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Washington’s ‘Waiver On, Waiver Off’ Game at Chabahar

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – December 9, 2025

In recent months, Washington has swung from revoking to restoring India’s sanctions waiver for operating Iran’s Chabahar port. The ‘waiver on, waiver off’ routine, however, comes with a clear strategic intent.

The move is not just leverage over New Delhi as trade talks loom; it’s also a signal to Central Asian states that their economic futures — including access to Chabahar — depend on aligning their foreign policies with US preferences.

In September 2025, the United States pulled the rug out from under one of India’s most carefully nurtured strategic ventures: the Chabahar Port in Iran. Long viewed by New Delhi as a critical gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Chabahar suddenly became a high-stakes chess piece in Washington’s policy game. On September 16, the US Department of State announced it would revoke the special exemption granted in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), with the revocation taking effect September 29. Overnight, Indian companies, shippers, insurers, and banks involved in the port’s operations were cast into uncertainty: their assets could be frozen, their access to the US financial system curtailed, and their commercial contracts imperilled.

This move did not occur in isolation. At the same time, New Delhi was itself involved in a high-stakes game with the US over bilateral trade. Specifically, it is resisting US pressure to halt oil imports from Russia. By targeting Chabahar, Washington signaled that it was willing to leverage unrelated strategic projects to enforce compliance elsewhere, effectively turning Indian economic and geopolitical interests into bargaining chips. Yet the situation shifted quickly: reports emerged on October 28 that Indian firms had halted Russian oil imports, and the very next day, the US issued a fresh six-month waiver, allowing Chabahar operations to continue without immediate penalty.

The rapid “waiver on, waiver off” cycle exposes the transactional and unpredictable logic of US sanction policy. A project that represents over $120 million in Indian investment, long-term regional connectivity, and painstaking diplomacy is reduced to a geopolitical pawn, its fate dictated less by commercial or developmental imperatives and more by Washington’s strategic calculus. This particular calculus, however, is not meant for India only. The politics of granting and restricting waivers is also tied very closely to Washington’s relationship with Central Asia.

The Central Asian gamble

Chabahar port is important not only for India but also for the landlocked states of Central Asia, offering a rare direct link to the Indian Ocean and a potential route to India that bypasses Pakistan. Several Central Asian states have expressed interest in using Chabahar Port for this purpose. Tajikistan has emerged as the most active player, signing a formal cooperation agreement with Iran in early 2025 and committing to developing a logistics hub with terminals and storage facilities. Uzbekistan has held discussions about utilising the port for trade and storage. While a lot of this is still far from being fully operational, there is little denying that a major roadblock has been the US sanctions.

In the same vein, the waiver also signals to Afghanistan, where India has recently become very active. The Taliban regime is currently involved in a border standoff with Pakistan. Kabul has suspended its trade with Pakistan, and the reopening of this route remains highly uncertain. At the same time, Washington has been pressuring the Taliban to come to terms with handing over the Bagram airbase to the US military for its potential operations against China. In this context, if Afghanistan wants to continue—and even expand—its trade with Central Asia and other countries beyond the region, i.e., with India itself, as an alternative to Pakistan, its best route goes through the Chabahar Port.

Beyond this, the US decision to grant the waiver—and unless it restricts it again in the future—also puts it in a position where it can influence several other regional trade and connectivity projects, including the Trans‑Caspian and broader International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) projects. By granting or revoking waivers, the US is signalling that it can create opportunities and or introduce uncertainty for companies and governments contemplating investment or trade through corridors that touch Iran.

For example, Central Asian states considering cargo flows via Chabahar—or via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and beyond—must now weigh the risk that US sanctions could suddenly be applied, making insurance, financing, or banking services problematic and/or unavailable. Even if the Trans‑Caspian route itself does not pass through Iran, the interconnected nature of regional logistics networks means that a disruption at Chabahar could ripple across supply chains, raising costs or forcing alternative routing through Russia, Turkey, or China.

In essence, the waiver policy acts as a geopolitical lever. Its application is meant to put pressure on countries and companies so that they align their foreign and trade policies with US preferences, discouraging full exploitation of alternatives like the Trans‑Caspian corridor that could reduce American influence. The US has, for some time, been trying to expand its geopolitical footprint in Central Asia. Its ability to strangulate or allow Chabahar helps it signal its continued relevance. On the whole, the uncertainty imposed by such sanctions creates a risk premium, slows governmental and private investment, and subtly nudges regional actors toward pathways that the US finds strategically acceptable, even if they are less efficient or commercially less viable.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

December 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Betrayed by western snapback: Iran dumps IAEA deal

Tehran’s attempt at diplomatic detente was met with an escalation by the US and the E3

By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | November 25, 2025

Just hours before his visit to France to discuss Iran’s nuclear file, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned:

“International relations face unprecedented crises due to militant unilateralism. Repeated violations of international law – including ongoing conflicts in West Asia – reflect the backing of the United States and the tolerance of certain European states.”

This underscores Tehran’s defiant stance as it moves in its nuclear diplomacy. Just three months after Israeli-US airstrikes targeted Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran signed a significant security agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It did not last long.

The so-called Cairo Agreement, signed in September and brokered by Egypt, was meant to defuse tensions. Yet that same month, the western-backed IAEA was warned against “any hostile action against Iran – including the reinstatement of cancelled UN Security Council resolutions” in which case the deal would become “null and void.”

Of note, Iran–IAEA relations had been deteriorating since June during the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran. The IAEA and its director general, Rafael Grossi, refused to condemn the attacks on Iranian civilians and nuclear facilities, and the targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and senior military officers.

The IAEA’s refusal to condemn the US-Israeli violations made Iranians furious. They accused Grossi of paving the ground for the strikes and being Israel’s footman. The Islamic Republic formally lodged a protest with the UN Secretary General and the Security Council against Grossi, arguing he breached the IAEA’s neutrality.

Resistance to western coercion

The Iranian parliament – or Majlis – raised the bar by ratifying legislation that suspended cooperation between Tehran and the international nuclear watchdog. The law was passed immediately after the war ended on 25 June.

It declared Grossi and his inspectors “persona non grata” and forbade them from travelling to Iran or visiting Iranian nuclear facilities. The law stipulated that the suspension will continue so long as the security and safety of Iranian nuclear installations and scientists have not been guaranteed.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian-mediated Cairo Agreement appeared to thaw the standoff, if temporarily. It was signed in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and Grossi, and ambiguously framed as a deal on “implementing the Safeguards Agreement.”

Few details were made public then; while the IAEA called it a deal on “practical modalities and implementation of the Safeguards Agreement”, the Iranian side insisted it was “a new regime of cooperation.”

State news agency, IRNA, elaborated, “the agency will not engage in monitoring activities provided Iran has not carried out environmental and nuclear safety measures at its bombed facilities.” IRNA referred to the Supreme National Security Council as the sole body that “could greenlight the IAEA monitoring missions inside Iran, case by case.”

Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering, including the deal with the IAEA, was obviously part of the broader strategy to prevent the UK, France, and Germany from activating the snapback mechanism, in the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.

The European Troika (E3), who were clearly dissatisfied with the Cairo Agreement, reiterated “Tehran needs to allow inspections of sensitive sites and address its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.”

Snapback triggers collapse

A threat to terminate the Cairo Agreement actually came three days after it was clinched, when Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that “launching the snapback mechanism would put the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the IAEA at risk.” Nevertheless, the UK, France, and Germany moved ahead with the snapback activation.

Araghchi’s first reaction noted that “in regards to the E3’s move, the Cairo agreement has lost its functionality.” Iranians had also vowed to halt cooperation with the IAEA. However, they did not fulfill that threat and collaborated in silence.

The IAEA inspectors visited some Iranian nuclear sites in early November. However, they were not given access to the US-bombed Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities.

Even this tactical compliance failed to shield Tehran from a new IAEA censure. On 20 November, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a US-E3-backed resolution ignoring Iran’s cooperation and demanding immediate access to all affected sites and data.

It was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Iran condemned the move as “illegal, unjustifiable, irresponsible, and a stain on the image of its sponsors.”

Araghchi on his X account posted, “like the diplomacy which was assaulted by Israel and the US in June, the Cairo Agreement has been killed by the US and the E3.”

For the second time, Iran’s top diplomat announced the termination of the Cairo Agreement, “given that the E3 and the US seek escalation, they know full well that the official termination of the Cairo Agreement is the direct outcome of their provocations.”

Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Reza Nadjafi, told reporters that “If the US claims success in destroying Iran’s Natanz and Fordow facilities, then what is left for inspections?” and further warned, “any decision (by the IAEA) has its own consequences.”

Back to confrontation

By applying pressure through the IAEA, the E3 and the US seek to coerce Iran into opening the doors of its bombed nuclear sites to the IAEA inspectors, to hand over the 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which the US believes is still intact, and “to eliminate Iran’s ability to convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon.”

The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a return to the kind of standoff that defined US–Iran relations from 2005 to 2013, when Iran’s nuclear file was sent to the UN Security Council, and sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII.

Some skeptics believe US President Donald Trump’s administration would not only take Iran to the Security Council but would also cite the chapter in question, which sanctions the use of military force against any country deemed a threat to global peace.

While Iran signed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in hopes of avoiding that scenario, the US’s unilateral withdrawal under Donald Trump’s first term in 2018 and the E3’s failure to meet their obligations rendered the agreement toothless.

June’s US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear infrastructure confirmed for Tehran that western powers have no intention of engaging in diplomacy in good faith.

Toward a new strategy 

According to IRNA, which echoes the official line of the Iranian government, “Iran feels that the goodwill gestures it has shown towards the IAEA and the United States, have drawn further hostility. Therefore, maybe now it is the time to change course and revise its strategy and the rule of engagement with international bodies, including the IAEA.”

Some observers believe Iran’s first step to map out a new strategy is pursuing the policy of “nuclear ambiguity, remaining silent regarding the whereabouts of the stockpile of the highly-enriched uranium and quietly halting the implementation of the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty, without officially admitting it.”

In the latest development, the chairman of the Parliament’s National Security Committee has vowed that “Iran will sturdily pursue its nuclear achievements.” Ibrahim Azizi has cautioned the US and Europe that “Iran has changed its behavior post June attacks and they’d better not try Iran’s patience.”

That posture is hardening. In September, over 70 Iranian lawmakers urged the Supreme National Security Council to reconsider Iran’s defense doctrine – including its long-standing religious prohibition on nuclear weapons.

They argue that the regional and international order has changed irreversibly since Israel and the US jointly bombed the Iranian nuclear facilities. While citing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2010 fatwa banning nuclear weapons, they assert that in Shia jurisprudence, such rulings may evolve when conditions change – especially when the survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake.

Iran is also working to immunize itself against any escalation at the UN Security Council. Here, it banks on the veto power of Russia and China to neutralize any western effort to reimpose sanctions.

The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a turning point in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy. It is a conclusion drawn from years of unmet commitments and military escalation that western multilateralism has exhausted its credibility.

November 25, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran Dismisses US Dialogue Claims as “Not Credible”

Al-Manar | November 23, 2025

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei stated on Sunday that Washington’s professed willingness for dialogue lacks credibility, asserting that US claims are fundamentally inconsistent with its actions.

Speaking at a weekly press conference, Baqaei referenced recent remarks by the US president, stating that America has demonstrated in practice that it is not serious about negotiations.

The spokesman suggested that Washington either misunderstands the very concept of negotiation or approaches talks with a mindset that reduces them to dictation. He emphasized that such claims must be measured against the United States’ actual conduct.

Commenting on Tehran’s conditions for any potential talks with the US, Baqaei underscored that safeguarding Iran’s national interests remains the central and guiding principle.

“The other side has shown no genuine belief in negotiations,” he said, adding that as long as dialogue is treated as an imposition, the necessary conditions for genuine talks do not exist.

“What matters is that the US government has destroyed any basis for trust through its actions,” Baqaei stated. He cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and subsequent “unfaithful” actions during the Biden administration, despite earlier progress.

He further argued that the US decision to accompany the Zionist regime in its military aggression against Iran this past June provided further proof of Washington’s lack of intent to reach a reasonable and fair solution.

Addressing other diplomatic matters, the spokesman firmly dismissed speculation that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s upcoming trip to the Netherlands would involve negotiations with the three European countries (the E3). He clarified that the visit’s sole purpose is participation in a conference for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Baqaei conceded that consultations with other foreign ministers might occur on the sidelines in The Hague, but he explicitly labeled reports of negotiations with the European troika as untrue.

November 23, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Russia, China upbraid anti-Iran IAEA resolution, urge West to drop threats

Press TV – November 21, 2025

Russia and China have, in the strongest terms, rebuked a recent anti-Iran resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), calling for the settlement of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear issue through dialogue and cooperation.

Drafted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and approved 19–3 with 12 abstentions on Thursday, the resolution sought to pressure Tehran by demanding it “without delay” account for its enriched uranium stocks and facilities damaged in the June attacks by the United States and Israel.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced at a press conference in Moscow that Russia continues to firmly emphasize finding political and diplomatic solutions to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.

Asked about a recent telephone conversation between the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers, during which the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and related talks were discussed, Zakharova was cited by TASS as saying that Moscow is consistently committed to actively seeking political and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue.

The spokeswoman added that Moscow has repeatedly warned about the dangers of “military actions” that threaten the stability and security of West Asia, underlining that any military attack on nuclear facilities, especially those under the monitoring of the IAEA, is “unacceptable.”

Zakharova also said the US aggression against Iran’s nuclear sites undermined the principles the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — a treaty to which Iran has always been fully committed and which the IAEA has confirmed.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman went on to say that despite the efforts on the part of some foreign actors to create chaos and trouble in Iranian society, Tehran still prefers the path of dialogue over war and believes that national interests can be secured based on equal dialogue and by taking into account mutual concerns.

She stressed that in order to resume the talks, Iran needs “serious guarantees” that its nuclear facilities will not be targeted by missile or air attacks again.

Zakharova further underlined that the West must put aside threats of sanctions and military threats and return to diplomacy with Iran.

IAEA urged to create ‘favorable conditions for cooperation’

Li Song, China’s permanent representative to the IAEA, told the Board of Governors on Thursday that pushing through a counterproductive resolution against Iran will “only make things worse,” stressing that the US, Israel, and key European states are fueling the ongoing crisis surrounding Tehran’s nuclear file.

“Countries that have recklessly resorted to the use of force and obsessively pursued confrontation and pressure are responsible for the current situation of the Iranian nuclear issue,” Li said.

The Chinese envoy stressed that Israel and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities safeguarded by the IAEA in June, which led to a “fundamental change in the situation of the Iranian nuclear issue.”

“Such an act should be strongly condemned by the international community and the IAEA,” he said.

On the Cairo agreement reached between Iran and the IAEA in September, Li emphasized that the pact was “a positive development” and “an important opportunity” to fully revive safeguards cooperation.

He said the activation of the snapback mechanism by the UK, France, and Germany had “seriously undermined the good momentum of cooperation” between Tehran and the Agency.

Li added that the Iranian nuclear issue “can only be properly resolved” by respecting Iran’s legitimate NPT rights and ensuring the peaceful nature of its program through political, diplomatic, and safeguards mechanisms.

The envoy called on the BoG to “create favorable conditions for cooperation and dialogue” and to avoid “provoking confrontation.”

November 21, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran moves to terminate Cairo agreement with IAEA

The Cradle | November 20, 2025

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 20 November that it is terminating the cooperation agreement signed in Cairo in retaliation for the UN nuclear watchdog adopting a new resolution demanding expanded access and information on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran’s envoy to the agency, Reza Najafi, said the resolution “will not add anything to the current situation” and described it as “counterproductive” shortly after the Board of Governors approved the text.

He warned that it would have “a negative impact on the cooperation that has already started between Iran and the agency.”

According to diplomats who attended the closed session, the 35-member board passed the resolution with 19 votes in favor, three against, and 12 abstentions.

The text requires Iran to report “without delay” on the status of its enriched uranium stock and on its nuclear sites that were bombed by Israel and the US during the 12-day war on Iran in June.

It also urges Iran to “comply fully and without delay” with its obligations under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and to provide all information and access requested by the agency.

Western members of the board stated that “Iran must resolve its safeguards issues without delay” and called for “practical cooperation through access, answers, restoration of monitoring.”

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and had earlier cautioned that the resolution would “adversely affect” ongoing cooperation. Najafi noted that Iran had already granted access to “all undamaged facilities,” while inspectors have not been to sites such as Fordow and Natanz since they were hit in the June war.

The agency says verification of Iran’s uranium stock is “long overdue,” and that it cannot inspect the bombed facilities until Tehran submits updated reports.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the IAEA resolution was “unlawful and politically motivated,” initiated by the US and the European troika, and pushed through despite the 15 members voting against or abstaining.

He said the move ignored Iran’s goodwill, undermined the agency’s credibility and independence, and would disrupt cooperation.

The Foreign Minister had previously said that the Cairo agreement with the IAEA was defunct after Europe triggered snapback sanctions, but added that a negotiated solution remains possible if the opposing side acts in good faith.

Araghchi confirmed that he informed IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in a formal letter that the agreement is now considered terminated.

When Israeli attacks began in June, the IAEA estimated Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent.

Iran and several allied states argued that issuing another resolution would jeopardize efforts to advance dialogue.

Tehran has declared that the September inspection agreement with the IAEA is void, and Najafi said the new resolution “will have its own consequences,” adding that Iran would announce them later.

November 20, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

IAEA’s new report focuses on Iran’s uranium stockpile, avoids Israeli-US aggression

Press TV – November 14, 2025

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program ahead of the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, focusing on uranium stockpile estimates while avoiding comment on recent illegal attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Press TV has obtained the unpublished report, dated November 12, which will be presented at the quarterly Board of Governors meeting beginning next week in Vienna.

It will be the first such session since the formal phase-out of the JCPOA, meaning Iran’s nuclear file will now be addressed solely under the NPT Safeguards Agreement rather than the defunct 2015 accord.

The report covers the period since the director general’s last assessment in early September and revisits the fallout from the June aggression on Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States.

The aggression led Tehran to halt all cooperation with the agency, citing “politically motivated” resolutions and the IAEA’s refusal to condemn terrorist attacks on its nuclear infrastructure and personnel.

Grossi has maintained his earlier stance; on September 8 he declined to denounce the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists during the June attacks, stating, “I believe this is not something that, as director general of the IAEA, falls within my purview.”

The new report similarly avoids comment on the June 13 Israeli aggression or the subsequent US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites—actions Tehran maintains violated the UN Charter, international law, and the NPT.

The director general instead focuses on verification issues that have arisen since Iran lawfully suspended cooperation in late June due to internal legislation and security concerns.

The report includes the agency’s estimate of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile as of June 13, shortly before cooperation was suspended. The IAEA assesses the total to be 9874.9 kg, of which 9040.5 kg is in the form of UF6.

This includes “2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.”

The report notes that the figure represents an estimate based on “information previously provided by Iran, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities.”

Iran says its nuclear materials remain under rubble from recent attacks. “What relates to our nuclear materials is all under the debris caused by attacks on the bombed facilities,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 11.

“Whether these materials are accessible or not, and the status of some of them, is currently being evaluated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” he added.

Araghchi said that once this evaluation is complete, the report will be submitted to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, which will decide on any subsequent actions considering Iran’s security concerns.

Despite the disruptions caused by the June attacks, the new IAEA report stresses that safeguard obligations remain unchanged.

It states: “The Director General has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances.”

At the same time, the agency acknowledges that “the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have created a situation which requires Iran and the Agency to cooperate constructively to implement safeguards.”

The Cairo agreement, reached on September 9 between Iran’s foreign minister and Grossi, is referenced as the basis for re-establishing some degree of procedural clarity.

According to the report, “the Cairo agreement provides a common understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation in Iran under the prevailing circumstances. While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures remain in line with the relevant provisions of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”

The report notes that Iran “has begun to facilitate” accounting reports and Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) updates for facilities unaffected by the US-Israeli attacks. It also urges reports on affected sites.

Grossi claimed his readiness “to work with Iran without delay in order to achieve non-mutually exclusive objectives: full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and with the recently adopted Iranian domestic legislation.”

On June 25—the day after Iran’s  retaliatory operations halted the 12-day aggression — the country’s parliament unanimously passed legislation suspending all cooperation.

The move was rooted in concerns that IAEA resolutions, particularly the June 12 resolution by the Board of Governors, paved the way for the Israeli aggression.

Talks with the IAEA resumed in September, but Iran warned that the decision by Britain, France, and Germany to trigger the UN “snapback” mechanism after the Cairo agreement would create “new conditions” rendering that framework void.

The agency has issued no criticism of the E3 decision, even as it continues to insist that Iran uphold its safeguards obligations under all circumstances.

November 14, 2025 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Leave a comment

West in no position to comment on Iranian missiles’ range: Security chief

Press TV – November 10, 2025

Iran’s top security official says the West is using the country’s missile capabilities as a means of pressure, stressing it is in no position to comment on the issue.

“The current debate on Iran’s missiles is not out of genuine security concerns but rather serves as a tool to exert pressure and restrict the country’s defensive power,” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said on Monday.

He added that it is irrelevant for the West to comment on the range of Iran’s missiles, questioning their involvement in the matter.

“What does it have to do with the West that it comments on the range of Iran’s missiles?” he asked.

Larijani, who was a former nuclear negotiator, emphasized that Western countries also use the nuclear issue as a pretext to harbor animosity towards the Iranian nation, saying the US and Europe are raising issues about the range of Iran’s missiles with the aim of imposing control and dominance.

“No country is entitled to interfere in the Iranian nation’s defensive power,” which is a matter of independence, Larijani pointed out.

The United States and its European allies have repeatedly called for any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities to include its ballistic missile program as well.

Tehran has consistently rejected that demand, saying its military capabilities are non-negotiable.

Iran held five rounds of talks on a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal prior to the US-Israeli airstrikes on the country and its nuclear facilities in mid-June.

In his remarks, Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither seeking control [over other nations] nor is submissive to the dominance of any power.”

Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither imperialistic nor submissive to the dominance of any power.”

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has increased its trade relations with the East, Muslim countries, and the neighbors, although for years the West was Iran’s primary trading partner, the SNSC secretary noted.

He slammed the West’s arrogant policies with respect to political and security issues, saying the policy resulted in a crisis in its cooperation with Iran.

Larijani stressed the importance of maintaining Iran’s independence “because freedom, culture, and economy will not remain stable in the absence of independence.”

The West, under the guise of advocating human rights and peace, has been the main obstacle to the independence of nations for centuries, he asserted.

Iran’s top security official described national unity as the “greatest asset” of the country, warning of plots to weaken the will of the Iranian people.

He said the Iranian nation has proved over the past four decades, particularly during the US-Israeli war in mid-June, that it will never compromise over its independence.

“Iran will not retreat from its path of independence and dignity, even if it means facing full-scale confrontation,” he emphasized.

He reaffirmed the Iranian nation’s will to stand strong and rational in the face of “modern brutality.”

November 10, 2025 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran–Russia railway pact sets keystone in North–South Corridor

Long-delayed rail deal unlocks final segment of a Eurasian freight artery, bolstering Axis of Resistance and bypassing western sanctions

By Vali Kaleji | The Cradle | November 7, 2025

In a long-anticipated development, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, announced on 26 October that a final contract with Russia for the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway would be signed the following month.

This 164-kilometer line through Gilan province, hugging the southwestern Caspian Sea, marks the last missing segment in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and is poised to radically transform Eurasian trade routes.

Beyond economics, the project also represents an effort to re-establish Iran’s rail connection with the South Caucasus for the first time in 35 years.

During the Soviet era, the Tabriz–Jolfa Railway, which connected to the Jolfa (Nakhichevan)–Meghri–Zangilan–Baku–Moscow line as well as the Jolfa–Nakhichevan–Yerevan route, was considered one of Iran’s main transit routes with the Soviet Union.

But the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s ruptured the web of regional rail lines, isolating Nakhchivan and severing Iran’s decades-old railway link to the Caucasus.

Thirty-five years later, Iran reconnects to the Caucasus

Since the early 2000s, Tehran has explored multiple avenues to re-establish these lost links. A proposed Iran–Armenia route via Marand and Meghri never materialized. Efforts to revive the Soviet-era Jolfa–Nakhchivan–Zangilan line have stalled amid Yerevan and Baku’s ongoing dispute over the Zangezur corridor.

In contrast, the Rasht–Astara line, as part of the larger Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, is now the only active rail project linking Iran back to the Caucasus. It also extends further along the Astara–Baku–Dagestan route, reconnecting the Islamic Republic to a key segment of the Eurasian transport grid.

This idea is not new. The Soviet Union had extended its own railway network to Astara, Azerbaijan, in 1941, reaching the Iranian border. But within Iran, the crucial stretch from Astara to Qazvin remained incomplete.

Construction on the Rasht–Qazvin leg only began in 2009 and was completed a decade later, with an official launch in March 2019 attended by then-Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and Azerbaijan’s then-economy minister Shahin Mustafayev.

However, the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway encountered significant challenges. A 2016 deal with the International Bank of Azerbaijan for a $500-million loan was shelved after US President Donald Trump – during his first term – unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Fearing US secondary sanctions, Baku froze its financial commitments.

Tehran subsequently turned to Moscow. When the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Russia in January 2022, both sides finalized a $5-billion credit line to fund key Iranian infrastructure projects, including the Rasht–Astara Railway. Russia’s own trade needs had grown increasingly urgent under the weight of western sanctions, prompting Moscow to double down on the INSTC as a lifeline to India, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin, accompanied by Iranian railway officials, surveyed the route by helicopter in January 2023. Four months later, on 17 May, the two sides signed a $1.6-billion contract to complete the railway. Raisi presided over the ceremony in Tehran, with Russian President Vladimir Putin joining via video link.

Map of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

Strategic rail link hinges on Russian capital and Iranian land

Despite the celebratory optics, the Rasht–Astara project faces formidable obstacles. The mountainous, forested, and ecologically fragile terrain in northern Iran presents serious engineering and environmental challenges. Specialized bridges, tunnels, and stabilization systems are required to navigate landslide-prone zones and protect sensitive ecosystems such as the Hyrcanian forests and regional wetlands.

Costs are steep. At an average of $10 million per kilometer, the entire line will cost an estimated $1.6 billion. Masoud Shakibaeifar, a transportation planning expert in Iran, believes that “the gross revenue of the project in this optimistic scenario could increase from $500 million in the first year of operation to $1 billion in subsequent years. In this case, a return on investment would be achievable within a 10-year period.”

But others, like Seyed Hossein Mirshafi, former infrastructure advisor to the Roads Ministry, argue Iranian contractors could complete the railway for under $700 million. It remains to be seen whether a new and different figure will be determined in the new Iran–Russia contract, which is set to be signed next month.

Land acquisition has been another sticking point. Much of the route runs through farmland, requiring time-consuming negotiations with private landowners. Under the current division of labor, Iran shoulders land procurement costs while Russia funds construction.

In this regard, Minister Sadegh stated: “Despite challenging climatic conditions and the constraints imposed by sanctions, approximately 80 kilometers of land along the route have so far been acquired and secured, and more than 30 kilometers have been handed over to the Russian side. We are prepared to transfer half of the route for the commencement of technical operations within the next few weeks.”

In addition, to overcome these challenges and mitigate environmental concerns in Iran, Hadi Haqshenas, the Governor of Gilan Province, announced that, following the emphasis of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the 160-kilometer Rasht–Astara route will be constructed on an elevated bridge.

These complexities make the Rasht–Astara Railway unlike any other infrastructure project in Iran’s recent history.

Map of Rasht-Astara Railway

The North–South Corridor challenges Atlanticist chokeholds

The strategic weight of the Rasht–Astara line cannot be overstated. For Iran, under relentless sanctions, and for Russia, seeking alternatives to its embargoed European trade routes, the railway represents a crucial artery in the multipolar world order. It also restores Tehran’s long-lost rail link to the South Caucasus and, by extension, to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As such, it represents a major geoeconomic and geopolitical development.

Kamal Ebrahimi Kavori, a senior expert on Iran’s free trade and economic zones, believes that “the Rasht–Astara Railway project is not merely a simple rail line, but a vital artery linking Iran to major trade corridors – a route that connects the country’s northern and southern ports, free trade zones, and neighboring countries into an integrated and competitive transport chain.”

For Azerbaijan, which is not formally involved in the project, the completed rail link offers faster freight access to Pakistan – a key strategic ally – and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Given Baku’s expanding trade with these partners, the benefits are clear even without direct investment.

Currently, the lack of a direct rail connection at Astara means cargo has to be manually transferred between rail and road, clogging border terminals and slowing transit between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Once the Rasht–Astara line is operational, freight can move seamlessly from Russia’s northern cities to Iran’s southern port of Bandar Abbas.

An important point is that the North–South Corridor has three main routes: the eastern route (Central Asia), the central route (Caspian Sea), and the western route (South Caucasus). Although all three routes have gained significant momentum in recent years, particularly after the war in Ukraine and western sanctions on Russia, the main volume of transit and trade occurs along the western segment of the North–South Corridor, connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.

Consequently, there is heavy truck traffic, especially at the Astara border terminals (Iran–Azerbaijan) and the Samur border terminal (Azerbaijan–Russia). Therefore, the construction and completion of the Rasht–Astara Railway could play a crucial role in reducing road congestion, lowering transportation costs, and accelerating transit and trade along this corridor.

In the first year of operation, the Rasht–Astara Railway is expected to handle up to approximately 10 million tons of cargo. In the long term, the cargo capacity of this route could reach approximately 15 million tons.

Adding momentum, Iran’s Preferential Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signed in October 2019, became a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025. While Azerbaijan is not part of the EAEU, it remains central to the INSTC’s westward stretch. The Rasht–Astara Railway will thus help streamline trade between Iran and major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Just days before the return of UN sanctions on Iran, Russia hosted a major nuclear deal with Iran on 24 September, and the two sides signed a $25-billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) to build four small-scale nuclear power plants in Sirik, in the southern Hormozgan Province. This was followed by the announcement of the Rasht–Astara Railway contract.

These moves signal a fundamental shift. Unlike in the 2006–2013 period when Russia backed UN sanctions against Iran, Moscow now stands aligned with Tehran against western coercion. Both reject the legitimacy of the UN snapback mechanism.

Far from being weakened by sanctions, the Iran–Russia partnership is expanding – anchored by energy cooperation, strategic transport corridors, and a shared challenge to western economic warfare.

November 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

Iran’s oil exports hit new post-sanctions record

Press TV – November 9, 2025

Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.

The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.

“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.

Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.

The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.

The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.

That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.

The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.

However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.

Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.

November 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

The myth of US peacemaking: Why Washington’s mediation in West Asia keeps crumbling

By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | November 3, 2025

The US has long styled itself as a guarantor of peace and stability in West Asia while systematically undermining both. From the Oslo Accords to the Abraham Accords, Washington’s so-called peace initiatives have masked coercion as consensus.

These efforts consistently reinforce the regional status quo, prioritizing Israeli security over Palestinian sovereignty, and maintaining western hegemony over regional autonomy.

The collapse of another US-backed Gaza ceasefire, violated within days by renewed Israeli aggression, exposes the structural flaws in this diplomatic model. Rather than arbitrating peace, Washington serves as an enabler of conflict.

Its diplomacy rests on selective morality and strategic interest, not universal principles. The American insistence on brokering ceasefires while actively resupplying Tel Aviv’s military machinery makes a mockery of its so-called neutrality.

‘No legal basis under international law’ 

The recent joint letter by Iran, China, and Russia to the UN Secretary-General rejecting Washington’s attempt to reactivate the expired “snapback” mechanism under Resolution 2231 further lays bare the fissures between western powers and global legitimacy.

The mechanism, part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, formally expired on 18 October 2025. Yet, the US and its European partners are now attempting to revive sanctions via a legal instrument widely considered void.

Tehran’s rejection of the move, supported by Moscow and Beijing, signals a collective refusal to let Washington unilaterally interpret international law. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian affirmed in August that “China reaffirms its commitment to the peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue and opposes the invocation of the UN Security Council’s ‘snapback’ mechanism.”

His words echoed a broader conviction across the Global South that legitimacy can no longer be dictated by Washington’s will. Fifteen years ago, Beijing and Moscow joined western powers in imposing sanctions on Iran; today, they stand beside Tehran in open defiance of that same framework.

The world’s center of gravity is shifting from a unipolar order managed by Washington to a multipolar one defined by resistance to its dominance.

Economic multipolarity and the end of American centrality

Nowhere is the erosion of US dominance more visible than in East and Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), once conceived as a Cold War neutral bloc, has evolved into a robust, self-sustaining economic engine. As reported by the Japan News in March 2024, ASEAN’s combined GDP now rivals that of Japan.

Following Washington’s 2017 withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the region coalesced around the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Even traditional US allies have joined. As Professor Amitav Acharya argues in ‘The End of American World Order,’ what is emerging is not anti-western, but post-western – a world in which regions increasingly manage their own affairs. Trump’s recent visit to East Asia highlighted Washington’s growing irrelevance in a region it once dominated.

Yet Washington continues to operate as though the post–Cold War era never ended. Its diplomats still speak the language of the “rules-based order,” even as its actions violate the very norms they claim to uphold.

The attempt to weaponize international law through the snapback mechanism mirrors its broader conduct in Gaza: mediation that enforces control rather than fosters compromise. When the US calls for restraint but resupplies Israel with weapons as civilian casualties rise, its moral authority collapses under its own contradictions.

As former US diplomat Chas Freeman once observed:

“Sadly, theories of coercion and plans to use military means to impose our will on other nations have for some time squeezed out serious consideration of diplomacy as an alternative to the use of force. Diplomacy is more than saying ‘nice doggie’ till you can find a rock … The weapons of diplomats are words and their power is their persuasiveness.”

This transition from persuasion to pressure has degraded Washington’s credibility. US diplomacy increasingly resembles an extension of Pentagon strategy – a negotiation backed by bombs, not by principle.

And this is not limited to Gaza or Iran. From Venezuela to North Korea, from Syria to China, Washington’s diplomatic strategy hinges on threats, sanctions, and military posturing. The soft power myth has dissolved under the weight of decades of failed interventions.

A cultural and philosophical disconnect

Western liberalism, historically presented as a universal framework for progress, falters in regions like West Asia, where faith and justice are intertwined. As even Francis Fukuyama – the American political scientist best known for declaring the “end of history” at the Cold War’s close – himself conceded, liberalism is not a universal fit. For Iran and much of West Asia, peace cannot be reduced to the absence of war or bought through economic incentives. It must arise from justice, dignity, and recognition.

This is the blind spot of every US-brokered deal: the failure to grasp that sovereignty and moral legitimacy cannot be negotiated away. The more Washington pressures regional actors into conformity, the more resistance solidifies into a collective identity.

Tehran’s approach reflects this new reality. Rather than reacting impulsively to western provocations, Iran has adopted a hybrid posture combining strategic deterrence with selective diplomacy. Its partnership with Moscow and Beijing is not an alliance of convenience but of conviction – a shared rejection of a system where power masquerades as principle.

In the wake of the failed snapback, Tehran has deepened energy and transport cooperation through the North–South Corridor while maintaining calibrated dialogue with regional states seeking stability beyond US patronage.

The existential failure of US diplomacy

Unlike in previous decades, Iran is no longer isolated. It now commands a regional network of partnerships that reflect mutual interests rather than asymmetric dependencies. From Iraq to Central Asia, Tehran’s outreach has become a model for post-western engagement.

Meanwhile, the Gaza ceasefire serves as a grim mirror of Washington’s diplomatic decay. Within 48 hours of its declaration, Israeli airstrikes resumed under the pretext of “pre-emptive defense,” and the White House responded with silence. For the Arab and Muslim world, this silence is deafening and an unmistakable confirmation that American mediation is designed to manage violence, not end it.

The myth of the western peacemaker has endured because it served both sides: it offered Washington moral legitimacy and offered local elites a pretext for inaction. But that myth is now collapsing under the weight of its contradictions.

A world divided between moral resistance and strategic cynicism cannot be reconciled through the language of “balance.” It demands a new moral vocabulary – one that acknowledges power but subordinates it to justice.

The failure of US mediation in West Asia is therefore not tactical but existential. It stems from a worldview that confuses control with order and influence with peace. Until Washington accepts that peace cannot be engineered through dominance, its diplomacy will remain what it has always been: an empire’s negotiation with its own illusions.

November 4, 2025 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran needs up to $180bn to meet oil production targets: Official

Press TV – October 29, 2025

An Iranian Oil Ministry official says that the country requires up to $180 billion in investment to increase its oil production by at least 1 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2028, as outlined in its national development plan.

Nasrollah Zarei, who serves as CEO of Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, said on Wednesday that Iran’s Seventh National Development Plan targets an output of 4.8 million bpd within three years.

However, Zarei said that the target may be out of reach due to financial constraints caused by foreign sanctions.

He said that even a more modest target of 4.5 million bpd would require $170 to $180 billion in investment, of which the government can only allocate $10 billion. He called for an immediate revision of funding schemes for oil projects in Iran, saying the country’s sovereign wealth fund could play a larger role in financing such projects.

Despite stringent US sanctions that restrict oil sales and reinvestment, Iran has maintained its production at approximately 3.5 million bpd in recent years. Nearly 2 million bpd are exported, with the remainder used for domestic fuel and petrochemical production.

While Iran has faced challenges in meeting its oil output targets, it has achieved significant breakthroughs in the production of natural gas. The country is now the world’s third-largest gas producer, with a daily output of nearly 1 billion cubic meters, which experts believe is equivalent to approximately 6.3 million barrels of oil.

This solidifies Iran’s position as a leading hydrocarbon supplier, whose petroleum industry has a key role to play in global energy markets.

Chairman of Iran’s Geological Society, Mansour Ghorbani, said on Wednesday that the country holds some 36 trillion cubic meters of gas, representing 16% of global reserves, adding that the figure could rise to 50 trillion cubic meters with new discoveries.

Ghorbani also said that Iran’s oil reserves are estimated at 157 billion barrels, ranking among the world’s largest.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity, Wars for Israel | , | Leave a comment

China will act if its interests are harmed by Iran sanctions: Envoy

Press TV – October 27, 2025

China will act to respond to the sanctions imposed against Iran if they harm its interests, the country’s ambassador to Iran has said.

Cong Peiwu said on Monday during a press conference in Tehran that China will not hesitate to act if its economic interests are affected by restrictions imposed on trade with Iran.

Cong made the remarks in response to questions about China’s way of dealing with recent United Nations sanctions on Iran, which were re-imposed in late September after European parties to a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers accused Tehran of failing to observe its obligations under the agreement.

Along with Russia and Iran, China believes that the move by Britain, France, and Germany to return UN sanctions on Iran was illegal, signaling that it would not necessarily abide by the UN sanctions.

The Chinese ambassador said that Beijing seeks closer cooperation with Tehran as he reiterated that Iran and China share a common stance opposing unilateralism in the world.

China is Iran’s largest trading partner, as it buys 29% of Iran’s total non-oil exports while being responsible for 25% of imports into the country.

Estimates suggest that more than 92% of Iran’s oil exports also end up in China, despite a harsh regime of US sanctions that imposes heavy penalties on buyers of Iranian oil.

Those estimates show that China’s total trade with Iran, including its oil purchases, amount to $65-70 billion per year.

Experts believe China counts on the smooth and affordable supply of oil from Iran for maintaining growth in its industrial sector.

Figures published in late August showed that China had relied on Iran for 13.6% of its total oil imports in the first half of 2025 as shipments reached an average of 1.38 million barrels per day (bpd) over the period.

Privately-owned refiners receive the bulk of Iranian oil shipments arriving in China as they enjoy discounts of up to 8% per barrel offered by Iran to circumvent US sanctions.

Recent data by international tanker tracking services suggest Iran’s oil exports to China reached records of more than 1.8 million bpd in September.

October 27, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

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