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By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – August 13, 2026
The Caspian Sea — for thirty years a backwater of great-power politics — has quietly become a battlespace, and most of the world is still treating it as a footnote.
In late July, Iranian officials confirmed that a US strike had damaged the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Seyyed al-Shuhada naval facility in Zibakenar, in Iran’s Caspian province of Gilan — the first time in the current war that Washington has reached into Iran’s Caspian coastline. Days earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Kyiv’s drones had struck several vessels in the Caspian more than 1,000 kilometers from Ukrainian-held territory, including a ship reportedly ferrying military cargo from Iran toward Russia. Iran, however, said one of the vessels hit was carrying iron ore from Astrakhan to the Iranian port of Anzali and summoned Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in protest.
Neither strike, on its own, would rewrite anyone’s map. Together, they are a signal. For the first time, the US and US-backed Ukraine have demonstrated that they have the will and the reach to hit targets on a sea that geography, more than strategy, had long kept insulated from direct confrontation. The Caspian’s basin states — Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan — built an entire diplomatic architecture, including a 2018 legal convention on the sea’s status, around the premise that outside militaries would stay out. That premise no longer holds.
What is emerging is not a contest for territory in the traditional sense. It is a contest over connectivity: over the ports, rail lines, pipelines, and shipping lanes that allow Russia, Iran, and, at one remove, China to function as an integrated economic and strategic space rather than three isolated, sanctioned, or otherwise constrained powers. Call it America’s New Eurasian Containment: a strategy that treats infrastructure, not territory, as the terrain worth contesting.

Severing the Connective Tissue
The clearest evidence of this shift sits not on the Caspian’s water but on its shores, in two projects Washington has spent the past year reshaping.
The first is the International North-South Transport Corridor, a roughly 7,200-kilometer multimodal freight route agreed upon by Russia, Iran, and India in 2000 that links the Indian Ocean, through Iran, across the Caspian, to Russian rail networks and on to Europe. Long stalled by under-investment, the corridor has become a priority for Moscow since 2022, precisely because it offers a way around Western sanctions. Its central artery is the Caspian crossing between the Iranian port of Bandar-e Anzali and the Russian port of Astrakhan. More importantly, it is the same stretch of water where Ukrainian drones struck in July and where Israeli forces had already hit Iranian naval and port assets at Anzali back in March, according to regional shipping trackers. A degraded, contested Caspian corridor is a direct blow to the one overland route that lets Moscow and Tehran trade around US and European sanctions. These attacks are, therefore, not about the US war on Iran; they are about reshaping the very geography of trade passing through the Eurasian landscape.
The second is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP — the transit corridor Washington brokered in August 2025 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, granting a US-led consortium a 99-year lease to build and manage rail, energy, and fiber-optic links through Armenia’s Syunik province. The deal ended a decades-old territorial dispute, but its geopolitical function is narrower and sharper. It places Iran’s only land border with Armenia under American-supervised transit control, cutting off Tehran’s most direct overland access into the South Caucasus and, by extension, into a region Russia has treated as its own backyard since the Soviet collapse. Whatever the deal’s stated humanitarian purpose, it functions as a wedge driven into Eurasian connective tissue.
Neither project was designed with the other in mind. But together with the Caspian strikes, they describe a single logic: deny Russia and Iran the infrastructure that lets their January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — a 20-year treaty covering defense, energy, finance, and counterterrorism cooperation — translate into real economic integration rather than a document signed in Moscow. China, meanwhile, watches from the margins. Beijing has no naval presence on the Caspian and is not a party to any of these strikes or corridors, but its own westward trade ambitions run through the same chokepoints, i.e., the Middle Corridor via the South Caucasus, and Iranian ports as a Belt and Road terminus. A Washington-controlled TRIPP and a contested Caspian complicate China’s overland options as a side effect, even if Beijing was never the intended target.
A Frontier Without a Front Line
The danger in this strategy is precisely that it has no clean edges. Containment during the Cold War had defined lines — the Fulda Gap, the Elbe, the 38th parallel — and a doctrine that most parties understood. Infrastructure containment has none of that. A drone strike on a cargo ship, an airstrike on a naval depot, and a 99-year land lease branded with a president’s name: each is individually deniable, incremental, and justifiable in its own narrow terms, even as the cumulative effect reshapes the strategic map of an entire region. That ambiguity is a feature for Washington, which can advance the strategy without ever declaring it. But it is also a source of volatility because affected countries are left to infer intent from actions rather than respond to a stated policy. And, inferences, in a region this armed and this aggrieved, tend toward worst-case assumptions.
The more durable question is what happens once the corridors themselves become targets, not just prizes. Pipelines, rail lines, and undersea cables may now be legitimate objects of great-power coercion. If so, the Caspian will not be the last “peripheral” space pulled into contested geography. The Arctic shipping lanes, the Malacca chokepoint, and the fibre-optic seabed of the Indian Ocean are all candidates for the same treatment. In this environment, the states that thrive will not be the ones with the largest militaries. They will be the ones that make their infrastructure redundant, diversified, and defensible: multiple routes, multiple partners, no single artery whose loss is fatal. Iran and Russia have bet heavily on a small number of chokepoints. Their partnership may keep deepening going forward. But the deeper it goes, the more attacks it will face and endure.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 12, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 12, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 11, 2026
By Drago Bosnic | August 12, 2026
NATO member Turkey plans to transfer a massive arsenal of US-made long-range strike systems and artillery munitions to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. This includes at least 70 M39 ATACMS TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles), 12 M270 MLRSs (multiple launch rocket systems), 2,524 M26 227 mm rockets (compatible with both the M270 MLRS and the M142 HIMARS) and 47,000 M509A1 203 mm cluster-munition artillery rounds.
This will be by far the largest single transfer of NATO-sourced weapons and munitions to the Kiev regime outside the United States. It comes at a critical moment for the political West, as the Neo-Nazi junta’s ATACMS stockpiles are virtually gone after years of failures against the Russian military, both in terms of losses caused by Moscow’s world-class long-range precision strike capabilities and its no less stellar SAM/ABM (surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile) systems.
With the US embroiled in its disastrous aggression against Iran, the Pentagon is unable to restock its own arsenal, let alone spare some of its missiles for the Kiev regime. Turkey’s decision to deliver these weapons and munitions comes at a critical moment for the political West, demonstrating its loyalty to NATO and its aggression against the world. Namely, arming the Neo-Nazi junta with so many weapons is a clear message to both Russia and Iran, particularly now that the latter has also been targeted by NATO’s favorite puppet regime. As previously mentioned, it also comes amid US aggression against Iran, demonstrating strategic coordination between Ankara and Washington DC. Turkish motives are certainly multifaceted. Apart from showing loyalty, it’s also gaining massive profits from (re)selling its old stockpile of US-made weapons and earning “points” for a potential return to the troubled F-35 program.
The latter is essentially an economic and financial boost to the troubled Turkish economy, which has suffered due to years of Western pressure and low-level sanctions in the decade since the failed NATO coup against Erdogan. Despite all this and Moscow’s critical role in thwarting the plot, Ankara seems to be distancing itself from the multipolar world and seeking deeper (re)integration into NATO. And while it doesn’t support the political West’s economic siege of Russia, primarily because of its own business interests, Turkey has once again emerged as one of the leading Russian adversaries within NATO, particularly in terms of weapons and munitions transfers. Not to mention its role in supporting all sorts of Islamic radicals and terrorists all across the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeastern Europe, including those who overthrew the last legitimate Syrian government.
Obviously, this was done in coordination with the political West and certain Persian Gulf monarchies, all of which were after President Bashar al-Assad for decades. Turkey’s role in destabilizing the South Caucasus and Central Asia should also be noted, particularly as it directly undermines Russian, Iranian and Chinese national security interests. This is a major challenge for the multipolar world, as it undermines stability in regions critical to BRICS and SCO. It leaves no other logical conclusion except that Turkey is deliberately coordinating its extremely aggressive foreign policy with that of the US and EU/NATO. This includes the involvement of Turkish intelligence in various insurgencies and coup attempts in Central Asia, most notably the failed color revolution attempt in Kazakhstan in early January 2022, which was prevented by joint Russian and Kazakh forces.
Ankara has also been one of the Neo-Nazi junta’s leading arms suppliers and has also played a major role in tricking Russia into fake diplomacy, such as the false promise it wouldn’t release members of the openly Nazi “Azov” battalion. All this was designed as a ruse to buy time for the political West and its favorite puppet regime. As for the latest weapons deal, perhaps the most dangerous aspect is the transfer of cluster munitions, which remain a major hazard for civilians long after fighting has ended. With the American arsenal depleted, Turkey remains one of the few major suppliers of these munitions. Unfortunately, its concern for civilian deaths is virtually non-existent, as it has a long history of using highly controversial weapons that are particularly dangerous for civilians, including white phosphorus that was regularly used by NATO-backed terrorists in Syria.
However, apart from NATO’s terrorist tendencies (hardly surprising considering its origins), can Turkish weapons, particularly the ATACMS, really change anything on the battlefield? While 70 missiles are certainly nothing to be ignored, it should be noted this is only a fraction of what the US already delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta. Namely, it supplied the HIMARS with thousands of M30/M31 GPS-guided rockets (approximately 70 km range) and at least 500 MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 165-300 km, depending on the variant). The Russian military’s unrivaled electronic warfare (EW) and SAM/ABM systems were instrumental in countering these weapons. Of the 500 missiles sent, at least 450 ATACMS are “missing”, which is around 25% of the entire US military’s stockpile. So far, there have been around 20 (if not even fewer) confirmed ATACMS hits on Russian positions.
If 450 were delivered to the Kiev regime and are now “unaccounted for”, is it really that difficult to calculate their actual battlefield effectiveness against the Russian military? As previously mentioned, the Neo-Nazi junta got at least 500 ATACMS, which is approximately 25% of the US Army stocks and 15% of the entire production run since 1991.
Of these, only 50 remained in the Kiev regime’s service by late 2024, meaning that the vast majority got shot down or destroyed while in storage. Even if we go out on a limb and say there have been 20 successful strikes on Russian positions, this would mean that the actual combat effectiveness of the ATACMS is 4.44%, although military reports suggest it’s even lower. In other words, these arms transfers only serve to prolong the fighting and can in no way offer any real battlefield advantages to the Neo-Nazi junta.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
RT | August 12, 2026
Romanian officials have presented pieces of foam plastic as supposed evidence that drones recently shot down over the country were Russian, Moscow’s embassy in Bucharest has said.
Speaking to the Izvestia newspaper on Wednesday, the mission responded to Romania’s accusations that Russian UAVs have on numerous occasions strayed onto its territory during attacks on Ukrainian military-related sites.
During a meeting at Romania’s Foreign Ministry on the matter, Russian diplomats were shown “pieces of foam plastic” and were asked to regard them as evidence of the drones’ supposed Russian origin. “Naturally, we were provided with no facts linking these drones to our country,” the embassy said.
The mission suggested that the incidents amounted to a “prearranged performance” involving shooting at training targets, intended to justify Romania’s military buildup and higher defense spending. “The local political establishment has long pursued this goal and is actively implementing it in practice,” the embassy said, adding that Bucharest is purchasing expensive Western-made weapons with taxpayers’ money, justifying it by the alleged “threat from the East.”
Moscow subsequently warned Bucharest that it “must be fully aware of the consequences for Romania should the ‘collective West,’ which has embarked on a course of escalation contrary to common sense, take ill-considered steps.”
The dispute comes after the Romanian Foreign Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador Vladimir Lipayev in late July when Romanian F-16s shot down three drones that entered national airspace on three consecutive days. Officials in Bucharest blamed Russia, while Moscow said no evidence or technical flight data was provided to prove its involvement.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones aimed at Russian infrastructure have on numerous occasions fallen on NATO territory over the past several months, with Kiev acknowledging Ukrainian ownership in most cases but blaming Russian electronic warfare for diverting them. NATO nations have mostly refrained from criticizing Kiev.
In most cases, Romania continued to attribute its own incidents to Russia, including in May when a drone hit an apartment building in Galati, injuring two people. Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the time that the UAV’s origin could not be established without examining the wreckage, while recalling previous incidents with stray Ukrainian drones.
Pointing to earlier incidents in the Baltics, Putin noted that “the initial reaction was exactly the same as it is now in Romania: ‘Alarm! The Russians are coming!.. Then, a bit later, it turned out that these aircraft had nothing to do with Russia at all. They were Ukrainian drones that had gone off course.”
Sputnik – 11.08.2026
The United Kingdom is the most active supplier of main units and components for unmanned aerial vehicles used as killer drones against civilians. Germany supplies weapons in large quantities, and Sweden is also involved. Canada plays an active role, Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik told Sputnik.
“At the very least, these countries, even in their official rhetoric, emphasize as much as possible that they are supplying the Ukrainian regime in Kiev with unmanned aerial vehicles, which have caused civilian deaths in the Russian cities of Nizhnekamsk and Belgorod,” Miroshnik stressed.
“Ukrainian forces have fired more than 7,000 munitions at civilian facilities in Russia in the past week, killing 43 civilians and injuring 376 more, the Russian diplomat said.
He added that Ukrainian troops used large quantities of “weapons with shrapnel and high-explosive fragmentation warheads with the aim of causing maximum harm to civilians.”
The enemy attacked residential areas, infrastructure facilities, industrial and logistics hubs in 16 Russian regions located far from the front lines, according to Miroshnik.
He also said that a Ukrainian drone operator deliberately directed a UAV at a beach with civilians in Arkhipo-Osipovka, Krasnodar Region, which should be classified as a grave war crime under international humanitarian law.
Disregarding the norms and principles of international humanitarian law, the enemy carried out deliberate strikes on medical facilities and medical transport, including those located in the Donetsk People’s Republic, Miroshnik pointed out.
By George Beebe | Responsible Statecraft | August 11, 2026
Over the course of a few short weeks, a grim new reality has taken shape in Ukraine.
Russia has shown that it need not conquer and occupy Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coastline to turn that country into the equivalent of a landlocked state. It need only deny access to Ukraine’s critically important Odessa port complex, something it is doing quite effectively through air and missile strikes on port facilities and approaching ships.
That reality will probably not amount to a knock-out blow in the ongoing war. But it is likely to have a profound impact on Ukraine’s already gloomy post-war prospects — and, by extension, on the contours of a new European security landscape in the current conflict’s aftermath.
Only a handful of months ago, Russia was conducting few military operations against Odessa. Early in the war, attacks by Russia and Ukraine on merchant shipping in the Black Sea had threatened to choke off agricultural exports vital to world markets. Under pressure from India and other key partners in the Global South, Moscow agreed to the so-called “Grain Deal” with Ukraine, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, to allow unimpeded commercial exports from the region.
For some four years thereafter, the Odessa port system remained open to Ukrainian imports and exports, handling some 90% of Ukraine’s agricultural trade. Russian hardliners bristled at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to attack Ukraine’s vital but vulnerable port, grumbling that Putin seemed more interested in avoiding rifts with Global South states than defeating Ukraine.
Several factors have combined to change this picture. One was the evident failure of the West’s campaign to turn Russia into a pariah state, a brainchild of the Biden administration that had magnified the importance of the Global South to Moscow as a means of avoiding international isolation. A second has been the depletion of Ukrainian air defense interceptors, which has left Odessa largely defenseless against Russian ballistic missiles and allowed bomb-carrying aircraft to operate in closer proximity to the port complex, increasing the accuracy and destructiveness of Russian air strikes.
Ironically enough, perhaps the most important factor was Ukraine’s own “40-day influence campaign” announced in late June, which included long- and medium-range drone strikes on energy infrastructure in Russia and merchant shipping in the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the campaign was aimed at “influencing the aggressor state in order to compel it to end the war.” President Trump described it more plainly as an “escalation that we hope will lead to peace.”
In practice, however, the escalation allowed Russia to deflect Global South criticism for violating terms of the Grain Deal by arguing it was Ukraine that had kicked off the recent cycle of shipping and port attacks.
The near-term effects have been disturbingly clear. Since July 22, the Russian military has effectively closed the Ukrainian port complex in and around Odessa to all shipping. The loss of its remaining deep-water ports is already having a devastating effect on Ukraine’s agricultural exports — the backbone of its economy — which officials warn may plummet by 50% in the coming months because alternative land, rail, and river routes have much less capacity and are much more costly.
The damage to Ukraine’s economy probably will be manageable in the near term so long as Europe steps up its flow of aid. But the impact of Odessa’s closure on Ukraine’s post-war prospects may prove to be much more profound.
It has long been assumed in both Washington and Europe that the main alternative to a compromise settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war is the transformation of Ukraine into a “steel porcupine.” The concept envisions a heavily armed and fortified Ukraine that can serve as a barrier to further Russian aggression and allow the hot war to settle into a stable, frozen conflict.
Proponents of this vision dismiss prospective “land for peace” deals with Moscow and oppose any quantitative or qualitative limitations on Ukraine’s military — points that Russian officials say are essential to any peace deal — arguing that such concessions would “reward Russian aggression” and prevent Ukraine from becoming an Eastern European variant of Israel, a “Major Non-NATO Ally” that punches well above its weight-class in regional affairs and serves as a keystone of broader European defense plans.
However, if Russia can use air and missile attacks to deny Ukraine the use of its port facilities, it can also prevent Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and economic revitalization. Just as merchant ships will not risk Russian attacks to enter Odessa, construction firms are unlikely to risk Russian airstrikes in attempting to build or repair bridges, roads, factories, ports, and other vital infrastructure. Nor will investors risk hundreds of billions of dollars if Russian missiles and bombs can destroy any Ukrainian reconstruction project in a matter of hours.
Without large-scale economic reconstruction and the jobs and stability that would follow, few of the millions of Ukrainians who fled the war (most for Europe but many for Russia) will return. Absent mass repatriation, Ukraine is likely to enter a demographic death-spiral. By Ukrainian officials’ own admission, a population that approached 52 million people when the Soviet Union broke up now stands at between 22 and 25 million people, and nearly half of them are retirees.
According to one estimate, Ukraine’s working age population – the backbone of both its civilian economy and its military — could lose an additional third by 2040. The number of children, the embodiment of Ukraine’s future, could decline to half its pre-war level.
This raises an obvious but under-discussed question: How can an aging and dying Ukrainian population, lacking a strong economic base, serve as a “new Sparta” countering a nuclear-armed Russia that is seven times its size?
The closure of Odessa should highlight two salient points for Western leaders. First, neither Ukraine nor the West can eliminate the threat of Russian air and missile strikes through military means alone. Second, Russia will have strong reason to continue them, even after it eventually halts large-scale ground operations, if the Kremlin worries that the West will otherwise turn Ukraine into a safe haven for threatening Russian security.
As a result, the alternative to an uncomfortable compromise settlement of the war will not be a steel Ukrainian porcupine. It will be a weak and dysfunctional rump state that ill-serves Ukrainians and undermines Europe’s broader security.
George Beebe is the Director of Grand Strategy for the Quincy Institute. He spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy advisor, including as director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and as a staff advisor on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. He is the author of “The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe” (2019).
RT | August 10, 2026
Ukraine must compensate Iran for a deadly attack on one of its cargo vessels in the Caspian Sea, as Kiev has failed to convince Tehran that the strike was unintentional, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has said.
The ship was hit in a Ukrainian strike last month, killing one sailor. Tehran condemned the attack as “reckless.” Kiev initially defended its actions, saying Iran has “no standing to pretend to be a victim,” but later described the attack as a mistake and said it did not seek an escalation with Tehran.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said on Monday that Tehran heard Kiev’s account of the strike but did not consider the matter resolved.
“We heard what they had to say, but given the admission by senior Ukrainian officials that such an attack took place, they must certainly compensate us,” Baghaei said at a press briefing. He added that if Kiev does not provide compensation, Tehran will pursue the matter itself.
Following the attack, Zelensky praised the “very strong results” of strikes on vessels he claimed were involved in transporting military cargo. He said Ukraine does not want to open a “new front” with Iran, but accused it of attacking his country by supplying Russia with Shahed drones and related technology.
Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel also claimed that the vessel, Anna, was carrying components for drones and missiles. Tehran said the ship and its cargo were entirely civilian.
Iran stated in 2022 that it delivered a “small number” of Shahed-136 kamikaze drones to Russia, but said the deliveries took place months before the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. Moscow has maintained that its Geran-2 drones, which are believed to be based on the Iranian design, are produced domestically.
Kiev has actively sought to become involved in the Middle East conflict triggered by the US-Israeli attack against Iran earlier this year. The Ukrainian leadership claimed that it secured agreements with Gulf states to provide specialists and technology to counter Iranian drones, and said it hopes to obtain additional air defense systems and munitions in return.
The Cradle | August 8, 2026
Turkiye has begun restricting commercial ship traffic into the Black Sea amid a surge in Russian and Ukrainian attacks on civilian vessels, Bloomberg reported on 8 August.
Turkiye’s Directorate General of Coastal Safety has informed several ships heading to Novorossiysk, an important Russian oil and grain export port, that it is not issuing transit permits at this time and requires more time to review passage applications through the Dardanelles.
The sources told Bloomberg that Turkish authorities had provided no explanation for the move. Some vessels have also reportedly been told that the restriction applies to ships heading to Ukraine.
The report comes after a series of drone attacks targeting Turkish commercial vessels operating in the Black Sea and near Russian ports in recent months.
On Friday, a Turkish-flagged vessel, the MV Gulluk, was struck by a drone off the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Although the drone hit the ship’s living quarters, no crew members were reported injured or killed.
On 3 August, the Ro-Ro cargo vessel Nadezhda was struck by a drone about 20 nautical miles off Novorossiysk while en route from the Russian port to Samsun. Three members of the ship’s crew were injured and in serious condition after the attack.
The same day, two civilian vessels, the Yasar and the Nadezhda, were attacked after leaving Novorossiysk.
In response, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister issued a statement saying it was “deeply concerned about the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, which is affecting civilian shipping despite our numerous warnings.”
“Unless preventive measures are taken, the escalation in the Black Sea will have multifaceted negative repercussions, including for food security,” the statement added.
Ukraine’s targeting of ships in the Black Sea, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels, have threatened grain exports from both countries, pushing wheat prices to a two-year high in July.
“Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter, and Ukraine is known as Europe’s breadbasket, while mutual attacks between the two countries are putting pressure on maritime transport in the region during the harvest season,” Anadolu Agency reported.
Global food prices already spiked as a result of soaring energy prices following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf earlier this year.
Iran closed the strait in response to the US-Israel war of aggression, disrupting oil and natural gas exports from the Gulf countries partnering with the US and Israel in the war.
Global fuel prices have also risen in response to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.
On Saturday, a Ukrainian drone targeted the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia’s southern Krasnodar region, causing it to catch fire.
Ukraine’s general staff said the Ukrainian military also hit the Syzran oil refinery in the Samara region of Russia overnight, causing a fire there as well.
The Ilsky refinery can process over 6 million metric tons of oil per year, while the Syzran refinery has a processing capacity of 8.5 million tons annually.
In May, Reuters estimated that disruptions associated with the wars between the US and Iran and between Russia and Ukraine together had knocked out nearly 9 percent of global refining capacity.
RT | August 8, 2026
Elon Musk has refused to allow Ukraine to use his Starlink satellite internet service to guide drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, The Atlantic reported on Friday, citing two close allies of former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mikhail Fedorov.
According to the publication, Fedorov, a tech-savvy promoter of drone warfare who was sacked from his position last month, has since been working through back channels to appeal to Musk, but the billionaire has so far refused to relent.
“As of this moment, there is no positive decision,” a Fedorov ally was quoted as saying. “Elon keeps saying it’s time to make a deal,” the source added.
The Atlantic previously reported that during his visit to the US last month, Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky asked President Donald Trump to help influence his close ally Musk on the matter, but Trump remained noncommittal.
Musk began donating tens of thousands of Starlink terminals to Ukraine shortly after its conflict with Russia broke out in February 2022. However, he soon began clashing with Ukrainian officials as he urged them to focus on reaching a peace deal between Moscow and Kiev and repeatedly warned that the conflict could lead to “World War III.”
In 2023, the entrepreneur confirmed reports that he had rejected Ukraine’s request to use Starlink for attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and naval bases in Crimea. “If I had agreed to their request, then SpaceX would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation,” he said at the time.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said last month that Musk should shut down Starlink in Ukraine altogether if he truly wanted “people to stop dying.”
Musk’s reported position represents a second major blow to Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts after Trump walked back an earlier promise to grant Kiev a license to produce Patriot air defense missiles and rebuffed a plea to deliver more interceptors. Zelensky and the Ukrainian military said this week that the country was struggling to fend off Russian strikes on Kiev and other cities.
Zelensky’s abrupt decision to sack Fedorov sparked street protests across Ukraine, with crowds and several prominent activists demanding his reinstatement. Zelensky responded to the public outrage by firing the country’s top commander, General Aleksandr Syrsky, with whom Fedorov had reportedly clashed over priorities and tactics.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 7, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 6, 2026