Hezbollah using Israeli Occupation Forces as testing ground for weapons: Israeli media
Al Mayadeen | June 2, 2024
Israeli media reported today, Sunday, on developments in the ongoing war on the northern front, stating that it is gradually becoming the “main front” at the moment. The reports addressed Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its handling of field developments.
The North is gradually becoming the “main front” as Hezbollah increases the scope and intensity of operations while utilizing only a fraction of its capabilities, Israeli media reported on Sunday.
The Resistance in Lebanon “has used only 5% of its weapons arsenal during these months of battle as a testing ground against the Israeli army, in preparation for a real and extensive battle,” Ynet reported, citing the occupation army.
The news website added that Hezbollah “tries every day to bypass air defense systems and derive lessons,” and that “this has become evident with the different launch angles [the Resistance] uses, the concentration of launches, and the varying amounts of explosives in each weapon fired, among other factors.”
Thus, despite the “relatively limited volume of fire compared to the quantities” Hezbollah possesses, the Resistance “is registering accurate and successful hits,” the outlet added, pointing out to the operation using the Burkan heavy rockets on Saturday targeting the 769th Brigade HQ, “Camp Gibor,” causing severe damage to the military base.
The report added that “the use of Burkan rockets has proven effective in terms of material and psychological damage,” citing its “impact due to the unusual levels of destruction caused by each of these rockets, which are known as heavy rockets and can carry up to half a ton of explosives.”
The website also noted that “in recent months, similar to updates introduced to the anti-tank Almas missile, Hezbollah has developed a new family of Burkan rockets with warheads that exceed a ton of explosives” compared to earlier versions with a maximum capacity of 500kg of explosives.
‘To be or not to be’
Israeli Reserve Major General Gershon Hacohen warned on Saturday that “Israel” is currently facing an “existential threat” from Hezbollah, with its motto being “to be or not to be,” emphasizing that the occupation entity lacks the military capability to eliminate the threat posed by the Lebanese Resistance group.
Hacohen told the Israeli Channel 14 that “Israel’s” system of concepts and lifestyles must change, warning that “tomorrow we may not be here if we do not prepare ourselves for a situation we have not witnessed before.”
The Israeli Major General explained that the Israeli military does not currently possess “the size of forces capable of decisive action against Hezbollah…”
“Lebanon is a large country and Hezbollah is spread across all its territory, even in the depths of Lebanon,” he added.
“You must understand that the Israeli army is small, and not only Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) but hundreds of thousands of those exempted from service from the age of 20 to 50 must be recruited to build three or four divisions, and then we can talk,” Hacohen told the Israeli Channel 14.
His statements coincide with a new study conducted by Tel Hai Academic College in “Israel” which revealed that around 40% of Israelis who fled from the settlements in northern occupied Palestine are contemplating not returning even after the war ends.
Terror in Syria: a US distraction from Gaza
The Resistance Axis has effectively thwarted US distraction tactics in Syria meant to support Israeli interests as the war on Gaza rages on
By Khalil Nasrallah | The Cradle | May 30, 2024
Western-backed terrorist strongholds in Syria have not remained untouched by the Israeli military assault on Gaza. With the broad activation of the Axis of Resistance in support of Gaza, particularly in Lebanon, it didn’t take too long before Washington began to mobilize its extremist foot soldiers in Syria’s north.
Soon after the 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood Palestinian resistance operation – and even before the war’s trajectory became clear and Hezbollah’s intentions were understood – terrorists in Syria began to escalate their operations. Terror attacks were recorded in northern Latakia and the western Aleppo region, where Hezbollah, Iranian advisors, and the Syrian army are concentrated, as well as along the demarcation line between areas controlled by the state and those controlled by the militants.
This escalation was almost certainly not a coincidence, given the history of similar mobilizations triggered during crucial political and military events in Syria. It is well established that Washington supports terrorist armed groups in northwest Syria to keep the Syrian army and its allies in a state of attrition, serving US and Israeli interests – most notably in the eastern part of the country where the US maintains an illegal military presence.
Moreover, there are clear indications that the uptick in terrorist attacks after 7 October was linked to the war on Gaza. This strategy seems designed to distract resistance forces, particularly Hezbollah, and sends a message that escalation by resistance factions would activate other fronts to alleviate pressure on Tel Aviv.
Idlib, the main northern sanctuary for the terror militias, presents a complex front, not only militarily but also due to its political entanglements and involvement in various regional dynamics. The conditions for launching a major operation there were unfavorable before 7 October and remain unfavorable in the ongoing war.
US support for subversive activities in Syria before 7 October
Before the Hamas-led resistance operation, US efforts were focused on supporting subversive activities in Syria, explicitly backing Al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani.
With British intelligence assistance, Washington sought to strengthen ties with Julani following a series of operations by the Syrian government and its allies in 2020. These military offensives culminated in the recapture of the Aleppo–Damascus M5 motorway and significant territory south of Idlib.
The hostilities concluded with the 5 March ceasefire agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the latter’s visit to Moscow, marking a new phase in the regional conflict.
On several occasions, the US attempted to rekindle hostilities to influence Turkish–Syrian negotiations, which were sponsored by Moscow and Tehran, aiming to restore relations and reduce tensions between Ankara and Damascus.
However, these talks faced several obstacles, including Erdogan’s domestic political considerations and the challenges posed by US policies regarding the Syrian crisis.
Between 2020 and 2023, the Syrian army and its allies imposed military conditions that restricted the militants’ capabilities, preventing them from launching large-scale operations. Reports indicate that during this period, the militants focused on enhancing their drone warfare capabilities, allegedly with support from French, British, and US intelligence.
These drones were used in several attacks, most notably the 5 October 2023 assault on a graduation ceremony at a military academy in Homs, central Syria, which resulted in over 150 military personnel and civilian casualties.
Post-7 October: Shifting focus and new frontline dynamics
The impact of the terrorist attack in Homs quickly faded as the world turned its attention two days later to the Qassam Brigades storming military sites and settlements around the Gaza Strip, capturing dozens of soldiers and settlers, prompting Israel to declare a state of war. As regional powers shifted their focus to the Gaza Strip, the situation in Idlib subsequently took a different turn.
In late December, terrorists launched a large-scale attack in the western Aleppo area, reaching the 76th Regiment near Urm al-Kubra. Hezbollah and the Syrian army managed to repel the assault, inflicting heavy casualties on the terrorists, many of whom were Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang region.
Following, several other attacks tried to exploit the broader regional conflict, particularly the tensions in southern Lebanon. These attacks were influenced by external forces and extended beyond Julani’s leadership.
The attacks continued sporadically until the beginning of February, when the Syrian army, supported by Russian forces, introduced FPV (first-person view) suicide drones into the battle. These drones, which had demonstrated high effectiveness in Ukraine, significantly hindered the terrorists’ movements along the front lines to logistical points behind them.
The ability to curb the front lines suggested that disruptive tactics Washington might employ at any stage, especially in Idlib, could be neutralized. This came after the US had agreed to a truce in eastern Syria, accepted the status quo, and made concessions to prevent its bases from being targeted. These developments indicated the Resistance Axis’ capability to manage and prepare for new challenges, maintaining regional stability despite external pressures.
The steadfastness of resistance forces in Syria
Several indicators show that despite US attempts to create distraction fronts for resistance factions, Hezbollah remains steadfast in its fight against terrorism in Syria.
Hezbollah, along with other resistance forces such as Iraqi factions and Iranian advisors, has maintained a presence that supports the ongoing confrontation. Ultimately, the Syrian army and its allies have been successful in countering US distraction tactics through significant terrorist organizations, especially in Idlib.
This success offers several insights for the future. The Resistance Axis forces had anticipated such tactics and responded effectively, adapting to the circumstances of each stage. The American–Israeli reliance on terrorism to alter realities on support fronts has proven to be an unrealistic and losing strategy.
The outcomes of the current conflict may create political conditions favorable for a wide-scale military operation in Idlib in the future. Additionally, resistance forces are not isolated in their efforts to counter terrorist fronts, with Russian involvement playing a significant role that cannot be overlooked.
Israeli officials’ jaws drop over Hezbollah’s complex operations
Al Mayadeen | May 17, 2024
Multiple Israeli media outlets are reporting on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, following a series of top-tier attacks that targeted highly-prized Israeli surveillance and radar systems, while introducing new methods of engagement.
The Ynet news website said that Israeli officers serving on the northern front have issued a warning regarding the fact that Hezbollah can launch an attack on Israeli soldiers near the Palestinian-Lebanese border 30 seconds after locating them. The capability has been showcased in several videos published by the group’s Military Media unit, where Hezbollah utilized either suicide drones, anti-tank guided missiles, or artillery weapons of various types to target Israeli groupings and individual soldiers.
Moreover, the military correspondent for the Israeli Army Radio said that Hezbollah has carried out a number of “high-quality attacks on more distant targets, using more advanced military weapons.”
Hezbollah’s ‘amazing capabilities’ showcased in first-ever airstrike
On Thursday, Hezbollah launched an airstrike via an Ababil-T drone armed with two Soviet-era S-5 rockets on a grouping of Israeli soldiers in Metulla. The attack marked the first-ever aerial strike launched on Israeli positions by a Lebanese entity and the first Arab strike on Israeli positions since 1973.
The Israeli Army Radio‘s correspondent said that Hezbollah has made it “a normal” occurrence to launch dozens of rockets and missiles toward the Meron Air Traffic Control military base, one of the occupation’s strategic military sites, used to both coordinate offensive operations and track and discover aerial threats.
As for today’s attacks, the correspondent pointed to an attack conducted via several suicide drones that targeted Israeli officers and soldiers’ accommodation camps in Ga’aton. On this particular incident, the Israeli broadcaster Channel 14‘s correspondent said that the drone attack placed hundreds of thousands of Israelis in shelters and bunkers after sirens went off in Ben Ami, Gesher HaZiv, Evron, Nahariya, Sa’ar, Shlomi, Metzuba, Betzet, Achziv Miluot Industrial Zone, Liman, Rosh HaNikra, Avdon, Neveh Ziv, Manot, Ga’aton, Yechiam, Cabri, and Ein Yacov over 14 minutes.
Channel 14 also reported that Israeli officials have always “estimated that Hezbollah had amazing capabilities that would surprise everyone.”
Hezbollah’s Tel Shamayim operation dropped the jaws of Israeli officials
The broadcaster also said that Hezbollah’s attack on the “highly sensitive” Tel Shamayim facility “dropped the jaws” of Israeli security officers, the military’s Northern Command, and the Israeli political leadership. The site, located 35 km away from the border, was attacked by two suicide drones, escaping a complex and layered anti-air defense system before impacting its target.
It is worth noting that the Sky Dew High Availability Aerostat System (HAAS) in question hosts high-tech surveillance equipment, early detection systems, and an AESA radar. Hezbollah has slowly dismantled Israeli surveillance and radar systems across occupied territories, by targeting spyware installed on frontline sites, attacking the Meron Air Traffic Control Base, surgically striking radars, downing a surveillance balloon, and taking down the Sky Dew HAAS.
Hezbollah’s ATGMs, drones evade Israeli anti-air, electronic warfare systems
The UK-based The Independent noted Hezbollah has adapted its attacks in recent weeks, managing to reduce the number of fighters lost in confrontations.
At the same time, Hezbollah has introduced new methods to its attacks, maintaining a high output of operations, including complex and composite attacks.
The Israeli news website, Intelli Times, said that “Hezbollah succeeds in utilizing suicide drones and precision television-guided weapons,” while Israeli forces do not have “the ability to intercept them.”
According to the website, this occurrence is “astonishing” and raises questions about Hezbollah’s electronic warfare capabilities and its possible use of the Russian satellite navigation system. The outlet called the aforementioned operations “worrying”, stressing that Hezbollah “will do anything to disable as many [Israeli] systems as possible,” in preparation for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
“[Israel] fired 5 Iron Dome missiles at 3 drones [and perhaps more] and shot down only one. What do we do when a swarm of 100 or 200 arrives?”
Intelli Times claims that Hezbollah is not launching its drones to attack “Israel” but to survey and scan the preparedness of Israeli anti-air systems and search for blind spots.
“This is what the public needs to know. This may be a scary outlook but it will become true,” the website added.
Settlers fail to cope with Hezbollah’s operations
On his part, the head of the Merom HaGalil settlement council, Amit Sofer, said in an interview for Channel 12, “We stand here in front of residents and people who do not know to what extent they can remain strong and steadfast,” adding that such feelings are “being crushed day after day.”
Sofer noted that every Israeli assassination of a Hezbollah officer has led to large-scale attacks on Meron.
“After every response, we experience unending tension, and we must completely and definitely stop,” he added.
Sofer called on Israeli authorities to strive for a resolution to the confrontations, saying that ongoing engagement is an economic threat “which is increasing month after month.” Fed up with the current state of affairs, Sofer called on the Israeli military to “show [Hezbollah] for once that the owner of the house has gone crazy.”
“The situation here, in the end, is unbearable. People here are collapsing day after day,” Sofer emphasized.
Strategic setbacks for US, Israel as the Resistance Axis gains ground in Syria
Recent resistance operations in eastern Syria have established new rules of engagement that constrain both Washington and Tel Aviv

By Khalil Nasrallah | The Cradle | May 14, 2024
For several years, the presence of the region’s Axis of Resistance forces in Syria has remained vulnerable to US and Israeli attacks across the country, from east to west. The US has persistently attempted to disrupt the communication routes along the Tehran–Beirut axis, through which Damascus plays an important link.
Starting in 2017, after eliminating ISIS from this key border crossing, Axis forces have safeguarded passage of vehicles through the vital Al-Qaim–Al-Bukamal road and effectively established rules of engagement in eastern Syria, gradually limiting Washington’s tactical flexibility and dominance. This was a strategically important development – maintaining a foothold west of the Euphrates River to the far southeast of Syria continues to be essential for both state and non-state actors in the resistance.
A shift in tactical approach
Since the Palestinian resistance’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood last October, many new shifts have emerged on the ground in eastern Syria. With an uptick in Iraqi resistance activities targeting US bases in both Syria and Iraq, a sort of tentative peace emerged in early February, coinciding with Kataib Hezbollah’s temporary suspension of operations.
During this period, the resistance forces secured new advancements that solidified their position, primarily because Washington had to grudgingly acknowledge the new ground realities – a fait accompli, if you will.
Although the US continued to carry out “retaliatory” strikes targeting the Iraqi resistance, which, to many, seemed to restore some level of peace, this came with significant compromises.
According to information obtained by The Cradle, the resistance groups have not only established a more pronounced military and political stance during this period of relative calm but have also forced the US to accept crucial losses in the field.
In short, not only has Washington retreated from its provocative operations against regional resistance forces, but Tel Aviv has likewise shown reluctance to launch further raids – so far – in eastern Syria to assassinate fighters affiliated with Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
The Israeli retreat is not a unilateral decision but a result of US recalibration of these risks. The occupation army cannot launch operations without the American green light and intelligence data, and Washington is currently reluctant to cover Israeli actions that will draw the US deeper into the morass in Syria and Iraq. It also seeks to avoid further resistance attacks on US bases and occupied Syrian oil fields, especially now that it has experienced direct blows from targeted munitions.
It is also not insignificant that the Iraqi resistance has directly targeted key Israeli ports. Tel Aviv cannot afford opening up further military fronts eight months into a conflict in which it is incapable of winning on a single front, in Gaza.
Rules of engagement in Eastern Syria
The rules of engagement in eastern Syria are distinct from those governing interactions in the western and central regions of the country, which primarily involve the Israeli entity and Resistance Axis forces alongside Damascus.
In the east, the main opposition to the resistance forces is the illegal US military occupation and its Kurdish allies.
This region, stretching across the Euphrates River to Albu Kamal, which abuts Iraq’s Al-Qaim crossing, represents a strategic foothold for the Resistance Axis established in 2017. This was achieved during the “Great Dawn” operations, a series of offensives in three stages led by resistance forces, the Syrian army, and their Russian allies.
These operations enabled the Syrian and Iraqi resistance forces to reach and secure the Al-Qaim crossing, effectively reconnecting the two countries for the first time since 2011, which offered the Axis a world of new tactical advantages.
The establishment of this route, known as the Tehran–Beirut road, was perceived by the US and Israelis as a strategic geopolitical setback to their goal of severing relations and routes between Iran and the Mediterranean. In response, Washington intensified its efforts to destabilize this area through raids and pressures and by supporting attacks by ISIS cells and other militant groups, aiming to prevent the resistance forces from cementing their positions and achieving stability.
These tensions would escalate significantly towards the end of 2019 and into early 2020, following US claims that its forces in Kirkuk were targeted in a rocket attack attributed to the Iraqi resistance.
Washington responded provocatively by launching heavy strikes against an Iraqi resistance faction in Al-Qaim, killing at least fifty fighters in an operation closely followed by the targeted assassinations of Iranian Quds Force Commander General Qassem Soleimani and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) Deputy Head Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
One key goal of this unprovoked US escalation was to prevent the resistance connectivity project, specifically cutting off the roads of communication between Tehran–Baghdad–Damascus–Beirut, which is seen as threatening both the US presence and Israel’s security.
Following the strike on the Ain al-Assad airbase earlier this year, resistance forces moved to intensify their targeting of US military bases using missiles and drones, conducted multiple operations in the Syrian Desert to safeguard transit routes against Washington-backed terror groups, and established protective measures around the US occupation base in Al-Tanf, located near the Syrian–Jordanian–Iraqi border intersection.
Through these coordinated efforts, the Axis of Resistance imposed new rules of engagement, effectively balancing the scales by linking their actions at Albu Kamal and Al-Qaim with significant retaliatory strikes against US bases.
This approach led to a noticeable reduction in direct US military engagements – which, interestingly and unsurprisingly, coincided with a spike in ISIS cells attempting infiltrations in both Syria and Iraq.
This state of affairs persisted until the Iraqi resistance increased its operations against US troops in both Syria and Iraq, partly in solidarity with the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip.
West Asia’s new reality
Between the rules of engagement that preceded the events of 7 October and those that followed the targeting of US bases, significant changes have occurred, especially after Iraqi resistance operations showcased the vulnerabilities of the American deterrence strategy.
The illegal US bases have been exposed as unsafe, not only in Syria and Iraq but also extending to Jordan. The results of the resistance operations can be summarized as follows:
The Axis has successfully established and strengthened its ground presence in areas Washington once viewed as its own stomping ground and has achieved a de facto truce that benefits long-term resistance goals across military, economic, and political domains.
Consequently, resistance troops are now more effectively pursuing the remnants of US-backed ISIS cells within the depths of the Syrian Desert. These terror cells, though engaged in continuous disruptive operations, are no longer seen as posing a strategic threat.
The Axis’ efforts can also now more effectively concentrate on the main front, against Israel, in support of the Palestinian resistance there. The rules of engagement with the US have been reinforced and are poised for further development in future stages, with plans to pose a more formidable challenge to the US presence across West Asia.
How Big a Factor is Iran in the War on Gaza?
By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | April 10, 2024
In both Ukraine and Gaza, the Joe Biden administration has adopted the dangerous doctrine of war management in which, while not stopping a war diplomatically, it attempts to contain it and prevent it from becoming a wider war into which the United States might get drawn.
This difficult to calibrate policy is being threatened in both theaters.
In the Middle East, two Israeli actions have escalated the calibrated strikes between Israel and Iran, up to the threshold that Iran could absorb without feeling the necessity to respond.
One was an airstrike in southern Lebanon that killed Ali Ahmad Hassin, an important Hezbollah commander. The more significant and volatile one was the April 1 attack on an Iranian embassy compound in Damascus that killed seven Iranian officers, including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the top Iranian Quds Force commander in Lebanon and Syria.
Zahedi is the most senior Iranian commander to be killed since war broke out on October 7. But what made this strike escalatory and dangerous is that it targeted an embassy compound under Iranian sovereignty. “When they attack our consulate,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a speech on April 10, “it is as if they have attacked our soil.” Khamenei called the decision to escalate to such an attack a “mistake” that “must be punished.”
A direct response by Iran against Israel could risk the nightmare scenario the United States has sought to avoid through its policy of managing wars. In that scenario, Iran retaliates in kind against Israel and Israel responds, drawing Iran and Hezbollah into the war in a manner that pulls in the Houthis as well as militias in Iraq and Syria. A Houthi source told Responsible Statecraft that “In case a full-scale war was to erupt between Hezbollah and Israel, Yemen and its leadership will stand with the party [Hezbollah] militarily, politically and economically” in a way that could even include “sending foot soldiers.” Such a force aligned against Israel could risk drawing the United States into the war.
In a speech on April 5, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah called the attack on Iran’s Damascus embassy “a turning point” and said that it is “certain that the Iranian response to the [bombing] of the Iranian consulate is coming without a doubt.”
He said, perhaps clearly for the first time, that Hezbollah could intervene in the event of a full-scale Israel-Iran war. “Everyone must prepare themselves, arrange their matters and be careful,” he said, “when the Iranian side responds to the targeting of the Iranian consulate and to the Zionist enemy’s possible response to the Iranian response.”
Nasrallah said that an Iranian response is inevitable and seemed to caution against the size of the Israeli counter-response, saying, not only that “everyone must prepare themselves,” but reminding that Hezbollah has “not used the main weapons nor the main forces and we have not called in the reserves.”
Nasrallah may have been leveraging a fuller Hezbollah entrance into the war to caution Israel and the United States against an even more escalatory Israeli counter-response to the response Iran feels it must deliver. Iran may have gone one step further, leveraging its entrance into the war in an attempt to stop the war altogether.
As Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute first reported, an Arab diplomatic source told Jadeh Iran that Iran will respond to the Israeli attack on its embassy with a direct attack on Israel unless the United States orchestrates a ceasefire in Gaza. According to reporting in Jadeh Iran, “Iran has vowed to respond to the assassination of Zahedi.” However, in an “exchange of messages between Tehran and Washington” whose aim is “to contain escalation,” an Iranian proposal “stipulated a ceasefire in Gaza as a price” for not striking Israel in retaliation.
Though a causal line cannot be drawn, it is interesting that, in an interview recorded on April 3, President Joe Biden said, “I think what [Netanyahu’s] doing is a mistake. I don’t agree with his approach,” and then said, “So what I’m calling for is the Israelis to just call for a ceasefire, allow for the next six, eight weeks, a total access to all food and medicine going into the country.”
It is also interesting that the United States is participating in the latest round of ceasefire negotiations in Cairo. In an April 8 press conference, National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said that CIA Director Bill Burns was in Cairo for the talks. He said that the Biden administration “is doing everything possible to broker a deal that secures the release of all the hostages and leads to an immediate ceasefire. And there’s simply no higher priority.”
CNN went further, reporting that Burns wasn’t just present or participating, but that he “presented a new proposal to try to bridge the gaps in ongoing negotiations to broker a deal to bring about a ceasefire.”
Hezbollah may be responding to the killing of one of their commanders by leveraging the threat of its entering the war to prevent the war from entering an uncontrolled series of escalations. Iran may be responding to the airstrike on its embassy that killed a general by leveraging its entering the war to stop the war altogether. How big a factor Iran is, and how powerful its leverage, may help determine what comes next, how big the Israeli counter-response to Iran’s promised response is and even, perhaps, the prospects of a future ceasefire.
A potential UAE-Hezbollah thaw?
By Radwan Mortada | The Cradle | March 31, 2024
The veiled details behind the recent visit of Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, to the UAE remain undisclosed. Rumors propagated by Saudi media have tried to insinuate that the Lebanese resistance party aims to placate its stance towards Israel, possibly even contemplating concessions.
This narrative seeks to undermine or distort any real achievements gained during the rare trip. Despite all the conjecture, one development is undeniable: there has been a nascent shift in thawing the longstanding hostilities between Hezbollah and the UAE — a prominent Arab ally of both the US and Israel.
Strained relations
The sudden revelation of Safa’s visit to the Persian Gulf state on 19 March was indeed astonishing — a first by a senior Hezbollah official in many years — particularly given Abu Dhabi’s active role in clamping down on even pro-Hezbollah sentiments within the UAE.
The UAE’s track record includes arbitrary arrests and expulsions of Lebanese nationals under all sorts of dubious charges, often subjecting them to inhumane treatment, exemplified tragically in the case of Lebanese businessman Ghazi Ezzeldin, who was tortured to death while in Emirati custody last year.
News reports suggest that seven Lebanese citizens — four serving life sentences; two others facing 15 years in prison — remain incarcerated in the Emirates under charges of laundering funds for Hezbollah and Iran, and for the spurious claim of having made contact with Hezbollah. All of the detainees deny these charges.
In short, UAE authorities need little justification to accuse Lebanese individuals of ties to Hezbollah, which is designated a terrorist entity in the Emirates.
The UAE, it should be noted, is Tel Aviv’s closest Arab ally in West Asia, marked by Abu Dhabi’s decision in 2020 to normalize relations with the occupation state — with Bahrain, the first Arab state in the Persian Gulf to do so. Despite Israel’s genocidal war against Gaza, economic ties between the UAE and Israel continue to flourish, further entrenching their alliance against common adversaries.
Against this backdrop, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad emerges as an unexpected mediator, leveraging his amicable relations with the UAE leadership, united in their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Behind the scenes, the UAE has been quietly leveraging its international clout to lift US Caesar Act sanctions on Syria, with an eye on participating in the war-torn country’s reconstruction efforts. As the first Arab state to break Assad’s diplomatic isolation, the UAE has now seized the opportunity to engage with Hezbollah via its renewed Damascus channel.
Preliminary discussions, facilitated by Syrian General Intelligence Director Major General Hossam Louka, bridged the gap between the two parties. These exchanges, held on Syrian soil, involved representatives from both Hezbollah and UAE officials.
Louka also visited Lebanon and the UAE to meet with Emirati officials and the leadership of Hezbollah and convey a detailed message to Assad.
Contrary to the many sensationalized reports in regional media, informed sources tell The Cradle that Safa encountered no explicit demands from UAE officials during his visit. Instead, discussions centered on two pivotal objectives: first, securing the release of Lebanese detainees unjustly incarcerated in the UAE under charges of affiliation with Hezbollah, and second, improving the precarious conditions Lebanese expatriates face in the UAE, where their presence is securitized by the state.
The sources affirm the constructive nature of the meetings and indicate there may be imminent releases of the Lebanese detainees before the end of the holy month of Ramadan.
What do both parties want?
But the timing of Safa’s visit, as Israel escalates airstrikes on Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, raises speculation about the implications of this renewed relationship. Safa himself is on a US sanctions list, while Hezbollah retains its designation as a terrorist organization by both Washington and the Persian Gulf states.
The UAE, having previously subjected Lebanese nationals to unjust treatment, now initiates efforts to mend ties with Hezbollah. Conversely, Hezbollah, having waged a war to free prisoners from Israeli detention, displays a willingness to engage in dialogue, even if the optics of its representative shaking hands with UAE officials may not be well-received back home.
Following the visit, Hezbollah issued a very brief statement:
“The head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit, Hajj Wafiq Safa, visited the United Arab Emirates as part of the ongoing follow-up to address the case of a number of Lebanese detainees there, where he met with a number of officials concerned with this case, and [a solution to this issue will be reached hopefully].”
Nevertheless, the underlying question remains: What does the UAE seek to achieve? Did it initiate this thaw in relations merely to reopen its embassy in Lebanon after years of closure and diplomatic strife? Does the UAE have hidden intentions concealing these superficial objectives — and what role could Hezbollah play in this equation?
Outreach to Iran via its allies
Early this year, as the regional war expanded, CIA Director William Burns wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine: “The key to Israel’s — and the region’s — security is dealing with Iran.”
Abu Dhabi too, knows that the relationship with Tehran is pivotal to resolving crises in the region. Hence, the UAE has taken a significant stride towards Hezbollah, recognizing its critical regional role. While this unusual meeting could have taken place in Damascus, in secret, the UAE opted instead for a public airing and even arranged for Safa’s transportation via plane to the Emirates.
Moreover, Abu Dhabi’s interest in improving relations with Hezbollah and its leadership could have direct security benefits. The Lebanese party has influence with Yemen’s Ansarallah resistance movement, whose naval operations in the Red Sea and other waterways are impacting international navigation and, thus, Emirati interests from the Persian Gulf to the Horn of Africa.
While a Syrian source tells The Cradle that the meeting yielded positive outcomes and is likely to be followed by further engagements, the visit carries implications that extend well beyond the immediate parties involved.
Beyond improving Hezbollah-UAE or Iran-UAE understandings, it will be essential to monitor the subsequent actions of Saudi Arabia’s leadership after this event.
In essence, these developments could lead to improved future relations between Hezbollah and Arab states of the Persian Gulf, in turn reversing Washington and Tel Aviv’s strategic target of clinching further normalization deals for Israel in West Asia.
Lebanon Sunni militant head affirms coordination with Hezbollah against Israel
MEMO | March 27, 2024
The head of a Lebanese Sunni political and militant group that has joined Hezbollah, a Shia resistance movement, in its fight against Israel said yesterday that the conflict has helped strengthen cooperation between the two groups, despite their sectarian differences.
Secretary-General of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, or the Islamic Group, Sheikh Mohammed Takkoush, told AP that his faction has joined the fighting along the Lebanon-Israel border in response to the occupation state’s ongoing genocidal war on Gaza and its strikes against Lebanese towns and villages, which have killed civilians including journalists.
“We decided to join [the battle] as a national, religious and moral duty. We did that to defend our land and villages,” Takkoush told the news agency at his group’s headquarters in Beirut. “We also did so in support of our brothers in Gaza,” where he said Israel was committing an “open massacre.”
According to AP, the Islamic Group’s armed wing, the Fajr Forces, carries out its operations against Israel mainly from the southern city of Sidon.
Takkoush said that he believed Israel has ambitions to seize more territory “not only in Palestine but in Lebanon too.”
The group acts independently but coordinates closely with Hezbollah and with the Lebanese branch of Hamas, Takkoush said. “Part of [the attacks against Israeli forces] were in coordination with Hamas, which coordinates with Hezbollah,” he explained, adding that direct cooperation with Hezbollah “is on the rise and this is being reflected in the field.”
“Our relations with Hezbollah are good and growing and it is being strengthened as we go through war,” adding that all the weapons they use are from their own arsenal: “We did not get even a bullet from any side.”
In a report published in November, L’Orient Today said Takkoush’s faction, which has been described as a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group, may help Hezbollah boost its credentials among some Lebanese Sunnis, although “it is not guaranteed to extend Hezbollah’s influence beyond the war.” This is because “The Sheikh has neither the oratory skills and charisma of Hassan Nasrallah, his Hezbollah counterpart, nor the popularity of Saad Hariri.”
Hezbollah detains Dutch armed group in Beirut suburb
The Cradle | March 2, 2024
Hezbollah security personnel arrested six Dutch nationals in the southern suburbs of Beirut last Wednesday, Al-Akhbar reported on 2 March.
The men were found in possession of military-grade weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
The Dutch government claimed the six men were part of a special group sent to evacuate its nationals if the war between Hezbollah and Israel expanded.
Hezbollah handed over the men to the Lebanese Intelligence Directorate, where they were interrogated and kept in detention until early Friday morning.
Sources speaking with Al-Akhbar said the six men claimed to be members of the Dutch military, simulating an evacuation attempt from inside the southern suburb. Contact with them was lost after they entered the southern suburb and were stopped by Hezbollah security personnel. Two employees of the Dutch embassy residing in the southern suburb allegedly participated in the failed simulation.
However, journalist Hasan Illaik of the Lebanese news outlet Al-Mahatta reported that the embassy employees were not Dutch nationals and that the “Dutch ambassador to Lebanon quickly arrived at the ministry to pressure their release, under the pretext that they had not committed any crime. This is, of course, untrue given that this is a major violation of the law and that it was a significant security threat.”
Illaik added that, “even more suspiciously, the armed group claimed to have carried out the operation without consulting their own embassy. It was also discovered that they launched their operation from Kaslik,” a coastal town north of Beirut, “rather than from the embassy or a place affiliated with the embassy.”
Neither the Lebanese military nor the Dutch government provided an official statement or explanation for the incident.
Al-Akhbar reported as well on 2 March that Hezbollah’s security service arrested a Spanish national in the Al-Kafaat area in the southern Beirut suburbs several days ago. The man was filming with his phone on the street, claiming he was lost and needed to send his location to friends to pick him up.
However, during the interrogation, it was discovered that his phone contained an advanced program preventing access to the stored data.
High-level officials from the Spanish embassy then intervened to win his release. It was later discovered that the man possessed a diplomatic passport.
The arrests of the Dutch and Spanish nationals came as part of a program of additional measures initiated by Hezbollah security officials in response to increased efforts by Israeli and other foreign intelligence agencies to collect information needed to assassinate Hezbollah cadres.
Israel assassinated prominent Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in an airstrike in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiya in December and prominent Hezbollah commander Ali Hussein Burji in January in south Lebanon.
Since the outbreak of the war with Israel on 8 October, the embassies of several western countries, including Britain and Canada, have brought in special forces, ammunition, and advanced equipment under the pretext of evacuating their diplomats and nationals if the situation deteriorates.
Al-Akhbar reported in November that mysterious foreign military cargo flights, potentially carrying equipment for use against Hezbollah, were landing at the Beirut and Hamat airports.
Between the 14 and 20 November, nine planes from various NATO countries were recorded landing at Beirut and Hamat airports, including several flying from Tel Aviv, according to Intelsky, a website monitoring aircraft movement in the region.
The Resistance Has a Plan for Israel. But on the Other Side, Fantastical U.S. Stratagems Ensure a Cascading Failure
By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 19, 2024
In a speech on Tuesday, Hizbullah leader Seyed Nasrallah said that the Party will continue the border offensive until at least the Gaza massacre stops. The war in Gaza however, is far from over. And Nasrallah warned that even were a ceasefire to be reached in Gaza, “should the enemy perform any action, we will return to operating according to the rules and formulas that existed before. The purpose of the resistance is to deter the enemy, and we will react accordingly”.
Israel’s Defence Secretary Gallant has underlined that contrary to international consensus expectations, he too expects the war in Lebanon to continue. Gallant said the military has stepped up its attacks against Hizbullah by one level out of ten:
“The Air Force planes flying currently in the skies of Lebanon have heavier bombs for more distant targets. Hizbullah went up half a step, whilst we, a full one … We can attack not only at 20 kilometres [from the border], but also at 50 kilometres, and in Beirut and anywhere else”.
It is not clear what ‘red line’ Hizbullah would have to cross for Israel to significantly escalate its response to much higher levels; Israeli leaders have suggested that an attack on a strategic site; or an attack leading to major civilian casualties; or a substantive barrage on Haifa might constitute the breaking point.
Nonetheless, with three military divisions rather than the usual one now deployed in the north of Israel, the IDF has more forces poised for action on the northern border than it has preparing for an incursion into Rafah – at this point. It is clear, as Chief of Staff Halevy has specified, that Israel is “preparing for war” against Hizbullah (more than preparing for Rafah).
Is the threat to Rafah a bluff to put pressure on Hamas to concede on the deal and hostages? One way or another, both Israel’s political and military chiefs are adamant: The IDF will incurse into Rafah – ‘at some point’.
The qualitatively different Hizbullah strike on Safed on Israel’s northern regional command HQ on Wednesday – which resulted in 2 dead and 7 further casualties – is being treated in Israel as the gravest attack since the start of the war, with Ben Gvir calling it a “declaration of war”. Subsequent Israeli attacks killed 11 people, including six children, in a barrage of strikes on villages across southern Lebanon, in retribution for the Safed blitz – with the fierce exchange of fire still continuing.
The ‘Safed Strike’ deep into the Galilee very likely was intended to signal that Hizbullah is not about to capitulate to western demands that it provide Israel with a ceasefire that is intended to facilitate evacuated Israelis to return to their homes in the north. As Nasrallah confirmed in a scathing attack on those external (Western) mediators who serve only as Israel’s lawyers, and neglect to address the massacres in Gaza:
“It is easier to move the Litani River forward to the borders, than to push back Hezbollah fighters from the borders, to behind the Litani River … They want us to pay a price without Israel committing to a thing”.
In these circumstances, Nasrallah clarified that residents of northern Israel will not return to their homes – warning that even more Israelis risk being displaced:
“‘Israel’ must prepare shelters, basements, hotels and schools to house two million settlers who will be evacuated from northern Palestine, [were Israel to expand the war zone].”
Nasrallah outlined what is clearly the agreed Axis of resistance’s overarching strategic plan. (There has been a flurry of meetings between senior Axis principals over the last week, across the region, for which Nasrallah is speaking):
“We are committed to fighting Israel until it is off the map. A strong Israel is dangerous to Lebanon; but a deterred Israel, defeated and exhausted, is less of a danger to Lebanon”.
“The national interest of Lebanon, the Palestinians, and the Arab world is that Israel leaves this battle defeated: Therefore, we are committed to Israel’s defeat”.
Put bluntly, the Axis has its vision of the conflict’s outcome. And it is a “deterred, defeated and exhausted” Israeli State. By implication, it is an Israel that has relinquished the Zionist project – one that is reconciled to the notion of living as Jews between the River and the Sea – albeit with rights no different to others living there (i.e. Palestinians).
On the other side, the western strategic plan, as the Washington Post reports – which the U.S. and several Arab countries hope to present within a few weeks – is a long-term plan for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, including a “time frame” for the establishment of a provisional de-militarized Palestinian “state”:
“Imperatively, it begins with a hostage deal accompanied by a six-week cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. While it may be termed “cessation of hostilities” or an “extended humanitarian pause,” such a cease-fire will signal the de facto end of the war along the lines and scale that it has been fought since 7 Oct.”
The plan addresses “Post-war Gaza”, in terms already well-known. As senior Israeli commentator, Alon Pinkas, affirms:
“Parallel to the announcement U.S., Britain and possibly other countries will consider and eventually make a joint statement of intent by recognizing a provisional, demilitarized and future Palestinian state – without delineating or specifying its borders”.
“Such a recognition does not necessarily contradict Israel’s legitimate and reasonable demand to have overriding security control over the area west of the Jordan River in the foreseeable future … [it constitutes] a practical, timebound, irreversible path to a Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with Israel … whose recognition could also be submitted to the UN Security Council – as a binding resolution. Once the Arab countries sign off on such a framework, the U.S. believes that neither Russia nor China would veto it …
“Within the “regionalization” phase however, the Americans will craft a regional security cooperation mechanism. Some in Washington imagine a reconfigured region with a new “security architecture” as a harbinger to a gradual Mideast version of the European Union, with greater economic and infrastructure integration”.
Ah – the New Middle East again!!!
Even Alon Pinkas, an experienced former Israeli diplomat, concedes: “If the plan seems too fantastical to you: You’re not alone”.
The basic improbabilities to this plan simply are disregarded. Firstly, Israel’s Finance Minister Smotrich responded to the reported American-Arab plan, saying: “there’s a joint American, British and Arab effort to establish a terrorist state” next to Israel. Second, (as Smotrich further notes): “They see the polls. They see how the absolute majority of Israelis oppose this idea [of a Palestinian State]”; and thirdly, some 700,000 settlers were installed in the West Bank – precisely to block any Palestinian State.
Is the U.S. really going to impose this onto a hostile Israel? How?
And, from the Resistance perspective, ‘a provisional, demilitarized and future Palestinian ‘state’, without delineated or specified borders, is not a state. It is truly a Bantustan.
The reality is that when a Palestinian State might have been a real prospect (two decades ago), the international community turned a willing ‘blind eye’ – for decades – to Israel’s successful and complete sabotage of the project. Today, circumstances are much changed: Israel has moved far to the Right and is in the grip of an eschatological passion to establish Israel on the entire “Land of Israel”.
The U.S. and Europe have only themselves to blame for the dilemma in which they now find themselves. And a policy stance – such as outlined by Biden – plainly said is doing untold strategic damage to the U.S. and its compliant European allies.
Even on the Lebanon track, let us be plain too, Israel’s demands from Lebanon go far beyond a mutual ceasefire. There is no guarantee, even should a ceasefire be reached in Gaza as part of a comprehensive hostage/end-of-war deal, that Nasrallah will agree to withdraw all his forces from the border with Israel, or conversely, that Israel will comply with its commitments.
And with the U.S. defining its Palestinian ‘solution’ as an improbable, provisional, disarmed and wholly impotent Palestinian entity, nestled within a fully militarised Israel, exercising ‘full security overlordship from the River to the Sea’, it would not be surprising were Hizbullah rather, to opt to pursue the Axis’ plan of a defeated, exhausted post-Zionism.
Israeli commentator, Zvi Bar’el, writes:
“Even were the American assumptions to become a working plan, it is still unclear what policy Israel will adopt on Lebanon. Even pushing Hezbollah back so that Israeli communities are no longer within the range of its anti-tank missiles does not remove the threat of tens of thousands of medium and long-range missiles. The deterrence equation between Israel and Hezbollah will continue to determine [the true] reality along the border”.
[The current U.S. working assumption, as presented by the Administration’s special envoy Amos Hochstein in his previous visits to Lebanon], “is that a border demarcation agreement between Israel and Lebanon will result in final and full recognition of the international border and thus deny Hezbollah the formal basis for justifying its continued fight against Israel to liberate occupied Lebanese territories. At the same time, it allows the Lebanese government to order its army to deploy its forces along the border in order to assert its sovereignty over its entire territory and demand that Hezbollah forces pull back from the border”.
This is just more wishful, ‘fantastical’ thinking. And it contains a flaw: Hochstein’s work plan does not include an agreement on the Sheba’a Farms, but only on the ‘Blue Line’ – the border agreed in 2000, but which is not recognized by Lebanon as an international border. If the issue of the Sheba’a Farms is not settled, Hezbollah will not be bound by a limited demarcation accord that omits the Sheba’a area.
Since Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October, every stratagem and protocol, dug from some musty West Wing cupboard, and upon which the U.S. leant, has failed. What was supposed to be a limited and compartmentalized military operation in Gaza by the IDF has turned into a regional firestorm. Aircraft carriers sent to deter other actors from getting involved failed with the Houthis; U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria became targets, with attacks on U.S. bases continuing, despite U.S. attempts at delivering deterrent ‘punches’.
Quite clearly, Netanyahu is ignoring Biden, and ‘defying the world’ – as this week’s headlines attest:
“Defying Biden, Netanyahu Doubles Down on Plans to Fight in Rafah” (Wall Street Journal )
“As Israel corners Rafah, Netanyahu defies the world” (Washington Post )
“U.S. won’t punish Israel for Rafah op that doesn’t protect civilians” (Politico )
“Egypt Builds Walled Enclosure on Border as Israeli Offensive Looms: Authorities are surrounding an area in the desert with concrete walls as a contingency for possible influx of Palestinian refugees” (Wall Street Journal ).
Netanyahu has vowed to forge ahead, saying on Wednesday that Israel would mount a “powerful” operation in the city of Rafah, once residents have been “evacuated”. Israelis explicitly say the White House is not opposed to the Rafah blitz, provided Palestinians are given the opportunity to “evacuate” (to where, is left unsaid). (Meanwhile, Egypt is building a refugee camp inside its border, surrounded by concrete walls …).
At this point, all of the U.S.’ various problems – the political polarization, widening war, funding for wars, the alienation amongst the swing-state Arab constituencies and Biden’s sinking ratings – are beginning to feed into, and reinforce, each other. What began as a foreign-policy issue – Israel defeating Hamas – has become a significant domestic crisis. Dissatisfaction within the U.S. at Israel’s conduct of the war is fuelling the growth of significant protest movements. Who can truly believe that yet another trip by Blinken to the region will solve anything at this point, asks Malcom Kyeyune?
It is hard to say where things in the region will stand, a couple of months from now. We have entered a period of breakdown and violence, as the forces pulling apart the old status quo cascade and mutually reinforce one another.
Lebanon rejects demands to push Hezbollah away from southern border
The Cradle | February 6, 2024
Lebanese caretaker Foreign Minister, Abdallah Bou Habib, voiced on 6 February the nation’s rejection of recent Israeli and international demands seeking to push Lebanese resistance group, Hezbollah, north of the Litani River, saying Beirut will not accept ‘partial solutions’ to resolving the cross-border conflict.
“Western countries demand the retreat of Hezbollah for about eight to ten kilometers north of Litani,” Bou Habib said in an interview with Nida al-Watan. “This is a formula that Lebanon rejects. [Beirut] will not accept ‘partial solutions’ that do not bring the desired peace and do not secure stability but will lead to the renewal of the war again and again.”
Instead, the foreign minister called for a “comprehensive implementation of UN Resolution 1701.”
UN Resolution 1701 was issued following the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war, which called for, among other things, respect for the Blue Line, a border drawn up by the UN in 2000.
Bou Habib expressed Lebanon’s demands in relation to the liberation of Shebaa Farms and the Kfarchouba hills, saying, “What we hear from some foreign ministers of the Western countries is that Israel is not in the question of this withdrawal, and our answer was that Lebanon will only accept a complete solution to all border issues with Israel, and half solutions do not work and will not [be accepted].”
He also demanded that part of a potential deal be for Israel to “stop the air, land and sea violations that have exceeded 30,000 violations since 2006.”
On 5 February, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said that “time is running out” in relation to a diplomatic solution with Lebanon, adding to his French counterpart Stephane Sejourne during her visit to Israel that “if we do not reach a diplomatic solution on Lebanon, we will move militarily to return the residents of Israeli towns on Lebanon’s borders,”
Hezbollah has recently released statistics showing that over 230,000 settlers had evacuated because of their operations since 8 October.
US special envoy Amos Hochstein paid a visit to Israel to speak with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in an attempt to develop a plan to de-escalate the crossfire between Lebanon and Israel.
Gallant requested for Hezbollah to be pushed back 8–10 kilometers from the border, an increase of UN forces and Lebanese army in the area, and the means to return settlers to the northern settlements.
Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said during a recent speech in reference to Israeli threats and negotiation talks, “we don’t fear war, and there are no talks before the war on Gaza ends.”




