Is China a threat to Greenland?
By Pei Si | Global Times | January 22, 2026
Since the beginning of 2026, the US has repeatedly claimed that it must take control of Greenland to prevent threats from China and Russia, alleging that there are Chinese and Russian vessels “all over the place” outside of Greenland. What is the reality? What is China’s actual presence in Greenland? And does China pose any threat to Greenland at all?
Based on information from various sources, China currently has no official institutions in Greenland, no investment projects, and no resident companies. There are only some 30 Chinese workers working at Greenlandic seafood companies. Cooperation between China and Greenland is largely confined to trade, particularly in aquatic products. In 2025, bilateral trade between China and Greenland reached $429 million, of which Greenland’s exports to China amounted to $420 million, mainly Arctic shrimp, halibut, cod, lobster and other seafood. Greenland’s imports from China totaled $9 million, consisting largely of daily consumer goods.
Nor are there many Chinese tourists visiting Greenland. Although the island boasts stunning natural scenery, it is not easy to reach it from China and remains a niche destination for Chinese travelers. In 2024, only about 3,500 Chinese tourists visited Greenland.
Claims that there are Chinese vessels all over the waters near Greenland, or that Greenland faces a so-called “China threat,” are even more groundless. On January 16, Soren Andersen, Major General of Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command in Greenland, dismissed such claims in an interview, stating clearly that “there were no Chinese or Russian ships near Greenland.” Vessel-tracking data from MarineTraffic and LSEG likewise show no Chinese ships’ presence near Greenland. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen has repeatedly clarified to the media that there is no “instant threat” from China. Rasmus Jarlov, the chair of Denmark’s parliamentary defense committee, put it even more bluntly: The claim of “a big threat from China and Russia against Greenland” is delusional.
Whether in terms of facts or policy, China does not pose a threat to Greenland. In fact, China has been subjected to unfair restrictions there. Rasmussen has openly acknowledged that the Danish government previously used administrative measures to veto the participation of Chinese companies in Greenland’s airport expansion and mining projects, and has already established an investment screening mechanism that will not allow Chinese investment in Greenland in the future. Whether such sacrifices of China can buy a US “hands-off” is highly doubtful – and hardly worthy of respect.
Anyone can see that the current tensions in the Arctic stem primarily from the actions of a certain country advancing claims that violate international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. By contrast, China made it explicit in its 2018 white paper China’s Arctic Policy that “all states should abide by international treaties such as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS, as well as general international law. They should respect the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction enjoyed by the Arctic States in this region, respect the tradition and culture of the indigenous peoples.”
On January 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning further stressed at a regular press briefing: “The Arctic bears on the common interests of the international community. China’s activities in the Arctic are aimed at promoting the peace, stability and sustainable development of the region. They are in line with the international law. Countries’ right and freedom to carry out activities in the Arctic in accordance with the law needs to be fully respected. The US should not use other countries as a pretext for seeking selfish gains.”
From China’s perspective, the future of the Arctic should not be a battleground for geopolitical rivalry, but a low-tension region for international cooperation on climate change and sustainable development. Claims that “China threatens Greenland” are simply too absurd to be worth refuting.
European leaders’ shift in their Davos addresses exposes Europe’s strategic anxiety
Global Times | January 21, 2026
The World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting recently kicked off in the Swiss resort city of Davos. This year’s forum took place amid rare transatlantic tensions triggered by the US intention to acquire Greenland. The focus of European leaders’ speeches pivoted noticeably from global economic issues to geopolitics, reflecting Europe’s deepening strategic anxiety amid structural contradictions with the US.
French President Emmanuel Macron said the EU should not bend to “the law of the strongest,” while Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the bloc was “at a crossroads” where it must decide on how to get out of a “very bad position” after trying to appease Trump. Even European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the “geopolitical shocks” and “a dangerous downward spiral” brought by the US.
“The forum sends a clear political signal of Europe’s growing strategic awakening,” Zhao Junjie, a senior research fellow at the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Wednesday.
The maximum pressure exerted by the US on the Greenland issue has shaken the long-standing value consensus between Europe and the US. Its unilateral and bullying actions have triggered strong fear and anxiety across Europe, which is a key reason for the heightened emotions and intense reactions toward the US among European representatives at this year’s forum.
The statements made by European leaders at the forum appear to have demonstrated Europe’s resolve to stand firm to the world. Yet it remains to be seen whether such firm commitments can be translated into practical, unified, and effective actions. As senior bankers and corporate executives at Davos noted, they believe the current responses of European leaders to the US are more emotional than pragmatic. Moreover, due to long-standing structural constraints – its deep entanglement with the US in security, energy, and economic affairs – Europe’s response is weak and constrained. Zhao further noted that Europe still lacks systematic measures to effectively counter American unilateralism, with current efforts largely limited to soft multilateral mechanisms.
Europe’s response to US unilateral pressures has been sluggish and lacking in internal coordination. The EU countries have not reached a consensus on the activation of Anti-Coercion Instrument. Meanwhile, Europe continues to grapple with “double standards” in its multilateral engagements. Despite the leaders’ calls for trade diversification, restrictive market-access policies toward certain foreign products have fueled ongoing trade tensions. This contradiction is illustrated by Macron’s appeal for Chinese investment in key sectors, even as the EU moves to phase out components and equipment from tech suppliers such as Huawei in some sectors – a policy that inevitably raises questions about Europe’s consistency and sincerity in pursuing cooperative partnerships.
Canada has already taken action. Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that middle powers are not “powerless” facing “a rupture in the world order.” He called for “honesty about the world as it is” and for building “something bigger, better, stronger, and more just.” Recently, Canada established strategic partnerships with China and Qatar to promote the diversification of its foreign relations. Such strategic sobriety may offer some inspiration for Europe.
Ursula von der Leyen declared in her special address that “Europe will always choose the world, and the world is ready to choose Europe.” Yet Europe must now answer a more pressing question: what path will it choose for itself in the changing global order?
The statements at Davos have sent a clear political signal of Europe’s awakening. Moving forward, Europe must consolidate its strength through unity, steer its own course with greater autonomy, and expand its strategic space through diversification. Confronted with external pressures, only by reinforcing internal solidarity, advancing pragmatic actions, and broadening multilateral cooperation can Europe truly safeguard its own interests and uphold the international multilateral order. Only in this way can Europe genuinely protect its interests amid profound changes. History does not wait for the hesitant – it is time for Europe to act.
When Greenland divides the North Atlantic allies, the world is astonished!
By Mohamed Lamine KABA – New Eastern Outlook – January 21, 2026
The posturing here (Washington) and there (London and Brussels) around Greenland is just one key indicator of the disintegration of the Western world, which must be included in a sui generis approach.
Indeed, far from being a mere Arctic territory, the island of Greenland reflects a decaying Western world, where alliances are crumbling under the weight of their own duplicity. Europe, paying dearly for its vassalage, is discovering that its American friend is a predator; while NATO, far from being a bulwark of peace, is a shadow play where former allies stab each other in the back, all the while smiling for the cameras. What if Greenland, this white and silent land, were to become the loudest stage for the disintegration of this alliance founded on lies? What if, beneath the melting icebergs, the immutable truth of a vassalized Europe, a predatory America, and an Atlantic alliance that has never been anything but a pact of convenience, cemented not by trust, but by a common hatred of the Other – yesterday the USSR, today China and Russia? Greenland, far from being a periphery, has become the nerve center of a simmering confrontation between “allies” who silently hate each other.
From a geostrategic perspective, this article demonstrates, based on the convergence of the questions raised, how the posturing, first American, then European, around Greenland reveals the long-hidden enmity of the North Atlantic allies.
Greenland, a strategic sentinel and the scene of competitive imperialism
In reality, Greenland has never been a forgotten territory. Since the Cold War (1947-1991), it has been a key component of the American military apparatus. The Thule Air Base, established in 1951, was imposed without consulting the Greenlanders, or even the Danish Parliament. It was not cooperation, but a disguised occupation. Greenland has never been a partner in the true sense of the word; it has always been an outpost, a buffer zone, a territory to be monitored, exploited, and militarized. In this context, NATO is merely a convenient smokescreen for unilateral domination.
But it was in 2019 that the absurdity became truly revealing. Donald Trump, in a fit of imperial brutality, proposed buying the island, which, it argued, was autonomous from Copenhagen, so close to it, and from the rest of the world, so far away. Europe, true to its role as a diplomatic bystander, offered only half-hearted indignation. Denmark, humiliated, protested weakly, then fell silent. For Europe had long ago traded its sovereignty for an illusion of protection, supposedly guaranteed by the American nuclear umbrella. Today, it is paying, in full, the price of its servility and vassalage to Washington. Greenland thus became the symbol of a Europe that, even humiliated, continues to bow its head, convinced that humiliation is the price of security. Will it break free from Washington this time? I don’t think so. not having prepared for this, and not having the means to do so anyway.
In 2025, and then again in January 2026, the situation shifted dramatically. Faced with Trump’s repeated threats to “buy up or, failing that, invade” the island, European chancelleries, initially paralyzed with fear, finally reacted. Not out of courage, but out of an instinct for survival. Fearing a de facto annexation of the territory by the United States, several European countries – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and, of course, Denmark – decided to discreetly send troops to Greenland, after the failure of talks between the United States and Denmark, under the guise of Arctic cooperation and rather pathetic military exercises. This deployment, unprecedented since the end of World War II in 1945, marked a turning point where Europe, without daring to name its adversary, began to treat Washington as a strategic threat. The first European soldiers thus set foot on Greenlandic soil, not to defend NATO, but to contain the ally that had become a predator. Unpredictable, Trumpism is now a political science in Europe.
Since 2020, the United States has methodically strengthened its grip on Greenland with the opening of a consulate in Nuuk, massive investments in infrastructure, funding of mining projects, and, above all, the deployment of radar and surveillance equipment without prior consultation. Washington does not negotiate; it imposes. Greenland is becoming the focal point of an intra-Western war of influence, where each side seeks to appropriate Arctic resources under the guise of collective security. NATO, far from being a pact of solidarity, is proving to be a hidden battleground between rival Western powers.
An alliance built on hatred, undermined by duplicity
NATO, founded in 1949, has never been an alliance of equals. It was a coalition of convenience, united by fear of Moscow, and later Beijing. But from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 onward, cracks began to appear, leading to the war in Iraq (2003), the intervention in Libya (2011), tensions over military spending, and disagreements over China. Greenland, today, reveals this structural hypocrisy; and, taken aback, the rest of the world is astonished and wonders: will the world finally be freed from the Western violence and terror that the peoples of the Global South, and even others within the Western sphere of influence, have suffered since 1945?
While Donald Trump ordered an illegal military operation in Venezuela on the night of January 2-3, 2026 – an operation that resulted in the abduction of the constitutional president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, who were then exfiltrated and tried in the United States in a sham extraterritorial trial – far from condemning this flagrant violation of international law, European leaders rushed to downplay it, minimize its significance, and justify the unjustifiable, as if it were a mere diplomatic adjustment. And when he demanded, in a truly imperial whim, that Denmark sell him Greenland, they ignored his outrageous demands and looked the other way, as if the Venezuelan episode had never happened. Yet, in the hushed corridors of power, one truth is undeniable: Washington is now perceived more as an enemy than an ally. This feigned loyalty, this diplomatic servility, is proving more dangerous today than open resistance. For it feeds Washington’s arrogance while simultaneously undermining the very foundations of European sovereignty.
The paradox in all of this is that Europeans realized, too late, that Washington is more of an enemy than an ally. An enemy that doesn’t bomb their cities, but humiliates their leaders, dictates their energy policies, sabotages their industrial projects (see the Alstom affair in 2014), and drags them into wars they didn’t choose, as the annals of the history of destabilizing military interventions by the NATO coalition clearly show. A predatory coalition under whose cover have been hidden free-riding states , incapable of pursuing an independent policy and deprived of any military, industrial, logistical, and financial autonomy, and which, through strategic opportunism and collective action, have contributed to the destruction of sovereign states like Libya. By becoming a pawn in this circumvented sovereignty, Greenland reveals this dynamic of tacit consent to domination.
In fact, NATO is now nothing more than a shadow play, where former allies act out a drama written in Washington. Europe, a docile spectator, zealously recites its role, even when it demands betraying its own interests. Greenland, by exposing this duplicity, becomes the mirror of an alliance that was never founded on trust but on a shared hatred – first of Russia, then of China, of course. And what is built on hatred can only implode into mistrust.
The world will remember that it took a divergence of interests over an island for the North Atlantic allies to split, presenting to the rest of the world a key indicator of the disintegration of the Western world, so desired and so long awaited to consolidate economic polycentrism and multipolarity in international relations.
In conclusion, as Brussels and London realize that Washington is more of an enemy than a friend, the transition to a multipolar world is now only a matter of time.
It remains to be seen whether they (Europeans) will remain at the feet of the master (Washington) for much longer, affectionately wagging the tail.
Mohamed Lamine KABA, Expert in the geopolitics of governance and regional integration, Institute of Governance, Human and Social Sciences, Pan-African University
‘Macron Is Trapped’: Double Standards in French President’s Davos Speech
Sputnik – 20.01.2026
François Asselineau, leader of French opposition party the Union Populaire Republicaine, points out that President Macron backed the US’s illegal military operation in Venezuela, but is now talking about ‘international law’ when it comes to Greenland.
“He approved Trump asserting the law of the strongest over international law,” Asselineau says. But now “he finds himself forced to call for a return to international law and multilateralism in an attempt to counter Trump’s desire to press his advantage by laying claim to Greenland.”
Macron’s WEF statement “about the need for European unanimity” only “touches on Europe’s permanent problem — that Europe doesn’t really exist,” the French opposition party leader stressed.
“It’s a fictitious entity made up of 27 states with different national interests,” Asselineau says. “We can already see this with Greenland. For example, there are several states that are not very critical of Donald Trump.”
Calling Macron’s position “extremely fragile,” he stresses that France is now “on very bad terms” with global powers including the US, China and Russia.
“It’s something like the twilight of the Macron presidency,” Asselineau argues. “Like many French people, I hope it ends as quickly as possible.”
Why EU ‘Has No Alternative’ But to Return to Russian Gas Imports Sooner Than Later
Sputnik – 20.01.2026
Fears are growing as Europe becomes increasingly dependent on American LNG—once viewed as a safe alternative to Russian gas, but now seen as uncertain amid strained transatlantic relations, according to a media report.
With EU–US tensions rising over Ukraine and Greenland, “it is virtually impossible for the bloc to stop buying American LNG without having to allow Russian gas imports to return,” says Dr. Mamdouh G. Salameh, international oil economist and global energy expert.
He notes that while the threat of halting US LNG imports “could act as a deterrent against Trump annexing Greenland,” the reality is that “the EU has no alternative but to return to Russian gas sooner than later.”
According to Salameh, the US sabotage of Russia’s Nord Stream pipeline network was intended to “forever sever Russian gas supplies to Europe and ensure that US LNG replaces Russian gas permanently.” Instead, he argues, “this turned out to be a real financial disaster for Europe’s economy.”
He points to 2025, when the EU economy grew by only about 1.4%, with many German and other European companies—including Volkswagen—relocating in search of cheaper energy. Looking ahead, Salameh warns that the EU’s plan to end all Russian energy imports by early 2027 “will mean anemic economic growth for Europe’s economy.”
As a result, he says, the bloc now faces “a big dilemma, namely letting its economy stagnate if not shrink or lifting sanctions on Russian gas.”
With Europe now “squeezed between a rock and a hard place,” Salameh concludes that it is Russian President Vladimir Putin who “will have the last laugh.”
He adds that Putin could choose to resume gas supplies to Europe—a move that, he argues, could reshape the future of NATO and Europe’s relationship with the US.
US’ European Vassals Taught Bitter Lesson With Greenland Crisis

Sputnik – 20.01.2026
Commenting on the topics discussed by Foreign Minister Lavrov in his 2025 diplomacy year-in-review presser, Daffodil International University journalism professor and international politics expert Greg Simons detailed two main themes: Ukraine and the breakdown of the so-called ‘rules-based international order’.
The Greenland crisis shows that “when you are such a servile lackey as the EU, eventually you get to be ‘on the menu’, especially when the US empire, this Pax Americana, is in decline,” Dr. Simons told Sputnik.
“The EU has nowhere to go.” Their leaders “can bluster, they can try and bluff, but to use Trump’s terminology, they have absolutely no cards… They have no honor, they have no dignity, they have no respect, either for themselves or the EU. So this is not going to go well for the EU.”
As for Ukraine, while Washington has apparently recognized that the proxy war with Russia is “lost” and that Ukraine is “a liability,” the Europeans are pushing headfirst into prolonging the conflict, no matter the cost to themselves, Simons noted.
“Europeans seem to have their head in the clouds and unaware or not willing to see” the “risks and hazards coming up for them,” the observer stressed.
Then there’s the dysfunction at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
“If you prevent consensus on issues, an organization such as the OSCE is absolutely useless because consensus should be reached on objectively coming together on mutually acceptable and mutually favorable grounds,” Simons said.
“What they’ve turned it into is just this platform for pillorying countries such as Russia or those that stand for their interests and objectives rather than those of the US. I absolutely agree with the foreign minister’s characterization – that the situation of the OSCE is catastrophic. I would doubt it can be saved, mostly because of what the so-called Global North, those Western countries at the behest of the US did to make sure that it could no longer function effectively as an organization to be a bridge between different interests, different worlds (which it no longer is).”
Why Washington will take Greenland
By Timofey Bordachev | RT | January 14, 2026
American political culture is drifting openly toward the annexation of Greenland. This may sound surreal to European ears, but it is not an exotic idea in Washington. It follows a logic that is deeply rooted in how the US historically became a great power and how it still proves its strength today.
The United States rose through territorial expansion at the expense of weaker neighbors. It seized land from those who could not defend it. There is no serious reason to assume that this instinct has disappeared. The only reliable guarantee of borders is the ability to fight for them. And history shows something very simple: the US does not attack those who can resist.
Modern world politics suggests that Western Europe is no longer among those who can resist.
That is why, from Washington’s point of view, the real question is not whether Greenland will eventually be absorbed into direct American control, but when. Western European states, and Denmark specifically, are among the least dangerous targets imaginable. They are harmless not only militarily, but psychologically: they are unlikely to respond in any serious way.
In American strategic culture, refusing to exploit such an insignificant position would contradict the fundamentals of foreign policy thinking. The conclusion becomes unavoidable: the annexation of Greenland, peacefully or by force, is inevitable.
Over the past few days we have seen an escalating series of statements and initiatives from American representatives. They range from internet “teasers” and political provocation to official remarks and even draft bills in Congress. The overall message is clear: Greenland should fall under direct US control. And just as importantly, the discussion itself is meant to create an impression in Europe, and in the wider world, that the outcome is pre-determined.
Western European politicians have responded with predictable panic.
Germany, for instance, has proposed a joint NATO mission called Arctic Sentry. The initiative is absurd, but revealing. It is Berlin’s attempt to respond to claims from the American president and others that Greenland is threatened by Russia and China, and that the island is supposedly defenseless. Direct consultations between senior German and American diplomats are reportedly scheduled in the coming days.
But it is difficult to imagine Washington taking Germany’s proposal seriously, because the issue is not about deterring mythical threats from Moscow or Beijing. It is about Washington’s own intentions.
The German idea draws inspiration from NATO’s Baltic Sea operation Baltic Guardian, which has been running for several years. But the Baltic Sea has little to do with American military or economic interests. Even the least intelligent member of the Finnish parliament should be able to understand this. That is precisely why NATO and Western Europe are free to play their games there.
Greenland is different.
Any attempt to frame Greenland as a NATO matter only exposes the alliance as a theater production, performing threats in order to justify foreign policy rituals. These Europeans are accustomed to imitating danger and imitating response. They appear to believe they can do it again.
It is unlikely to work.
Meanwhile, most of the world views this spectacle with indifference. Russia, China, India and many others see the Greenland drama primarily as another lesson in how relations inside the so-called “collective West” are structured. It is simply a more visible version of what has always been there.
There is nothing new in the fact that Americans are prepared to violate norms, including international law. The difference is that this time they are openly testing these norms against their own allies.
From Russia’s perspective, the situation does not pose a direct threat to our interests. The US can deploy weapons in Greenland even today. Its presence does not fundamentally change the military situation in the Arctic, nor does it threaten shipping along the Northern Sea Route. The US still lacks a serious fleet of military icebreakers, and it remains unclear when – or whether – it will acquire one.
China, too, is essentially indifferent to Greenland becoming American property. Greenland does not threaten China’s trade in the Arctic because the only real issue of interest to Beijing is the Northern Sea Route. And the US military presence on the island does not materially affect Chinese security interests.
On the contrary, in the context of Taiwan, Beijing watches with curiosity as the Americans undermine their own empire’s ideological foundations, including the principles of international law. Once the balance of power settles, it is always possible to return to old norms. Or indeed to codify new ones.
But for Western Europe, Washington’s aggressive noise around Greenland feels like the death sentence for what remained of the half-continent’s relevance.
For decades, its politicians considered themselves a “special” element of global affairs. Not fully sovereign perhaps, but privileged. They were happy to violate the sovereignty of other states across the world, insisting that this was humanitarianism, democracy, civilization. Yet they never seriously imagined the same logic could be applied to them.
The entire content of what Western Europeans loudly call “transatlantic solidarity” or a “community of values” lies precisely in this exceptional status. Their part of Europe’s role was to serve as a morally decorated extension of American power, a satellite that believes it is a partner.
Now it is the US itself that is delivering a potentially fatal blow to that illusion.
Even if the annexation of Greenland is postponed, watered down, or delayed by unforeseen complications, the fact that it is being discussed seriously is already catastrophic for Western European political legitimacy. It undermines what remains of their credibility in the eyes of their own citizens and the rest of the world.
Every state must justify its existence.
Russia’s legitimacy rests on the ability to repel external threats and pursue an independent foreign policy. China justifies itself through organization, stability and prosperity for its citizens. India’s legitimacy is grounded in holding together peace in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious civilization.
In every case, legitimacy is tied to the state’s ability to influence the most important aspects of people’s lives. Not to mention being able to rely on internal resources to do so.
But modern Western European states justify themselves differently. They justify their actions to their citizens through the idea of exceptional status, the right to look down on other countries and civilizations. If Americans can simply deprive the EU of territory, then they become equal to countries like Venezuela or Iraq: states which Washington attacks with impunity.
This is why Greenland matters more than Greenland.
Western European politicians still do not understand the main point. The US wants Greenland, of course, because it is valuable Arctic territory. Geography that matters in a changing world. Direct control over territory is often preferable to indirect use through allies.
But the deepest motive is more psychological and political: Washington wants to act as it sees fit.
In the US, disregarding all external norms – recognizing only internal American rules – is increasingly part of how the state gains legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The ability to seize something from a weaker neighbor becomes proof that such a state is not only strong, but necessary.
Donald Trump was elected precisely because he promised to restore American statehood. Greenland will not be the only issue where this restoration expresses itself.
In other words: Greenland is not a dispute about the Arctic. It is a demonstration of how American power is validated, and a demonstration that Western Europe is no longer protected by the very system it helped to build.
Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club
Rare Earths—or Arctic Control? Greenland’s Riches May Just Be Excuse
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 13.01.2026
Greenland holds the world’s eighth-largest rare earth reserves—1.5 million tons—but US interests extend far beyond minerals, Ruslan Dimukhamedov, chairman of the Association of Producers and Consumers of Rare and Rare-Earth Metals, tells Sputnik.
Greenland is rich in iron ore, graphite, tungsten, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper, and oil. It also hosts two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits—Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly signaled US ambitions to secure leadership in rare earths to advance semiconductors, AI, and robotics. Against this backdrop, it seems like it’s no coincidence that he set his sights on Greenland.
“That means permanent magnets—for electric vehicles, drones, and robotics,” Dimukhamedov says. “If we’re talking about the so-called magnetic group, that includes dysprosium and terbium. If we look at lanthanum and cerium, those are used in petrochemicals and optics.”
Greenland’s rare earths are technologically complex and relatively poor deposits, located in challenging conditions—not just climatically, but geographically as well, in mountainous terrain, the pundit explains.
“If we’re talking about commercial extraction—that is, mining that is economically viable at today’s price levels, rather than production for appearances’ sake,” Greenland’s rare earths hold limited appeal for US companies, according to Dimukhamedov.
His experience in the rare earth industry shows that the conditions of these deposits indicate that rare earth metals themselves are not the main object of the US’ interest. What is it then?
“Territorial control? Yes. Control of the Arctic? Yes. Preventing Russia from freely using the Northern Sea Route, making our lives difficult with military bases? Yes,” the expert says.
Trump, Greenland, and the colonialism Europe pretends not to see
Neither Washington nor Copenhagen: Greenland belongs to the Inuit people
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 10, 2026
The recent resurgence of controversy surrounding Donald Trump’s interest in annexing Greenland has reignited debates over imperialism, sovereignty, and self-determination in the Arctic. The European response – particularly from Denmark and the European Union – has been marked by a moralizing discourse against “American expansionism.” This discourse, however, deliberately ignores Denmark’s own colonial history in the region – a history that has been profoundly violent toward the Inuit people of Kalaallit Nunaat, the territory’s true name.
Recently, Russia-based Irish journalist Chay Bowes wrote an excellent piece on the history of European colonialism in Greenland. As he said, Denmark’s presence in Greenland was never the result of Indigenous consent. Beginning in 1721 under the religious pretext of “rescuing” supposed Norse descendants, colonization quickly became a systematic project of cultural domination and economic exploitation. When no Europeans were found, Danish missionaries turned their efforts against the Inuit, criminalizing their spiritual and cultural practices, dismantling traditional social structures, and imposing Lutheranism as a tool of control.
With the establishment of a trade monopoly in 1776, Denmark began treating the island as a profitable hub for natural resources, deliberately keeping the Indigenous population isolated and dependent. This colonial logic intensified throughout the twentieth century. In 1953, seeking to evade new UN decolonization guidelines, Copenhagen annexed Greenland as a “county.” Lacking adequate international scrutiny, the lives of Inuit natives increasingly became a nightmare.
Among these policies were the abduction of Inuit children to be “reeducated” in Denmark – the infamous “Little Danes” experiment – and the forced removal of entire communities from their ancestral lands into urban housing complexes, aimed at creating cheap labor for Danish-controlled industries. Even more severe was the secret imposition of contraceptive devices on thousands of Inuit women and girls between the 1960s and 1970s, without consent, in an explicit attempt at population control.
Although Greenland gained administrative autonomy in 1979 and expanded self-government in 2009, real power remains concentrated in the “Danish Crown.” Key areas such as foreign policy, defense, and much of the economy remain outside Inuit control. International bodies continue to pressure Denmark to acknowledge and repair colonial crimes, but progress has been minimal.
In this context, European indignation over potential U.S. expansionist moves sounds hypocrite. This does not mean absolving Washington of its own imperialist history – the United States has an equally disastrous record in its treatment of Indigenous peoples. However, for many Inuit, life under American rule would hardly be worse than centuries of European subjugation have already been. The difference is that the U.S., at least, does not pretend to be a “progressive benefactor” while maintaining intact colonial structures.
The true alternative, however, lies neither in Washington nor in Copenhagen. The most coherent and reasonable solution would be the construction of an independent Inuit state, grounded in self-determination, cultural restoration, and sovereign control over the territory. An Inuit ethnic state – understood as a project of Indigenous national liberation, not of ethnic or racial exclusion – would represent a historic rupture with centuries of external domination.
Obviously, in a world marked by violent disputes and the rule of force, it is naïve to think that the political will of Greenland’s native population alone would be sufficient to secure any real sovereignty. It will be necessary to engage in alliances and strategic diplomacy with countries that also oppose U.S. and European imperialism and expansionism – especially those with shared ethnic and cultural ties. Russia would be an excellent example of a potential partner for an independent Greenland, given the large presence of Arctic peoples in Russian territory – including Inuit – and Russia’s historical experience with respect for plurinationality.
Greenland is not a strategic asset to be bargained over by rival Western powers. It is the homeland of a people who have survived colonization, social engineering, and population control. Before denouncing “American imperialism,” Denmark and the European Union should confront their own colonial past—and recognize that Inuit self-determination remains the only truly right path forward for Kalaallit Nunaat.
Beijing Urges US Not to Use ‘China Threat’ Narrative to Control Greenland
Sputnik – 05.01.2026
BEIJING – The United States must stop using the so-called “China threat” narrative to justify its personal interests, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said on Monday, commenting on US President Donald Trump’s claims to Greenland.
On Sunday, Trump told The Atlantic that the United States “absolutely” needed Greenland, claiming the island was “surrounded by Russian and Chinese ships.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen urged Trump to stop threatening Greenland, an autonomous part of Denmark, with annexation.
“We urge the US to stop using the so-called ‘China threat’ as a pretext for itself to seek selfish gains,” Lin told the briefing.
Earlier in the day, Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said that the island is open to dialogue with the United States as long as communication occurs through the proper channels.
Trump has repeatedly said that Greenland should become part of the United States, citing its strategic importance for national security and the defense of the “free world,” including from China and Russia. Former Greenlandic Prime Minister Mute Egede said the island was not for sale.
The island was a Danish colony until 1953. It has remained a part of the Kingdom of Denmark after gaining autonomy in 2009, with the ability to self-govern and determine its own domestic policy.
The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968
Greenland “Green Light”: Danish PM’s Secret Acquiescence Encouraged U.S. Nuclear Deployments
Pentagon Approved Nuclear-Armed B-52 Flights Over Greenland
National Security Archive | June 3, 2025
The Trump administration’s intention to acquire Greenland, including possibly by force, has put a focus on the history of its strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. Today, the National Security Archive publishes the first of a two-part declassified document collection on the U.S. role in Greenland during the middle years of the Cold War, covering the decisions that led to the secret deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Danish territory in 1958 to the 1968 crash of a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber near Thule Air Base that left plutonium-laced debris scattered across miles of Arctic sea ice.[1]
The radioactive mess caused by the accident required a major clean-up and caused a serious controversy in U.S.-Denmark relations. The U.S. had never officially told Denmark that it was flying nuclear weapons over Greenland, although Danish officials suspected it; nor had the U.S. informed the Danes that it had once stored nuclear weapons in Greenland, although in 1957 they had received a tacit “green light” to do so from the Danish prime minister, according to documents included in today’s posting. But both the nuclear-armed overflights of Greenland and the storage of nuclear weapons there were in strong contradiction to Denmark’s declared non-nuclear policy. When the bomber crash exposed the overflights, Denmark tried to resolve the conflict by seeking a U.S. pledge that Greenland would be nuclear free.
This new publication revisits the nuclear and strategic history of the United States and Greenland as it emerged during the late 1940s through the crash in 1968, highlighting key declassified documents from the archival record, FOIA releases, the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and other sources. The analysis draws on the work of U.S. and Danish scholars who have written about the B-52 crash and the history of the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland during the Cold War, including revelations in the 1990s that prompted Danish experts to revisit the historical record.[2]
Part I, below, looks at U.S. strategic interests in Greenland in the early Cold War period, including Danish government acquiescence to the storage of nuclear weapons there, U.S. nuclear-armed airborne alert flights over Greenland, and the 1968 B-52 crash. Part II will document the aftermath of the accident, including the clean-up of contaminated ice, the U.S.-Denmark government nuclear policy settlement, and the failed search for lost nuclear weapons parts deep in the waters of North Star Bay.
Background
Greenland has been seen as an important strategic interest to United States defense officials and policymakers since World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Nazis seized Denmark, and the Roosevelt administration feared that Germany would occupy Greenland, threatening Canada and the United States. In response, the U.S. insisted that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere and thus a territory that had to be “assimilated to the general hemispheric system of continental defense.” The U.S. began talks with Danish Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann, who was acting on his own authority as “leader of the Free Danes” and in defiance of the German occupiers. On 9 April 1941, Kauffmann signed an extraordinary agreement with Washington giving the United States almost unlimited access to build military facilities in Greenland and would remain valid as long as there were “dangers to the American continent,” after which the two parties could modify or terminate it. By the end of World War II, the U.S. had 17 military facilities in Greenland. After the liberation of Denmark from German rule, the Danish Parliament ratified the Kauffmann-U.S. agreement on 23 May 1945, but it assumed its early termination, with Denmark taking over Greenland’s defense.[3]
In 1946, the Truman administration gave brief consideration to buying Greenland because it continued to see it as important for U.S. security.[4] During 1947, with the U.S. beginning to define the Soviet Union as an adversary, defense officials saw Greenland as an important “primary base,” especially because they were unsure about long-term access to Iceland and the Azores.[5] Thus, maintaining U.S. access was an important concern, as exemplified in an early National Security Council report that U.S. bases in Greenland, along with Iceland and the Azores, were of “extreme importance” for any war “in the next 15 or 20 years.” For their part, Danish authorities had no interest in selling Greenland but sought to restore their nation’s sovereignty there; having joined NATO, they dropped their traditional neutrality approach and were more willing to accept a limited U.S. presence. In late 1949, the U.S. and Denmark opened what became drawn out negotiations over Greenland; during 1950, the U.S. even returned some facilities to Denmark, including Sandrestrom air base. But in late 1950, with Cold War tensions deepening, the Pentagon gave the negotiations greater priority, seeking an agreement that would let the U.S. develop a base at Thule as part of an air strategy designed to reach Soviet targets across the Arctic.[6]
In April 1951, the two countries reached an agreement on the “defense of Greenland” that superseded the 1941 treaty, confirmed Danish sovereignty, and delineated three “defense areas” for use by the United States, with additional areas subject to future negotiations. Under the agreement, each signatory would “take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.” Consistent with that broad guidance, the U.S. would be free to operate its bases as it saw fit, including the movement of “supplies,” and with no restrictions on its access to airspace over Greenland. With this agreement, Washington had achieved its overriding security goals in Greenland. To move the agreement through Parliament, the Danish government emphasized its defensive character, although the negotiators and top officials understood that U.S. objectives went beyond that.[7]
In 1955, a few years after the 1951 agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to revive interest in purchasing Greenland to ensure U.S. control over the strategically important territory and without having to rely on an agreement with another government. But the JCS proposal never found traction in high levels of the Eisenhower administration. The State Department saw no point to it, since the United States was already “permitted to do almost anything, literally, that we want to in Greenland.” The 1951 agreement stayed in place for decades. Denmark and the United States finally modified it in 2004, limiting the “defense area” to Thule Air Base and taking “Greenland Home Rule” more fully into account.
Nuclear Issues
When the U.S. negotiated the 1951 agreement, nuclear deployments were not an active consideration in official thinking about a role for U.S. bases for Greenland. Yet by 1957, when U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, became interested in deploying nuclear bombs at Thule, they used the agreement’s open-ended language to justify such actions. According to an August 1957 letter signed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, the Agreement was “sufficiently broad to permit the use of facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of [nuclear] weapons.” The problem was to determine whether Danish leaders would see it that way.
While Defense Department officials were willing to go ahead on the deployments without consulting the Danish Government, Murphy thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. ambassador, former Nebraska Governor Val Peterson. Peterson recommended bringing the question to Danish authorities and, having received the Department’s approval, in mid-November 1957 he asked Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen if he wished to be informed about nuclear deployments. By way of reply, Hansen handed Peterson a “vague and indefinite” paper that U.S. and Danish officials interpreted as a virtual “green light” for the deployments. Hansen raised no objections, asked for no information, and tacitly accepted the U.S. government’s loose interpretation of the 1951 agreement. He insisted, however, that the U.S. treat his response as secret because he recognized how dangerous it was for domestic politics, where anti-nuclear sentiment was strong, and for Denmark’s relations with the Soviet Union, which would have strongly objected.[8]
When Prime Minister Hansen tacitly approved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, he was initiating what Danish scholar Thorsten Borring Olesen has characterized as a “double standard” nuclear policy. On the one hand, in a May 1957 address, Hansen had stated that the government would not receive nuclear weapons “under the present conditions.” Thus, Denmark abstained from NATO nuclear storage and sharing plans as they developed in the following years. On the other hand, the Danish leadership treated Greenland differently with respect to nuclear weapons even though, as of 1953, it was no longer a colony but a county represented in Parliament. This double standard was not necessarily a preference for Denmark’s leaders but they felt constrained by the need to accommodate U.S. policy goals in Greenland. Thus, by keeping their Greenland policy secret, Hansen and his successors kept relations with Washington on an even keel while avoiding domestic political crises and pressure from the Soviet Union.[9]
In 1958, the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear weapons in Greenland, the details of which were disclosed in a declassified SAC history requested by Hans Kristensen, then with the Nautilus Institute. According to Kristensen’s research and the Danish study of “Greenland During the Cold War,” during 1958 the U.S. deployed four nuclear weapons in Greenland—two Mark 6 atomic bombs and two MK 36 thermonuclear bombs as well as 15 non-nuclear components. That SAC kept bombs there for less than a year suggests that it did not have a clear reason to continue storing them in Greenland. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept nuclear air defense weapons at Thule: 48 nuclear weapons were available for Nike-Hercules air missiles through mid-1965. There may also have been a deployment of nuclear weapons for Falcon air-to-air missiles through 1965, but their numbers are unknown.[10]
Airborne Alert and the January 1968 Crash
If it had only been an issue of the U.S. storing nuclear weapons on the ground in Greenland for a few years, the matter might have been kept under wraps for years. But the crash of a U.S. Air Force B-52 on 21 January 1968 near Thule Air Base exposed another nuclear secret and caused serious difficulties in U.S.-Denmark relations. While the bomber crash was quickly overshadowed by North Korea’s seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo the next day and the Tet offensive that began on 30 January, the coincidence of the three events was a major crisis for the overextended U.S.[11]
Beginning in 1961, accident-prone B-52s were routinely flying over Thule because Greenland had become even more salient to U.S. national security policy. To warn the U.S. of incoming bombers, the Air Force had deployed Distant Early Warning Line radar stations across Alaska and northern Canada during the 1950s and extended them to Greenland in 1960-1961. The Air Force also deployed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with a site located near Thule Air Base in 1960. With BMEWS, the U.S. would receive 15 minutes of warning of a ballistic missile launch.
The warning time was important for U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) because it provided the opportunity to launch ground alert bomber forces in the event of an attack. But the possibility of an ICBM strike on U.S. airbases also helped inspire the emergence of airborne alert, whereby SAC kept nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, ready to move on Soviet targets in the event of war. SAC began to test airborne alert in the late 1950s, and the flights soon became routine. By 1961, SAC had initiated “Chrome Dome,” with 12 B-52s flying two major routes, a Northern Route over North America and a Southern Route across the Atlantic. While SAC leaders used strategic arguments to justify airborne alert, they also had a parochial interest because it kept bombers in the air, giving pilots even more training.[12]
Airborne alert converged with Greenland in August 1961, when SAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan for two B-52 sorties a day to fly over the BMEWS site at Thule. Given the major importance of the BMEWS site, if the Soviets knocked it out in a surprise attack, they could disrupt U.S. early warning capabilities. Thus, SAC insisted on visual observation so that the B-52 crew could check whether the site was intact in the event there were failures in the communications links between Thule and the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado. SAC’s BMEWS Monitor was a routine operation for years, even after the B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, led to decisions to scale back on airborne alert. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted to end the program altogether but accepted a JCS compromise proposal for fewer sorties.
Danish military personnel and others nearby were aware of the daily B-52 flights. Moreover, every year there were emergency landings by U.S. bombers, with three in 1967 alone. After a nuclear-loaded B-52 crashed in western Maryland in January 1964, Eske Brun, Denmark’s Under Secretary for Greenland, wondered whether the B-52s flying over Thule carried nuclear weapons and asked U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair about the possibility of an accident. Blair suggested that such an “unfortunate” occurrence would be the price of defending the “free world” and that the flights were consistent with the 1951 agreement. The Danes held internal discussions about whether there were any restrictions on U.S. flights over Greenland and decided not to pursue the matter.
According to Scott Sagan, the January 1968 crash was a “normal accident waiting to happen.” The heating system failed on a bomber carrying four nuclear weapons over Thule, causing foam rubber cushions placed under the seats to catch fire. The crew could not extinguish the flames and bailed out after determining that an emergency landing was impossible, with all but one of the seven crew members surviving. While the nuclear weapons carried on the plane did not detonate when the B-52 crashed on Wolstenholme Fjord, near North Star Bay, conventional high explosives carried in the bombs did, causing plutonium contaminated aircraft parts and bomb debris to scatter about the ice for miles.[13]
To recover what they could of the bombs and assess the contamination, SAC sent an emergency team to Thule, including officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). All of this occurred under incredibly difficult conditions, sub-zero temperatures, and winter arctic darkness. Danish officials joined in the effort, although they would not take part in the bomb-salvaging activity. While SAC’s disaster team discovered most of the bomb parts after the accident, it could not find some of the important pieces, which eventually necessitated an underwater search. An equally significant problem was the possible risk to the local ecology from plutonium contamination, including its impact on Inuit hunters. U.S. officials had to find a way to clean up the icy mess quickly and in a way that was satisfactory to Danish authorities.
Immediately after the accident, JCS Chair Earle Wheeler and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered nuclear-armed airborne alert flights to end. SAC would continue the BMEWS Monitor using KC-135 tanker aircraft, but that ended that April 1968 when the flights were switched to the BMEWS site in Clear, Alaska. BMEWS, including the site at Thule, remained a U.S. strategic asset until 2001, when the Air Force replaced it with the Solid State Phase Array Radar System.
Soon after the accident, the Danish Foreign Ministry issued a statement that included this language: “Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also to air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland.” With this statement, the Government of Denmark was beginning to abandon the “double standard” by moving toward a consistent no nuclear policy. How Danish authorities worked with Washington to confirm this policy goal will be the subject of Part II.
The crash of the B-52 was no secret in Denmark, but the fact that airborne alert flights over Greenland were routine during the 1960s did not reach public attention until the early 1990s. Prompted by the revelations, the Danish Government asked the U.S. government for more information, which led the State Department to disclose to the Danish government in July 1995 that the U.S. had deployed nuclear bombs and air defense weapons in Greenland during 1958-1965. The State Department letter was secret, but its contents began to leak. The preceding month, the Danish government had released information on the Hansen paper, creating a political scandal and prompting calls for an investigation of the historical record.
The Danish Institute of International Affairs sponsored the research and published its report in 1996, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy 1945-1968 ]. The report, which included a full reproduction of the Hansen paper, among other revelations, disclosed much of this once-hidden history.[14] Nevertheless, significant State Department and U.S. Embassy records remain classified and have been the subject of declassification requests by National Security Archive to the U.S. National Archives.
Greenland eyes Chinese investment amid ‘new world order’
RT | May 27, 2025
Greenland is weighing the possibility of inviting Chinese investment to develop its mining sector in light of tensions with the US and limited engagement with the EU, the island’s business and mineral resources minister, Naaja Nathanielsen, told the Financial Times on Tuesday.
An autonomous territory of Denmark, Greenland holds vast but hard-to-exploit reserves of minerals such as gold and copper. Foreign capital is essential for developing the resources, yet recent geopolitical tensions have made it difficult to secure reliable partnerships.
“We are trying to figure out what the new world order looks like,” Nathanielsen said, adding that Greenland was “having a difficult time finding [its] footing” in evolving relationships with its Western allies.
The Arctic island signed a memorandum of understanding with the US on mineral development during President Donald Trump’s first term. However, according to Nathanielsen, it’s coming to an end. The government in Nuuk had tried, unsuccessfully, to renew it during the administration of former US President Joe Biden.
Following Trump’s return to office in January, Greenland hoped to revive discussions of renewing the memorandum. Instead, the US president talked about purchasing the island and refused to rule out using military force to assert US sovereignty over it.
Nathanielsen called such statements “disrespectful and distasteful,” adding that Greenland “has no wish to be American.”
China has shown interest in the Arctic’s mineral wealth, including oil, gas, and minerals. It has invested in Russian energy projects and has expressed interest in Greenland’s mining sector. No Chinese companies, however, are currently operating active mines in Greenland, although one firm holds a minority stake in an inactive project.
According to Nathanielsen, Chinese investors might be holding back because they don’t want “to provoke anything.”
“In those terms, Chinese investment is of course problematic, but so, to some extent, is American,” she said.
Greenland would prefer closer cooperation with the EU, which aligns more closely with its environmental priorities, the minister said. However, the bloc’s engagement has been slow, with only one project, led by a Danish-French consortium, currently in development. The mine is expected to begin operations within five years.
At present, Greenland has two functioning mines: one for gold, operated by the Icelandic-Canadian firm Amaroq Minerals, and another for anorthosite, a light-colored industrial rock, managed by a subsidiary of Canada’s Hudson Resources.

