200 for the two interceptor types combined is plausible as a rough order of magnitude, but no precise public count is available.
The broader concern is that naval interceptors are expensive and slow to manufacture, while the Navy must preserve sufficient stocks to address other potential threats, including those posed by China and Russia. Every interceptor expended in the defense of Israel is therefore one fewer available for other contingencies until it can be replaced.
Not all US and allied defenses against Iran relied on ground-based or naval interceptors. Fighter jets also engaged Iranian drones using air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-9X and AIM-120. The AIM-9X reportedly costs several hundred thousand dollars per missile, while the AIM-120 AMRAAM costs more than $1 million.
Using such expensive weapons to destroy drones that cost only thousands of dollars compounds the economic imbalance, even when the immediate tactical objective is achieved.
The trade-off
By the final phase of the 40-day imposed war, following the initial ceasefire, it had become clear that US commanders were holding back dedicated SM-3 and THAAD interceptors rather than expending them to protect American bases in Jordan and elsewhere.
Footage of nighttime defensive missile launches appeared to show almost exclusively Patriot interceptors, with only one exception. The implication was stark: stocks had dwindled to the point where US commanders could no longer afford to use these missiles freely.
The apparent logic was to preserve the remaining interceptors for a larger war, prioritizing the future defense of Israel over the immediate protection of American service members.
That decision carried its own cost. Aircraft on the ground were hit, and US personnel were killed in some of the retaliatory attacks. This matters because it illustrates the full price of managing depleted stockpiles. A shortage of interceptors weakened the US military’s defensive capacity across multiple theaters, leaving American personnel exposed to attacks that more robust defenses might have helped repel – all in the effort to protect the Israeli regime.
Cost, however, is only part of the problem. Production capacity is the more consequential constraint in a prolonged campaign.
Patriot and THAAD interceptors are manufactured in limited quantities, and expanding output takes time.
CSIS estimates that restoring Patriot and THAAD inventories to their pre-war levels will take at least three years. Interceptors ordered in fiscal year 2027 are not expected to arrive until 2029, leaving a prolonged gap between expenditure and replenishment.
The China and Asia-Pacific dimension
The most serious long-term cost to the United States may emerge far from the West Asia region. As US interceptor stocks are depleted in the region, the Pacific is left more exposed.
The Indo-Pacific is where Washington faces its most formidable strategic competitor. Taiwan’s defense depends in part on US air and missile defenses, while Pentagon war plans for a potential war with China assume that American forces can withstand and respond to large-scale missile attacks.
If SM-3, SM-6, and Patriot inventories fall to a fraction of their previous levels, the margin for absorbing such an attack narrows considerably. A few hundred interceptors would be insufficient to sustain even several days of high-intensity combat in East Asia.
The extent to which US military capabilities in the South China Sea and across East Asia have been weakened cannot yet be quantified.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern is widely recognized among defense analysts: a shortage of interceptors in one theater affects the military’s ability to respond in every theater, and the Pacific is particularly difficult to reinforce quickly.
Persian Gulf states and early-warning network
The Persian Gulf monarchies and Jordan contributed to Israel’s defense in a different but equally consequential way.
Their role was not primarily to supply interceptors, but to provide sensors, airspace access, military bases, and the political authorization needed to put these assets to use.
Missile defense depends on early warning. A THAAD battery cannot intercept a missile it has not detected, and detection depends on radars capable of identifying and tracking threats at sufficient range and speed. The AN/TPY-2 radar used by THAAD is a large, transportable system. The US Missile Defense Agency’s 2025 budget puts the cost of each unit at approximately half a billion dollars.
In March 2026, during the first days of the 40-day imposed war of aggression, the American THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan was struck and destroyed. Imagery showed craters around the site, suggesting that multiple strikes may have been involved.
Buildings housing similar radar systems were also hit at two locations in the United Arab Emirates. Another THAAD radar, at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, was destroyed as well.
Iran also targeted and struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, which was used to track Iranian missile launches.
Taken together, these incidents point to a broader pattern of Iranian retaliatory attacks on US-aligned early-warning radars and THAAD sites across the region.
This interpretation is consistent with the available satellite imagery, which indicates that the campaign extended beyond individual military installations to the sensor network underpinning regional missile defense that has been at the service of the US and the Israeli regime.
Such radars are expensive and exceptionally difficult to replace. Their value lies not only in the hardware itself, but also in their integration with interceptor batteries and the data links connecting them to other sensors.
Destroying a single radar can compromise an entire interceptor network’s ability to detect and track threats approaching from a particular direction. Replacing these systems can take months or even years, and rebuilding them does not necessarily restore the coverage they previously provided.
Radar losses therefore carry a strategic cost as well as a financial one. Once a radar is destroyed, the states that depend on it must decide whether to rebuild it at an exposed location, relocate it, or accept a gap in their defensive coverage.
By providing Israel and the United States with tracking data on Iranian projectiles, Arab monarchies exposed themselves to Iranian retaliation and risked becoming direct targets in a war they had helped shape.
These losses also raised questions about Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability as the wider regional confrontation extended to other fronts.
Yemen is a prominent example. Damage to radar and air defense assets across the Persian Gulf may have further complicated Saudi Arabia’s position in its prolonged war against Yemen.
Although the Ansarullah-led Yemeni military possesses independent capabilities, and Saudi Arabia’s difficulties in Yemen stem from numerous military, political, and strategic factors, the decision to contribute to Israel’s defense added another layer of risk for the Persian Gulf monarchies.
Their involvement exposed critical military infrastructure to retaliation and potentially weakened their ability to respond to threats beyond the immediate confrontation with Iran.
Jordan’s exposed position
Jordan’s case is perhaps the most striking because of its small military and fragile economy. The country hosts US occupation forces, including a THAAD battery at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, and lies along the flight paths of missiles and drones traveling between Iran and the Israeli-occupied territories.
During Iran’s 2024 retaliatory strikes, Jordan’s air force was reported to have intercepted many of Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace. The Jordanian government defended these actions as necessary to protect its territory and citizens – a lame justification.
For a country with limited military resources, however, the cost was significant: every interceptor fired and every fighter jet scrambled placed additional demands on an already constrained defense budget.
The political cost was even greater. Jordan has a large population of Palestinian origin, and public opinion is strongly sympathetic to Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank as well as the Axis of Resistance.
Jordan’s decision to intercept Iranian projectiles launched in retaliation for Israeli strikes proved controversial domestically, with Jordanians slamming their government for helping protect the Israeli regime.
Jordan made this choice despite facing its own concerns about Israel’s regional ambitions. Members of Israel’s ruling regime have openly advocated annexing the occupied West Bank, while some have promoted proposals that would displace Palestinians into Jordan.
This context makes Amman’s involvement in regional missile defense particularly sensitive. The country faces the dual risk of Iranian retaliation against US military assets on its soil and growing domestic anger over its role in protecting Israel.
Jordan’s economic vulnerabilities compound these pressures. Public debt, energy costs, and the burden of hosting refugees already strain its finances. Against this backdrop, even a relatively modest additional military expenditure can have significant consequences.
Jordan’s experience illustrates how participation in regional missile defense can impose not only military and financial costs, but also serious domestic political risks.

Europe’s price
European states paid in a different currency. Most did not expend large numbers of interceptors against Iranian drones, but their involvement carried costs across three main areas: munitions, military operations, and the economic shock of the war imposed on Iran.
France deployed air assets to the region to intercept drones and missiles over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Some reports suggested that French stocks of air-to-air missiles, including the MICA, came under strain.
Such shortages would be significant, given France’s other military commitments. Its air force and weapons inventories are already stretched across support for Ukraine, operations in the Sahel, and the maintenance of its own strategic deterrent. Each additional deployment reduces the resources available for other missions.
Britain used its bases in Cyprus, including RAF Akrotiri, as well as its military presence in the Persian Gulf, to support operations against Iran. Reports indicated that RAF aircraft intercepted drones and missiles. The British armed forces are considerably smaller than they were at the height of the country’s military power, and sustained operations of this kind consume substantial flying hours, spare parts, and personnel capacity.
Europe’s greatest burden, however, has been economic and political. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the collapse of Persian Gulf energy exports drove up oil, gas, and diesel prices.
Europe’s dependence on imported energy meant that the shock quickly fed into household bills, transport costs, and food prices. Many European governments were already grappling with public dissatisfaction over the cost of living before the 40-day war. The war intensified those pressures as is evident now with protests raging across European countries.
European governments that committed military resources to Israel’s defense and offensive operations now face a difficult question: will their own citizens view that commitment as a principled security measure or as complicity in policies that have contributed to worsening economic conditions?
There is no straightforward answer, but the issue has become part of Europe’s domestic political debate. The costs of defending Israel have reached far beyond the battlefield, affecting budgets, energy security, and public confidence in government policy.
Defending the indefensible
The costs of protecting Israel have been substantial, although they have fallen unevenly across the countries involved.
The United States has spent billions of dollars and depleted significant portions of its advanced interceptor stockpiles, with replenishment expected to take years. The Persian Gulf states and Jordan have suffered damage to radar and air defense assets while assuming additional security risks.
European countries have borne the costs of munitions and military operations, alongside an energy shock that has intensified public anger over the cost of living.
Yet the financial figures tell only part of the story. The more fundamental question is whether the policies driving these expenditures serve the interests of the governments and populations bearing the costs.
The costs are real and continue to mount: public expenditure, depleted interceptor stockpiles, damaged radars and military bases, and the heightened risk of retaliation against countries drawn into a war beyond their borders. Meanwhile, rising fuel, food, and housing costs have placed additional pressure on ordinary households, deepening public frustration with government decisions.
Israel’s regional military campaign has drawn its partners further into a confrontation whose consequences extend well beyond the immediate battlefield. For these governments, the challenge is no longer simply how to sustain their support for Israel, but how to justify its mounting costs to their own populations.
The question is how much more they are willing to spend, how much additional risk they are prepared to accept, and how long their citizens will continue to support a policy whose burdens are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
Press TV – October 26, 2026
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says a meeting in Tehran with senior officials from Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could lay the groundwork for a regional security framework based on the interests and decisions of countries in the region.
Speaking at a weekly press conference on Monday, Baghaei said Tehran would host Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Pakistan’s army chief and Turkey’s intelligence chief as part of an initiative to discuss regional security.
He stated that the initiative was proposed during Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran and was welcomed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Responding to a question from IRNA about the purpose and format of the gathering, Baghaei said the participation of senior officials from the three countries reflected efforts to explore mechanisms for regional security.
“From our perspective, the fact that regional countries are seeking to establish, or at least consider, regional security mechanisms based on their own interests and concerns is a welcome development,” he said.
“This meeting could serve as a prelude to further steps toward shaping endogenous security, an issue we have insisted on for decades. We have consistently emphasized that regional security can only be ensured by relying on the will and security considerations of the countries of the region,” Baghaei added.
He noted that developments over the past two years, particularly the past eight months, had demonstrated the importance of cooperation among regional countries.
“Recent events have shown that sustainable and reliable security in our region can only be achieved through building trust and cooperation among regional countries,” the spokesman said.
Baghaei said the visiting officials would hold discussions with the Iranian president and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
As this is the first meeting of its kind, he said, a range of issues would be on the agenda, with regional security challenges expected to feature prominently.
“Such a meeting cannot be held without taking into account the consequences of the United States’ military aggression against Iran for the security of the entire region,” Baghaei said, describing the issue as another important subject that should be considered within the framework of regional security discussions.
Deputy Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Bagheri Kani said the three senior officials are scheduled to meet with SNSC Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei and participate in a joint session on Monday.
Regional countries must strengthen capabilities to counter Israel
Responding to reports of disagreements between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli army chief over a possible attack on Iran, Baghaei said such differences would have no impact on Iran’s defensive preparedness.
“Despite possible differences in tactics, this group is united in its aggression and expansionism,” he said, adding that the regime’s actions across the region showed it was pursuing a common course aimed at undermining regional security.
He stressed that regional countries must enhance their capabilities to confront the Israeli regime’s threats and destabilizing actions.
Iran unconcerned about who rules in Israeli regime
Commenting on the upcoming Knesset elections in the occupied territories, Baghaei dismissed the process as a genuine democratic election, describing it instead as competition among rival groups seeking to commit greater crimes.
“For us, it makes no difference who ultimately takes the helm of the Zionist regime,” he said, noting that its record had brought nothing to the region but violence and bloodshed.
Armed forces will firmly counter threats
Responding to reports about the deployment of drone bases near Iran, Baghaei said Iran’s relevant authorities were closely monitoring developments surrounding the country, including reports of drone bases near its borders and Ukrainian activities in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
“Those responsible for monitoring these developments are following the situation carefully and will act whenever necessary to defend the country and repel hostile actions and threats,” he said.
He emphasized that Iran’s armed forces had firmly defended the country whenever threats or hostile activities targeted its territory and would continue to do so.
Europe part of the problem
Baghaei expressed doubt that European countries had genuinely changed their approach toward Iran, pointing out that their renewed emphasis on diplomacy could amount to a political gesture.
He slammed Europeans for contributing to the crisis by aligning with the United States over the so-called snapback mechanism and failing to condemn US-Israeli military aggression against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Baghaei said Tehran hoped the three European countries would assess regional developments more realistically and adopt an independent and constructive approach toward West Asian affairs.
Brazilian people resisted unfair pressure
Commenting on Brazil’s presidential election and the defeat of the right-wing camp aligned with US President Donald Trump, Baghaei said the outcome demonstrated the Brazilian people’s determination to make independent political choices.
“The people of Brazil showed that they would not submit to misleading narratives and unjustified pressure, and that they would choose what they consider to be in their country’s best interests,” he said.
Press TV – October 25, 2025
Pakistan has reopened a major border crossing with Iran that handles key energy and commodity supplies between the two countries amid improved security in the region.
Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reported on Sunday that the Gabd-Rimdan border crossing, also known as Gate 250, in the country’s Gwadar region, had reopened a day earlier following a weeklong suspension that began on October 17.
The report quoted Mir Naveed Jan Kalmati, president of the Gwadar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as saying that import and export operations between Pakistan and Iran had resumed.
It said the decision came amid dwindling LPG supplies in Pakistan ahead of the winter season.
The closure of the border crossing on October 17 left hundreds of trucks stranded on both sides of the border.
An attack was also reported in the region earlier this week, when unidentified gunmen targeted parked trucks, setting dozens ablaze and damaging several others.
Dawn said local administrators had deployed additional forces to protect trade convoys before reopening the border crossing.
Meanwhile, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, said in a post on his X account on Sunday that the disruption to cross-border trade between the two countries was mainly due to changes in Islamabad’s import rules.
He denied that Iran had made any decision to reduce LPG exports to Pakistan.
“… Changes in the implementation of Pakistan’s E-Form procedure for imports from Iran have created a situation in which traders are effectively and literally unable to dispatch cargo from Iran to Pakistan,” Amiri Moghadam said.
He said cross-border trade between Iran and Pakistan “serves the mutual interests of both countries and their people,” adding that Iran had made every possible effort to facilitate and promote trade with its “brotherly” neighbor.
Press TV – October 23, 2026
Iran has condemned “parasitic” military relations between the United States and Israel, citing the spending of $11 billion in American taxpayers’ money on missiles for the occupying regime over the past three years.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made the remarks in an X post on Friday, saying the US has fired more interceptors to protect Israel than the usurping entity has.
“That is not a symbiotic relationship. It is a parasitic one,” he added.
He also attached to his post a table provided on social media by independent policy analyst Stephen Semler that showed the US had fired an estimated 609 ballistic missile interceptors to protect Israel against Iran’s retaliatory strikes between October 2023 and September 2026.
The figure, however, did not include the interceptors the US fired to protect its own military assets across West Asia in the face of Iran’s reprisal attacks.
Earlier, Semler had estimated that the US had fired approximately 1,800 Patriot missiles between February and September this year.
Estimates indicate that the illegal aggression against Iran has consumed up to 82 percent of pre-war US THAAD stockpiles and 61 percent of Patriot missile supplies.
Experts warn that the shrinking stockpile leaves the US vulnerable, noting that it would take years to replace the missiles used at the current build rate of 600 per year.
The US and the Israeli regime waged their first illegal war against Iran, which lasted 12 days, in June 2025. Their second aggression began on February 28, 2026, and came to a halt in early April after 40 days.
In both wars, Iran’s resistance and successful retaliatory operations forced the aggressors to accept a ceasefire.
Iran has also maintained a tight grip on the Strait of Hormuz since the early days of the second imposed war amid the US’s acts of mischief in the region.
Glenn Diesen | October 22, 2026
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Follow his excellent Substack: https://tritaparsi.substack.com/
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