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Why Trump’s war on Iran will fail

By Tamer Ajrami | MEMO | February 27, 2026

The United States has turned the talks with Iran upside down. What is happening now does not look like serious negotiations. It looks more like a way to buy time and prepare for a more dangerous phase. That is why two questions matter: Why Trump’s war on Iran will not succeed, and why would it be a dangerous choice for Washington? The answer is simple. The demands Washington is putting on the table are designed to be rejected, and because any military action, if it occurs, will reveal the limits of force, the logic of exhaustion, and the absence of a clear or achievable goal.

All the talk about a deal, gaps, and loopholes continues to go around in circles. On the ground, the US is moving in a completely different direction: it is raising the bar in a way that ruins the talks from the inside and pushes things toward escalation.

Washington now says it has clear conditions. In reality, these conditions make any settlement almost impossible. The first demand is that Iran hand over all its enriched uranium directly to the United States. Not to a third country, not through an international mechanism, not through gradual reductions. Just hand it over to Washington. This is not meant to produce a balanced agreement. It is meant to humiliate a state and force it to give up a highly sensitive part of its sovereignty.

The second demand is even clearer: dismantle Iran’s nuclear facilities and destroy them completely, including major sites like Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, along with underground facilities hidden in mountains. The irony is that Washington and its allies do not have full certainty about what earlier strikes (12-day war, June 2025) actually achieved inside these deep facilities. So, the demand for dismantling and destruction looks like a political cover for the simple reality of what lies underground is not easy to reach.

On sanctions, the US offers no clear path. The talk is about lifting a limited set of sanctions imposed recently, while keeping the main sanctions in place under a long “test.” Has Iran truly surrendered, or is it only offering symbolic concessions? Then comes the most dangerous condition of all: the deal must be permanent, Iran must stop enrichment completely, and this must last forever. These are not terms for a fair agreement. They are terms of surrender.

That is why this round looks more like the round before war. The US military buildup in the region is still expanding, and the flow of aircraft, defence systems, and naval assets continues. Everyone is watching everyone through satellites. Almost nothing can be hidden. The real message is not in press statements. It is in the movements that create a new reality and make escalation feel closer than a settlement.

But if a strike happens, it will be full of risks. Even in the American media, one question keeps coming back: what exactly are Trump’s goals? Does he want a limited strike to force Iran into quick concessions? Does he want a wider campaign to bring down the regime? Or does he simply want to declare that he “destroyed” the nuclear program without being able to prove it? The problem is that these goals clash with each other, and each one requires different tools, different costs, and different timelines.

Time is part of the problem too. Some estimates suggest that the ability to keep up intense operations with the current level of forces may be limited. This connects with warnings about running down air defences and burning through advanced / expensive ammunition in a campaign that does not guarantee results. In other words, if war starts, it may quickly turn into a war of exhaustion. It is exactly the kind of fight Washington does not want.

If Iran can launch large waves of ballistic missiles, it can drain defensive stocks on US ships and at US bases in the region fast. Then comes the embarrassing question: how does the US keep fighting? And how does it stop without looking like it pulled back under fire? If Iran keeps firing while the US withdraws, the image inside America would be politically costly.

That is why the administration, based on what is being discussed in Washington, may look for a way to sell the war at home. One idea is for Israel to launch the first strike, and then for the US to step in later under the banner of “defending Israel”. That makes it easier to justify the intervention in Washington, because critics will face a ready-made slogan: we are defending an ally.

But on the ground, it is hard to separate who starts and who joins. US and Israeli forces operate in the same environment and in overlapping ways. The real difference is not in the sky. It is in the story Washington wants to tell its public.

Even if a strike happens, the main question remains: can airstrikes alone achieve big goals? Many analysts say hitting facilities becomes like a game of chasing a moving target. You destroy one site, it gets rebuilt. You hit a surface facility that was emptied beforehand. Equipment and materials are moved elsewhere. As for facilities buried deep in mountains, they remain a major problem. Access is not guaranteed, and photos alone cannot prove total destruction.

More importantly, a nuclear programme is not just concrete and steel. It is knowledge, technology, experience, and an industrial base. Even if part of it is damaged, Iran can repair it over time. Claims of “total destruction” therefore sound more like political messaging than a verifiable reality.

The missile program is an even bigger challenge. Iran produces missiles in large numbers and has the industrial and scientific base to rebuild its stock after any confrontation. Even if the US hits some production lines, wiping the program out completely would require long-term control on the ground and not just airstrikes.

Here is the truth that official speeches avoid: if Trump’s real goals are regime change, removing Iran’s missile power for good, or forcing “zero enrichment” forever, then airstrikes will not deliver that. Those goals require a major ground war and a long occupation. This then may bring huge losses, heavy costs, and years of deep involvement.

This would not serve the US at a time when competition with China is rising. Burning through advanced and expensive American capabilities in the Middle East without clear gains could give China a strategic advantage and push it to move faster on bigger priorities like Taiwan, while Washington remains stuck in a war with no clear ending.

There is also a constant operational risk in any large air campaign: an aircraft could be shot down, a pilot could be captured, or a major incident could happen in a sensitive strait. One such event can turn a limited strike into a wider war, and shift the focus from negotiating nuclear issues to negotiating prisoners and political humiliation.

So, Washington faces two costly paths: a full-scale war it does not have the political tools to sustain, or airstrikes that will not achieve the announced goals but could open the door to further escalation. In both cases, negotiations become a temporary cover while the region moves toward a dangerous test of power and its limits.

The bottom line is this: raising demands to the level of humiliation does not lead to an agreement. It pushes the other side toward rejection and then toward preparation for confrontation. When talks become terms designed to fail, they do not prevent war. They delay it to a moment chosen by Washington; after the battlefield is prepared and the political story is already written.

In the end, the problem is not that Washington has less power. The problem is that it is pursuing goals that are bigger than its tools. Airstrikes do not topple regimes, erase nuclear know-how, and do not end a missile program that can be rebuilt. The higher the US raises its demands, the more it closes the door to diplomacy and the closer the drift toward confrontation.

If war begins, it may quickly become a costly fight with no clear ending: defenses get drained, rare munitions get burned, markets shake, and bases come under attack. Then an unsolved question will rise inside the US: how do we end this without political defeat? Failure becomes likely because the goals cannot be achieved by bombing alone. And the danger is huge, because escalation may spiral beyond control. In a war like this, Washington might win a round in the air, but lose the bigger game on the ground.

February 27, 2026 Posted by aletho | Militarism, Wars for Israel | Iran, Israel, United States | Comments Off on Why Trump’s war on Iran will fail