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Fidel Castro’s War on Jewish Mobster Meyer Lansky

How a Jewish gangster helped build—and then lost—Cuba’s Sin City

José Niño Unfiltered | March 21, 2026

For more than two decades, Meyer Lansky built what he believed would be his permanent kingdom in the Caribbean. The Jewish gangster from New York’s Lower East Side had transformed Havana into the gambling capital of the Western Hemisphere, a glittering playground where American tourists could indulge every vice under the protection of a dictator on the mob’s payroll. Then came Fidel Castro, a young Catholic revolutionary from the Cuban countryside who would destroy everything Lansky had built in a matter of weeks.

Their conflict was never personal. The two men likely never met or spoke. But the collision between Lansky’s criminal empire and Castro’s revolutionary movement would reshape Cuba, spawn assassination plots that entangled the CIA, and leave a trail of consequences that echoes into the present day.

More than half a century later, as Washington once again toys with the idea of remaking Cuba’s political order, the ghost of Meyer Lansky’s Havana hangs over every discussion of regime change: the dream of turning the island back into a glittering casino colony has never fully died.

Meyer Lansky entered the world as Maier Suchowljansky on July 4, 1902, in Grodno, a city in the Russian Empire that now belongs to Belarus. His family was part of the vast population of Eastern European Jews who migrated to America in the early 20th century. In 1911, Lansky emigrated with his mother and brother Jacob through the port of Odessa, joining his father Max, who had arrived two years earlier and settled first in Brownsville, Brooklyn. The family later moved to the Lower East Side of Manhattan, where Max worked in the garment industry and young Meyer grew up among the crowded tenements where Yiddish filled the streets and opportunity meant whatever you could grab with your own hands.

Young Meyer found his opportunities in crime. By 1918 he and his friend Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel were running floating dice games on the streets. They graduated to auto theft, then burglary, and when Prohibition arrived, they plunged into the liquor smuggling trade that would make fortunes for a generation of gangsters. Lansky also befriended Charles “Lucky” Luciano, an Italian immigrant who would become one of the most powerful mob bosses in American history.

The three young men rose together. Lansky and Siegel developed a squad of killers for hire that became the prototype for Murder, Inc. Lansky allegedly persuaded Luciano to arrange the 1931 assassination of mob boss Joe “The Boss” Masseria, a murder that consolidated power and helped establish the National Crime Syndicate between 1932 and 1934.

What set Lansky apart from the gunmen and enforcers around him was his financial chops. He became known as the “Mob’s Accountant,” the man who used Swiss bank accounts and shell companies to launder the Mafia’s wealth and hide it from federal investigators. He oversaw the syndicate’s finances as its unofficial banker and was instrumental in shifting the mob’s focus from bootlegging to gambling after Prohibition ended in 1933. His gambling operations stretched from Florida to New Orleans to Las Vegas.

But Lansky’s grandest ambition lay 90 miles off the coast of Florida.

Building the Havana Empire

Lansky’s relationship with Cuba began in 1933, the same year Prohibition ended, and a young military strongman named Fulgencio Batista seized control of the island nation. Lansky pitched Batista a proposal to open Mafia-owned casinos and nightclubs in Havana. The arrangement was straightforward. Batista and his inner circle would receive regular payments from the mob, and in return the gangsters could operate without interference from Cuban authorities.

By 1938, Lansky had been formally invited to help clean up and professionalize Havana’s gambling operations, which had been plagued by fixed races and crooked dealers. He was the fixer, the man who could make the casinos run honestly enough to keep the tourists coming back.

The landmark event came in December 1946 with what became known as the Havana Conference. More than 20 mob bosses from across the United States gathered at the Hotel Nacional de Cuba for a meeting organized by Lansky on Luciano’s orders. The expansion of mob operations in Cuba sat at the top of the agenda. Lansky then visited Batista, who was temporarily out of power and living in Florida, and urged him to return to Cuba to fulfill their grand plans.

Batista obliged. He returned to power through a military coup in 1952, and the arrangement with the mob became even more lucrative. The Batista-Lansky Alliance, included a deal where Batista agreed to match dollar for dollar any hotel investment over one million dollars, with each project automatically including a casino license. Casino hotels were exempted from Cuban taxes.

Lansky owned or held financial interests in at least three major gambling operations. The crown jewel was the Habana Riviera, which opened in December 1957 as the largest Mafia-owned hotel casino outside Las Vegas. It featured 440 rooms that were booked solid for its first winter season. Cuban development banks subsidized half of the $14 million construction cost.

But Lansky did not build this empire alone.

The Inner Circle

Jake Lansky, Meyer’s brother, served as his most trusted man on the ground in Cuba. Jake managed the casino at the Hotel Nacional, Cuba’s most prestigious hotel. By spring 1957, it was reportedly bringing in as much cash as the biggest casinos in Las Vegas.

Joseph “Doc” Stacher was a lifelong Lansky associate dating back to their youth in Newark, New Jersey. Born Gdale Oistaczer in Letychiv, in what is now Ukraine, Stacher was also Jewish and had risen through the criminal ranks alongside Lansky. He operated as the official bribe paymaster to Batista, managing the corrupt payments that kept the dictator and his inner circle cooperative.

Norman “Roughhouse” Rothman was another mobster deeply embedded in the Havana gambling scene. He was a close associate of Santo Trafficante Jr. and operated casinos in Havana, most notably the Sans Souci. Cuba’s slot machine concessions were controlled by Roberto Fernandez y Miranda, Batista’s brother-in-law and army general, who held them as a personal fief.

Ed Levinson, a longtime Lansky associate, ran illegal gambling operations from the Midwest to Kentucky. In Cuba, Levinson’s name appeared on the casino license for the Habana Riviera itself. Lansky kept his own name listed only as the hotel’s kitchen director while Levinson served as the official licensee.

Dino Cellini, though Italian-American rather than Jewish, worked hand in glove with the Lansky operation. He served as casino manager at the Habana Riviera before being replaced by Frank Erickson, and was later detained alongside Jake Lansky at the Tiscornia immigration camp after Castro took power.

The operation also included powerful Italian-American mobsters. Santo Trafficante Jr., the Tampa crime family boss, openly operated the Sans Souci nightclub and the Casino Internacional at the Hotel Nacional. He was also suspected of having behind-the-scenes interests in the Habana Riviera, the Tropicana Club, the Sevilla-Biltmore, the Capri Hotel Casino, the Commodoro, the Deauville, and the Havana Hilton.

The Revolutionary in the Mountains

While Lansky counted his profits in Havana’s glittering casinos, a revolutionary movement was gathering strength in the mountains of eastern Cuba.

Fidel Castro came from a background that could not have been more different from Lansky’s. Born on August 13, 1926, near Birán in Oriente Province, Castro was the son of a prosperous Spanish immigrant landowner. He was raised Catholic and educated at Jesuit schools in Santiago de Cuba and Havana, including the prestigious Colegio de Belén. He studied law at the University of Havana beginning in 1945, earned his degree in 1950, and briefly practiced as a lawyer before turning fully to revolutionary politics. Where Lansky had clawed his way up from immigrant poverty through criminal enterprise, Castro came from rural privilege and channeled his ambitions into armed struggle against the Batista regime.

Castro’s 26th of July Movement directly targeted the Mafia’s presence in its propaganda. In 1958, the revolutionaries denounced the mobsters in radio broadcasts from their guerrilla redoubt in the Sierra Maestra, accusing them of turning Havana into a center of commercialized vice through gambling, prostitution, and drugs. The casinos, the brothels, the drugs, the corruption that enriched Batista and his American gangster partners would all be swept away when the revolution triumphed.

The Fall

On December 31, 1958, Batista’s army was defeated at the Battle of Santa Clara. That night, Batista fled the country for the Dominican Republic, abandoning his gangster partners along with everything else. Lansky left Cuba on January 7, 1959, the day before Castro marched into Havana.

What happened next was a settling of accounts that played out in the streets of Havana. On January 1, 1959, citizens took to the streets after hearing news of Batista’s flight, ransacking casinos, smashing slot machines, and dragging gambling equipment into the streets to be burned. To many Cubans, the American-owned hotels symbolized a corrupting foreign influence. At the Riviera, Lansky’s crown jewel, campesinos (peasants) reportedly brought a truckload of pigs into the lobby. Castro vowed to “clean out all the gamblers.” The revolutionary government eventually nationalized the Riviera and all other Mafia-owned properties, though the final nationalization of hotel casinos did not come until October 1960. Some casinos briefly re-opened on February 19, 1959, after casino workers who depended on tourism jobs marched to the presidential palace demanding their livelihoods back, but tourists stopped coming. Lansky, who told many associates that Cuba had ruined him financially, looked to other outposts in the Caribbean and South America.

Not everyone fled immediately. Jake Lansky and Dino Cellini were arrested by Cuban authorities in May 1959 and detained at the Tiscornia immigration camp outside Havana, the same facility where Santo Trafficante Jr. was also being held. According to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger had sent a list of suspected drug traffickers to Cuban authorities that included both Jake Lansky and Cellini. Jake Lansky and Cellini were detained for approximately 25 days before being released; Trafficante was held until August. All eventually left Cuba.

By October 1960, Castro formally nationalized all hotel casinos on the island and outlawed gambling entirely.

Revenge and Assassination Plots

Lansky did not merely accept his losses. He actively sought to use the U.S. government and its intelligence apparatus to reclaim his Cuban empire.

According to Doc Stacher, Lansky “indicated to the CIA that some of his people who were still on the island might assassinate Castro” and was “quite prepared to finance the operation himself.”

This was not Lansky’s first collaborative effort with American intelligence. During World War II, he had served as a key intermediary in Operation Underworld, a classified program in which the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence enlisted the Mafia to counter Axis sabotage on the northeastern seaboard. That wartime relationship established a precedent for cooperation between organized crime and the U.S. government.

In August 1960, according to a report by Salon, Lansky struck a deal with exiled Cuban politician Manuel Antonio Varona, offering him several million dollars to form a Cuban government-in-exile to replace Castro. Lansky also promised to arrange a public relations campaign to polish Varona’s image, with the single-minded objective of reopening the Mafia’s casinos, hotels, and nightclubs in a post-Castro Cuba.

Around the same time, the CIA formally recruited mobsters with deep ties to the Havana gambling operations into plots to eliminate Castro. In September 1960, the agency enlisted Chicago Mob operative Johnny Rosselli through former FBI agent Robert Maheu. Rosselli brought in Chicago boss Sam Giancana and Tampa boss Santo Trafficante Jr. The CIA created poison pills to be slipped into Castro’s food, but the attempts failed. The CIA-Mafia assassination partnership was scuttled in early 1963, though the CIA continued plotting against Castro through other means.

Norman Rothman’s trajectory after the revolution was particularly dramatic. Before the revolution succeeded, Rothman had actually been running guns to Castro’s rebels alongside Joe Merola and the Mannarino brothers of Pittsburgh. Sam Mannarino had reasoned that if Castro won, the mobsters who helped arm him would be in the driver’s seat for Cuba’s gambling industry. Rothman advised Mannarino to place his bets on Castro, predicting he would allow the casinos to remain under Mafia control. When that calculation proved disastrously wrong, the scheme unraveled. The weapons in question, 317 guns, had been stolen from a National Guard armory in Canton, Ohio. A plane carrying 121 of the stolen weapons was captured at Morgantown, West Virginia on November 4, 1958. Rothman was convicted on February 4, 1960, along with five co-defendants, for possession, receiving, transportation, and exportation of firearms stolen from the United States government.

Lansky also explored contingency plans in case Cuba could not be recovered. He traveled to the Dominican Republic in 1958 to meet with dictator Rafael Trujillo about potentially relocating the entire Havana operation there. None of these schemes succeeded.

The Final Years

Lansky spent his final years living quietly in Miami Beach. In 1970, facing federal tax evasion charges, he fled to Israel, hoping to claim citizenship under the Law of Return. But after two years, Israel rejected his bid for permanent residency due to his criminal record and deported him back to the United States, where he was arrested at Miami International Airport.

He was acquitted of the tax evasion charges, in part because the government’s main witness lacked credibility, and other indictments were abandoned due to his chronic ill health. He died on January 15, 1983, at age 80 from lung cancer. Despite nearly half a century of involvement in organized crime, the most serious conviction he ever received was for illegal gambling in 1953, which resulted in only a brief jail term.

Despite a lifetime running one of the world’s most profitable criminal enterprises, a granddaughter later claimed he left behind just $57,000 in cash. The FBI believed he had hidden at least $300 million in offshore bank accounts, but this money was never recovered. His heirs later filed a compensation claim against Cuba for the Riviera with the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, valuing the property at $70 million.

The mob never returned to Cuba. The casinos that Lansky built were nationalized, and gambling was outlawed entirely. The slot machines that crowds smashed in the streets on New Year’s Day 1959 were never replaced. The Habana Riviera still stands on the Malecón waterfront, declared a National Monument in 2012 and now managed by the Spanish chain Iberostar, still maintaining its original 1950s style. Staff members still refer to it as “el hotel de Meyer Lansky.”

Fidel Castro outlived Meyer Lansky by more than three decades, dying in 2016 at age 90. The revolutionary who had vowed to clean out all the gamblers kept that promise, at least regarding the foreign mobsters who had turned Havana into their personal playground.

The confrontation between these two men, the Jewish gangster from the Lower East Side and the Catholic revolutionary from Oriente Province, ended decisively in Castro’s favor.

Castro’s revolution did what no rival gangster or corrupt strongman ever managed: it toppled the dictatorship that shielded Lansky’s operations and erased his Havana casino empire almost overnight. In the name of sovereignty, the new regime shut down the glittering hotels and gambling halls that had turned Cuba into a playground for American tourists, mafiosi, and intelligence services alike.

But the pressures now bearing down on Cuba suggest that history’s wheel is turning back toward Lansky’s original blueprint. A successful regime change engineered from abroad would not simply “liberate” the island; it would open prime waterfront real estate and tourist infrastructure to the same forces of vice, speculation, and foreign ownership that once made Havana the mob’s favorite casino.

The danger is that Cuba’s next great transformation would replace revolutionary austerity not with genuine self‑determination, but with a return to what Lansky always wanted. Namely, a Caribbean Macau where the house is global finance, the chips are Cuban sovereignty, and the people of the island are once again reduced to serving drinks on someone else’s casino floor.

March 21, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on Fidel Castro’s War on Jewish Mobster Meyer Lansky

Washington’s War on Cuba Is Older Than You Think

By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | March 18, 2026

Not distracted by the war on Iran, on March 3, President Donald Trump, once again, warned that Cuba was in its “last moments.” The next day, he said, “It may be a friendly takeover. It may not be a friendly takeover. It wouldn’t matter because they are down to, as they say, fumes” before admitting that the United States has caused a humanitarian disaster in Cuba.

Trump’s rhetoric has continued to escalate. On March 17, Trump said,  “I do believe I will be having the honor of taking Cuba. Taking Cuba. I mean, whether I free it, take it. I think I can do anything I want with it. They’re a very weakened nation right now.” The Trump administration is reportedly pursuing a policy of removing  President Miguel Díaz-Canel from power while keeping in place his government. They have communicated to Cuba that no deal can be negotiated while he is leader.

The U.S. has cut Cuba off. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has said that he is “extremely concerned about the humanitarian situation in Cuba” and warned that it “will worsen, if not collapse,” if the U.S. does not ease its chokehold. But as the humanitarian catastrophe unfolds, while the world largely watches on, there are three enduring American myths about Cuba that need to be obliterated.

The Trump administration has cut Cuba off from its energy lifeline: “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA – ZERO!,” Trump pronounced. “I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.” With that threat, Trump declared a “national emergency” and signed an executive order imposing tariffs on any country that sends oil to Cuba. “Now there is going to be a real blockade. Nothing is getting in. No more oil is coming,” the U.S. Charge d’Affairs in the U.S. Embassy in Havan told his staff.

And, with the exception of a trickle of aid from Mexico and the promise of a drop of aid from Canada, nothing is getting in. “There’s no oil, there’s no money, there’s no anything,” Trump boasted. There is no longer enough oil in Cuba to guarantee your car, generator or hot water will run. There is not enough electricity to keep the lights on. Classes have been cancelled at many schools, and many hospitals have cut services. Tourism, the economic lifeblood of Cuba, is drying up. Cuba has announced that international airlines can no longer refuel there due to fuel shortages. On Monday, a “complete disconnection” caused a blackout across all of Cuba.

The American embargo has gotten so successfully out of hand that, after the leaders of Cuba’s Caribbean neighbors expressed alarm over the suffering of Cubans, the U.S. has relented a little and now says it will loosen some restrictions and let some Venezuelan oil into Cuba.

Foundational to the American embargo on Cuba are three myths that need to be undermined. The hostility to Fidel Castro and Cuba has been going on longer than expressed in the official narrative. The hostility was not originally about communism. And the intent of the embargo has always been to starve the Cuban people.

The hostility toward Cuba stretches back two years and one administration further than told in the official narrative. Though the embargo, the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose’s determination to assassinate Castro are all attributed to John F. Kennedy, they all need to be deposited in President Dwight D Eisenhower’s foreign policy account.

Though it would be Kennedy who would water the seed that locked Cuba down, the seed was planted two years earlier by Eisenhower who, on January 25, 1960, suggested the U.S. Navy “quarantine” Cuba. Eight months later, he  banned all U.S. exports to Cuba except food and medicine. It would be left to Kennedy to implement the full embargo, and Lyndon Johnson to include food and medicine. In the official narrative, the embargo is associated with Kennedy, but its origins are older, going back to the very beginning of the story. Castro overthrew the Batista dictatorship on January 1, 1959. He was sworn in as prime minister on February 16, 1959. Already by January of the next year, Eisenhower had proposed the embargo.

Like the embargo, Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs are forever linked in the official narrative. But that too stretches back to the Eisenhower years. Right from the start, in the earliest days after the revolution, the CIA had nominated its operative Jake Esterline, who had helped carry out the coup against Guatemala’s Jacobo Árbenz, to plan the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA plan to invade Cuba is dated December 6, 1960. Kennedy would not be inaugurated until forty-five days later.

Castro’s death sentence was also signed in Washington much earlier than recorded in the official narrative. It was October 1959, according to CIA expert John Prados, that Eisenhower “approved measures” that led to the “secret war,” included grooming opposition leaders in Cuba and encouraging raids by Cuban exiles on Cuba from the United States. Eisenhower had already ordered a covert action on Castro by March 17, 1960.

But the decision to assassinate Castro goes back even earlier than that. “[K]ey officials in the Eisenhower administration reached… a clear determination to bring about Castro’s demise” by the summer of 1959, only months after Castro came to power, according to William LeoGrande and Peter Kornblum in their book, Back Channel to Cuba. Overthrowing Castro was the official secret policy of the United States by October. On November 5, according to LeoGrande and Kornblum, that plan was approved by Eisenhower. On December 11, 1959, according to CIA expert Tim Weiner, Allen Dulles, Eisenhower’s CIA director, gave the go-ahead for Castro’s “elimination.” Dulles changed “elimination” to “removal from Cuba.” Stephen Kinzer reports that on May 13, 1960, after being briefed by Dulles, Eisenhower ordered Castro “sawed off.”

All of this took place earlier than told in the official narrative and long before Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, which, headed by his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and run by the experienced and notorious CIA operative Edward Lansdale, made assassinating Castro “the top priority in the United States Government.” Robert Kennedy told Lansdale and the Operation Mongoose team that “all else is secondary—no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.”

The second myth is that hostility toward Cuba was born out of the requirement to keep communism out of the hemisphere. But Washington was hostile to Castro before Castro was a communist. When the U.S. placed Castro in its crosshairs, he was neither aligned with the Soviet Union nor openly communist at all. At this time, Castro’s program of social reforms was neither radical nor communist. In America, América: A New History of the New World, Greg Grandin records that “[t]he CIA called Castro’s agenda ‘the common stock of Latin American reformist ideas’: land reform, housing, health care, education, control over natural resources, and national sovereignty.”

In the early years of the Cuban revolution, Castro sought friendly relations with the United States. What the U.S. opposed was not communism in its backyard, but an alternative political and economic model in its backyard that could prove attractive to other countries in the hemisphere.

To preserve its hemispheric hegemony, the U.S. has erased any attractive alternative that could encourage other countries in America’s backyard to copy what Noam Chomsky has called Cuba’s “successful defiance.” The alternative the U.S. has feared most are forms of nationalism in which the leader defiantly nationalizes land and resources so the wealth benefits, not a foreign power, but the people who live on that land. It was Castro’s nationalistic policies and agrarian reforms that put him in the United States’ sites.

Castro nationalized land, redistributing it from large farms—including American owned farms—to the Cubans. Grandin says that when the large American oil companies refused to process oil sent to Cuba by the Soviet Union, Castro nationalized their refineries too.

The problem with Castro wasn’t communism, it was a model of government that offered an attractive alternative to the American model and American hegemony. As internal State Department documents had said about Arbenz in Guatemala half a decade earlier, the concern was the contagious “example of independence of the US that Guatemala might offer to nationalists throughout Latin America,” and that that example “might spread through the example of nationalism and social reform.” That is why Eisenhower called his embargo a “quarantine.”

The U.S. had this concern about Castro from the first minutes. Observing Castro after the revolution but before he had even been sworn in as leader, Grandin records CIA operative Esterline, soon to be of the Bay of Pigs, warning that Castro was “something different, something more impressive.” He said a “chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power” and described “a new and powerful force… at work in the hemisphere.”

Communist or not, the contagious alternative had to be erased. And as far back as it goes, the embargo that was meant to erase it always had as its deliberate intent the starvation of the Cuban people. That is the third truth.

When Eisenhower first proposed his quarantine of Cuba, he adopted the policy, he said, because “If they are hungry, they will throw Castro out.” Explaining how sanctions would work, Eisenhower’s assistant secretary of state for Latin America said, as Grandin reports, that the sanctions were intended to bring down “real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.” The embargo was a deliberate policy of bringing about regime change through hunger. And it still is. On February 16, Trump told reporters that Cuba “should absolutely make a deal, because it’s really a humanitarian threat.”

The official American narrative on its Cuba policy is a myth. To alter the narrative from mythology to history so policy decisions can responsibly be made, three truths need to be told. American hostility to Cuba has been going on longer than commonly believed. That hostility was not originally about communism. And the intent of the embargo has always been to bring about regime change by starving the Cuban people.

March 18, 2026 Posted by | Book Review, Timeless or most popular | , , | Comments Off on Washington’s War on Cuba Is Older Than You Think

40 Years of Endless War, Data Point by Data Point

By Tom Elliott | The Libertarian Institute | March 11, 2026

Dinosaur GenXers like me recall that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the foreign policy set was busy asking how the United States would cash its forthcoming “peace dividend,” whether NATO would fold up shop having achieved its ostensible purpose, and maybe whether we were entering “the end of history”? How short-sighted. Instead, the pace of war-fighting from the 1950s (the original “peace dividend”), to the 1990s increased by a multitude of twelve. See my chart below.

Overall, the United States has engaged in 481 total military engagements since 1798—287 of them since 1989 (60% of total). We’re only six years into the 2020s and it’s already at 34 and on pace to hit ~57 by decade’s end, which would make it the second-busiest decade in U.S. history behind the 1990s. U.S. servicemen have fought in 102 countries For those keeping score, here’s a list of more than 110 military conflicts since 1989:

  • January 1989, Libya: Two U.S. Navy F-14s shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean after the Libyan planes showed hostile intent.
  • May 1989, Panama: President George H.W. Bush deployed ~1,900 troops to Panama after General Manuel Noriega disregarded the results of the Panamanian election.
  • September 1989, Colombia/Bolivia/Peru: The United States sent military advisers and Special Forces teams to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help combat drug producers and traffickers.
  • December 1989, Philippines: U.S. fighter planes from Clark Air Base helped the Corazon Aquino government repel a coup attempt, and one hundred marines were sent to protect the U.S. embassy in Manila.
  • December 1989, Panama: President George H.W. Bush ordered a full-scale military invasion of Panama to protect American citizens and bring General Manuel Noriega to justice; all forces withdrew by February 1990.
  • August 1990, Liberia: A reinforced rifle company was sent to secure the U.S. embassy in Monrovia and helicopters evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.
  • August 1990, Saudi Arabia: President George H.W. Bush ordered a massive forward deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
  • January 1991, Iraq/Kuwait: U.S. forces commenced combat operations against Iraqi forces in Iraq and Kuwait under a United Nations coalition; combat was suspended on February 28, 1991.
  • May 1991, Iraq: U.S. forces entered northern Iraq to provide emergency relief to Kurdish populations facing Iraqi government repression.
  • September 1991, Zaire: U.S. Air Force transports carried Belgian and French troops into the region and evacuated American citizens after widespread looting and rioting in Kinshasa.
  • May 1992, Sierra Leone: U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone after a military coup overthrew the government.
  • August 1992, Kuwait: The United States began military exercises in Kuwait following Iraqi refusal to recognize its new United Nations-drawn border and cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors.
  • September 1992, Iraq: President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. participation in enforcing a no-fly zone over southern Iraq and aerial reconnaissance to monitor Iraqi cease-fire compliance.
  • December 1992, Somalia: President George H.W. Bush deployed U.S. forces to Somalia as part of an American-led United Nations task force to address a crisis the Security Council deemed a threat to international peace.
  • January 1993, Iraq: U.S. aircraft shot down an Iraqi plane in the no-fly zone, and coalition forces attacked missile bases in southern Iraq in multiple strikes through mid-January.
  • January 1993, Iraq: President Bill Clinton continued the Bush policy on Iraq, with U.S. aircraft firing at Iraqi targets after sensing radar or anti-aircraft threats directed at them.
  • February 1993, Bosnia: The United States began airdropping relief supplies to Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces in Bosnia.
  • April 1993, Bosnia: U.S. forces joined a NATO operation to enforce a United Nations ban on unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  • April-May 1993, Iraq: U.S. planes bombed or fired missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft sites that had tracked U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones.
  • June 1993, Somalia: The U.S. Quick Reaction Force participated in military action against a Somali factional leader who attacked United Nations forces, with continued air and ground operations through the following months.
  • June 1993, Iraq: U.S. naval forces launched cruise missiles against Iraqi Intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for an alleged assassination attempt on former President George H.W. Bush.
  • July-August 1993, Iraq: U.S. aircraft fired missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft sites and bombed an Iraqi missile battery displaying hostile intent.
  • July 1993, Macedonia: 350 U.S. soldiers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of a United Nations force to maintain stability in the former Yugoslavia.
  • October 1993, Haiti: U.S. ships began enforcing a United Nations embargo against Haiti.
  • February 1994, Bosnia: The United States expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts in former Yugoslavia, with sixty aircraft available for NATO missions.
  • March 1994, Bosnia: U.S. planes patrolling the no-fly zone shot down four Serbian Galeb planes.
  • April 1994, Bosnia: U.S. warplanes under NATO command fired on Bosnian Serb forces shelling the United Nations safe city of Gorazde.
  • April 1994, Rwanda: Combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Burundi to conduct potential evacuation of American citizens from Rwanda amid widespread fighting.
  • April 1994, Haiti: U.S. naval forces continued enforcing the United Nations embargo around Haiti, having boarded 712 vessels since October 1993.
  • August 1994, Bosnia: U.S. aircraft under NATO attacked Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone at the request of United Nations forces.
  • September 1994, Haiti: President Bill Clinton deployed 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy, later increasing to 20,000.
  • November 1994, Bosnia: U.S. combat aircraft under NATO attacked Serb bases used to assault the Bosnian town of Bihac.
  • March 1995, Somalia: 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Mogadishu to assist in withdrawing United Nations forces from Somalia.
  • May 1995, Bosnia: U.S. fighter aircraft continued enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, with ~500 troops deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of United Nations peacekeeping.
  • September 1995, Bosnia: U.S. aircraft participated in major NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces threatening United Nations safe areas, flying roughly three hundred sorties on the first day alone.
  • December 1995, Bosnia: President Bill Clinton ordered ~20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of NATO’s Implementation Force to enforce the Dayton peace agreement, with ~12,000 more in support roles across the region.
  • April 1996, Liberia: U.S. military forces evacuated American and third-country nationals from Liberia after security deteriorated, and responded to attacks on the embassy compound.
  • May 1996, Central African Republic: U.S. forces deployed to Bangui to evacuate American citizens and government employees and secure the U.S. embassy.
  • December 1996, Bosnia: President Bill Clinton authorized ~8,500 U.S. troops to participate in NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) follow-on force in Bosnia to deter resumption of hostilities.
  • March 1997, Albania: U.S. forces evacuated government employees and citizens from Tirana, Albania, and enhanced embassy security amid civil unrest.
  • March 1997, Congo/Gabon: A standby evacuation force deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for Americans and prepare for possible evacuation from Zaire.
  • May 1997, Sierra Leone: U.S. military personnel deployed to Freetown to evacuate U.S. government employees and citizens.
  • July 1997, Cambodia: ~550 U.S. military personnel deployed to Thailand for possible emergency evacuation of American citizens from Cambodia during civil conflict.
  • June 1998, Guinea-Bissau: A standby evacuation force deployed to Senegal to evacuate Americans from Guinea-Bissau after an army mutiny endangered the U.S. embassy.
  • August 1998, Kenya/Tanzania: U.S. military personnel deployed to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to provide disaster assistance and enhanced security after terrorist bombings of both U.S. embassies.
  • August 1998, Albania: Two hundred marines and ten Navy SEALs deployed to the U.S. embassy in Tirana to enhance security against reported threats.
  • August 1998, Afghanistan/Sudan: President Bill Clinton authorized airstrikes against Osama bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and facilities in Sudan in response to the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
  • September 1998, Liberia: Thirty U.S. military personnel deployed to augment embassy security in Monrovia and provide evacuation capability amid political instability.
  • December 1998, Iraq: The United States and United Kingdom conducted Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign against Iraqi facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other military targets.
  • 1998-2001, Iraq: American and coalition forces conducted ongoing military operations against the Iraqi air defense system in response to threats against aircraft enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones.
  • March 1999, Yugoslavia: U.S. forces, in coalition with NATO, commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to its campaign of violence and repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
  • April 1999, Albania: President Bill Clinton ordered ~2,500 additional troops and heavy weapons to Albania to enhance NATO’s air operations against Yugoslavia.
  • May 1999, Yugoslavia: Additional U.S. aircraft and several thousand more personnel deployed to support NATO’s ongoing operations against Yugoslavia.
  • June 1999, Kosovo: ~7,000 U.S. troops deployed as part of the ~50,000-member NATO-led security force (KFOR) in Kosovo after the end of the air campaign.
  • October 1999, East Timor: U.S. military forces deployed to support a United Nations multinational force aimed at restoring peace to East Timor, including the USS Belleau Wood and marines.
  • October 2000, Yemen: After a terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, U.S. military security and disaster response personnel deployed to secure the ship and respond to the incident.
  • September 2001, Global: Following the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush ordered combat-equipped forces to multiple nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas to prevent and deter terrorism.
  • October 2001, Afghanistan: U.S. forces began combat operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban in direct response to the September 11 attacks.
  • September 2002, Cote d’Ivoire: U.S. military personnel entered Cote d’Ivoire to evacuate American citizens and third-country nationals from the city of Bouake during a rebellion.
  • 2002, Philippines: ~600 combat-equipped U.S. personnel deployed to the Philippines to train, advise, and assist Filipino forces in enhancing counterterrorism capabilities.
  • 2002, Georgia/Yemen: U.S. combat-equipped forces deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of their armed forces.
  • March 2003, Iraq: President George W. Bush directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations against Iraq on March 19 as part of a coalition to disarm Iraq, launching a war whose duration was unknown at the time.
  • June 2003, Liberia/Mauritania: Roughly thirty-five combat-equipped troops deployed to Monrovia to augment embassy security and enable possible evacuation, with additional forces sent to Mauritania.
  • August 2003, Liberia: ~4,350 combat-equipped U.S. personnel entered Liberian waters to support United Nations and West African efforts to restore order in Liberia.
  • 2003-ongoing, Djibouti: American combat-equipped and support forces deployed to Djibouti to enhance counterterrorism capabilities and support operations against international terrorists in the Horn of Africa.
  • February 2004, Haiti: Roughly fifty-five combat-equipped troops deployed to Port-au-Prince to augment embassy security during an armed rebellion.
  • March 2004, Haiti: Roughly two hundred additional combat-equipped troops deployed to Haiti to prepare for a United Nations Multinational Interim Force, eventually growing to ~1,800 personnel.
  • 2004-2005, Iraq: The United States maintained over 135,000 troops in Iraq as part of the Multinational Force, rising to ~160,000 by late 2005.
  • July 2006, Lebanon: Combat-equipped helicopters and military personnel deployed to Beirut to evacuate American citizens and designated personnel during the security crisis.
  • 2007-ongoing, Somalia: The U.S. military took direct action against members of al-Qaida and al-Shabaab engaged in planning terrorist attacks against the United States.
  • 2007-2011, Afghanistan: U.S. forces grew from ~25,900 to a peak of ~99,000, pursuing al-Qaida and Taliban fighters as part of both ISAF and separate U.S. operations.
  • 2009-ongoing, Yemen: The U.S. military worked with the Yemeni government to eliminate the threat from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), resulting in direct action against operatives and senior leaders.
  • March 2011, Libya: U.S. military forces launched strikes against Libyan air defenses and military targets to enforce a United Nations-authorized no-fly zone and protect civilians from Gaddafi’s forces.
  • April-October 2011, Libya: After transferring lead to NATO, U.S. support continued with intelligence, logistics, and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against defined targets until the mission ended in October.
  • October 2011, Central Africa: Roughly one hundred combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to advise regional forces working to remove Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony.
  • January 2012, Somalia: U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a rescue operation in Somalia, freeing kidnapped American Jessica Buchanan and Danish national Poul Hagen Thisted.
  • September 2012, Libya/Yemen: Combat-equipped security forces deployed to Libya and Yemen after the attack on the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.
  • February 2013, Niger: Roughly one hundred U.S. military personnel deployed to Niger with weapons for force protection to support intelligence collection and share intelligence with French forces operating in Mali.
  • April-June 2013, Jordan: Up to seven hundred combat-equipped U.S. troops deployed to Jordan for training exercises and remained at the request of the Jordanian government amid the Syrian Civil War.
  • December 2013, South Sudan: U.S. forces evacuated embassy personnel from Juba, and a follow-on evacuation mission near Bor was curtailed after the aircraft came under fire.
  • June 2014, Iraq: President Obama deployed 300 military advisers to Iraq to assess and counter the threat from ISIL, with subsequent deployments growing to over 5,200 by late 2014.
  • August 2014, Ukraine: A dozen U.S. troops from European Command deployed to Kiev to help investigate the downing of Malaysian airliner MH17 that killed 298 people.
  • August 2014, Poland: Six hundred soldiers deployed to Poland as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve to reassure NATO allies in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.
  • October 2015, Cameroon: Roughly three hundred U.S. military personnel deployed to Cameroon to conduct airborne ISR operations against the Islamist militant group Boko Haram.
  • June-September 2016, Iraq: An additional 1,160 U.S. troops deployed to Iraq to assist in the fight against ISIL, including preparation for the offensive to retake Mosul.
  • July 2016, South Sudan: Up to two hundred combat-equipped U.S. forces prepositioned in Uganda and deployed to protect the U.S. embassy after deadly fighting erupted in Juba.
  • October 2016, Yemen: U.S. forces conducted missile strikes on Houthi-controlled radar facilities in Yemen after threats to U.S. naval vessels, destroying the targets.
  • January 2017, Europe: 3,500 soldiers with tanks and heavy equipment from the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Poland, marking the start of continuous armored brigade rotations in Europe.
  • March 2017, Syria: Roughly four hundred Marines and Army rangers deployed to Syria to assist in the fight against the Islamic State.
  • October 2017, Niger: Four U.S. servicemembers were killed and two wounded during an advise-and-assist mission in Niger when their patrol was ambushed.
  • December 2017, Iraq/Syria: The Pentagon reported 5,200 U.S. troops in Iraq and 2,000 in Syria, with numbers trending down as the fight against ISIS progressed.
  • April 2018, Syria: President Donald Trump directed American, French, and British forces to strike Syrian chemical weapons research, development, and production facilities.
  • February 2018, Afghanistan: The U.S. Army’s first Security Force Assistance Brigade deployed to Afghanistan to train and advise Afghan National Security Forces.
  • September 2019, Saudi Arabia: Roughly two hundred U.S. support personnel with Patriot batteries and Sentinel radars deployed to augment air and missile defenses after attacks on Saudi oil facilities.
  • May-June 2019, Middle East: The United States deployed ~14,000 additional forces to the CENTCOM area, including carrier strike groups, Patriot batteries, and additional troops in response to escalating tensions with Iran.
  • December 2019, Baghdad: Roughly one hundred marines deployed to reinforce security at the U.S. embassy after it was attacked, followed by ~750 troops from the 82nd Airborne as an Immediate Response Force.
  • January 2020, Kuwait: An additional 2,800 troops from the 82nd Airborne deployed to Kuwait, bringing the total rapid deployment to ~3,500 in response to the Baghdad embassy attack and regional tensions.
  • February 2020, Africa: The U.S. Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade deployed to Africa to train and assist African forces and better compete with Russia and China.
  • 2019-2020, Syria: After President Donald Trump announced a full withdrawal from Syria in December 2018, the United States reversed course and maintained roughly four hundred troops in the country.
  • February 2022, Romania/Poland/Germany: Roughly three thousand troops deployed to Romania, Poland, and Germany as Russia built up forces on Ukraine’s border, eventually growing to over 100,000 U.S. personnel across Europe.
  • March-September 2022, Europe: Successive waves of additional forces deployed across Europe including aerial refueling, air support, logistics, and combat units in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • May 2022, Somalia: President Joe Biden authorized a small, persistent U.S. military presence in Somalia to advise and assist local forces, reversing the prior episodic deployment model.
  • June 2022, Europe: President Joe Biden announced long-term force posture increases across Europe including additional destroyers in Spain, F-35s in the United Kingdom, a rotational brigade in Romania, and a permanent corps headquarters in Poland.
  • April 2023, Sudan: U.S. forces evacuated roughly one hundred American personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum amid armed conflict, coordinating with allies including Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia.
  • October 2023–February 2024, Iraq/Syria: Iran-backed militias attacked American bases over sixty times; the United States conducted retaliatory strikes on IRGC-linked facilities in eastern Syria and Iraq.
  • November 2023–ongoing, Red Sea/Yemen: Houthi rebels began attacking commercial shipping and U.S. naval vessels; the United states launched Operation Prosperity Guardian (a multinational naval coalition) in December 2023.
  • January 2024–January 2025, Yemen: Operation Poseidon Archer—United States and United Kingdom conducted sustained air and cruise missile strikes against Houthi targets, totaling 774 airstrike events.
  • April 2024, Israel/Iran defense: U.S. forces helped defend Israel during Iran’s first direct missile/drone attack.
  • November 2024, Israel/Iran defense: United States again assisted Israel defending against a second Iranian attack.
  • March–May 2025, Yemen: Operation Rough Rider—Trump escalated strikes significantly against Houthi bases, radar, air defenses, and launch sites. Ceasefire brokered by Oman in May.
  • June 2025, Iran: U.S. forces struck Iranian nuclear sites and defended Israel during a third Iran-Israel conflict.
  • September 2025–ongoing, Caribbean/Pacific: U.S. military began striking alleged drug trafficking boats using MQ-9 Reapers and AC-130 gunships—over thirty-two strikes killing over 115 people as of December 2025. USS Gerald R. Ford redeployed to Caribbean for Operation Southern Spear.
  • December 2025, Nigeria: U.S. bombed ISIS targets in Sokoto state in coordination with the Nigerian government.
  • Late 2025, Venezuela: Escalating maximum pressure campaign culminating in the reported capture of Maduro in January 2026.
  • January–February 2026, Middle East buildup: Largest U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq invasion.
  • February 28, 2026, Iran: Operation Epic Fury launched — joint American-Israeli strikes hitting 1,700+ targets in seventy-two hours, targeting nuclear facilities, missile sites, navy, and regime leadership. Forty-eight senior Iranian leaders killed. Seven U.S. service members killed in retaliatory strikes.

March 11, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on 40 Years of Endless War, Data Point by Data Point

Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

By Lucas Leiroz | February 24, 2026

In recent days, Mexico has made headlines worldwide due to the increase in internal violence in the country. After the local government launched an offensive against drug trafficking and eliminated a major criminal leader, the country’s main drug cartel began a series of attacks against state forces, killing several soldiers and civilians, destroying military equipment and infrastructure.

The combat capacity of the criminal forces is surprising world public opinion, but little has been said about how the professionalization of organized crime in Mexico is directly related to the current situation in the Ukrainian conflict.

The wave of violence began after the Mexican government launched a special operation against the Jalisco Cartel. Using police and military troops and with broad support from the army, state forces eliminated Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, better known as “El Mencho,” identified by experts as the leader of the Jalisco Cartel.

The action was praised by the international press, as well as by US authorities, such as Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who called the operation a “great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world” – thus easing months of tensions between the US and Mexico, which had been escalating since Donald Trump’s inauguration.

“I’ve just been informed that Mexican security forces have killed ‘El Mencho,’ one of the bloodiest and most ruthless drug kingpins. This is a great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world (…) The good guys are stronger than the bad guys,” Landau said.

However, the operation was quickly met with extreme violence by the criminals. Police officers began to be hunted down in the streets in various regions of the country, mainly in the suburbs of Jalisco. Cartel members blocked roads, attempting to prevent basic supplies from moving in the country. Photos and videos circulate on the internet showing scenes of extreme violence in the streets of Jalisco, where police officers, soldiers, and innocent civilians were indiscriminately murdered by the criminals.

These photos and videos are also surprising internet users by revealing the true level of combat power of Latin American cartels. It’s possible to see in the images soldiers armed with heavy weaponry and wearing modern and sophisticated tactical uniforms. At first glance, anyone would think those men were officers of the Mexican army, but they are just members of local cartels.

It has long been known that Mexican cartels – and Latin American cartels in general – have become rapidly and dangerously professionalized. These criminal organizations in Mexico already possess access to complex equipment such as armored vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, suicide drones, and grenade launchers, as well as various types of short- and medium-range rockets. The criminals also frequently use flamethrowers, landmines (both anti-tank and anti-personnel), and other advanced military equipment.

It is regularly stated by various experts that in Mexico, cartels have already acquired a combat capability superior to that of regular police and military forces. This is a natural consequence of the fact that these organizations have acquired considerable financial power over time – with their funds being equivalent to the GDP of some small countries – which guarantees the possibility of acquiring military equipment on the black market.

However, there is a factor being ignored in the Western media coverage of the case: Ukrainian influence. Since the beginning of the conflict, thousands of Latin American mercenaries have fought for the Kiev regime. When they survive the harsh fighting against Russian forces, these criminals return to their countries and pass on the knowledge and experience acquired on the battlefield to their partners.

Over time, Mexican cartels (as well as Colombian and Brazilian cartels) have created a systematic scheme for sending their members as mercenaries to Ukraine, which has allowed for rapid military professionalization and the acquisition of combat experience for these criminals, giving them an advantage against state forces – which act according to laws that restrict the use of force and lack war experience.

Several reports have been published by specialized websites showing that Mexican criminals are using techniques learned in Ukraine. In images of current hostilities, it is even possible to see the Ukrainian flag on some uniforms and armored vehicles of the criminals. Also, the use of drones has become one of the main specialties of the drug traffickers, largely learned during the Ukrainian conflict – in which drones are an essential factor in the dynamics of combat.

To solve the problem, the Mexican state will need to do much more than simply eliminate a cartel leader. “Decapitation” attacks don’t work in the long term because criminals quickly recruit new leaders from within their ranks. It is necessary to confront the ranks of criminals in the long term, with constant military attrition, in addition to destroying the drug production and transportation infrastructure used by criminals.

On the other hand, it will also be necessary to create measures to cut off the source of knowledge and military equipment that supplies organized crime in Mexico. Sophisticated intelligence operations must be established to sever contact between local cartels and the Kiev regime, arresting mercenaries and neutralizing arms smuggling – since it is known that many Western weapons sent to Ukraine end up in the hands of these criminals, further increasing their fighting power.

If Mexico is not efficient in addressing this problem, there will be a much deeper crisis in the country, considering the American interest in expanding its regional interventionism using the excuse of “anti-trafficking operations.” Trump himself does not rule out the possibility of using force on the Mexican side of the border in an “anti-terrorist operation.”

Obviously, this is just an excuse to defend American interests abroad, but the only way Mexico can disrupt US plans is precisely by being efficient in combating crime alone or with the support of countries genuinely interested in the same objective. Naturally, the Mexican government should seek Russian support, since it is in Moscow’s interest to neutralize the international ties of the Kiev regime, including arms trafficking and the recruitment of mercenaries.

February 24, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

US Caribbean Buildup Near $3B — Report

Sputnik – 15.02.2026

The US military surge around Venezuela that culminated in the military aggression and abduction of President Nicolas Maduro is approaching a $3 billion price tag, Bloomberg reported.

Bloomberg calculations show the deployment at its peak cost more than $20 million a day, with as much as 20% of the US Navy’s surface fleet tied up in the region. Former Pentagon comptroller Elaine McCusker estimated that Operation Southern Spear has “probably cost about $2 billion since August 2025,” excluding intelligence and targeting expenses.

The White House has said the operation did not cost taxpayers extra because the forces were already deployed. But experts cited by Bloomberg noted that combat activity, higher operational tempo and personnel benefits add to expenses, and there is “no contingency fund in the DOD budget for unexpected operations.”

Despite the USS Gerald R. Ford being reassigned to the Middle East, Bloomberg reported the Caribbean deployment has no clear end date, even as US lawmakers say they have not been provided with detailed cost estimates.

Billions spent. No formal accounting.

And the tab keeps rising.

February 15, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

The Sordid History of the CIA – Part 2

Tales of the American Empire | February 12, 2026

Tales of the American Empire produces short historical videos about the American empire, like the “Sordid History of the CIA”, which is linked below. Most viewers are interested in the American CIA, so this is another episode about videos detailing the evils of the CIA. Some CIA officers work with murderous dictators and criminal organizations involved in the drug trade, arms dealing, and government contract fraud. These evil deeds are sometimes uncovered by the media but receive little attention.

There are YouTube videos that provide insight into covert CIA operations. This is far too much material to condense into a short video. Here is a quick review of more great YouTube videos about the CIA with a link to them below. If the link no longer works, the content has been removed. Two videos from the first part of this series have since disappeared. They may be found on smaller video hosting websites like Rumble, Bitchute, or Odyssey.

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Related Tale: “The Sordid History of the CIA”;    • The Sordid History of the CIA  
“The 1964 CIA Coup in Brazil”; Tales; November 11, 2021;    • The 1964 CIA Coup in Brazil  
“The CIA, Money Laundering, and Organized Crime w/ Economist Michael Hudson”; Our Hidden History; May 25, 2020;    • The CIA, Money Laundering, and Organized C…  
“The CIA’s Cocaine Corridor”; Tales; November 25, 2021;    • The CIA’s Cocaine Corridor  
“The U.S. Plan to KILL Its Own Citizens: Operation Northwoods”; Forgotten History; May 9, 2025;    • The U.S. Plan to KILL Its Own Citizens: Op…  
“The Empires 2021 Coup in Guinea”; Tales; September 16, 2021;    • The Empire’s 2021 Coup in Guinea  
“Hector Berrellez (Unreleased Full Interview)”; a career DEA agent; djvald; December 24, 2023; this is set to start when he talks about the CIA murder of a DEA agent;    • Hector Berrellez (Unreleased Full Interview)  
“The CIA in Angola”; Tales; February 2, 2023;    • The CIA in Angola  
“Story of a Whistleblower Jailed for Exposing CIA”; Spy Diaries; July 3, 2025;    • Story of a Whistleblower Jailed for Exposi…  
“The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala”; Tales; August 4, 2022;    • The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala  
“Part 1: Kevin Shipp, CIA Officer Exposes the Shadow Government”; Kevin Shipp; February 19, 2018;    • Part 1:  Kevin Shipp, CIA Officer Exposes …  
“The Empire’s 2009 Coup in Honduras”; Tales; October 29, 2020;    • The Empire’s 2009 Coup in Honduras  
“Max Blumenthal exposes CIA-cartel connections”; The Grayzone; December 10, 2025;    • Max Blumenthal exposes CIA-cartel connections  
Tales’ playlist: “The CIA”;    • The CIA  

February 13, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Timeless or most popular, Video | , , | Leave a comment

Why didn’t China protect Venezuela from the US?

Beijing is regrouping to adapt to the new hemispheric world order, but not retreating from Latin America

By Ladislav Zemánek | RT | February 9, 2026

The US military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026 – known as Operation Absolute Resolve – sent shockwaves far beyond Caracas. By striking targets in the Venezuelan capital and capturing President Nicolás Maduro, Washington signaled a decisive return to hard power in the Western hemisphere. The operation was not merely a tactical move against a hostile regime; it was a strategic message about influence, hierarchy, and control in the Americas. For China, which had invested heavily in Venezuela’s political and economic survival, the intervention raised immediate questions about the limits of its global reach and the evolving rules of great-power competition in an increasingly multipolar world.

China’s response to Operation Absolute Resolve was swift in tone but cautious in substance. Official statements from Beijing condemned the US action as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, framing it as destabilizing and emblematic of unilateral hegemony. Chinese foreign ministry officials repeatedly urged Washington to respect the UN Charter and cease interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs, positioning China as a defender of state sovereignty and multilateral norms.

Yet the rhetoric was not matched by escalation. Beijing avoided threats of retaliation or offers of direct military assistance to Caracas. Instead, it confined its response to diplomatic channels, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral sanctions, and issued travel advisories warning Chinese citizens to avoid Venezuela amid heightened instability. Chinese analysts emphasized that the priority was damage control: protecting long-standing economic and strategic interests without provoking a direct confrontation with US military power in the Western Hemisphere.

This measured reaction highlights a defining feature of China’s approach to Latin America. Beijing has pursued deep economic engagement and vocal support for sovereignty, but it has consistently avoided military competition with the US in a region where American power remains overwhelming. Operation Absolute Resolve exposed both the strengths and the limits of that strategy.

China’s relationship with the Maduro government was neither symbolic nor superficial. Over the past two decades, Venezuela emerged as one of Beijing’s most important partners in the Americas. In 2023, the two countries elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” China’s highest level of bilateral designation. This status reflected ambitions for durable cooperation across energy, finance, infrastructure, and political coordination, and placed Venezuela among a small circle of states Beijing regarded as strategically significant.

Chinese policy banks extended large-scale financing to Caracas, much of it structured as oil-backed loans that allowed Venezuela to maintain access to global markets despite US sanctions. Chinese companies became involved in energy projects, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, while bilateral trade expanded substantially. Venezuelan heavy crude, though difficult and expensive to refine, accounted for a meaningful share of China’s oil imports, contributing to Beijing’s broader strategy of supply diversification.

Security cooperation also developed, albeit cautiously. Venezuela became one of the largest buyers of Chinese military equipment in Latin America, and Chinese technicians gained access to satellite tracking facilities on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Beijing drew clear red lines. It avoided formal defense commitments, permanent troop deployments, or the establishment of military bases – signals that China did not seek to challenge US strategic primacy in the hemisphere.

Beijing’s interests in Venezuela extended well beyond oil and arms sales. The country served as a key node in China’s wider Latin American strategy, which emphasized infrastructure development, trade expansion, financial integration, political coordination, and cultural exchange within multilateral frameworks. This model sought to build influence through connectivity and economic interdependence rather than coercion or force, reinforcing China’s image as a development partner rather than a security patron.

The post-intervention reality, however, has significantly altered this equation. With Maduro removed from power, the US assumed effective control over Venezuela’s oil exports, redirecting revenues and setting the terms under which crude reaches global markets. While Washington has allowed China to continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, sales are now conducted strictly at market prices and under conditions that erode the preferential arrangements Beijing previously enjoyed. This shift directly affects China’s energy security calculations and weakens the leverage embedded in its oil-backed lending.

US control over oil flows also grants Washington influence over debt restructuring and creditor negotiations, potentially complicating China’s efforts to recover outstanding loans. The result is a sharp reduction in Beijing’s bargaining power in Caracas and a reassessment of the long-term viability of its investments. For China, the dilemma is acute: how to defend economic interests without crossing a strategic threshold that would invite confrontation with the US.

These developments align closely with the broader direction of US policy articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a core strategic priority and reflects a clear revival of Monroe Doctrine logic. It signals Washington’s determination to assert influence in the region and to limit the military, technological, and commercial presence of external powers – particularly China.

For Beijing, this creates a structural asymmetry. Decades of investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement cannot offset the reality of US military dominance in the Americas. China’s preferred toolkit – economic statecraft, infrastructure finance, and non-interference – faces inherent constraints when confronted with decisive uses of hard power. At the same time, Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and multilateralism continues to resonate with segments of Latin American political opinion that are wary of external intervention and eager to preserve strategic autonomy.

A comparison between US and Chinese strategies reveals different worldviews. The US approach, as outlined in the 2025 strategy, treats the hemisphere as a strategic space to be secured against external challengers through security partnerships, economic inducements, and military readiness. China’s approach prioritizes integration, development cooperation, and respect for national choice, relying on gradual influence rather than explicit enforcement.

Viewed through the lens of ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the transition to multipolarity, the Venezuelan episode marks a critical inflection point. The US has reasserted hemispheric dominance in unmistakable terms, while China has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its reach far from home.

China may well lose ground in Venezuela, but this does not necessarily signal retreat from the region. Instead, it suggests adaptation. Diversified partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico, along with continued engagement through trade and investment, offer alternative pathways forward. More broadly, the emergence of implicit spheres of influence may align with China’s interests elsewhere, particularly in Asia, where Beijing seeks greater recognition of its own strategic space.

In an international system increasingly defined by negotiated boundaries rather than universal dominance, both Washington and Beijing are testing how far their power extends – and where restraint becomes strategic. The outcome will shape not only Venezuela’s future, but also the evolving architecture of global order in a multipolar age.


Ladislav Zemánek is a non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club.

February 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Illegal Occupation, Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

South American countries’ pragmatic reassessment of ties with China amid US hegemonism, protectionism

Global Times | February 8, 2026

A quiet but profound shift is reshaping the geopolitical map of South America, as revealed by an exclusive Reuters report, “Brazil signals new openness to Mercosur-China talks as Beijing seeks deeper ties”: For the first time, senior Brazilian officials are considering a push for a “partial” trade agreement between the Mercosur bloc and China.

This represents a major shift for Latin America’s largest economy. While Washington is busy raising tariffs and fortifying protectionist walls, countries in the Western hemisphere are recalculating their survival strategies. The result? A pragmatic reassessment of ties with Beijing.

We are already seeing the ripple effects of US pressure on neighbors like Mexico and Panama, but the shifting mood in the wider region is far more significant. The degree to which Latin American nations are pivoting is directly correlated to the economic squeeze they feel from the North.

Mercosur is the customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and newcomers Bolivia and Venezuela (currently a suspended member).

For decades, Brazil acted as the bloc’s protectionist “gatekeeper” against Chinese influence. Fearing that its domestic manufacturing sector would be hollowed out by Asian imports, Brasília consistently vetoed formal negotiations with Beijing. However, what Reuters describes as a “new global scenario” is forcing a change. This is a diplomatic euphemism for a stark reality: the rise of US protectionism coupled with the undeniable allure of Chinese opportunity. Facing the headwinds of American unilateralism, Brazil has done the math. Traditional allies offer no alternative market access, only higher tariff barriers.

Meanwhile, however, China is not only offering a market but also bringing tangible industrial investment, from BYD to Great Wall Motor. When Washington offers only sticks without carrots, Brazil has little choice but to turn toward a pragmatic East. Uruguay’s president, who recently visited China with a large business delegation to demand faster trade talks, is a clear testament to this regional impatience.

Historically, a Mercosur-China deal was viewed as “mission impossible” due to the bloc’s Common External Tariff rules, which forbid members from negotiating individual trade deals. Politics also posed a formidable barrier. Paraguay, a member of Mercosur, maintains “diplomatic ties” with China’s Taiwan region, creating a legal deadlock to any comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Beijing under the one-China principle.

Furthermore, Argentina’s political pendulum – swinging from protectionist Peronism to Javier Milei’s pro-US stance – has made a unified strategy difficult.

This is why the proposed “partial agreement” is a masterstroke of political pragmatism. It serves as a strategic bypass around these obstacles.

Unlike a full FTA targeting zero tariffs, a partial deal sidesteps the sensitive issue of tariff reduction that terrifies Brazilian manufacturers. It also navigates around Paraguay’s diplomatic dilemma. Instead, it would focus on non-tariff barriers, such as harmonizing sanitary regulations, streamlining customs procedures and setting import quotas.

By shifting the focus from tariffs to regulatory cooperation, Brazil is doing more than just clearing the path for soy and iron ore. It is paving the way for deeper integration of Chinese capital.

The China-Brazil relationship has already evolved from simple trade to manufacturing. With Chinese EV makers taking over shuttered Ford factories in Bahia, the two economies are moving toward supply chain symbiosis. This partial agreement could provide the institutional framework needed to secure those investments.

From a macro perspective, this is a snapshot of the Global South’s increasing autonomy. If these talks proceed, they will mark the opening of a new path – one where pragmatism supersedes ideology.

This serves as a stark reminder to policymakers in Washington: trying to block economic gravity with pressure tactics often accelerates the search for new partners. The shifting winds in South America are not merely a passive reaction to fading hegemony; they represent an active and powerful response from nations determined to define their own economic destiny.

February 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

‘Fact-checking’ as a disinformation scheme: The Brazilian case of Agência Lupa

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 7, 2026

Since the term “fake news” emerged in the world of political journalism, we have been confronted with a new angle through which the establishment attempts to reinforce its hegemony in the intellectual and informational sphere: by simulating ideology as science, data, or fact.

A fundamental aspect of hegemonic liberalism in the “rival-less” post-Cold War world is the transition of ideology into the diffuse realm of pure facticity. What decades earlier was clearly identified as belief comes to be taken as “data,” that is, as indisputable, not open for debate. This is the case, for example, with the myth of “democracy,” the myth of “human rights,” the myth of “progress,” and the myth of the “free market.” And today, we could extend this to the dictates of “gender ideology” and a series of other beliefs of ideological foundation, which are nevertheless taken as scientific facts.

“Fact-checking” has thus become one of the many mechanisms used by the establishment to reinforce systemic “consensus” in the face of the emergence of alternative perspectives following the popularization of the internet and independent journalism. The “authoritative” distinction made by a self-declared “independent” and “respectable” agency between what would be “fact” and what would be “fake news” has become a new source of truth.

Some liberal-democratic governments, like the USA, have gone so far as to create special departments dedicated to “combating fake news,” thus acting as authentic “Ministries of Truth” of Orwellian memory.

However, even within the “independent” sphere, we rarely encounter genuine independence. On the contrary, in fact, Western “fact-checking agencies” tend to be well-integrated into the constellation of NGOs, foundations, and associations of the non-profit industrial complex, which, in turn, is permeated by the money of large corporations and the interests of liberal-democratic governments. Even their staff tend to be revolving doors for figures coming from the NGO world, mainstream journalism, and state bureaucracy.

Although the phenomenon is of Western origin, Brazil is not exempt from it. “Fact-checking agencies” also operate here — most of them engaged in the same types of disinformation operations as the governments, newspapers, and NGOs that sponsor them.

A typical example is Agência Lupa.

Founded in 2015, its founder Cristina Tardáguila previously worked for another disinformation apparatus disguised as “fact-checking,” Preto no Branco, funded by Grupo Globo (founded and owned by the Marinho family, members of which are mentioned in the Epstein Files). Lupa was financially boosted by João Moreira Salles, from the billionaire banker family Moreira Salles (of Itaú Unibanco).

Despite claiming independence from the editorial control of Revista Piauí, also controlled by the Moreira Salles family, Agência Lupa continues to be virtually hosted by Piauí’s resources, where Tardáguila worked as a journalist from 2006 to 2011. Furthermore, she also received support from the Instituto Serrapilheira, also from the Moreira Salles family, during the health crisis to act as a mechanism for imposing the pandemic consensus in what was one of the largest social experiments in human history.

In parallel, it is relevant to mention that the same João Moreira Salles was involved decades ago in a scandal after it was revealed that he had financed “Marcinho VP,” one of the leaders of the drug trafficking organization Comando Vermelho. Moreira Salles made a deal with the justice system to avoid being held accountable for this involvement.

Tardáguila was also the deputy director of the International Fact-Checking Network, an absolutely “independent” “fake news combat” network, yet funded by institutions such as the Open Society, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Google, Meta, the Omidyar Network, and the US State Department, through the National Endowment for Democracy.

Today Tardáguila no longer runs Lupa, but her “profile” on the official page of the National Endowment for Democracy (notorious funder of color revolutions and disinformation operations around the world) states that she is quite active at the Equis Institute, which counts among its funders the abortion organization Planned Parenthood, and aims to conduct social engineering against “Latino” populations.

Lupa is currently headed by Natália Leal. Contrary to the narrative of “independence,” the reality is that she has worked for several Brazilian mass media outlets, such as Poder360, Diário Catarinense, and Zero Hora, in addition to also writing for Revista Piauí, from the same Moreira Salles. Leal is less “internationally connected” than Tardáguila, but she was “graced” with an award from the International Center for Journalists, an association of “independent journalists” that, in fact, is also funded by the US State Department’s National Endowment for Democracy, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Meta, Google, CNN, the Washington Post, USAID, and the Serrapilheira Institute itself, also from Moreira Salles.

Quite clearly, it is somewhat difficult to take seriously the notion that Lupa would have sufficient autonomy and independence to act as an impartial arbiter of all narratives spread on social networks when it and its key figures themselves have these international connections, including at a governmental level.

But even on a practical level, it is difficult to take seriously the self-attributed role of confronting “fake news.” Returning to the pandemic period, for example, the differentiated treatment given by the company to the Russian Sputnik vaccine and the Pfizer vaccine is noteworthy. The former is treated with suspicion in articles written in August and September 2020, both authored by Jaqueline Sordi (who is also on the staff of the Serrapilheira Institute and a dozen other NGOs funded by Open Society), the latter is defended tooth and nail in dozens of articles by various authors, ranging from insisting that Pfizer’s vaccines are 100% safe for children, to stating that Bill Gates never advocated for reducing the world population.

On this matter, by the way, it is important to emphasize that Itaú coordinates investment portfolios that include Pfizer, therefore, there are business interests that bring the Moreira Salles family and the pharmaceutical giant closer.

But beyond disinformation about Big Pharma, as well as about other places around the world, such as Venezuela, regarding which Lupa claims that María Corina Machado has the popular support of 72% of the Venezuelan population (based on a survey by an institute that is not even Venezuelan, ClearPath Strategies), Lupa seems to have a particular obsession with Russia and, curiously, Lupa’s alignment with the dominant narratives in Western media is absolute.

Lupa argues, for example, that the Bucha Massacre was perpetrated by Russia, using the New York Times as its sole source. Regarding Mariupol, it insists on the narrative of the Russian attack on the maternity hospital and other civilian targets, even mentioning Mariana Vishegirskaya, who now lives in Moscow, has admitted to being a paid actress in a staging organized by the Ukrainian government, and now works in the Social Initiatives Committee of the “Rodina” Foundation. It also denies the attempted genocide in Donbass and the practice of organ trafficking in Ukraine.

An article written by founder Cristina Tardáguila herself relies on the Atlantic Council as a source to accuse Russia of spreading disinformation, one of which would be that Ukraine is a failed state subservient to Europe — two pieces of information that any average geopolitical analyst would calmly confirm.

A particular object of Lupa’s obsession is the Global Fact-Checking Network — of which, by the way, I am a part. It is one of the few international organizations dedicated to fact-checking in a manner independent of ideological constraints, counting among its members a team that is, certainly, much more diverse and multifaceted than the typical “revolving door” of fact-checking agencies in the Atlantic circuit, where everyone studied more or less in the same places, worked in mass media, and were, at some point, funded or received grants from Open Society, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and/or the US State Department.

Lupa’s criterion for attacking the GFCN is… precisely obedience or not to Western mass media sources, in a circular reasoning that cannot go beyond the argument from authority.

This specific case helps to expose a bit the functioning of these disinformation apparatuses typical of hybrid warfare, which disguise themselves in the cloak of journalistic neutrality to engage in informational warfare in defense of the liberal West.

February 7, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Russophobia, Science and Pseudo-Science | , | Leave a comment

Beijing cancels Panama deals after court blocks Chinese port operations

The Cradle | February 5, 2026

Chinese authorities have asked state-owned companies to suspend talks on new projects in Panama, in response to the Central American nation’s cancellation of a contract with China’s CK Hutchison Holdings to operate two ports along its strategic canal, Bloomberg reported on 5 February.

According to sources familiar with the matter, Panama’s decision could jeopardize billions of dollars in potential Chinese investments.

Chinese authorities also asked shipping companies to consider rerouting goods through other ports if the extra cost is not prohibitive, and have stepped up inspections of Panamanian imports, such as bananas and coffee.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian issued a statement saying that the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling “ignores the facts, violates credibility,” while harming the interests of Chinese companies.

Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison responded to the Supreme Court decision by initiating international arbitration proceedings against Panama.

CK Hutchison has operated Panama’s Cristobal and Balboa ports for decades. The ports lie at opposite ends of the Panama Canal – the strategic waterway that connects the Pacific and Caribbean Oceans, and through which roughly three percent of global seaborne trade passes.

The move comes amid US President Donald Trump’s campaign to counter Chinese influence over strategic infrastructure in the Americas.

Following his election last year, Trump argued that it was “foolish” of the US to hand over control of the canal to Panama. The US built the canal in 1904 and handed it back to Panamanians nearly a century later, in 1999.

Trump has also complained about the fees Panama charges the US to use the waterway.

Amid pressure from Washington, Panama also withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in February last year.

At the time, Beijing stated it “firmly opposes the United States using pressure and coercion to smear and undermine Belt and Road cooperation. The US side’s attacks … once again expose its hegemonic nature.”

Twenty Latin American nations have participated in the BRI since Beijing initiated it in 2013.

Current Chinese infrastructure projects in Panama include a $1.4-billion bridge over the canal, a cruise terminal constructed by China Harbour Engineering Co., and a segment of a metro line by China Railway Tunnel Group Co.

In Latin America, Trump is seeking to revive the 200-year-old Monroe Doctrine. It states that Washington will not allow European powers to interfere in the Western Hemisphere as they had in colonial times, asserting that the region would be regarded as a sphere of US interest.

Trump used the doctrine as one of his justifications for bombing Venezuela and abducting its president, Nicholas Maduro, on 3 January.

The US president claimed that Maduro was hosting “foreign adversaries in our region” and acquired “menacing offensive weapons that could threaten U.S. interests and lives.”

February 5, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Sinophobia | , , , | Leave a comment

Russia doubts ‘bright future’ for US economic ties – Lavrov

RT | February 5, 2026

The actions of US President Donald Trump’s administration contradict its claims that it is willing to restore economic cooperation with Russia, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said.

Since returning to the White House more than a year ago, Trump has repeatedly said he wants to do business with Moscow. After a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin last March, the White House teased “enormous economic deals” between the two countries once the Ukraine conflict is settled.

Moscow doubts the sincerity of those claims by Washington, Lavrov said in an interview with RT’s Rick Sanchez on Thursday, ahead of Diplomatic Workers’ Day on February 10.

Not only the economic restrictions that had been slapped on Moscow under the previous administration of US President Joe Biden “all remain in place,” but “very harsh sanctions have been imposed against our largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, for the first time,” he said.

Washington’s move “surprised” Putin, the foreign minister recalled, coming just weeks after his face-to-face meeting with Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, in August, during which Moscow “supported the US proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.”

According to Lavrov, the Americans are now “openly trying to push Russian companies from Venezuela.” This follows a January raid by US commandos on the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, during which President Nicolas Maduro and his wife were abducted.

“India is being banned from buying Russian oil. At least, that is what was announced,” the Russian diplomat added.

Last month, Washington also said that “a state of emergency is being declared due to the threat Cuba poses to US interests in the Caribbean, including due to Russia’s hostile and malicious policies,” the minister noted.

The US is looking to introduce “a worldwide ban” on Russian oil and gas supplies, saying that they should be replaced by American oil and liquefied natural gas, Lavrov stressed.

“Well, the bright future of our economic and investment cooperation doesn’t really square with that,” he noted.

February 5, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics | , , , | Leave a comment

Focus on Panama’s ‘port case’ must not be misplaced

Global Times | February 3, 2026

Since the Supreme Court of Panama ruled that CK Hutchison’s concession contract to operate Panama Canal ports was “unconstitutional,” the most elated individuals over the past few days have undoubtedly been certain US politicians and media outlets. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly posted on social media that the US is “encouraged,” while some American media outlets claimed this marks a “major victory” for Washington in curbing Chinese influence. The Wall Street Journal even issued a blunt threat, stating that other countries “might re-examine their ties to the world’s second-biggest economy.”

The cries of “victory” coming from the US confirm widespread outside suspicions and further expose Washington’s hegemonic arrogance in using geopolitical means to interfere with commercial cooperation and undermine trade rules. Although the US formally handed over control of the Panama Canal in 1999, in Washington’s Cold War mentality, this area remains an “inner lake” that others are not allowed to touch. The US has repeatedly expressed desire to “retake control of the Canal,” and Secretary of State Rubio chose Panama for his first overseas visit, threatening the country that it “must reduce Chinese influence.” Therefore, when the Supreme Court of Panama issued its so-called ruling, it is difficult for the international public opinion not to question its independence.

However, if one follows Washington’s rhythm and views this turmoil through the lens of “US-China competition,” they fall into a cognitive trap set by the US, and the focus on this matter becomes misplaced. These ports have never been, and should never be, bargaining chips in a geopolitical game. In fact, CK Hutchison has operated these ports for nearly 30 years; in such a long span of time, where has there ever been a shadow of a “Chinese threat”?

On the contrary, under the company’s management, these ports have been developed, benefiting the local area and contributing to global free trade. In this process, the US itself has been one of the beneficiaries. Therefore, regarding the attention on Panama’s port operation rights, if one must talk about winners and losers, the core should lie in the contest between free trade and hegemonism, and the confrontation between the spirit of contract and power politics.

Whether it is the ports along the Panama Canal, Australia’s Darwin Port mired in controversy, or the case of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the same “invisible hand” looms in the background. Some countries repeatedly claim to uphold a “rules-based order”; yet in practice, what they defend is an “order based on the interests of a single country.” This is, in essence, a targeted demolition of global investment credibility. If commercial contracts can be nullified at the whim of politicians or under pressure from allies, then no long-term investment within the Western system is truly safe. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, global investors are watching closely, asking whether today’s rapacious acts will tomorrow descend upon any profitable industry.

International investment law does indeed recognize “security exceptions,” but these are by no means a universal master key for hegemonism. The core of international commercial law is certainty: companies that operate in compliance with the rules deserve the protection of the law. By using diplomatic coercion to push allies into rulings that defy legal principles, the US is eroding from within the very credit foundations on which the capitalist world depends. In the short term, Washington may have secured a few “strategic footholds”; however, in the long term, this has fundamentally undermined the international credibility of the US and the space for transnational commercial interactions. It is foreseeable that when the law ceases to be a fair arbiter and becomes a political tool, global capital will have to seek safe havens independent of the dollar system and the US “long-arm” influence.

What is even more concerning to the international community is that the geopolitical will of the US often surpasses the constitutions of some sovereign nations. This is a mockery of the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. From the case of Alstom years ago to the current controversy over Darwin Port, the methods used by the US to attack competitors and seize interests are strikingly similar. The international business community needs a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment, not a “law of the jungle” dominated by hegemonic will. If this trend of politicizing economic and trade issues and weaponizing legal tools continues unchecked, the ultimate victim will be the entire international economic and trade order. Those who attempt to curb their rivals by undermining the rules will also find themselves facing a bankruptcy of credibility.

As an important maritime passage that carries about 5 percent of global shipping trade, the Panama Canal ports have become a crucial cargo hub on a global scale, and they should not waver under the shadow of hegemonism. According to reports, concessions for the Panama Canal ports will now need to be auctioned off.

In this context, it is hoped that the Panamanian side will truly demonstrate its “independence” by providing a predictable environment for fair competition for all bidders, rather than trying by any means to “ensure that China is blocked from the bidding” as some US media outlets have trumpeted. The whole world is watching everything that happens there.

February 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment