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Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025

The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.

In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?

Trump’s visit

Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.

Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.

The new thinking

The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.

To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.

Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.

Beyond Ambitions

Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.

Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

November 11, 2025 Posted by aletho | Economics, Militarism | China, United States | 2 Comments