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Focus on Panama’s ‘port case’ must not be misplaced

Global Times | February 3, 2026

Since the Supreme Court of Panama ruled that CK Hutchison’s concession contract to operate Panama Canal ports was “unconstitutional,” the most elated individuals over the past few days have undoubtedly been certain US politicians and media outlets. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly posted on social media that the US is “encouraged,” while some American media outlets claimed this marks a “major victory” for Washington in curbing Chinese influence. The Wall Street Journal even issued a blunt threat, stating that other countries “might re-examine their ties to the world’s second-biggest economy.”

The cries of “victory” coming from the US confirm widespread outside suspicions and further expose Washington’s hegemonic arrogance in using geopolitical means to interfere with commercial cooperation and undermine trade rules. Although the US formally handed over control of the Panama Canal in 1999, in Washington’s Cold War mentality, this area remains an “inner lake” that others are not allowed to touch. The US has repeatedly expressed desire to “retake control of the Canal,” and Secretary of State Rubio chose Panama for his first overseas visit, threatening the country that it “must reduce Chinese influence.” Therefore, when the Supreme Court of Panama issued its so-called ruling, it is difficult for the international public opinion not to question its independence.

However, if one follows Washington’s rhythm and views this turmoil through the lens of “US-China competition,” they fall into a cognitive trap set by the US, and the focus on this matter becomes misplaced. These ports have never been, and should never be, bargaining chips in a geopolitical game. In fact, CK Hutchison has operated these ports for nearly 30 years; in such a long span of time, where has there ever been a shadow of a “Chinese threat”?

On the contrary, under the company’s management, these ports have been developed, benefiting the local area and contributing to global free trade. In this process, the US itself has been one of the beneficiaries. Therefore, regarding the attention on Panama’s port operation rights, if one must talk about winners and losers, the core should lie in the contest between free trade and hegemonism, and the confrontation between the spirit of contract and power politics.

Whether it is the ports along the Panama Canal, Australia’s Darwin Port mired in controversy, or the case of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the same “invisible hand” looms in the background. Some countries repeatedly claim to uphold a “rules-based order”; yet in practice, what they defend is an “order based on the interests of a single country.” This is, in essence, a targeted demolition of global investment credibility. If commercial contracts can be nullified at the whim of politicians or under pressure from allies, then no long-term investment within the Western system is truly safe. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, global investors are watching closely, asking whether today’s rapacious acts will tomorrow descend upon any profitable industry.

International investment law does indeed recognize “security exceptions,” but these are by no means a universal master key for hegemonism. The core of international commercial law is certainty: companies that operate in compliance with the rules deserve the protection of the law. By using diplomatic coercion to push allies into rulings that defy legal principles, the US is eroding from within the very credit foundations on which the capitalist world depends. In the short term, Washington may have secured a few “strategic footholds”; however, in the long term, this has fundamentally undermined the international credibility of the US and the space for transnational commercial interactions. It is foreseeable that when the law ceases to be a fair arbiter and becomes a political tool, global capital will have to seek safe havens independent of the dollar system and the US “long-arm” influence.

What is even more concerning to the international community is that the geopolitical will of the US often surpasses the constitutions of some sovereign nations. This is a mockery of the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. From the case of Alstom years ago to the current controversy over Darwin Port, the methods used by the US to attack competitors and seize interests are strikingly similar. The international business community needs a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment, not a “law of the jungle” dominated by hegemonic will. If this trend of politicizing economic and trade issues and weaponizing legal tools continues unchecked, the ultimate victim will be the entire international economic and trade order. Those who attempt to curb their rivals by undermining the rules will also find themselves facing a bankruptcy of credibility.

As an important maritime passage that carries about 5 percent of global shipping trade, the Panama Canal ports have become a crucial cargo hub on a global scale, and they should not waver under the shadow of hegemonism. According to reports, concessions for the Panama Canal ports will now need to be auctioned off.

In this context, it is hoped that the Panamanian side will truly demonstrate its “independence” by providing a predictable environment for fair competition for all bidders, rather than trying by any means to “ensure that China is blocked from the bidding” as some US media outlets have trumpeted. The whole world is watching everything that happens there.

February 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

US traders struggling to find buyers for Venezuelan oil, as China shifts supply chain to Canada

Inside China Business | February 2, 2026

Following the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry, commodities trading firms were given contracts to market the crude to buyers across the world, including to China. But Venezuelan crude oil is now being sold at far higher prices than before, with the profits routed through US companies and energy traders. The higher prices have pushed Chinese refiners out of the market for the heavy crude from Venezuela, and they are shifting their orders to Canada, Russia, and Iran. Canadian tar sands oil is more expensive than Venezuelan heavy sour, but is similar, and offers far shorter transit times and lower shipping costs. Chinese energy traders have been instructed to refuse new offers for Venezuelan crude. Closing scene, Wulingyuan, Hunan Resources and links:

Reuters, Vitol, Trafigura offer Venezuelan oil to Indian, Chinese refiners for March delivery, sources say https://www.reuters.com/business/ener…

China replaces US barrels with crude from Canada https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/tan…

Trump’s Venezuela oil grab is pushing Chinese refiners to Canada (Not paywalled) https://calgaryherald.com/business/tr…

Reuters Exclusive: PetroChina holds off from buying Venezuelan oil marketed under US control, sources say https://www.reuters.com/business/ener…

Bloomberg, Trump’s Venezuela Oil Grab Pushes Chinese Refiners to Canada https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl…

Trump administration demands Venezuela cut ties with US adversaries to resume oil production https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/07/politi…

February 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Video | , , , | Leave a comment

Iran, China and Russia sign trilateral strategic pact

By Ranjan Solomon | MEMO | January 29, 2026

In a dramatic geopolitical development this afternoon, Iran, China and Russia formally signed a comprehensive strategic pact, marking one of the most consequential shifts in 21st-century international relations. While the full text of the agreement is being released in stages by the three governments, state media in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have acknowledged the ceremony and described it as a cornerstone for a new multipolar order.

The pact comes against the backdrop of decades of growing cooperation between these three states. Iran and Russia earlier concluded a 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty designed to deepen economic, political, and defence ties, and to blunt the impact of Western sanctions — a treaty that was signed in January 2025 and entered into force last year.  Meanwhile, Iran and China have been bound by a 25-year cooperation agreement first signed in 2021, aimed at expanding trade, infrastructure, and energy integration.

What makes today’s signing significantly different, and newsworthy, is that it explicitly combines the three powers in a coordinated framework, aligning them on issues ranging from nuclear sovereignty and economic cooperation to military coordination and diplomatic strategy.

Officials in Tehran described the pact as a joint commitment to “mutual respect, sovereign independence and a rules-based international system that rejects unilateral coercion,” echoing similar statements issued by Beijing and Moscow.

What the pact represents

This agreement does not – at least from the initial public texts – constitute a formal mutual defence treaty akin to NATO’s Article 5, obligating one to defend the others militarily. Past pacts between Iran and Russia always carefully stopped short of a binding defence guarantee.  Instead, the pact appears to link three major powers in a broader geopolitical coalition defined by shared opposition to Western military dominance and economic coercion.

Central to the agreement is a unified stance against reimposition of sanctions on Iran tied to its nuclear programme under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Tehran, Beijing and Moscow have previously issued joint statements rejecting European attempts to trigger “snapback” sanctions, and have declared the UN Security Council’s considerations of the nuclear deal terminated.

This trilateral pact is therefore as much about diplomatic leverage and strategic narrative as it is about concrete defence or economic mechanisms.

Immediate regional and global consequences

The pact’s signing coincides with heightened tensions between the United States and Iran. President Donald Trump has reiterated threats of military action against Iran absent a negotiated settlement on its nuclear activities, even deploying a US carrier strike group to the Middle East theatre.  Against that backdrop, this new strategic pact serves both Tehran and its partners as a buffer against unilateral US military pressure. By presenting a united front, the three governments aim to compel Washington to negotiate from a position of constraint rather than dominance.

For the Middle East, the balance of power is reshaping. Iran, long isolated by Western policies — now claims the protection of two permanent members of the UN Security Council. This will embolden Tehran’s regional posture in theatres such as Iraq, Syria and the Persian Gulf, and complicate conventional deterrence strategies exercised by the United States and its Gulf allies.

For Europe, the pact undercuts Brussels’ ambitions to retain independent influence in Middle Eastern diplomacy. European powers have repeatedly attempted to revive elements of the JCPOA and threaten punitive measures against Tehran, but coordination by Iran, China and Russia has thwarted those efforts, exposing Europe’s diplomatic limitations in a world less anchored to Western consensus.

Economic repercussions

Economically, the deal signals deeper integration among three of the world’s most significant non-Western economies. Russia and China have already worked on investment protection and bilateral trade agreements designed to sidestep Western financial systems, such as SWIFT, which have been used as vectors for sanctions.  A trilateral pact potentially accelerates the creation of alternative financial mechanisms and trade routes that further bleed Western economic leverage.

Iran — sitting on vast energy resources — gains broader access to markets and investment, especially as China continues its Belt and Road initiatives and Russia seeks alternatives to sanctions-laden European markets. In combination, these developments portend increased trade flows and reduced vulnerability to the US dollar-centric financial system.

Military and strategic dynamics

Although not a formal alliance, the pact strengthens military cooperation among the trio. China and Russia have conducted regular joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean and Gulf waters — exercises that Iran has participated in as well, signalling interoperability and shared security interests.

Strategically, the pact will likely lead to more coordinated defence planning and intelligence sharing, even if it stops short of a binding treaty that compels military intervention. For the United States and NATO partners, this raises the stakes in multiple regions: any escalation with Iran now risks broader strategic responses involving Beijing and Moscow, increasing the threshold for conflict and reducing the effectiveness of unilateral threats.

Longer-term global impact

In the long term, the pact accelerates the multipolar restructuring of international relations. For decades, the United States and its allies have dominated the architecture of global governance — from trade regimes to security pacts. A structured alignment of Iran, China and Russia signifies an alternative axis that challenges Western hegemony not through ideological competition but through pragmatic power balances.

Whether this pact evolves into a deeper defence agreement, or stays as a diplomatic and strategic framework, remains to be seen. What is indisputable is that the world’s power centre is shifting — not towards a simple “East vs West” dichotomy, but towards a more contested, multipolar world order where diplomatic leverage, economic resilience and military signalling converge in new and unpredictable ways.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Fānpán – Is China Turning the Tables on the ‘Democratic’ West?

By Mats Nilsson | 21st Century Wire | January 29, 2026

As a European born analyst with a realist mindset, I was, if not surprised, at least slightly intrigued when I read that China feels freer than Germany in the Era of Xi Jinping’s reforms.

In a world where narratives about freedom and authoritarianism are often painted in stark black and white, the words of Ai Weiwei, one of China’s, in the West most prominent dissident artists, have sent shockwaves through the European cultural scene, hurting our self-image. Ai, known for his bold critiques of the Chinese government, his iconic installations like the “Sunflower Seeds” at Tate Modern, and his 81-day detention in 2011, has long been a symbol of resistance against perceived oppression in his homeland. Yet, after a decade in exile, living primarily in Germany, Ai’s recent return visit to China has led him to a startling conclusion: Beijing now feels “more humane” than Berlin, and Germany, once renown for its liberalism, comes across as “insecure and unfree.” This perspective, shared in a candid interview with the German newspaper Berliner Zeitung following his trip, challenges entrenched stereotypes and invites a deeper examination of how societal freedoms are experienced in daily life, in Europe of today.

Ai’s statements are not mere embellishment; they stem from personal encounters that highlight bureaucratic inefficiencies, social isolation, and institutional irrationality in the West, contrasted with the efficiency and warmth he rediscovered in China. But what underpins this shift? A closer look reveals that Ai’s observations align closely with the sweeping reforms outlined by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his seminal works, particularly the multi-volume series Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. These books, which compile Xi’s speeches, writings, and policy directives, emphasize streamlining governance, enhancing people’s livelihoods, and fostering a “people-centered” development model. Under Xi’s leadership since 2012, China has undergone transformations that prioritize efficiency, anti-corruption, and social harmony; elements that Ai implicitly praises through his anecdotes.

When I read about Ai’s new insights, and tying them to Xi’s reforms, I can suddenly argue that in practical terms, China may indeed offer a form of freedom that eludes many in the West today.

Weiwei’s story is one of displacement. Born in 1957, he grew up amid the tumult of the Cultural Revolution, with his father, the poet Ai Qing, exiled to a labor camp. Ai himself rose to global fame through art that critiqued power structures, such as his investigation into the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which exposed local government negligence in school collapses. His activism led to clashes with Chinese authorities, culminating in his 2011 arrest on charges of tax evasion, a move in the West widely seen as politically motivated.

Released but stripped of his passport until 2015, Ai fled to Germany, where he was granted asylum and continued his work from Berlin and later Portugal. For ten years, Ai immersed himself in European life, producing art that often lambasted both Chinese and Western hypocrisies. Yet, his return visit to China in late 2025 marked a pivotal moment.

In the Berliner Zeitung interview, Ai describes Beijing not as the oppressive dystopia of Western media portrayals but as “a broken jade being perfectly reassembled.” He reports feeling no fear upon arrival, a stark contrast to his past experiences. Instead, he encountered a society that felt vibrant and accessible. “Perfectly ordinary people from at least five different professions lined up, hoping to meet me,” Ai recounts, highlighting a social openness that he found lacking in Germany.

This warmth, Ai suggests, extends to everyday interactions. In Germany, he laments, “almost no one has ever invited me to their home. Neighbors from above or below exchange at most a brief nod.” Such isolation, he argues, contributes to a sense of precariousness in Western societies. In China, by contrast, the immediate eagerness of strangers to connect reflects a cultural and social fabric that prioritizes community over individualism; a theme echoed in Xi’s reforms.

This also touches on the issue of bureaucracy and freedom. At the heart of Ai’s critique is the suffocating bureaucracy he encountered in Europe, which he claims makes daily life “at least ten times” more difficult than in China. A poignant example is his experience with banking. Upon returning to China, Ai reactivated a dormant bank account in mere minutes, discovering it still held “a considerable sum of money.” This seamless process stands in sharp relief to his ordeals in the West: “In Germany, my bank accounts were closed twice. And not just mine, but my girlfriend’s as well. In Switzerland, I was refused an account at the country’s largest bank, and another bank later closed my account there as well.”

Ai describes these incidents as “extraordinarily complicated and often irrational,” hinting at possible political motivations or overzealous compliance with anti-money laundering regulations that disproportionately affect outspoken figures like himself, and just recently struck US analyst and author Scott Ritter.

This disparity underscores a broader point about freedom: while Western democracies trumpet abstract rights like free speech, the practical exercise of freedom is often hampered by bureaucratic hindrances. In Germany, a country renowned for its efficiency in engineering, the administrative state can feel labyrinthine. Opening a bank account, registering a residence, or navigating healthcare requires layers of documentation, appointments, and verifications that can take weeks or months. Ai’s account stems from “de-risking” practices, where banks sever ties with high-profile clients to avoid regulatory government scrutiny; practices that have over the last four years intensified in Europe amid geopolitical tensions.

In contrast, China’s banking system under Xi has embraced digital innovation to enhance accessibility. Xi’s The Governance of China (Volume I, 2014) outlines reforms to modernize financial services, emphasizing “inclusive finance” to ensure even remote or dormant accounts remain functional. Through initiatives like the widespread adoption of mobile payment platforms such as WeChat Pay China has reduced bureaucratic hurdles, allowing transactions and account management to occur instantaneously via smartphones. Ai’s quick reactivation exemplifies this: no endless forms, no interrogations; just efficiency. This aligns with Xi’s push for “streamlining administration and delegating power,” a key reform pillar aimed at cutting red tape and boosting economic vitality.

Xi’s books repeatedly stress that true freedom emerges from governance that serves the people. In The Governance of China (Volume II, 2017), he discusses anti-corruption campaigns that have purged inefficiencies and graft from institutions, including banks. Since 2012, over 1.5 million officials have been disciplined, fostering a cleaner, more responsive system. This has translated into practical freedoms: the ability to access services without fear of arbitrary denial. Ai’s experience suggests that in China, freedom is not just rhetorical but operational, free from the “cold, rational, and deeply bureaucratic” constraints he felt in Germany.

Xi’s people-centered approach finds confirmation in Ai’s assertion that Beijing’s political climate feels “more natural and humane” than Germany’s. This in my humble view, points toward a deeper cultural and policy shift. Ai portrays Germany as a place where individuals feel “confined and precarious,” struggling under the weight of historical guilt and future uncertainties. This resonates with critiques of Western societies, where economic inequality, rising populism, and social fragmentation have eroded communal bonds. In Europe, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with energy crises and migration debates, has heightened a sense of insecurity. Ai’s social isolation in Germany, minimal neighborly interactions, mirrors surveys showing increasing loneliness in Western nations.

China, under Xi, has pursued a different path. Xi’s reforms, as detailed in The Governance of China (Volume III, 2020), prioritize “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” emphasizing social harmony and collective well-being. This includes massive poverty alleviation efforts, lifting nearly 100 million people out of extreme poverty by 2021: a feat Xi describes as ensuring “no one is left behind.”

Such policies foster a society where, as Ai observed in his interview, ordinary people eagerly engage with others, creating a humane environment. Moreover, Xi’s focus on cultural confidence has revitalized community ties. In Volume IV (2023), he advocates for “socialist core values” like civility and harmony, which manifest in everyday life through neighborhood committees, volunteer networks, and cultural events. Ai’s warm reception upon return; people from various professions seeking him out, reflects this. It’s a far cry from the European atomized individualism, where privacy norms can border on alienation.

Critics might argue that China’s harmony comes at the cost of dissent, pointing to tightened controls on expression under Xi. Yet, Ai’s lack of fear during his visit suggests a nuance: while political criticism remains sensitive, daily freedoms, economic mobility, social interaction, access to services, have expanded. Xi’s reforms include “rule of law” initiatives, with over 300 laws revised since 2012 to protect individual rights in non-political spheres. This “selective freedom” may feel more liberating in practice than the West’s more abstract liberties of today.

One must also consider China’s economic transformations in this aspect. Xi’s books outline the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation through innovation-driven growth. Reforms like the Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation strategy have bolstered domestic resilience, reducing reliance on Western systems that Ai found unreliable. Xi critiques European protectionism in his writings, advocating for open economies. Ironically, Ai, once a Western darling, now embodies the pitfalls of this approach, his accounts closed perhaps due to his Chinese ties, highlighting how geopolitical insecurities undermine personal freedoms. In China, Xi’s anti-corruption drive has stabilized institutions, ensuring accounts like Ai’s remain intact despite dormancy. This stability contributes to the “unfree” feeling Ai ascribes to Germany, which he says, “plays the role of an insecure and unfree country, struggling to find its position between history and future.”

Xi’s reforms, by contrast, position China as forward-looking, with policies like the 14th Five-Year Plan emphasizing high-quality development and environmental sustainability, creating a sense of progress and security.

So, in conclusion, Weiwei’s reflections serve as a mirror—forcing the West to confront its own contradictions. Germany, with its history of division and reunification, symbolizes the democratic triumph, and yet, Ai’s experiences reveal cracks: overregulation, social coldness, and institutional paranoia.

This isn’t unique to Germany or the EU; similar issues plague the U.S. and U.K., where bureaucratic hurdles in immigration, healthcare, and finance frustrate citizens. Xi’s governance model offers an alternative: efficiency through centralization, humaneness through collectivism. While not without flaws, critics note surveillance and censorship, and so Ai’s endorsement suggests that for many, China’s system delivers tangible freedoms. His words directly challenge the binary of “free West vs. authoritarian East,” urging a reevaluation based on lived realities. Ai Weiwei’s declaration that China feels more humane and freer than Germany isn’t a reversal of his principles, but an evolution based on experience. It underscores the success of Xi Jinping’s reforms in creating a society where bureaucracy recedes, community thrives, and daily life flows unencumbered. As the world grapples with uncertainty, perhaps the West can learn from China’s jade-like reassembly, piecing together a more practical freedom for all?

Author Mats Nilsson LL.M is political analyst and legal historian based in Sweden. See more of his work at The Dissident Club on Substack.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Book Review, Civil Liberties, Corruption, Full Spectrum Dominance | , , , | Leave a comment

Davos and Abu Dhabi: How the Ukrainian Endgame Exposed Western Decline

By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – January 28, 2026

While Russia, the United States, and Ukraine quietly negotiated in Abu Dhabi, Davos revealed Europe’s real position in the emerging world order: excluded from decision-making yet burdened with the costs of war and peace alike.

The 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos will likely be remembered less as a forum for global coordination than as a public autopsy of the Western-led international order.

What emerged in the Alpine setting was not coherence but fragmentation: rhetorical excess, strategic confusion, and an unmistakable sense that the world has already moved beyond the frameworks still defended—often ritualistically—by Euro-Atlantic elites.

Three speeches captured this moment with particular clarity: those of Volodymyr Zelensky, Mark Carney, and, less noticed but arguably most consequential, Chinese Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang (represented in the Davos debate through He Lifeng’s economic message).

Zelensky and the Public Humiliation of Europe

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech was striking not only for its confrontational tone but also for its intended audience. His criticism was not primarily directed at Russia or even the United States, but bluntly at Europe. He accused the European Union of strategic indecision, military weakness, and an inability to guarantee Ukraine’s security, reiterating that Europe “still does not know how to defend itself” and remains structurally dependent on Washington.

Mocking Europe’s symbolic troop deployments to Greenland and its delayed reactions to crises such as Iran reinforced Zelensky’s humiliation of Europe.

This rhetoric can be understood as a final reckoning — an all-or-nothing move in which he burned all bridges and launched a frontal attack without regard for the consequences. By Davos, Kyiv was already aware that negotiations over the territorial concessions of the war were being discussed in Abu Dhabi between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine without European participation.

Zelensky’s speech thus functioned as political coercion aimed at Europe as the remaining actor capable of paying the price of a settlement. By publicly framing Europe as weak and morally indebted, Zelensky attempted to transform guilt into leverage in the final phase of negotiations.

This interpretation is reinforced by reporting in the Financial Times, which revealed that Ukraine’s willingness to consider territorial concessions is conditional upon accelerated EU membership, potentially by 2027. In domestic political terms, this trade-off allows Zelensky to reframe territorial loss as civilisational gain: Ukraine does not lose land; it “joins Europe.”

The bill, however, is addressed to Brussels.

Europe’s Astonishing Response

The European reaction to Zelensky’s speech in Davos bordered on political self-abnegation. Despite being publicly criticised, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Ukraine’s “heroic struggle” and emphasised Europe’s material commitment rather than responding to the substance of Zelensky’s accusations.

This asymmetry—verbal humiliation met with renewed rhetorical loyalty—reveals a deeper structural problem: Europe’s inability to translate financial power into strategic agency.

Dissent has nevertheless emerged at the national level. Italian politicians, including Rossano Sasso and Matteo Salvini, openly criticised Zelensky’s “ungrateful” tone and questioned continued military and financial support.

Such reactions reflect mounting domestic pressures linked to inflation, energy costs, and war fatigue, documented extensively by Politico and the Kiel Institute.

Yet these voices remain fragmented, and Europe as a collective actor continues to display what can only be described as strategic paralysis.

Mark Carney and the End of the Rules-Based Illusion

If Zelensky exposed Europe’s weakness, Mark Carney articulated its anxiety. His Davos speech openly acknowledged what had long been implicit: the so-called “rules-based international order” is no longer operative—and perhaps never was. Carney framed the current moment as a rupture, arguing that “middle powers” such as Canada and European states must now navigate a world no longer structured by predictable norms but by power, leverage, and economic scale.

Carney’s concept of “value-based realism” deserves close scrutiny. On the surface, it appears as an attempt to reconcile normative language with geopolitical adaptation. In substance, however, it represents an effort to preserve Western managerial influence within a system that has already shifted towards multipolarity. Sovereignty, in Carney’s formulation, is diluted into “managed multipolarity,” administered by the same financial and institutional elites that dominated the previous order.

This is precisely why his discourse fails to resonate in the Global South. For emerging powers—particularly within BRICS—the collapse of the Western order is not a tragedy to be managed but a long-awaited correction. Carney’s speech, far from acknowledging this, sought to repackage decline as stewardship.

That it reportedly irritated Donald Trump is unsurprising: Carney implicitly rejected American unilateralism while simultaneously refusing genuine systemic change.

China and the Silent Centre of Gravity

The most consequential intervention in Davos was arguably not Western at all. Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng articulated Beijing’s strategic priority with remarkable clarity: China is positioning itself to become the world’s largest consumer market, making access to Chinese demand the central axis of future global trade.

This message, echoed by analysts such as Pepe Escobar, signals a structural shift in the global economy: dependence is moving eastward.

Unlike Carney’s rhetorical manoeuvres, China’s position was grounded in material capacity: industrial scale, domestic demand, and long-term planning. For much of the Global South, this represents opportunity rather than threat. For Europe, however, it underscores marginalisation.

Abu Dhabi Decides, Europe Pays

The trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi marked a geopolitical turning point. While Europe has committed close to €200 billion in support to Ukraine, it was excluded from negotiations shaping the war’s end.

This exclusion is not accidental. Both Washington and Moscow increasingly view Brussels as incapable of strategic compromise, bound instead by ideological rigidity and proceduralism.

Europe thus faces a brutal dilemma: continue financing a war it does not control, or finance a peace settlement that fundamentally alters the EU through accelerated Ukrainian accession. Neither option strengthens European sovereignty.

Granting Ukraine some lite-sort of membership by 2027—without completed accession chapters—would transform the EU’s budgetary, agricultural, and cohesion policies overnight. Yet postponement risks indefinite financial haemorrhage. As the Financial Times and Reuters have noted, peace may ultimately be cheaper than perpetual war, even if politically uncomfortable.

Conclusion: Europe as the Weakest Link

Davos revealed a system speaking past itself. Zelensky spoke from desperation and tactical clarity. Carney spoke from elite anxiety. China spoke from structural confidence. Europe, by contrast, spoke in platitudes.

The irony is stark. Europe funds Ukraine, absorbs the economic shock, and bears the political consequences—yet is excluded from decision-making. In Abu Dhabi, values were absent, and strategy was outsourced. When the deal is announced, Europe may discover it was not a negotiator, but a guarantor of last resort.

The tragedy is not merely Europe’s weakness, but its refusal to acknowledge it.

Ricardo Martins is a Doctor in Sociology with specialisation in geopolitics and international relations.

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January 28, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , | Leave a comment

China Rejects U.S. Claims of Coercion in Central America

teleSUR | January 26, 2026

On Monday, Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, rejected U.S. accusations of alleged Chinese “coercion” and “interference” in Central America.

His remarks came after Rep. John Moolenaar, chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on China, traveled to several Central American countries to counter Chinese influence and question the involvement of Asian companies in strategic sectors such as the operation of ports linked to the Panama Canal.

In response, Guo described the U.S. claims as “complete lies and fallacies,” saying they reflect ideological bias and a Cold War mentality. “China firmly opposes certain U.S. politicians interfering in the normal relations between Central American countries and China,” the Chinese diplomat said.

He also stressed that the Chinese foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is based on principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness, and cooperation aimed at shared development.

According to Guo, relations between China and Central American countries have produced tangible benefits for local populations, particularly in areas such as infrastructure, trade, logistics connectivity, productive investment, and technology transfer.

China maintains that its presence in Central America is not aimed at political domination but rather at a model of South-South cooperation that has been “well received by the countries involved.”

Guo urged U.S. politicians to stop instrumentalizing China-related issues for geopolitical purposes and to focus their efforts on initiatives that contribute to regional development. In multiple international forums, China has reiterated its rejection of bloc-based thinking and confrontation, advocating for a multipolar international order based on multilateralism and respect for state sovereignty.

Earlier, U.S. President Donald Trump released the new U.S. National Security Strategy, which prioritizes strengthening his country’s influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and seeks to reconfigure strategic control over key trade corridors such as the Panama Canal.

January 26, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

Is China a threat to Greenland?

By Pei Si | Global Times | January 22, 2026

Since the beginning of 2026, the US has repeatedly claimed that it must take control of Greenland to prevent threats from China and Russia, alleging that there are Chinese and Russian vessels “all over the place” outside of Greenland. What is the reality? What is China’s actual presence in Greenland? And does China pose any threat to Greenland at all?

Based on information from various sources, China currently has no official institutions in Greenland, no investment projects, and no resident companies. There are only some 30 Chinese workers working at Greenlandic seafood companies. Cooperation between China and Greenland is largely confined to trade, particularly in aquatic products. In 2025, bilateral trade between China and Greenland reached $429 million, of which Greenland’s exports to China amounted to $420 million, mainly Arctic shrimp, halibut, cod, lobster and other seafood. Greenland’s imports from China totaled $9 million, consisting largely of daily consumer goods.

Nor are there many Chinese tourists visiting Greenland. Although the island boasts stunning natural scenery, it is not easy to reach it from China and remains a niche destination for Chinese travelers. In 2024, only about 3,500 Chinese tourists visited Greenland.

Claims that there are Chinese vessels all over the waters near Greenland, or that Greenland faces a so-called “China threat,” are even more groundless. On January 16, Soren Andersen, Major General of Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command in Greenland, dismissed such claims in an interview, stating clearly that “there were no Chinese or Russian ships near Greenland.” Vessel-tracking data from MarineTraffic and LSEG likewise show no Chinese ships’ presence near Greenland. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen has repeatedly clarified to the media that there is no “instant threat” from China. Rasmus Jarlov, the chair of Denmark’s parliamentary defense committee, put it even more bluntly: The claim of “a big threat from China and Russia against Greenland” is delusional.

Whether in terms of facts or policy, China does not pose a threat to Greenland. In fact, China has been subjected to unfair restrictions there. Rasmussen has openly acknowledged that the Danish government previously used administrative measures to veto the participation of Chinese companies in Greenland’s airport expansion and mining projects, and has already established an investment screening mechanism that will not allow Chinese investment in Greenland in the future. Whether such sacrifices of China can buy a US “hands-off” is highly doubtful – and hardly worthy of respect.

Anyone can see that the current tensions in the Arctic stem primarily from the actions of a certain country advancing claims that violate international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. By contrast, China made it explicit in its 2018 white paper China’s Arctic Policy that “all states should abide by international treaties such as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS, as well as general international law. They should respect the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction enjoyed by the Arctic States in this region, respect the tradition and culture of the indigenous peoples.”

On January 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning further stressed at a regular press briefing: “The Arctic bears on the common interests of the international community. China’s activities in the Arctic are aimed at promoting the peace, stability and sustainable development of the region. They are in line with the international law. Countries’ right and freedom to carry out activities in the Arctic in accordance with the law needs to be fully respected. The US should not use other countries as a pretext for seeking selfish gains.”

From China’s perspective, the future of the Arctic should not be a battleground for geopolitical rivalry, but a low-tension region for international cooperation on climate change and sustainable development. Claims that “China threatens Greenland” are simply too absurd to be worth refuting.

January 24, 2026 Posted by | Russophobia, Sinophobia | , , | Leave a comment

Pentagon downgrades China threat, shifts focus to homeland, hemisphere

Al Mayadeen | January 24, 2026

The United States Department of War has released its long-delayed 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), signaling a major shift in Washington’s military priorities by no longer treating China as the “primary threat” to US national security.

The document, published late Friday, places the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere at the center of Pentagon planning, a sharp departure from strategies issued under both former President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump’s first term, which identified China as the foremost strategic challenge.

According to the strategy, past US administrations “ignored American interests,” allowing strategic vulnerabilities to emerge in areas such as the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the broader Western Hemisphere. The document explicitly calls for abandoning what it describes as “grandiose strategies” in favor of policies rooted in the “practical interests” of the US public.

Reduced emphasis on China, conciliatory tone in the Pacific

While China remains a key concern, the 2026 NDS no longer characterizes Beijing as an “acute” or “existential” threat. Instead, it refers to China as a “settled force” in the Indo-Pacific that must be deterred from dominating the US or its allies.

The document adopts a notably conciliatory tone, stressing that Washington does not seek to “strangle or humiliate” China. It argues that a “decent peace” is achievable under terms favorable to the US and acceptable to Beijing, emphasizing diplomacy, stable relations, and expanded military-to-military communication channels to avoid escalation.

Although the Pentagon continues to advocate a “strong denial defense” in the Pacific, the strategy does not specify what military assets will be deployed. Notably, Taiwan is not mentioned by name, marking a significant shift from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which explicitly framed Taiwan as a central security concern.

Europe’s declining importance, new DPRK strategy

In contrast to the National Security Strategy released last month, the defense document avoids describing Europe as being in “civilizational decline”, but it nonetheless downplays the continent’s strategic importance.

“Although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power,” the strategy states, adding that while US engagement will continue, Washington will prioritize defending the homeland and its immediate sphere of influence.

The strategy also outlines a reduced US military role in deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shifting primary responsibility to South Korea, which currently hosts around 28,500 US troops.

“South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support,” the document states.

The strategy notably omits any reference to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reinforcing speculation that Washington is moving toward managing the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities rather than seeking their elimination.

“This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating US force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” the strategy explains, noting that Washington seeks to make its forces more flexible and better positioned to respond to a wider range of contingencies across the region.

Burden-sharing and regional rebalancing in the Pacific

Across the broader Pacific region, the Pentagon is urging allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, linking continued US cooperation to increased military spending by allies, with benchmarks as high as 5% of GDP. The strategy emphasizes economic and maritime security over regime-change policies, describing the Indo-Pacific as the world’s most dynamic economic region and underscoring the need to protect trade routes and strategic access points.

Japan and South Korea are identified as central to this regional balancing approach, with the US seeking to “incentivize and enable” allies to play a more assertive role in collective defense.

Meanwhile, South Korea has raised its defense spending to 7.5% of GDP and continues to field upwards of 500,000 regular troops with approximately 3.1 million reservists. On its part, Japan is moving to decisively break with decades of post-war pacifism, accelerating a historic military buildup and adopting a more assertive security posture.

Tokyo is on track to reach defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP by March 2026, abandoning the long-standing 1% cap, as part of a five-year rearmament plan totaling 43 trillion yen. The shift is accompanied by the development of “counterstrike” capabilities, marking a transition from an exclusively defense-oriented doctrine toward deterrence by punishment and the fielding of overtly offensive weapons. While Japanese officials frame the change as strategic maturity and greater alliance responsibility, critics have denounced it as a revival of Japanese militarism.

The release of the 2026 NDS comes after months of internal delays. US media reported that a draft reached War Secretary Pete Hegseth as early as September, but disagreements within the administration over how to characterize China’s threat, particularly amid ongoing trade negotiations, stalled its publication.

Despite references to Russia, Iran, and DPRK as sources of risk, the strategy treats these threats as secondary, reinforcing the Pentagon’s pivot toward homeland defense and regional retrenchment rather than expansive global confrontation.

January 24, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Iran: The Eurasian Lock

Iran’s geography makes it a strategic hinge – one that anchors Russia’s southern depth and gives China an escape from US maritime containment

By Abbas al-Zein | The Cradle | January 22, 2026

In the corridors of US strategic decision-making, Iran is no longer treated as a discrete regional file. Dealing with Tehran has become inseparable from great-power competition itself. Coordination between Iran, Russia, and China has moved beyond situational alignment, coalescing into what western analysts increasingly describe as a form of “structural synergy” that undermines Washington’s ability to isolate its rivals.

This assessment overlaps with conclusions reached by the Carnegie Endowment in its report on America’s Future Threats, which identifies Iran as a “central node” in the Eurasian landmass – one that prevents Russia’s geographical isolation while securing China’s energy needs beyond the reach of US naval control.

Any serious destabilization of the Islamic Republic would not remain confined within its borders. It would translate into a dual strategic blockade targeting both China and Russia: reviving security chaos across Eurasia’s interior while striking at the financial and energy platforms that emerging powers increasingly rely on to loosen unipolar dominance.

Geography as strategic depth

For Moscow, Iran’s importance begins with geography. It offers Russia a vital geopolitical opening beyond its immediate borders. According to studies by the Valdai Club, Iran’s significance lies not in formal alliance politics but in its function as the sole land bridge connecting the Eurasian heartland to the Indian Ocean via the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

This route provides Russia with insulation from NATO’s maritime pressure in the Baltic and Mediterranean, effectively converting Iranian territory into strategic depth protecting Russia’s southern flank.

This geographic interdependence has produced a shared political interest that goes beyond tactical coordination. The stability of the Iranian state acts as a safeguard against the Caucasus and Central Asia drifting toward the kind of fragmentation that preceded the Ukraine war. Research by the Russian Council for International Affairs (RIAC) frames Iranian geography as a cornerstone of the “Greater Eurasia” concept, central to Moscow’s effort to dilute western hegemony across the continent.

For Beijing, Iran plays a comparable role within a different strategic equation. As US naval pressure tightens across the Pacific, China’s westward extension through Iran has become increasingly difficult to replace. Research by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) identifies Iran as one of the most critical geographic nodes in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing Beijing with a land-based corridor into West Asia that bypasses US-controlled maritime choke points – from the Taiwan Strait to the Mediterranean approaches.

Iran’s intermediate position between the Eurasian interior and open seas has therefore imposed a durable entanglement between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing. In this configuration, political alignment is driven less by ideology than by physiogeographic necessity.

Any attempt to destabilize the Iranian plateau would likely trigger a cascading shock across Eurasia’s interior, escalating a regional confrontation into a systemic blockade aimed at arresting the rise of rival power centers.

Buffer state and security firewall

Beyond logistics, Iran functions as a stabilizing buffer within East Eurasia’s security architecture. One research report by RAND on “Extending Russia” speaks of adversary exhaustion strategies that emphasize the use of peripheral instability to drain rival powers. From this perspective, Iran represents a critical firewall.

Instability inside Iran would mechanically undermine security coordination across Russia’s southern periphery, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. RIAC assessments warn that such a breakdown would open pathways for extremist networks, transcontinental smuggling, and militant spillover – threats Moscow has repeatedly classified as existential.

For China, the concern lies in contagion. Iran’s stability limits the transmission of unrest through Central Asia’s mountain corridors, where Tehran functions as an integral security partner within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This role provides Beijing with a degree of security insulation, allowing it to pursue global ambitions without being drawn into attritional border conflicts.

Energy and financial sovereignty

Economically, Iran’s role extends beyond conventional trade logic. Its partnerships with Russia and China increasingly form part of an alternative financial and energy architecture designed to blunt western leverage.

From Beijing’s perspective, Iranian oil has become a form of strategic insulation. Data indicates that China purchases roughly 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude – around 13.4 percent of its seaborne oil imports – with close to 80 percent of Iran’s exports flowing eastward. Increasing settlement through non-dollar mechanisms, including the digital yuan, has further reduced vulnerability to US pressure, particularly at choke points such as the Strait of Malacca.

Reports from the Electricity Hub confirm that China imported more than 57 million tons of Iranian – or suspected Iranian – oil in 2025, often routed via intermediaries such as Malaysia. The figures underscore the diminishing effectiveness of sanctions when confronted with geoeconomic necessity.

Russia’s calculus follows a different path to the same outcome. Cooperation with Iran has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important routes around SWIFT-based isolation. Government of the Russian Federation data shows bilateral trade rising by 35 percent following the Eurasian Economic Union free trade agreement implemented in May 2025.

A central shift has been monetary. In January 2025, the Central Bank of Iran announced full connectivity between Russia’s MIR and Iran’s Shetab payment systems, creating a protected financial corridor. According to Iranian officials, Iran and Russia aim to expand bilateral trade to $10 billion over the next decade, while Iran’s exports to Russia are expected to rise to about $1.4 billion by the end of the current Iranian calendar year (March 20, 2026).

Tehran has increasingly functioned as a re-export hub for Russian technologies and goods, frustrating efforts to economically isolate Moscow.

Washington’s strategy of separation

Against this backdrop, US strategy has evolved. Rather than relying solely on pressure or open confrontation, Washington has gravitated toward what western policy circles describe as a “strategy of separation.” This is an attempt to loosen the interdependence binding Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing by offering alternative pathways rather than confronting the bloc directly.

On the Chinese front, energy has emerged as the primary point of leverage. As the world’s largest oil importer, Beijing remains sensitive to supply stability and pricing. US moves in Latin America – particularly regarding Venezuela – are widely interpreted as efforts to reintegrate large oil reserves into global markets under western regulatory frameworks, potentially diluting Iran’s role in China’s energy security calculus.

In parallel, Washington has expanded its naval and coalition presence across key trade corridors stretching from the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific. This posture is framed not only as deterrence but as a persistent reminder that maritime supply security remains tied to US-led power balances.

On the Russian front, Ukraine occupies a central role. While sustained military and economic pressure aims to drain Moscow’s capacity, intermittent diplomatic signals suggest interest in compartmentalized understandings over European security. The underlying wager is that Russia’s core interests might be partially accommodated in Europe, reducing the long-term value of its partnership with Iran.

US engagement has also intensified across Central Asia and the Caucasus – regions that constitute strategic depth for Russia and critical corridors for China’s BRI. From Moscow and Beijing’s view, expanded security and investment ties in these areas represent an effort to geographically encircle Iran and weaken its role as Eurasia’s connective knot.

Why the bet fails

Despite the breadth of these efforts, the strategy of separation runs up against entrenched distrust in both Moscow and Beijing. For the two powers, the issue is not the scale of incentives on offer but the structure of the international system itself – and the accumulated experience of sanctions, coercion, and volatile western commitments.

From Russia’s vantage point, any trade-off between Iran and Ukraine constitutes a strategic trap. Iran anchors Russia’s southern access to the Indian Ocean; its collapse would expose the Caucasus–Central Asia arc to chronic instability. Gains in Eastern Europe would offer little compensation for a structurally weakened southern flank.

China’s reasoning is similarly grounded. Alternative energy suppliers remain embedded within supply chains that Washington can influence or disrupt. Iranian oil, by contrast, offers a higher degree of geographic and political autonomy. Its value lies less in price than in resilience.

The last barrier

At its core, the contest over Iran pits two logics against one another. One assumes geopolitical networks can be dismantled through incentives and selective realignment. The other recognizes that geography, accumulated experience, and the erosion of trust render such guarantees fragile in a world moving steadily toward multipolarity.

Iran’s collapse or prolonged internal destabilization would not merely reorder energy markets or regional alignments. It would reopen West Asia as a zone of near-exclusive US influence, completing a strategic arc across Western Eurasia. For more than a century, the region has served as a central theater of global power competition – from imperial rivalries to the Cold War and into the present transition toward multipolarity.

Therefore, Iran becomes more than a pivotal state. Much as Venezuela once represented the outer limit of resistance to US power in the Western Hemisphere, Iran now stands as the final geopolitical barrier to the consolidation of American hegemony across the heart of Eurasia.

Its cohesion serves not only its own national interest but also the broader objective shared by Moscow and Beijing: constraining unilateral dominance and preserving strategic autonomy in their immediate neighborhoods.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Russian gas exports to China soar – data

RT | January 22, 2026

China sharply increased its purchases of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2025 and reached a record monthly volume in December, according to Chinese customs data cited by RIA Novosti.

In 2025, the Asian nation imported 9.8 million tons of the super-chilled fuel, up 18.3% from the previous year, the outlet reported.

December saw particularly strong growth, with imports rising to 1.9 million tons, a 114.6% increase from the 889,482 tons delivered in the final month of 2024.

Data also showed that in October, Russia became China’s second biggest LNG supplier, overtaking Australia and coming in slightly behind Qatar. Russia’s total gas supplies to China – via pipeline and in liquefied form – reached 5.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) in November 2025, a 33% increase from the same month a year earlier.

Imports of Russian LNG by China, one of the world’s largest gas consumers, have been rising steadily for several years. Alongside pipeline flows, Russia has expanded seaborne shipments from projects in the Arctic and the Far East, including Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 2, and Sakhalin-2. Cargoes are transported largely via the Northern Sea Route during the summer navigation season and via longer southern routes in winter.

Moscow has sought to expand LNG exports via the Arctic corridor due to Western sanctions targeting key parts of its energy sector.

The surge in gas deliveries reflects a broader shift of Russia’s energy exports toward Asia following the sharp reduction of pipeline supplies to the EU since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.

Russia also delivers natural gas to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline, which began operations in 2019 and reached full operational capacity in December 2024.

Moscow and Beijing are also advancing the planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline through Mongolia. President Vladimir Putin has said that, together with existing and future pipelines, Russian gas deliveries to China could exceed 100 bcm a year.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

European leaders’ shift in their Davos addresses exposes Europe’s strategic anxiety

Global Times | January 21, 2026

The World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting recently kicked off in the Swiss resort city of Davos. This year’s forum took place amid rare transatlantic tensions triggered by the US intention to acquire Greenland. The focus of European leaders’ speeches pivoted noticeably from global economic issues to geopolitics, reflecting Europe’s deepening strategic anxiety amid structural contradictions with the US.

French President Emmanuel Macron said the EU should not bend to “the law of the strongest,” while Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the bloc was “at a crossroads” where it must decide on how to get out of a “very bad position” after trying to appease Trump. Even European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the “geopolitical shocks” and “a dangerous downward spiral” brought by the US.

“The forum sends a clear political signal of Europe’s growing strategic awakening,” Zhao Junjie, a senior research fellow at the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Wednesday.

The maximum pressure exerted by the US on the Greenland issue has shaken the long-standing value consensus between Europe and the US. Its unilateral and bullying actions have triggered strong fear and anxiety across Europe, which is a key reason for the heightened emotions and intense reactions toward the US among European representatives at this year’s forum.

The statements made by European leaders at the forum appear to have demonstrated Europe’s resolve to stand firm to the world. Yet it remains to be seen whether such firm commitments can be translated into practical, unified, and effective actions. As senior bankers and corporate executives at Davos noted, they believe the current responses of European leaders to the US are more emotional than pragmatic. Moreover, due to long-standing structural constraints – its deep entanglement with the US in security, energy, and economic affairs – Europe’s response is weak and constrained. Zhao further noted that Europe still lacks systematic measures to effectively counter American unilateralism, with current efforts largely limited to soft multilateral mechanisms.

Europe’s response to US unilateral pressures has been sluggish and lacking in internal coordination. The EU countries have not reached a consensus on the activation of Anti-Coercion Instrument. Meanwhile, Europe continues to grapple with “double standards” in its multilateral engagements. Despite the leaders’ calls for trade diversification, restrictive market-access policies toward certain foreign products have fueled ongoing trade tensions. This contradiction is illustrated by Macron’s appeal for Chinese investment in key sectors, even as the EU moves to phase out components and equipment from tech suppliers such as Huawei in some sectors – a policy that inevitably raises questions about Europe’s consistency and sincerity in pursuing cooperative partnerships.

Canada has already taken action. Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that middle powers are not “powerless” facing “a rupture in the world order.” He called for “honesty about the world as it is” and for building “something bigger, better, stronger, and more just.” Recently, Canada established strategic partnerships with China and Qatar to promote the diversification of its foreign relations. Such strategic sobriety may offer some inspiration for Europe.

Ursula von der Leyen declared in her special address that “Europe will always choose the world, and the world is ready to choose Europe.” Yet Europe must now answer a more pressing question: what path will it choose for itself in the changing global order?

The statements at Davos have sent a clear political signal of Europe’s awakening. Moving forward, Europe must consolidate its strength through unity, steer its own course with greater autonomy, and expand its strategic space through diversification. Confronted with external pressures, only by reinforcing internal solidarity, advancing pragmatic actions, and broadening multilateral cooperation can Europe truly safeguard its own interests and uphold the international multilateral order. Only in this way can Europe genuinely protect its interests amid profound changes. History does not wait for the hesitant – it is time for Europe to act.

January 22, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , | Leave a comment

What happens when START-3 expires, and US doesn’t want to prolong it?

By Ahmed Adel | January 20, 2026

Although START-3, the last strategic arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, expires on February 5, the two countries will most likely continue to informally respect it, unless Washington violates it. Washington likely wants the treaty to expire so a new agreement can be signed that will not limit the development of new weapons.

US President Donald Trump considers all agreements made before he took office outdated and does not want to accept restrictions from a bygone era. Russia has prepared for that, since the proposal to extend the agreement was made more than a year ago and received no response from the American side.

The US and Russia together possess almost 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, but Russia remains the largest nuclear power. The first START treaty was signed on July 31, 1991, at a summit in Moscow between then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George W. Bush, and entered into force on December 5, 1994. This was the first document of its kind between the Soviet Union and the US, aimed at ensuring parity between the two sides, with the nuclear potential of both countries to be reduced by 30%. The treaty remained in force for a full 15 years, when START-3 was signed, the last strategic arms control treaty concluded between Russia and the US after the end of the Cold War.

With the Prague disarmament agreement, signed in 2010 by heads of state Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, Washington and Moscow committed to having no more than 700 deployed warheads and no more than 1,550 nuclear warheads. The contract expired in February 2021, but the Joe Biden administration decided to extend the agreement for five years, without any amendments or changes.

Washington does not want this arms control agreement because Russia is now a step ahead in the development of modern weapons systems. Russia has manufactured weapons incomparable to anything else in the world, such as the Oreshnik and Poseidon systems, as well as nuclear-powered missiles, while the Americans believe that the restrictions under this agreement hinder their development in this direction and therefore do not want to limit themselves.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, said that the US is likely not prepared to accept the Russian proposal to voluntarily extend the key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for another year.

It is recalled that on January 8, the US president said regarding START, “If it expires, it expires,” adding, “We’ll just do a better agreement.”

All these agreements were concluded in different eras and under different conditions, and the Americans could, conditionally speaking, once impose many things on Russia. Now they cannot, because Russia has an advantage across a wide range of areas today, such as modernizing 95% of its nuclear forces, something the Americans have not done yet. Russia also has hypersonic missiles that have already been tested on the battlefield, which the Americans do not.

Trump stated in 2020 during his previous presidential term that the US possesses a “super-duper missile” about seventeen times faster than turbine-powered cruise missiles like the Tomahawk and unlike any other in the world, but such a missile has not been shown to the public to this day. Then the Trump administration claimed that Russia developed hypersonic weapons, allegedly stealing some technologies from the US.

Based on all this, the Trump administration considers the circumstances and refuses to enter into any agreements or treaties that limit US capabilities.

In reaching any new nuclear arms agreement, beyond Russia and the US, several other players would need to be involved, with the US president primarily considering China. From Washington’s perspective, Russia should persuade China to join the deal. However, China refuses to do so because its nuclear arsenal is much smaller than Russia’s and the US’s. Additionally, Trump might have also considered India.

However, if Moscow and Washington, for example, say that such an attitude is acceptable regarding China, there is the question of how they will handle England and France, which also possess nuclear weapons. It is clear, therefore, that American think tanks are working to develop different options for establishing a new world order, but it will mainly be ‘peace through force’ under United States dominance.

There is a possibility that Russia will announce it will continue to respect the limits of the agreement, as long as Washington does not violate them. What the Americans, for their part, will say is unknown, but there have been Trump’s statements about the necessity of resuming nuclear tests, which are banned. Moscow responded that they are against resuming, but if the US conducts nuclear tests, the Russians will immediately carry out their own in response.

In that case, a nuclear arms race could occur, which would lead to increased strategic risks and potentially threaten global security. Therefore, Moscow believes that responsible and restrained behavior by nuclear states is more important than ever and is firmly committed to the principle that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it must never be started.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

January 20, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

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