Calls for the reconfiguration of military arrangements in the Gulf region
By Thembisa Fakude | MEMO | March 8, 2026
The former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani called for the formation of a strategic defence alliance bringing together Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan. Al Thani has described it as an “urgent need” in light of developments and changing regional and international dynamics. He made this call weeks before the attack on Iran by Israel and the US on 28th February 2026. It is not the first time Israel attacked Iran whilst in negotiations.
In June 2025 Israel attacked Iran whilst it was it was negotiating its nuclear program with the US. Iran retaliated with hundreds of missiles and drones targeting Israeli cities and the US military base in Al Udeid in Doha, Qatar. Al Udeid is the largest US military base in the Gulf region. In September 2025 Hamas leadership was attacked in Qatar by Israel whilst meeting to consider a ceasefire proposal from the US on the war on Gaza.
Qatar has spent billions of US dollars on US’s weapons and military hardware including a huge investment at the Al Udeid military base. It is estimated that Qatar has spent over 19 billion USD over time in Al Udeid. Notwithstanding, Qatar has remained vulnerable from external military attacks and its sovereignty has been compromised over the past months.
On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel started launching unprovoked attacks on Iran. They killed the Supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei and over 180 school girls at the Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in the city of Minab in the early stages of the attack. Iran retaliated to the attacks by firing hundreds of drones to Israeli cities and US military installations in the Gulf.
The US and Israel have called for a regime change in Iran. Speaking to the media on 5th March 2026, Donald Trump said “he wants to be involved in picking up the next leadership in Iran”. Iran has vowed not to allow foreign interference in their politics including how its leadership is elected. Such rhetoric from the president of the US presents a threat to the political process in Iran. Moreover, Trump’s hope and ambition that the US can come into Iran, impose its political will and preference and still have a stable Iran is farfetched and dangerous. It could lead to political instability in Iran and indeed the region. Iran has suffered tremendous infrastructural and leadership devastation already in this conflict. However, its government has vowed to continue fighting and judging by how it has resisted over the past couple of days since the start of this war, it is unlikely to collapse.
Secondly, the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu has said repeatedly that he wants to eliminate all threats to Israel in the region including obliterating Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah have refused to disarm and are both showing signs of recovering from the devastating war on Gaza. The recent attacks of Israel by Hezbollah in retaliation to the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, caught Israel and many in the world by surprise. After heavy bombardment and killing of its leadership by Israel over the past 24 months, they are still capable of sending missiles and drones hitting their targets in Israel. Likewise, Hamas – who got praised by Trump – for their great work in helping to allocate the dead bodies of the Israeli captives in Gaza – are still governing Gaza.
Notwithstanding the devastation of Iran and the killing of its leadership, its political infrastructure is likely to endure. However, as long as the government of Iran continues to function, with all its current political infrastructural framework, it will continue to be targeted by Israel. Moreover, Hamas, Hezbollah have not disarmed. The Houthis in Yemen continue to attack US and Israeli interests in the Red Sea. Basically, notwithstanding the military attacks on these organisations and Iran, they are still standing albeit weaker. This means the “threats” to Israel remain, it also means that future conflicts between Israel and the US on one hand and Iran will continue as long as both Israel and the US refuse to accept the status quo. This reality brings us back to what the former prime minister of Qatar raised i.e., the strategic defence alliance in the region. Second, a need for the reconfiguration of the military arrangement in the region. The recent unprovoked attacks on Iran and its subsequent retaliation have added a momentum to these discussions. The attacks have also raised questions about the significance of the presence of US’s military bases in the region. Particularly, whether countries in the region should continue having strategic military partnerships with the US? Iran has insisted that US military bases in the region are legitimate targets and it will continue targeting them in retaliation and in defense of their people and sovereignty.
The conclusion therefore is that unless there is a reconfiguration of the security arrangements in the region, the US and Israel are likely to attack Iran again. Iran is likely to retaliate in the manner it is currently doing, targeting both Israel and US’s bases and infrastructure in the region. Iran has repeatedly said “it is not targeting its friendly neighbors rather the interests and assets of the US and Israel in the region”. Consequently, Gulf countries hosting these bases will continue to be targeted by Iran.
Big League War
By William Schryver | February 24, 2026
“What the West has, and has had for some time now, is a single-shot military. One serious campaign, whether finally won or lost, would disarm the West for a decade.” — Aurelien
This, folks, is the simple truth of the matter.
The US simply could not, at this moment — nor at any time in even the medium-term future — mount and sustain a campaign the size, intensity, and duration of what we have seen in Ukraine for the past four years.
US logistical chains would have long-since broken down; losses in men and equipment — including LOTS of heavy lift cargo aircraft and the refueling tankers upon which they depend to fly across the planet — would have been calamitous.
Oh, sure, in the context of the current crisis in the Middle East, there’s a huge chorus of people who are gung-ho convinced that US air and naval power would overcome all obstacles in a matter of days, bringing the presumptuous third-world Iranians to their knees.
That’s not what would happen.
What would happen is that, despite a few spectacular successes to stuff the first 24-hour news cycle, the “full-spectrum dominance” everyone believes the US wields would, over the course of just a few days, suffer shocking losses across the entire military spectrum.
Several US aircraft of all types would be shot down.
A few US warships would very likely be damaged — or possibly even sunk.
US bases in the Persian Gulf region would be pounded relentlessly by Iranian drones and ballistic missiles.
US air defenses would exhaust their meager stockpiles of interceptors within just a few days.
US airborne ISR assets would be aggressively targeted, and some could quite conceivably be shot down.
SEAD assets like the E/A-18G Growler and the F-16CJ Wild Weasels would prove more vulnerable to Iranian air defenses than is widely believed.
The legendary (but old and slow) Tomahawk cruise missiles would be jammed and / or shot down in surprising numbers — or even just malfunction on their own, as did 25% of a recent salvo of a dozen that was fired into Nigeria.
As even Israeli intelligence is reported to believe, the US force arrayed against Iran could only sustain high-intensity strikes for about FIVE days. After that, the US would start to experience severe shortages of all types of precision-guided munitions, greatly exacerbated by the degree to which Iranian strikes could attrit weapons stockpiles, destroy refueling tankers, and render runways unusable by boutique US aircraft that need everything to be perfectly pristine.
Iranian naval capability would very likely surprise many people around the world. Their small, fast missile boat swarms present a formidable asymmetric threat, and they have several small submarines that may prove sufficiently stealthy to sneak up on US warships, including the big lumbering US Ohio-class missile submarines.
Iran is by no means a major military power like Russia and China. But they are unquestionably an extremely formidable asymmetric military power, and they have been planning and preparing to fight an asymmetric war against the Americans for the past quarter century.
And if, as now appears almost certain, the Russians and Chinese provide Iran top-shelf intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, Iranian capabilities would be significantly augmented.
US naval officers confessed that the recent Battle of the Red Sea against the Houthi warriors of Yemen was the most intense combat the US Navy had experienced since WW2.
Iran possesses firepower an entire order of magnitude greater than the Houthi.
A two-week long high-intensity war against Iran would be a stunning exhibition of 21st century warfare.
It would be Big League War, rather than what the US has been fighting for the past several decades.
Both sides would be hurt badly, but the Iranians would not be severely depleted, let alone defeated, whereas the US would be hurt in a fashion it has not experienced in the memory of many people still alive — only to then look around and discover itself in a state of acute logistical crisis after only a fortnight of high-intensity combat operations.
That will be the moment of decision; the last chance for the saner heads within the halls of empire — those who have hitherto acquiesced as this catastrophe unfolded — to choose to finally act to stop the madness, or stand idly by as they and all the rest of us are acted upon by events that spiral out of control.
Israel ready to strike Iran-backed armed groups – media
RT | February 20, 2026
Israel’s military is preparing to launch large-scale pre-emptive strikes on Iran-backed armed groups across the Middle East in order to prevent them from lending support to Tehran in any potential regional conflict, the Saudi daily Asharq Al-Awsat reported on Friday.
Israeli military sources told the newspaper that West Jerusalem has engaged mediators to warn Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and armed factions in Iraq that any attack against Israel would be met with a “massive and unprecedented response.”
The sources said that Israeli defense officials believe Tehran is pushing its regional allies to take part in any potential escalation after concluding that their limited involvement in the 12-day Israel-Iran war was a strategic mistake.
Iran has allocated substantial resources, including an estimated $1 billion in 2025, to bolster its allies’ ability to strike targets in Israel and the region, the sources claimed.
Israeli assessments cited by the paper suggest that Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq is reluctant to take part in a confrontation, while Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis are more likely to participate.
The IDF said on Thursday it had carried out airstrikes on alleged Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon. Despite a fragile US-brokered ceasefire, Israel has routinely attacked its northern neighbor, accusing it of violating its side of their agreement.
The Houthis, who control much of Yemen, have halted missile and drone attacks on Israel and its commercial shipping in the Red Sea since the truce with Gaza was signed in October, after repeatedly targeting vessels in what they said was solidarity with Palestinians.
On Thursday, US President Donald Trump set a ten-day deadline for Iran to reach a nuclear deal with Washington, saying that failure to comply could trigger decisive measures. The warning followed Omani-mediated talks in Geneva on Tuesday, which both sides described as a positive step, although no breakthrough was made. At the same time, the US accelerated its troop buildup in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also warned about preparations for possible missile strikes on Iran. “We are prepared for any scenario,” he said, adding “they will experience a response they cannot even imagine.”
The US struck Iran’s nuclear sites during the 12-day Israel-Iran air war in June 2025. Tehran has maintained that its nuclear program is peaceful and has vowed it will not be deterred. Tehran’s UN envoy Amir Saeid Iravani reiterated on Thursday that Iran “will not initiate any war,” but will respond resolutely to being attacked.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the US of “playing with fire” and warned that strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites could lead to disaster.
In an interview with Al Arabiya aired on Wednesday, Lavrov said Moscow backs Tehran’s right to peaceful enrichment, adding that the current tensions stem from the US tearing up the 2015 Iran nuclear deal during Trump’s first term.
Riyadh and Hezbollah: A rapprochement forged in fire
As Lebanon becomes an unlikely stage for a slow Saudi pivot toward pragmatism, regional rifts with allies and foes alike compel Riyadh to recalculate its hard lines.
By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | January 29, 2026
Lebanon, once more, reflects the fault lines tearing through the Arab world. But this time, the ground is moving. The era of blockades and isolation is ceding to a colder, more calculated politics – and at its core lies an unlikely dialogue: between Hezbollah and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
As The Cradle observed last month on ‘Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente,’ behind-the-scenes communication between the two has laid groundwork for a quiet thaw. Recent developments have accelerated this shift, compelling the kingdom to reassess both threats and alliances. The signals are no longer limited to backchannels.
They are becoming visible across Lebanon’s political, economic, and media fronts. This suggests that rapprochement is no longer a theoretical discussion but an unfolding process reshaping both the Lebanese and regional scene.
Economic tremors, political signals
Saudi repositioning on Lebanon and Hezbollah has taken shape across multiple fronts. Economic pressures are easing, political language is softening, and discourse on the resistance movement’s disarmament is adapting to new realities. These changes track with the Saudi–Hezbollah talks and reflect broader drivers such as domestic demands in Lebanon, urgent regional recalculations, and Hezbollah’s calibrated outreach.
Sources tell The Cradle the talks have already produced results, with Riyadh stepping away from its previous economic blockade. That shift is becoming tangible across Lebanon.
The economic front offers the clearest evidence. During a visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, flanked by a senior economic team, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signaled readiness to deepen Beirut–Tehran ties. In Lebanon, such moves usually require nods from Riyadh or Washington.
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, known for his Saudi ties, announced the launch of reconstruction in southern Lebanon within two weeks, with plans to accelerate rebuilding efforts. This follows parliamentary approval of a World Bank loan – an indication of intent to harness regional momentum. Salam also flagged upcoming agreements with Riyadh.
Simultaneously, the long-dormant file of Lebanese depositors was revived in cabinet through a proposed financial reorganization and deposit recovery law. This legislation lays the groundwork for closing the financial gap and gradually repaying deposits.
The reopening of this file after years of stagnation reflects not only domestic pressure but also a new political and financial environment shaped by waning external pressure and the rollback of the economic suffocation policy previously imposed on Lebanon.
Changing tones in Beirut
Political and media rhetoric in Lebanon is also adjusting, particularly among factions with Saudi leanings. The Lebanese Forces (LF) offer a striking example. Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raji’s tone during Araghchi’s visit was notably tempered compared to previous Iranian delegations. While his broader stance may still reflect internal party lines, it is important to note that the LF is not entirely Saudi-aligned and intersects with Washington’s foreign policy.
Equally notable is the near absence of the usual Saudi-linked media campaigns. Outlets and figures typically vocal during such visits stayed quiet. That silence reflects a broader repositioning.
Media sources also say Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Waleed Bukhari has privately conveyed Riyadh’s interest in engaging Lebanon’s Shia leaders, moving beyond the image of a sectarian boycott.
The weapons file: A vocabulary shift
A recalibration is also visible in official discourse around Hezbollah’s arms. Where previous rhetoric focused on “disarmament” or exclusive control south of the Litani River, a new phrase has emerged: weapons “containment” north of the Litani. This lexical shift reflects a more tempered and strategic approach.
On one level, it indicates closer coordination – both internally and with external stakeholders – and a move away from maximalist demands. On another, it aligns with a broader political posture from Riyadh to reduce friction and avoid escalation.
During a recent visit to Beirut, Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan told Lebanese officials that while Riyadh supports arms being under state authority, the process must proceed with reason and avoid internal disruption. This was widely read as a message tailored to Hezbollah.
His remark that Saudi Arabia has “no problem … with any of the Lebanese components,” mirrored Hezbollah’s framing of a national defense dialogue. More pointedly, his call for calm in the process echoed the group’s insistence that change must come through consensus, not coercion.
Wariness of war, new parliamentary cues
Another clear signal of Saudi recalibration is its growing resistance to military escalation in Lebanon. Once expressed obliquely, this position is now surfacing in both private meetings and public statements from Saudi-aligned figures.
Reports from Israel’s Channel 12, citing unnamed Saudi royals, pointed to Riyadh’s refusal to countenance any military operation against Lebanon. Such red lines bolster Hezbollah’s messaging and complicate Tel Aviv’s threat matrix.
This shift was also evident in the 18 January parliamentary session, where quorum battles pitted Hezbollah and the Amal Movement – referred to in Lebanon as the Shia Duo – against the LF. Samir Geagea, the long-standing LF leader and vocal advocate for Hezbollah’s disarmament, reportedly urged the Saudi envoy to discourage Sunni MPs from attending. The attempt fell flat. Sunni MPs aligned with Riyadh showed up anyway.
In this context, Hezbollah Political Council member Ghaleb Abu Zainab tells The Cradle:
“In principle, we want our relations with Arab states to be positive – built on mutual respect and shared interests in Lebanon and the Arab world. This, of course, includes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which holds significant Arab and Islamic weight in the region.”
Riyadh’s Persian Gulf equation is shifting
The Hezbollah track is one part of a larger Saudi recalibration, driven by new regional pressures. Yemen, Sudan, the Red Sea, and Lebanon are all areas where Riyadh now sees mounting friction with longtime Gulf ally, the UAE.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains uneasy. While it sought to contain Emirati actions in the south, Abu Dhabi’s moves – including a controlled pullback from certain zones – have sparked concern. The fugitive leader of the now-dissolved Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zubaidi’s remarks from Abu Dhabi about pursuing southern independence, coupled with the assassination attempt on Giants Brigade commander Hamdi Shukri al-Subaihi and subsequent protests, have raised alarms in Riyadh.
In Sudan, Saudi Arabia is backing the official government in Khartoum, preparing for a potential confrontation with the UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Riyadh facilitated a $1.5-billion deal with Pakistan to supply weapons, air defense systems, and drones to the Sudanese army, signaling its intent to push back on Emirati encroachment – part of a broader regional re-ordering described as a response to Abu Dhabi’s growing alignment with Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reports of a possible military presence there have added another layer of anxiety – a new Israeli footprint near the Red Sea.
Confronting Emirati ambitions
Lebanon is not exempt. Saudi officials now suspect that Abu Dhabi is maneuvering for influence in Beirut. The LF, with its alignment to the UAE–Israel axis, is part of this concern. The scandal involving “Abu Omar” – a man posing as a Saudi prince who reportedly ran Lebanese political operations – reinforced concerns that the UAE filled the Saudi void during Riyadh’s absence.
Sources note that Qatar has also intensified its presence in Lebanon, funding figures like those in the Free Patriotic Movement. Whether this is in coordination with Riyadh or not, it contributes to a crowded Gulf rivalry playing out in Beirut.
In response, Riyadh is reassessing its Lebanese allies. The “Abu Omar” affair reportedly prompted the kingdom to question the seriousness of some of its former clients – many of whom failed to deliver either politically or in terms of security. This realization has made Riyadh more cautious and less inclined to repeat past mistakes.
The kingdom is now leaning on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s Ain al-Tineh as a channel to Hezbollah – a more direct and realistic track. Hezbollah remains the decisive force in Lebanon, and Riyadh now appears willing to operate within that reality.
Even former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri’s future is under reconsideration. A political source stresses that a return through the Emirati channel would lead to deep divisions, especially within the Hariri household itself, as the Emirati project does not align with his personality or political legacy. One of the main reasons for his withdrawal from public life was his refusal at the time to follow the Saudi call for a civil war – a demand that reflected the Emirati approach. Therefore, the Saudi option remains the most realistic path for Hariri, capable of reintegrating him into the political scene and ensuring the unity of the Sunni community under Riyadh’s umbrella rather than fragmenting it through external projects.
These developments mark a broader unveiling of the long-simmering Saudi–Emirati rivalry. Riyadh is now moving quickly to neutralize manageable disputes and focus on what it increasingly sees as its main challenge: Abu Dhabi.
In the end, it is clear that the Saudi–Hezbollah rapprochement is not a sudden development but the product of mounting regional pressures and internal constraints that have made pragmatism not a choice – but a necessity.
Regime Change In Iran Is The Final Phase Of The ‘Clean Break’ Strategy
The Dissident | January 21, 2026
Lindsey Graham, the Neo-con Republican Senator, at the Zionist Tzedek conference, gave the real reason for America’s policy of regime change in Iran, namely to isolate the Palestinians in the Middle East and pave the way for Israeli domination.
Graham, referring to regime change in Iran said, “If we can pull this off, it would be the biggest change in the Middle East in a thousand years: Hamas, Hezbollah gone, the Houthis gone, the Iranian people an ally not an enemy, the Arab world moving towards Israel without fear, Saudi-Israel normalize, no more October the 7th”.
In other words, Lindsey Graham and the U.S. believe that regime change in Iran would lead to the collapse of Palestinian resistance and allied groups Hezbollah and Ansar Allah and lead Middle Eastern powers to normalize with Israel without any concessions to Palestinians, thus paving the way for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza and the West Bank, and further expansion into Syria and Lebanon in service of the Greater Israel project.
This motive is not only driving the desire for regime change in Iran, but has been the main motive for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since 9/11, not fighting a “war on terror”.
In 1996, key figures who ended up in high level positions in the Bush administration, such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, who were at the time advising the newly elected Benjamin Netanyahu, sent him a letter titled, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm”, which called on him to make a “clean break” from peace talks with Palestinians and instead focus on isolating them in the region, first a for-most by, “removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right”.
Netanyahu kept to his word and made his “Clean Break” from the Oslo Accords during his first term as Prime Minister, later boasting:
how he forced former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to agree to let Israel alone determine which parts of the West Bank were to be defined as military zones. ‘They didn’t want to give me that letter,’ Netanyahu said, ‘so I didn’t give them the Hebron agreement [the agreement giving Hebron back to the Palestinians]. I cut the cabinet meeting short and said, ‘I’m not signing.’ Only when the letter came, during that meeting, to me and to Arafat, did I ratify the Hebron agreement. Why is this important? Because from that moment on, I de facto put an end to the Oslo accords.”
Soon after, the authors of the clean break document became key advisors on the Middle East in the George W. Bush administration.
After 9/11, they used the attack to carry out the “important Israeli strategic objective” of “removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq”, who was seen as too sympathetic to Palestinians.
As David Wurmser, one of the authors of the clean break document and the Middle East Adviser to former US Vice President Dick Cheney, later admitted , “In terms of Israel, we wanted Yasser Arafat not to have the cavalry over the horizon in terms of Saddam”.
George W. Bush aide, Philip Zelikow said , “the real threat (from Iraq) (is) the threat against Israel”, “this is the threat that dare not speak its name, because the Europeans don’t care deeply about that threat”, “the American government doesn’t want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell”.
But for Israel and the Bush administration, the war in Iraq was just the first phase of the “clean break strategy”, to take out all of Israel’s enemies in the Middle East.
As the U.S. General Wesley Clark revealed the clean break went from a plan to take out Saddam Hussein in Iraq to a plan to “take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and, finishing off, Iran”. (Emphasis added)
As Clark later explained on the Piers Morgan show, the list came from a study which was “paid for by the Israelis” and said, “if you want to protect Israel, and you want Israel to succeed… you’ve got to get rid of the states that are surrounding”.
With every other country on the hit list either weakened (Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan) or taken out (Iraq, Libya, Syria) from the ensuing years of U.S. and Israeli intervention, Neo-cons and Zionists see Iran as the last bulwark in the way of carrying out the Clean Break plan.
Eilat port faces worst crisis as Red Sea shipping collapses
Al Mayadeen | January 12, 2026
The southern port of Eilat in occupied Palestine is facing the most severe crisis in its history, with operations nearly paralyzed for more than two years amid disruptions to Red Sea shipping routes, attacks on vessels, and escalating regional tensions, according to Yedioth Ahronoth.
The newspaper reported that port workers arrive each morning to empty docks, prepared to work, but with no ships docking. Once generating around 240 million shekels annually, the port’s revenues have dropped to almost zero, while government assistance has amounted to just 15 million shekels.
According to the report, the General Federation of Labor, the Histadrut, pledged an additional 5 million shekels to prevent layoffs, but the funds have yet to be delivered due to a suspected conflict-of-interest scandal involving its head, Arnon Bar-David.
The crisis has been compounded by a recent decision by the finance and transport ministries not to extend the port’s operating concession, citing failure to meet required conditions. Port management is reportedly preparing to challenge the decision and demand that the government reverse its stance.
Yedioth Ahronoth noted that operations at the Port of Eilat came to a complete halt after Sanaa seized a vessel bound for the port in November 2023. This followed what had been a record year, with around 150,000 vehicles handled by October 2023 and expectations of another 15,000 arrivals.
Port finance vice president Batya Zafrani said that on the day of the incident, shipping companies NYK and ZIM suspended deliveries for several months. “We thought the government would intervene, but after three months we began worrying about the workers’ future,” she said, adding that the 15 million shekels in government aid would only cover two months of operations.
Avi Hormaro, chairman of the Eilat port and chief executive of the Nakash Group, criticized the government’s handling of the crisis, saying the Israeli occupation authorities had neglected the port. “The transport ministry is making efforts, but other ministries are not interested,” he said.
Hormaro added that just as Kiryat Shmona had been forgotten, the port was also being sidelined, arguing that “a group in Yemen is deciding for the Israeli occupation whether it has a southern port or not.” He stressed that responsibility for keeping Red Sea shipping lanes open lies with the government, not the port authority.
Eilat port shut down due to debt
The Israeli economic media outlet The Marker reported in July that the port of Eilat will completely cease operations starting next Sunday after the city municipality froze its bank accounts due to millions of shekels in accumulated debts.
This development comes as the port has faced near-total paralysis since November 2023, when Yemen imposed a naval blockade on ships heading to “Israel”, leading to a sharp decline in revenue and a collapse in commercial activity at the facility.
The Eilat Municipality announced that it had frozen the port’s bank accounts due to massive accumulated debts, and according to the Israeli economic outlet The Marker, all operations will come to a complete halt starting Sunday, signaling a total economic shutdown of the port.
The crisis at Eilat Port began when Yemeni forces imposed a naval blockade on ships heading to “Israel,” prompting international shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea route, which brought the port’s operations to a near standstill and caused a collapse in its revenue.
UAE begins ‘hurried evacuation’ from Somali air base: Report
The Cradle | January 12, 2026
The UAE has begun evacuating security personnel and heavy military equipment from Somalia, after officials in Mogadishu reportedly suspended Emirati use of their territory and airspace for military operations, Middle East Eye (MEE) reported on 12 January.
The Somali government informed the Emiratis that “all their military activities in Somalia, including the use of airspace and the landing of cargo military aircraft in Bosaso, Berbera and Mogadishu, had been suspended,” a senior Somali official told MEE, speaking on condition of anonymity.
The official said the UAE now appears to be evacuating its security personnel and military equipment to neighboring Ethiopia.
Citing flight-tracking data and two eyewitnesses, MEE reported that an average of six IL-76 cargo aircraft have arrived and departed the air base in Bosaso – the port city in Somalia’s Puntland – each day over recent days.
One source speaking with the UK news outlet described the flights as “resembling a hurried evacuation.”
“Unlike previous operations, where incoming cargo would be immediately transferred to another aircraft on standby, these planes have been arriving over several days, loaded with heavy military equipment, and departed without delay,” a source at Bosaso air base told MEE, describing the activity as highly unusual.
The UAE has long used Somalia as a rear operational base for its military engagements in both Sudan and Yemen. It had been using Bosaso’s port and airport in recent years to send weapons, mercenaries, and supplies to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is fighting a civil war against Sudan’s military.
Bosaso is part of a cluster of airfields the UAE has constructed in an effort to dominate the southern end of the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.
According to a source in Somalia’s federal government, Mogadishu has revoked the agreement allowing the UAE to use the Bosaso air base and other facilities in the country.
Somali authorities opened an investigation into Emirati activities at Bosaso after the UAE used the air base to help a Yemeni separatist leader escape to the Gulf nation.
The separatist leader, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, is the president of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC).
He was wanted by Saudi Arabia amid fighting between the STC and Saudi-backed forces in Yemen that began in December. The UAE was supporting the STC’s bid to take territory from the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in hopes of creating an independent state in southern Yemen.
Zubaidi was supposed to travel to Saudi Arabia for talks to end the violence, but the UAE secretly helped him escape to Abu Dhabi. He first traveled by ship to the breakaway region of Somaliland, then boarded a plane at the Bosaso air base to travel to the UAE.
After helping Zubaidi escape, the Somali government informed the Emiratis that all their military activities in Somalia were suspended.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are increasingly competing for influence in both Yemen and Somalia.
The UAE is closely aligned with Israel, which has supported Somaliland in its effort to gain formal independence from Somalia.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has supported Somalia’s unity and established closer relations with officials in Mogadishu.
Saudi officials held an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation conference on Somalia over the weekend and rallied the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to issue statements in support of Somalia’s unity after Israel recognized Somaliland.
Pakistan, the Gulf, and the high cost of Zionist alignment
By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | January 6, 2026
Geopolitics is most dangerous not when it erupts, but when it reorganises quietly — when the ground shifts beneath familiar alliances while elites continue to speak the language of yesterday. The Gulf today is in precisely such a moment. What once masqueraded as a coherent bloc has fractured into rival power models, incompatible strategic visions, and diverging relationships to empire, Israel, and popular legitimacy. And Pakistan, true to form, is responding not with strategic intelligence but with institutional reflex — confusing obedience with balance and habit with foresight.
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is no longer a matter of speculation or diplomatic gossip. It is an open contradiction — political, military, and infrastructural. Yemen has exposed it. Israel has radicalised it. The United States, particularly under Trumpism, has weaponised it. And Pakistan’s ruling elite — military and civilian alike — has chosen to drift toward the most toxic pole of this fracture while reassuring itself that it is merely being “pragmatic.” It is not. It is being complicit.
Two Gulf projects, one moral abyss
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are still lazily grouped together by analysts who mistake shared authoritarianism for shared strategy. This is intellectual malpractice. The two monarchies are pursuing fundamentally different regional projects.
Saudi Arabia’s current posture — hardly virtuous, often cynical, and deeply reactionary — nevertheless reflects a begrudging recognition of reality. After years of disastrous interventionism, Riyadh wants consolidation. It wants borders quieted, fires contained, and regional fragmentation slowed. Its outreach to Iran, cautious engagement with the
Houthis, and growing hostility to separatist militias are not gestures of enlightenment but acts of self-preservation. Endless chaos undermines Saudi ambitions at home.
The Emirati project is the opposite — and far more dangerous. Abu Dhabi does not seek order through states; it seeks domination through fragments. Ports, islands, militias, mercenaries, logistics corridors, surveillance hubs — these are its tools. Sovereignty is irrelevant. Fragmentation is not a failure; it is a business model.
If Saudi Arabia is a reactionary status-quo power, the UAE is a hyperactive destabiliser — an empire of nodes, happy to burn regions so long as trade flows and leverage compounds.
Yemen: Where the lie finally died
Yemen is where the fiction of Gulf unity collapsed beyond repair. What began as a joint intervention has devolved into a struggle over whether Yemen will exist at all as a state. The House of Saud — bloodied, embarrassed, and exposed — now insists on a unified Yemeni authority capable of enforcing borders and agreements. The UAE has invested
instead in carving out a southern enclave: separatist militias, port control, island bases, and economic chokeholds.
For Riyadh, this is existential. A fragmented Yemen exports instability directly into Saudi territory and sabotages any negotiated settlement with the Houthis. For Abu Dhabi, fragmentation is leverage — control of chokepoints matters more than Yemen’s survival as a polity.
That Saudi Arabia has now openly bombed weapons shipments linked to UAE-backed forces and issued public warnings is extraordinary. Gulf disputes are traditionally smothered in silence. When they go kinetic and public, it signals not a spat but a structural rupture. Pakistan’s establishment sees this — and chooses denial.
Israel: The cancer at the core
To understand the Emirati recklessness, one must confront the real axis around which it revolves: Apartheid, genocidal Israel.
The Abraham Accords were not peace agreements; they were an integration pact into Zionist regional supremacy. Israel does not merely occupy Palestine; it exports a model — militarised impunity, surveillance capitalism, permanent war dressed as security. The UAE did not normalize with Israel reluctantly. It embraced Israel as a force multiplier.
Israel provides Abu Dhabi with access to Washington’s coercive machinery, advanced surveillance, cyberwarfare, and a propaganda ecosystem that converts mass death into “stability.” In return, the UAE provides geography, ports, islands, mercenaries, and political insulation — doing Israel’s dirty work where Tel Aviv prefers not to appear.
Sudan. Somaliland. Socotra. Cyprus. The Red Sea. These are not isolated projects; they are components of a Zionist–Emirati expansion strategy designed to insulate Israel from economic pressure and accountability while strangling any resistance corridor before it matures.
Israel is the disease. The UAE is its most enthusiastic carrier.
Pakistan’s elite: Zionism in uniform and suits
Pakistan’s tragedy is not that it lacks options. It is that its ruling elite lacks dignity.
Rather than reassess its position amid this fracture, Pakistan’s military–civilian elite clings to the rhetoric of “balance” while deepening structural entanglement with the Emirati–Israeli axis. Ports, airports, logistics terminals, military-linked corporations — these are not neutral investments. They are instruments of alignment.
Pakistan’s generals and their civilian accessories imagine they are playing geopolitics. In reality, they are being used as infrastructure — cheap, deniable, disposable. Their behaviour is not naïveté. It is covert Zionism: collaboration without confession, obedience without ideological honesty. They mouth solidarity with Palestine while embedding Pakistan’s economy and security apparatus deeper into a regional order built to protect Israel from consequences. This is not pragmatism. It is moral and strategic bankruptcy.
Venezuela: When empire drops the mask
The illusion that empire prefers subtlety should have died long ago. Venezuela put the lie to it.
When sanctions failed and proxy pressure proved insufficient, the United States escalated —directly. US special forces were involved in a scandalous operation that culminated in the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. This was not deniable proxy warfare. It was naked imperial contempt for sovereignty.
And what happens if Washington’s decapitation move fails at complete regime change in Caracas? Silence. Zero accountability. Empire simply moves on.
This is the future Pakistan’s elite is courting. When alignment fails to deliver stability, the costs will not be borne by Washington, Tel Aviv, or Abu Dhabi. They will be borne by Pakistan. Empire does not protect collaborators. It discards them.
Saudi Arabia: A lesser evil, still an evil
Saudi Arabia deserves no absolution. The House of Saud remains a reactionary monarchy, structurally hostile to popular sovereignty and deeply entangled with empire. Its version of “stability” is still oppression — merely quieter than the Emirati inferno.
Yet the difference matters. Saudi Arabia understands that Zionist expansionism generates perpetual instability. The UAE celebrates it. Riyadh conceals its servitude; Abu Dhabi flaunts it.
Pakistan’s elite has chosen to tilt slightly more towards the louder master.
Trumpism: Empire without shame
Hovering over this landscape is Trumpism — the ideological nakedness of empire. Trump dispenses with liberal hypocrisy entirely. Loyalty is transactional. Morality is a joke. Strongmen are preferred to institutions. Israel is sacred. Everyone else is expendable.
The UAE fits this worldview perfectly: ruthless, efficient, unburdened by public opinion. Pakistan’s rulers mistake proximity to this axis for relevance. In truth, it entrenches their subordination.
When things go wrong — as they inevitably will — Trumpism will shrug. Pakistan will bleed.
The reckoning Pakistan is avoiding
The Gulf is not merely fracturing; it is sorting. States will be forced to choose — between sovereignty and fragmentation, between justice and normalisation, between dignity and managed submission.
Pakistan’s establishment has already chosen. It just lacks the courage to admit it. History will not judge Pakistan for failing to be the Mafia Don of West Asia. It will judge it for failing to recognise a moral and strategic crossroads when it stood directly upon it.
The UAE will continue to burn regions in service of Zionism. Israel will continue its genocidal project. The United States will continue to kidnap, sanction, and discard. Saudi Arabia will continue to pretend restraint equals virtue.
And Pakistan — unless it breaks from habit — will continue confusing servitude for strategy.
Israel and the politics of fragmentation: The hidden hand behind secessionist projects in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya
By Ahmed Asmar | MEMO | January 3, 2026
Israel’s malicious, meddling role in the Arab countries has long extended beyond direct military confrontation, as seen in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. For long, Tel Aviv has pursued a quieter yet dangerous strategy of encouraging fragmentation, weakening central states, and cultivating ties with separatist actors in fragile and war-torn countries. Today, this pattern is increasingly clear and visible in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya; three countries that suffer from prolonged conflicts, administrative collapse, and foreign interference. In each case, Israel’s footprint is not accidental; it serves a broader strategic doctrine aimed at dividing Arab countries, controlling critical waterways, and reshaping the regional balance of power to its advantage and dominance.
Yemen: secession as a gateway to normalisation
In Yemen, Israel’s indirect involvement surfaces through its alignment with the so-called Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist entity seeking to reestablish an independent state in southern Yemen. While the Yemeni conflict is often framed as a regional proxy war, the STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has openly, and on several occasions, signaled willingness to normalize relations with Israel. He publicly declared that recognizing Israel is not an obstacle if southern Yemen’s independence is achieved; an extraordinary statement that was slammed by many Yemeni public figures and politicians.
This declaration is not merely rhetorical. Yemen’s southern geography grants access to some of the most sensitive maritime corridors in the world, particularly near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. For Israel, influence over forces operating near this chokepoint aligns with its long-standing objective of securing Red Sea navigation and countering its perceived regional adversaries. Supporting or encouraging secessionist forces in southern Yemen offers Israel a strategic foothold without formal military deployment, turning internal Yemeni fragmentation into a geopolitical asset, and posing a direct threat against the Arab countries, especially the littoral countries of the Red Sea – Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Somalia: Somaliland and the militarisation of recognition
Somalia presents an even clearer case of Israel exploiting separatism for strategic gain. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland, unrecognised by the international community, has actively sought foreign backing to legitimise its secession. Israel’s contacts and recognition of Somaliland’s de-facto authorities mark a dangerous precedent in international relations, and against the international law and the UN charter.
The strategic motivation is transparent. Somaliland’s coastline also overlooks the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud warned of the Israeli malicious plan behind such recognition, where he said that Israel seeks from recognising Somaliland to resettle Palestinians from Gaza, who experienced a two-year genocide, and most importantly, to host an Israeli military or intelligence base. These plans are added to the dangers of undermining Somalia’s territorial integrity and encouraging further fragmentations across the Horn of Africa.
Israel’s move to recognize a secessionist entity reflects how Israel exploits weak entities and divided states to move ahead with its expansionist and dominance strategies at the expense of the region and its people.
Libya: Haftar and the normalisation through the back door
Not far from the examples in Yemen and Somalia, in Libya, Israel’s role is more discreet but visible too. General Khalifa Haftar, who controls eastern Libya and has long sought international legitimacy, reportedly maintained contacts with Israeli officials as part of efforts to secure external backing. These interactions fit within a wider pattern of covert normalization between Israel and authoritarian or factional actors seeking foreign support in exchange for political concessions.
Libya’s fragmentation has turned it into fertile ground for foreign manipulation. Israel’s engagement with Haftar is surely not about peace or stability, but about influence, leverage, and having a close foot near its surrounding Arab countries.
Fragmentation as a strategic doctrine
Altogether, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya illustrate a consistent Israeli strategy: exploiting internal conflicts to advance a regional agenda based on fragmentation. This approach intersects with Israel’s ongoing territorial expansion and military aggression, from its occupation of Palestinian land to its violations of sovereignty in Syria and Lebanon. Fragmented Arab states are less capable of resisting Israeli policies and more exposed to normalization under opportunistic conditions.
Israel’s encouragement of secessionist movements is not about supporting self-determination; it is about redrawing the region into weaker, smaller entities incapable of collective action. This strategy directly threatens Arab national security as a whole, adding a new dimension to Israel’s expansionism.
At a time when the Arab world faces unprecedented challenges, recognising and confronting this hidden hand of fragmentation is essential. While ignoring Israel’s role in these secessionist projects risks allowing instability to become permanent, solely in favor of Israel in the region and beyond.
Proxy Regime: Understanding the UAE-Israeli Conspiracy in Yemen, Saudi Arabia
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | January 2, 2026
The reason why the recent feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is important is that it paves the way to a totally different reality on the ground.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were once viewed as a unified power in Yemen; any semblance of such an alliance is now crumbling. As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain at loggerheads, it is clear that Tel Aviv is a key driver of the escalation across Yemeni territory.
Saudi Arabia had recently released a sternly worded statement condemning their Gulf neighbors in the United Arab Emirates, following the armed takeover of the Hadramaut and al-Mahra provinces by the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces. Saudi airstrikes were also launched, largely on soft targets as a warning, which prompted the UAE to announce the withdrawal of all its forces from the country.
The war in Yemen is one of the most underreported and misrepresented conflicts in the region, which often makes it difficult to decipher what is truly transpiring. What is important to understand here is that Abu Dhabi’s role inside Yemen is in large part driven by Israeli interests, which will not only potentially lead to blowback against the UAE itself, but also aims to destabilize the entire Arabian Peninsula. This is part and parcel of forging a way forward toward the “Greater Israel Project”.
The reason why the recent feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is important is that it paves the way to a totally different reality on the ground. In 2015, the Ansarallah movement took over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and received the backing of roughly two-thirds of the nation’s armed forces in doing so.
As a revolutionary Islamic movement, Ansarallah’s seizure of power was interpreted as an immediate challenge to the rulers across Arabia. Considering the long history of violence between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in particular, it was no surprise that tensions immediately rose. Yet, the Saudi-led coalition that initiated the war on Yemen to overthrow the newly ushered in Ansarallah leadership (often incorrectly referred to as “the Houthis”), was not driven by its own interests alone.
In fact, the US, UK, and Israel were in the picture from the very start and it was former American President Barack Obama who gave the green light for the war, which eventually resulted in the deaths of around 400,000 people. Saudi Arabia, for its part, decided to back the deposed president of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, using his position and control over what is called the “internationally recognized government” of Yemen as its excuse for legitimacy for action inside the country.
The United Arab Emirates had instead thrown its weight behind southern separatists in Yemen’s south, with the goal of securing the strategic port city of Aden. Prior to 1990, Yemen was divided between north and south, yet there has always been the presence of separatist elements there. Without delving into the nation’s long history, the British had strategically occupied southern Yemen, utilizing the strategic port of Aden as a tool of empire; the UAE clearly sees the geostrategic weight of this location also.
After years of horrifying war, mass starvation due to the Saudi-US-imposed blockade, and a situation that began to come to a stalemate, by early 2022 Yemen’s Ansarallah-led government had not only established a strong, rooted rule, but the Yemeni Armed Forces under its command had clearly made breakthroughs in military technology. It had launched devastating long-range drone and missile attacks against not only Saudi Arabia, but also the UAE, even making a point of striking the Emiratis while Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited.
It wasn’t long until a ceasefire was reached, brokered by the United Nations, one that has largely held until now. Following the ceasefire, in April of 2022, the Saudi government created what is known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). The PLC’s leader, sometimes referred to as the internationally recognized president of Yemen, is a man named Rashad al-Alimi, presiding over an eight-member council that is not elected by the Yemeni people.
The PLC, or “internationally recognized government,” was then based in Aden, and three of its seats were granted to members of the Emirati proxy group called the STC, the separatist militia that Abu Dhabi backed to seize Aden. Despite promising prosperity to the people in southern Yemen and not being under the same sanctions as Ansarallah’s government in Sana’a, the living conditions in the south continued to deteriorate and have since led to countless protests and even riots.
In early December, the STC suddenly swept over the eastern provinces of al-Mahra and Hadramaut, even forcing some Saudi-backed PLC officials to flee Aden. The Emirati proxy separatists have since openly declared their intent to divide Yemen and separate southern Yemen from the north, which is controlled by Ansarallah. This takeover meant that some 80% of the country’s oil resources fell into the hands of the Emirati-backed STC.
The takeover of these provinces also proved a massive threat to both Saudi and Omani security in the eyes of their leadership. The primary armed faction that fights for the southern separatist cause is called the “Southern Giants Brigades”, a large element of which are Salafist extremists, with former Al-Qaeda fighters forming the most experienced core of the militant organization.
Just as the UAE has been backing ISIS-linked gangs in the Gaza Strip to fight Hamas, it utilizes Salafist extremists in Yemen to fight its battles for it also. Evidently, such a powerful militia force is viewed rightly as a threat to regional stability.
Riyadh saw these recent developments as a major challenge to its regional project and stability. Not only because of the potential issues along its border, but also the birth of a new reality on the ground inside Yemen that will further weaken the “internationally recognized government” that they back.
If the UAE’s proxy forces succeed, despite the Emiratis withdrawing their own forces, then the STC will push for separation and undermine the Saudis’ role entirely. There is also a good chance that the Emirati proxy forces will launch an offensive aimed at seizing the Red Sea port city of Hodeidah from Ansarallah. Israel was seeking this outcome in early 2025, when it convinced the Trump administration to fight Ansarallah on its behalf, an attack which resulted in a resounding failure.
The Israelis not only maintain close ties with the Emirati-backed STC but have also directly participated in training their forces. Israel and the UAE have also established joint military positions in areas of Yemen, like the island of Socotra.
Recently, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland as a nation. Little attention has been paid to the fact that the UAE has quietly recognized Somaliland also; in fact, the UAE-Israeli cooperation and support for the separatist movement in Somalia goes well beyond recognition.
The Somaliland connection is key here. Some analysts have mentioned the value of the Berbera Port area to Israel and focused on the Israeli desire to build a military presence there for the sake of attacking Yemen. While this is true, it was actually the UAE that began to build the Berbera airbase in Somaliland back in 2017 and has invested greatly in establishing a military foothold there.
The UAE-Israeli alliance to establish dominance in North Africa and the Horn of Africa is directly tied to Yemen. So much so that the Emiratis used militants from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—who are currently carrying out genocidal acts against the people of their own country—to fight in Yemen against Ansarallah.
All of this being said, if the UAE proxy forces succeed, it will certainly prove a major issue and lead to enormous bloodshed, yet the STC will not likely defeat Ansarallah, even with high-altitude air support provided by Israel. In fact, once Saudi Arabia is effectively out of the picture, Ansarallah will have one primary enemy to confront with full force: the United Arab Emirates.
The UAE, unlike Saudi Arabia, is a tiny country that is primarily made up of immigrants and foreign workers; it does not have a capable military, despite its Hollywood-style parades that it uses to try and demonstrate this. A sustained missile and drone attack campaign from the Yemeni Armed Forces will very likely be enough to force the UAE to wave the white flag.
Even if some kind of agreement is eventually reached as a result of the UAE being battered into submission—one that does not bring about an Ansarallah takeover that unifies the country—the Saudis will end up having to sign an agreement with Sana’a to properly end the conflict.
Riyadh understood this all well, which is why it quickly acted to draw red lines. It is more in Saudi Arabia’s interests to keep the status quo for now, because the UAE’s moves could end up creating a nightmare situation for it in the future. Saudi Arabia does not want a strong, unified Yemen under the control of Ansarallah; it will only accept a Yemeni leadership that bows to it, and like past Yemeni governments, bows to the West, while refusing to utilize the nation’s immense resource wealth and harness the power of its location.
Israel, on the other hand, most certainly will not accept a united Yemen under Ansarallah’s rule, but is adamant about “making them pay” for daring to impose a Red Sea blockade and fight in defense of Gaza. Therefore, the Israelis are willing to work with the UAE to totally destabilize the region in order to take a stab at dealing a major blow to Ansarallah and asserting their dominance.
It is unclear where exactly this is all heading, but it is possible that we may eventually see a drastic change in the situation on the ground, one which will perhaps lead to Saudi Arabia adopting a different posture toward the UAE altogether. It also appears that Tel Aviv is angry about Riyadh refusing to normalize ties, which could well have factored into this latest move. It is important to consider that the Emiratis will not move a fingernail without Israeli approval in this regard; they are, in essence, a proxy regime of Tel Aviv at this point.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
What Is Actually Behind Israel’s Recognition Of Somaliland?

The Dissident | December 27, 2025
Recently, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia that declared independence in 1991 but until now has not been officially recognized by any UN member state.
But what is Israel’s real motive behind this move?
One motive appears to be the fact that Israel has taken part in negotiations with Somaliland to use the region as a place to relocate Palestinians ethnically cleansed from Gaza by Israel.
The Israeli newspaper Ynet, writing about Israel’s Recognition Of Somaliland, noted that, “The territory has recently been mentioned as a possible destination for Gazans, with officials there saying they would be willing to absorb ‘one million Gazans,’ though no formal agreement has been announced.”
Israeli journalist Amit Segal wrote, “Israel announced today its official recognition of Somaliland as an independent, sovereign state, in a joint declaration signed by the leaders and in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” and went on to boast that “Somaliland was supposed to — and may still — absorb Gazans.”
A report from the Financial Times from March of this year reported that during a meeting with U.S. officials and leaders of Somaliland, “Washington had raised the possibility of relocating refugees from the US and Gaza”, adding that, “Israel was ‘in conversations’ with countries around the world, including in Africa, about taking in Gazans”.
An August report from the Times of Israel wrote that, “Israel is in talks with five countries — Indonesia, Somaliland, Uganda, South Sudan and Libya — about the potential resettlement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip” and added, “‘Some of the countries are showing greater openness than before to accepting voluntary immigration from the Gaza Strip,’ a diplomatic source tells the outlet, naming Indonesia and Somaliland in particular.”
It noted that, “Somaliland is a breakaway region of Somalia that is reportedly hoping to secure international recognition through the deal.”
Previously, the Israeli newspaper, The Jerusalem Post, reported that Somaliland Foreign Minister, Abdirahman Dahir Adan, “does not rule out absorbing Gazan residents” but said that, “the most important thing for us is to receive recognition”, signalling that Somaliland would agree to Israel’s ethnic cleansing plan in exchange for recognition Of Somaliland.
Journalist Kit Klarenberg noted that forcibly sending Palestinians from Gaza into Somaliland would amount to forcing them “in yet another open air concentration camp”, noting that, “In late 2022, mass protests broke out in the contested Somalian city of Las Anod. Somaliland security forces crushed the upheaval using lethal force, leaving dozens dead” and adding that, “Somaliland’s appeal to Israel and its Western puppet masters as a dumping ground for Gazans is obvious. A well-armed repressive domestic security apparatus stands ever-ready to brutally quell any and all local resistance”.
Furthermore, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland will be a strategic boost to Israel’s war against Yemen’s Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, the resistance militia, which had put a naval blockade on Israeli ships in the Red Sea, in an attempt to force Israel to end the genocide in Gaza.
Mark Dubowitz, an official with the Neo-con think tank “Foundation for Defense of Democracies,” boasted that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland will aid their war on Yemen, writing, “For those mocking why Israel would engage Somaliland: look at the map. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, next to the Bab el-Mandeb—a chokepoint for global trade and energy. Across the water are Iran-backed Houthis firing on Israel and shipping. Somaliland offers stability, ports, intelligence access, and a non-Iranian platform on the Red Sea. Similar reason why the U.S. has a military base in Djibouti.”
The Israeli newspaper Ynet reported that, Israel, “has strong strategic interest in Somaliland due to its long coastline and location in the Horn of Africa, close to Yemen” adding that, “One reason Israel has taken a keen interest in Somaliland is its proximity to areas controlled by Yemen’s Houthi rebels … Strengthening ties with Somaliland is viewed in Israel as a potential force multiplier against the Houthis”.
The outlet wrote that, “Somaliland lies near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key global shipping lane. Amid clashes between Israel and the Houthis following the war in Gaza, and against the backdrop of a US operation against the Houthis this year, waters near Yemen have become a danger zone for commercial vessels … Somaliland’s Port of Berbera, about 250 kilometers south of Yemen, is considered strategically significant in this context”.
Another article in Ynet reported that, “Israeli intelligence officials say the Mossad has been active in Somaliland for years, laying the groundwork for the recognition through long-standing, discreet relationships with senior figures there. Mossad chiefs have maintained personal ties with Somaliland officials, and Israeli officials hope the agreement will encourage additional countries to pursue strategic relations with Israel as part of a broader regional alignment” because, “One key factor driving Israel’s interest is Somaliland’s proximity to areas controlled by the Houthis in Yemen” adding that, “Strengthening ties with Somaliland is seen in Israel as a strategic force multiplier against the Houthis.”
Reports in Israeli media show that Israel’s real motive behind recognition of Somaliland is to ethnically cleanse Palestinians in Gaza, and to have a strategic boost to its war against the Houthis, one of the only forces left willing to fight in solidarity with Palestinians.
Israeli-UAE Aggression In Yemen Could Backfire Enormously
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle |December 26, 2025
Although the Yemeni Armed Forces have halted their ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel, adhering to the Gaza ceasefire, officials in Tel Aviv are continuing to insist that their front against Sana’a is not over.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has been busy seizing territory from Saudi-backed forces and signalling an intent to declare southern Yemen’s independence. Far from simply domestic disputes between armed groups, these developments will have major regional implications.
On December 3, the STC seized Hadramout province from forces aligned with Saudi Arabia, followed by a takeover of al-Mahra province. The UAE-backed separatists even went a step further, with a number of officials declaring their intent to break away and declare southern Yemen an independent state.
For context here, the UAE and Saudi proxies in Yemen were operating a joint governing body out of southern Yemen’s port city of Aden. For years, the Saudi-led coalition had attempted to prop up deposed Yemeni President, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, with the backing of the US, UK, and Israel. Hadi was therefore referred to as the “internationally recognised” leader of the Yemeni State, when in reality he had no such power.
Despite the glaringly obvious fact that Ansarallah had set up and was operating a government in the nation’s capital, enjoying a lot of popular support, the United Nations continued to play along with the West’s demands to recognise Saudi’s puppet proxy regime. In 2022, Riyadh then created what is known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which was endowed with the powers of the Presidency and serves as the “internationally recognised government”.
The head of the PLC is a man named Rashad al-Alimi, who is an unelected leader and is part of the eight-member body. As of May 2023, three of the eight seats in the PLC were handed to officials belonging to the UAE-backed STC, which recently ran Saudi-backed officials out of Aden.
The STC’s recent territorial gains have posed an active security threat to Saudi Arabia and Oman, deepening the ongoing feud between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The UAE, for its part, also appears to have been sizing up an offensive campaign against Ansarallah at some stage, as it acts in coordination with the Israelis.
The recent developments in Yemen have triggered anxiety amongst Zionist analysts in Washington, as they see a UAE-Saudi conflict in Yemen between their proxies as detrimental to the fight against Ansarallah in Sana’a. In line with this way of thinking, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) recently published a Policy Analysis piece arguing that such a UAE-Saudi conflict should be avoided and instead both should focus on Ansarallah.
It is clear that the primary goal of the Israelis is to see their Emirati allies use the STC to try and seize the port city of Hodeidah, thus securing dominance over the Red Sea. This is important to Tel Aviv as it means weakening the Yemeni Armed Forces and preventing them from being able to effectively impose a blockade on their ships. Israel even pushed the Trump administration to launch a war in Yemen for over a month in an attempt to break the blockade in the Red Sea, which resulted in resounding failure.
The Zionist think-tank WINEP has warned that any conflict between Saudi proxies and Emirati proxies could open the door for Ansarallah’s forces to seize the oil-rich region of Marib, a major catastrophe for the Israelis and Americans. Yet, so far, no UAE-Saudi understandings appear to have come about to find any solution to their competition in Yemen.
Instead, the major agreement that was just brokered came between the Yemeni government in Sana’a and Saudi Arabia, the largest prisoner exchange deal since the beginning of the war. This meant agreeing upon the release of 1,700 Ansarallah detainees in exchange for 1,200 opposition prisoners.
Another important clarification is that the Ansarallah government is often labelled “the Houthis” in the Western media, and the Saudi proxy opposition is called the “Yemeni government”. This can sometimes get confusing, but it is important to point out that this propagandistic rhetoric is used to shape the conflict in a way that reflects Western bias, not the objective reality on the ground.
Some will try to argue that the Saudi proxy opposition is the “internationally recognised government” according to the United Nations, which is true, but again, this has little bearing on the reality on the ground. There simply aren’t enough powerful States or even smaller nations that are willing to bat for recognising the government in Sana’a, therefore the West and their Arab allies have managed to prevent any reflection of reality reaching the United Nations or even the international media.
At this phase, the UAE’s STC appears to be in control of the majority of opposition-held territory in Yemen, greatly undermining Saudi Arabia’s role. However, the STC is not exactly a movement with the popular support to sustain and operate a lasting, or stable, southern Yemeni State. The STC has faced countless protests against their rule, after failing to deliver even basic services to the people living under its control. Blatant corruption, combined with criminal activities and a lack of basic governing skills, has left people with very little. Even in the Hadramout and al-Mahra provinces, there is significant opposition that could lead to their swift overthrow.
Amidst this, if the STC decides to commit to offensives against the Yemeni Armed Forces of Ansarallah, the strategy to defeat the UAE-proxy forces is rather simple. Ansarallah will not only most likely batter these armed militants on the ground, but need only direct drone and missile fire towards the real headquarters of the STC, Dubai. If ballistic and cruise missiles, along with drones, flood Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Emirati plot will quickly collapse.
When it comes to Saudi Arabia, it is a much larger nation and has the capacity to endure a lot more than the much smaller Emirates, making Riyadh a more formidable foe than Abu Dhabi. If the STC proxy forces become the main opposition and Saudi Arabia can no longer maintain any significant foothold in Yemen, the recipe for Yemeni unification becomes much simpler.
A war between Ansarallah and the STC has a very easy solution: flooding the UAE with missiles and drones for a sustained period, which will force them to give up and depart from Yemen. If this happens, Riyadh will have no choice but to reach a broader agreement with Sana’a, effectively ending the war altogether.
In the eyes of the Israelis and the United States, this outcome would be a catastrophe. If Ansarallah, even under a power-sharing styled agreement, reigned supreme over all of Yemen and became its officially recognised leadership, it would significantly increase its power and pose an even greater threat to Israel. In Tel Aviv’s eyes, this would be Iran 2.0 in the Arab World, an Islamic government that is openly hostile to Israel and a staunch supporter of the Palestinian resistance.
No matter which way you slice it, the US and Israel have no answer for the predicament they face in Yemen. The only option is to try and keep the nation in perpetual war, tightening the sanctions and ensuring immense suffering amongst its civilian population, all to avoid the inevitable rise of an Ansarallah-controlled Yemeni State, equipped with a military arsenal that will continue to develop.
