Why no power can undermine Iran’s eternal dominance over the Strait of Hormuz
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026
The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway nestled between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is not merely a geographical passageway or a shipping lane on the world map to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
It is a strategically vital waterway that forms the pulse of the global energy economy and, simultaneously, a potent asset for the Islamic Republic to fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and around the world.
Iran seeks not merely to protect or monitor this strait but to exercise absolute, intelligent and legitimate control that, in the short term, applies economic pressure on any adversary to force it into retreat, negotiation, or acceptance of Iranian terms, and in the long term, to convert this control into permanent and inexhaustible strategic advantage.
This unchallenged authority on the strategic chokepoint, which carries around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, includes regulating maritime traffic, collecting passage tolls, influencing global supply chains, and reconfiguring power dynamics in the region in alignment with the Axis of Resistance.
Backed by immutable geographical realities, international legal frameworks, precise economic data, and Iran’s asymmetric military capabilities, we examine how no military threats nor diplomatic pressure can alter this fundamental and unalterable reality.
Geographically, the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz measures just 21 nautical miles — roughly 39 kilometers — in width. This extremely narrow gap places all key shipping routes, including two two-mile-wide carriageways and a two-mile buffer strip, entirely within Iranian and Omani exclusive territorial economic waters.
Iran is uniquely positioned to exert absolute control over the northern and most critical part of the strait, with its coastline stretching more than 1,600 kilometers along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. This extensive coastline includes not only mainland shores but also numerous strategic islands that serve as natural strongpoints.
Unlike the Suez Canal or Panama Canal — artificial waterways that can be circumnavigated — the Strait of Hormuz is the only natural, mandatory route for crude oil, liquefied natural gas, and chemical products exiting the Persian Gulf en route to the Indian Ocean and global markets.
No viable alternative to bypass Iran’s control
There is no economically viable or practically feasible alternative to bypass it.
The geography is also immutable: the mountains, rocky coasts, and shallow water depths in key formations make it impossible or prohibitively expensive to open parallel routes or construct new canals. No power on earth, irrespective of its military prowess, can overcome this geographical reality through insignificant actions, the occupation of tiny islands, or even the deployment of naval forces.
Iran’s long and impenetrable coastline is a natural wall that would require manpower and logistical support far beyond the capacity of the world’s largest armies to capture or hold.
Legally, the Strait of Hormuz falls under the purview of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though its interpretation has consistently and appropriately followed the line advanced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Because the strait’s width is less than 24 nautical miles, the entire waterway is not considered part of international waters or an international shipping route. The governing legal regime is not free and compulsory transit passage, but rather innocent passage.
Iran, having signed but not fully ratified the 1982 Convention, has always maintained that vessel passage must not prejudice the sovereignty of coastal states in any way, and that any passage threatening Iran’s national security is invalid.
This unique legal status grants Tehran the option of selective and conditional control over vessel traffic without necessarily infringing upon international law as interpreted by Western powers.
This is why the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s real unsinkable aircraft carrier: an inseparable asset that costs virtually nothing to maintain daily, yet offers strategic and deterrent value inestimable to the global economy.
This legal position, combined with its geographical reality, has placed Iran in a situation where it can exercise practical dominance and unquestionable authority over the waterway without maintaining a permanent surface force presence.
Economically, the Strait of Hormuz is rightly called the true chokepoint of the world economy.
According to the most recent data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20.9 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit through the strait daily — equivalent to 20 percent of all oil consumed worldwide and 25 to 27 percent of global oil imports and exports.
Moreover, over 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade — roughly 11.4 billion cubic feet per day, mostly from Qatari fields — also passes through this route.
Influence of the Strait of Hormuz beyond oil
But the waterway’s influence extends far beyond the oil industry. Iran is the world’s largest source of urea — a nitrogen fertilizer vital to agriculture — and the broader Persian Gulf region dominates this trade.
Iran alone ranks among the top five urea exporters globally, and any disruption in transit automatically drives international urea prices up by 25 to 30 percent.
This price surge directly disrupts fertilizer supply chains for major importing countries such as India, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and most African countries. The consequence is a large-scale food crisis: soaring wheat, rice, and other agricultural commodity prices, worldwide food inflation, and a direct threat to the food security of billions of people.
Thus, the Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint of the global food supply — a weapon Iran can use to influence the currents of the global economy and generate unprecedented pressure by seizing control of food and energy chains without launching a single missile or drone.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz serves as an asymmetric weapon or economic nuclear. It can hold the world economy at ransom by the implementation of selective but intelligent control of the waterway, without the requirement that involves direct war, without incurring huge costs of armaments and even the use of advanced nuclear weapons.
This strategy can be used to impose colossal and rapid economic strain that compels the opposing side to either flee in haste, bargain, or accept Iran’s terms, with no other options.
The long-term goal could be to transform this temporary control into a structural and permanent arrangement: collecting passage tolls from vessels, selectively regulating traffic (free passage for friendly ships in the Persian Gulf, restrictions and bans on hostile ones), and completely redefining the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf in alignment with the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Axis of Resistance.
During periods of tension, Iran implements a calculated approach by raising the threat to the point of execution without necessarily ever closing the waterway completely, as was seen in operations True Promise 1, True Promise 2, and True Promise 3.
This strategy imposes continuous economic costs on the enemy without inflicting any harm on Iran. Even though Iranian oil exports and its own products are indirectly affected in the short term, selective transit management and toll collection create new revenue streams, ultimately swinging the economic war in Tehran’s favor.
Iran’s balance of action closely mirrors that of Gamal Abdel Nasser when he nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Nasser dared to seize the canal, scuttled ships at its entrance, and effectively closed the oil lifeline to Europe.
That action brought the British and French empires to their knees, triggered the Suez Crisis, and symbolized the fall of British colonial rule in the West Asia region.
Just as Nasser, with a single strategic stroke, turned a major energy canal into an instrument of influence and power shift, Iran has now moved to nationalize the Strait of Hormuz through actual action, asymmetric military strength, and unyielding political determination.
This nationalization of the Strait of Hormuz can be seen as the beginning of the de facto demise of American power in the Persian Gulf region, just as the nationalization of Suez heralded the end of the British Empire. The only difference is that Iran employs less advanced, less costly, and more efficient means to enforce this power and authority.
Iran’s efforts to implement a passage toll system in the operational and executive spheres have been intelligent and multifaceted. Enemies or vessels lacking the required permission face direct threats, while friendly vessels — particularly those from Eastern countries and key allies like China, Russia or Pakistan — pay tolls in Chinese yuan, Russian rubles, or cryptocurrencies such as USDT or Bitcoin, securing safe and uninterrupted passage.
This policy not only provides a direct and permanent revenue stream for the Iranian economy but also significantly reduces Iran’s reliance on the US dollar, which is dying a slow death.
Through the comprehensive use of China’s international payment system (CIPS), other banking networks, and digital payment systems, Tehran has successfully moved to eliminate the dollar from the commercial equations of the Strait of Hormuz and is working toward currency multipolarity and the dismantling of Western financial supremacy.
Iran’s legitimate control over Strait of Hormuz
This initiative is part of a broader economic warfare strategy that renders further struggle or pressure on Iran far more expensive and burdensome for the opponent than capitulating to Tehran’s demands. Iran’s intelligent and legitimate control over the Strait of Hormuz is thus absolute and enduring, resting on three unchangeable foundations.
First is the irrevocable nature of geography and the impossible cost of seizing it by force. Iran is literally impregnable with its 1,600-kilometer coastline. Any invading force attempting to assert control over a 100-kilometer front and fully reopen the strait would require over one million men, a vast naval fleet, and unparalleled logistical support — a force that even the world’s strongest military would struggle to assemble.
Moreover, Iran’s control over the strait does not depend on fixed ground positions surrounding the waterway; complete control can be exercised through anti-ship missiles, long-range drones with a range of nearly 2,000 kilometers, and integrated radar command systems.
The second justification is Iran’s absolute superiority in both low-intensity and high-intensity asymmetric warfare. Large-scale mining of the Strait — not using surface ships but rather Fajr-5 rockets fired from a range of 70 kilometers — is entirely within Iran’s capabilities.
These rockets can deploy magnetic, intelligent, and advanced mines along the entire length of the strait, rendering shipping traffic completely uneconomical. Clearing such mines from this waterway would require no less than six months, during which the global economy would be crippled in terms of energy supply and food security.
The ancillary cost of such warfare to Iran is minimal — thousands of dollars per mine — while the enemy suffers billions of dollars in daily losses, not to mention the devastating disruption to global supply chains.
The third foundation is Iran’s long history and precise strategic calculus. Iran has on many occasions in the past spoken of shutting down the Strait but has not acted on it, as demonstrated during the crises of the 1980s, in 2011-2012, and the last few years.
The threat itself is an effective deterrent. Any force that attempts to respond to Iran’s language of direct threat with its own language of direct threat instantly faces the prospect of a global energy shock, extreme inflation, economic downturn, and domestic opposition.
Records in the contemporary world have revealed that Iran will push the threat to the final stage of execution and will ultimately compel the opponent to withdraw and accept new realities, and it has been clearly and unquestionably demonstrated in the past 40 days.
Finally, Iran does not insist on a permanent and destructive closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but rather on intelligent and selective control. This domination includes non-dollar toll collection, selective passage management of vessels, and the transformation of all external threats into opportunities to reformulate the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf.
Iran soars above this waterway because its permanence — rooted in immutable natural geography, low-cost and effective asymmetric technology, and most importantly, its unshakable determination — has secured it forever.
This fact cannot be altered by any power on earth, regardless of massive military pressure or international coercion. Any attempt to counter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz would simply cost the global economy far more and ultimately force adversaries to accept the new reality in the Persian Gulf: this waterway will no longer be anyone’s backyard, but rather the territory of the established, solid, and indestructible deterrent power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran war will leave long-term ‘scar’ on Wall Street, investors warn
Al Mayadeen | April 10, 2026
Investors have warned that the US-Israeli war on Iran will leave “scar tissue” in global markets, with commodity prices and bond yields unlikely to quickly return to prewar levels even if a lasting deal is reached.
Energy prices remain far above prewar levels even after the United States and Iran announced a fragile two-week ceasefire on Tuesday, with investors saying that damage to Gulf infrastructure and the loss of confidence after Tehran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz will weigh on any recovery.
“It goes beyond the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. I think there would be longer-lasting scar tissue that would need a higher risk premium in markets, even if a permanent ceasefire was agreed,” said James Vokins, head of core income and investment grade credit at Aviva Investors.
Markets rallied but remain fragile
Stocks and bonds tumbled throughout March as US and Israeli attacks on Iran led Tehran to close the narrow waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas transits. Markets rallied quickly on the truce, with European government bonds and stock markets posting their best day for years on Wednesday.
Yet the international oil benchmark Brent crude remains nearly 35 percent higher than its price on the eve of the war, despite falling sharply in recent trading sessions. Bond yields, which have surged as traders slashed their bets on interest rate cuts by major central banks, remain elevated.
The yield on the interest rate-sensitive two-year Treasury note is 0.4 percentage points higher than it was before the aggression began. In Europe, where energy-importing economies are particularly vulnerable to global oil prices, yields have risen even further. Two-year yields in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy remain more than 0.5 percentage points higher than they were on the eve of the war.
A worse outlook than before the war
Bill Papadakis, macro strategist at Lombard Odier, said: “Even if the ceasefire proves to be a lasting one, the conflict was long enough, and leaves enough damage behind, that any reasonable macro scenario as of today looks meaningfully worse than the pre-conflict outlook.”
The US dollar and Treasuries have historically been seen as risk-free assets, used around the world for reserves. But President Trump’s alienation of allies and the ballooning national debt, made worse by the war on Iran, has lifted risk levels on those assets.
“Absolutely there is a bigger risk premium priced into US assets than before the war,” said George Pearkes, macro strategist at Bespoke Investment Group.
International investors losing confidence in the dollar
Andrew Jackson, head of investments at Vontobel, said his firm’s clients were increasingly concerned about the US dollar. “International investors are worried about the US dollar because of debt sustainability and the US’s relationship with the rest of the world. The US dollar curve is probably not the risk-free curve now,” he said.
Bill Campbell, a bond portfolio manager at DoubleLine, added that the conflict had encouraged him to further diversify away from the United States.
As the war on Iran enters its seventh week, the economic consequences continue to ripple outward. Even with a temporary ceasefire in place, investors are warning that the damage done to global markets and to confidence in US assets may not be easily repaired. The “scar tissue” that Aviva’s Vokins spoke of could take years to heal, if it ever does.
For the United States, a country already burdened by record debt and a president who has alienated traditional allies, the long-term cost of this war may be measured not only in dollars, but in the erosion of the very foundations of its economic power.
How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026
As the ceasefire comes into effect after 40 days of aggression against the Islamic Republic, with violations continuing on the Lebanese front, military analysts worldwide are just beginning to unpack one of the most unexpected outcomes of modern military confrontation.
They are examining how the Islamic Republic of Iran, against the full American air and naval power backed by the finest allied systems, managed not only to survive but to inflict high costs and ultimately achieve a historic victory despite overwhelming odds.
Iran’s success did not come through matching the United States in crude technological adequacy or superior system quantities. Rather, it resulted from an advanced, multidimensional asymmetric approach integrating mass, accuracy, mobility, electronic warfare, and unremitting innovation.
This strategy turned historically strong American capabilities in air superiority and power projection into liabilities, while exposing the vulnerabilities of costly, high-tech defensive systems facing prolonged, low-cost saturation attacks.
Anti-access/area denial in the Persian Gulf: Holding US carriers at bay
Among the clearest evidence of Iranian military effectiveness was its maritime defense. The backbone of American power projection — US Navy carrier strike groups — was never free to operate without detection in proximity to Iranian waters.
Iranian coastal defense doctrine established a dense network of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, creating an impassable no-go zone.
Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles — such as the Noor (range approximately 120-170 km), the Qader (range approximately 200-300 km), and longer-range systems like the Abu Mahdi (some versions reaching 1,000 km) — forced American surface combatants to standoff range.
US carriers and their escorts never dared to approach within 300 km of the Iranian coast. Iranian forces fired multiple salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles at both short-range (300 km) and long-range (1,000 km) targets, typically accompanied by swarms of loitering munitions and fast-attack boats.
Although these attacks did not necessarily result in sinkings, they forced US forces to expend vast quantities of defensive missiles and divert air assets to protection missions, significantly impairing American offensive momentum.
Combined with sea-skimming profiles, terminal maneuvering, and saturation tactics, this made interception an extremely expensive affair. The US Navy found itself in an archetypal cost-benefit trap: pitting expensive multimillion-dollar interceptors against cheaper cruise missiles in a highly constrained littoral battlespace where response time was minimal.
Ballistic missile excellence and defeat of theater missile defense
Iran’s ballistic missile force proved to be the decisive strategic weapon. Throughout the 40-day war, Iran maintained a very high volume of fire, launching waves of advanced missiles combining liquid and solid fuel systems with increasing accuracy and survivability.
The Kheibar Shekan (and its modernized versions) played a particularly significant role. This medium-range ballistic missile features a maneuverable reentry vehicle capable of making terminal-phase adjustments at high speed, making reliable interception by Patriot PAC-3 systems extremely difficult.
The combination of speed, altitude profile, and evasive maneuvers stretched the kinematic limits of several Western interceptors. The United States and its allies expended thousands of Patriot and THAAD missiles — costing billions of dollars — yet leak rates remained high enough to damage bases and infrastructure multiple times over.
Targeting the eyes of the US missile defense
One of the enablers of Iran’s astounding success was the systematic targeting of the US missile defense system’s “eyes.” At the beginning of the war, Iranian retaliatory attacks — using both ballistic missiles and drones — damaged or destroyed at least four AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD stations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.
These powerful X-band radars are essential for providing the long-range, high-resolution tracking needed to achieve exo-atmospheric intercepts. As several of these mission-critical sensors were either blinded or impaired, the effectiveness of the layered US-led missile defense architecture plummeted significantly.
The destruction of early-warning and discrimination capability meant that even advanced THAAD interceptors could no longer reliably engage incoming threats — particularly when Iran combined ballistic missiles with decoys and saturation salvos.
Short-range air defense: The stealthy killers of sophisticated aircraft
Although long-range capabilities dominated headlines, it was Iran’s short- and very-short-range air defense systems that inflicted some of the most crushing damage on US airpower. Electro-optically guided, low-signature launchers such as the Majid (AD-08) and the Qaem-118 — with ranges of approximately 10-15 km — proved incredibly successful.
These systems lack radar emitters, making them nearly invisible to conventional radar warning receivers until a missile is already in flight. During the war, Iranian short-range air defenses were reported to have shot down over 160 drones and several manned aircraft, including F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. Most astonishingly, Iran claimed — and provided evidence of having downed or damaged at least one F-35 Lightning II.
This was widely regarded as nearly impossible before the war. The F-35’s AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) provides 360-degree infrared coverage and can detect incoming missiles, cue countermeasures, and even command evasive maneuvers without pilot input.
The jet is also equipped with advanced infrared countermeasures, including cutting-edge flare dispensers and other systems designed to counteract optically guided threats. Nevertheless, Iranian electro-optical systems repeatedly achieved locks and hits — possibly indicating higher sensor sensitivity, superior image processing, or effective tactics that reduced warning time beyond the F-35’s defensive capabilities.
These short-range systems formed a dense, mobile, and highly integrated air defense grid. Iranian crews adapted quickly as the war progressed: they refined engagement envelopes, improved camouflage and relocation strategies, and closed off previously exploitable avenues.
What began as an occasional threat became a tightening noose. According to American pilot reports, they experienced an ever-shrinking operating range, an increasing risk profile during close air support and strike missions, and a continued deterioration of freedom of maneuver.
The result was a slow strangulation of US air superiority — not necessarily through attrition of aircraft numbers, but through a drastic rise in the risk and cost of every sortie.
Delayed adaptation and cost-imbalance strategy
Iran’s overall strategy rested on three pillars: mass (large quantities of cheaply produced drones and missiles), precision and maneuverability (enhanced guidance packages and terminal-phase evasion), and resilience (mobile launchers, underground bases, and rapid repair capabilities).
This dragged the United States and its allies into a war of attrition in which high-cost, limited-quantity munitions were traded against low-cost, mass-produced Iranian weapons.
Patriot and THAAD interceptors cost millions of dollars each and were often fired in two- or three-shot salvos against each incoming threat. The problem was exacerbated by swarms of drones, which forced defenders to choose between expending expensive interceptors or suffering successful attacks. The result was that US and Persian Gulf inventories were depleted, logistics systems were repeatedly overstretched, and political pressure mounted to de-escalate.
Iran also demonstrated remarkable operational learning. Air defense crews continuously adjusted frequencies, emission control protocols, and ambushing strategies. Missile forces rotated between fixed and mobile positions, employed decoys, and maintained launch efficiency despite persistent American and Israeli airstrikes.
Air corridors that had previously been open became highly contested, forcing American planners to either accept greater risk or reduce operational tempos.
A new model of regional deterrence
Neither side was able to win the Ramadan war on its own traditional battlefield. But in strictly military terms, Iran achieved its fundamental objectives: it deterred a full-scale ground invasion, foiled the “regime change” plots hatched by the enemy, and demonstrated that American troops and airspace were no longer safe havens of American hegemonic power.
This war highlighted a dynamic reality of modern warfare: the absence of qualitative technological superiority can be countered by quantity, asymmetry, and multi-domain integration.
Iran’s ability to combine ballistic missiles that defeat or saturate theater defenses, anti-ship attacks that keep capital ships at standoff range, and short-range electro-optical air defenses proven effective against fifth-generation stealth aircraft — all of this demonstrates that Iran has built an effective A2/AD bubble far stronger than pre-war estimates suggested.
As the dust settles and both sides count the lessons, one inescapable fact remains: the mighty US military is no longer able to dictate its terms at an acceptable pace and cost against a resolute, well-armed regional power equipped with modern asymmetric capabilities.
The Iranian military’s performance has rewritten chapters of the military playbook for future confrontations in the West Asia region — and has sent a powerful message that the era of unparalleled US domination in the region is past.
The ceasefire may have prevented the continuation of a devastating war that could spill over beyond the region, but the military lessons of the ‘Ramadan War’ will continue to shape deterrence calculations, force planning, and alliances in the region for years to come.
Mohammad Molaei is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.
Iran’s report details US-Israeli war crimes in targeting schools, hospitals, livelihoods
Press TV – April 10, 2026
Iran’s Human Rights Headquarters has condemned the US-Israeli attacks that “deliberately” targeted civilian places directly affecting people’s daily lives and livelihoods as a “clear violation” of the most basic humanitarian and legal principles, stressing that they amount to “war crimes”.
In a statement on Friday, the office strongly condemned “the repeated and deliberate attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States against a wide range of civilian targets, including residential homes, hospitals, medical and relief centers, vital infrastructure, economic centers, bridges, schools, as well as vessels and barges used for people’s livelihoods”.
The statement referred to the attack on four fishing boats in the Lengeh port and other civilian vessels set ablaze, saying the attacks have directly violated “fundamental human rights, including the right to life, the right to work and the right to development.”
These acts of aggression “may amount to war crimes”, it said, referring to threats by US President Donald Trump and his war secretary Pete Hegseth to return Iran to the “Stone Age” and attack its vital infrastructure as “a clear evidence of the war crime intent of this aggressor regime.”
The statement noted that the fundamental principle of separation – the principle of distinction between military and civilian – in international humanitarian law obliges all parties to the conflict to avoid targeting civilian persons and property.
“Systematic attacks against ordinary people, the country’s vital arteries and development infrastructure are a gross violation of these principles and constitute a war crime.”
The statement also emphasized that the US and Israeli practice of “collective punishment” of the Iranians breaches the principle of prohibition of the threat and use of force in international law.
“This inhuman approach, which is devoid of the logic of law, morality and human conscience, reveals the true mentality” of those behind these “brutal” attacks, it added.
The statement urged the international community, human rights institutions and the United Nations to take immediate, decisive action against the US and the Israeli regime for committing these crimes and holding them accountable for these crimes.
It warned that any silence or indifference on the part of international institutions constitutes “approval and complicity” in these crimes.
NATO’s Slow Fracture: How Trump’s Iran War Exposed the Instrument of Hegemony
By Adrian Korczyński – New Eastern Outlook – April 10, 2026
The myth was always more durable than the machinery. NATO presented itself as a collective security architecture; in practice, it functioned as a billing arrangement for American imperial overhead, in which European governments paid in treasure, territory, and political will for the privilege of hosting Washington’s forward operating positions. The Iran war has not broken the alliance. It has simply made the arrangement too expensive to maintain the fiction. When Spain closed its airspace to U.S. flights on 31 March 2026, and Italy denied Sigonella to transiting bombers, it was not a minor rift or hesitation. It was the first visible moment in decades in which the instrument of European subordination refused to execute commands. NATO, as a mechanism of American coercion, has encountered limits.
The Myth of the Monolith
Europe’s formal commitments, ceremonial meetings, and Article 5 promises created an impression of unity. Yet 28 February 2026 revealed the monolith for what it was: a thin shell over a transactional system. The United States and Israel struck Iran first, without consultation, without a Security Council mandate, and without Iranian aggression against U.S. territory. The assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei was the execution of a sitting head of state, an act that violated international law. Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a defensive response, not an act of aggression. European refusal to participate is not mere obstinacy; it is recognition of the legal asymmetry. Compliance was optional the moment the operation violated the norms Europe had quietly internalized.
Compliance, Refused
The operational picture is unequivocal. Spain barred U.S. aircraft from Rota and Morón. Italy prevented Sigonella landings. France blocked munitions intended for Israel. Poland refused to redeploy its Patriot batteries. These refusals are not symbolic; they are concrete disruptions to U.S. planning. Bases, airspace, and munitions are tools of war; withholding them alters outcomes. NATO’s bureaucratic structure remains, but the logic of obedience—the lifeblood of the instrument—has fractured.
Poland illustrates the alliance’s contradictions most starkly. Warsaw has cultivated the image of the United States’ most reliable European client: hosting expanded troop rotations, spending 4.8% of GDP on defence in 2026, providing Patriot batteries, absorbing the economic costs of Ukraine-related sanctions. Operation Epic Fury arrived without consultation. Washington’s subsequent request to redeploy Polish Patriots to the Persian Gulf met a clear refusal. Defence Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz stated: “Our Patriot batteries are used to protect Polish airspace and NATO’s eastern flank. Nothing is changing in this regard.” The message is stark: loyalty is no longer a currency that guarantees influence. Even the most obedient client confronts limits when the cost of compliance exceeds both legality and national interest. Every denial signals a reassertion of European discretion, previously constrained by financial and political leverage wielded by Washington.
Trump, Rubio, and the Transactional Doctrine
Trump’s public denunciations of NATO—calling it a “paper tiger” and European governments “cowards”—and Rubio’s remarks on Fox News are doctrinal, not emotional. Trump suggested that U.S. membership itself is under reconsideration. Rubio asked why America should maintain NATO when the operational support is denied. What they articulate is a formal redefinition: the transatlantic relationship is no longer a guarantee of security; it is a transaction. European compliance in operations like Hormuz now exchanges political obedience for U.S. defence assurances. The logic is imperial, not allied. Empires do not seek permission; they dictate terms and issue invoices. When clients decline, threats of withdrawal follow. This is not a NATO crisis; it is the moment when the protection racket stops pretending to be a mutual defense treaty.
Historical Echo: From Suez to Iran
The lessons of Suez, 1956, resonate here. Britain and France acted militarily without consulting Washington; Eisenhower threatened financial retaliation, forcing withdrawal. Europe learned that independent military initiative without U.S. consent carries unmanageable cost. Iran 2026 reverses the dynamic. Washington acts unilaterally; Europe refuses operational support. The instruments of coercion—financial leverage, dollar dominance—are no longer sufficient. Europe possesses central bank reserves, fiscal tools, and industrial capacity to resist. Suez taught Europe to follow. Iran may be teaching it to lead.
Yuan in Hormuz
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is now operating a live pilot for post-dollar maritime commerce. Ships wishing to transit the Strait are assessed for U.S. or Israeli connections. Friendly vessels—from China, India, Turkey, or neutral states—pay transit fees in Chinese yuan or cryptocurrency. Rates are significant: oil tankers carrying two million barrels face starting fees of one dollar per barrel. Washington launched a war to defend the rules-based international order; in real time, Iran is constructing an alternative settlement infrastructure that bypasses the dollar entirely. The petrodollar system, once the backbone of American financial hegemony, is not debated in conferences—it is bypassed, barrel by barrel, yuan by yuan, as the U.S. Navy observes from afar. This is not a theoretical shift. It is operational, measurable, and immediate.
Europe Responds and the Quiet Proof
European capitals retreated into legal formalism not out of cowardice but calculation—the calculation that the cost of compliance now exceeds the cost of refusal. Macron called the operation illegal, yet deployed the Charles de Gaulle for French interests. Starmer emphasized national priorities. Steinmeier denounced the operation as dangerous. Spain and Italy blocked airspace and bases. France restricted ammunition transit. Simultaneously, a coalition outside Washington—Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey—began mediating Ormuz transit. States are acting to preserve navigational freedom, financial sovereignty, and operational independence without U.S. supervision.
Economic behavior confirms the operational shifts. EU-Iran trade in 2025 reached €3.72 billion, with Germany exporting €963 million and importing €218 million. Italy exported €447 million, and imported €132 million. The Netherlands served primarily as a logistics hub. These flows constitute two-thirds of total EU-Iran commerce. INSTEX remains operative, facilitating transactions despite secondary sanctions. Machinery, transport equipment, and chemical products move across borders under a deliberately maintained European framework. The numbers require no interpretation. While Warsaw was applauding in Davos, Berlin was exporting machinery to Tehran. Strategic autonomy was always practiced. It simply wasn’t named.
The Architecture of Compliance
Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, noted: “Military alliances are, at their core, based on trust. It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” The alliance exists in form; obedience does not. European investment in defense, industrial capacity, and energy diversification accelerates independently of U.S. preferences. NATO survives as a bureaucratic structure, but the instrument of American hegemony—the mechanism through which Washington coerced compliance—is no longer operational.
What matters is what emerges where the old order once dominated: a mediation coalition outside U.S. influence, yuan-denominated shipping through Hormuz, European defence funded by its own borrowing, independent industrial capacity, and sustained trade with Iran. These are not marginal adjustments; they are the outlines of a multipolar order actively taking shape. The architecture of compliance is intact. The compliance itself is not. In geopolitics, that distinction is everything.
Chinese jet fuel and the myth of energy independence
Inside China Business | April 8, 2026
Except for in Russia and (ironically) Iran, the war in the Persian Gulf has blown up energy markets everywhere. Worldwide, no country is self-sufficient in all its energy needs, and disruptions in a supply chains anywhere result in major problems everywhere. China is the largest refiner of jet fuel in Asia-Pacific, and has enormous reserves of crude stashed away, which can last months. But immediately after the war on Iran began, China locked down its exports of jet fuel. The effect on prices across Asia was felt immediately, with costs more than doubling in just six weeks. In the United States, fuel prices also soared, and also by over 100%.
Resources and links:
$140, and going higher: That’s the real price of oil, right now. Oil traders will be wiped out.
• $140, and going higher: That’s the real p…
Singapore’s major oil source is blocked and experts warn Australians will pay https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-0…
Australia and Japan face jet fuel supply crunch as China cuts exports https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-ec…
Daily Jet Fuel Spot Prices https://www.airlines.org/dataset/argu…
America’s energy independence https://no01.substack.com/p/americas-…
US crude oil exports decreased by 3% in 2025 despite higher production (+3%) https://www.enerdata.net/publications…
Petroleum & Other Liquids, Imports by Country of Origin https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move…
China set to extend fuel export ban with small exemptions, sources say https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pa…
South Korea to enforce 5-day vehicle rotation system as Mideast conflict hits energy supplies https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific…
IRGC: Iranian forces launched no attacks during ceasefire hours
Press TV – April 9, 2026
The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) has categorically denied carrying out reported drone and missile strikes on facilities in countries along the southern edge of the Persian Gulf, stressing that Iranian forces carried out no such operations during the ceasefire hours.
In an official statement on Thursday night, the IRGC stated, “The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran have not launched any missiles at any country during the ceasefire hours until now.”
The IRGC was responding to a wave of unverified reports circulated by various news agencies over the past few hours alleging Iranian attacks on targets in the Persian Gulf region.
“We would like to inform you that the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran have not launched any missiles at any country during the ceasefire hours until now,” the statement read.
The IRGC further stated that if the media reports prove accurate, “it is undoubtedly the work of the Zionist enemy or the United States,” entities notorious for staging provocations and false-flag operations to destabilize the region and undermine the ceasefire.
Highlighting the Islamic Republic’s policy of transparency and accountability, the IRGC added, “If the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran hit any target, they will boldly announce it in an official statement, and any action that is not in the statements made by the Islamic Republic of Iran has nothing to do with us.”
The IRGC’s decisive clarification exposes yet another attempt by hostile media networks to fabricate narratives against the Islamic Republic at a sensitive time. Iran has remained steadfast in honoring the ceasefire while the Zionist regime continues its aggressive policies across West Asia.
The IRGC reaffirmed the Iranian armed forces’ readiness to defend the country’s sovereignty and regional stability, while exposing the real instigators of any destabilizing actions in the Persian Gulf.
The US and Israel launched an unprovoked war against Iran on February 28, assassinating the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, along with several senior officials, military commanders, and hundreds of civilians.
In retaliation, Iran launched its decisive Operation True Promise 4. Hundreds of ballistic and hypersonic missiles and drones have pounded US military bases across West Asia and Israeli positions throughout the occupied territories.
Throughout the war, Iran continued to target Israeli and American assets in occupied Palestine and US military bases and interests in the Persian Gulf, maintaining its resilience even after about six weeks of fighting.
Trump Administration Moves To Automate U.S. Military Draft Registration
A dark omen that peace is not what lies ahead
blueapples on X | April 9, 2026
Although the Trump administration has framed the war it has waged against Iran as a decisive victory saving the American people from an inevitable nuclear apocalypse, that unconvincing narrative does little to shield from the reality that the biggest loser in the conflict is the reputation of the administration itself. While Trump built the campaign that led him back to the White House upon a platform of refusing to drag the country into any new conflicts like the endless cycle of regime change wars in the Middle East that has haunted the United States since the dawn of the new millennium, that promise has been completely broken little more than a year into his second term in the Oval Office. Any optimism that the administration will emerge in the image of the pro-peace ticket voters elected is bleak, as the two-week ceasefire agreement between the U.S. and Iran de-escalating the latest episode of the return to a neoconservative foreign policy already hangs on a knife’s edge, making a resumption of the conflict seem little more than an inevitability. The pessimism that more war lies ahead have been amplified by a new policy being advanced by the Trump administration that forecasts an even more bellicose future for the country, as the Selective Service System (”SSS”) has begun to take measures to automatically register eligible men for a potential military draft that could be enacted to quench the bloodthirst of the warmongers who have once again taken control of America’s foreign policy.
Starting in December 2026, men between 18 and 25 years old will be automatically registered into the U.S. military draft pool. This requirement went into effect on December 18th, 2025, when President Trump signed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (”NDAA”) into law. A proposed rule submitted by the SSS to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on March 30th has initiated the implementation of the technical infrastructure necessary to transfer registration for the draft from eligible individuals to an automated process that will integrate disparate federal data systems. All male U.S. citizens from 18 to 25 years old continue to be required by federal law to register with the SSS within 30 days of their 18th birthday until the automated system goes into effect in December 2026. Young men failing to register for the draft pool are in violation of the Military Selective Service Act (“MSSA”) and face penalties including ineligibility for federal programs and a fine of up to $250,000 or five years imprisonment.
The SSS lists that automatic registration system as the first of the three strategic initiatives it aims to achieve in order to reshape the agency and increase the draft pool over the next five years. The second and third of those initiatives are the technological modernization and workforce optimization of the agency, each of which it frames as imperative to facilitate automatic draft registration. The newly automated draft registration system will integrate data from various state and federal databases, including the Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and nationwide Department of Motor Vehicles registries, to register eligible individuals.
Automating registration into the draft pool has long been a goal of the SSS, which it began making headway during the drafting of the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA in 2024 when the agency began to enhance its efforts to work with Congress to achieve that mission. The impetus of that increased initiative followed a decline in voluntary registrations, which began decreasing significantly in 2022 when the option to register for the draft was removed from federal student loan forms. That option had previously accounted for nearly one quarter of all previous registrations.
The SSS was established under the Selective Service Act (”SSA”) in 1917 by President Woodrow Wilson following the U.S. entry into the First World War, marking the first modern military draft in the country’s history. Opposition to conscription into the U.S. military to fight WWI was quickly suppressed, culminating in the landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States (”SCOTUS”) in the case of Schenck v. United States, which ruled that criticism of the draft was not protected by the free speech protection under the First Amendment. In a unanimous decision from the SCOTUS, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously coined the term “clear and present danger” to characterize how speech designed to oppose the draft created an imminent threat to national security. The court upheld the application of Section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917 that the defendants were charged with violating. Long considered to be one of the worst rulings in the SCOTUS’ history, the precedent set by Schenck became void when the case was overturned in 1969 following the decision in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, which deemed that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
Since the U.S. implemented conscription under President Wilson, the SCOTUS has heard several challenges to its constitutionality. In 1918, the court immediately upheld the constitutionality of the SSA after deciding the Selective Service Draft Law Cases united under the matter of Arver v. United States. The court rejected the argument that the military draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude and the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of conscience. The constitutionality of a male-only draft has also been challenged on the basis it violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That argument was also rejected by the SCOTUS in the case of Rostker v. Goldberg in 1981. While opponents of the draft who continue to conceptualize arguments that only requiring men to register for the military draft violates the equal protection provisions under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution are optimistic that the changing attitudes of the court toward a more liberal jurisprudence offer some hope in striking the draft down, caselaw since the decision of Schenck demonstrates the SCOTUS’ unwavering support to uphold it.
Six years after Schenck was overturned by Brandenburg, President Gerald Ford suspended the draft in 1975 in response to the fallout from the Vietnam War, which shifted the paradigm on how U.S. citizens perceived the bellicosity of their federal government. Although President Jimmy Carter reinstated the draft just five years later in 1980 after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the U.S. hasn’t implemented a military draft since 1973 during the Vietnam War. Currently, 17 million men between the ages of 18 and 25 years old are eligible for the draft pool. In 2024, registration rates dropped to as low as 81%. The Trump administration hopes to increase that rate to as close to 100% as possible by enabling the SSS to automate the draft registration process. While the administration has undertaken increased efforts to streamline the draft process, reactivation of the draft is not vested in the authority of the Executive Branch alone. Congress would have to amend the MSSA first in order for President Trump to exercise that authority.
The implementation of an automated draft registration process is the latest troubling sign of enhanced militarism from the Trump administration. In late March 2026, the U.S. Army increased its maximum enlistment age to 42, a significant increase from the previous limit of 35. The army had previously increased its maximum enlistment to 42 temporarily in 2006 as it struggled to fill its ranks during the height of the War on Terror. Despite President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth constantly boasting about how military recruitment is at record highs, the increased enlistment age of the Army indicates the administration seeks to further supplement its ranks nevertheless. The decision to automate the draft registration process beckons the question of how it intends to do so.
When White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt spoke on the prospect of the U.S. reactivating the military draft during the onset of the war with Iran, she stated that while it was not part of the current calculus of the administration, she refused to rule out the possibility, saying that President Trump “keeps his options on the table.” That rhetoric, combined with decisions to automate the military draft registration and increase the age of those eligible to enlist in the U.S. army, stands as an ominous omen that peace will not be what defines the legacy of the Trump presidency.
Spain orders reopening of Tehran embassy, condemns Israel’s carpet bombing of Lebanon
The Cradle | April 9, 2026
Spain is reopening its embassy in Tehran in hopes of achieving “peace” in the US-Israeli war against Iran, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares declared on 9 April.
“I’ve instructed our ambassador in Tehran to return, to take up his post again and reopen our embassy, and for us to join in this effort for peace from every possible quarter, including from the Iranian capital itself,” Albares told reporters.
The move comes as Spain sharply escalates its criticism of Israel and the US, condemning Israeli assault on Lebanon and the broader war on Iran, and pushes for regional de-escalation, according to Reuters.
Spain’s position, voiced by Albares, called the war “the greatest assault on the civilization built upon the humanist ideals of reason, peace, understanding, and universal law.”
He criticized Israel for violating international law and breaching the newly brokered two-week ceasefire after strikes killed more than 254 people and injured over 1,100 in Lebanon on Wednesday.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has reinforced that stance, previously closing Spanish airspace to aircraft involved in attacks on Iran, and renewing calls for the EU to suspend its association agreement with Israel, citing “impunity for (Israel’s) criminal actions.”
He also described Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “contempt for life and international law” as “intolerable.”
At the same time, Spain summoned Israeli envoys alongside Italy over incidents involving UN peacekeepers in Lebanon, including the reported detention of a Spanish UNIFIL member.
US officials and allies of US President Donald Trump have pushed for punitive measures after Madrid rejected military cooperation and restricted the use of joint bases, widening the diplomatic rift between the two countries.
One US senator suggested relocating forces to “a country that will allow us to use them.”
Domestically, public opinion mirrors the government’s stance, with a POLITICO European Pulse survey showing that 51 percent of respondents in Spain view Washington as a “threat” to Europe, and 56 percent strongly oppose the US-Israeli offensive on Iran.
Support for European independence is also overwhelming, with 94 percent backing greater autonomy even at economic cost.
Despite welcoming a Pakistani-brokered ceasefire, Sanchez warned Spain would “not applaud those who set the world on fire just because they turn up with a bucket.”
Iran restricts Hormuz access to 15 vessels per day under ceasefire terms: Report
The Cradle | April 9, 2026
Iran will restrict maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to fewer than 15 vessels per day under a Pakistani-brokered ceasefire with the US, a senior Iranian source told Russia’s state-run TASS on 9 April, outlining the conditions for the ceasefire’s continuation.
“Under the current ceasefire, fewer than 15 ships per day are permitted to transit the Strait of Hormuz. This movement is strictly contingent upon Iran’s approval and the enforcement of a specific protocol,” the source said.
“This new regulatory framework, operating under the supervision of the IRGC, has been officially communicated to regional parties. There will be no return to the pre-war status quo,” the source added.
The same official linked the arrangement to broader demands, stating that “the unfreezing of Iran’s blocked assets is a critical executive guarantee that must be realized within this two-week timeframe.”
Tehran has also tied the ceasefire to international backing.
“If the termination of the war is not codified into a UN Security Council resolution based on our stipulated terms, we are fully prepared to resume combat against the US and the Zionist regime … and with even greater intensity,” the source said.
In parallel, Iran insisted that Washington refrain from increasing troop deployments during the truce, while maintaining its right to uranium enrichment.
“Regarding uranium enrichment – we remain committed strictly to the text of the exchanged agreement and are actively holding to it,” the source added.
On 7 April, US President Donald Trump announced a “two-week mutual ceasefire,” describing Iran’s demands as a “working basis” for negotiations and linking the pause in hostilities to reopening Hormuz.
Tehran, in turn, agreed to halt “defensive attacks” on the condition that no strikes target the country.
Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has invited both sides to Islamabad on 10 April for talks, which Iranian state television said are expected to be direct.
The ‘Opposition Party’ Has Done Nothing to Stop the Iran War and Much to Goad Trump Into Continuing It

By Jeremy Loffredo | April 9, 2026
There is a version of the Democratic Party that exists only in the imagination: the peace party, the anti-war party, the party that marched against the Iraq War and howled at its neocon designers. As Donald Trump (reportedly) accepted Iran’s ceasefire terms this week, some of the most pointed attacks coming his way from Democrats are not about the thousands of civilians killed, the weeks of brutal bombardments against medical centers and universities, or the global economic damage the war has caused. They are about the war ending before the U.S. and Israel finished the job.
And this is not a fringe phenomenon. It is a pattern coming from Democratic senators, the Democratic House Foreign Affairs Committee, ranking members of the Armed Services Committee, and some of the party’s most prominent voices. The liberal opposition party wants more war.
This pattern predates the war. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Kamala Harris called Iran America’s “greatest adversary,” vowed that Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon under her watch, and argued that Iran’s attacks on Israel would not have happened under her presidency. The Democratic nominee for president was running on a promise to be harder on Iran than Donald Trump.
“What a disaster”
On April 7, 2026, as a ceasefire between the United States and Iran was announced following weeks of devastating U.S.-Israeli bombing campaigns, Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) took to X to offer his initial reaction: not relief at the end of the killing, but outrage at the terms Trump had accepted to stop it.
“It appears Trump just agreed to give Iran control of the Strait of Hormuz, a history-changing win for Iran,” Murphy wrote. “The level of incompetence is both stunning and heartbreaking. What on earth is happening?”
And Murphy is not a Democratic Party outlier. The New York Times has called Murphy “one of the future leaders of the party.” The Guardian, the Times, and NBC News have all listed him as a possible 2028 presidential candidate. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has named him one of the party’s “best messengers.” Foreign Policy magazine has called him a “rising Democratic star.”
For Murphy, attempting to end a war against a civilian population that had been brutally bombed for over five weeks was just infuriating.
In a follow-up thread, he wrote: “They will control and toll the Strait for the first time. They keep their nuclear program. They keep their missiles. What a disaster.”
And should anyone point out that at least the killing had stopped, Murphy had an answer ready: “An anti-American regime is in power and emboldened. Iran still has their missiles and nuclear program. That’s ‘good’?”
Murphy is not arguing that the war was unjust, that it violated international law, or that it killed too many innocent women and children, all of which are true and documented. He’s arguing that the ceasefire is a bad deal because it leaves the Iranian government standing with its nuclear program and ballistic missiles intact.
Having a civilian nuclear program is a legal right under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory. But Murphy is treating Iran’s exercise of their international right as an American defeat. And as for their intolerable missiles, most countries have militaries, and every country has the right to them.
Trump, for his part, had no good options left: Iran had closed the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices had spiked globally, and American military objectives had not been achieved. The only path out was accepting terms. Stopping the bombing has already saved lives and protected a civilian population from further devastation. Murphy’s “Democratic rising star” objection is not that the war was wrong but that it ended before the Iranian state was entirely destroyed.
‘TACO’ Trump
Chuck Schumer, the Senate’s top Democrat, had established this line — attacking Trump from the right — months earlier, during nuclear deal negotiations in mid-2025. When Trump was reportedly exploring a diplomatic agreement with Tehran as an alternative to war, Schumer coined an acronym: TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out).
“When it comes to negotiating with the terrorist government of Iran, Trump’s all over the lot,” Schumer said. “One day he sounds tough, the next day he’s backing off. If TACO Trump is already folding, the American public should know about it.”
Schumer was not criticizing Trump for threatening war; he was criticizing him for not following through on those threats, demanding that Trump be tougher on Iran at a moment when most Americans, including supermajorities of his own party, supported a diplomatic nuclear deal. Foreign Policy magazine noted that Schumer’s attack was from a position to Trump’s right, using the language of Iran hawks.
When the ceasefire was finally announced, Schumer held a press conference in New York and went through the deal point by point, explaining why the outcome represented an American failure. “The Strait of Hormuz is in worse shape today, with more Iranian domination of it than it was before the war started,” Schumer said. “Iran still has an ayatollah named Khamenei. The Iranian regime is still standing. Not just standing, but now emboldened. And the regime is likely to be even more radical and more dangerous than it was before.” He called Trump “a military moron” and said the war had made the United States worse off than before it started. The Senate’s top Democrat was not upset that the war happened. He was upset that it hadn’t achieved more.
Venezuela: Trump Didn’t Finish the Job
In January 2026, U.S. special forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in a nighttime raid and flew him to New York to face drug trafficking charges. Within weeks, the Trump administration settled into a working relationship with Maduro’s former vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, now Venezuela’s acting president. Trump, having removed Maduro, chose to work with the Venezuelan regime rather than dismantle it. Rodriguez, previously sanctioned by Trump’s own Treasury Department, was quietly removed from the sanctions list in April 2026.
House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats posted a screenshot of the New York Times article reporting the sanctions removal and responded:
“Delcy was Maduro’s brutal co-conspirator to steal an election and repress Venezuelans. 3 months later she’s off the US sanctions list, with zero plans for reforms and her regime still harassing and jailing its political opponents. Trump doesn’t care about Venezuela’s democracy, just its oil.”
Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the body in Congress responsible for overseeing U.S. foreign policy, were not satisfied. The problem, in their telling, was not that Trump had removed a foreign head of state by military force. It was that Trump had cut a deal with his successor rather than going for full regime change.
The Impeachment Spectacle
In 2019, Democrats launched an impeachment process that would run for months, producing two weeks of nationally televised public hearings, 12 witnesses, and more than 30 hours of testimony, before the full House voted to impeach in December. The central charge was that Trump had frozen $400 million in military aid to Ukraine, weapons intended to be used against Russia, a U.S. adversary. Withholding them was, in the Democratic telling, an impeachable betrayal of American interests. Fast forward to 2026: Trump waged a 40-day bombing campaign against Iran, a U.S. adversary, without congressional authorization, and Democrats introduced not impeachment articles but complaints that he failed to hit Iran hard enough.
When Trump withheld weapons from a U.S. enemy’s enemy, Democrats called it impeachable. When Trump actually bombed a U.S. enemy, Democrats called it inadequate. In both cases, they were pushing Donald Trump in exactly the same direction.
All of it, from Schumer’s TACO attacks to the Democratic Foreign Affairs Committee’s frustration with Delcy Rodriguez to Murphy calling a ceasefire “heartbreaking,” points in the same direction. Not toward restraint, not toward diplomacy, but toward a more complete and more decisive confrontation with American adversaries. Whether that reflects genuine hawkishness, reflexive opposition to anything Trump does, or some complicated mixture of both, the political effect is the same. The liberal opposition party is pushing for more war.
Jeremy Loffredo (X: @loffredojeremy) is an independent journalist and filmmaker who covers foreign policy and war.
How UK Regulator Ofcom Quietly Bypassed International Law to Police American Speech
A UK regulator bypassed every formal legal treaty and just emailed American companies into compliance, 98% of them apparently obliged
By Dan Frieth | Reclaim The Net | April 9, 2026
A Freedom of Information response has confirmed what the UK’s speech regulator would probably have preferred to keep quiet. Ofcom fired off 197 information demands to American tech companies under the Online Safety Act, and not a single one went through the US-UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the formal diplomatic process that exists for exactly this kind of cross-border legal enforcement. Every one of those 197 notices was sent directly, by email or post, to companies operating entirely on American soil.
The number comes from a FOI request filed by Daniel Lü, who asked Ofcom a series of pointed questions about how it enforces the Online Safety Act against non-UK targets.
Ofcom confirmed that as of February 26, 2026, it had issued 197 Section 100 notices to US businesses. Zero through MLAT. The treaty between the US and UK that governs how one country’s legal process gets enforced in the other’s jurisdiction was treated as optional. Ofcom decided it didn’t apply.
That admission drew an immediate response from Preston Byrne, the American lawyer who represents 4chan and other US companies targeted by Ofcom.
Byrne called the 197 notices a “breathtaking” “attack on the First Amendment” and pointed out the uncomfortable math.
Only two US companies, 4chan and Kiwi Farms, have publicly refused to comply with Ofcom’s demands. If Byrne’s assessment is right, that leaves Ofcom enjoying “a 98% compliance rate with foreign censorship orders that violate the First Amendment.”
A British regulator sent nearly 200 demands to American companies, bypassed every established legal channel, and almost all of them appear to have simply done what they were told. The chilling effect is already here.
Ofcom Uses Free Speech to Hide Its Censorship Methods
Lü did more than ask for the number of notices. He asked for policy documents about how Ofcom selects its foreign enforcement targets, what guidance it gives its teams about the legality of emailing criminal penalty warnings to US corporations, and whether Ofcom has any internal guidance on protected speech.
Ofcom admitted it holds much of that information. Then it refused to hand it over. The reason, cited directly from the FOI Act, was that disclosure “would, or would be likely to, inhibit the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation; and/or would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.”
A speech regulator is claiming that transparency about its censorship operations would damage free and frank deliberation. Ofcom is borrowing the language of free expression to shield itself from accountability over how it suppresses expression. The irony is so complete it feels deliberate.
On the question of whether Ofcom holds any guidance on protected speech, the answer was even more revealing. Ofcom said it doesn’t have any. No internal documents addressing what speech is protected when it exercises its enforcement powers against foreign companies.
It pointed instead to its general obligations under the Online Safety Act, the Communications Act 2003, and the European Convention on Human Rights, along with links to already-public guidance documents. That’s the speech protection regime for companies being censored by the UK from American soil: a few hyperlinks to existing publications.
The MLAT Problem Isn’t New. It’s Getting Worse.
The treaty issue is central. MLAT exists so that when one country wants to enforce its laws against people or companies in another country, there’s a formal process involving both governments. For the US side, that means routing through the Department of Justice. A judge gets involved. There’s oversight. There are procedural protections.
Ofcom has previously argued it doesn’t need to use MLAT because its Section 100 notices are administrative, not criminal. That distinction might satisfy Ofcom’s lawyers in London, but it doesn’t satisfy anyone else. Byrne and his clients have argued in federal court that Ofcom’s demands have no legal force precisely because they skipped the treaty process. 4chan and Kiwi Farms received their enforcement demands by email, sent to addresses that in some cases weren’t even authorized to accept legal service.
The Lü FOI also asked whether Ofcom holds any correspondence with the US Department of Justice or the FBI about its enforcement activity. Ofcom’s response: it holds no information related to this question. The regulator didn’t talk to anyone in the US government before firing off 197 demands to US companies. It just hit send.
What the FOI Actually Revealed, and What Ofcom Hid
Lü’s request covered six questions. The pattern in Ofcom’s responses tells its own story. On the questions where Ofcom could respond by linking to documents that are already public, it was happy to share. On everything else, it cited exemptions, claimed it didn’t hold the information, or both.
When asked for policy documents about enforcing the OSA against non-UK providers, including any records discussing MLAT, Ofcom said it holds some information but won’t release it. It also claimed it holds no records of MLAT discussions or legal guidance about whether emailing criminal penalty warnings to American corporations is valid. Either Ofcom never considered whether its enforcement method was legal under international law, or it did consider it and doesn’t want anyone to see that analysis.
When asked how it selects non-UK enforcement targets, Ofcom cited exemptions under the Communications Act 2003 and linked to its public enforcement guidance, plus its own decisions against 4chan and other US entities. The internal criteria, the actual decision-making process for choosing which American companies to go after, stayed hidden.
When asked about its approach to “qualifying worldwide revenue,” the basis for calculating fines that can reach £18 million or 10% of global revenue, Ofcom linked to its public guidance explaining that companies are expected to self-report their revenue to Ofcom. Companies that Ofcom is threatening with fines are supposed to voluntarily tell Ofcom how much money they make, so that Ofcom can calculate a bigger fine. The compliance incentives here are about as perverse as they get.
Byrne Goes to Congress
Byrne said he forwarded Ofcom’s admission directly to the US government. He tagged US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers, Senator Eric Schmitt, and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Jordan, and called on Congress to act. This is consistent with Byrne’s approach throughout the Ofcom fight. He has previously said he copies the US government on Ofcom correspondence that crosses his desk.
The legal strategy from the US side has been to deny Ofcom any clean precedent. The four companies that received formal enforcement action, 4chan, Kiwi Farms, a mental health forum called SaSu, and the social network Gab, all refused to comply. 4chan responded to one of Ofcom’s fines with a picture of a hamster. The point was to make Ofcom’s orders publicly and visibly unenforceable on American soil, turning each attempted punishment into a political liability for the regulator rather than a deterrent for the rest of the American internet.
But the 197 number changes the scale of the problem. Those four companies were the public-facing enforcement targets, the ones Ofcom wanted to make examples of. Behind them, 193 other US companies apparently received quieter demands and, if Byrne’s analysis is correct, most of them complied without a fight. Without lawyers, without publicity, without anyone in Congress knowing it happened.
Byrne has pushed the GRANITE Act, a proposed law that would allow US entities to sue foreign governments for censorship attempts and void foreign censorship orders in US courts. Sarah Rogers, the US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, has appeared on GB News in London suggesting Congress is considering a federal version of the law. The Trump administration has made public statements objecting to the Online Safety Act. The US State Department sent diplomats to London in 2025 to challenge Ofcom directly.
Whether all of that translates into legislation remains an open question. Ofcom, for its part, has already moved on to bigger targets. After spending a year trying to fine platforms like 4chan and getting nowhere, the regulator recently opened new investigations into Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, YouTube, Roblox, and X. The small companies held the line. The question now is whether the large ones will too, or whether they’ll decide that complying with a foreign regulator’s censorship demands is easier than asserting their constitutional rights.
