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Latest US-backed regime change operation in Iran hits the wall

By Samuel Geddes | Al Mayadeen | January 17, 2026

Having bombed the country in 2025, “Israel” and the US seemed to think that provoking street violence would have more success at collapsing the Iranian state. Instead, it fizzled almost instantly.

We have been here at least half a dozen times in the past two decades. Street protests in Iran over an internal economic, social or political issue emerge, gather a degree of momentum in urban areas and the Western propaganda system declares that the protests have “shifted” from their initial focus, to calls for the repudiation of the Islamic Revolution and the end of the political system it created. European and American politicians issue their empty statements of solidarity with the Iranian people and unilaterally decide that the Islamic Republic has “lost its legitimacy,” that its fall is simply a matter of “when,” not “if.” We have seen this narrative played out often enough to recognize it never survives contact with the real world.

The source of the persistent delusion that the Islamic Republic is about to fall comes not only from the Euro-American elite class wishing it to be so, but also from its deferral to the “analysis” of segments of the diaspora whose own political objectives are detached from reality.

Whether it is protests over the government’s handling of the economy, energy blackouts, or the water crisis, most external observers are incapable of viewing each individual issue through any lens other than that of regime change.

This time around the US and Israelis, in coopting the protests to destabilize the country through street violence, have not even bothered to hide their involvement. It has also not helped the West’s case that it is now feigning “humanitarian concern” for the rights of Iranian citizens while it has spent more than two years facilitating the ongoing slaughter and starvation of Gaza’s population. Any observer following both issues can detect the dissonance and conclude what is motivating the frantic calls to escalate the situation into military intervention. That is, the desire to crush a state and society that has resisted Western dominance for more than four-and-a-half decades.

The brazenness of the West’s affected concern for the well-being of the Iranian public is particularly galling in light of the sanctions. If Iranians’ living standards were really of any concern to Washington, London or Brussels, they would start by unconditionally ending their economic strangulation in effect against the country. The truth is that the suffering and misery engendered by the sanctions is entirely the point. As well as stifling the development of an independent state outside the globalized-Western economy, the siege is specifically intended to make living conditions unbearable for the average Iranian so that they are incentivized to undermine the Islamic Republic. The continuation of the sanctions is a barely disguised punishment of the Iranian public for not pursuing the West’s geopolitical goal of regime-change for them.

Were it not glaringly obvious to the Trump administration before the latest unrest, it surely is now that the exiled political diaspora most actively pushing for the fall of the Islamic Republic through Western military action are entirely incapable of political organization. Even the least crazed fan of the defunct Pahlavi dynasty is pathologically hostile to the terrorist personality cult of the MEK, as much as they are to the Islamic Republic itself. There simply is no political alternative, to say nothing of whether it even has any domestic support, waiting to replace the Islamic Republic.

Flush from the “success” of his abducting Venezuelan president Maduro, Trump seemed temporarily convinced he might have a similar option here, to carry out a meaningless military stunt for which he can take credit and declare “victory.” His problem is that there is no level of open military action against Iran that would allow him to do this without igniting a regional war that destroys the global economy.

This realization, if he has come to it, would explain his backtracking on the red lines he set, that any executions would trigger US attacks. If a controlled, stage-managed performance is his goal, as it almost always is, then the confrontation with Iran leaves him with no viable option but to back down.

The absence of any realistic military option has now seen both the US and Europe revert to their standard tactic; the intensification of the sanctions they have used to punish the Iranian people. Trump’s latest declaration of a 25% tariff on any country trading with Iran is his way of giving himself an off-ramp, for now, from a crisis that is largely of his making.

January 17, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

“Real men go to Tehran” — The Zion-Con fantasy of regime change in Iran

By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | January 16, 2026

“Anyone can go to Baghdad. Real men go to Tehran.”

It is difficult to imagine a sentence that more perfectly distils the arrested adolescence of American neoconservatism. Equal parts locker-room bravado and imperial hallucination, the phrase belongs to the same intellectual ecosystem as Rambo sequels, Tom Clancy paperbacks, and the enduring belief that history naturally submits to men armed with air superiority and a television-ready talking point.

The slogan has circulated for decades among Washington’s most aggressively incurious minds. Iraq was merely the appetizer. Tehran was always the entrée — the Everest of regime change, the final boss in a video game played by men who have never once paid the price of defeat.

Iran is not different merely because of its size, its population, or its terrain — though the Zagros Mountains are far less forgiving than the streets of Fallujah. Iran is different because it has refused, stubbornly and at enormous cost, to internalise the post–Cold War catechism: accept American primacy, subcontract your sovereignty, and call the arrangement “integration into the international order.”

For the ‘Zion-Cons’ — Zionist neoconservatives — this refusal is not simply strategic defiance. It is psychological heresy.

The theology of regime change 

Neoconservatism is not a foreign-policy framework. It is a belief system. Like all theologies, it comes equipped with sacred texts, sanctioned demons, and end-times fantasies. Iran occupies a unique place in this cosmology: simultaneously an ideological abomination and a geopolitical temptation too intoxicating to abandon.

The Islamic Republic represents everything neocon thought cannot tolerate — an independent regional power immune to Western legitimacy rituals, rooted in a civilizational memory more than a millennium older than Washington itself. That it is also openly hostile to Israel, and persistently aligned with Palestinian resistance, elevates Iran from problem to obsession.

This obsession is always framed as concern. Concern for democracy. Concern for women’s rights. Concern for regional stability. Yet the concern follows a suspiciously selective pattern. It spikes when Iranian women protest. It flattens when women in Gaza are buried beneath concrete and shrapnel. It demands sanctions in the name of “helping the Iranian people” while celebrating the annihilation of Iran’s middle class as a strategic achievement.

This is not hypocrisy. It is architecture.

Sanctions are not a failed alternative to regime change; they are its slow-motion variant. When bombing proves politically inconvenient, starvation becomes policy. When diplomacy threatens stabilisation, diplomacy must be sabotaged. Engagement is dangerous precisely because it works. The objective is not reform. The objective is obliteration.

Israel’s strategic mirage

For Israel’s security establishment, Iran is the final unresolved obstacle in a region otherwise disciplined into submission. Egypt neutralised. Syria pulverised. Iraq shattered and held together with duct tape. Lebanon perpetually destabilised. Only Iran remains intact and intolerably autonomous.

The idea that Israel’s posture toward Iran has ever been defensive borders on parody. The fear is not that Iran will strike tomorrow; it is that Iran will exist coherently ten years from now.

This explains the fixation on Iran’s air defences, its scientists, its infrastructure. The logic is brutally simple: a state that cannot defend itself cannot act independently. A state that cannot act independently can eventually be wrecked, partitioned, and remade.

But here the fantasy collides with reality. Iran is not Syria. It is not Libya. It is not Iraq circa 2003 — hollowed out by sanctions and ruled by a dictatorship so despised that collapse felt like relief. Iran, like all societies, contains fractures and rivalries. But fragmented societies do not automatically disintegrate. Quite often — especially under existential threat — they consolidate. External assault does not reliably dissolve states. Sometimes it forges them.

The opposition mirage

Every regime-change project requires a hero. In Iran’s case, while ritualistic nods are made toward protesters with genuine grievances, the starring role is awkwardly reserved for an exile aristocracy whose Twitter/X followings vastly exceed their domestic relevance.

Reza Pahlavi is marketed like a Silicon Valley prototype: sleek, Western-approved, and permanently “almost ready.” His appeal thrives in think tanks, donor salons, and Israeli conference halls. Inside Iran, his name provokes neither mass devotion nor visceral hatred — just indifference at best, uncontrollable laughter at worst.

This is the core contradiction of Washington’s Iran policy: regime change without revolution; installation without legitimacy; democracy without the inconvenience of mass politics.

The resulting strategy is perversely elegant in its cynicism — wait for collapse while ensuring no alternative survives long enough to govern.

Civil war option

What follows regime collapse? Zion-Con discourse treats the question like a software update users will sort out later. Something, it is assumed, will emerge. Something manageable. Something vaguely liberal.

History offers no such reassurance

Iran’s disintegration would not yield a liberal republic — and it is not meant to. It would yield precisely what Zion-Cons privately welcome: centrifugal violence, ethnic fragmentation, militia economies, refugee flows that would make Syria look like a rehearsal dinner. Kurdish separatism. Baloch insurgency. Nuclear insecurity. The scenario reads less like a transition plan than a controlled demolition spiralling out of control.

For Washington and Tel Aviv, this is not a deterrent. It is an acceptable – perhaps even desirable – outcome. A broken Iran is preferable to a strong one, even if the shards cut indiscriminately.

The masculinity problem

“Real men go to Tehran” is not merely rhetoric. It is theatre. It reflects a masculinity crisis at the heart of American empire — a compulsion to prove relevance through violence because legitimacy has evaporated.

Short wars. Clean optics. Cinematic strikes. The problem with Iran is that it refuses to follow the script. There is no “Mission Accomplished” banner waiting in the Persian Gulf. There is only attrition, retaliation, and the dawning realisation that power is not a substitute for strategy.

The endgame nobody admits

The scarcely concealed truth is that regime change in Iran is not primarily about Iran. It is about preserving Zionist hegemony in the region. An Iran that survives sanctions, absorbs pressure, and refuses submission is contagious. It teaches others that defiance is survivable.

That lesson is intolerable

So, the fantasy endures. The slogans recycle. The men who went to Baghdad insist they are wiser now — just before deliberately repeating the same catastrophe, only on a grander scale.

But Tehran is not a sequel. It is a reckoning. And this time, the audience will not be so forgiving.

January 16, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Former Head of Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate: There’s a ‘very significant influence operation by the US’ in Iran

The Dissident | January 14, 2026

Recently, the Israeli newspaper Maariv interviewed the head of the Military Intelligence Directorat in Israel from 2018-2021, Tamir Hayman, who revealed that the United States currently has a “Significant Influence Operation” on the ground in Iran.

In the interview, Hayman said, “If the question is, is there zero operation right now? The answer is no, because there is already an operation. There is currently a very significant influence operation by the US” referring to the current unrest happening in Iran.

He added, “The sequence of news that is received from within Iran, rumors that are coming, videos that are coming, there are many things that are happening that have no explanation. It could be a coincidence, and it could be something else. Simply put, an influence effort is an effort that operates primarily in the cyber realm, and in the realm of local disruption and subversion, and there are some.”

Along with this, Tamir Hayman, acknowledged that U.S. sanctions were the cause of the economic issues that in Iran that sparked the initial protests in Iran which are apparently being exploited by American and Israeli intelligence, saying, “there is the attempt, as we heard tonight from Trump, that this is a path of negotiation with the Americans, that this is really the only thing that can save the Iranian economy, the lifting of sanctions”.

This comment comes at the same time that Tamir Morag, the Diplomatic Correspondent for the Netanyahu-linked Channel 14 in Israel, reported that “foreign actors are arming the protesters in Iran with live firearms, which is the reason for the hundreds of regime personnel killed.”

American and Israeli officials have been fairly open about the fact that Israeli intelligence is currently operating on the ground in Iran, with the former Secretary of State and CIA director, Mike Pompeo saying, “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also, to every Mossad agent walking beside them” and the Israeli Heritage Minister, Amichai Eliyahu saying, “When we attacked in Iran during ‘Rising Lion’ we were on its soil and knew how to lay the groundwork for a strike. I can assure you that we have some of our people operating there right now”.

But now, Tamir Morag has revealed that there are “very significant influence operations by the US” in Iran, which include “operates primarily in the cyber realm, and in the realm of local disruption and subversion” and according to Tamir Morag, apparent operations to arm protestors in Iran to kill Iranian government officials.

Referring to the protests in Iran, the U.S. government connected private intelligence firm Stratfor, wrote, “the United States may also try to intervene, such as by covertly helping to organize the protesters”, something that is apparently already underway through American “influence operations”.

January 14, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran’s Mass Protests /Patrick Henningsen & Lt Col Daniel Davis

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – January 12, 2026

January 13, 2026 Posted by | Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Only Way For America To ‘Help’ Iran Is To Lift the Crushing Sanctions

The Dissident | January 12, 2026

On Truth Social, Donald Trump recently promised to “help” protestors in Iran, saying, “Iran is looking at FREEDOM, perhaps like never before, The USA stands ready to help!!”

By “help”, Trump meant unleashing a new American/Israeli bombing campaign in the country to enact regime change. According to the New York Times, “President Trump has been briefed in recent days on new options for military strikes in Iran as he considers following through on his threat to attack the country for cracking down on protesters, according to multiple U.S. officials familiar with the matter.”

In reality, the only way Trump can “help” the people of Iran is by removing the sanctions on the country, which were placed on the country with the explicit goal of causing economic collapse and a mass uprising, leading to regime change in Iran.

In its early days, the Obama administration ramped up sanctions on Iran in a “maximum pressure” campaign.

As journalist Max Blumenthal uncovered, Richard Nephew, who coordinated the sanctions on Iran under the Biden administration, in his sadistic book, “The Art of Sanctions” boasted that because of the sanctions, “Iran’s economy went from GDP growth of 3 percent to a 6.6 percent contraction between 2011 and 2012 . Iranian unemployment and inflation remained in the double digits. In 2012, Iran’s currency depreciated threefold in a matter of weeks, resulting in the hemorrhaging of Iranian hard-currency reserves.”

Nephew boasted in the book that the intention was to destroy Iran’s economy, while running propaganda operations designed to trigger unrest against the government due to the economic situation, writing:

The United States took its surgical sanctions approach a step further in June 2013 with a carefully structured set of sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector, denying Iran the ability to import manufacturing assistance but not spare parts for existing autos or whole cars themselves. Iranian manufacturing jobs and export revenue were the targets of this sanction, undermining the Iranian government’s attempt to find non-oil export sectors and ways of employing 500,000 Iranians.

All the while, the United States expanded the ability of U.S. and foreign companies to sell Iranians technology used for personal communications, helping ensure that the Iranian public had the ability to learn more about the dire straits of their country’s economy and to communicate

Richard Nephew boasted that the sanctions were intended to cause “income inequality and inflation” in Iran in order to “drive up the pressure on the Iranian government from internal sources”, boasting:

With Iran’s population technically able to purchase such goods and imports still flowing in, but with the exchange rate depriving most people of the practical benefit of being able to purchase these goods, only the wealthy or those in positions of power could take advantage of Iran’s continued connected- ness. Hard currency streamed out of the country while luxuries streamed in, and stories began to emerge from Iran of intensified income inequality and inflation . This was a choice, a decision made on the basis of helping to drive up the the pressure on the Iranian government from internal sources.

He also boasts that the sanctions deprived Iranians’ ability to purchase medical equipment and “directly contributed to the deprivation of the Iranian rial”, writing:

In Iran, for instance, there were reports throughout 2012 and 2013 that medicine and medical devices were unavailable not because their trade was prohibited but rather because they cost too much for the average Iranian due to shortages and the depreciation of the Iranian currency. The United States and its partners, through sanctions, directly contributed to the depreciation of the Iranian rial and, consequently, played some part – even if unintentional- in the creation of this problem.

In 2015, Obama ended the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which loosened sanctions in exchange for Iran limiting its nuclear enrichment, much to Benjamin Netanyahu’s dismay, leading him to give a speech in front of the United States Congress in an attempt to stop the deal. [The US failed to actually implement their side of the deal. In the end the EU never resumed normal trade either.]

Benjamin Netanyahu got his wish in 2018, when Donald Trump, at the behest of his Zionist donors, such as Paul Singer and Sheldon Adelson, pulled out of the deal and reinstated the “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran.

Like Richard Nephew, Trump’s then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo boasted, “Things are much worse for the Iranian people [with the US sanctions], and we are convinced that will lead the Iranian people to rise up and change the behavior of the regime”.

Human Rights Watch documented at the time that the renewed sanctions on Iran were, “severely limiting Iranian companies and hospitals from purchasing essential medicines and medical equipment from outside Iran that residents depend upon for critical medical care” and “directly impacted families’ purchasing power, contributing to inflation rates of around 30 percent”.

This time, as Human Rights Watch documented, the sanctions were even harsher than the previous sanctions under the Obama administration, “including doing things like designating some Iranian financial institutions not previously designated and that were previously used to facilitate food, medicine and medical imports”.

Human Rights Watch also documented that, “The Trump administration’s September 20, 2019 decision to impose further sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank under its ‘counterterrorism authority’ severely restricts the last remaining Iranian financial institution able to engage in foreign exchange transactions involving humanitarian imports”.

Elliott Abrams, the Zionist architect of the Trump’s administration’s Iran sanctions, boasted to Israel Hayom that because of the Trump administration’s sanctions, “At the end of Trump’s term, Iran was facing bankruptcy” adding, “If Trump had received four more years, the regime would have faced a choice between economic collapse and mass uprising or halting the nuclear program.”

The Biden administration continued Trump’s sanctions on Iran at the behest of the Israel lobby, never renegotiating the Iran deal.

Since getting into office, Trump has ramped up the sanctions on Iran even further, signing an executive order in February that sanctioned any country that buys oil from Iran with the intention to “drive Iran’s export of oil to zero”. The White House statement in February bragged that the sanctions were intended to “restore maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and “impose maximum economic pressure” on Iran.

In June Al-Monitor reported, “The Trump administration announced … what it called its most extensive set of Iran-related sanctions since 2018, targeting a ‘vast shipping empire’ involved in transporting oil and petroleum products from Iran and Russia” which, “target more than 115 individuals, entities and vessels across 17 different jurisdictions, including the United Arab Emirates, India, Turkey, Singapore and Switzerland.”

Just as Richard Nephew, Mike Pompeo, and Elliott Abrams boasted would happen, the sanctions helped cause the economic collapse that sparked the current protests, which were soon exploited by the U.S. and Israel to enact their desired regime change campaign.

If, Trump really cared about helping Iranians, he would end his “maximum pressure” campaign on the country, but instead, he cares about launching a regime change war at the behest of Benjamin Netanyahu.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Pirates of the Caribbean

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 12, 2026

So many things are happening in such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep track of them all. Certainly, one of the most “entertaining” is the return of piracy, which the United States of America inaugurated at the beginning of 2026.

We are talking about a new and particularly controversial phase of their economic and strategic pressure policy: the direct seizure of oil tankers on the high seas, believed to be involved in the transport of crude oil on behalf of states subject to unilateral U.S. sanctions, in particular Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. This practice, which Washington presents as a legitimate enforcement activity against illegal trafficking, is raising profound questions about international maritime law and the balance between state sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and the use of force.

From the Caribbean to the icy North Seas, the most emblematic case is that of the oil tanker Mariner, seized a few days ago after a long chase in the North Atlantic by the U.S. Coast Guard, while the ship was being joined by Russian naval forces. According to U.S. authorities, the ship was part of the so-called shadow fleet, an informal network of oil tankers that operate through frequent changes of name, flag, and management company in order to evade sanctions regimes. This operation is accompanied by other significant seizures or interceptions, including the tankers Sophia, Skipper, and Centuries, stopped in various maritime areas on similar charges of sanctioned oil trafficking and fraudulent use of flags of convenience. In short, a cinematic-style raid. Donald “Sparrow” Trump has found a new hobby.

As for the Mariner, to be fair, it is a VLCC oil tanker built in 2002. Its gross tonnage is over 318,000 tons, making it one of the largest types of oil tankers used in the global crude oil trade. In terms of age and technical characteristics, it is an ordinary working ship, designed to operate for 25-30 years, provided it passes inspections. Since its construction, the ship has not had a stable “nationality.”

Over the course of more than twenty years, it has changed its name, flag, and owners several times, a practice typical of tankers operating in sanctioned and semi-sanctioned segments of the market. The ship was successively named Overseas Mulan, Seaways Mulan, Xiao Zhu Shan, Yannis, Neofit, Timimus, Bella 1, and finally Marinera. Each name change was accompanied by a change of jurisdiction or management company. The flags also changed regularly. The ship flew the flags of the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Palau, and Panama. According to international databases, there was a period when the ship flew the flag of Guyana, indicating an incorrect or unconfirmed registration. This episode was subsequently used as a formal pretext for intervention by the U.S. Coast Guard.

After the persecution began, the ship obtained temporary registration under the flag of the Russian Federation with Sochi as its port of registry, as recorded in official ship registers. The history of the ship’s ownership and management also indicates its commercial rather than state nature. Over the years, the ship has been managed by companies registered in Asia and offshore jurisdictions, including structures linked to Chinese and Singaporean operators. Between 2022 and 2023, the owner and manager of the ship was Neofit Shipping Ltd, then Louis Marine Shipholding ENT. Since the end of December 2025, the owner and commercial operator of the ship has been the Russian company Burevestmarin LLC. This is a private entity, not linked to state-owned oil companies and not part of any “state fleet.”

In recent years, the ship has been used in the classic sanctions evasion scheme linked to the Iran-Venezuela-China routes. A crucial turning point came in mid-December 2025, when the United States announced an effective maritime blockade of Venezuela. The tanker, then called Bella 1, had left the Iranian port in November and was approaching the Venezuelan coast just as these measures were introduced. The attempt to enter the port was interrupted by the U.S., after which the ship set course for the Atlantic Ocean. The composition of the crew also clearly shows the commercial nature of the ship. Most of the sailors on board are Ukrainian citizens, while there were also Georgian citizens and only two Russians on board. The Mariner proved to be a convenient demonstration target for the U.S. as part of its new strategy of forcibly disrupting Venezuelan oil routes.

The owner’s attempt to hide under the Russian flag was a logical commercial move, but it did not change the intentions of the U.S. Russia was formally involved in the situation as the flag state and because of the presence of Russian citizens in the crew. The ship was not of strategic value to Russia and was not part of its oil logistics. Any escalation around a private tanker, which had been operating for decades on gray routes, would have made no rational sense.

From Washington’s point of view, the legitimacy of such actions rests on two main pillars. The first is the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions: seized tankers are considered assets directly involved in violations of Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations and are therefore subject to confiscation. The second pillar is the doctrine of the stateless vessel, according to which a ship that cannot credibly prove its nationality—due to irregular registrations, false flags, or contradictory documentation—loses the legal protection guaranteed by the flag state and can be stopped by any other state on the high seas.

Bye-bye Law of the Sea

It is precisely this second point that is the focus of much of the legal debate. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes that, on the high seas, a ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Exceptions to this principle are limited and strict: piracy, slave trade, unauthorized radio transmissions, absence of nationality, or express authorization from the UN Security Council. The extension of these exceptions to the application of unilateral sanctions, not approved by the United Nations, is a highly contested interpretation.

Russia and China have reacted harshly to the seizures, calling them a blatant violation of international law and, in some cases, an act comparable to state piracy. Moscow argues that the seized tankers were flying regular flags and that the use of force against commercial vessels in peacetime, outside a UN mandate, constitutes a breach of the maritime legal order. Beijing, for its part, has emphasized the illegitimate nature of unilateral sanctions and the risk that such practices create dangerous precedents, normalizing the armed interdiction of commercial shipping.

The implications of this new phase are significant. On the legal front, there is growing tension between a law of the sea based on the neutrality of routes and freedom of navigation, and a power practice that tends to transform economic sanctions into instruments of military coercion. On the geopolitical front, there is a risk of maritime escalation, with possible countermeasures by the affected states and a progressive militarization of global energy routes.

On the other hand, all this is consistent with what the U.S. administration is doing: creating rapid chaos that distracts the world, while surgically targeting certain elements within the American system and, on the other hand, applying the Donroe Doctrine and establishing control over the Western Hemisphere.

The seizure of oil tankers is not just an isolated episode of conflict between states, but a sign of a deeper transformation of the international order. The U.S. has set out with conviction and has no intention of stopping. If this practice were to become established, international maritime law would risk being very quickly stripped of its fundamental principles, leaving room for a logic of force in which naval supremacy replaces shared legality. The issue, therefore, is not only about the seized ships, but the entire future of global maritime governance.

The U.S. has said it: Venezuela is American property and from now on will be its new backyard. Greenland will be next.

Piracy elevated to the rank of military strategy and international relations.

And remember: in just 11 months of government, since the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump has bombed seven sovereign countries: Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela. He has kidnapped one head of state (Maduro) and threatened to kill three others: Khamenei, Petro, and Rodriguez. He has threatened to invade five countries: Iran, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Greenland (i.e., Denmark). He has done everything in his power to prevent the international community from passing resolutions against Israel and its prime minister Netanyahu during and after the massacres in Gaza.

Anyone with a modicum of common sense, who is not misled by political preconceptions, can draw the most basic conclusions from these actions.

January 12, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, War Crimes | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Prof. Marandi on Iran & Venezuela: What’s Next?

TMJ News Network | January 5, 2026

Professor Mohammad Marandi joins TMJ News to break down the latest developments in Iran and Venezuela, unpacking how economic protests, sanctions, and media narratives are being weaponized once again to push long-standing U.S.-Israeli regime change agendas.

January 6, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Leave a comment

Iran’s collapsing currency exposes the profiteers behind the crisis

By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | January 5, 2026

In the final days of 2025, as the rial plunged to unprecedented lows, Tehran’s bustling Jomhuri (Republic) Avenue transformed into a corridor of defiance.

‘Bazaaris’ (traditional merchant class with deep political and economic influence) and cellphone shopkeepers, cornered by a collapsing currency and punishing tariffs, shuttered their stores and poured into the streets.

Their outrage ignited a fire that quickly spread to the Grand Bazaar, long considered Iran’s economic barometer. Unlike the 2022 protests over social freedoms or the 2009 unrest sparked by electoral disputes, this wave of demonstrations is driven squarely by economic collapse and long-festering mismanagement.

What began as a merchants’ revolt against an unworkable trade environment soon revealed the deeper rot of decades-long economic mismanagement, institutional corruption, and a sanctions-choked system that punishes the people to sustain itself.

Sanctions, sabotage, and a vanishing economy

Iran, a nation of over 86 million, registered a meager 0.3 percent economic growth in summer 2025, while inflation soared past 42 percent by December. Labor force participation remains abysmally low, trailing nearly 20 points behind the global average. These dire metrics have steadily worsened under the weight of relentless US sanctions, first re-imposed by President Donald Trump in 2018 during his first term, and have intensified through two presidential terms.

The rial’s spectacular collapse – breaking the 1,445,000 mark against the US dollar – did not occur in a vacuum. It marked a 47.8 percent surge in just six months.

The higher the rate was going up, the angrier were businesses whose sales are directly dependent on the dollar-rial change rate. The first spark of protests was ignited by the shopkeepers at two cellphone shopping malls in downtown Tehran. They started a strike, saying they were unable to do business because they were struggling with a new cellphone registry tariff the government had imposed on devices priced at $600 and more.

The next day, shopkeepers did not just close their shops but took to the famous Republic Avenue, protesting against the situation. The dollar dealers at Ferdowsi Avenue joined the protests too, and in the Grand Bazaar, gold and silversmiths brought their shutters down in fear of chaos.

A shopkeeper at Lalezar Street tells The Cradle that, “we were forced to close our shops as some protesters attacked us verbally and threatened to ransack our shops by hurling stones at our windows.”

In addition to sanctioning traditional routes such as banks, firms and individuals, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), has been targeting digital currency addresses it accuses of being used by a financial network to transfer Iran’s oil and non-oil money.

According to Gholma-Reza Taj Gardoun, chairman of the parliamentary budget committee, “the Iranian government only received 13 out of $21 billion oil revenues in the last eight months”. He added that “the remaining $8 billion is the cause of the current turmoil, the shortage of dollar bills in the market and the rising exchange rate.”

A rigged system of profiteers

Taj Gardoun is not alone in exposing how oil and non-oil export revenues have failed to return to Iran. At the heart of the crisis lies a parasitic class of semi-governmental enterprises and politically-connected traders who profit from Iran’s fiscal dysfunction.

Former finance minister and current lawmaker Hussein Samsami estimates that “117 out of $335 billion non-oil export revenues have not returned to the country, since the US re-imposed sanctions in 2018.” Much of this capital, he says, was siphoned off by ‘khosulati’ entities – quasi-governmental firms benefiting from state ownership yet operating without transparency or oversight.

Equally troubling is the shadowy role of “trustees” – a secretive network tasked with circumventing sanctions to sell Iranian oil.

Former Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Governor Valiollah Seif acknowledged “they are trusted people, Iranians and non-Iranians, who transfer money (for Iran),” adding “money transfer is a very risky process and the payment of these so-called trustees and the money changers working with them is high.” Seif revealed “sometimes a trustee siphons off the funds.”

Apart from the trustees, the quasi-governmental entities are also blamed for refusing to give back the non-oil export money to the central bank and sell it at rates higher than the regular CBI-approved rate at the official market.

These companies are owned by various funds affiliated with the Iranian government. The petroleum and the social welfare ministries gained a majority of the shares in these funds through the privatization process in different governments.

The third group that has not returned the export money is individuals or firms with special business permits. A deputy CBI governor reports that “Individuals who own or rented 900 special licenses must return some $16 billion to the central bank, (but they didn’t).”

The result is a liquidity trap in which foreign exchange vanishes from official markets, feeding a vicious cycle of inflation and speculation.

State paralysis and political deflection

For months, the government of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared paralyzed, watching as the currency spiralled and public rage mounted. While some suggest the state deliberately allowed the rial to slide to ease its budget deficits, others cite institutional chaos and a lack of cohesive economic policy.

They refer to a confession made by former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani in 2020, “The foreign currency belongs to the government, the price is decided by the government and we can bring it down, if we decide it.”

In reaction to the voices of dissatisfaction, Pezeshkian tasked his interior minister with meeting the representatives of the protesters and listening to their grievances.

He sat with merchants and replaced CBI governor Mohammad-Reza Farzin with former finance minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. Nevertheless, the latter, who was impeached 10 months ago over his mismanagement of the foreign exchange market, said “he has no responsibility regarding the currency market and his task is to control imbalanced banks and reduce inflation.”

Austerity in a powder keg

In the streets, the demonstrations have morphed into sporadic riots, mostly in western provinces, marked by attacks on police stations and arson against state buildings. Casualties have been reported, including among security forces, as the protests shift from organized dissent to expressions of raw frustration.

Demonstrations in Tehran that were not large in essence have subsided, but morphed into sporadic riots. Smaller cities or towns in western Iran are now the scene of riots, with the number of rioters limited to dozens, not even hundreds.

Arson attacks against government buildings or rioters storming police stations to capture their armory have been reported. About a dozen, including police forces, have been killed countrywide, and arrests have been made.

Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 3 January, admitted that the ‘bazaaris’ have legitimate complaints regarding economic instability. Still, he made it clear that the Islamic Republic “will not yield to the enemy” and will deal seriously with violent protesters; “rioters must be put in their place.”

The Iranian leader’s comments were a response to Trump after he threw his weight behind the protesters, threatening the Islamic Republic with military intervention “if protesters are killed.” The Reformist Front joined in rejecting foreign threats, warning that any interference in the protests would escalate violence and distort the people’s demands.

In a last-ditch bid to regain economic control, an Iranian official from the Budget and Planning Organization says “the Trustees will be asked to return billions of dollars in their overseas accounts to the country.” A lawmaker cautions, “the parliament will question the oil minister over the issue of the Trustees.”

Iran’s minister of economy said that positive results have been achieved from negotiations with several countries, including the release of part of Iran’s financial resources and the opening of funding channels for importing essential goods, along with gradual efforts to unify the exchange rate into a single rate.

Simultaneously, Pezeshkian is pushing ahead with plans to phase out subsidies for essential imports – a move he dubs an “economic surgery” that will be offset by targeted vouchers for lower-income citizens. But austerity in the midst of currency collapse, inflation, and a credibility crisis is a combustible formula.

Iranian officials are closely tracking the situation in Venezuela, where the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and rising US aggression offer chilling parallels. For now, Tehran’s street protests remain contained. But if the economic pain persists and reforms deepen inequality, the next wave may not be as easily quelled.

January 5, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Protests in Iran: Analysis of current demonstrations and their implications for the Islamic Republic

Few analysts in the West are truly aware of the situation in Iran

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 3, 2026

Western understanding of Iran’s internal situation remains profoundly mistaken. Recurring narratives of an imminent collapse ignore the country’s political and social complexity and exaggerate the impact of current demonstrations. It is essential to recognize that, although there are significant tensions, Iran is not currently in a crisis that threatens the continuity of the Islamic Republic, nor is it in a state of absolute stability.

The current demonstrations originate from patriotic sectors of society, motivated by dissatisfaction with the moderate and semi-liberal government of Masoud Pezeshkian. Contrary to widespread claims, most of these protests do not challenge the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. The discontent is focused on government economic policies, considered ineffective by broad segments of the population, leading to a perception of management crisis, but not a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Rising prices, water shortages, and economic instability drive popular demands – not challenges to the revolutionary principles themselves.

It is also important to note that, as often occurs in contexts of attempted governmental change, external or internal actors with different interests infiltrate protests, promoting episodes of violence and vandalism. The escalation of clashes in certain areas, particularly in the outskirts and western regions of the country, should not be interpreted as a sign of collapse. Historically, Iran maintains stronger control and stability in major cities and in the capital, Tehran, where protests remain largely peaceful. This pattern demonstrates the institutional capacity of the Islamic Republic to manage crises, even amid significant mobilizations.

Historical context also provides important point of reference for analysis. Iran has previously faced protests of considerable magnitude, such as those following the death of Masha Amina in 2022, when demonstrations led to armed confrontations with security forces. Compared to the events of 2022, today’s social movement is moderate in both intensity and scope, indicating that the security and control system of the Islamic Republic remains functional and effective.

Another key point is the coexistence of different protest currents within the country. While there are mobilizations critical of the government, there are also demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic (albeit critical of Pezeshkian’s administration). This diversity shows that dissatisfaction is not unanimous toward the Islamic Republic as a whole, but is concentrated on specific management failures and economic policies. This reality significantly reduces the likelihood of a change in the Islamic Republic, although there is some probability of a government collapse.

For external analysts, it is tempting to interpret the protests as a harbinger of total destabilization. A closer analysis suggests that the most plausible scenario is the erosion of Pezeshkian’s moderate government, followed by a possible rise of leadership more aligned with the original revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic. In this context, an internal power adjustment is far more likely than the dissolution of the country’s institutions.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the Islamic Republic is not immune to risks. Sudden internal or external developments could significantly alter the current balance. Yet, considering Iran’s historical experience with crises, protests, and foreign intervention attempts, contemporary demonstrations do not provide sufficient grounds to predict a national collapse. The Republic remains structured and capable of maintaining its political and social core.

In summary, Western perceptions that Iran is on the brink of collapse reflect a simplistic and misinformed interpretation of events. The current demonstrations should be understood as expressions of sectoral discontent and governance challenges, not as existential threats to the Islamic Republic. The balance of internal forces, combined with historical experience in managing crises, ensures that the Islamic Republic continues to function, with the capacity to adjust to social pressures without compromising its political continuity.

January 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Iran says no basis for inspection of bombed nuclear sites

Press TV – December 24, 2025

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) says that political and psychological pressure over inspection of damaged nuclear facilities will have no effect, calling for clear procedures to be established for such occasions.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Mohammad Eslami said there is currently no codified instruction for inspecting nuclear facilities that have been damaged by military attacks.

“Until this issue is clarified, political and psychological pressure and irrelevant follow-ups aimed at re-inspecting bombed facilities and completing the enemy’s operations are unacceptable and will not be responded to,” he said.

Back in June, during the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, the US bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, in a clear violation of international law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Eslami noted that Article 68 of the Safeguards Agreement refers only to natural accidents and damage, not military attacks or war.

“If the IAEA considers military attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities acceptable, it must explicitly approve and declare that,” he said. “But if such attacks are illegal, they must be condemned, and the post-war procedures must be clearly defined.”

He added that until such conditions are formally defined by the agency, Iran will not accept demands for renewed inspections of damaged sites.

On Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Eslami said no country in history has cooperated with the agency to the extent Iran has.

“The most extensive and intensive inspections ever conducted have been imposed on Iran’s nuclear industry, and there is not a single report indicating non-compliance or diversion from safeguards,” he said.

He characterized current pressure as politically motivated and aimed at harming and weakening the Iranian people, stressing that Iran’s nuclear activities remain entirely peaceful.

Referring to the UN Security Council meeting held on Tuesday, Eslami said the discussions no longer merely warranted regret but instead exposed the reality of long-standing US pressure on Iran’s nuclear industry.

He noted that Washington has openly stated in its national security strategy that it does not pursue its interests through international organizations and, instead, relies on “the law of the jungle and the use of force.”

Eslami described the report, statements, and references made during the Security Council session as “completely unprofessional and non-legal.”

He emphasized that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 has expired, and even if it were to be cited, its procedural requirements were not followed.

Claims that Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the JCPOA justifies the reinstatement of previous UN sanctions, he said, are “entirely rejected and unacceptable.”

He added that China and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, have explicitly rejected these claims, stating that the push by the three European countries and the United States—backed by Israeli lobbying—has no legal standing and is not enforceable.

Elsewhere in his remarks, Eslami announced the launch of a nationwide multimedia festival titled “Nuclear Technology for Life,” organized jointly with Iran’s national broadcaster.

He said the initiative aims to counter misinformation and distorted narratives about Iran’s nuclear program by presenting multi-layered accounts through public and media participation.

December 24, 2025 Posted by | War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Medicinal plants hold key to Iran’s drought-resistant revenue

Press TV – December 16, 2025

Iran’s agriculture faces water scarcity, restricted market access, and declining returns from traditional crops, pushing farmers and policymakers toward low-water, high-value, and sanction-resilient export products.

Medicinal plants are among the few agricultural sectors meeting all three criteria, increasingly seen over the past decade as an expandable income source aligned with environmental limits and export needs.

Iran has one of the richest plant ecosystems in the world. More than 8,000 plant species have been identified across the country, of which around 2,300 have medicinal, aromatic, cosmetic, or industrial uses.

About 1,700 of these species are endemic, meaning they grow naturally only in Iran. This biodiversity is supported by wide climatic variation, from arid plains to high mountain ranges, with elevations from 900 to more than 4,000 meters above sea level.

These conditions allow different plants to grow with little or no irrigation. The scale and diversity of this natural resource provide Iran with a broad production base that few countries can replicate, enabling year-round cultivation and harvesting across different regions.

Most medicinal plants cultivated or harvested in Iran are naturally adapted to dry and semi-dry environments. Many grow under rain-fed conditions or require less than 3,000 cubic meters of water per hectare.

By comparison, crops such as wheat, rice, and corn often need between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic meters per hectare. As groundwater reserves shrink and rainfall becomes more erratic, this difference has direct economic value.

Lower water use reduces production costs while preserving agricultural land for sustained use over time. This makes medicinal plants particularly suitable for long-term planning in regions facing declining water availability.

According to official figures, Iran receives about 400 billion cubic meters of rainfall annually, but more than half is lost to evaporation. Crops that can grow using direct rainfall reduce pressure on dams, rivers, and aquifers.

Medicinal plants make effective use of this rainfall because they are already rooted in the soil when seasonal precipitation occurs, allowing moisture to be absorbed rather than lost. This characteristic strengthens their role in maintaining agricultural output without increasing water extraction.

Medicinal plants are produced both on farmland and in rangelands. In many provinces, farmers grow them under permits on national lands, relying on rainfall rather than irrigation. Because these plants are mostly perennial and slow-growing, high irrigation costs are not economically justified.

Harvesting, drying, and basic processing often take place close to production sites, creating seasonal employment in rural areas. Each hectare of medicinal plants generates between two and three direct jobs, according to agricultural authorities.

In addition to farming, jobs are created in collection, sorting, drying, distillation, and packaging, forming local value chains that support village-level incomes.

Export revenue from medicinal plants currently stands at about $600 million a year, accounting for roughly 9 to 10 percent of Iran’s total agricultural exports. Projections suggest exports could reach $700 million if production and processing improve.

Saffron dominates the sector. Iran produces more than 90 percent of the world’s saffron and accounts for around 40 percent of the total export value of medicinal plants.

Other major exports include rose products from damask rose, such as rose water and extracts, liquorice extract, mint, thyme, and natural gums like asafoetida locally called anguzeh.

These products are sold not only as raw materials but also as inputs for pharmaceutical, food, and cosmetic industries.

Demand for medicinal plants continues to grow in international markets, including Central Asia, Eurasia, and China. These markets are accessible through regional trade routes and do not always require direct financial links with Western banking systems.

Products such as saffron, rose water, and herbal extracts have relatively high value-to-weight ratios, which lowers transport costs and makes them more suitable for indirect export channels. Their long shelf life further supports trade across longer distances and reduces losses during storage and transport.

Barijeh, scientifically known as ferula gummosa, is a plant native to Iran.

The internal economics of medicinal plant cultivation are also favorable. In several provinces, income from medicinal plants is many times higher than from grains.

For example, harvesting wild or cultivated plants such as musir can generate net income far above that of wheat or barley on the same land.

This income difference has encouraged farmers to shift land away from water-intensive crops, especially in drought-affected regions. Higher returns per hectare allow smaller landholdings to remain economically viable, supporting family-based farming systems.

Four provinces illustrate this potential clearly. Khorasan remains the center of saffron production. Kashan and surrounding areas specialize in rose cultivation and distillation.

Yazd produces lemon verbena, while Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province has emerged as a major center for wild and cultivated medicinal plants.

This province is largely mountainous, with 87 percent of its area classified as highland. More than 1,350 plant species have been identified there, including 270 with medicinal or industrial uses and 27 species found nowhere else in the world. Cool nights, diverse soils, and varied elevations contribute to high-quality yields and strong concentrations of active ingredients.

In Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, medicinal plants are grown on about 3,500 hectares, split between national rangelands and agricultural land. Since the early 2010s, the cultivated area has expanded sharply, supported by a national strategy to promote medicinal plants.

From a fiscal perspective, medicinal plants offer a rare combination for Iran under sanctions. They reduce water use, generate foreign currency, and support employment without heavy reliance on imported inputs.

Unlike major industrial exports, they do not require large-scale capital equipment or advanced foreign technology. Their production is decentralized, which spreads income across rural and underdeveloped regions. This decentralization strengthens local economies and reduces dependence on a limited number of export hubs.

Iran already holds dominant positions in several global markets, particularly saffron. Medicinal plants do not eliminate the economic impact of sanctions, but they provide a measurable source of revenue that fits Iran’s environmental constraints.

December 19, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Environmentalism | , , | Leave a comment

Washington’s ‘Waiver On, Waiver Off’ Game at Chabahar

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – December 9, 2025

In recent months, Washington has swung from revoking to restoring India’s sanctions waiver for operating Iran’s Chabahar port. The ‘waiver on, waiver off’ routine, however, comes with a clear strategic intent.

The move is not just leverage over New Delhi as trade talks loom; it’s also a signal to Central Asian states that their economic futures — including access to Chabahar — depend on aligning their foreign policies with US preferences.

In September 2025, the United States pulled the rug out from under one of India’s most carefully nurtured strategic ventures: the Chabahar Port in Iran. Long viewed by New Delhi as a critical gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Chabahar suddenly became a high-stakes chess piece in Washington’s policy game. On September 16, the US Department of State announced it would revoke the special exemption granted in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), with the revocation taking effect September 29. Overnight, Indian companies, shippers, insurers, and banks involved in the port’s operations were cast into uncertainty: their assets could be frozen, their access to the US financial system curtailed, and their commercial contracts imperilled.

This move did not occur in isolation. At the same time, New Delhi was itself involved in a high-stakes game with the US over bilateral trade. Specifically, it is resisting US pressure to halt oil imports from Russia. By targeting Chabahar, Washington signaled that it was willing to leverage unrelated strategic projects to enforce compliance elsewhere, effectively turning Indian economic and geopolitical interests into bargaining chips. Yet the situation shifted quickly: reports emerged on October 28 that Indian firms had halted Russian oil imports, and the very next day, the US issued a fresh six-month waiver, allowing Chabahar operations to continue without immediate penalty.

The rapid “waiver on, waiver off” cycle exposes the transactional and unpredictable logic of US sanction policy. A project that represents over $120 million in Indian investment, long-term regional connectivity, and painstaking diplomacy is reduced to a geopolitical pawn, its fate dictated less by commercial or developmental imperatives and more by Washington’s strategic calculus. This particular calculus, however, is not meant for India only. The politics of granting and restricting waivers is also tied very closely to Washington’s relationship with Central Asia.

The Central Asian gamble

Chabahar port is important not only for India but also for the landlocked states of Central Asia, offering a rare direct link to the Indian Ocean and a potential route to India that bypasses Pakistan. Several Central Asian states have expressed interest in using Chabahar Port for this purpose. Tajikistan has emerged as the most active player, signing a formal cooperation agreement with Iran in early 2025 and committing to developing a logistics hub with terminals and storage facilities. Uzbekistan has held discussions about utilising the port for trade and storage. While a lot of this is still far from being fully operational, there is little denying that a major roadblock has been the US sanctions.

In the same vein, the waiver also signals to Afghanistan, where India has recently become very active. The Taliban regime is currently involved in a border standoff with Pakistan. Kabul has suspended its trade with Pakistan, and the reopening of this route remains highly uncertain. At the same time, Washington has been pressuring the Taliban to come to terms with handing over the Bagram airbase to the US military for its potential operations against China. In this context, if Afghanistan wants to continue—and even expand—its trade with Central Asia and other countries beyond the region, i.e., with India itself, as an alternative to Pakistan, its best route goes through the Chabahar Port.

Beyond this, the US decision to grant the waiver—and unless it restricts it again in the future—also puts it in a position where it can influence several other regional trade and connectivity projects, including the Trans‑Caspian and broader International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) projects. By granting or revoking waivers, the US is signalling that it can create opportunities and or introduce uncertainty for companies and governments contemplating investment or trade through corridors that touch Iran.

For example, Central Asian states considering cargo flows via Chabahar—or via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and beyond—must now weigh the risk that US sanctions could suddenly be applied, making insurance, financing, or banking services problematic and/or unavailable. Even if the Trans‑Caspian route itself does not pass through Iran, the interconnected nature of regional logistics networks means that a disruption at Chabahar could ripple across supply chains, raising costs or forcing alternative routing through Russia, Turkey, or China.

In essence, the waiver policy acts as a geopolitical lever. Its application is meant to put pressure on countries and companies so that they align their foreign and trade policies with US preferences, discouraging full exploitation of alternatives like the Trans‑Caspian corridor that could reduce American influence. The US has, for some time, been trying to expand its geopolitical footprint in Central Asia. Its ability to strangulate or allow Chabahar helps it signal its continued relevance. On the whole, the uncertainty imposed by such sanctions creates a risk premium, slows governmental and private investment, and subtly nudges regional actors toward pathways that the US finds strategically acceptable, even if they are less efficient or commercially less viable.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

December 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

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