OPCW-UN Syria Sarin Attack Probe Based on ‘Staged Proof’
Sputnik – October 30, 2017
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations used fabricated evidence in their Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) probe into April’s chemical attack in the Syrian town of Khan Sheikhoun, threatening the reputation of international organizations, Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Theodore A. Postol told Sputnik.
Last week, the JIM presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC) a confidential report on the attack, carried out in the Syrian opposition-held province of Idlib, reportedly killing over 80 people. Some Western media outlets, which had access to the report, quoted the document as saying that the government of Syria’s President Bashar Assad was held responsible for the chemical attack on April 4. The panel also reportedly blamed the Islamic State terror group (banned in Russia) for using sulfur mustard in an attack on Syria’s Um Housh on September 16, 2016.
The report “relies on findings” of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria that was published this June following the investigation into the incident. The mission revealed that the victims had been exposed to sarin, a toxic substance, or a sarin-like substance. The FFM did not send its staff directly to the site, but completed the probe by conducting interviews, and collecting evidence and samples, such as video footage of the incident and hair from a dead goat found at the scene. The FFM also specified that it was unable to “implement a complete chain of custody, by the team, for samples from source.”
Postol shared with Sputnik the results of his own research proving that the UN-OPCW probe into the Khan Sheikhoun incident was flawed and biased.
Postol’s Research
In his analysis, the expert referred to the well-publicized video footage taken by Orient News in Khan Sheikhoun very shortly after the alleged April 4 nerve agent attack. The video showed a dead goat that allegedly suffocated in the attack next to the targeted area. Postol underlined that this evidence could not be used because the animal’s corpse could have been planted.
“As an inspection of the four images and the labels on the images clearly and unambiguously show, the dead goat in the image was dragged to the location where the journalists claim it died,” Postol said.
According to the expert, the corpse’s location could be easily established by other images taken in the Orient News video and other videos. The goat was located roughly 100 meters (328 feet) southeast of a crater that was considered the source of the sarin release.
“Perhaps most incredible in the OPCW report is an appendix that reports evidence of sarin use from analysis of a hair from the dead goat. Nowhere in the OPCW report is there any indication that the goat may have died elsewhere, possibly from sarin poisoning in a room or barn, and was then dragged to the location as an exhibit,” Postol pointed out.
The FFM found that the alleged nerve agent was most likely triggered at the site where there was a crater in the road. The OPCW concluded that such a release could only be determined as the use of sarin as a chemical weapon. According to the UN commission, two parts of a bomb were found at the site, including a larger part for chemical payload and a filler cap for chemical weapon itself, adding that it was “unable to determine the exact type of chemical bomb used,” however it suggested the explosive was a Soviet-era chemical bomb.
“There are many images of this crater that indicate subsequent tampering with the pipe that is vertically standing near the edge of the crater. In later photographs that can be seen that the pipe was pulled out from its vertical position in place flat at the center of the crater. This was then followed by claims that the pipe was a vessel containing sarin that was released at the site. Our calculations speculated that the crater was formed by a standard 122 mm artillery rocket explosive warhead of the kind that is ubiquitously available for purchase around the world,” Postol pointed out.
Postol’s research included forensic computational analysis performed by two of his colleagues — Professor Goong Chen and Dr. Chung Gu, at Texas A&M University — which “unambiguously explains how this crater was actually created.”
“The spent rocket motor casing of the rocket is embedded at the forward edge of the crater (not at the center as some people have asserted) and it is slightly bent forward by the sudden torque that occurs when the warhead impacts the asphalt surface. If we assume that the rocket casing was fabricated into a pipe and welded, our calculations show exactly the kind of split along the axis of symmetry of the pipe. This suggests that the rocket motor was manufactured locally and probably filled with a propellant that was locally produced. One such propellant that is commonly used in the manufacturing of improvised rocket motors is potassium nitrate and sugar,” the expert explained.
Postol suggested that the rocket motor had been manufactured locally, and the warhead, igniter and nozzle had been attached to each end of the improvised rocket.
The expert then went into detail about the blast site, and the positions the rocket was found in.
“The arrival azimuth is easily identified because the rocket is embedded at the forward edge of the crater and the bent spent rocket casing also points forward along the direction of arrival. The cracking of the asphalt surface surrounding the crater is due to hot gases propagating through the underlying ground and pushing the asphalt vertically,” the expert explained.
It was because of the above-mentioned observations Postol was able to determine the type of explosive device used and why it was not possible to definitely conclude that this warhead carried the alleged sarin toxin.
“It is therefore unambiguous that the crater was created by a standard 122 mm explosive warhead of the type that can be purchased anywhere in the world. There is absolutely no evidence of any sarin containing vessel. The split pipe that has been inaccurately identified as evidence of the container filled with sarin is simply the casing of the rocket motor that propelled the purchased warhead to the location of the explosion,” the expert noted.
UN Reputation Threatened
“The information I am providing contains compelling and unambiguous evidence that the UN OPCW investigation of this matter was deeply flawed and biased. The fact that the UN OPCW did not have investigators under their direct control at the scene of the alleged nerve agent attack at Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017 is no excuse for them making claims that are demonstrably false,” Postol said.
Postol pointed to the fact that in their analyses, both the UN commission and the OPCW used publicly available information obtained from videos that “clearly showed attempts by local organizations to manipulate information.”
“The fact that the OPCW has made no effort to verify the accuracy of this information indicates either extreme incompetence, or much more likely, extreme bias on the part of OPCW leadership. Of even greater concern is that the UN leadership is not exercising its fiduciary responsibilities to member countries by assuring that the OPCW is free of bias and incompetence,” the expert continued.
By failing to properly investigate incidents like the supposed Khan Sheikhoun chemical weapons attack, the United Nations and the OPCW are most likely enabling various groups with military and political agendas to use nerve agents and then point a finger at their enemies, Postol suggested.
“Continuing failure to properly review the veracity of the OPCW claims will ultimately have serious negative consequences for the reputation of the UN. This will, in turn, have serious negative consequences for the role of the UN as a credible source of analysis with regard to other dismaying and potentially escalatory events that will certainly occur in the future,” the expert emphasized.
Postol noted Russia’s “well-justified” criticisms of the handling of the JIM by the UN leadership.
The expert called on Russia to introduce a proposal within the UNSC for his investigation results to be reviewed by the organization’s authorities.
“Our interest is to help the UN reach a technically sound conclusion about the evidence that is available that indicates that the crater at Khan Sheikhoun has been misidentified as the source of a sarin release,” Postol explained.
Postol believes the data on flaws in the UN-sponsored report on the alleged use of sarin in Khan Sheikhoun provides strong ground for the Russian UN delegation to seek a review of the JIM report, because the misidentified source of the sarin attack, as outlined by Postol, casts doubts on whether the JIM report can accurately claim Assad as the responsible party.
Fabricated Casus Belli
After the incident in Khan Sheikhoun, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Syrian military airfield in Ash Sha’irat in the province of Homs from which the chemical attack was allegedly carried out.
“My concern was that the United States attack against Syria would encourage these rebel groups to engage in false attacks, attack people with sarin and then blame it on the Assad government. So that’s what got me involved at looking at this,” Postol explained.
Postol reiterated the lack of reliable evidence in the UN and OPCW materials, as all the information that the investigators used had been fabricated, misidentified and misinterpreted.
Also, the expert pointed out the lack of methodology, noting that the investigators’ findings were “filled with errors.”
“They made no attempt at all to determine the veracity of the evidence, that their claims can reach that conclusion. There was a very substantial indication that I put in the report for you that indicated that the site where the alleged sarin release occurred could not have been [the place where] there was a sarin release … but those things were clearly staged, clearly fraudulent,” Postol continued.
Postol also said that he had released a series of papers on the issue, which were ignored by the Western press. The expert explained this by the fact that public opinion in the United States is split into two camps: the liberals and the conservatives. In order to be a “liberal,” one has to adopt certain ideas, like that Assad is a monster, Postol explained. With Washington putting pressure on everyone whose vision of things is different, the liberal US media refuse to publish materials which provide an alternative perspective, such as Postol’s analysis of the events in Khan Sheikhoun, the expert elaborated.
The UN chief’s spokesman said on Thursday that he had trust in the professionalism and objectivity of the OPCW-UN joint mechanism.
Meanwhile, on Friday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told Sputnik the methodology of the OPCW-UN report on chemical weapon use in Syria was flawed, being based on biased evidence. He continued by saying that after an in-depth analysis of the JIM report and presentation of conclusions, Russia would put forward specific measures and steps aimed at “improving dramatically this unacceptable position and put the investigation of crimes with chemical weapons use on a solid, reliable … basis.”
Damascus reportedly denied the JIM allegations. Moscow, in turn, said that the Russian Foreign Minister would present its own analysis of the UN-OPCW report since “opinions and assessments by Russian specialists that were transferred to the mechanism at its own request turned out to be completely ignored” in JIM’s investigation.
The JIM revealed its report two days after Russia blocked a UNSC resolution extending its mandate in Syria, set to expire on November 16, for another year. The Russian Foreign Ministry has said that the decision on the prolongation of the UN-OPCW investigators’ mandate must not be made by the UNSC until the examination of the probe results.
Khan Sheikhoun: why it is sensible to be sceptical still
By Tim Hayward | July 4, 2017
The OPCW fact finding mission (FFM) has now reported on the chemical incident in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria, in April 2017. Although heavily trailed in previews, by Bellingcat and others, as presenting virtually a smoking gun implicating the Syrian government, the report itself is so hedged with caveats that one could perhaps say there is so much smoke that we can’t even see a gun.
Certainly, the report cannot specifically verify any weapon involved, as the FFM ‘was unable to retrieve any items from the site which would indicate the means of dispersal of a chemical. After analysing photographs and video supplied by witnesses, the FFM could not establish with a great degree of confidence the means of deployment and dispersal of the chemical.’ (6.19)[1]
I know nothing about chemical weapons but I know a little about how reports get written. A number of people collaborate in piecing together the evidence and analysis that goes into the long document. One voice then has to come clearly through the summary that goes out to press, even though different glosses are possible. Since a certain gloss, given some extra spin, has been making the rounds in the media, I think it worth pointing out how one could interpret it quite differently.
The OPCW tell us they could not visit the site of the reported incident (since it is in the control of very dangerous men) and could not therefore get high value evidence (3.11).[2] The evidence they examined included samples that were sent (via those dangerous men) to Turkey without the FFM being able to document a verifiable chain of custody (3.46).[3] So how the samples came to be contaminated or by exactly what (since it apparently could have been a ‘Sarin-like substance’ or Sarin) is a matter of surmise. They tried to piece together a narrative on the basis of witness statements from people on the ground who were among, if not of, the dangerous men. ‘It was not possible to corroborate’ the narrative that was inferred from those testimonies (5.10); and the narrative was in fact contradicted by statements taken by the Syrian authorities (5.10).
Commentators who had sight of the report during its embargo period, like Bellingcat, worked very quickly to bring out publications aimed at convincing us the report provided a refutation of those of us who are sceptical about the narrative of Syrian Government responsibility for the Khan Sheikhoun incident.
It seems to me, though, that the caveats are extremely significant. Especially given that in order to feel safe in disregarding those caveats one has to put a good deal of faith in the honesty and integrity of the people in control of the area of the incident. I find this hard to do, given that everyone considers them not even safe to visit.
[Readers will notice that in this brief comment I have not referred to the victims of the incident. The cause of death of all those people should presumably be a matter for criminal investigation, which was not the purpose of the OPCW mission. It is a matter of very grave concern indeed.]

[1] All references are to paragraphs in the Report Of The Opcw Fact-Finding Mission In Syria Regarding An Alleged Incident In Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic April 2017.
[2] ‘During an investigation, complete, direct, and immediate access to the alleged initiation site provides the greatest opportunity to collect high value evidence.’ (3.11)
[3] ‘Typically, samples from an incident would be collected by the investigating team immediately after the incident, using approved procedures and equipment, including full documentation of the chain of custody of the samples. As noted earlier, the team was constrained due to the inability to access the site of the alleged incident and the amount of time that had passed between the alleged incident and receipt of samples by the team (depending on the source, between 1 week and 2 months after the incident). As a result, the team was unable to:
(a) assess the geography and conditions of the location of the alleged incident; (b) directly select sampling points and items; (c) conduct on-site collection of samples; and (d) implement a complete chain of custody, by the team, for samples from source.’ (3.46)
OPCW’s Syrian Sarin Gas Report Based on Doubtful Data – Russian Foreign Ministry
Sputnik – 30.06.2017
MOSCOW – Russia believes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report on the use of a nerve agent in Syria last spring is based on doubtful data, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Friday.
The OPCW said earlier in the day that its fact-finding mission had established the use of sarin in the April 4 incident in Khan Sheikhoun in the province of Idlib.
“Unfortunately, we are forced to state on the first reading of the document that its conclusions are still based on very doubtful data,” the Russian ministry’s information and press department said.
It noted that the OPCW’s data was “obtained from the same opposition and the same notorious NGOs of the White Helmet type, and not at the site of the tragedy but in a certain ‘neighboring country’.”
“Therefore, it is not surprising that the content of the OPCW special mission’s report is largely biased, suggesting the presence of a political order in this structure’s activity,” the ministry said.
Russia fumes as OPCW investigators fail to inspect Khan Sheikhoun or Al-Shayrat air base
By Alexander Mercouris | The Duran | May 26, 2017
Two months after the alleged chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun in Syria and the US cruise missile strike on Al-Shayrat air base from where the alleged chemical attack was allegedly launched, the OPCW investigators charged with investigating the alleged chemical attack have failed to inspect either location.
This has provoked an angry and exasperated statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry yesterday, highlighting especially the failure of the OPCW inspectors to inspect Al-Shayrat air base, the location from which the chemical attempt was allegedly launched
All the conditions have been created there in terms of security and compliance with obligations under the Convention. The Syrian government demanded an urgent visit, thus reaffirming the preparedness to fulfil its obligations that arise from Clause 12 of the OPCW mission mandate and from the provisions specified in Clause 15 of Part IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention appendix on inspections. These documents state in clear terms that an (OPCW) inspection group has the right of access to any and all areas that might have been affected by the employment of chemical weapons. This means all the conditions have been created there (at Shayrat) in terms of security and compliance with obligations under the Convention. Standing in a sharp contrast to it is the inaction of the (OPCW/UN) Joint Mechanism and the detached position of the OPCW leadership that believes a trip to Shayrat is outside of the sphere of competence of the OPCW Mission.
I discussed the obvious lack of enthusiasm of the OPCW inspectors to inspect either location in an article I wrote for The Duran on 21st April 2017. I pointed out in that article that though there might be safety concerns preventing the OPCW inspectors from inspecting the location of the alleged attack at Khan Sheikhoun – which is under Jihadi control – the same was certainly not true of Al-Shayrat air base, which was from where the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun was allegedly launched.
I said that the failure of the OPCW inspectors to inspect either location meant that the investigation of the Khan Sheikhoun attack had effectively collapsed even before it started.
Needless to say it is a basic principle of any criminal investigation – which is what this investigation essentially is – that the investigators inspect the crime scene and any other locations related to it. The fact that the inspectors in this case have not even attempted to discharge this basic task shows that they are not really interested in carrying out an investigation at all.
This is the inevitable consequence of the President of the United States and of Western governments making a pronouncement of the Syrian government’s guilt before any investigation of the Khan Sheikhoun incident had taken place. That inevitably was going to prejudice the conduct of the investigation, with the result that we now see.
What that means is that when the investigation eventually reports its findings they will carry no authority, and will be rejected with good cause by those who dispute its conclusions.
Investigation into Khan Sheikhoun: Rules-based order tested by Western scheming
By Dr Alexander Yakovenko | RT | May 2, 2017
There is still no proper reaction by the OPCW to the alleged use of sarin in Khan Sheikhoun in Syria on 4 April.
Unfortunately, the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to Syria is shrouded in secrecy. What is clear is that it continues to operate in a remote mode, using Internet data mostly concocted by the radical elements of the Syrian opposition, including the notorious “White Helmets”.
From the scarce information one can gather that the samples taken from those injured or dead were tested in the OPCW-licensed laboratories in Britain and Turkey and established to be sarin or sarin-like substance. However, the samples were not taken at the site of the incident. Hence, the basic principle of the investigation, that of the chain of custody, hasn’t been observed. There are no answers on that from our Western partners. As there is no clear evidence that those people were from Khan Sheikhoun and not from somewhere else.
Equally dubious is the questioning of the “witnesses” by the FFM. One can’t be sure they were residents of Khan Sheikhoun. Moreover, those “witnesses”, as we understand, are mostly supporters of the opposition or their family members. Their impartiality is questionable. However, information is available, including provided by the Swedish Doctors for Human Rights, which demonstrates that those photo- and video- materials were clearly staged.
It looks like the FFM, so far, is not doing its job properly. That the FFM team, in terms of its composition, is absolutely dominated by the countries hostile to Damascus, is another fundamental flaw. This is in sharp contrast to the established international practice. According to the UN Secretary-General decision the UN-OPCW Investigation Mechanism mustn’t include representatives of the UNSC P5, as well as Syria’s neighbors. And yet the heads of both FFM segments are British citizens, albeit no one can in earnest assume the British position in the Syrian conflict as unbiased. Why not act by the book and why afraid of the truth being established in due course? The proposal to have a special investigation, with due oversight of the international community, was voted down by the West.
There’s still time to conduct a proper, full-fledged investigation. According to the UN Secretariat, the security situation in Khan Sheikhoun is quite acceptable. The Syrian side is also ready, in the interests of this investigation, to put a ceasefire in force along the way of the OPCW staff’s travel to the site. The Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat stated his willingness to send the OPCW experts to Khan Sheikhoun.
The Syrian Government is also ready to ensure a totally secure environment for the FFM staff to visit Shayrat airbase. We insist on such a visit. The US Administration explained its Shayrat missile attack by the alleged storage of sarin at this airbase. It is necessary to verify this allegation.
It is a fair assumption that sarin could have been used in Khan Sheikhoun. The question is who did it and how the toxic substance was delivered. A few versions exist. As the information is accumulated there is more and more grounds to think that the terrorists controlling this area blew up the home-built sarin munition on the ground which resulted in civilian casualties. The “White Helmets” acted too hastily to stir public outrage and posted in-advance prepared materials on the Internet. However, they made several bad mistakes which point to the staged nature of those materials.
The definitive answer to what really happened in Khan Sheikhoun can only be provided by a full-fledged investigation in full compliance with the OPCW verification provisions. It is too serious a matter for peace in the region and a wider world for the OPCW to fail this test of credibility. Those who have taken over the FFM investigation are all to eager to manage the truth in their vested interest. Otherwise they wouldn’t obstruct efforts to open it up for due scrutiny. It is this tactics of pushing the UN Security Council to act on the basis of forged evidence and flawed investigation, that undermines the rules-based world order.
It has to be borne in mind that the British Foreign Secretary recently hypothesized on joining another US action in Syria in response to another chemical incident, which means that an order for it has already been placed. A lot is said about the disastrous lack of trust in international relations. Unilateral actions and takeovers of international bodies by the West further undermine it.
Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Deputy foreign minister (2005-2011). Follow him on Twitter @Amb_Yakovenko
How did al-Qaeda know in advance about the Syrian air strike?
By Paul Larudee | Dissident Voice | April 21, 2017
There is an anomaly among the evidence that the Syrian chemical weapons attack at Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib province on April 4, 2017 was a “false flag” operation, designed to provoke a US attack on Syria. The evidence is otherwise quite strong, as put forth by former Pentagon consultant and MIT professor Theodore Postol in his three part analysis of the declassified White House Report on the Syrian chemical weapons attack of April 4, 2017. Postol’s analysis has been widely cited as disproving the White House contention that the Syrian Air Force bombed the “rebel” controlled village with chemical weapons.
Indeed, Dr. Postol’s analysis pokes quite a few gaping holes in the White House Report, concluding that the crushed gas canister and the “crater” shown in open source videos and photographs from the site demonstrate that it could not have been delivered by air. Postol also concludes that the report is, in fact, fraudulent and was produced by the National Security Agency without the input or review of impartial intelligence professionals.
Nevertheless, Postol begs a couple of questions, the most compelling of which is how the “false flag” imposters on the ground would have known how to time their operation with the Syrian air strike that everyone admits actually took place (the Syrians and Russians alleging that only conventional weapons were used, and the Americans alleging the use of chemical weapons). In order to do this, they would have had to have advance knowledge of the attack. How would they have gotten this information?
A clue to this comes from the suspension of the Russian-American “deconfliction” agreement. Under a September, 2015, memorandum of understanding, information about all military flights by forces in the area would be shared in order to prevent dangerous and unintended confrontations. In this case, Russia informed its US counterparts of the intended Syrian strike twenty-four hours in advance.
That would be plenty of time to prepare a “false flag” operation of the type shown in the videos and photographs and described in the Postol analysis. But in that case, the information would have to have been conveyed by US sources to operatives on the ground in Idlib, which is headquarters for al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliates.
Russia seems to think that this is exactly what happened. Their unilateral suspension of the agreement has been widely interpreted as a reaction to the US attack on the al-Sha’yrat airstrip, but it may be more than that. Military actions are often calculated to appear to be a justifiable reaction to an earlier action from the other party. Thus, for example, the US chose to attack the Sha’yrat airstrip at least partly because that is where the aircraft that attacked Khan Sheikhoun had originated.
Similarly, Russia reacted to the US strike by authorizing increased anti-aircraft defenses in Syria and dispatching a frigate to its Mediterranean base in Tartus. These moves can be considered reactions to the fact that Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are known to be able to shoot down Tomahawk missiles of the type used in the US attack, and that the Tomahawks were fired from US vessels in the Mediterranean, off the coast of Syria.
But what about the suspension of the deconfliction agreement? How is that a specific response to the something done by the US? Perhaps Russia suspects that the information that they gave to the US in compliance with the agreement was leaked. Does Russia think that the US has al-Qaeda operatives at the highest and most secure levels of the U.S. government? That is a bit far-fetched, especially when there is a simpler and more plausible explanation.
The explanation is that al-Qaeda does not need operatives to get such information. The US has been strategically in bed with al-Qaeda, ISIS and their permutations for quite some time. US policy makers do not speak with a unified voice on this matter, but many – especially those of the neoconservative school of strategic policy – have cultivated the use of violent groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS as alternatives or supplements to the use of US forces on the ground.
Furthermore, many of the same policy makers were the ones who led the US into the disastrous wars in Iraq and Libya, and are committed to do the same in Syria. False flag operations and faulty intelligence are part of their stable, as they showed with their tall tales of WMD and Viagra-fueled black mercenaries. They have been influential in the US government since at least the Reagan administration, and groomed Hillary Clinton for the White House for decades.
Since the loss of their horse in the last presidential election, these policy makers have been trying to turn the Trump government against its campaign rhetoric of leaving Syria and letting Russia and the Syrian government put an end to ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. That is not part of their playbook. Their plan therefore uses false flag operations, false intelligence and working with terrorists, in order to control US foreign and military policy through subterfuge when they cannot control it directly.
But how can they do this? What sorts of connections make it possible for them to undermine the White House, State Department and intelligence services to achieve their ends? We don’t have to look far for examples.
An obvious one is the US attack on the Syrian army at Deir ez-Zour on September 17, 2016, killing scores of Syrian soldiers and wounding many more. Critically, this happened only five days into a trial ceasefire and only two days before the trial period was to end and the ceasefire to become permanent. Needless to say, this had the effect of scuttling the ceasefire, but interestingly, ISIS troops were apparently standing by to overrun Syrian army positions almost immediately after the US aircraft completed their bombing mission (and how would they have known when it was completed?).
US military officials said it was unintentional, but an excellent investigative report by Gareth Porter demonstrates that, in fact, this was a purposeful choice by high ranking US military officers to prevent the ceasefire from forcing them to cooperate with Russian counterparts on target coordination in Syria. These officers had allies in the administration, including Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, who effectively undermined the policies of President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry and their Russian counterparts, President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. As Kerry admitted to the Boston Globe, “…we had people in our government who were bitterly opposed to [the agreement].”
There is plenty of circumstantial evidence of US collusion with al-Qaeda, as well. Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy advisor Jake Sullivan even went so far as to admit that “AQ [al-Qaeda] is on our side in Syria.” Is it coincidence that most of the weapons delivered to “moderate rebels”, including TOW anti-tank guided missiles that turned the tide against the Syrian army in 2014-15 were almost immediately transferred or put under the control of al-Qaeda? Or that when US forces evacuated Falujah and other territories conquered by ISIS in the same period, it left behind huge quantities of arms, vehicles and other resources, contrary to standard military policy of destroying whatever could be of use to the enemy? Or that, more recently, when retaking Mosul, US forces left the way to Syria open for ISIS to flee to Syria and use its forces to retake Tadmur (Palmyra) from the Syrian army?
Typically, the US has created intermediaries such as the quasi-mythical “moderate rebels” between them and the most extreme terrorist organizations. However, the mythical quality of these emissaries is sometimes exposed, as when an audio recording was released of a conversation between John Kerry and twenty representatives from four “moderate” Syrian organizations in September, 2016, at the United Nations.
In the recording, a Syrian woman, Marcell Shehwaro, threatens Kerry that if the US doesn’t do more to help, they will join forces with al-Nusra (the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria). Another man (unidentified) repeats the threat later in the recording. Shehwaro later argues that more support should go to al-Nusra; i.e., that “we are not arming the right people” and “there is not enough political and arms support to those who consider [al-Nusra] moderate. I wish we had these friends.”
Such admissions show that the veneer of “moderation” is very thin in these groups. They are, in fact, little more than a public relations front for al-Qaeda and ISIS, providing whatever the west needs – and especially news feeds – needed to keep support flowing.
The four groups represented at the meeting clearly have access to the highest levels of the US government and vice versa. It would be a simple matter for a US government official in the Pentagon, NSA or other agency to pass the information about Syrian aircraft movements to someone like White Helmets leader Raed Saleh, who was present at the Kerry meeting, with assurance that it would reach the al-Nusra leadership in Idlib. In effect, Kerry (and other government officials) are speaking directly to al-Qaeda.
Obama and Kerry learned their lesson. They understood the degree to which their decisions could be undermined, so to preserve their limited power, they sometimes went along with the powers that they could not control, and sometimes partly thwarted those powers. Obama was gifted with a Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who famously told him that the alleged 2013 Syrian army use of chemical weapons was “not a slam dunk,” which led the President to back off his plan to attack Syria.
Does Trump have such people? His replacement of noninterventionist Michael Flynn with war hawk H.R. McMaster is an ominous sign that neoconservative influence is reasserting itself. And the success of the Khan Sheikhoun false flag chemical weapons attack in inciting a US attack on Syria is a clear encouragement for more such false flag operations.
Paul Larudee is one of the founders of the Free Gaza and Free Palestine Movements and an organizer in the International Solidarity Movement.
