EU mulls ways to censor Russian views
VOLTAIRE NETWORK | FEBRUARY 2, 2023
The European Union is organizing a conference entitled: “Beyond disinformation – EU responses to the threat of foreign information manipulation.”
Its main thrust is to seek ways of expunging any trace of a Russia-friendly outlook within the Union.
The EU has already censored Russia Today TV channels and the Sputnik agency. It is now extending its reach to EU citizens relaying content from these portals, whether they agree with it or not.
The event will be chaired by Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, assisted by Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European External Action Service,.
MEP Raphaël Glucksmann, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference, will address the meeting along with representatives of the Swedish Psychological Defense Agency, the British Foreign Office and the US State Department, and of course of NATO.
The star of the show will be Nina Jankowicz (pictured), who, after serving as communications adviser to President Volodymr Zelensky, was appointed by President Joe Biden to chair the Disinformation Governance Board, the short-lived US censorship structure.
With the exception of Mr. Glucksman, all the speakers are senior, though unelected, officials.
Save the planet – stop this Net Zero lunacy
By William Loneskie | TCW Defending Freedom | February 8, 2023
In seven years, diesel vans under 3.5 tons will be banned from sale. How will the switch from diesel to battery-powered vans affect business and commerce? Cost and range are factors of concern. A battery-powered Ford Transit costs over £10,000 more than a similar specification diesel van. The diesel, depending on fuel tank size selected, can carry its payload more than 500 miles, and takes only minutes to refuel. A laden battery Transit will manage 90 miles in summer, less in winter, and will take hours to recharge.
Then there is the question of service life. Looking at the Ford Transit Forum, the record for mileage is over 750,000 miles. While this is exceptional, figures of 200,000 are not uncommon. The trouble with battery vans is that the batteries degrade from the word go, and cost a huge sum to replace. I doubt if many will go further than 150,000 miles on the original battery, then they will probably be scrapped because the new battery will cost more than the value of the vehicle. Surely a cost-benefit analysis should be carried out about battery vans; after all, if the cost of transporting goods soars, so will the cost of living.
The reason for scrapping new dependable diesels and petrol vehicles is a supposed climate crisis, and the cause of this crisis, we are told, is anthropogenic global warming caused by CO2. Hence the ‘need’ to ban fossil fuels and move to a grid dependent on the vagaries of wind power. The irony is that building a wind farm without fossil fuels is impossible. The towers are made of steel which requires coking coal, the (non-recyclable) rotors consist of a composite plastic made from oil, and of course the gearboxes are filled with gallons of oil. The components are transported to site on land or at sea by diesel power. Even the hard hats, eye shields and hi-vis jackets used by the technicians are made from oil.
We need coal to make coke to make steel, and it makes sense to mine it in Britain rather than import it. Hence the go-ahead for the new colliery near Whitehaven. Production here will be sufficient to allow exports too; not only that but it will bring highly skilled, well-paid jobs to an area in sore need of them. Opposition to this project from ill-informed politicians and eco-zealots has held up this project for seven years. They say coal will ‘damage the planet’. But Germany, Europe’s powerhouse, is getting one-third of its electricity from coal-fired power stations – 37,000MW of reliable, cheap, weather-independent power. Japan produces over 50,000 MW from coal – and the UK a measly 4,000 MW, and zero by 2025. Not only should the Whitehaven mine go ahead in a rational world but we should be looking at opening new state-of-the-art collieries and power stations to tap the 3billion tons of UK coal reserves.
The science about AGW is not settled. Recent research using satellite temperature data has shown that warming has stalled, and indeed cooling is likely caused by the North Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation. The Greenland ice sheet has grown. Arctic ice shrinking has stopped. The media has failed to keep up. Repeated apocalyptic predictions of climate-caused disaster have proved false. In July 2019 the then Prince Charles said: ‘I am firmly of the view that the next 18 months will decide our ability to keep climate change to survivable levels and to restore nature to the equilibrium we need for our survival’. Oh dear.
A particularly virulent form of the Net Zero virus has been caught in Scotland by the SNP regime, governing in tandem with the separatist Greens. From 2025, Patrick Harvie, the Minister for Zero Carbon Buildings, Active Travel and Tenants’ Rights, intends oil, solid fuel and LPG central heating should be ‘phased out’ from off-gas-grid homes. That will also apply to on-gas-grid homes from 2030. I have been unable to discover exactly what ‘phasing out’ means. Does it mean that from 2025 we will no longer be able to have a new LPG boiler fitted? Will we who just a love a blazing coal fire on a winter’s night, reflected in an amber glass of finest malt, no longer be able to enjoy that simple pleasure? Very likely. Perhaps Mr Harvie can explain in detail what it does mean and how much it will cost to have a heat pump fitted, which many experts say is a bad idea.
It is clear, however, that Mr Harvie and the SNP intend to force gas, oil, and coal use to be ended whether householders want it or not – just as they are keen to make farmers and foresters and gamekeepers give up their dependable diesel Land Rovers and pick-ups in favour of battery-powered vehicles. This is in line with the SNP/Green top-down Net Zero strategy which – even more than that of the Westminster government – is totalitarian in nature, where those in power dictate to hard-working men and women how they must live their lives.
They say this is to ‘save the planet’ from CO2 , but the fact is that if Britain were not to exist from tomorrow it would not make one iota of difference to climate change.
The Final Report of the International Health Regulations Review Committee
The International Health Regulations Review Committee (IHRRC) published their final report and they have validated nearly everything that I have been saying for the last month and a half. Go figure.
By James Roguski | February 7, 2023
Final Report of the International Health Regulations Review Committee regarding the proposed amendments to the International Health Regulations
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_5-en.pdf
I must admit. I am pleasantly SURPRISED.
Is it possible that my prayers have been answered?
Below are the TOP 10 things that I have been speaking up against followed by excerpts from the IHRRC Report.
For the most part, it seems like the IHRRC agrees with me.
Go figure.
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
Article 1- Definitions
In relation to the two proposed amendments to remove the word “non-binding” from the definitions of “temporary” and “standing recommendations”, the Committee notes that on a plain reading the proposed change would not affect the current understanding of the definition of standing or temporary recommendations as merely advice that is not mandatory. However, given that substantial proposals were made in relation to WHO recommendations in other related articles, the proposed amendments to these definitions could be understood as aiming to change the nature of these recommendations from non-binding to binding, and giving a binding effect to WHO recommendations and requests as proposed in other articles. That change would require a fundamental reconsideration of the nature of recommendations and the process for their adoption and implementation. The Committee further notes that during a public health emergency of international concern the recommendations may work better if they are not mandatory and advises against changing the nature of recommendations.
-Page 26
Article 42 – Implementation of health measures
The proposed amendments expand the scope of Article 42 in three ways: by making specific reference to recommendations made under Articles 15 and 16 (temporary and standing recommendations);
The proposed amendment to include a reference to temporary and standing recommendations seems to make application of these recommendations obligatory.
-Page 67
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
Article 2 – Purpose and scope
The Committee considers that the proposed amendment to replace “public health risk” with “all risks with a potential to impact public health” may not increase the clarity of this Article. Public health risks are already defined in Article 1.
-Page 27
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
Article 3 – Principles
The Committee strongly recommends the retention of the existing text “full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons” as an overarching principle in the first paragraph, and notes that the concepts of human rights, dignity and fundamental freedoms are clearly defined within the framework of treaties to which many of the States Parties to the Regulations have adhered. The inclusion of human rights in Article 3 of the current International Health Regulations (2005) was a major improvement on the previous 1969 Regulations.1 The reference to “respect for dignity, human rights and freedoms of persons” works not only as an overarching principle in Article 3, but also as a concrete reference point in the operationalization of all articles concerning public health response, response measures, additional health measures and recommendations.
-Page 28
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
NEW Article 13A – Access to health products, technologies and know-how for public health response
This proposed new Article addresses a range of considerations pertaining to the availability and affordability of health products, technologies and know-how. It goes further than the other proposed new Article 13A WHO-led international public health response in that it imposes obligations on States Parties as well as on WHO and it introduces a more robust final paragraph concerning the role and regulation of non-State actors.
WHO recommendations, as currently stated under Articles 15 and 16, were not envisioned for the purposes of establishing a medicines allocation mechanism or otherwise directing States Parties on increasing access to health products.
-Page 52
NEW Article 13A – Access to health products, technologies and know-how for public health response
However, the requirement in paragraph 1 for the Director-General to make an “immediate assessment of availability and affordability of required health products” may not be feasible due to the magnitude of such a list implied by the proposed amendment and the very high workload imposed on WHO during the initial stages of determining a PHEIC .
The Committee has concerns regarding the proposal in paragraph 1 to use Article 15 (temporary recommendations) for the purposes of establishing an “allocation mechanism.” Temporary recommendations, as defined under Article 1, are “non-binding advice and do not authorize WHO to direct States.
A different mode of authority may be required to establish an allocation mechanism.
It is unclear to the Committee what it means to comply with non-binding recommendations as per Articles 15 or 16.
-Page 53
NEW Article 13A – WHO-led international public health response
The Article goes further, however, in attributing to WHO several obligations that it does not currently have under the International Health Regulations (2005), including: to conduct an assessment of availability and affordability of “health products”; to develop an allocation and prioritization plan in the event that such an assessment reveals shortages in supply; and to direct States Parties to increase and diversify production and distributive functions for health products within individual States.
The Article further mandates WHO to establish a database “containing details of the ingredients, design, know-how, and manufacturing process or any other information required to facilitate manufacturing of health products” required to respond to potential PHEICs, and to maintain the database for all past PHEICs, as well as diseases identified in the International Health Regulations (1969).
This proposal also renders mandatory the temporary and standing recommendations addressed under Articles 15 and 16. The State Party making this proposal has also provided corresponding proposals to change the definitions of temporary and standing recommendations under Article 1 to render them coherent with new proposals in paragraph 1 of this proposal for a new Article 13A.
More fundamentally, it remains unclear how WHO could discharge the unprecedented set of new responsibilities attributed to it relating to health products and know-how under this proposed amendment, as these may arguably exceed its constitutional mandate. In order to be legally feasible, this amendment will require coherence with States Parties’ relevant national laws and other international obligations.
-Pages 54-55
NEW Article 13A – WHO-led international public health response
Finally, it is unclear whether reference to “WHO’s recommendations” in this paragraph refers to WHO’s authority to issue non-binding recommendations under Articles 15 and 16, or whether other forms of recommendations are envisioned. If indeed recommendations under Articles 15 and 16 are the targets of this addition in paragraph 1, the addition would be incoherent with the existing Regulations, as it would render these recommendations mandatory, whereas they were intended to be non-binding.
The Committee notes that the same State Party that proposed this new Article, has also put forward amendments to the definitions of temporary and standing recommendations, which propose removing the reference to “non-binding” in these definitions. If read in conjunction with this newly proposed Article, the proposed amendments to remove “non-binding” could be seen as a desire to make the temporary and standing recommendations binding, and therefore legally coherent with Article 13A, paragraph 1.
Similar to this proposal, paragraph 1 in the other proposal for a new Article 13A also makes explicit reference to Articles 15 and 16, and paragraph 2 creates a mandatory obligation on States to cooperate according to Articles 15 and 16.
Irrespective of legal coherence, changing temporary and standing recommendations into binding obligations may raise questions of feasibility. At this moment it is still unclear how to assess “compliance” with temporary recommendations issued during PHEICs, since they are defined as non- binding advice.
-Page 56
The IHRRC did not specifically address the types of “recommendations” that are listed in Article 18 (see below), they did raise concerns regarding articles 1, 13A and 42 that directly relate to the concept of changing non-binding “recommendations” to obligations.
Article 18 Recommendations with respect to persons, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels
1. Recommendations issued by WHO to States Parties with respect to persons may include the following advice:
– no specific health measures are advised;
– review travel history in affected areas;
– review proof of medical examination and any laboratory analysis;
– require medical examinations;
– review proof of vaccination or other prophylaxis;
– require vaccination or other prophylaxis;
– place suspect persons under public health observation;
– implement quarantine or other health measures for suspect persons;
– implement isolation and treatment where necessary of affected persons;
– implement tracing of contacts of suspect or affected persons;
– refuse entry of suspect and affected persons;
– refuse entry of unaffected persons to affected areas; and
– implement exit screening and/or restrictions on persons from affected areas.
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
Article 18 – Recommendations with respect to persons, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels
The first part of the proposal about passenger information is not clear. If the proposed mechanism only concerns affected persons as per Article 1, then the mechanisms described in Articles 30, 37 and 38 and Annexes 8 and 9 can be used. If it is to cover all passengers, this would be a challenge to feasibility.
-Page 60
Article 23 – Health measures on arrival and departure
Regarding the proposal to introduce the possibility for health documents to include information related to laboratory tests, the Committee notes that this was a practice during the COVID-19 pandemic, within the context of the PHEIC and the related temporary recommendations. However, given that Article 23 applies to all situations, not only PHEICs, the Committee is concerned that such a requirement may overburden travellers, and may even raise ethical and discrimination-related concerns.
Lastly, the Committee recommends examining these proposed amendments in conjunction with Articles 31, 32, 35 and 36 and Annexes 6 and 7, as well as with the related proposed amendments thereto. Should any of these amendments be retained, definitions should be provided in Article 1 for the terms “information”, “digital” and “report”.
-Page 62
Article 27 – Affected Conveyances
The Committee considers the proposed amendment to be redundant.
The Committee notes that States Parties’ ability to regulate is subject to the international law of jurisdiction. Depending on the location of conveyance, State Parties may or may not have the legal power to fulfill their newly proposed obligation.
-Page 63
Article 35 – General rule
This Article states that, as a general rule, no health documents, other than those provided for under the Regulations or in recommendations issued by WHO, shall be required in international traffic.
-Page 65
Introducing an obligation for States Parties to recognize the health documents of other States Parties may pose many practical difficulties, especially considering that domestic legislation concerning privacy and personal information protection differs from one State Party to the next. Another concern, depending on how the amendments are implemented, is the appropriate level of protection of personal data under the applicable regional and international instruments.
As a general observation, the Committee recommends that the multiple proposals for amendments related to the digitalization of health information should be addressed in one single article and be harmonized with the provisions of Annexes 6 and 7.
-Page 66
Article 36 – Certificates of vaccination or other prophylaxis
It is unclear how the specifications and requirements for such “other types of proofs and certificates” would be formulated and by whom, since the proposal only mentions a possibility for the Health Assembly to design and approve such certificates. It is also unclear whether “substitutes for” and “complementary to” are to be used interchangeably. This matters because the meaning is different. The proposal that such certificates may include test certificates and recovery certificates should be read in conjunction with the proposed amendments to Article 23, paragraph 1(a), introducing laboratory tests and/or information on vaccination as part of the information that may be required of travellers.
-Page 67
Annex 6
The comments made under Article 35 apply in general to Annex 6, for example, with regard to the feasibility of digital certificates in many countries, as well as not precluding future technological developments. Similar considerations apply to the feasibility of having the Health Assembly decide on the related technical requirements, since situations may change periodically at short notice.
-Page 87
Annex 8
It is unclear to the Committee how this additional question on the maritime declaration will facilitate application of the Regulations.
The issue of the digital format of vaccination cards is being addressed in other proposed amendments to Articles 31, 35 and 36 (see related comments).
-Page 88
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
Article 43 – Additional health measures
The proposals in paragraphs 4 and 6 establish a quasi-judicial process with tight deadlines and binding effects for recommendations, with the Emergency Committee having the final authority to decide on the appropriateness of health measures. This Committee is concerned that these proposals may unduly impinge on the sovereignty of States Parties and give binding effects to what are supposed to be recommendations.
-Page 68
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
New Article 44A – Financial mechanism for equity in health emergency preparedness and response
The Committee notes a divergence of views as to whether WHO has a financing function.
The Committee notes that, under Article 44, WHO already has a role, in collaboration with States Parties, to mobilize financial resources, and cautions against creating an explicit financing function for WHO under the Regulations.
-Page 71
The IHRRC did not specifically address the proposed amendment regarding increased censorship powers for the WHO in Annex 1, but they did state the following:
A balance is needed between ensuring more accurate scientific information on one hand and freedom of speech and the press on the other. How to strike that balance while navigating global policy and national regulatory landscapes will be an ongoing challenge.
-Page 21
In their final report, the IHRRC stated:
NEW Annex 10
The obligations set out in paragraph 1 of this proposed new Annex appear to be absolute and unconditional.
If requested to provide assistance, it is unclear what steps WHO or States Parties should take.
In summary, the Committee supports the idea of full cooperation and collaboration between WHO and States Parties, but the proposed new Annex 10 would be difficult to implement.
However, the proposed new Annex 10 goes well beyond that supporting function, containing provisions that exceed the scope of both the current Article 44 and the amendments proposed thereto.
-Page 89
OFFICIAL WHO DOCUMENTS:
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/e/e_wgihr-2.html
1. Provisional Agenda
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_1-en.pdf
2. Draft Program of Work
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_2-en.pdf
3. Proposed Modalities of Engagement For Relevant Stakeholders
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_3-en.pdf
4. Provisional WGIHR timeline 2022–2024
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_4-en.pdf
5. Report of the Review Committee regarding amendments to the International Health Regulations
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_5-en.pdf
6. Proposed amendments to the International Health Regulations
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_6-en.pdf
7. Article-by-Article compilation of proposed amendments to the International Health Regulations
https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_7-en.pdf
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Review Committee regarding amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR)
Varicella-Zoster Reactivation after COVID-19 Illness versus SARS-CoV-2 Vaccination
Larger Ongoing Threat is COVID-19 Vaccination
By Peter A. McCullough, MD, MPH | Courageous Discourse | February 6, 2023
Many papers in the medical literature seem to pit a consequence such as myocarditis or stroke as either occurring as a consequence of COVID-19 illness compared with COVID-19 vaccination. Because the denominator is so large for acutely ill hospitalized patients with COVID-19 especially during the first two years of the pandemic allowing ICD code capture of comorbidities, authors erroneously conclude the illness is “more dangerous” or a “bigger risk factor.” These arguments are daft in my opinion since COVID-19 respiratory illness is treatable and a recent paper from Klaassen et al has estimated 94% are already recovered from COVID-19—so it is water under the bridge. Not true for COVID-19 vaccines which are still mandated by some ill-advised schools, employers, and agencies. One way of looking for what is a more pressing and continued problem is to survey the medical literature.
Martinez-Reviejo et al completed a literature review of varicella-zoster reactivation (shingles) and compared cases arising after vaccination and those with the respiratory infection. There were more manuscripts and cases after vaccination. However, the manifestations of varicella-zoster were more severe in those with acute COVID-19 illness which was also high in disease severity.
Martinez-Reviejo R, Tejada S, Adebanjo GAR, Chello C, Machado MC, Parisella FR, Campins M, Tammaro A, Rello J. Varicella-Zoster virus reactivation following severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 vaccination or infection: New insights. Eur J Intern Med. 2022 Oct;104:73-79. doi: 10.1016/j.ejim.2022.07.022. Epub 2022 Aug 1. PMID: 35931613; PMCID: PMC9340059.
I found it curious the authors did not disclose the shingles vaccine status in the tables. The bottom line is that shingles can occur with severe COVID-19 and it is treatable. Acute COVID-19, however is amenable to early therapeutics so severe cases can be avoided and most of us have recovered SARS-CoV-2 infection. COVID-19 vaccination continues to be an ongoing threat for varicella-zoster reactivation syndromes, some of which are very serious including ocular damage and long-lasting painful cutaneous syndromes.
The UN calls for a “code of conduct” on social media
By Didi Rankovic | Reclaim The Net | February 7, 2023
The United Nations is becoming heavily involved in several initiatives to regulate the digital space and online speech, and judging by the priorities the organization has for 2023, outlined on Monday in New York City, this trend is only picking up steam.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres spoke about those priorities and suppressing the spread of online “hate” speech via what he called misinformation and disinformation made it to the list, among issues like rights-based approach, renewable energy, and a dire warning about the world being closer than ever to total catastrophe – all mentioned in his speech.
Guterres spoke about the subject of “mis- and disinformation” on the internet as a call for action to deal with these threats.
And Guterres had “everyone with influence” in mind – governments, regulators, policymakers, technology companies, the media, civil society. It’s notable that he “squeezed in” this warning about the need to “stop the hate” on the internet in the same paragraph he spoke about UN outreach programs that concern the Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide.
He then moved on to the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which included the “call for action.”
“Stop the hate. Set up strong guardrails. Be accountable for language that causes harm,” the UN secretary-general said and explaining the plan on how to do that: by creating a code of conduct for information integrity on digital platforms.
This, Guterres noted, is part of his 2021 report titled, “Our Common Agenda.” In May 2022, a meeting was held at the UN by delegates who gathered to discuss what was dramatically dubbed as “the epidemic of misinformation and disinformation.”
The UN Department of Global Communications was tasked with drafting a code of conduct “to promote integrity in public information.”
In his speech on Monday, Guterres also accused social media platforms of using algorithms to “amplify toxic ideas and funnel extremist views into the mainstream,” and asserted that some platforms tolerate hate speech, which, according to him, is “the first step towards hate crime.”
And as stakeholders, those identified by Guterres, get together to produce the code of conduct for information integrity on digital platforms, “we will also further strengthen how focus on our mis- and disinformation are impacting progress on global issues, including the climate crisis,” he promised.
Critics wonder if this doubling-down on “the war on misinformation” by the UN will serve as an excuse for even more online censorship and if it might clash with members’ own speech protection laws.
Donald Trump — the Peace Candidate in the 2024 Republican Presidential Primary?
By Adam Dick | Ron Paul Institue | February 8, 2023
A Monday article at Politico makes the case that Donald Trump will likely be running as the peace candidate among individuals vying to be the 2024 Republican presidential nominee.
The article’s authors — Meridith McGraw, Natalie Allison, and Gary Fineout — write:
Those close to Trump’s campaign operation say he plans to try and paint himself as an anti-war dove amongst the hawks. They believe doing so will resonate with GOP voters who are divided on, but growing wary of, continued support for Ukraine in its war with Russia.
Such a strategy would be in line with how Trump presented his campaign from the beginning — in his November 15 candidacy announcement speech. In that speech, Trump referenced his not having started a new war during his presidential term when declaring that, “unlike Biden possibly getting us into World War III, which can seriously happen, I will keep America out of foolish and unnecessary foreign wars just as I did for four straight years.”
Trump’s record on peace leaves some to be desired. But, his 2024 Republican presidential primary opponents can be expected to include major warmongers. The Politico article mentions Nikki Haley, Mike Pence, and Mike Pompeo as likely contenders, all of whom appear to be more pro-war than Trump. And while Florida Governor Ron DeSantis — another potential candidate for the nomination — is not widely known for his thoughts on foreign policy, the Politico article quotes a Trump advocate who provides a preview of the case for Trump as the peacemaker vis-à-vis DeSantis:
‘Trump is the peace president and he’s the first president in two generations to not start a war, whereas if you look at DeSantis’ congressional record, he’s voted for more engagement and more military engagement overseas,’ said a person close to the Trump campaign, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe internal discussions.
DeSantis was a Republican United States House of Representatives member from Florida from January of 2013 through September of 2018, when he left the House toward the end of his successful governor campaign. DeSantis was appointed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs upon joining the House and went on to be chairman on the Subcommittee on National Security at the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. So DeSantis should have plenty of a track record related to war and peace.
We’ll see if Trump follows through with this campaign strategy.
Copyright © 2023 by RonPaul Institute.
An Overblown Balloon Headline Inflates False Narrative on China
By Patrick Macfarlane | The Libertarian Institute | February 8, 2023
For several decades the American public has been instilled with an intrinsic fear of and hatred for China.
No singular event in this seemingly inevitable march to war is more emblematic of the American public’s warped psyche than the “Chinese Spy Balloon” narrative—perhaps due, in part, to its facial absurdity. The happening eclipses even similarly nonsensical yarns such as widespread TikTok paranoia (see the NSA’s PRISM program), China’s American farmland purchases (Chinese firms account for <.5% of all foreign-owned land in the U.S.), and the “invasion” of Chinese fentanyl through the Southern border (fentanyl trafficking is illegal in China).
Indeed, even the pervasive use of the term “Chinese Spy Balloon”—an utterly unsupported Pentagon accusation—is emblematic of the absolutely captured state of the American consciousness.
This narrative control is critical to Washington as it manufactures consent for its declared “great power competition” with Beijing.
The saga began on February 2, when an official spokesman announced the Pentagon was tracking the passage of a “high-altitude surveillance balloon” over the continental United States. The spokesman expressed confidence that the “surveillance balloon” belonged to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this initial announcement, it was importantly noted “[i]nstances of this kind of balloon activity have been observed previously over the past several years.”
On February 3, a PRC spokesperson confirmed the balloon originated from China, but said it was merely a civilian weather balloon on a research mission. The spokesperson apologized for the intrusion and explained the balloon entered the United States by accident due to unexpected wind currents. The statement stressed continued communication and diplomacy.
On the afternoon of February 4, American forces downed the balloon just off the coast of South Carolina. The next day, the Chinese foreign ministry called the response “a clear overreaction and a serious violation of international practice.”
In its press conference announcing the shootdown, a senior Pentagon official admitted that so-called “PRC government surveillance balloons transited the continental United States briefly at least three times during the prior administration and once that we know of at the beginning of this administration, but never for this duration of time.” Another official admitted that the Pentagon had tracked the balloon since it entered Alaskan airspace on January 28.
Although the Pentagon insists the balloon was a clandestine surveillance device, it has not tendered a shred of evidence to support that assertion.
It would make little sense for the PRC to launch surveillance balloons across the United States because, as stated during the Pentagon’s initial press briefing, “[the balloon] does not create significant value added over and above what the PRC is likely able to collect through things like satellites in Low Earth Orbit.”
As the balloon made its way from Montana to South Carolina, the American people were whipped into predictable histrionics, with most politicians calling for the balloon to be shot down.
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) stated on February 3, “[i]t wasn’t a good idea to have a spy balloon fly over our country, it must come down.”
Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) called the balloon a “Potemkin village attempting to conceal [China’s] malign ambitions toward our country and the global order.” He urged the Pentagon to shoot down the balloon, and later quipped “[a] big Chinese balloon in the sky and millions of Chinese Tik Tok balloons on our phones. Let’s shut them all down.”
True to form, the general Republican messaging maligned Joe Biden’s perceived weakness for not shooting the balloon down faster.
Establishment Republican mainstays, Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Marco Rubio (R-FL), and House Intelligence Committee chair, Representative Mike Turner, blasted the Biden administration’s inaction in separate TV interviews.
On February 4, Turner said on Meet the Press, “[t]his [balloon] should never have been allowed to enter the U.S., and it never should have been allowed to complete its mission,” adding “I think this administration lacks urgency.”
The same day Cruz told Face the Nation that Biden gave the PRC “a full week…to conduct spying operations over the U.S., over sensitive military installations,” and that “this entire episode telegraphed weakness.”
On February 5, Rubio betrayed the true intent of accusing Biden of weakness—to give cover for more extreme escalation. He told ABC “[t]hese guys [U.S. leadership] can’t even do anything about a balloon flying over U.S. airspace? How can you possibly count on them if something were to happen in the Indo-Pacific region? How are they gonna come to the aid of Taiwan?”
Rubio’s comments fly in the face of Washington’s long-standing Sino-American policy—that the U.S. acknowledges China’s dominion over Taiwan, but will not say what it would do if China were to use force to reconstitute the wayward island.
While some populist Republicans have bravely departed from the establishment’s support for Ukraine, many led the chorus of voices urging escalation—and not diplomacy.
Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) issued multiple tweets regarding the balloon. On February 3, he stated “[n]ow #China is OPENLY spying on us and the Biden Admin does nothing. China is trolling us. They know Biden is weak.” He later added, inter alia, “SHOOT IT DOWN.”
Representative Matt Gaetz (R-FL) tweeted on February 3, “[t]he Department of Defense would like to know the Balloon’s pronouns,” a comment that detracts from Washington’s objectively aggressive global posture by suggesting ineptitude. On February 5, he wrote, “I wonder how much the [Chinese Communist Party]-funded Biden Center at UPenn studied Balloon Theory.”
On February 3, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene issued a lengthy Twitter thread urging the Biden Administration to “SHOOT DOWN THE BALLOON!!” Taylor Greene further called the balloon’s presence “an act of aggression,” that she blamed on the Chinese Communist Party and Joe Biden’s inaction.
Surprisingly, the invective from populist Republicans surpassed even that of the ultra-hawkish architects of Washington’s fortress Taiwan policy, Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bob Menendez (R-NJ).
For his part, Bob Menendez neither Tweeted, nor issued a press release about the balloon.
Graham’s statement was much more measured than that of his populist colleagues. February 4, he thanked the military and the Biden administration for shooting down the balloon, but then stated: “[t]he next step is to recover the attached surveillance equipment to determine if the Chinese were lying about the balloons [sic] true purpose…Our intelligence community doubts the Chinese explanation […] but we will only know the true answer when the platform is recovered.”
The universal rejection of diplomacy in favor of an immediate and violent response to the balloon is deeply troubling—from the public to neoliberal Democrats, to the populist right. Surely a collision between U.S. and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea or aircraft in the Taiwan Strait would provoke a similar response. Some popular pundits even called for extreme escalation, such as urging the Pentagon to scramble jets from Guam, ostensibly to attack or threaten mainland China.
The banner narrative favored by mainline Republicans and the populist right alike—that Joe Biden is weak—is insidious, because it implies that Biden should be more aggressive. Furthermore, it excuses Biden’s objectively ultra-hawkish policy against China.
Just in the last few weeks, the Biden administration continued its redoubling of the Asia Pivot launched by Barack Obama and furthered by Donald Trump: the U.S. Marine Corps opened a new base in Guam as the U.S. opened an embassy in the Solomon Islands, furthered diplomatic measures meant to militarize Japan, announced the opening of new military installations in the Philippines and Palau, and furthered a deal that would secure it exclusive military access to Micronesia, an area of the Pacific Ocean as large as the continental U.S.—all with the express and stated aim of confronting China.
Furthermore, any discussion of Chinese surveillance of the United States must necessarily begin with our own surveillance of mainland China. In 2001, “[a] United States Navy spy plane on a routine surveillance mission near the Chinese coast collided with a Chinese fighter jet that was closely tailing it” causing the American plane to crash land in Chinese territory. These surveillance missions continue to this day, along with the at least monthly transit of American warships through the Taiwan Strait, a channel of water that separates Taiwan from mainland China by 110 miles at its widest point.
Meanwhile, the “Biden is weak” narrative enables the Biden administration’s ultra-hawkish policy by drawing attention away from it. While the nation’s imagination was captured by a white balloon, Secretary of State Antony Blinken canceled a rare diplomatic visit to China. That the Pentagon knew the balloon’s trajectory as soon as it entered Alaskan airspace suggests it may have been used as a convenient excuse to cancel the talks. This is further evidenced by the fact that similar balloons have entered the United States without public knowledge.
Furthermore, the timing of the balloon’s transit suggests it wasn’t purposely dispatched by China, as its incentive is likely to preserve Blinken’s visit. The long-planned trip would have seen Blinken meet with his Chinese counterpart and possibly with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From the PRC perspective, such a visit is an opportunity to negotiate with a country that is encircling it militarily. A high-level meeting might have soothed its offense at yet another diplomatic envoy to Taiwan by an American House Speaker.
Unfortunately, the prevailing narrative won the day—while Americans’ heads were in the clouds, imagining a biowarfare attack, or falsely reporting the balloon carried explosives, Sino-American relations deteriorated even further. Distressingly, the American public exhibited its eagerness to rush to just about any conclusion concerning China.
That rush to judgment—and violent action—should concern us more than the specter of a wayward white spy balloon.
Patrick MacFarlane is the Justin Raimondo Fellow at the Libertarian Institute where he advocates a noninterventionist foreign policy. He is a Wisconsin attorney in private practice. He is the host of the Vital Dissent at http://www.vitaldissent.com, where he seeks to oppose calamitous escalation in US foreign policy by exposing establishment narratives with well-researched documentary content and insightful guest interviews. His work has appeared on antiwar.com, GlobalResearch.ca, and Zerohedge. He may be reached at patrick@libertarianinstitute.org
Absurd US propaganda claims China has more ICBMs than America
By Drago Bosnic | February 8, 2023
Mere days after the United States pompously announced that it has soundly defeated an adrift weather balloon, another absurdity has taken the headlines in the mainstream media. Apparently, China somehow managed to overtake America in the number of ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers. This was reported by the Wall Street Journal on February 7, citing the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. According to WSJ, the commander of the US Strategic Command, which oversees America’s nuclear forces, notified the US Congress about the supposed Chinese advantage.
“The number of land-based fixed and mobile ICBM launchers in China exceeds the number of ICBM launchers in the United States,” the commander stated.
The author of the WSJ article himself admitted that the US is currently modernizing its entire nuclear triad (land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons) and that “it has a much larger nuclear force than China”. The Strategic Command also notified US lawmakers that America still has more land-based ICBMs than China, as well as several times more thermonuclear warheads mounted on those missiles. Worse yet, the report doesn’t even include SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and strategic bombers that make the US dominance even more pronounced.
But US officials and experts are claiming that “many of China’s land-based launchers still consist of empty silos”, meaning that Beijing “potentially has more launch options”. The lawmakers cited these launchers as “a portent of the scale of China’s longer-range ambitions and are urging the US to expand its own nuclear forces to counter the Russian and Chinese forces”. According to Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, “China is rapidly approaching parity with the United States”.
“We cannot allow that to happen. The time for us to adjust our force posture and increase capabilities to meet this threat is now,” Rogers stated.
He then criticized America’s compliance with the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), claiming this is “inhibiting the US from building up its arsenal to deter Russia and China”. And while China isn’t included in the treaty (set to expire in 2026), Russia is, meaning that Moscow is also “inhibited” by it, making the assertion all the more illogical. On the other hand, many US experts are now claiming that it’s in the US interest to preserve treaty limits with Russia and to also attempt to draw Beijing into it, while still continuing with constant modernization of America’s nuclear arsenal.
Rose Gottemoeller, a US arms control expert who took part in negotiating the New START, stated: “It’s in our national interest to keep the Russians under the New START limits. We need to complete our nuclear modernization according to plan, not pile on new requirements.”
The WSJ report posits that the US is now trying to deal with Russia and China by using a mix of arms control treaties and upgraded nuclear forces. The Pentagon’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review identified both superpowers as strategic rivals, stating that “by the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries.”
However, while claiming that it wants to preserve the New START, the troubled Biden administration seems to be working towards eliminating it. Just last week, the US accused Russia of violating the treaty by refusing to allow on-site inspections, although the US itself is doing the same, meaning Moscow is simply responding in kind. Such actions indicate that Washington DC might be trying to sabotage the New START because it’s frustrated that China isn’t included in it.
The Pentagon claims that Beijing will increase its current arsenal of 400 warheads to 1,500 by 2035. At present, China’s nuclear arsenal includes an unspecified number of mobile ICBM launchers, while the US military claims that the Asian giant also operates approximately 20 liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBMs, but that it’s also building three ICBM silo fields intended to house approximately 300 modern solid-fueled missiles. For comparison, the US fields 5,428 warheads, with at least 400 land-based ICBMs. In other words, the current American nuclear arsenal is over 13 times larger than China’s, while its land-based ICBMs outnumber Beijing’s by more than 20 times.
US experts are often debating what China plans to do with the aforementioned silos it’s now allegedly building. Some claim that, while Beijing currently doesn’t have enough nuclear-tipped ICBMs to fill all silos, it might leave some empty or install conventionally armed missiles. Still, the sheer magnitude of the mental gymnastics used by the US political establishment to present itself as the “party in jeopardy” in this case is ludicrous for anyone familiar with the size of America’s nuclear arsenal. Even with the assertion that China will have 1,500 nuclear weapons in 2035, including 400 land-based ICBMs, the US would still have a 3:1 advantage, making the accusations against Beijing a moot point.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.