Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries driving price hikes in the US – Bloomberg
RT | November 16, 2025
Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy facilities are contributing to rising oil prices in the US, Europe, and Asia, Bloomberg reported on Saturday.
The attacks, combined with outages at key plants in Asia and Africa, have removed millions of barrels of diesel and gasoline from the global market, the outlet said. US sanctions on Russian energy giants Lukoil and Rosneft in October, along with restrictions imposed by the EU, have also helped drive prices higher.
Refining margins in the US, Europe, and Asia are now at their highest levels for this time of year since at least 2018, Bloomberg said, citing its own calculations. Additional pressure has come from shutdowns and outages at refineries in Kuwait and Nigeria.
Ukraine has targeted oil depots, processing plants, and metering stations with drones and missiles, calling them legitimate facilities that support Russia’s “war machine.” Russia, in turn, has struck elements of Ukraine’s power grid, saying the infrastructure supports the Ukrainian military.
In August, Hungary imposed sanctions on Ukraine’s top drone commander, Robert Brovdi, after repeated strikes disrupted the flow of crude through the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline.
Alternative for Germany Party Mulls Energy Cooperation With BRICS Countries – Lawmaker
Sputnik – 16.11.2025
SIRIUS, Russia – The right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is considering the possibility of cooperating with BRICS countries in the energy sector, lawmaker Steffen Kotre told Sputnik on Saturday.
“One of the reasons I am here is to meet with representatives of the BRICS nations. We discussed some positions on this issue [energy cooperation]. This is a positive process. Whether this will have any results is another matter. The main goal now is simply to get to know each other,” Kotre said on the sidelines of the BRICS-Europe symposium, which is underway in Russia’s Sirius Federal Territory.
The pressure on the AfD over its members’ trip to Russia is growing, but the party does not intend to abandon what it considers “a realistic political line,” the lawmaker noted.
“Quite the contrary, this pressure certainly strengthens our understanding that we will certainly achieve normal relations. And by this I mean a peaceful exchange of views with Russia,” he said.
Communication channels should be open in both directions, including to show Moscow that “there are sensible people in Germany and not only warmongers,” Kotre added.
In Busan, China did not just stand firm—it watched America blink
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 16, 2025
Beyond the optics of handshakes and photo-ops at the Busan summit, the much-hyped Trump–Xi meeting laid bare the paradox that defines US–China relations today: deep economic interdependence coupled with unrelenting strategic rivalry.
Washington’s fear of Beijing’s ascent—and Beijing’s determination to rewrite the terms of global power—mean that even when the two leaders talk of “cooperation,” they are really negotiating the limits of competition. Far from heralding a new détente, the Busan meeting merely pressed pause on a conflict too entrenched to be resolved by diplomatic theatre.
The Summit of Distrust
At the Busan meeting, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping announced a limited set of economic and diplomatic understandings aimed at easing immediate tensions without altering the fundamentals of their rivalry. The U.S. agreed to reduce certain tariffs on Chinese imports, while China pledged to resume large-scale purchases of American agricultural products and to delay the expansion of its rare-earth export controls. Both sides promised greater cooperation on curbing fentanyl precursor exports and maintaining stable supply chains, and they reaffirmed the need to prevent escalation in trade and technology disputes.
While the Busan deal was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough, it exposed a deeper void: there is still no framework for strategic coexistence between Washington and Beijing. The reason is simple—there is no trust. Beijing knows that under Donald Trump, U.S. foreign policy swings between confrontation and concession, depending on the political winds. And despite years of tariffs and rhetoric, Trump’s trade war has failed to dent China’s global standing. If anything, Beijing has learned how to weaponize US vulnerabilities. By withholding soybean purchases and rare-earth exports, it extracted precisely what it wanted in Busan: a rollback of select tariffs and a pause on new export controls. The so-called “agreement” restored the status quo—China promised to resume buying soybeans, a gesture aimed squarely at Trump’s Midwestern base, while deferring for a year the rare-earth restrictions that Washington fears most. The optics looked like cooperation; the substance showed who really dictated the terms.
Therefore, the Busan summit was less a diplomatic reset than a reckoning for Washington—a reminder of how limited its leverage over Beijing has become. After years of tariffs and bluster, the US has discovered that China can absorb the pain, reroute its exports across Asia, and keep its economy humming. The numbers tell the story: China’s trade surplus this year is projected to exceed last year’s record levels, and its stock market has surged more than 30 per cent in dollar terms, even as US inflation, stoked by tariff pressures, hit an election-year high of 3 per cent. Beijing has not only weathered the storm but also turned it into a strategy. By weaponising its $12 billion soybean market and dangling rare-earth supplies, China forced Washington into a truce on its own terms. In Busan, it wasn’t China that blinked.
Who will blink next?
The real question after Busan is not whether the US and China will clash again, but who will blink first. Washington’s arsenal of tariffs and tech bans is running up against the limits of its own economic pain threshold, while Beijing’s state-driven resilience is tested. Trump’s “America First” protectionism, fueled as it is by an aggressive form of politics, may soothe his domestic base, but it erodes US influence among allies, both in Europe and in Southeast Asia, who now see a power more obsessed with trade deficits than offering and/or providing strategic leadership. China, meanwhile, is playing a longer game: tightening regional supply chains, expanding the yuan’s footprint, and anchoring new trade corridors from Asia to Africa. Both sides are recalibrating rather than retreating, but the advantage increasingly lies with the player who can endure short-term costs for long-term control. If Busan revealed anything, it is that China is betting on (growing) American fatigue while America is still betting on Chinese collapse, which remains an unlikely event to take place even in the distant future.
In the end, Busan revealed not a reset but a reckoning: China has learned to endure pressure, while America has learned the limits of its own leverage. The US–China rivalry is now a contest of stamina, not ideology, in which Beijing appears better equipped to play the long game. With expanding regional trade networks, a growing technological base, and a much better, state-driven, and state-backed capacity to absorb external shocks, China has turned resilience into a strategy. Washington, by contrast, remains trapped between domestic populism and global ambition, unable to sustain confrontation without hurting itself. Busan showed that when forced to choose between economic pain and political optics, it is the US that blinks first. Therefore, what Washington can learn is this: in this rivalry of endurance, China’s patience—not America’s pressure—may prove decisive. The sooner it learns this lesson, the less it will hurt itself.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Nicolai Petro: Ukraine Endgame & Fragmentation of Europe
Glenn Diesen | November 14, 2025
Nicolai N. Petro is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, and formerly the US State Department’s special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union. Prof. Petro discusses the pending end of the Ukraine War and why Europe will likely fragment as a consequence of its proxy war against Russia.
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HTS strips Russia of Syria port deals; hands Tartus to UAE, Latakia to France
Press TV – November 14, 2025
Syria has formally handed over operations of Tartus port, the second largest port in the country, to the logistics company DP World from the United Arab Emirates under a 30-year, $800-million concession.
DP World officially commenced operations months after signing a 30-year $800-million concession agreement Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports.
“We are committed to applying DP World’s global expertise to build a modern and digitally enabled port that will grow trade, create opportunities and firmly position Tartus as a key trade hub in the Eastern Mediterranean,” said Fahad al-Banna, the newly appointed chief executive of DP World Tartus.
Under the agreement, DP World would upgrade the port’s infrastructure, expand handling and storage capacity, and invest in bulk-handling systems.
This comes as the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led regime in Syria in June decided to annul a 2019 agreement between former President Bashar al-Assad’s government and Russia’s Stroytransgaz, saying the company breached its contract by failing to invest a promised $500 million in modernizing Tartous.
Along with Tartus, a separate 30-year concession was also inked with French shipping company CMA CGM to run Latakia port, the largest port city in the country.
The shift comes after US President Donald Trump announced in May that all US sanctions on Syria would be lifted.
Trump made the announcement in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, during his visit to the kingdom, where he met Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led regime in Syria, who expressed readiness to normalize ties between Damascus and Israel.
Once affiliated with al-Qaeda and Daesh, al-Jolani seized power in Syria following a rapid onslaught by his militant group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which ousted the government of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
COP 30 Is A Failure… “Only Europe Remains Committed”
By Prof. Fritz Vahrenholt | No Tricks Zone | November 12, 2025
Cooling trend continues
The global temperature did not change in October compared to August. The cooling trend remains intact. The American National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) foresees a cool LA NINA developing in the Pacific this winter, which will lead to a further decline in global temperatures as well.
Belém – All that fuss for nothing
The 30th World Climate Conference in Belém is not yet over, but it is already becoming apparent that the event, announced as the “Conference of Truth,” will go down in the history of climate conferences as a turning point.
No head of state from the four largest CO2-emitting nations—China (33%), the USA (12%), India (8%), and Russia (5%)—is showing up in Belém.
Even before the conference, the New York Times headlined: “The whole world is fed up with climate policy.” And the fact that Bill Gates, one of the biggest supporters and sponsors of climate policy, explicitly warned against excessive, shortsighted climate policy just 14 days before the conference, and put prosperity back in focus — a major blow.
Glenn Beck, a prominent American television host, explains the change of heart by Bill Gates: “It’s not about science, it’s about Trump.” Expressed differently: it’s not about conviction; it’s about damage control for his own company, which is planning multibillion-dollar investments in data centers in the USA and globally. And given the situation, these will have to rely on electricity from new gas-fired power plants in the short term, as the reactivation of old nuclear power plants will not suffice, and the construction of new nuclear power plants will still take several years in the USA.
Only 1/3 of the states actually submit a plan
For the Climate Conference in Belém, states had to report on their future plans for the use of coal, oil, and gas. The fact that only one-third even submitted a statement already hints at the dissolving importance of the climate issue in most nations around the world. But the reports that were submitted are revealing. Most states reported continuously increasing use of coal, oil, and gas. The reports show an increase in global coal usage by 30%, oil by 25%, and gas by 40% by 2030 compared to 2015. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) hoped to reduce global CO2 emissions by 45% by 2030 compared to 2015; now they are continuing to rise.
Only Europe onboard
Only Europe remains unshakably committed to the goal of achieving Net Zero CO2 emissions by 2050. Germany, the industrial heart of Europe, is even more ambitious and, according to Axel Bojanowski, is “the ‘leader’ among industrialized countries: It aims to be climate-neutral by 2045 – a self-destructive plan: Germany’s reduction will inevitably be compensated by rising emissions in other EU countries. This is because the European Emissions Trading System ensures that emission allowances not used in Germany are consumed in other EU countries.
It is becoming increasingly clear what the Wall Street Journal meant when it called Germany’s energy policy the ‘dumbest in the world.’
A few days before the conference, the European states agreed on a common goal, namely to achieve a 90% CO2 reduction by 2040 compared to 1990. 5% of the self-commitment could come from emission reductions abroad, which, of course, must also be expensively paid for. The German Minister for the Environment celebrated this agreement as “good news for the German economy, as everyone would now have the same competitive conditions.”
This statement reveals how little the German federal government and its ministers understand the global economy. As if German industry only exports goods to European countries. German goods, however, compete in a global market that does not have the burdens of CO2 taxes and high energy prices on German products and can therefore always offer them more cheaply. 50% of exports go to countries outside the EU.
Chancellor Merz and his Environment Minister Schneider are blatantly downplaying the German situation. Germany has set self-imposed shackles with the Climate Protection Act that will become highly painful in the coming years.
German climate policy: “script for an economic catastrophe”
Welt journalist Axel Bojanowski: “The German Climate Protection Act, cemented by the Federal Constitutional Court, seems to be a script for an economic catastrophe. It only allows Germany a remaining budget of 6.7 gigatonnes of CO2, which is likely to be used up by the early 2030s. According to the law, penalties, shutdowns, and restrictions on freedom are then threatened to meet the climate goals.”
6.7 gigatonnes was the remaining permissible budget after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court from 2020 onwards. As of today, only 3.6 gigatonnes of this remain. The buffer is reduced by about 0.5 gigatonnes each year. By 2032 at the latest, the remaining budget will be exhausted, and Germany will have reached the end of the line set by the Federal Constitutional Court. This will happen in the next legislative period, not just in 2040.
Chancellor Merz whitewashes
And in his 5-minute speech in Belém before a half-empty hall, Chancellor Merz spreads negligent whitewashing: “The economy is not the problem. Our economy is the key to protecting our climate even better.” Does the Chancellor not know the perilous state our industry is in?
Scandal surrounds tropical forest Ffund (TFF)
Probably the only outcome of the Belém conference will be the establishment of an investment fund, proposed by Brazilian President Lula, to finance the protection of tropical forests.
The fund works as follows: Donor countries pay $25 billion into the fund. Private investors (investment funds) are supposed to pay in $100 billion. The donor countries receive a return of about 4.0-4.8%, which corresponds to the return on their government bonds, as they generally have to raise the money through government debt. The return for private investors is 5.8% to 7.2%. The fund’s money is invested in emerging market government bonds, which yield comparatively high interest due to the higher risk (Brazilian government bonds are currently at 12.25%). Private investors are served first, followed by the donor countries. If anything remains after the distribution of profits to private investors and donor countries, the amount is paid out to 74 countries with tropical forests. It is hoped that this way, $3-4 billion will be distributed annually to the tropical forest countries.
The catch is this: To entice investors, private investors are given preference in the payment sequence: first the private ones, then the donor states. Furthermore, the donor countries must insure the fund against default. A default by an emerging market could quickly lead to the fund’s insolvency. In that case, the taxpayers of the donor countries would be held liable and, in an extreme scenario, lose their capital.
Disadvantageous for the German taxpayer
In preparation for Belém, there was fundamental disagreement over Germany’s participation in the fund between the Ministry of Finance and the Chancellor’s Office. The Chancellor’s Office clearly advocated for participation and a contribution of at least $1 billion. It was assisted by the Ministry for the Environment under Minister Schneider and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development under Minister Alabali-Radovan. The Ministry of Finance, under Lars Klingbeil, strongly objected, viewing the fund as a billion-dollar risk and doubting the viability of the fund’s structure.
And indeed, the model is structurally disadvantageous for the German taxpayer. One could also say: We are subsidizing the returns of private investors with public money and providing the default guarantee for BlackRock and Co. That is why the Federal Ministry of Finance is persistently blocking Germany’s participation in the fund. It can be unequivocally stated that the Federal Ministry of Finance has thus far bravely defended the interests of the German taxpayer against the interests of BlackRock and Co.
This is the background to Chancellor Merz being unable to name a figure (“a noteworthy amount”) in Belém. The billion € or $ is now supposed to be found in the budget reconciliation for the 2026 federal budget, which is taking place this week, so that the federal budget can be adopted on November 28. It is to be expected that the SPD will concede. But it could be a Pyrrhic victory for Chancellor Merz, who would then visibly be prioritizing the interests of international financial investors, especially if the fund were to run into difficulties.
Whether the fund will ultimately materialize is still questionable, as it only comes into effect if the donor states commit to $10 billion. So far (excluding Germany), $5.6 billion has been raised.
The USA and the UK have already declined.
If the fund comes into being, the investment companies will profit first, with high returns secured by states, and then the emerging markets, which can sell their high-risk government bonds. Whether the tropical forest will benefit in this confusing financial jungle is not yet certain. The biggest risk remains with the donor countries, who are putting their taxpayers’ money at risk with the catchy story of saving the rainforest.”
Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025
The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.
In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?
Trump’s visit
Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.
Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.
The new thinking
The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.
To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.
Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.
Beyond Ambitions
Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.
Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Oklo’s Valuation: Nuclear on Welfare (joining wind, solar, batteries)
By Robert Bradley Jr. – Master Resource – November 5, 2025
Commercial nuclear power has turned into the welfare energy de jure. It is politically correct despite many decades of failure to compete against other forms of thermal energy. Uranium might be the ultimate energy density-wise, but nuclear fission (and more so nuclear fusion) is the most complicated, expensive, fraught way to boil water.
Commercial nuclear power was government-created in the 1950s and remains government dependent today. (Stay tuned: my primer on the history of this energy source is forthcoming. [1]). Regarding the present, consider this example from Jamie Smyth, editor of US Energy, who wrote:
Nuclear technology company Oklo has no revenues, no licence to operate reactors and no binding contracts to supply power. But this has not stopped the Silicon Valley-based start-up from riding a wave of investor enthusiasm that has propelled its stock market valuation above $20bn, a rise of more than 500 per cent since the turn of the year.
He provided the background.
The company, backed by technology boss Sam Altman and with close ties to Donald Trump’s energy secretary, has set ambitious targets to deliver commercial power to its first customers in 2027, having broken ground on its pilot in Idaho last month.
Oklo, led by the husband-and-wife team Jacob and Caroline DeWitte, envisages a future powered by a new generation of small modular reactors that use liquid sodium rather than water as a coolant. The company is seeking to become a leader among businesses that will supply energy hungry data centres with the power they need to fuel the artificial intelligence boom.
Yet the surge in its shares, buoyed by enthusiasm from retail investors who make up an outsized proportion of its shareholders, has worried experts who fear the stock has become wildly overheated. It is among the highest valued pre-revenue businesses listed in the US.
I commented:
A government play, like Tesla. Political capitalism with the US DOE ready to subsidize commercial nuclear power. Nuclear is the new subsidy baby, or welfare queen, the politically correct replacement for wind/solar/batteries under a new political regime.
The siren song of “competitive” nuclear power continues into its seventh decade. Taxpayer and ratepayers beware.
———————
[1] “Nuclear Power: A Free-Market Perspective.” American Institute for Economic Research, forthcoming.
Iran–Russia railway pact sets keystone in North–South Corridor
Long-delayed rail deal unlocks final segment of a Eurasian freight artery, bolstering Axis of Resistance and bypassing western sanctions
By Vali Kaleji | The Cradle | November 7, 2025
In a long-anticipated development, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, announced on 26 October that a final contract with Russia for the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway would be signed the following month.
This 164-kilometer line through Gilan province, hugging the southwestern Caspian Sea, marks the last missing segment in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and is poised to radically transform Eurasian trade routes.
Beyond economics, the project also represents an effort to re-establish Iran’s rail connection with the South Caucasus for the first time in 35 years.
During the Soviet era, the Tabriz–Jolfa Railway, which connected to the Jolfa (Nakhichevan)–Meghri–Zangilan–Baku–Moscow line as well as the Jolfa–Nakhichevan–Yerevan route, was considered one of Iran’s main transit routes with the Soviet Union.
But the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s ruptured the web of regional rail lines, isolating Nakhchivan and severing Iran’s decades-old railway link to the Caucasus.
Thirty-five years later, Iran reconnects to the Caucasus
Since the early 2000s, Tehran has explored multiple avenues to re-establish these lost links. A proposed Iran–Armenia route via Marand and Meghri never materialized. Efforts to revive the Soviet-era Jolfa–Nakhchivan–Zangilan line have stalled amid Yerevan and Baku’s ongoing dispute over the Zangezur corridor.
In contrast, the Rasht–Astara line, as part of the larger Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, is now the only active rail project linking Iran back to the Caucasus. It also extends further along the Astara–Baku–Dagestan route, reconnecting the Islamic Republic to a key segment of the Eurasian transport grid.
This idea is not new. The Soviet Union had extended its own railway network to Astara, Azerbaijan, in 1941, reaching the Iranian border. But within Iran, the crucial stretch from Astara to Qazvin remained incomplete.
Construction on the Rasht–Qazvin leg only began in 2009 and was completed a decade later, with an official launch in March 2019 attended by then-Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and Azerbaijan’s then-economy minister Shahin Mustafayev.
However, the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway encountered significant challenges. A 2016 deal with the International Bank of Azerbaijan for a $500-million loan was shelved after US President Donald Trump – during his first term – unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Fearing US secondary sanctions, Baku froze its financial commitments.
Tehran subsequently turned to Moscow. When the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Russia in January 2022, both sides finalized a $5-billion credit line to fund key Iranian infrastructure projects, including the Rasht–Astara Railway. Russia’s own trade needs had grown increasingly urgent under the weight of western sanctions, prompting Moscow to double down on the INSTC as a lifeline to India, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.
Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin, accompanied by Iranian railway officials, surveyed the route by helicopter in January 2023. Four months later, on 17 May, the two sides signed a $1.6-billion contract to complete the railway. Raisi presided over the ceremony in Tehran, with Russian President Vladimir Putin joining via video link.
Map of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)
Strategic rail link hinges on Russian capital and Iranian land
Despite the celebratory optics, the Rasht–Astara project faces formidable obstacles. The mountainous, forested, and ecologically fragile terrain in northern Iran presents serious engineering and environmental challenges. Specialized bridges, tunnels, and stabilization systems are required to navigate landslide-prone zones and protect sensitive ecosystems such as the Hyrcanian forests and regional wetlands.
Costs are steep. At an average of $10 million per kilometer, the entire line will cost an estimated $1.6 billion. Masoud Shakibaeifar, a transportation planning expert in Iran, believes that “the gross revenue of the project in this optimistic scenario could increase from $500 million in the first year of operation to $1 billion in subsequent years. In this case, a return on investment would be achievable within a 10-year period.”
But others, like Seyed Hossein Mirshafi, former infrastructure advisor to the Roads Ministry, argue Iranian contractors could complete the railway for under $700 million. It remains to be seen whether a new and different figure will be determined in the new Iran–Russia contract, which is set to be signed next month.
Land acquisition has been another sticking point. Much of the route runs through farmland, requiring time-consuming negotiations with private landowners. Under the current division of labor, Iran shoulders land procurement costs while Russia funds construction.
In this regard, Minister Sadegh stated: “Despite challenging climatic conditions and the constraints imposed by sanctions, approximately 80 kilometers of land along the route have so far been acquired and secured, and more than 30 kilometers have been handed over to the Russian side. We are prepared to transfer half of the route for the commencement of technical operations within the next few weeks.”
In addition, to overcome these challenges and mitigate environmental concerns in Iran, Hadi Haqshenas, the Governor of Gilan Province, announced that, following the emphasis of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the 160-kilometer Rasht–Astara route will be constructed on an elevated bridge.
These complexities make the Rasht–Astara Railway unlike any other infrastructure project in Iran’s recent history.
Map of Rasht-Astara Railway
The North–South Corridor challenges Atlanticist chokeholds
The strategic weight of the Rasht–Astara line cannot be overstated. For Iran, under relentless sanctions, and for Russia, seeking alternatives to its embargoed European trade routes, the railway represents a crucial artery in the multipolar world order. It also restores Tehran’s long-lost rail link to the South Caucasus and, by extension, to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As such, it represents a major geoeconomic and geopolitical development.
Kamal Ebrahimi Kavori, a senior expert on Iran’s free trade and economic zones, believes that “the Rasht–Astara Railway project is not merely a simple rail line, but a vital artery linking Iran to major trade corridors – a route that connects the country’s northern and southern ports, free trade zones, and neighboring countries into an integrated and competitive transport chain.”
For Azerbaijan, which is not formally involved in the project, the completed rail link offers faster freight access to Pakistan – a key strategic ally – and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Given Baku’s expanding trade with these partners, the benefits are clear even without direct investment.
Currently, the lack of a direct rail connection at Astara means cargo has to be manually transferred between rail and road, clogging border terminals and slowing transit between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Once the Rasht–Astara line is operational, freight can move seamlessly from Russia’s northern cities to Iran’s southern port of Bandar Abbas.
An important point is that the North–South Corridor has three main routes: the eastern route (Central Asia), the central route (Caspian Sea), and the western route (South Caucasus). Although all three routes have gained significant momentum in recent years, particularly after the war in Ukraine and western sanctions on Russia, the main volume of transit and trade occurs along the western segment of the North–South Corridor, connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
Consequently, there is heavy truck traffic, especially at the Astara border terminals (Iran–Azerbaijan) and the Samur border terminal (Azerbaijan–Russia). Therefore, the construction and completion of the Rasht–Astara Railway could play a crucial role in reducing road congestion, lowering transportation costs, and accelerating transit and trade along this corridor.
In the first year of operation, the Rasht–Astara Railway is expected to handle up to approximately 10 million tons of cargo. In the long term, the cargo capacity of this route could reach approximately 15 million tons.
Adding momentum, Iran’s Preferential Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signed in October 2019, became a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025. While Azerbaijan is not part of the EAEU, it remains central to the INSTC’s westward stretch. The Rasht–Astara Railway will thus help streamline trade between Iran and major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Just days before the return of UN sanctions on Iran, Russia hosted a major nuclear deal with Iran on 24 September, and the two sides signed a $25-billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) to build four small-scale nuclear power plants in Sirik, in the southern Hormozgan Province. This was followed by the announcement of the Rasht–Astara Railway contract.
These moves signal a fundamental shift. Unlike in the 2006–2013 period when Russia backed UN sanctions against Iran, Moscow now stands aligned with Tehran against western coercion. Both reject the legitimacy of the UN snapback mechanism.
Far from being weakened by sanctions, the Iran–Russia partnership is expanding – anchored by energy cooperation, strategic transport corridors, and a shared challenge to western economic warfare.
Iran’s oil exports hit new post-sanctions record
Press TV – November 9, 2025
Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.
The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.
“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.
Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.
The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.
The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.
That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.
The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.
However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.
Germany to sharply increase funding for Ukraine – Reuters
RT | November 5, 2025
Germany is set to significantly increase its funding for Ukraine in 2026, Reuters has reported, citing government sources.
Berlin is Kiev’s largest EU backer, and has already provided it with around €40 billion ($46 billion) since the escalation of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in February 2022.
According to Reuters, Berlin is considering an additional €3 billion ($3.5 billion) increase in 2026, meaning the overall amount of German aid could reach €11.5 billion ($13.2 billion) next year.
The German authorities had allocated €8.5 billion ($9.8 billion) for Ukraine in its budget for next year, although sources told Reuters on Tuesday that the sum will likely balloon by more than a third due to additional funds from the finance and defense ministries. Similar figures were reported by the Handelsblatt newspaper.
The extra money will cover artillery, drones, armored vehicles, and the replacement of two US-made Patriot air-defense systems, according to the agency’s sources.
“We will continue our support for as long as necessary,” one source told Reuters.
The Ukrainian allocation has been approved despite German Chancellor Frederich Merz acknowledging in August that the German economy is suffering a “structural crisis” with large sectors “no longer truly competitive.”
The country’s economy saw two years of annual contraction in 2023 and 2024, partly due to the loss of cheap Russian energy as a result of EU sanctions on Moscow.
Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky last week thanked Merz for providing Kiev with an unspecified number of Patriot systems, saying that earlier agreements had been implemented.
In late October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the German authorities of pursuing policies reminiscent of Adolf Hitler’s objectives of dominating Europe and inflicting a strategic defeat on Moscow.
Speaking about Merz’s plans to make Germany the strongest army in Europe, Lavrov said “it is not just militarization – there are clear signs of re-nazification.”
Moscow has repeatedly said Western military aid to Zelensky’s government will not prevent it from achieving its goals in the Ukraine conflict, but only prolongs the fighting and increases the risk of a direct clash between Russia and NATO.
The enigma of Tusk and Nord Stream as original sin
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 3, 2025
Do you remember Nord Stream 2? The story was discussed by the media for months and, after various accusations and assumptions, it ended with the bitter truth: an operation devised by Western powers, coordinating Kiev and London, to sabotage the energy channel and accuse Russia, thus discrediting it. Investigations were then launched, implicating several players, including Germany and Poland.
Now the story is back in the spotlight.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has clearly stated his position on the Nord Stream 2 sabotage, arguing that it is not “in Poland’s interest” to hand over to Germany the Ukrainian citizen detained in Warsaw and accused of participating in the explosion of the gas pipeline. But, above all, he reiterated that the real problem with Nord Stream 2 “is not that it was destroyed, but that it was built.” Excuse me? The prime minister must have had a little too much to drink before making his statements.
With these words, Tusk defined the Warsaw government’s position on the 2022 attack, attributed to men linked to Kiev, against the pipelines that carried Russian gas to Europe, particularly to Germany.
Although the operation had serious economic consequences for Berlin—with a sharp rise in gas prices and repercussions for the entire German economy—the Polish head of government was clear in his assessment of the events that took place in the Baltic Sea after the start of the SMO.
Just a few hours earlier, commenting on the extradition request for the citizen known to the press as Volodymyr Z. (Yes, that is his real name, which only makes the whole thing even more ridiculous), who is suspected of having participated in the attack and is currently detained in Poland, Tusk had stated: “It is certainly not in Poland’s interest to accuse or hand over this citizen to another country,” although the final decision will still be up to the judiciary.
Historically, Poland has always opposed the construction of gas pipelines from Russia, considering them instruments that have made Europe overly dependent on Moscow’s energy. “Russia, thanks to funding from some European states and German and Anglo-Dutch companies, has been able to build Nord Stream 2 against the vital interests not only of our countries but of the whole of Europe. There can be no ambiguity on this point,” Tusk stressed, with a critical reference to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who in the past had accused Poland and the Baltic countries of bearing some of the responsibility for the war between Russia and Ukraine.
As for the Ukrainian suspected of sabotage, who was arrested in Poland at the end of September, a Polish court ruled on Monday that he must remain in custody for another 40 days while Germany’s extradition request based on a European arrest warrant is examined. According to German prosecutors, the man is a diver involved in a group of people suspected of chartering a yacht and placing explosives in gas pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. The charges against him relate to conspiracy to carry out an attack with explosives and the crime of “unconstitutional sabotage.”
Political stability issues
The reason behind Tusk’s statements may be more profound. Germany’s leadership position in the EU is weakening, and the absence of cheap Russian gas is contributing significantly to this process. Poland can now more actively promote its own interests and impose its own vision of problem solving on Berlin, including the situation regarding the sabotage of Nord Stream.
Germany’s economic strength has long been based on cheap Russian/Soviet energy resources (mainly natural gas). Berlin’s refusal to purchase Russian gas has already led to a significant economic and industrial decline. This benefits Warsaw, as well as other major European powers, particularly the UK and France, in their efforts to curb German influence in the region. In essence, Warsaw is carrying out the will of its “senior European partners,” primarily London.
By defending the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines and refusing to extradite Ukrainian citizens suspected of taking part in the attack to Germany, the Warsaw government seems to be legitimizing further sabotage operations, even on European territory, against infrastructure linked to Russia or to EU and NATO countries that have not yet cut off energy supplies from Moscow.
Donald Tusk’s statement is emblematic in this sense: “The problem with Nord Stream 2 is not that it was blown up, but that it was built.” Radosław Sikorski, too, had posted a message on X (“Thank you, United States”) after the explosion of the gas pipelines in September 2022, only to delete it later. More recently, he even publicly called on Ukrainians to destroy the Druzhba oil pipeline.
During a heated exchange with the Hungarian government, Sikorski also stated that Warsaw “cannot guarantee that an independent Polish court” would not order the arrest of Vladimir Putin if he were to fly over Poland to attend a meeting in Budapest. The ironic response from Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was not long in coming: “Perhaps the same independent court that, on the orders of Prime Minister Tusk, refused to extradite the terrorist who blew up Nord Stream?” Sikorski’s reply was peremptory: he said he was “proud of the Polish court that ruled that sabotaging an invader is not a crime.” This statement is cause for concern, as the “invader” in question is Russia in Ukraine, not Poland or Hungary. If this legal principle were to be applied universally, Warsaw would end up justifying international chaos.
If the logic of the “Tusk-Sikorski Doctrine” were followed, any country accusing another of invasion could feel justified in striking its interests anywhere.
From this perspective, this doctrine would theoretically make actions against Israel, the United States, or other NATO members, all accused at various times of conducting invasions or occupations, “justifiable.” Poland itself, in fact, participated in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside its Western allies.
Still according to this logic, would it even be permissible to sabotage the gas pipeline connecting Norway to Poland, which was inaugurated — curiously — on the same day that Nord Stream was destroyed, September 22, 2022? And, by analogy, should Islamist attacks against the United States, France, and the United Kingdom be considered “legitimate acts” in response to their military campaigns in the Arab world?
It should also be remembered that both Joe Biden and Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland had already announced the destruction of Nord Stream, which many observers interpreted as a possible indication of plans for sabotage that were never officially clarified.
Beyond speculation and paradoxes, the statements coming out of Warsaw appear highly dangerous, as they contribute to normalizing and even glorifying acts of terrorism, if carried out against Russian or pro-Russian targets, as well as sowing divisions among European countries themselves. Above all, they foreshadow disturbing scenarios in which new acts of sabotage could target strategic infrastructure in Europe, justified by the narrative of the ’war against the Russian invader’.
While Germany continues to support Ukraine militarily and financially, even at the cost of its own energy security, it is perhaps time to question the true nature of ’allies’ who, in the name of an ideological war, do not hesitate to compromise the interests of the entire continent.
It remains to be asked of Tusk, Sikorski, and their friends whether we can really continue to believe that refineries catch fire on their own and gas pipelines commit suicide at sea. All just “coincidences,” right?
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From the Archives
Clash of Civilization, Iran Part II
By Jamal Kanj – Intifada-Palestine.com – January 14, 2011
Israel’s survival kit is: perpetuate conflict, insecurity to rationalize collective hate and finally playing victim.
Devoid of conflict, Israel implodes internally; without hate, Zionism loses its justification; and playing eternal victim to continue blackmailing the West. Absence of this holy trinity, Israel ceases to exist. … continue
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- House Votes to End Iran War for Third Time
- North Korea Slams US Plan for ‘AUKUS 2.0’ with South Korea and Japan
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- EU bans former Zelensky aide from parliament
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- If Americans Knew
- U.S. Makes, Israel Takes: The Real Story of U.S.-Israeli Military Cooperation
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- Tucker Carlson interviews Norman Finkelstein about Gaza
- Groups urge Americans to support Van Hollen legislation on Israel’s killing of Americans & Palestinians
- Trump administration plans to send 40,000 tons of bombs to Israel: report
- Sanctions Target Iran’s Government, But Kill Hospitalized 23-Year-Old Woman
- An alternative view on the book “Israel’s Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power”
- Ed Sheeran’s band Beoga, other opening acts quit tour after Macklemore was dropped over his pro-Palestinian comments
- The assassination attempt on President Trump in Butler and the various Israeli connections to it
- “We Want That the Whole Land Be Jewish”
- No Tricks Zone
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- Energy Crisis: Germany Enters Heating Season With Historically Low Gas Reserve Fill Levels
- New Study: The Antarctic Ice Sheet Gained Mass From 2020-2024 Due To Staggering Snow And Ice Accumulation
- Study: Ocean Heating Rates From Thousands Of Years Ago ‘Dwarf’ Modern Ocean Heating Rates
- Climate Extremists Target, Attack Large-Scale Power Grid Infrastructure In Germany!
- New Study: Antarctic Ice Melt Has Contributed Less Than 1 Centimeter To Sea Level Rise In The Last 30 Years
- Fear Of Debate: Alarmist German Climate Scientist Calls On Mainstream Media To Discredit Skeptic Voices
- End-Of-August Arctic Sea Ice Extent Hasn’t Fallen In 20 Years, Official Data Show!
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