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Prof. Marandi on Iran & Venezuela: What’s Next?

TMJ News Network | January 5, 2026

Professor Mohammad Marandi joins TMJ News to break down the latest developments in Iran and Venezuela, unpacking how economic protests, sanctions, and media narratives are being weaponized once again to push long-standing U.S.-Israeli regime change agendas.

January 6, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran’s collapsing currency exposes the profiteers behind the crisis

By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | January 5, 2026

In the final days of 2025, as the rial plunged to unprecedented lows, Tehran’s bustling Jomhuri (Republic) Avenue transformed into a corridor of defiance.

‘Bazaaris’ (traditional merchant class with deep political and economic influence) and cellphone shopkeepers, cornered by a collapsing currency and punishing tariffs, shuttered their stores and poured into the streets.

Their outrage ignited a fire that quickly spread to the Grand Bazaar, long considered Iran’s economic barometer. Unlike the 2022 protests over social freedoms or the 2009 unrest sparked by electoral disputes, this wave of demonstrations is driven squarely by economic collapse and long-festering mismanagement.

What began as a merchants’ revolt against an unworkable trade environment soon revealed the deeper rot of decades-long economic mismanagement, institutional corruption, and a sanctions-choked system that punishes the people to sustain itself.

Sanctions, sabotage, and a vanishing economy

Iran, a nation of over 86 million, registered a meager 0.3 percent economic growth in summer 2025, while inflation soared past 42 percent by December. Labor force participation remains abysmally low, trailing nearly 20 points behind the global average. These dire metrics have steadily worsened under the weight of relentless US sanctions, first re-imposed by President Donald Trump in 2018 during his first term, and have intensified through two presidential terms.

The rial’s spectacular collapse – breaking the 1,445,000 mark against the US dollar – did not occur in a vacuum. It marked a 47.8 percent surge in just six months.

The higher the rate was going up, the angrier were businesses whose sales are directly dependent on the dollar-rial change rate. The first spark of protests was ignited by the shopkeepers at two cellphone shopping malls in downtown Tehran. They started a strike, saying they were unable to do business because they were struggling with a new cellphone registry tariff the government had imposed on devices priced at $600 and more.

The next day, shopkeepers did not just close their shops but took to the famous Republic Avenue, protesting against the situation. The dollar dealers at Ferdowsi Avenue joined the protests too, and in the Grand Bazaar, gold and silversmiths brought their shutters down in fear of chaos.

A shopkeeper at Lalezar Street tells The Cradle that, “we were forced to close our shops as some protesters attacked us verbally and threatened to ransack our shops by hurling stones at our windows.”

In addition to sanctioning traditional routes such as banks, firms and individuals, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), has been targeting digital currency addresses it accuses of being used by a financial network to transfer Iran’s oil and non-oil money.

According to Gholma-Reza Taj Gardoun, chairman of the parliamentary budget committee, “the Iranian government only received 13 out of $21 billion oil revenues in the last eight months”. He added that “the remaining $8 billion is the cause of the current turmoil, the shortage of dollar bills in the market and the rising exchange rate.”

A rigged system of profiteers

Taj Gardoun is not alone in exposing how oil and non-oil export revenues have failed to return to Iran. At the heart of the crisis lies a parasitic class of semi-governmental enterprises and politically-connected traders who profit from Iran’s fiscal dysfunction.

Former finance minister and current lawmaker Hussein Samsami estimates that “117 out of $335 billion non-oil export revenues have not returned to the country, since the US re-imposed sanctions in 2018.” Much of this capital, he says, was siphoned off by ‘khosulati’ entities – quasi-governmental firms benefiting from state ownership yet operating without transparency or oversight.

Equally troubling is the shadowy role of “trustees” – a secretive network tasked with circumventing sanctions to sell Iranian oil.

Former Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Governor Valiollah Seif acknowledged “they are trusted people, Iranians and non-Iranians, who transfer money (for Iran),” adding “money transfer is a very risky process and the payment of these so-called trustees and the money changers working with them is high.” Seif revealed “sometimes a trustee siphons off the funds.”

Apart from the trustees, the quasi-governmental entities are also blamed for refusing to give back the non-oil export money to the central bank and sell it at rates higher than the regular CBI-approved rate at the official market.

These companies are owned by various funds affiliated with the Iranian government. The petroleum and the social welfare ministries gained a majority of the shares in these funds through the privatization process in different governments.

The third group that has not returned the export money is individuals or firms with special business permits. A deputy CBI governor reports that “Individuals who own or rented 900 special licenses must return some $16 billion to the central bank, (but they didn’t).”

The result is a liquidity trap in which foreign exchange vanishes from official markets, feeding a vicious cycle of inflation and speculation.

State paralysis and political deflection

For months, the government of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared paralyzed, watching as the currency spiralled and public rage mounted. While some suggest the state deliberately allowed the rial to slide to ease its budget deficits, others cite institutional chaos and a lack of cohesive economic policy.

They refer to a confession made by former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani in 2020, “The foreign currency belongs to the government, the price is decided by the government and we can bring it down, if we decide it.”

In reaction to the voices of dissatisfaction, Pezeshkian tasked his interior minister with meeting the representatives of the protesters and listening to their grievances.

He sat with merchants and replaced CBI governor Mohammad-Reza Farzin with former finance minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. Nevertheless, the latter, who was impeached 10 months ago over his mismanagement of the foreign exchange market, said “he has no responsibility regarding the currency market and his task is to control imbalanced banks and reduce inflation.”

Austerity in a powder keg

In the streets, the demonstrations have morphed into sporadic riots, mostly in western provinces, marked by attacks on police stations and arson against state buildings. Casualties have been reported, including among security forces, as the protests shift from organized dissent to expressions of raw frustration.

Demonstrations in Tehran that were not large in essence have subsided, but morphed into sporadic riots. Smaller cities or towns in western Iran are now the scene of riots, with the number of rioters limited to dozens, not even hundreds.

Arson attacks against government buildings or rioters storming police stations to capture their armory have been reported. About a dozen, including police forces, have been killed countrywide, and arrests have been made.

Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 3 January, admitted that the ‘bazaaris’ have legitimate complaints regarding economic instability. Still, he made it clear that the Islamic Republic “will not yield to the enemy” and will deal seriously with violent protesters; “rioters must be put in their place.”

The Iranian leader’s comments were a response to Trump after he threw his weight behind the protesters, threatening the Islamic Republic with military intervention “if protesters are killed.” The Reformist Front joined in rejecting foreign threats, warning that any interference in the protests would escalate violence and distort the people’s demands.

In a last-ditch bid to regain economic control, an Iranian official from the Budget and Planning Organization says “the Trustees will be asked to return billions of dollars in their overseas accounts to the country.” A lawmaker cautions, “the parliament will question the oil minister over the issue of the Trustees.”

Iran’s minister of economy said that positive results have been achieved from negotiations with several countries, including the release of part of Iran’s financial resources and the opening of funding channels for importing essential goods, along with gradual efforts to unify the exchange rate into a single rate.

Simultaneously, Pezeshkian is pushing ahead with plans to phase out subsidies for essential imports – a move he dubs an “economic surgery” that will be offset by targeted vouchers for lower-income citizens. But austerity in the midst of currency collapse, inflation, and a credibility crisis is a combustible formula.

Iranian officials are closely tracking the situation in Venezuela, where the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and rising US aggression offer chilling parallels. For now, Tehran’s street protests remain contained. But if the economic pain persists and reforms deepen inequality, the next wave may not be as easily quelled.

January 5, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Protests in Iran: Analysis of current demonstrations and their implications for the Islamic Republic

Few analysts in the West are truly aware of the situation in Iran

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 3, 2026

Western understanding of Iran’s internal situation remains profoundly mistaken. Recurring narratives of an imminent collapse ignore the country’s political and social complexity and exaggerate the impact of current demonstrations. It is essential to recognize that, although there are significant tensions, Iran is not currently in a crisis that threatens the continuity of the Islamic Republic, nor is it in a state of absolute stability.

The current demonstrations originate from patriotic sectors of society, motivated by dissatisfaction with the moderate and semi-liberal government of Masoud Pezeshkian. Contrary to widespread claims, most of these protests do not challenge the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. The discontent is focused on government economic policies, considered ineffective by broad segments of the population, leading to a perception of management crisis, but not a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Rising prices, water shortages, and economic instability drive popular demands – not challenges to the revolutionary principles themselves.

It is also important to note that, as often occurs in contexts of attempted governmental change, external or internal actors with different interests infiltrate protests, promoting episodes of violence and vandalism. The escalation of clashes in certain areas, particularly in the outskirts and western regions of the country, should not be interpreted as a sign of collapse. Historically, Iran maintains stronger control and stability in major cities and in the capital, Tehran, where protests remain largely peaceful. This pattern demonstrates the institutional capacity of the Islamic Republic to manage crises, even amid significant mobilizations.

Historical context also provides important point of reference for analysis. Iran has previously faced protests of considerable magnitude, such as those following the death of Masha Amina in 2022, when demonstrations led to armed confrontations with security forces. Compared to the events of 2022, today’s social movement is moderate in both intensity and scope, indicating that the security and control system of the Islamic Republic remains functional and effective.

Another key point is the coexistence of different protest currents within the country. While there are mobilizations critical of the government, there are also demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic (albeit critical of Pezeshkian’s administration). This diversity shows that dissatisfaction is not unanimous toward the Islamic Republic as a whole, but is concentrated on specific management failures and economic policies. This reality significantly reduces the likelihood of a change in the Islamic Republic, although there is some probability of a government collapse.

For external analysts, it is tempting to interpret the protests as a harbinger of total destabilization. A closer analysis suggests that the most plausible scenario is the erosion of Pezeshkian’s moderate government, followed by a possible rise of leadership more aligned with the original revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic. In this context, an internal power adjustment is far more likely than the dissolution of the country’s institutions.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the Islamic Republic is not immune to risks. Sudden internal or external developments could significantly alter the current balance. Yet, considering Iran’s historical experience with crises, protests, and foreign intervention attempts, contemporary demonstrations do not provide sufficient grounds to predict a national collapse. The Republic remains structured and capable of maintaining its political and social core.

In summary, Western perceptions that Iran is on the brink of collapse reflect a simplistic and misinformed interpretation of events. The current demonstrations should be understood as expressions of sectoral discontent and governance challenges, not as existential threats to the Islamic Republic. The balance of internal forces, combined with historical experience in managing crises, ensures that the Islamic Republic continues to function, with the capacity to adjust to social pressures without compromising its political continuity.

January 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Iran says no basis for inspection of bombed nuclear sites

Press TV – December 24, 2025

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) says that political and psychological pressure over inspection of damaged nuclear facilities will have no effect, calling for clear procedures to be established for such occasions.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Mohammad Eslami said there is currently no codified instruction for inspecting nuclear facilities that have been damaged by military attacks.

“Until this issue is clarified, political and psychological pressure and irrelevant follow-ups aimed at re-inspecting bombed facilities and completing the enemy’s operations are unacceptable and will not be responded to,” he said.

Back in June, during the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, the US bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, in a clear violation of international law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Eslami noted that Article 68 of the Safeguards Agreement refers only to natural accidents and damage, not military attacks or war.

“If the IAEA considers military attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities acceptable, it must explicitly approve and declare that,” he said. “But if such attacks are illegal, they must be condemned, and the post-war procedures must be clearly defined.”

He added that until such conditions are formally defined by the agency, Iran will not accept demands for renewed inspections of damaged sites.

On Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Eslami said no country in history has cooperated with the agency to the extent Iran has.

“The most extensive and intensive inspections ever conducted have been imposed on Iran’s nuclear industry, and there is not a single report indicating non-compliance or diversion from safeguards,” he said.

He characterized current pressure as politically motivated and aimed at harming and weakening the Iranian people, stressing that Iran’s nuclear activities remain entirely peaceful.

Referring to the UN Security Council meeting held on Tuesday, Eslami said the discussions no longer merely warranted regret but instead exposed the reality of long-standing US pressure on Iran’s nuclear industry.

He noted that Washington has openly stated in its national security strategy that it does not pursue its interests through international organizations and, instead, relies on “the law of the jungle and the use of force.”

Eslami described the report, statements, and references made during the Security Council session as “completely unprofessional and non-legal.”

He emphasized that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 has expired, and even if it were to be cited, its procedural requirements were not followed.

Claims that Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the JCPOA justifies the reinstatement of previous UN sanctions, he said, are “entirely rejected and unacceptable.”

He added that China and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, have explicitly rejected these claims, stating that the push by the three European countries and the United States—backed by Israeli lobbying—has no legal standing and is not enforceable.

Elsewhere in his remarks, Eslami announced the launch of a nationwide multimedia festival titled “Nuclear Technology for Life,” organized jointly with Iran’s national broadcaster.

He said the initiative aims to counter misinformation and distorted narratives about Iran’s nuclear program by presenting multi-layered accounts through public and media participation.

December 24, 2025 Posted by | War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Medicinal plants hold key to Iran’s drought-resistant revenue

Press TV – December 16, 2025

Iran’s agriculture faces water scarcity, restricted market access, and declining returns from traditional crops, pushing farmers and policymakers toward low-water, high-value, and sanction-resilient export products.

Medicinal plants are among the few agricultural sectors meeting all three criteria, increasingly seen over the past decade as an expandable income source aligned with environmental limits and export needs.

Iran has one of the richest plant ecosystems in the world. More than 8,000 plant species have been identified across the country, of which around 2,300 have medicinal, aromatic, cosmetic, or industrial uses.

About 1,700 of these species are endemic, meaning they grow naturally only in Iran. This biodiversity is supported by wide climatic variation, from arid plains to high mountain ranges, with elevations from 900 to more than 4,000 meters above sea level.

These conditions allow different plants to grow with little or no irrigation. The scale and diversity of this natural resource provide Iran with a broad production base that few countries can replicate, enabling year-round cultivation and harvesting across different regions.

Most medicinal plants cultivated or harvested in Iran are naturally adapted to dry and semi-dry environments. Many grow under rain-fed conditions or require less than 3,000 cubic meters of water per hectare.

By comparison, crops such as wheat, rice, and corn often need between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic meters per hectare. As groundwater reserves shrink and rainfall becomes more erratic, this difference has direct economic value.

Lower water use reduces production costs while preserving agricultural land for sustained use over time. This makes medicinal plants particularly suitable for long-term planning in regions facing declining water availability.

According to official figures, Iran receives about 400 billion cubic meters of rainfall annually, but more than half is lost to evaporation. Crops that can grow using direct rainfall reduce pressure on dams, rivers, and aquifers.

Medicinal plants make effective use of this rainfall because they are already rooted in the soil when seasonal precipitation occurs, allowing moisture to be absorbed rather than lost. This characteristic strengthens their role in maintaining agricultural output without increasing water extraction.

Medicinal plants are produced both on farmland and in rangelands. In many provinces, farmers grow them under permits on national lands, relying on rainfall rather than irrigation. Because these plants are mostly perennial and slow-growing, high irrigation costs are not economically justified.

Harvesting, drying, and basic processing often take place close to production sites, creating seasonal employment in rural areas. Each hectare of medicinal plants generates between two and three direct jobs, according to agricultural authorities.

In addition to farming, jobs are created in collection, sorting, drying, distillation, and packaging, forming local value chains that support village-level incomes.

Export revenue from medicinal plants currently stands at about $600 million a year, accounting for roughly 9 to 10 percent of Iran’s total agricultural exports. Projections suggest exports could reach $700 million if production and processing improve.

Saffron dominates the sector. Iran produces more than 90 percent of the world’s saffron and accounts for around 40 percent of the total export value of medicinal plants.

Other major exports include rose products from damask rose, such as rose water and extracts, liquorice extract, mint, thyme, and natural gums like asafoetida locally called anguzeh.

These products are sold not only as raw materials but also as inputs for pharmaceutical, food, and cosmetic industries.

Demand for medicinal plants continues to grow in international markets, including Central Asia, Eurasia, and China. These markets are accessible through regional trade routes and do not always require direct financial links with Western banking systems.

Products such as saffron, rose water, and herbal extracts have relatively high value-to-weight ratios, which lowers transport costs and makes them more suitable for indirect export channels. Their long shelf life further supports trade across longer distances and reduces losses during storage and transport.

Barijeh, scientifically known as ferula gummosa, is a plant native to Iran.

The internal economics of medicinal plant cultivation are also favorable. In several provinces, income from medicinal plants is many times higher than from grains.

For example, harvesting wild or cultivated plants such as musir can generate net income far above that of wheat or barley on the same land.

This income difference has encouraged farmers to shift land away from water-intensive crops, especially in drought-affected regions. Higher returns per hectare allow smaller landholdings to remain economically viable, supporting family-based farming systems.

Four provinces illustrate this potential clearly. Khorasan remains the center of saffron production. Kashan and surrounding areas specialize in rose cultivation and distillation.

Yazd produces lemon verbena, while Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province has emerged as a major center for wild and cultivated medicinal plants.

This province is largely mountainous, with 87 percent of its area classified as highland. More than 1,350 plant species have been identified there, including 270 with medicinal or industrial uses and 27 species found nowhere else in the world. Cool nights, diverse soils, and varied elevations contribute to high-quality yields and strong concentrations of active ingredients.

In Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, medicinal plants are grown on about 3,500 hectares, split between national rangelands and agricultural land. Since the early 2010s, the cultivated area has expanded sharply, supported by a national strategy to promote medicinal plants.

From a fiscal perspective, medicinal plants offer a rare combination for Iran under sanctions. They reduce water use, generate foreign currency, and support employment without heavy reliance on imported inputs.

Unlike major industrial exports, they do not require large-scale capital equipment or advanced foreign technology. Their production is decentralized, which spreads income across rural and underdeveloped regions. This decentralization strengthens local economies and reduces dependence on a limited number of export hubs.

Iran already holds dominant positions in several global markets, particularly saffron. Medicinal plants do not eliminate the economic impact of sanctions, but they provide a measurable source of revenue that fits Iran’s environmental constraints.

December 19, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Environmentalism | , , | Leave a comment

Washington’s ‘Waiver On, Waiver Off’ Game at Chabahar

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – December 9, 2025

In recent months, Washington has swung from revoking to restoring India’s sanctions waiver for operating Iran’s Chabahar port. The ‘waiver on, waiver off’ routine, however, comes with a clear strategic intent.

The move is not just leverage over New Delhi as trade talks loom; it’s also a signal to Central Asian states that their economic futures — including access to Chabahar — depend on aligning their foreign policies with US preferences.

In September 2025, the United States pulled the rug out from under one of India’s most carefully nurtured strategic ventures: the Chabahar Port in Iran. Long viewed by New Delhi as a critical gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Chabahar suddenly became a high-stakes chess piece in Washington’s policy game. On September 16, the US Department of State announced it would revoke the special exemption granted in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), with the revocation taking effect September 29. Overnight, Indian companies, shippers, insurers, and banks involved in the port’s operations were cast into uncertainty: their assets could be frozen, their access to the US financial system curtailed, and their commercial contracts imperilled.

This move did not occur in isolation. At the same time, New Delhi was itself involved in a high-stakes game with the US over bilateral trade. Specifically, it is resisting US pressure to halt oil imports from Russia. By targeting Chabahar, Washington signaled that it was willing to leverage unrelated strategic projects to enforce compliance elsewhere, effectively turning Indian economic and geopolitical interests into bargaining chips. Yet the situation shifted quickly: reports emerged on October 28 that Indian firms had halted Russian oil imports, and the very next day, the US issued a fresh six-month waiver, allowing Chabahar operations to continue without immediate penalty.

The rapid “waiver on, waiver off” cycle exposes the transactional and unpredictable logic of US sanction policy. A project that represents over $120 million in Indian investment, long-term regional connectivity, and painstaking diplomacy is reduced to a geopolitical pawn, its fate dictated less by commercial or developmental imperatives and more by Washington’s strategic calculus. This particular calculus, however, is not meant for India only. The politics of granting and restricting waivers is also tied very closely to Washington’s relationship with Central Asia.

The Central Asian gamble

Chabahar port is important not only for India but also for the landlocked states of Central Asia, offering a rare direct link to the Indian Ocean and a potential route to India that bypasses Pakistan. Several Central Asian states have expressed interest in using Chabahar Port for this purpose. Tajikistan has emerged as the most active player, signing a formal cooperation agreement with Iran in early 2025 and committing to developing a logistics hub with terminals and storage facilities. Uzbekistan has held discussions about utilising the port for trade and storage. While a lot of this is still far from being fully operational, there is little denying that a major roadblock has been the US sanctions.

In the same vein, the waiver also signals to Afghanistan, where India has recently become very active. The Taliban regime is currently involved in a border standoff with Pakistan. Kabul has suspended its trade with Pakistan, and the reopening of this route remains highly uncertain. At the same time, Washington has been pressuring the Taliban to come to terms with handing over the Bagram airbase to the US military for its potential operations against China. In this context, if Afghanistan wants to continue—and even expand—its trade with Central Asia and other countries beyond the region, i.e., with India itself, as an alternative to Pakistan, its best route goes through the Chabahar Port.

Beyond this, the US decision to grant the waiver—and unless it restricts it again in the future—also puts it in a position where it can influence several other regional trade and connectivity projects, including the Trans‑Caspian and broader International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) projects. By granting or revoking waivers, the US is signalling that it can create opportunities and or introduce uncertainty for companies and governments contemplating investment or trade through corridors that touch Iran.

For example, Central Asian states considering cargo flows via Chabahar—or via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and beyond—must now weigh the risk that US sanctions could suddenly be applied, making insurance, financing, or banking services problematic and/or unavailable. Even if the Trans‑Caspian route itself does not pass through Iran, the interconnected nature of regional logistics networks means that a disruption at Chabahar could ripple across supply chains, raising costs or forcing alternative routing through Russia, Turkey, or China.

In essence, the waiver policy acts as a geopolitical lever. Its application is meant to put pressure on countries and companies so that they align their foreign and trade policies with US preferences, discouraging full exploitation of alternatives like the Trans‑Caspian corridor that could reduce American influence. The US has, for some time, been trying to expand its geopolitical footprint in Central Asia. Its ability to strangulate or allow Chabahar helps it signal its continued relevance. On the whole, the uncertainty imposed by such sanctions creates a risk premium, slows governmental and private investment, and subtly nudges regional actors toward pathways that the US finds strategically acceptable, even if they are less efficient or commercially less viable.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

December 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Betrayed by western snapback: Iran dumps IAEA deal

Tehran’s attempt at diplomatic detente was met with an escalation by the US and the E3

By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | November 25, 2025

Just hours before his visit to France to discuss Iran’s nuclear file, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned:

“International relations face unprecedented crises due to militant unilateralism. Repeated violations of international law – including ongoing conflicts in West Asia – reflect the backing of the United States and the tolerance of certain European states.”

This underscores Tehran’s defiant stance as it moves in its nuclear diplomacy. Just three months after Israeli-US airstrikes targeted Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran signed a significant security agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It did not last long.

The so-called Cairo Agreement, signed in September and brokered by Egypt, was meant to defuse tensions. Yet that same month, the western-backed IAEA was warned against “any hostile action against Iran – including the reinstatement of cancelled UN Security Council resolutions” in which case the deal would become “null and void.”

Of note, Iran–IAEA relations had been deteriorating since June during the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran. The IAEA and its director general, Rafael Grossi, refused to condemn the attacks on Iranian civilians and nuclear facilities, and the targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and senior military officers.

The IAEA’s refusal to condemn the US-Israeli violations made Iranians furious. They accused Grossi of paving the ground for the strikes and being Israel’s footman. The Islamic Republic formally lodged a protest with the UN Secretary General and the Security Council against Grossi, arguing he breached the IAEA’s neutrality.

Resistance to western coercion

The Iranian parliament – or Majlis – raised the bar by ratifying legislation that suspended cooperation between Tehran and the international nuclear watchdog. The law was passed immediately after the war ended on 25 June.

It declared Grossi and his inspectors “persona non grata” and forbade them from travelling to Iran or visiting Iranian nuclear facilities. The law stipulated that the suspension will continue so long as the security and safety of Iranian nuclear installations and scientists have not been guaranteed.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian-mediated Cairo Agreement appeared to thaw the standoff, if temporarily. It was signed in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and Grossi, and ambiguously framed as a deal on “implementing the Safeguards Agreement.”

Few details were made public then; while the IAEA called it a deal on “practical modalities and implementation of the Safeguards Agreement”, the Iranian side insisted it was “a new regime of cooperation.”

State news agency, IRNA, elaborated, “the agency will not engage in monitoring activities provided Iran has not carried out environmental and nuclear safety measures at its bombed facilities.” IRNA referred to the Supreme National Security Council as the sole body that “could greenlight the IAEA monitoring missions inside Iran, case by case.”

Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering, including the deal with the IAEA, was obviously part of the broader strategy to prevent the UK, France, and Germany from activating the snapback mechanism, in the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.

The European Troika (E3), who were clearly dissatisfied with the Cairo Agreement, reiterated “Tehran needs to allow inspections of sensitive sites and address its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.”

Snapback triggers collapse

A threat to terminate the Cairo Agreement actually came three days after it was clinched, when Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that “launching the snapback mechanism would put the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the IAEA at risk.” Nevertheless, the UK, France, and Germany moved ahead with the snapback activation.

Araghchi’s first reaction noted that “in regards to the E3’s move, the Cairo agreement has lost its functionality.” Iranians had also vowed to halt cooperation with the IAEA. However, they did not fulfill that threat and collaborated in silence.

The IAEA inspectors visited some Iranian nuclear sites in early November. However, they were not given access to the US-bombed Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities.

Even this tactical compliance failed to shield Tehran from a new IAEA censure. On 20 November, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a US-E3-backed resolution ignoring Iran’s cooperation and demanding immediate access to all affected sites and data.

It was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Iran condemned the move as “illegal, unjustifiable, irresponsible, and a stain on the image of its sponsors.”

Araghchi on his X account posted, “like the diplomacy which was assaulted by Israel and the US in June, the Cairo Agreement has been killed by the US and the E3.”

For the second time, Iran’s top diplomat announced the termination of the Cairo Agreement, “given that the E3 and the US seek escalation, they know full well that the official termination of the Cairo Agreement is the direct outcome of their provocations.”

Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Reza Nadjafi, told reporters that “If the US claims success in destroying Iran’s Natanz and Fordow facilities, then what is left for inspections?” and further warned, “any decision (by the IAEA) has its own consequences.”

Back to confrontation

By applying pressure through the IAEA, the E3 and the US seek to coerce Iran into opening the doors of its bombed nuclear sites to the IAEA inspectors, to hand over the 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which the US believes is still intact, and “to eliminate Iran’s ability to convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon.”

The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a return to the kind of standoff that defined US–Iran relations from 2005 to 2013, when Iran’s nuclear file was sent to the UN Security Council, and sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII.

Some skeptics believe US President Donald Trump’s administration would not only take Iran to the Security Council but would also cite the chapter in question, which sanctions the use of military force against any country deemed a threat to global peace.

While Iran signed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in hopes of avoiding that scenario, the US’s unilateral withdrawal under Donald Trump’s first term in 2018 and the E3’s failure to meet their obligations rendered the agreement toothless.

June’s US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear infrastructure confirmed for Tehran that western powers have no intention of engaging in diplomacy in good faith.

Toward a new strategy 

According to IRNA, which echoes the official line of the Iranian government, “Iran feels that the goodwill gestures it has shown towards the IAEA and the United States, have drawn further hostility. Therefore, maybe now it is the time to change course and revise its strategy and the rule of engagement with international bodies, including the IAEA.”

Some observers believe Iran’s first step to map out a new strategy is pursuing the policy of “nuclear ambiguity, remaining silent regarding the whereabouts of the stockpile of the highly-enriched uranium and quietly halting the implementation of the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty, without officially admitting it.”

In the latest development, the chairman of the Parliament’s National Security Committee has vowed that “Iran will sturdily pursue its nuclear achievements.” Ibrahim Azizi has cautioned the US and Europe that “Iran has changed its behavior post June attacks and they’d better not try Iran’s patience.”

That posture is hardening. In September, over 70 Iranian lawmakers urged the Supreme National Security Council to reconsider Iran’s defense doctrine – including its long-standing religious prohibition on nuclear weapons.

They argue that the regional and international order has changed irreversibly since Israel and the US jointly bombed the Iranian nuclear facilities. While citing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2010 fatwa banning nuclear weapons, they assert that in Shia jurisprudence, such rulings may evolve when conditions change – especially when the survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake.

Iran is also working to immunize itself against any escalation at the UN Security Council. Here, it banks on the veto power of Russia and China to neutralize any western effort to reimpose sanctions.

The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a turning point in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy. It is a conclusion drawn from years of unmet commitments and military escalation that western multilateralism has exhausted its credibility.

November 25, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran Dismisses US Dialogue Claims as “Not Credible”

Al-Manar | November 23, 2025

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei stated on Sunday that Washington’s professed willingness for dialogue lacks credibility, asserting that US claims are fundamentally inconsistent with its actions.

Speaking at a weekly press conference, Baqaei referenced recent remarks by the US president, stating that America has demonstrated in practice that it is not serious about negotiations.

The spokesman suggested that Washington either misunderstands the very concept of negotiation or approaches talks with a mindset that reduces them to dictation. He emphasized that such claims must be measured against the United States’ actual conduct.

Commenting on Tehran’s conditions for any potential talks with the US, Baqaei underscored that safeguarding Iran’s national interests remains the central and guiding principle.

“The other side has shown no genuine belief in negotiations,” he said, adding that as long as dialogue is treated as an imposition, the necessary conditions for genuine talks do not exist.

“What matters is that the US government has destroyed any basis for trust through its actions,” Baqaei stated. He cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and subsequent “unfaithful” actions during the Biden administration, despite earlier progress.

He further argued that the US decision to accompany the Zionist regime in its military aggression against Iran this past June provided further proof of Washington’s lack of intent to reach a reasonable and fair solution.

Addressing other diplomatic matters, the spokesman firmly dismissed speculation that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s upcoming trip to the Netherlands would involve negotiations with the three European countries (the E3). He clarified that the visit’s sole purpose is participation in a conference for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Baqaei conceded that consultations with other foreign ministers might occur on the sidelines in The Hague, but he explicitly labeled reports of negotiations with the European troika as untrue.

November 23, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Russia, China upbraid anti-Iran IAEA resolution, urge West to drop threats

Press TV – November 21, 2025

Russia and China have, in the strongest terms, rebuked a recent anti-Iran resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), calling for the settlement of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear issue through dialogue and cooperation.

Drafted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and approved 19–3 with 12 abstentions on Thursday, the resolution sought to pressure Tehran by demanding it “without delay” account for its enriched uranium stocks and facilities damaged in the June attacks by the United States and Israel.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced at a press conference in Moscow that Russia continues to firmly emphasize finding political and diplomatic solutions to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.

Asked about a recent telephone conversation between the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers, during which the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and related talks were discussed, Zakharova was cited by TASS as saying that Moscow is consistently committed to actively seeking political and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue.

The spokeswoman added that Moscow has repeatedly warned about the dangers of “military actions” that threaten the stability and security of West Asia, underlining that any military attack on nuclear facilities, especially those under the monitoring of the IAEA, is “unacceptable.”

Zakharova also said the US aggression against Iran’s nuclear sites undermined the principles the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — a treaty to which Iran has always been fully committed and which the IAEA has confirmed.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman went on to say that despite the efforts on the part of some foreign actors to create chaos and trouble in Iranian society, Tehran still prefers the path of dialogue over war and believes that national interests can be secured based on equal dialogue and by taking into account mutual concerns.

She stressed that in order to resume the talks, Iran needs “serious guarantees” that its nuclear facilities will not be targeted by missile or air attacks again.

Zakharova further underlined that the West must put aside threats of sanctions and military threats and return to diplomacy with Iran.

IAEA urged to create ‘favorable conditions for cooperation’

Li Song, China’s permanent representative to the IAEA, told the Board of Governors on Thursday that pushing through a counterproductive resolution against Iran will “only make things worse,” stressing that the US, Israel, and key European states are fueling the ongoing crisis surrounding Tehran’s nuclear file.

“Countries that have recklessly resorted to the use of force and obsessively pursued confrontation and pressure are responsible for the current situation of the Iranian nuclear issue,” Li said.

The Chinese envoy stressed that Israel and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities safeguarded by the IAEA in June, which led to a “fundamental change in the situation of the Iranian nuclear issue.”

“Such an act should be strongly condemned by the international community and the IAEA,” he said.

On the Cairo agreement reached between Iran and the IAEA in September, Li emphasized that the pact was “a positive development” and “an important opportunity” to fully revive safeguards cooperation.

He said the activation of the snapback mechanism by the UK, France, and Germany had “seriously undermined the good momentum of cooperation” between Tehran and the Agency.

Li added that the Iranian nuclear issue “can only be properly resolved” by respecting Iran’s legitimate NPT rights and ensuring the peaceful nature of its program through political, diplomatic, and safeguards mechanisms.

The envoy called on the BoG to “create favorable conditions for cooperation and dialogue” and to avoid “provoking confrontation.”

November 21, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran moves to terminate Cairo agreement with IAEA

The Cradle | November 20, 2025

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 20 November that it is terminating the cooperation agreement signed in Cairo in retaliation for the UN nuclear watchdog adopting a new resolution demanding expanded access and information on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran’s envoy to the agency, Reza Najafi, said the resolution “will not add anything to the current situation” and described it as “counterproductive” shortly after the Board of Governors approved the text.

He warned that it would have “a negative impact on the cooperation that has already started between Iran and the agency.”

According to diplomats who attended the closed session, the 35-member board passed the resolution with 19 votes in favor, three against, and 12 abstentions.

The text requires Iran to report “without delay” on the status of its enriched uranium stock and on its nuclear sites that were bombed by Israel and the US during the 12-day war on Iran in June.

It also urges Iran to “comply fully and without delay” with its obligations under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and to provide all information and access requested by the agency.

Western members of the board stated that “Iran must resolve its safeguards issues without delay” and called for “practical cooperation through access, answers, restoration of monitoring.”

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and had earlier cautioned that the resolution would “adversely affect” ongoing cooperation. Najafi noted that Iran had already granted access to “all undamaged facilities,” while inspectors have not been to sites such as Fordow and Natanz since they were hit in the June war.

The agency says verification of Iran’s uranium stock is “long overdue,” and that it cannot inspect the bombed facilities until Tehran submits updated reports.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the IAEA resolution was “unlawful and politically motivated,” initiated by the US and the European troika, and pushed through despite the 15 members voting against or abstaining.

He said the move ignored Iran’s goodwill, undermined the agency’s credibility and independence, and would disrupt cooperation.

The Foreign Minister had previously said that the Cairo agreement with the IAEA was defunct after Europe triggered snapback sanctions, but added that a negotiated solution remains possible if the opposing side acts in good faith.

Araghchi confirmed that he informed IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in a formal letter that the agreement is now considered terminated.

When Israeli attacks began in June, the IAEA estimated Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent.

Iran and several allied states argued that issuing another resolution would jeopardize efforts to advance dialogue.

Tehran has declared that the September inspection agreement with the IAEA is void, and Najafi said the new resolution “will have its own consequences,” adding that Iran would announce them later.

November 20, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

IAEA’s new report focuses on Iran’s uranium stockpile, avoids Israeli-US aggression

Press TV – November 14, 2025

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program ahead of the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, focusing on uranium stockpile estimates while avoiding comment on recent illegal attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Press TV has obtained the unpublished report, dated November 12, which will be presented at the quarterly Board of Governors meeting beginning next week in Vienna.

It will be the first such session since the formal phase-out of the JCPOA, meaning Iran’s nuclear file will now be addressed solely under the NPT Safeguards Agreement rather than the defunct 2015 accord.

The report covers the period since the director general’s last assessment in early September and revisits the fallout from the June aggression on Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States.

The aggression led Tehran to halt all cooperation with the agency, citing “politically motivated” resolutions and the IAEA’s refusal to condemn terrorist attacks on its nuclear infrastructure and personnel.

Grossi has maintained his earlier stance; on September 8 he declined to denounce the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists during the June attacks, stating, “I believe this is not something that, as director general of the IAEA, falls within my purview.”

The new report similarly avoids comment on the June 13 Israeli aggression or the subsequent US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites—actions Tehran maintains violated the UN Charter, international law, and the NPT.

The director general instead focuses on verification issues that have arisen since Iran lawfully suspended cooperation in late June due to internal legislation and security concerns.

The report includes the agency’s estimate of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile as of June 13, shortly before cooperation was suspended. The IAEA assesses the total to be 9874.9 kg, of which 9040.5 kg is in the form of UF6.

This includes “2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.”

The report notes that the figure represents an estimate based on “information previously provided by Iran, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities.”

Iran says its nuclear materials remain under rubble from recent attacks. “What relates to our nuclear materials is all under the debris caused by attacks on the bombed facilities,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 11.

“Whether these materials are accessible or not, and the status of some of them, is currently being evaluated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” he added.

Araghchi said that once this evaluation is complete, the report will be submitted to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, which will decide on any subsequent actions considering Iran’s security concerns.

Despite the disruptions caused by the June attacks, the new IAEA report stresses that safeguard obligations remain unchanged.

It states: “The Director General has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances.”

At the same time, the agency acknowledges that “the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have created a situation which requires Iran and the Agency to cooperate constructively to implement safeguards.”

The Cairo agreement, reached on September 9 between Iran’s foreign minister and Grossi, is referenced as the basis for re-establishing some degree of procedural clarity.

According to the report, “the Cairo agreement provides a common understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation in Iran under the prevailing circumstances. While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures remain in line with the relevant provisions of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”

The report notes that Iran “has begun to facilitate” accounting reports and Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) updates for facilities unaffected by the US-Israeli attacks. It also urges reports on affected sites.

Grossi claimed his readiness “to work with Iran without delay in order to achieve non-mutually exclusive objectives: full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and with the recently adopted Iranian domestic legislation.”

On June 25—the day after Iran’s  retaliatory operations halted the 12-day aggression — the country’s parliament unanimously passed legislation suspending all cooperation.

The move was rooted in concerns that IAEA resolutions, particularly the June 12 resolution by the Board of Governors, paved the way for the Israeli aggression.

Talks with the IAEA resumed in September, but Iran warned that the decision by Britain, France, and Germany to trigger the UN “snapback” mechanism after the Cairo agreement would create “new conditions” rendering that framework void.

The agency has issued no criticism of the E3 decision, even as it continues to insist that Iran uphold its safeguards obligations under all circumstances.

November 14, 2025 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Leave a comment

West in no position to comment on Iranian missiles’ range: Security chief

Press TV – November 10, 2025

Iran’s top security official says the West is using the country’s missile capabilities as a means of pressure, stressing it is in no position to comment on the issue.

“The current debate on Iran’s missiles is not out of genuine security concerns but rather serves as a tool to exert pressure and restrict the country’s defensive power,” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said on Monday.

He added that it is irrelevant for the West to comment on the range of Iran’s missiles, questioning their involvement in the matter.

“What does it have to do with the West that it comments on the range of Iran’s missiles?” he asked.

Larijani, who was a former nuclear negotiator, emphasized that Western countries also use the nuclear issue as a pretext to harbor animosity towards the Iranian nation, saying the US and Europe are raising issues about the range of Iran’s missiles with the aim of imposing control and dominance.

“No country is entitled to interfere in the Iranian nation’s defensive power,” which is a matter of independence, Larijani pointed out.

The United States and its European allies have repeatedly called for any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities to include its ballistic missile program as well.

Tehran has consistently rejected that demand, saying its military capabilities are non-negotiable.

Iran held five rounds of talks on a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal prior to the US-Israeli airstrikes on the country and its nuclear facilities in mid-June.

In his remarks, Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither seeking control [over other nations] nor is submissive to the dominance of any power.”

Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither imperialistic nor submissive to the dominance of any power.”

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has increased its trade relations with the East, Muslim countries, and the neighbors, although for years the West was Iran’s primary trading partner, the SNSC secretary noted.

He slammed the West’s arrogant policies with respect to political and security issues, saying the policy resulted in a crisis in its cooperation with Iran.

Larijani stressed the importance of maintaining Iran’s independence “because freedom, culture, and economy will not remain stable in the absence of independence.”

The West, under the guise of advocating human rights and peace, has been the main obstacle to the independence of nations for centuries, he asserted.

Iran’s top security official described national unity as the “greatest asset” of the country, warning of plots to weaken the will of the Iranian people.

He said the Iranian nation has proved over the past four decades, particularly during the US-Israeli war in mid-June, that it will never compromise over its independence.

“Iran will not retreat from its path of independence and dignity, even if it means facing full-scale confrontation,” he emphasized.

He reaffirmed the Iranian nation’s will to stand strong and rational in the face of “modern brutality.”

November 10, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

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