Iraqi resistance is quietly but effectively hitting the Israeli regime where it hurts
By Wesam Bahrani | Press TV | January 2024
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced a drone attack on Sunday deep inside the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, marking another significant development amid the Israeli genocide in Gaza.
What makes it a major development is the location of the target. The Israeli Zevulun naval facility near Haifa Port was struck as part of a “new phase” of operations against the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestine as well as the illegal American occupation of Iraq and Syria.
A pattern is emerging of the Iraqi resistance attacking Zionist targets in the Mediterranean while the Yemeni military continues its operations against Zionist and US targets in the Red and Arabian seas.
In a statement on Sunday, the Iraqi resistance said it struck “four enemy targets”, which included three illegal American bases in Syria and “the Israeli Zevulun naval facility”.
In a sign of how quickly these operations are occurring, by Sunday afternoon the Iraqi resistance published another statement announcing an attack on another illegal US base in Erbil, northern Iraq.
The attack by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq near Haifa followed a successful operation against the Israeli port of Ashdod just two days before that, which followed two other operations against Haifa itself as well as drone attacks on the Israeli Karish gas rig.
All these military operations against the Zionist entity have one thing in common: strategically all these targets sit on the Mediterranean Sea.
Last month, the Iraqi resistance pledged a new phase in its operations against the Zionist entity and its American patrons, declaring that “more is to come” and in “solidarity with “our people in Gaza”.
The commander of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada, Abu Ala’a al-Walai, one of the senior officials in the Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Units), recently spoke about the beginning of a new phase and said “This stage includes preventing Zionist shipping in the Mediterranean Sea and disabling the ports of the Zionist regime”.
In response to the now almost daily attacks on the illegal US bases in Iraq and Syria by the Iraqi resistance as well as targeting vital Israeli targets, America’s military response has seen deadly airstrikes on buildings belonging to Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah.
These are the two prominent anti-terror groups belonging to the Hashd al-Sha’abi, which is an integral part of the Iraqi National Armed Forces.
The Commander of the Hashd al-Sha’abi for the Central Euphrates Operations in Iraq, Major General Ali al-Hamdani on Sunday declared that “The Americans only understand the language of the force and will not leave Iraq through dialogue”.
As Washington continues to violate Iraqi sovereignty by attacking and killing members of its armed forces and continues to violate Yemeni sovereignty by attacking Yemeni military positions (as the US claims) or redecorating the sand in the desert, one thing is clear: both parties targeted are undeterred.
American and British warships are trying their best to prevent Ansarullah from attacking Israeli vessels or ships heading to the occupied Palestinian territories, but it is simply not working.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is now seeking to target the other side of the Israeli occupation’s waters in the Mediterranean, which explains the strikes on Haifa, Ashdod and the Israeli regime’s natural reserves in the Mediterranean Sea.
Ansarullah-led Yemeni military and Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi are with surgical precision targeting the Zionist entity’s naval and maritime interests, which the Israeli regime depends on for a significant amount of its trade.
Haifa Port itself (on the Mediterranean) is believed to handle up to 90 percent of vital commodities entering the occupied Palestinian territories.
These operations are causing notable damage to the Israeli economy amid a sizeable drop in shipping activity in the regime’s ports with Israeli officials speaking about workers being furloughed.
The threat posed to the regime’s economy, at the moment, is bigger in the port of Eilat (on the Red Sea), which has been targeted on various occasions by the Yemeni military in recent weeks, who have also imposed an embargo on ships docking at the Israeli occupied Palestinian ports.
As much as the US and its now “poodle” vassal, Britain, insist that the resistance operations from Yemen and Iraq have nothing to do with the Israeli genocidal war on Gaza, the writing is on the wall.
Every statement put out by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq or the Yemeni armed forces mentions “our brothers in Gaza” and “our occupied land in Palestine”.
These resistance operations in solidarity with the oppressed people of Gaza, targeting the infrastructure of the illegitimate Zionist entity and American military assets in the region will continue unless three conditions are met.
An unconditional ceasefire in Gaza, humanitarian aid entering the besieged territory and the withdrawal of the Israeli military from the blockaded strip where the death toll now tops 26,500.
There is no coordination between the Yemeni military (Ansarullah) and the Hashd al-Sha’abi, this is simply strategic thinking by both sides, something Washington and Tel Aviv are lacking.
On October 8, when the Palestinian resistance launched an unprecedented operation, the United States lacked a coherent strategy for West Asia, choosing to focus on Russia and China instead.
More than 115 days later, as the ripple effects of the faith, determination, and power of the Axis of Resistance is slowly being digested in the White House, Washington’s strategy remains incoherent.
It has and can only resort to “precision strikes” as putting boots on the ground in Yemen or allowing those boots to leave their bases in Iraq will rubber stamp the end of Biden’s presidency.
It would be like Vietnam and Afghanistan put together but on steroids.
The attacks by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq against the Israeli occupation and the American occupation will not only persist but expand as the genocidal war on Gaza rages on.
The Zionists will feel this in their ports, vital naval sites and trade in the Mediterranean for as long as their indiscriminate attacks against the women and children of Gaza continue.
Does Hamas need help in defending Gaza?
The Palestinian resistance doesn’t have the air defense systems to protect Palestinian women and children from Israeli attacks. But still, Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups have been inflicting heavy losses on the regime’s military on ground zero.
Up to 80 percent of Hamas tunnels in Gaza are still intact despite months of Israeli attacks aimed at destroying them, according to a report by The Wall Street Journal, citing Israeli officials.
All that the Zionist regime has done is kill civilians and allow 2.3 million people to starve while the West, with the US in particular, has looked the other way.
That has prompted the resistance groups in the region to step up and help the oppressed Palestinians.
For Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi, Yemen’s Ansarullah, Lebanon’s Hezbollah or the Islamic Republic of Iran, support for Gaza and the people of Gaza is not a matter of public relations or goodwill. They consider it a moral and religious duty.
Wesam Bahrani is an Iraqi journalist and commentator.
‘Swarming’ the US in West Asia, until it folds
The US is so deeply mired in an unwinnable battle from the Levant to the Persian Gulf that only its adversaries in China, Russia, and Iran can bail it out.
By MK Bhadrakumar | The Cradle | January 29, 2024
Deterrence in defense is a military strategy where one power uses the threat of reprisal to preclude attack from an adversary, while maintaining at the same time the freedom of action and flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of challenges. In this realm, the Lebanese resistance, Hezbollah, is an outstanding example.
Hezbollah’s clarity of purpose in establishing and strictly maintaining ground rules that deter Israeli military aggression has set a high regional bar. Today, its West Asian allies have adopted similar strategies, which have multiplied in the context of the war in Gaza.
America, surrounded
While the Yemeni resistance movement Ansarallah is comparable to Hezbollah in certain respects, it is the audacious brand of defensive deterrence practiced by the Islamic Resistance of Iraq that is going to be highly consequential in the near term.
Last week, citing sources in the State Department and Pentagon, Foreign Policy magazine wrote that the White House is no longer interested in continuing the US military mission in Syria. The White House later denied this information, but the report is gaining ground.
The Turkish daily Hurriyet wrote on Friday that while Ankara is taking a cautious approach to media reports, it does see “a general striving” by Washington to exit not only Syria but the entire region of West Asia, as it senses that it has been dragged into a quagmire by Israel and Iran from the Red Sea to Pakistan.
Russia’s special presidential representative for the Syrian settlement, Alexander Lavrentiev, also told Tass on Friday that much depends on any “threat of physical impact” on American forces present in Syria. The swift US military exit from Afghanistan took place with virtually no advance notice, in coordination with the Taliban. “In all likelihood, the same may happen in Iraq and Syria,” Lavrentiev said.
Indeed, the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has stepped up its attacks on US military bases and targets. In a ballistic missile attack on Ain al-Asad airbase in western Iraq a week ago, an unknown number of American troops sustained injuries, and the White House announced its first troop deaths on Sunday when three US servicemen were killed on the Syrian-Jordanian border in strikes earlier that day.
Calling Beijing for help
This situation is untenable for President Joe Biden politically — in his re-election bid next November — which explains the urgency of the National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Friday and Saturday in Thailand to discuss the Ansarallah attacks in the Red Sea.
US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby explained Washington’s rush for Chinese mediation thus:
“China has influence over Tehran; they have influence in Iran. And they have the ability to have conversations with Iranian leaders that — that we can’t. What we’ve said repeatedly is: We would welcome a constructive role by China, using the influence and the access that we know they have…”
This is a dramatic turn of events. While the US has long been concerned about China’s growing sway in West Asia, it also needs that influence now as Washington’s efforts to reduce violence are getting nowhere. The US narrative on this will be that the “strategic, thoughtful conversation” between Sullivan and Wang will not only be “an important way to manage competition and tensions [between the US and China] responsibly” but also “set the direction of the relationship” on the whole.
Meanwhile, there has been hectic diplomatic traffic between Tehran, Ankara, and Moscow, as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Turkiye, and the moribund Astana format on Syria last week got kickstarted. Succinctly put, the three countries anticipate a “post-American” situation arising soon in Syria.
A US exit from Syria and Iraq?
Of course, the security dimensions are always tricky. On Friday, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad chaired a meeting in Damascus for commanders of the security apparatus in the army to formulate a plan for what lies ahead. A statement said the meeting drew up a comprehensive security roadmap that “aligns with strategic visions” to address international, regional, and domestic challenges and risks.
Certainly, what gives impetus to all this is the announcement in Washington and Baghdad on Thursday that the US and Iraq have agreed to start talks on the future of American military presence in Iraq with the aim of setting a timetable for a phased withdrawal of troops.
The Iraqi announcement said Baghdad aims to “formulate a specific and clear timetable that specifies the duration of the presence of international coalition advisors in Iraq” and to “initiate the gradual and deliberate reduction of its advisors on Iraqi soil,” eventually leading to the end of the coalition mission. Iraq is committed to ensuring the “safety of the international coalition’s advisors during the negotiation period in all parts of the country” and to “maintaining stability and preventing escalation.”
On the US side, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in a statement that the discussions will take place within the ambit of a higher military commission established in August 2023 to negotiate the “transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between Iraq and the United States.”
Pentagon commanders would be pinning hopes on protracted negotiations. The US is in a position to blackmail Iraq, which is obliged, per the one-sided agreement dictated by Washington during the occupation in 2003, to keep in the US banks all of Iraq’s oil export earnings.
But in the final analysis, President Biden’s political considerations in the election year will be the clincher. And that will depend on the calibration by West Asia’s resistance groups, and their ability to ‘swarm’ the US on multiple fronts until it caves. It is this ‘known unknown’ factor that explains the Astana format meeting of Russia, Iran, and Turkiye on January 24-25 in Kazakhstan. The three countries are preparing for the endgame in Syria. Not coincidentally, in a phone call last Friday, Biden once again told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “to scale down the Israeli military operation in Gaza, stressing he is not in it for a year of war,” Axios‘ Barak Ravid reported in a ‘scoop’.
Their joint statement after the Astana format meeting in Kazakhstan is a remarkable document predicated almost entirely on an end to the US occupation of Syria. It indirectly urges Washington to give up its support of terrorist groups and their affiliates “operating under different names in various parts of Syria” as part of attempts to create new realities on the ground, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives under the pretext of ‘combating terrorism.’ It demands an end to the US’ illegal seizure and transfer of oil resources “that should belong to Syria,” the unilateral US sanctions, and so on.
Simultaneously, at a meeting in Moscow on Wednesday between the Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev and Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the latter reportedly stressed that Iran-Russia cooperation in the fight against terrorism “must continue, particularly in Syria.” Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to host a trilateral summit with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts to firm up a coordinated approach.
The Axis of Resistance: deterrence means stability
Iran’s patience has run out over the US military presence in Syria and Iraq following the revival of ISIS with American support. Interestingly, Israel no longer abides by its “de-confliction” mechanism with Russia in Syria. Clearly, there is close US-Israeli cooperation in Syria and Iraq at the intelligence and operational level, which goes against Russian and Iranian interests. Needless to say, the backdrop of the imminent upgrade of the Russia-Iran strategic partnership also needs to be factored in here.
These developments are a vintage illustration of defensive deterrence. The Axis of Resistance turns out to be the principal instrument of peace for the issues of security that entangle the US and Iran. Clearly, there isn’t any method or any reasonable hope of convergence to this process, but, fortunately, the appearance of chaos in West Asia is deceiving.
Beyond the distractions of partisan argument and diplomatic ritual, one can detect the outlines of a practical solution to the Syrian stalemate that addresses the inherent security interests of the US and Iran that are embedded within an outer ring of US-China concord over the situation in West Asia.
Russia may seem an outlier for the present, but there is something in it for everyone, as the pullout of US troops opens the pathway to a Syrian settlement, which remains a top priority for Moscow and for Putin personally.
Israel loses control of its borders
By Khalil Harb | The Cradle | January 23, 2024
Israel once reigned supreme on the back of some immovable narratives: widely spun myths of a “promised land,” a “land without a people,” the “only democracy in the Middle East,” and the “only secure place for Jews in the world.” Today, those lofty soundbites lie in tatters, with the occupation state reeling from an unprecedented blow to its foundational ideas.
This transformation has unfolded with unexpected intensity since the 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood resistance operation and Israel’s devastating, genocidal war on Gaza.
But it is not just the challenge of narratives that has Israel on its back feet. For the first time in its 76-year history, Israel’s entire security calculations have been turned upside down: the occupation state is today grappling with buffer zones inside Israel. In past wars, it was Tel Aviv that established these “security zones” inside enemy territory — advancing Israel’s strategic geography, evacuating Arab populations near their state border areas, and fortifying its own borders.
This shift can be attributed to various factors, including vulnerabilities within the so-called “Arab Ring States” (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). Throughout its history, Israel has consistently exerted military and political dominance, enforcing security measures on neighboring states, with the unconditional backing of allies like the US and Britain.
Israel’s new border realities
But in this current war, Tel Aviv is slowly understanding that the equations and calculations of military confrontation have fundamentally changed — a process that began in 2000 when the Lebanese resistance, Hezbollah, forced Israel to withdraw from most occupied territories in southern Lebanon.
Today, Israel is horrified to find itself retreating from direct confrontation lines with its arch-enemies in Gaza and Lebanon. The formidable capabilities of the resistance now include drones, rockets, targeted projectiles, tunnels, and spanking new shock tactics, casting doubt on the feasibility of Israeli settlers remaining safe in any of Israel’s border perimeters.
There is now one common refrain among settlers in the north and south of occupied Palestine: “We will not return unless security is restored on the border.”
But prospects for their return appear elusive at present. The Israeli Defense Ministry, which pledged a swift and decisive war to safeguard its settlers over 100 days ago, is now actively devising plans to shelter approximately 100,000 people along the northern border, deeper inside its territory. This measure could involve evacuating settlements that may come under fire during any future military escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This situation implies three critical outcomes: any immediate return of settlers remains unlikely, additional evacuations are anticipated, and numerous Israeli families – in the interim – may establish permanent settlements in other, more secure locations at a much further distance from the borders with southern Lebanon and the Gaza envelope.
Failed objectives and the northern front
Preliminary reports from settler councils in the north assessed settler “displacement” to be around 70,000 in the initial weeks of the conflict. Subsequent reports, however, suggest a vastly higher figure of approximately 230,000.
Against this backdrop, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah emphasized a crucial point in his 3 January speech. He referenced Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s concern that Israelis are not only reluctant to reside in the border regions, but that their apprehension about remaining in any part of Israel will also likely rise if Tel Aviv’s war fails to achieve its stated objectives.
Indeed, since 7 October, a significant toll has been exacted on Israeli forces, with 13,572 “soldiers and civilians” wounded in the battles in Gaza and along the northern border with Lebanon, as reported by Yedioth Ahronoth.
One suspects those numbers may be underreported. Skepticism has recently grown over the accuracy of the Israeli Ministry of Health’s data, with various experts, independent sources, and media investigations suggesting a considerably higher casualty count. The IDF Handicapped Organization, for example, estimates that approximately 20,000 individuals have been disabled in the ongoing war — a number much higher than the health ministry’s findings.
The secrecy surrounding Israeli casualties is particularly evident on the Lebanese war front, where data is virtually nonexistent, and Tel Aviv’s military censorship tightly controls all information flows. This leads to a critical question regarding Israel’s ability to establish strategic “border” equations as a compensatory measure for what appears to be a military and political setback in achieving its stated war goals — which include the elimination of Hamas and the release of all captives.
Moreover, doubts arise about Israel’s capacity to wage a major war in the north given its clear shortcomings in its southern military campaign, in which it faced heavily besieged adversaries with multiple vulnerabilities. The Lebanese resistance, in comparison to its Gazan counterparts, boasts considerable and many unknown military capabilities, which it can exercise from within a sovereign state that is neither besieged nor landlocked. Furthermore, Hezbollah, which singlehandedly routed Israel from its territories in both 2000 and 2006 — makes it plain that it has thus far revealed and utilized only a fraction of its new military capabilities.
Decolonization in progress
In November, Hezbollah’s introduction of the Burkan missile, a domestically-made weapon with a range of up to 10 kilometers and destructive power of 500 kilograms of explosives, adds a potent dimension to the confrontation.
While Hezbollah has primarily targeted Israeli military barracks and troop gatherings with the Burkan, hundreds of guided missiles such as Kornet and Katyusha rockets have been employed with precision against specific targets within empty residential settlements, extending up to 10 kilometers in geographic depth from Lebanon’s border.
As of the onset of 2024, Hezbollah has conducted over 670 military operations against all 48 Israeli outposts, spanning from Naqoura in the west to the occupied-Shebaa Farms in the east, along with 11 rear military positions.
This is a major advancement in the Lebanese resistance’s border strategy. For 15 years — from 1985 to 2000 — Israel struggled to defend its “border strip” in southern Lebanon. Today, it faces many hundreds of attacks on its positions in northern Palestine, but fears opening a second war front that could complicate its already militarily draining Gaza campaign.
The so-called “defense” line along the border with Lebanon is now heavily compromised. Deemed insufficient for safeguarding the hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers in the north, the recently displaced residents are demanding assurances about the future safety of that zone and their ability to return.
In December, the head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council revealed that the Israeli government had effectively created a buffer zone approximately 10 kilometers wide by evacuating towns in the north. This area, stretching from Mount Hermon in occupied Syria to Ras al-Naqoura, is reported to be nearly devoid of residents, with Israeli forces predominantly present.
At the so-called Kibbutz Manara border, a settler told Hebrew Radio North that 86 of the settlement’s 155 homes had been completely destroyed by Hezbollah rocket fire, raising the question of whether settlers would even have homes to return to.
Even if Israel dares to launch a full-scale aggression against Lebanon, just as it has faltered in besieged Gaza for 17 years, it will not be able to guarantee its success in achieving its objectives on the Lebanese front.
A land of false promises
The days when Israel could impose security arrangements on its Arab neighbors through military force and political machinations are gone.
Previously, Israel attempted to establish a security strip inside southern Lebanon through operations like the 1978 “Litani Operation.” This vision ultimately collapsed in 2000, with the occupation state’s humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon.
Israel now seems to be revisiting this approach — via American intermediaries — aiming to clear the southern Litani of resistance factions by brandishing the threat of war against all of Lebanon. This is a perilous strategy, particularly given the precarious position of its army in Gaza.
Israel’s tactics of bulldozing and bombing entire residential areas in the northern and eastern parts of the Gaza Strip, ostensibly to create a security strip with a depth of up to 2 kilometers, have hit a hard wall. Even its US ally has raised objections about the territorial delineation from Gaza, and the military efficacy of such measures. But more importantly, the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance appear prepped to mirror Tel Aviv’s ploys by eliminating Israeli habitation in the Gaza envelope and northern Palestine.
‘Destroy our neighborhoods, and we will destroy yours.’ This is surely not a response expected by Israel, whose military and political leadership are unaccustomed to repercussions for their aggressions. This new tit-for-tat that the occupation state appears unequipped to counter only further highlights Israel’s fragility and irreversible decline.
Settlers refuse return to Gaza envelope: ‘Hamas not yet deterred’
The Cradle | January 19, 2024
Hebrew media reported on 19 January that tens of thousands of evacuated settlers from the Gaza envelope are refusing to return to their homes.
A former resident of the Sderot settlement, located less than a mile from Gaza, told Israel’s Channel 13 in an interview that settlers “will not return to Sderot in the current situation.”
This is “not only due to the threat of rockets … no one knows if the Palestinians from Gaza can reach us. No one knows where their tunnels extend to,” the settler said.
“I have been living in Sderot for years, and I cannot count the times they told us that Hamas is deterred.”
Sderot is one of the Gaza envelope settlements that was stormed by resistance fighters during the outbreak of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October. Rockets struck the settlement at the onset of the attack, as Palestinian fighters made their way in.
The Hamas fighters seized the Sderot police station, taking around 30 of its force as captives. The fighters then waged a 20-hour battle with Israeli troops in which all of the policemen were killed. The Israeli military then destroyed the station, bringing it down on top of those inside.
Since being evacuated in October, Sderot and other Gaza envelope settlements have continued to be hit by rocket attacks launched by the Palestinian resistance in Gaza.
According to Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, the Israeli government is facing great difficulty in convincing the residents of the Gaza envelope settlements to return to their homes.
Last month, Israeli public broadcaster KAN reported that Tel Aviv was offering financial grants to those willing to return to the settlements located between four and seven kilometers from the Gaza border.
A meeting was held between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the council chiefs of the Gaza envelope settlements on 16 January, according to a Channel 12 report.
The council chiefs reportedly demanded that “the process of returning … be delayed or extended until the summer and the start of the new school year, and for the state to continue to fund their stay in temporary accommodation until then,” The Times of Israel said.
Netanyahu also reportedly told the council chiefs during the meeting that the war could potentially continue until 2025.
“Netanyahu said he accepted their request, promised that financial assistance to residents would be applicable then as well, and instructed the relevant officials to draw up the necessary framework.”
Meanwhile, Hamas’ Qassam Brigades and other groups in Gaza are nowhere near defeat, continuing to engage the Israeli army in fierce clashes and deadly ambushes across the entirety of the Gaza Strip, including in north Gaza, where Israel has announced a scale-back of operations.
The scale-back came as Israeli officials were boasting that Hamas has been “dismantled” in the north. Despite this, the fighters have been able to fire large rocket barrages at Israel from northern Gaza.
Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, reporting on 19 January, cited sources in the Palestinian resistance who said that the Israeli ground operation has achieved nothing – particularly in the north. The report added that in the north, Hamas has been able to replenish its supplies and rebuild its ranks.
And just as the Israeli settlers of the Gaza envelope refuse to return to their homes, so too do the settlers of northern Israel, where hundreds of thousands have also been displaced by Hezbollah’s operations on the Lebanese border.
Asymmetric Warfare: Why the Houthis Can Beat the Collective West
By Russell Bentley – Sputnik – 14.01.2024
Dr. Michael Parenti once said, “Economic violence is physical violence in slow motion.” The economic sanctions against Iraq in the 1990’s led directly to the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. Economic sanctions can be a weapon as deadly as any artillery shell or cruise missile.
The Houthis might at first appear to be vastly outmatched by the US/UK armada that has struck Yemen, but militarily and economically, the US and Europe are actually much more vulnerable than the Houthis. To put it simply, in both economic and military terms, the US, UK and Europe, and Israel, have a lot more to lose.
The Houthis are not alone – Hezbollah, considered to be one of the most effective fighting forces in the world today, has an estimated 100,000 highly trained and motivated and very well armed soldiers in Lebanon, and is already at (undeclared, but de facto) war with Israel, and will probably escalate in the next few days. In October, 1983, Hezbollah was able to kill 305 US and French occupation soldiers at a cost of only 2 KIA on the Hezbollah side.
Of the US and French soldiers, 220 were US Marines, the greatest single loss in one day of US Marines since the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945. In the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, in which Israel invaded southern Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to inflict “unacceptable casualties” on Israeli forces, which resulted in the withdrawal of IDF forces and the signing of UNSC1701. While the Lebanese casualties were significantly higher than Israeli, the conflict is generally seen as a tactical and strategic defeat for Israel. Israel and their US/EU allies would do well to remember both of these battles before continuing to escalate an already extremely volatile situation beyond the point of no return.
Escalation between Hezbollah and the IDF on Lebanon’s southern border will not only expand the current area of conflict into the eastern Mediterranean, it can quickly become a serious threat to the Israeli city of Haifa, only 20 miles from the Lebanese border. Haifa is Israel’s 3rd largest city, with a population of around 300,000. The Port of Haifa is Israel’s second largest by cargo tonnage, and the Haifa oil refinery (the largest, and one of only two in Israel) processes more than 66 million barrels of crude oil per year, more than a million barrels per week. The port, and especially the refinery would be prime targets, and significant damage to either, especially the refinery, would have serious repercussions for the Israeli economy.
The “massive attack” by US/UK naval forces against the Houthis involved airstrikes, as well as approximately 100 cruise missiles, at a cost of more than $1 million each. According to reports published by the Houthi military command and Western media, the attack killed five Houthis. Now, do the math. The US and UK just spent a collective $100 million to kill 5 Houthis and escalate and exacerbate an already volatile situation. Based on assurances from the Houthi government that only Israeli-connected shipping was under threat, the majority of Red Sea shipping traffic had actually continued the Red Sea unhindered.
This is no longer the case. As of January 13th, after the US/UK attacks and their possible continuation, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), which represents almost 70 per cent of all internationally traded oil, gas and chemical tankers, said in an advisory to members to “stay well away” from the Bab al Mendab strait, and for vessels travelling south via the Suez Canal to pause north of Yemen. This major disruption of tanker traffic may well have an upward influence on oil prices, coming as it does right on the heels of Saudi Aramco’s announcement of a $2 per barrel discount beginning in February.
The Huthis don’t even have to shoot at any more ships – just the threat of the possibility of Houthi or coalition missiles being fired has been enough to disrupt Red Sea shipping traffic, which carries 12% of all global trade goods, and a staggering 30% of all container goods. It is actually the US/UK “coalition” that has escalated the situation to dangerous levels that now interfere with much more shipping, including tanker traffic.
Palestine: EU’s Borrell bats for US
BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | INDIAN PUNCHLINE | JANUARY 11, 2024
The diplomatic arena of the Middle East was dominated in the past week by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s regional tour to Türkiye, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the West Bank and Egypt. It was a ‘road show’ to rally the leaders of the Arab countries behind the US but culminated in an acrimonious meeting in the West Bank between Blinken and the Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas marred by “quarrels and arguments,” according to Sky News Arabia.
The region is gripped by angst that Israel may provoke a fateful expansion of the conflict in the Gaza Strip to Lebanon and Iran after the assassination of a number of senior military figures from Hamas and Hezbollah in the recent days, which overlapped Blinken’s presence in the region and underscored Tel Aviv’s disdain toward diplomatic niceties. Two videos from the West Bank showed Israeli troops shooting a 17-year-old boy and repeatedly running over the dead body of a man they had shot last Friday.
The US fears the expansion of the conflict in the Middle East. Yet, Blinken was burdened with the contradiction that the rhetoric of Washington’s continued support for the Israeli operation is so visibly at odds with the words of President Joe Biden last week that he was doing “quiet” work with the Israeli government “to get them to significantly reduce their presence and largely withdraw from the Gaza Strip.”
Blinken claimed that “the (Arab) countries agreed to work together to help the Gaza Strip stabilise, chart a political path for the Palestinians and work towards long-term peace, security and stability in the region.” At the same time, he conceded that to do this, it is necessary to end the conflict in Gaza and identify a concrete path to the creation of a Palestinian state. Blinken flagged that the countries of the region are still interested in normalising relations with Israel, but only on the terms of a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Arguably, these could be incipient signs of a road map emerging.
The killing of senior Hamas and Hezbollah officials indicates that Israel is not making significant progress on the battlefield and the leadership is under compulsion to gather ‘trophies’ and claim ‘victory’. In a hybrid war, such killings will not significantly weaken the resistance movement. An effective leader was appointed overnight to head the IRGC’S Quds Force when the legendary Iranian general Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in 2020.
That said, the probability of a direct conflict between Israel and Hezbollah should not be overestimated, since the latter is well aware that an outbreak of hostilities is precisely what suits Tel Aviv. Iran also sizes up Israel’s calculus to drag the US into the war. According to reports, Iran has supplied cruise missiles to Hezbollah.
Against such a tumultuous backdrop, in a carefully choreographed sideshow, the European Union’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell also appeared in the region at the same time as Blinken. Borrell’s destinations were Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The EU announcement said that Borrell’s mission “will be an occasion to discuss all aspects of the situation in and around Gaza, including its impact on the region, especially the situation at the Israeli-Lebanese border, as well as the importance of avoiding regional escalation and of sustaining the flow of humanitarian assistance to civilians.”
While speaking to the media in Beirut, Borrell was highly critical of Israel’s war in Gaza and called for a pause “that could become a permanent one.” He also said, “It is imperative to avoid a regional escalation. It is absolutely necessary to avoid Lebanon being dragged into a regional conflict.” Borrell saw his mission as one to take stock of the situation and “to contribute to a way out of the crisis.”
Borrell met with the Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) General Aroldo Lazaro, a compatriot from Spain. Indeed, there has been some talk of deploying a peacekeeping force on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reported, citing a government source in Beirut, that Borrell also had an unpublicised meeting with a delegation from Hezbollah led by Mohammad Raad, a member of the Lebanese legislature. Conceivably, this might have been a key item on his itinerary in Beirut.
While the US and several European countries, including Germany, the UK, Czech Republic, Austria, among others, regard Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, the EU restricted itself to merely adding Hezbollah’s so-called “military wing” to its terror list, leaving the door open to interact with the movement’s political leadership if need arises.
That came in the wake of the group’s alleged 2012 suicide bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian driver. During a debate on the crisis situation in Lebanon last July, the European Parliament, for the first time, adopted a resolution calling for the EU to add the whole of Hezbollah to its list of banned terrorist organisations, but that hasn’t yet been acted upon.
Borrell’s meeting with the Hezbollah delegation would only have been with the knowledge of the Biden administration — it could even be providing a thinkable (and actionable) leitmotif of Borrell’s trip to Lebanon. BBC had reported a week ago on secret contacts between Israel and Hezbollah as well.
At any rate, by a coincidence, Borrell happened to be in Saudi Arabia when Blinken arrived there, and the two of them had a meeting. Later, in a prepared statement to the media after talks in Saudi Arabia with foreign minister Prince Faisal, Borrell also took a nuanced stance apropos Hamas, saying,
“And now we have to stop the killing of civilians in Gaza. We have to stop this great number of casualties. Hamas has to be eradicated. But Hamas is an idea, it represents an idea, and you cannot kill an idea. The only way of killing an idea –- a bad idea — is to propose a better one, to give a horizon to the Palestinian people, to their dignity, to their freedom, to their security, which has to go hand in hand with the security of Israel.”
Clearly, Borrell strove to break the ice by engaging with Hezbollah. Considering that the EU has been the US’ junior partner on major international issues, Borrell’s mission can be considered as substantive aimed at opening a diplomatic track to ease the Israel-Lebanon border tensions.
Equally, Borrell and Prince Faisal rekindled the so-called Peace Day Effort launched in September last year jointly by the EU with Saudi Arabia, the League of Arab States, Egypt and Jordan as an initiative “to reinvigorate the peace process in the Middle East.”
A joint statement issued at that time on the sidelines of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, in the presence of almost fifty Foreign Ministers from around the world sought “to produce a “Peace Supporting Package” that will maximise peace dividends for the Palestinians and Israelis once they reach a peace agreement, … thus incentivising earnest efforts to reach it.”
As EU foreign policy chief, Borrell navigated international turbulence and divisions within the 28-member bloc to make Europe more united and turn it into a diplomatic heavyweight, but with patchy success. Of course, Ukraine spoiled the party. Palestine could well be Borrell’s last waltz. Borrell’s five-year term in Brussels ends in December.
Israel about to engage in two-front war
By Lucas Leiroz | January 9, 2024
In recent days there has been a major escalation in the Middle Eastern conflict. Israel has launched a series of attacks against targets outside Palestine, including Lebanon, resulting in the deaths of key members of anti-Zionist organizations. Israel’s targeted assassinations have been seen as an affront to Lebanese national sovereignty, increasing the risks of an open war between the Zionist state and Hezbollah.
Israel has been bombing its neighboring countries since the war began in October. However, the frequency and brutality of these raids has grown significantly in recent weeks. Lebanon has become one of the main targets of Israeli attacks, especially in strikes targeting strategic public figures. In one of these operations, Wissam al-Tawil, deputy head of the Radwan group, a special unit of the Shiite militia, was murdered. Al-Tawil was a high-ranking member of Hezbollah, which means there will certainly be a retaliation.
A few days earlier, a brutal Israeli attack in Beirut had left six high-ranking Hamas members dead, including the Palestinian organization’s deputy head, Saleh al-Arouri. At the time members of Hezbollah were not targeted, and the strike was aimed at killing Hamas militants gathered in Beirut. However, the fact that the attack was carried out on Lebanese soil obviously generated outrage among members of the Shiite militia, who promised retaliation for the violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
Hassan Nasrallah, general secretary of Hezbollah, made two statements about these events. According to him, Hezbollah is already fighting Israel, but is using only a small percentage of its combat potential. The militia’s involvement is “limited”, being focused on neutralizing Israeli intelligence targets on the border. For now, the objectives of these operations are, according to Nasrallah, to generate military pressure against Israel and help the Palestinians by eliminating IDF’s resources. However, Nasrallah made it clear that if Israel continues to violate Lebanese sovereignty, the group will launch a “war without restrictions”, using full power against Zionist troops.
Apparently, Israel is not interested in de-escalation. The attacks on Lebanon have continued even after Nasrallah’s warnings – and more targeted killings of Hezbollah members could happen at any time. In fact, Tel Aviv is currently in a complicated military situation. The war in Gaza has become “unwinnable”, as the debris from the bombings have severely damaged the IDF itself, preventing the flow of armored vehicles and creating a network of hiding places and barricades that favor Hamas.
There is currently a guerrilla war in Gaza, with members of the Palestinian Resistance having the advantage, as they know the terrain better and are skilled at carrying out surprise attacks and hiding among the debris of buildings and tunnel networks. Although Israel has managed to destroy the physical structure of Gaza, the consequences of its attacks have mainly affected civilian people and have not been extremely effective in neutralizing Hamas and other Palestinian militias. The result is an uncomfortable situation, with Israel involved in a permanent war of attrition.
Given this, Israel is betting on the internationalization of the conflict as a way of “winning” the war. Since it is not being successful in Gaza, the Israeli government hopes to generate new outbreaks of hostilities by launching attacks against Lebanon and Syria. The aim is to bring new actors into the war, creating a situation of total regional conflict that makes intervention by Israel’s Western partners “inevitable”.
The main problem with this Israeli “strategy” is that the consequences could be devastating. It will not be easy to garner Western support and justify an intervention in the conflict, as global public opinion is outraged by Israeli genocidal actions in Gaza. Furthermore, Hezbollah is showing patience and strategic mentality by avoiding symmetrical responses to Israeli attacks. The group is trying not to engage in an all-out war, as the IDF is already in a delicate situation and there is no need to open a new front. Hezbollah’s focus appears to be to launch surgical strikes across the border, delaying more involvement as long as possible.
To get a strong reaction from Hezbollah, Israel will have to further increase the brutality of its raids against Lebanon. And this will be a serious problem in the Zionist strategy, since by doing this Tel Aviv will be justifying Hezbollah’s reactions, and there will therefore be no legal arguments for the West to mobilize collectively to support Israel. In fact, without full Western support, Israel will not be able to fight a two-front war, being a real catastrophe for the IDF itself.
This is further evidence of how Israel took wrong actions at the beginning of the conflict. Instead of only responding to Hamas’ “Operation Al Aqsa Flood”, Tel Aviv chose to launch a campaign of genocide and territorial expansion, sinking into a prolonged war that will not be won so easily.
Lucas Leiroz is a journalist, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, geopolitical consultant.
You can follow Lucas on X (former Twitter) and Telegram.
Gaza destroys western divide-and-rule narratives
By Sharmine Narwani | The Cradle | January 4, 2024
It could be a clean sweep. Decades of western-led narratives crafted to exploit differences throughout West Asia, create strife amid the region’s myriad communities, and advance western foreign policy objectives over the heads of bickering natives are now in ruins.
The war in Gaza, it transpires, has blown a mile-wide hole in the falsehoods and fairytales that have kept West Asia distracted with internecine conflicts since at least the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Shia versus Sunni, Iran versus Arabs, secular versus Islamist: these are three of the west’s most nefarious narrative ploys that sought to control and redirect the region and its populations, and have even drawn Arab rulers into an ungodly alliance with Israel.
Facts are destroying the fiction
It took a rare conflict – uncooked and uncontrolled by Washington – to liberate West Asian masses from their narrative trance. Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza also brought instant clarity to the question of which Arabs and Muslims actually support Palestinian liberation – and which do not.
Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi resistance factions, and Yemen’s Ansarallah – maligned by these western narratives – are now visibly the only regional players prepared to buttress the Gaza frontline, whether through funds, weapons, or armed clashes that aim to dilute and disperse Israeli military resources.
The so-called ‘moderate Arabs,’ a misnomer for the western-centric, authoritarian Arab dictatorships subservient to Washington’s interests, have offered little more than lip service to the carnage in Gaza.
The Saudis called for support by hosting Arab and Islamic summits that were allowed to do and say nothing. The Emiratis and Jordanians trucked supplies to Israel that Ansarallah blockaded by sea. The mighty Egypt hosted delegations when all it needed to have done was to open the Rafah Crossing so Palestinians can eat. Qatar – once a major Hamas donor – now negotiates for the freedom of Israeli captives, while hosting Hamas ‘moderates,’ who are at odds with Gaza’s freedom fighters. And Turkiye’s trade with the Israeli occupation state continues to skyrocket (exports increased 35 percent from November to December 2023).
Palestine, for the pro-west ‘moderate Arabs,’ is a carefully handled flag they occasionally wave publicly, but sabotage privately. So, they watch, transfixed and horrified today, at what social media and tens of millions of protesters have made crystal clear: Palestine remains the essential Arab and Muslim cause; it may ebb and flow, but nothing has the power to inflame the region’s masses like this particular fight between right and wrong.
The shift toward resistance
It is early days yet in the battle unfolding between the region’s Axis of Resistance and Israel’s alliances, but the polls already show a notable shift in public sentiment toward the former.
An Arab barometer poll taken over a six-week period – three weeks before and three weeks after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation – provides the first indication of shifting Arab perceptions. Although the survey was restricted to Tunisia, the pollsters argue that the country is “as close to a bellwether as one could imagine” and that it represents views similar to other Arab countries:
“Analysts and officials can safely assume that people’s views elsewhere in the region have shifted in ways similar to the recent changes that have taken place in Tunisia.”
The survey results should be of paramount concern to meddling western policymakers: “Since October 7, every country in the survey with positive or warming relations with Israel saw its favorability ratings decline among Tunisians.”
The US saw its favorability numbers plummet the most, followed by West Asian allies that have normalized relations with Israel. Russia and China, both neutral states, experienced little change, but Iran’s leadership saw its favorability figures rise. According to the Arab barometer:
“Three weeks after the attacks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approval ratings that matched or even exceeded those of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed.”
Before 7 October, just 29 percent of Tunisians held a favorable view of Khamenei’s foreign policies. This figure rose to 41 percent according to the conclusion of the survey, with Tunisian support most notable in the days following the Iranian leader’s 17 October reference to Israel’s actions in Gaza as a “genocide.”


The Saudi shift
Prior to the 7 October operation by the Palestinian resistance to destroy the Israeli army’s Gaza Division and take captives as leverage for a mass prisoner swap, the region’s main geopolitical focus was on the prospects of a groundbreaking Saudi normalization deal with Tel Aviv. The administration of US President Joe Biden flogged this horse at every opportunity; it was seen as a golden ticket for his upcoming presidential election.
But Operation Al-Aqsa Flood ruined any chance for Saudi Arabia – home to Islam’s holiest sites – to seal that political deal. And with Israeli airstrikes raining down daily on Palestinian civilians in Gaza, Riyadh’s options continue to shrink.
A Washington Institute poll conducted between 14 November and 6 December measures the seismic shift in Saudi public sentiment:
A whopping 96 percent agree with the statement that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.”
Meanwhile, 91 percent believe that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” This is a shockingly unifying statement for a country that has adhered closely to western narratives that seek to divide Palestinians from Arabs, Arabs among themselves, and Muslims along sectarian lines – geographically, culturally, and politically.
Although Saudi Arabia constitutes one of the few Arab states to have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, favorable views of Hamas have increased by 30 percent, from 10 percent in August to 40 percent in November, while most – 95 percent – do not believe the Palestinian resistance group killed civilians on 7 October.
Meanwhile, 87 percent of Saudis agree with the idea that “recent events show that Israel is so weak and internally divided that it can be defeated some day.” Ironically, this is a long-stated Resistance Axis refrain. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was famously quoted as saying “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web,” upon its defeat by the Lebanese resistance on 25 May, 2000.
Prior to 7 October, Saudis had strongly favored economic ties with Israel, but even that number dropped dramatically from 47 percent last year to 17 percent today. And while Saudi attitudes toward the Resistance Axis remain negative – Saudi Arabia, after all, has been the regional epicenter for anti-Iran and anti-Shia propaganda since the 1979 revolution – that may be largely because their media is heavily controlled.
Contrary to the observations of the Arab masses, 81 percent of Saudis still believe that the Axis is “reluctant to help Palestinians.”
The Palestinian shift
Equally important to the discussion of Arab perceptions is the shift seen among Palestinians themselves since 7 October. A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in both the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip between 22 November and 2 December mirrors Arab views, but with some nuances.
Gazan respondents, understandably, displayed more skepticism for the ‘correctness’ of Hamas’ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which triggered Israel’s genocidal assault on the Strip in which over 22,000 civilians – mostly women and children – have so far been brutally killed. While support for Hamas increased only slightly in the Gaza Strip, it tripled in the West Bank, with both Palestinian territories expressing near equal disdain for the western-backed Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs from Ramallah.
Support for acting PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party was hit hard. Demands for his resignation are at nearly 90 percent, while almost 60 percent (the highest number recorded in a PSR poll to date in relation to this matter) of those surveyed want a dissolution of the PA.
Over 60 percent of Palestinians polled (closer to 70 percent in the West Bank) believe armed struggle is the best means to end the occupation, with 72 percent agreeing with the statement that Hamas made a correct decision to launch its 7 October operation, and 70 percent agreeing that Israel will fail to eradicate the Palestinian resistance in Gaza.
Palestinians have strong views about regional and international players, who they largely feel have left Gaza unprotected from Israel’s unprecedented violations of international law.
By far the country most supported by respondents is Yemen, with approval ratings of 80 percent, followed by Qatar (56 percent), Hezbollah (49 percent), Iran (35 percent), Turkiye (34 percent), Jordan (24 percent), Egypt (23 percent), the UAE (8 percent), and Saudi Arabia (5 percent).

In this poll, the region’s Axis of Resistance dominates the favorability ratings, while pro-US Arab and Muslim nations with some degree of relations with Israel, fare poorly. It is notable that of the four most favorable countries and groups for mostly-Sunni Palestinians, three are core members of the “Shia” Axis, while five Sunni-led states rank lowest.
This Palestinian view extends to non-regional international states, with respondents most satisfied with Resistance Axis allies Russia (22 percent) and China (20 percent), while Israeli allies Germany (7 percent), France (5 percent), the UK (4 percent), and the US (1 percent) struggle to maintain traction among Palestinians.

The numbers depend on the war ahead
Three separate polls show that Arab perceptions have shifted dramatically over Israel’s war on Gaza, with popular sentiment gravitating to those states and actors perceived to be actively supporting Palestinian goals, and away from those who are perceived to support Israel.
The new year starts with two major events. The first is the drawdown of Israeli reservists from Gaza, whether because Washington demands it, or due to unsustainable loss of life and injury to occupation troops. The second is the shocking assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri and six others in Beirut, Lebanon, on 2 January.
All indications are that Israel’s war will not only continue, but will expand regionally. The new US maritime construct in the Red Sea has drawn other international actors into the mix, and Tel Aviv has provoked Lebanon’s Hezbollah in a major way.
But if the confrontation between the two axes escalates, Arab perceptions will almost certainly continue to tilt away from the old hegemons toward those who are willing to resist this US-Israeli assault on the region.
There will be no relief for Washington and its allies as the war expands. The more they work to defeat Hamas and destroy Gaza, and the more they lob missiles at Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, and besiege the Resistance Axis, the more likely Arab populations are to shrug off the Sunni-versus-Shia, Iran-versus-Arab, and secular-versus-Islamist narratives that have kept the region divided and at odds for decades.
The swell of support that is mobilizing due to a righteous confrontation against the region’s biggest oppressors is unstoppable. Western decline is now a given in the region, but western discourse has been the first casualty of this war.
Israel’s Gaza withdrawal, a prelude to full-out war
By Hasan Illaik | The Cradle | January 4, 2024
At the start of the new year, Israel’s occupation army began implementing the withdrawal of a large portion of its forces from the northern Gaza Strip.
This withdrawal did not mean the end of the war on Gaza, and it certainly did not suggest calm on the Lebanese-Israeli front. On the contrary, reducing the pace of the war in the Gaza Strip increases the possibilities of an Israeli war on Lebanon.
The battles taking place between the occupation army and Hezbollah along the southern Lebanese border since 8 October, in support of the resistance in Gaza, have been increasing in intensity day after day.
Washington and Tel Aviv have sought to maximize pressure on Hezbollah by warning of the possibility of a large-scale war between Israeli forces and the Lebanese resistance. These tactics were in effect long before the assassination of Hamas’ Deputy Head of the Political Bureau Saleh Al-Arouri on 2 January by an Israeli air strike in Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut. The killing of Al-Arouri now increases the chance of the war expanding.
The third stage is coming
The first stage of Tel Aviv’s war was the mass destruction and occupation of northern Gaza; the second stage is the occupation of key points in the south of the Gaza Strip, where Palestinian civilians have flocked for safety. The current troop withdrawal from the territory’s north means that the Israelis are cementing their southern plans and preparing to move on to phase three: the long, low-intensity war.
As it enters the third stage, the occupation army intends to maintain a geographical buffer surrounding the northern Gaza Strip. It also plans to continue occupying the Gaza Valley area (central Gaza), while completing its operations in Khan Yunis in the south.
The fate of the Philadelphia axis – or Salah ad-Din Axis – a strip of land on the border between Gaza and Egypt which Israel wants to control, will be left to deliberations between Tel Aviv and Cairo. This is to ensure that incidents do not occur that lead to tension between the two parties, as well as to guarantee that refugees do not flow from the south of the Gaza Strip towards Sinai.
Israel’s ground withdrawal from northern Gaza is taking place primarily because the occupation army’s target bank has been depleted. All targets prior to the start of the war have been destroyed, and all new operational targets have been bombed.
Despite this, the Palestinian resistance continues to carry out operations against Israeli forces. These organizations remain relatively unscathed in the entire area of the northern Gaza Strip, which will increase the ability of the resistance to inflict losses on occupation ranks, now and in the future.
This clear Israeli loss – in terms of Tel Aviv’s stated war objectives – has been made evident by two basic factors: First, that the occupation army cannot ‘cleanse’ the northern Gaza Strip house by house or tunnel by tunnel, because this process will take years, expose more of its soldiers to danger, and cannot be implemented without further displacing the entire population of northern Gaza or massacring them. It should be noted, despite Israeli attempts to portray matters otherwise, that hundreds of thousands of civilians are still present in the north.
Second, the Israeli government needs to gradually re-inject reserve soldiers into the country’s economy to jump-start it, and to ensure that the productive sectors are not exposed to damage from which recovery will take a long time. This, despite the fact that the US and much of Europe appear ready to assist Israel’s economy, if necessary.
These measures are being taken because Israel has patently failed to achieve the two main goals of its war, namely, eliminating the Hamas-led resistance in Gaza, and liberating the Israeli prisoners captured by the resistance on 7 October.
There remains a basic motive that must be noted: The Israeli army is currently putting all its efforts into implementing a US decision to push the war from its first and second phases into the third phase before the end of January 2024. This requires the war to be managed at a slower boil, drawing less attention to Israeli carnage and the mass suffering of Palestinians.
After three months of brutalities, Washington has assessed the Israeli army as unable to eliminate the resistance or the possibilities of regional escalation, and has noted the significant harm caused to the US administration of Joe Biden as he enters the presidential primary season.
An escalation with Lebanon
As the Israeli occupation army moves to focus its operations on the southern Gaza Strip, the intensity of military operations along the Lebanese border between Hezbollah and the Israeli army has also been ratcheted up.
Hezbollah increased its targeting of occupation soldiers, both in their visible locations and inside the settlements of northern Palestine.
The information capabilities of Hezbollah have developed in both sophistication and accuracy during the past months. The Lebanese resistance fighters have employed missile types not previously utilized, which have a greater range and better destructive capacity than previous generations.
On the other hand, Tel Aviv has doubled the firepower it used in southern Lebanon. The Israelis continue to limit their operations to the area south of the Litani River, and are not expanding their scope except to target resistance groups that carry out strikes across the border. In recent weeks, the occupation army’s destructive power has risen dramatically since the early days of the battle.
By increasing its strikes, Israel’s leadership seeks to inflict the greatest possible number of losses among the ranks of the resistance fighters, as well as to spread panic among southern Lebanese residents – displacing more of them, and destroying the largest possible number of homes. This places a burden on both Hezbollah and the Lebanese state in the reconstruction process after the end of hostilities.
But there is a longer-term goal to this Israeli military performance. The government in Tel Aviv, according to its official statements, wants Hezbollah to withdraw from the south of the Litani, to ensure the security of Israeli settlers in northern Palestine who abandoned their homes, either voluntarily or under evacuation orders from their army. By some estimates, the number of Israelis fleeing their settlements in occupied north Palestine has reached more than 230,000 people.
In parallel with the public statements, messages began arriving in Beirut, from the US and from European capitals, demanding what they call ‘the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701,’ meaning Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the south of the Litani River.
According to emerging information, Tel Aviv is betting that Hezbollah will be deterred, as the 2019 economic collapse from which Lebanon has not yet recovered and the country’s long-running internal tensions are factors that will ultimately prevent Hezbollah from waging war.
Israel is therefore hoping that Hezbollah will yield to pressure and meet its demands regarding the withdrawal of its fighters from the border area with occupied Palestine.
The Israeli assessment of Lebanese affairs preceded its assassination of Al-Arouri in Beirut on 2 January. But in the same way that Israel military commanders and politicians have under-estimated and dismissed armed Palestinian resistance initiatives within occupied lands prior to 7 October, they continue to cling to a dated Israeli calculus that Hezbollah will never fully retaliate, or that it will only do so in a way that stops short of war.
Granted, Hezbollah does genuinely seek to limit the scope of the military confrontation, and has often pushed for a Gaza ceasefire to end hostilities throughout the region. Hezbollah is equally concerned about not disrupting the lives and livelihood of southern residents.
But while Hezbollah takes into account the complex political and economic Lebanese reality, it is not prepared to make concessions. Sources in the resistance axis say that Israel, as Hezbollah sees it, is not in a position to go to war with Lebanon when it cannot even compensate or digest the massive strategic losses it has incurred from Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
Despite its desire to not expand the war, Hezbollah has already begun to prepare for it. Hezbollah’s party statement, issued after the assassination of Al-Arouri, indicates this, and field measures and developments will begin to appear in time.
What Israel was unable to achieve in Gaza (restoring deterrence) while facing the tight ranks of the region’s Axis of Resistance, it will most certainly not be allowed to gain in Lebanon.
The first signs of this will appear in the plans that Hezbollah is expected to carry out in response to Israel’s 2 January raid on Dahiyeh to assassinate Al-Arouri – the first of its kind since August 2006 – and to which its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had previously threatened he would respond.
The bottom line is that Tel Aviv’s assessment of a war with Lebanon is based on its reading that Hezbollah wishes to prevent a major confrontation at any cost. Not only is this calculus wrong, but it has also muddled Israeli minds to the point where this may itself lead to the outbreak of a destructive war between the two sides.
Flooding Gaza’s Tunnels Is Proof the Final Solution Has Begun
By Declan Hayes | Strategic Culture Foundation | December 15, 2023
Asking an engineering friend of mine with almost 50 years’ experience of handling water what obstacles Israel would face with flooding Gaza’s tunnels (and drowning all therein), he said there were three main issues to consider.
The first of these is that the total head of water or height water has to be pumped above sea level but, as Gaza is fairly flat, he did not see that as being particularly problematic. The second issue he drew my attention to was the distance to be pumped from the sea. He imagines this can be overcome by arranging a series of pumps in a line with holding tanks spaced over the total distance, though a canal system might also work. Given that the Gaza strip is narrow, approximately 9 km wide on average, he did not see any big issues there. The third issue he drew attention to was the volume of water needed, which is obtained by multiplying the diameter of tunnels by their total lengths, and perhaps adding something extra “for luck”. That total volume would determine the number and size of pumps needed for the volume of the tunnels and the duration of the exercise.
Thus, once Israel secures the Gazan shoreline and installs the appropriate pumping material, it is game on, all the more so as such engineering feats should be well within the capabilities of the Israeli/American alliance. As Egypt previously flooded the tunnels to stop ISIS attacks in the Sinai, we can rest assured Israel and America will be more than competent for the job in hand.
As Al Mayadeen, Al Jazeera and other outlets have reported that the Israelis have already begun flooding some of the tunnels, we can regard that as a done deal. Because Israel and its American sidekick have had years to plan all this and they don’t give a damn for either the human or ecological damage they will cause, we can expect Christmas 2023 in Gaza to be literally hell on earth.
Although you can read more here, here, here, here, here and here from these military, academic, and media sites on the technical and tactical issues involved in flooding the tunnels, let me just draw your attention to these articles here and here about the various laws on genocide Israel is blatantly violating to state that none of that matters a damn, as Israel has made it plain time and again that it is not constricted by any laws of either God or man.
The scenes from Gaza are already post-apocalyptic, with Israel parading naked men about as human shields, whilst shell shocked children have limbs amputated with no anaesthetic by heroic surgeons Israeli snipers shoot at through hospital windows and other innocent children, who dreamed childish dreams about being doctors, vets or gamers are now gone, their lives expunged like cigarette butts under Israeli jackboots.
In a previous article about these war crimes, I compared the Israeli army to Hitler’s doomed Sixth Army, which found itself marooned in Stalingrad, fighting the wrong war in what infamously turned out to be the wrong place.
Another friend wrote to me that: I would have thought that the most obvious comparable situation would have been the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943, with Israel’s ‘defence’ minister Gallant playing the role of Jürgen Stroop, the Ordnungspolizei commandant, who boasted about clearing Warsaw of the ‘Jews and bandits,’ like Gallant speaking of ridding Gaza of ‘human animals’. In position papers, and in the public utterances of leading Israeli figures, it looks like the sheer violence of the Israeli response to the Oct’ 7th events, is to affect the ‘Final Solution,’ to the problem of Gaza. Not my words, but those of a Jewish member of the Knesset, critical of state policy towards the Palestinians. It now seems obvious that this ‘Final Solution’ will involve the forced expulsion of the entire Gaza population to the Egyptian controlled Sinai, with or without the cooperation of the client military regime in Cairo. I strongly suspect that plans drawn up years ago are now being put into effect, and notwithstanding world wide pro-Palestinian protests, it seems to me that this abominable plan will succeed, for it appears to have the tacit support of the U.S. and Western powers. What we may soon see is the largest forced exodus of people in either Europe or the Near East since 1945, since the forced departure of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. The numbers from Gaza alone will be three times those of the original Nabka in 1948.
My friend, sadly, makes his case well. Gaza’s final solution will soon be in full throttle and, as with the original Nakba, no one of consequence can or will do a thing about it. No one but Hezbollah perhaps?
Hezbollah are currently engaged in taking potshots at Israel’s Northern District, which is the only district of Israel, where the majority of inhabitants are Arabs. As the Lebanese border becomes more volatile, the Druze, who form 8% of the area’s population and who are the attack dogs of the Israelis, might have to reconsider their options.
Certainly, Hezbollah’s ability to hold the line in Southern Lebanon will give the Druze of Northern Israel and Southern Syria food for thought as I, for one, would not like Hezbollah gunning for me if I lived in the area and was vulnerable to attack from them. Although Hezbollah gave the ‘Christian’ militias a pass when they defeated those Israeli proxies in the Lebanese civil war, fools’ pardons can only be dished out so many times.
Hezbollah long ago decided that its main regional enemy was Israel and it was not going to allow itself to be unduly distracted by others sniping at its heels. The Druze of Northern Israel, now that they are fully within range of Hezbollah’s entire arsenal, might really want to reconsider how long more they should be the bitch of Israel, which has the same sort of moral standing Jürgen Stroop had following the Warsaw Uprising.
As regards East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the final solution is only a matter of time. As I type this, Israeli drones are terrorising the village of Taybeh, the last Christian town on the West Bank. Elsewhere, in towns like Jenin, the Israelis continue to kill and plunder as they please. Christians continue to get beaten up in Jerusalem’s Old City and it is only a matter of time before the Al Aqsa mosque falls, just as the mosque in Hebron was transformed at gunpoint into a synagogue.
Although truly legendary rock stars like Roger Waters are to be admired for calling all this out, it will take much more than an octogenarian guitarist to stop this ongoing carnage. If we are to use Stalingrad, Stroop and Waters’ father (martyred at Anzio) as our templates, then the answer can only be found in military resistance, coupled with an unbending consensus that Gallant, Biden, Netanyahu and all like them must go the way of Stroop and his leather-clad chums.
But dreaming for such a consensus is as childish as the dreams of being doctors, surgeons or vets that once sustained those martyred Gazan children. If there is to be peace this Christmas or any Christmas in the Holy Land, then it must be a case of out with the old and in with the new. Or, to put it more prosaically, the military, economic and diplomatic dominance of the United States and Israel must be shattered by forces that can accommodate the dreams of a life with dignity of whatever Gazan children beat the odds and survive their genocide.
And, though that might sound as childish as anything those martyred children might have said, it is the only way. Not only must Israel and the United States be upended but so too must every Hollywood spun narrative, bought, bribed or bullied politician, media hack or parasitic NGO or charity that ever helped sustain them, their endless lies and their serial racketeering.
Israel having difficulties and suffering losses both on land and sea
By Lucas Leiroz | November 20, 2023
It seems increasingly clear that the conflict in Palestine is not an easy task for Israel. In addition to the difficulties of advancing on the battlefield and the heavy losses that the IDF has suffered during clashes with Palestinian troops, defeats at sea are beginning to occur. Yemeni forces, who previously declared full support for Palestine, captured an important Israeli merchant ship, taking new hostages and improving the Palestinians’ bargaining power in the prisoner exchange negotiation process.
Undoubtedly, Israel is stronger than its adversaries in the current Palestinian war. Tel Aviv is a state with a complex and organized structure, having a regular national army and sufficient strength to defeat armed militias such as Hamas and many other Palestinian armed groups. The problem is that the fighting is not happening symmetrically, and, despite territorial advances, Israel is clearly suffering significant damages, which could generate great difficulties in the near future.
The Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, frequently announce the neutralization of Israeli soldiers and tanks. Several videos have been published on social media showing Hamas fighters using rockets and grenades against Israeli tanks and instantly disabling them. Confirming what had been predicted by analysts, Israel is having difficulty using its combat vehicles in an urban area full of debris. IDF’s bombings destroyed civilian buildings, making the ground in Gaza difficult terrain for tanks, which end up becoming an easy target for Hamas.
In the same sense, it is important to remember that Israel has not yet managed to enter the Hamas’ tunnels. The IDF claimed that the Palestinian Resistance was using Al Shifa Hospital and other civilian facilities as a human shield. With these excuses, several bombings were carried out against hospitals, but no bunkers were found. In practice, the IDF is unable to find the correct way to reach the enemy’s underground system. So, the bombings against civilians have really no strategic value.
However, the situation is complicated not only on the land battlefield. At sea, things are getting worse for the Zionist state, which is starting to suffer not only military but also commercial losses. On November 19, Yemen’s Houthi armed forces captured a major Israeli merchant ship in the Red Sea. The ship belongs to an Israeli businessman and was being operated by employees of German and Japanese companies on a voyage from Turkey to India.
Commenting on the topic on social media, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that the seizure was a response to the “heinous acts against our Palestinian brothers in Gaza and the West Bank”, adding that “if the international community is concerned about regional security and stability, rather than expanding the conflict, it should put an end to Israel’s aggression against Gaza”.
A number of 25 people were reported taken prisoner by the Houthis. None of the crew are believed to be Israeli citizens, which makes the case even more complicated. By capturing an Israeli vessel with foreign crew, the Houthis create a situation of diplomatic instability for Tel Aviv. Countries whose citizens have been captured will demand a quick and safe rescue operation, but this is almost impossible to be achieved by military means. Therefore, the bargaining power of the Palestinians is increased. To avoid a diplomatic crisis with the possible death of foreigners in a naval operation, Israel will have to agree to release Palestinian prisoners, withdraw militarily or meet any other request from the Yemenis.
All these factors lead Israel to diplomatically and militarily difficult circumstances. The IDF has to face long military attrition, heavy losses and, in parallel, Tel Aviv has great diplomatic and political instability. The Netanyahu government is the most harmed by this crisis as any of its actions turn against it. If Netanyahu increases attacks, he is criticized for human rights violations and fomenting war. If he reduces the intensity of the fighting, opponents call him a weak leader and incapable of achieving Israel’s objectives.
In parallel to all this, the chances of the conflict reaching an international level raise day by day. Recently, Hezbollah published a video on its social media with the message “We are coming”. This has generated expectations that the Lebanese militia’s troops will begin a full-scale attack soon. The group has been a de facto participant in the conflict since the beginning, using artillery and drones to destroy Israeli military and intelligence infrastructure on the border with Lebanon. Considering the massive military power of Hezbollah – apparently the largest non-state armed group in the world – the beginning of a land incursion would greatly harm Israeli plans.
Lucas Leiroz, journalist, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, geopolitical consultant.
