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40 Years of Endless War, Data Point by Data Point

By Tom Elliott | The Libertarian Institute | March 11, 2026

Dinosaur GenXers like me recall that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the foreign policy set was busy asking how the United States would cash its forthcoming “peace dividend,” whether NATO would fold up shop having achieved its ostensible purpose, and maybe whether we were entering “the end of history”? How short-sighted. Instead, the pace of war-fighting from the 1950s (the original “peace dividend”), to the 1990s increased by a multitude of twelve. See my chart below.

Overall, the United States has engaged in 481 total military engagements since 1798—287 of them since 1989 (60% of total). We’re only six years into the 2020s and it’s already at 34 and on pace to hit ~57 by decade’s end, which would make it the second-busiest decade in U.S. history behind the 1990s. U.S. servicemen have fought in 102 countries For those keeping score, here’s a list of more than 110 military conflicts since 1989:

  • January 1989, Libya: Two U.S. Navy F-14s shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean after the Libyan planes showed hostile intent.
  • May 1989, Panama: President George H.W. Bush deployed ~1,900 troops to Panama after General Manuel Noriega disregarded the results of the Panamanian election.
  • September 1989, Colombia/Bolivia/Peru: The United States sent military advisers and Special Forces teams to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help combat drug producers and traffickers.
  • December 1989, Philippines: U.S. fighter planes from Clark Air Base helped the Corazon Aquino government repel a coup attempt, and one hundred marines were sent to protect the U.S. embassy in Manila.
  • December 1989, Panama: President George H.W. Bush ordered a full-scale military invasion of Panama to protect American citizens and bring General Manuel Noriega to justice; all forces withdrew by February 1990.
  • August 1990, Liberia: A reinforced rifle company was sent to secure the U.S. embassy in Monrovia and helicopters evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia.
  • August 1990, Saudi Arabia: President George H.W. Bush ordered a massive forward deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
  • January 1991, Iraq/Kuwait: U.S. forces commenced combat operations against Iraqi forces in Iraq and Kuwait under a United Nations coalition; combat was suspended on February 28, 1991.
  • May 1991, Iraq: U.S. forces entered northern Iraq to provide emergency relief to Kurdish populations facing Iraqi government repression.
  • September 1991, Zaire: U.S. Air Force transports carried Belgian and French troops into the region and evacuated American citizens after widespread looting and rioting in Kinshasa.
  • May 1992, Sierra Leone: U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone after a military coup overthrew the government.
  • August 1992, Kuwait: The United States began military exercises in Kuwait following Iraqi refusal to recognize its new United Nations-drawn border and cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors.
  • September 1992, Iraq: President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. participation in enforcing a no-fly zone over southern Iraq and aerial reconnaissance to monitor Iraqi cease-fire compliance.
  • December 1992, Somalia: President George H.W. Bush deployed U.S. forces to Somalia as part of an American-led United Nations task force to address a crisis the Security Council deemed a threat to international peace.
  • January 1993, Iraq: U.S. aircraft shot down an Iraqi plane in the no-fly zone, and coalition forces attacked missile bases in southern Iraq in multiple strikes through mid-January.
  • January 1993, Iraq: President Bill Clinton continued the Bush policy on Iraq, with U.S. aircraft firing at Iraqi targets after sensing radar or anti-aircraft threats directed at them.
  • February 1993, Bosnia: The United States began airdropping relief supplies to Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces in Bosnia.
  • April 1993, Bosnia: U.S. forces joined a NATO operation to enforce a United Nations ban on unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  • April-May 1993, Iraq: U.S. planes bombed or fired missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft sites that had tracked U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones.
  • June 1993, Somalia: The U.S. Quick Reaction Force participated in military action against a Somali factional leader who attacked United Nations forces, with continued air and ground operations through the following months.
  • June 1993, Iraq: U.S. naval forces launched cruise missiles against Iraqi Intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for an alleged assassination attempt on former President George H.W. Bush.
  • July-August 1993, Iraq: U.S. aircraft fired missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft sites and bombed an Iraqi missile battery displaying hostile intent.
  • July 1993, Macedonia: 350 U.S. soldiers deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of a United Nations force to maintain stability in the former Yugoslavia.
  • October 1993, Haiti: U.S. ships began enforcing a United Nations embargo against Haiti.
  • February 1994, Bosnia: The United States expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts in former Yugoslavia, with sixty aircraft available for NATO missions.
  • March 1994, Bosnia: U.S. planes patrolling the no-fly zone shot down four Serbian Galeb planes.
  • April 1994, Bosnia: U.S. warplanes under NATO command fired on Bosnian Serb forces shelling the United Nations safe city of Gorazde.
  • April 1994, Rwanda: Combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Burundi to conduct potential evacuation of American citizens from Rwanda amid widespread fighting.
  • April 1994, Haiti: U.S. naval forces continued enforcing the United Nations embargo around Haiti, having boarded 712 vessels since October 1993.
  • August 1994, Bosnia: U.S. aircraft under NATO attacked Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone at the request of United Nations forces.
  • September 1994, Haiti: President Bill Clinton deployed 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy, later increasing to 20,000.
  • November 1994, Bosnia: U.S. combat aircraft under NATO attacked Serb bases used to assault the Bosnian town of Bihac.
  • March 1995, Somalia: 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Mogadishu to assist in withdrawing United Nations forces from Somalia.
  • May 1995, Bosnia: U.S. fighter aircraft continued enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, with ~500 troops deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of United Nations peacekeeping.
  • September 1995, Bosnia: U.S. aircraft participated in major NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces threatening United Nations safe areas, flying roughly three hundred sorties on the first day alone.
  • December 1995, Bosnia: President Bill Clinton ordered ~20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of NATO’s Implementation Force to enforce the Dayton peace agreement, with ~12,000 more in support roles across the region.
  • April 1996, Liberia: U.S. military forces evacuated American and third-country nationals from Liberia after security deteriorated, and responded to attacks on the embassy compound.
  • May 1996, Central African Republic: U.S. forces deployed to Bangui to evacuate American citizens and government employees and secure the U.S. embassy.
  • December 1996, Bosnia: President Bill Clinton authorized ~8,500 U.S. troops to participate in NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) follow-on force in Bosnia to deter resumption of hostilities.
  • March 1997, Albania: U.S. forces evacuated government employees and citizens from Tirana, Albania, and enhanced embassy security amid civil unrest.
  • March 1997, Congo/Gabon: A standby evacuation force deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for Americans and prepare for possible evacuation from Zaire.
  • May 1997, Sierra Leone: U.S. military personnel deployed to Freetown to evacuate U.S. government employees and citizens.
  • July 1997, Cambodia: ~550 U.S. military personnel deployed to Thailand for possible emergency evacuation of American citizens from Cambodia during civil conflict.
  • June 1998, Guinea-Bissau: A standby evacuation force deployed to Senegal to evacuate Americans from Guinea-Bissau after an army mutiny endangered the U.S. embassy.
  • August 1998, Kenya/Tanzania: U.S. military personnel deployed to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to provide disaster assistance and enhanced security after terrorist bombings of both U.S. embassies.
  • August 1998, Albania: Two hundred marines and ten Navy SEALs deployed to the U.S. embassy in Tirana to enhance security against reported threats.
  • August 1998, Afghanistan/Sudan: President Bill Clinton authorized airstrikes against Osama bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and facilities in Sudan in response to the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
  • September 1998, Liberia: Thirty U.S. military personnel deployed to augment embassy security in Monrovia and provide evacuation capability amid political instability.
  • December 1998, Iraq: The United States and United Kingdom conducted Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign against Iraqi facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other military targets.
  • 1998-2001, Iraq: American and coalition forces conducted ongoing military operations against the Iraqi air defense system in response to threats against aircraft enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones.
  • March 1999, Yugoslavia: U.S. forces, in coalition with NATO, commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to its campaign of violence and repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
  • April 1999, Albania: President Bill Clinton ordered ~2,500 additional troops and heavy weapons to Albania to enhance NATO’s air operations against Yugoslavia.
  • May 1999, Yugoslavia: Additional U.S. aircraft and several thousand more personnel deployed to support NATO’s ongoing operations against Yugoslavia.
  • June 1999, Kosovo: ~7,000 U.S. troops deployed as part of the ~50,000-member NATO-led security force (KFOR) in Kosovo after the end of the air campaign.
  • October 1999, East Timor: U.S. military forces deployed to support a United Nations multinational force aimed at restoring peace to East Timor, including the USS Belleau Wood and marines.
  • October 2000, Yemen: After a terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, U.S. military security and disaster response personnel deployed to secure the ship and respond to the incident.
  • September 2001, Global: Following the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush ordered combat-equipped forces to multiple nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas to prevent and deter terrorism.
  • October 2001, Afghanistan: U.S. forces began combat operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban in direct response to the September 11 attacks.
  • September 2002, Cote d’Ivoire: U.S. military personnel entered Cote d’Ivoire to evacuate American citizens and third-country nationals from the city of Bouake during a rebellion.
  • 2002, Philippines: ~600 combat-equipped U.S. personnel deployed to the Philippines to train, advise, and assist Filipino forces in enhancing counterterrorism capabilities.
  • 2002, Georgia/Yemen: U.S. combat-equipped forces deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of their armed forces.
  • March 2003, Iraq: President George W. Bush directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations against Iraq on March 19 as part of a coalition to disarm Iraq, launching a war whose duration was unknown at the time.
  • June 2003, Liberia/Mauritania: Roughly thirty-five combat-equipped troops deployed to Monrovia to augment embassy security and enable possible evacuation, with additional forces sent to Mauritania.
  • August 2003, Liberia: ~4,350 combat-equipped U.S. personnel entered Liberian waters to support United Nations and West African efforts to restore order in Liberia.
  • 2003-ongoing, Djibouti: American combat-equipped and support forces deployed to Djibouti to enhance counterterrorism capabilities and support operations against international terrorists in the Horn of Africa.
  • February 2004, Haiti: Roughly fifty-five combat-equipped troops deployed to Port-au-Prince to augment embassy security during an armed rebellion.
  • March 2004, Haiti: Roughly two hundred additional combat-equipped troops deployed to Haiti to prepare for a United Nations Multinational Interim Force, eventually growing to ~1,800 personnel.
  • 2004-2005, Iraq: The United States maintained over 135,000 troops in Iraq as part of the Multinational Force, rising to ~160,000 by late 2005.
  • July 2006, Lebanon: Combat-equipped helicopters and military personnel deployed to Beirut to evacuate American citizens and designated personnel during the security crisis.
  • 2007-ongoing, Somalia: The U.S. military took direct action against members of al-Qaida and al-Shabaab engaged in planning terrorist attacks against the United States.
  • 2007-2011, Afghanistan: U.S. forces grew from ~25,900 to a peak of ~99,000, pursuing al-Qaida and Taliban fighters as part of both ISAF and separate U.S. operations.
  • 2009-ongoing, Yemen: The U.S. military worked with the Yemeni government to eliminate the threat from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), resulting in direct action against operatives and senior leaders.
  • March 2011, Libya: U.S. military forces launched strikes against Libyan air defenses and military targets to enforce a United Nations-authorized no-fly zone and protect civilians from Gaddafi’s forces.
  • April-October 2011, Libya: After transferring lead to NATO, U.S. support continued with intelligence, logistics, and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against defined targets until the mission ended in October.
  • October 2011, Central Africa: Roughly one hundred combat-equipped U.S. forces deployed to Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to advise regional forces working to remove Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony.
  • January 2012, Somalia: U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a rescue operation in Somalia, freeing kidnapped American Jessica Buchanan and Danish national Poul Hagen Thisted.
  • September 2012, Libya/Yemen: Combat-equipped security forces deployed to Libya and Yemen after the attack on the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.
  • February 2013, Niger: Roughly one hundred U.S. military personnel deployed to Niger with weapons for force protection to support intelligence collection and share intelligence with French forces operating in Mali.
  • April-June 2013, Jordan: Up to seven hundred combat-equipped U.S. troops deployed to Jordan for training exercises and remained at the request of the Jordanian government amid the Syrian Civil War.
  • December 2013, South Sudan: U.S. forces evacuated embassy personnel from Juba, and a follow-on evacuation mission near Bor was curtailed after the aircraft came under fire.
  • June 2014, Iraq: President Obama deployed 300 military advisers to Iraq to assess and counter the threat from ISIL, with subsequent deployments growing to over 5,200 by late 2014.
  • August 2014, Ukraine: A dozen U.S. troops from European Command deployed to Kiev to help investigate the downing of Malaysian airliner MH17 that killed 298 people.
  • August 2014, Poland: Six hundred soldiers deployed to Poland as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve to reassure NATO allies in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.
  • October 2015, Cameroon: Roughly three hundred U.S. military personnel deployed to Cameroon to conduct airborne ISR operations against the Islamist militant group Boko Haram.
  • June-September 2016, Iraq: An additional 1,160 U.S. troops deployed to Iraq to assist in the fight against ISIL, including preparation for the offensive to retake Mosul.
  • July 2016, South Sudan: Up to two hundred combat-equipped U.S. forces prepositioned in Uganda and deployed to protect the U.S. embassy after deadly fighting erupted in Juba.
  • October 2016, Yemen: U.S. forces conducted missile strikes on Houthi-controlled radar facilities in Yemen after threats to U.S. naval vessels, destroying the targets.
  • January 2017, Europe: 3,500 soldiers with tanks and heavy equipment from the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Poland, marking the start of continuous armored brigade rotations in Europe.
  • March 2017, Syria: Roughly four hundred Marines and Army rangers deployed to Syria to assist in the fight against the Islamic State.
  • October 2017, Niger: Four U.S. servicemembers were killed and two wounded during an advise-and-assist mission in Niger when their patrol was ambushed.
  • December 2017, Iraq/Syria: The Pentagon reported 5,200 U.S. troops in Iraq and 2,000 in Syria, with numbers trending down as the fight against ISIS progressed.
  • April 2018, Syria: President Donald Trump directed American, French, and British forces to strike Syrian chemical weapons research, development, and production facilities.
  • February 2018, Afghanistan: The U.S. Army’s first Security Force Assistance Brigade deployed to Afghanistan to train and advise Afghan National Security Forces.
  • September 2019, Saudi Arabia: Roughly two hundred U.S. support personnel with Patriot batteries and Sentinel radars deployed to augment air and missile defenses after attacks on Saudi oil facilities.
  • May-June 2019, Middle East: The United States deployed ~14,000 additional forces to the CENTCOM area, including carrier strike groups, Patriot batteries, and additional troops in response to escalating tensions with Iran.
  • December 2019, Baghdad: Roughly one hundred marines deployed to reinforce security at the U.S. embassy after it was attacked, followed by ~750 troops from the 82nd Airborne as an Immediate Response Force.
  • January 2020, Kuwait: An additional 2,800 troops from the 82nd Airborne deployed to Kuwait, bringing the total rapid deployment to ~3,500 in response to the Baghdad embassy attack and regional tensions.
  • February 2020, Africa: The U.S. Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade deployed to Africa to train and assist African forces and better compete with Russia and China.
  • 2019-2020, Syria: After President Donald Trump announced a full withdrawal from Syria in December 2018, the United States reversed course and maintained roughly four hundred troops in the country.
  • February 2022, Romania/Poland/Germany: Roughly three thousand troops deployed to Romania, Poland, and Germany as Russia built up forces on Ukraine’s border, eventually growing to over 100,000 U.S. personnel across Europe.
  • March-September 2022, Europe: Successive waves of additional forces deployed across Europe including aerial refueling, air support, logistics, and combat units in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • May 2022, Somalia: President Joe Biden authorized a small, persistent U.S. military presence in Somalia to advise and assist local forces, reversing the prior episodic deployment model.
  • June 2022, Europe: President Joe Biden announced long-term force posture increases across Europe including additional destroyers in Spain, F-35s in the United Kingdom, a rotational brigade in Romania, and a permanent corps headquarters in Poland.
  • April 2023, Sudan: U.S. forces evacuated roughly one hundred American personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum amid armed conflict, coordinating with allies including Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia.
  • October 2023–February 2024, Iraq/Syria: Iran-backed militias attacked American bases over sixty times; the United States conducted retaliatory strikes on IRGC-linked facilities in eastern Syria and Iraq.
  • November 2023–ongoing, Red Sea/Yemen: Houthi rebels began attacking commercial shipping and U.S. naval vessels; the United states launched Operation Prosperity Guardian (a multinational naval coalition) in December 2023.
  • January 2024–January 2025, Yemen: Operation Poseidon Archer—United States and United Kingdom conducted sustained air and cruise missile strikes against Houthi targets, totaling 774 airstrike events.
  • April 2024, Israel/Iran defense: U.S. forces helped defend Israel during Iran’s first direct missile/drone attack.
  • November 2024, Israel/Iran defense: United States again assisted Israel defending against a second Iranian attack.
  • March–May 2025, Yemen: Operation Rough Rider—Trump escalated strikes significantly against Houthi bases, radar, air defenses, and launch sites. Ceasefire brokered by Oman in May.
  • June 2025, Iran: U.S. forces struck Iranian nuclear sites and defended Israel during a third Iran-Israel conflict.
  • September 2025–ongoing, Caribbean/Pacific: U.S. military began striking alleged drug trafficking boats using MQ-9 Reapers and AC-130 gunships—over thirty-two strikes killing over 115 people as of December 2025. USS Gerald R. Ford redeployed to Caribbean for Operation Southern Spear.
  • December 2025, Nigeria: U.S. bombed ISIS targets in Sokoto state in coordination with the Nigerian government.
  • Late 2025, Venezuela: Escalating maximum pressure campaign culminating in the reported capture of Maduro in January 2026.
  • January–February 2026, Middle East buildup: Largest U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq invasion.
  • February 28, 2026, Iran: Operation Epic Fury launched — joint American-Israeli strikes hitting 1,700+ targets in seventy-two hours, targeting nuclear facilities, missile sites, navy, and regime leadership. Forty-eight senior Iranian leaders killed. Seven U.S. service members killed in retaliatory strikes.

March 11, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Timeless or most popular | , , , | Comments Off on 40 Years of Endless War, Data Point by Data Point

Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

By Lucas Leiroz | February 24, 2026

In recent days, Mexico has made headlines worldwide due to the increase in internal violence in the country. After the local government launched an offensive against drug trafficking and eliminated a major criminal leader, the country’s main drug cartel began a series of attacks against state forces, killing several soldiers and civilians, destroying military equipment and infrastructure.

The combat capacity of the criminal forces is surprising world public opinion, but little has been said about how the professionalization of organized crime in Mexico is directly related to the current situation in the Ukrainian conflict.

The wave of violence began after the Mexican government launched a special operation against the Jalisco Cartel. Using police and military troops and with broad support from the army, state forces eliminated Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, better known as “El Mencho,” identified by experts as the leader of the Jalisco Cartel.

The action was praised by the international press, as well as by US authorities, such as Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who called the operation a “great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world” – thus easing months of tensions between the US and Mexico, which had been escalating since Donald Trump’s inauguration.

“I’ve just been informed that Mexican security forces have killed ‘El Mencho,’ one of the bloodiest and most ruthless drug kingpins. This is a great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world (…) The good guys are stronger than the bad guys,” Landau said.

However, the operation was quickly met with extreme violence by the criminals. Police officers began to be hunted down in the streets in various regions of the country, mainly in the suburbs of Jalisco. Cartel members blocked roads, attempting to prevent basic supplies from moving in the country. Photos and videos circulate on the internet showing scenes of extreme violence in the streets of Jalisco, where police officers, soldiers, and innocent civilians were indiscriminately murdered by the criminals.

These photos and videos are also surprising internet users by revealing the true level of combat power of Latin American cartels. It’s possible to see in the images soldiers armed with heavy weaponry and wearing modern and sophisticated tactical uniforms. At first glance, anyone would think those men were officers of the Mexican army, but they are just members of local cartels.

It has long been known that Mexican cartels – and Latin American cartels in general – have become rapidly and dangerously professionalized. These criminal organizations in Mexico already possess access to complex equipment such as armored vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, suicide drones, and grenade launchers, as well as various types of short- and medium-range rockets. The criminals also frequently use flamethrowers, landmines (both anti-tank and anti-personnel), and other advanced military equipment.

It is regularly stated by various experts that in Mexico, cartels have already acquired a combat capability superior to that of regular police and military forces. This is a natural consequence of the fact that these organizations have acquired considerable financial power over time – with their funds being equivalent to the GDP of some small countries – which guarantees the possibility of acquiring military equipment on the black market.

However, there is a factor being ignored in the Western media coverage of the case: Ukrainian influence. Since the beginning of the conflict, thousands of Latin American mercenaries have fought for the Kiev regime. When they survive the harsh fighting against Russian forces, these criminals return to their countries and pass on the knowledge and experience acquired on the battlefield to their partners.

Over time, Mexican cartels (as well as Colombian and Brazilian cartels) have created a systematic scheme for sending their members as mercenaries to Ukraine, which has allowed for rapid military professionalization and the acquisition of combat experience for these criminals, giving them an advantage against state forces – which act according to laws that restrict the use of force and lack war experience.

Several reports have been published by specialized websites showing that Mexican criminals are using techniques learned in Ukraine. In images of current hostilities, it is even possible to see the Ukrainian flag on some uniforms and armored vehicles of the criminals. Also, the use of drones has become one of the main specialties of the drug traffickers, largely learned during the Ukrainian conflict – in which drones are an essential factor in the dynamics of combat.

To solve the problem, the Mexican state will need to do much more than simply eliminate a cartel leader. “Decapitation” attacks don’t work in the long term because criminals quickly recruit new leaders from within their ranks. It is necessary to confront the ranks of criminals in the long term, with constant military attrition, in addition to destroying the drug production and transportation infrastructure used by criminals.

On the other hand, it will also be necessary to create measures to cut off the source of knowledge and military equipment that supplies organized crime in Mexico. Sophisticated intelligence operations must be established to sever contact between local cartels and the Kiev regime, arresting mercenaries and neutralizing arms smuggling – since it is known that many Western weapons sent to Ukraine end up in the hands of these criminals, further increasing their fighting power.

If Mexico is not efficient in addressing this problem, there will be a much deeper crisis in the country, considering the American interest in expanding its regional interventionism using the excuse of “anti-trafficking operations.” Trump himself does not rule out the possibility of using force on the Mexican side of the border in an “anti-terrorist operation.”

Obviously, this is just an excuse to defend American interests abroad, but the only way Mexico can disrupt US plans is precisely by being efficient in combating crime alone or with the support of countries genuinely interested in the same objective. Naturally, the Mexican government should seek Russian support, since it is in Moscow’s interest to neutralize the international ties of the Kiev regime, including arms trafficking and the recruitment of mercenaries.

February 24, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

US Caribbean Buildup Near $3B — Report

Sputnik – 15.02.2026

The US military surge around Venezuela that culminated in the military aggression and abduction of President Nicolas Maduro is approaching a $3 billion price tag, Bloomberg reported.

Bloomberg calculations show the deployment at its peak cost more than $20 million a day, with as much as 20% of the US Navy’s surface fleet tied up in the region. Former Pentagon comptroller Elaine McCusker estimated that Operation Southern Spear has “probably cost about $2 billion since August 2025,” excluding intelligence and targeting expenses.

The White House has said the operation did not cost taxpayers extra because the forces were already deployed. But experts cited by Bloomberg noted that combat activity, higher operational tempo and personnel benefits add to expenses, and there is “no contingency fund in the DOD budget for unexpected operations.”

Despite the USS Gerald R. Ford being reassigned to the Middle East, Bloomberg reported the Caribbean deployment has no clear end date, even as US lawmakers say they have not been provided with detailed cost estimates.

Billions spent. No formal accounting.

And the tab keeps rising.

February 15, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

The Sordid History of the CIA – Part 2

Tales of the American Empire | February 12, 2026

Tales of the American Empire produces short historical videos about the American empire, like the “Sordid History of the CIA”, which is linked below. Most viewers are interested in the American CIA, so this is another episode about videos detailing the evils of the CIA. Some CIA officers work with murderous dictators and criminal organizations involved in the drug trade, arms dealing, and government contract fraud. These evil deeds are sometimes uncovered by the media but receive little attention.

There are YouTube videos that provide insight into covert CIA operations. This is far too much material to condense into a short video. Here is a quick review of more great YouTube videos about the CIA with a link to them below. If the link no longer works, the content has been removed. Two videos from the first part of this series have since disappeared. They may be found on smaller video hosting websites like Rumble, Bitchute, or Odyssey.

___________________________________________
Related Tale: “The Sordid History of the CIA”;    • The Sordid History of the CIA  
“The 1964 CIA Coup in Brazil”; Tales; November 11, 2021;    • The 1964 CIA Coup in Brazil  
“The CIA, Money Laundering, and Organized Crime w/ Economist Michael Hudson”; Our Hidden History; May 25, 2020;    • The CIA, Money Laundering, and Organized C…  
“The CIA’s Cocaine Corridor”; Tales; November 25, 2021;    • The CIA’s Cocaine Corridor  
“The U.S. Plan to KILL Its Own Citizens: Operation Northwoods”; Forgotten History; May 9, 2025;    • The U.S. Plan to KILL Its Own Citizens: Op…  
“The Empires 2021 Coup in Guinea”; Tales; September 16, 2021;    • The Empire’s 2021 Coup in Guinea  
“Hector Berrellez (Unreleased Full Interview)”; a career DEA agent; djvald; December 24, 2023; this is set to start when he talks about the CIA murder of a DEA agent;    • Hector Berrellez (Unreleased Full Interview)  
“The CIA in Angola”; Tales; February 2, 2023;    • The CIA in Angola  
“Story of a Whistleblower Jailed for Exposing CIA”; Spy Diaries; July 3, 2025;    • Story of a Whistleblower Jailed for Exposi…  
“The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala”; Tales; August 4, 2022;    • The 1954 CIA Coup in Guatemala  
“Part 1: Kevin Shipp, CIA Officer Exposes the Shadow Government”; Kevin Shipp; February 19, 2018;    • Part 1:  Kevin Shipp, CIA Officer Exposes …  
“The Empire’s 2009 Coup in Honduras”; Tales; October 29, 2020;    • The Empire’s 2009 Coup in Honduras  
“Max Blumenthal exposes CIA-cartel connections”; The Grayzone; December 10, 2025;    • Max Blumenthal exposes CIA-cartel connections  
Tales’ playlist: “The CIA”;    • The CIA  

February 13, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Timeless or most popular, Video | , , | Leave a comment

Why didn’t China protect Venezuela from the US?

Beijing is regrouping to adapt to the new hemispheric world order, but not retreating from Latin America

By Ladislav Zemánek | RT | February 9, 2026

The US military intervention in Venezuela in January 2026 – known as Operation Absolute Resolve – sent shockwaves far beyond Caracas. By striking targets in the Venezuelan capital and capturing President Nicolás Maduro, Washington signaled a decisive return to hard power in the Western hemisphere. The operation was not merely a tactical move against a hostile regime; it was a strategic message about influence, hierarchy, and control in the Americas. For China, which had invested heavily in Venezuela’s political and economic survival, the intervention raised immediate questions about the limits of its global reach and the evolving rules of great-power competition in an increasingly multipolar world.

China’s response to Operation Absolute Resolve was swift in tone but cautious in substance. Official statements from Beijing condemned the US action as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, framing it as destabilizing and emblematic of unilateral hegemony. Chinese foreign ministry officials repeatedly urged Washington to respect the UN Charter and cease interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs, positioning China as a defender of state sovereignty and multilateral norms.

Yet the rhetoric was not matched by escalation. Beijing avoided threats of retaliation or offers of direct military assistance to Caracas. Instead, it confined its response to diplomatic channels, reaffirmed opposition to unilateral sanctions, and issued travel advisories warning Chinese citizens to avoid Venezuela amid heightened instability. Chinese analysts emphasized that the priority was damage control: protecting long-standing economic and strategic interests without provoking a direct confrontation with US military power in the Western Hemisphere.

This measured reaction highlights a defining feature of China’s approach to Latin America. Beijing has pursued deep economic engagement and vocal support for sovereignty, but it has consistently avoided military competition with the US in a region where American power remains overwhelming. Operation Absolute Resolve exposed both the strengths and the limits of that strategy.

China’s relationship with the Maduro government was neither symbolic nor superficial. Over the past two decades, Venezuela emerged as one of Beijing’s most important partners in the Americas. In 2023, the two countries elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” China’s highest level of bilateral designation. This status reflected ambitions for durable cooperation across energy, finance, infrastructure, and political coordination, and placed Venezuela among a small circle of states Beijing regarded as strategically significant.

Chinese policy banks extended large-scale financing to Caracas, much of it structured as oil-backed loans that allowed Venezuela to maintain access to global markets despite US sanctions. Chinese companies became involved in energy projects, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, while bilateral trade expanded substantially. Venezuelan heavy crude, though difficult and expensive to refine, accounted for a meaningful share of China’s oil imports, contributing to Beijing’s broader strategy of supply diversification.

Security cooperation also developed, albeit cautiously. Venezuela became one of the largest buyers of Chinese military equipment in Latin America, and Chinese technicians gained access to satellite tracking facilities on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Beijing drew clear red lines. It avoided formal defense commitments, permanent troop deployments, or the establishment of military bases – signals that China did not seek to challenge US strategic primacy in the hemisphere.

Beijing’s interests in Venezuela extended well beyond oil and arms sales. The country served as a key node in China’s wider Latin American strategy, which emphasized infrastructure development, trade expansion, financial integration, political coordination, and cultural exchange within multilateral frameworks. This model sought to build influence through connectivity and economic interdependence rather than coercion or force, reinforcing China’s image as a development partner rather than a security patron.

The post-intervention reality, however, has significantly altered this equation. With Maduro removed from power, the US assumed effective control over Venezuela’s oil exports, redirecting revenues and setting the terms under which crude reaches global markets. While Washington has allowed China to continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, sales are now conducted strictly at market prices and under conditions that erode the preferential arrangements Beijing previously enjoyed. This shift directly affects China’s energy security calculations and weakens the leverage embedded in its oil-backed lending.

US control over oil flows also grants Washington influence over debt restructuring and creditor negotiations, potentially complicating China’s efforts to recover outstanding loans. The result is a sharp reduction in Beijing’s bargaining power in Caracas and a reassessment of the long-term viability of its investments. For China, the dilemma is acute: how to defend economic interests without crossing a strategic threshold that would invite confrontation with the US.

These developments align closely with the broader direction of US policy articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a core strategic priority and reflects a clear revival of Monroe Doctrine logic. It signals Washington’s determination to assert influence in the region and to limit the military, technological, and commercial presence of external powers – particularly China.

For Beijing, this creates a structural asymmetry. Decades of investment, trade, and diplomatic engagement cannot offset the reality of US military dominance in the Americas. China’s preferred toolkit – economic statecraft, infrastructure finance, and non-interference – faces inherent constraints when confronted with decisive uses of hard power. At the same time, Beijing’s emphasis on sovereignty and multilateralism continues to resonate with segments of Latin American political opinion that are wary of external intervention and eager to preserve strategic autonomy.

A comparison between US and Chinese strategies reveals different worldviews. The US approach, as outlined in the 2025 strategy, treats the hemisphere as a strategic space to be secured against external challengers through security partnerships, economic inducements, and military readiness. China’s approach prioritizes integration, development cooperation, and respect for national choice, relying on gradual influence rather than explicit enforcement.

Viewed through the lens of ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the transition to multipolarity, the Venezuelan episode marks a critical inflection point. The US has reasserted hemispheric dominance in unmistakable terms, while China has been forced to acknowledge the limits of its reach far from home.

China may well lose ground in Venezuela, but this does not necessarily signal retreat from the region. Instead, it suggests adaptation. Diversified partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Mexico, along with continued engagement through trade and investment, offer alternative pathways forward. More broadly, the emergence of implicit spheres of influence may align with China’s interests elsewhere, particularly in Asia, where Beijing seeks greater recognition of its own strategic space.

In an international system increasingly defined by negotiated boundaries rather than universal dominance, both Washington and Beijing are testing how far their power extends – and where restraint becomes strategic. The outcome will shape not only Venezuela’s future, but also the evolving architecture of global order in a multipolar age.


Ladislav Zemánek is a non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club.

February 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Illegal Occupation, Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

South American countries’ pragmatic reassessment of ties with China amid US hegemonism, protectionism

Global Times | February 8, 2026

A quiet but profound shift is reshaping the geopolitical map of South America, as revealed by an exclusive Reuters report, “Brazil signals new openness to Mercosur-China talks as Beijing seeks deeper ties”: For the first time, senior Brazilian officials are considering a push for a “partial” trade agreement between the Mercosur bloc and China.

This represents a major shift for Latin America’s largest economy. While Washington is busy raising tariffs and fortifying protectionist walls, countries in the Western hemisphere are recalculating their survival strategies. The result? A pragmatic reassessment of ties with Beijing.

We are already seeing the ripple effects of US pressure on neighbors like Mexico and Panama, but the shifting mood in the wider region is far more significant. The degree to which Latin American nations are pivoting is directly correlated to the economic squeeze they feel from the North.

Mercosur is the customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and newcomers Bolivia and Venezuela (currently a suspended member).

For decades, Brazil acted as the bloc’s protectionist “gatekeeper” against Chinese influence. Fearing that its domestic manufacturing sector would be hollowed out by Asian imports, Brasília consistently vetoed formal negotiations with Beijing. However, what Reuters describes as a “new global scenario” is forcing a change. This is a diplomatic euphemism for a stark reality: the rise of US protectionism coupled with the undeniable allure of Chinese opportunity. Facing the headwinds of American unilateralism, Brazil has done the math. Traditional allies offer no alternative market access, only higher tariff barriers.

Meanwhile, however, China is not only offering a market but also bringing tangible industrial investment, from BYD to Great Wall Motor. When Washington offers only sticks without carrots, Brazil has little choice but to turn toward a pragmatic East. Uruguay’s president, who recently visited China with a large business delegation to demand faster trade talks, is a clear testament to this regional impatience.

Historically, a Mercosur-China deal was viewed as “mission impossible” due to the bloc’s Common External Tariff rules, which forbid members from negotiating individual trade deals. Politics also posed a formidable barrier. Paraguay, a member of Mercosur, maintains “diplomatic ties” with China’s Taiwan region, creating a legal deadlock to any comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Beijing under the one-China principle.

Furthermore, Argentina’s political pendulum – swinging from protectionist Peronism to Javier Milei’s pro-US stance – has made a unified strategy difficult.

This is why the proposed “partial agreement” is a masterstroke of political pragmatism. It serves as a strategic bypass around these obstacles.

Unlike a full FTA targeting zero tariffs, a partial deal sidesteps the sensitive issue of tariff reduction that terrifies Brazilian manufacturers. It also navigates around Paraguay’s diplomatic dilemma. Instead, it would focus on non-tariff barriers, such as harmonizing sanitary regulations, streamlining customs procedures and setting import quotas.

By shifting the focus from tariffs to regulatory cooperation, Brazil is doing more than just clearing the path for soy and iron ore. It is paving the way for deeper integration of Chinese capital.

The China-Brazil relationship has already evolved from simple trade to manufacturing. With Chinese EV makers taking over shuttered Ford factories in Bahia, the two economies are moving toward supply chain symbiosis. This partial agreement could provide the institutional framework needed to secure those investments.

From a macro perspective, this is a snapshot of the Global South’s increasing autonomy. If these talks proceed, they will mark the opening of a new path – one where pragmatism supersedes ideology.

This serves as a stark reminder to policymakers in Washington: trying to block economic gravity with pressure tactics often accelerates the search for new partners. The shifting winds in South America are not merely a passive reaction to fading hegemony; they represent an active and powerful response from nations determined to define their own economic destiny.

February 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

‘Fact-checking’ as a disinformation scheme: The Brazilian case of Agência Lupa

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 7, 2026

Since the term “fake news” emerged in the world of political journalism, we have been confronted with a new angle through which the establishment attempts to reinforce its hegemony in the intellectual and informational sphere: by simulating ideology as science, data, or fact.

A fundamental aspect of hegemonic liberalism in the “rival-less” post-Cold War world is the transition of ideology into the diffuse realm of pure facticity. What decades earlier was clearly identified as belief comes to be taken as “data,” that is, as indisputable, not open for debate. This is the case, for example, with the myth of “democracy,” the myth of “human rights,” the myth of “progress,” and the myth of the “free market.” And today, we could extend this to the dictates of “gender ideology” and a series of other beliefs of ideological foundation, which are nevertheless taken as scientific facts.

“Fact-checking” has thus become one of the many mechanisms used by the establishment to reinforce systemic “consensus” in the face of the emergence of alternative perspectives following the popularization of the internet and independent journalism. The “authoritative” distinction made by a self-declared “independent” and “respectable” agency between what would be “fact” and what would be “fake news” has become a new source of truth.

Some liberal-democratic governments, like the USA, have gone so far as to create special departments dedicated to “combating fake news,” thus acting as authentic “Ministries of Truth” of Orwellian memory.

However, even within the “independent” sphere, we rarely encounter genuine independence. On the contrary, in fact, Western “fact-checking agencies” tend to be well-integrated into the constellation of NGOs, foundations, and associations of the non-profit industrial complex, which, in turn, is permeated by the money of large corporations and the interests of liberal-democratic governments. Even their staff tend to be revolving doors for figures coming from the NGO world, mainstream journalism, and state bureaucracy.

Although the phenomenon is of Western origin, Brazil is not exempt from it. “Fact-checking agencies” also operate here — most of them engaged in the same types of disinformation operations as the governments, newspapers, and NGOs that sponsor them.

A typical example is Agência Lupa.

Founded in 2015, its founder Cristina Tardáguila previously worked for another disinformation apparatus disguised as “fact-checking,” Preto no Branco, funded by Grupo Globo (founded and owned by the Marinho family, members of which are mentioned in the Epstein Files). Lupa was financially boosted by João Moreira Salles, from the billionaire banker family Moreira Salles (of Itaú Unibanco).

Despite claiming independence from the editorial control of Revista Piauí, also controlled by the Moreira Salles family, Agência Lupa continues to be virtually hosted by Piauí’s resources, where Tardáguila worked as a journalist from 2006 to 2011. Furthermore, she also received support from the Instituto Serrapilheira, also from the Moreira Salles family, during the health crisis to act as a mechanism for imposing the pandemic consensus in what was one of the largest social experiments in human history.

In parallel, it is relevant to mention that the same João Moreira Salles was involved decades ago in a scandal after it was revealed that he had financed “Marcinho VP,” one of the leaders of the drug trafficking organization Comando Vermelho. Moreira Salles made a deal with the justice system to avoid being held accountable for this involvement.

Tardáguila was also the deputy director of the International Fact-Checking Network, an absolutely “independent” “fake news combat” network, yet funded by institutions such as the Open Society, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Google, Meta, the Omidyar Network, and the US State Department, through the National Endowment for Democracy.

Today Tardáguila no longer runs Lupa, but her “profile” on the official page of the National Endowment for Democracy (notorious funder of color revolutions and disinformation operations around the world) states that she is quite active at the Equis Institute, which counts among its funders the abortion organization Planned Parenthood, and aims to conduct social engineering against “Latino” populations.

Lupa is currently headed by Natália Leal. Contrary to the narrative of “independence,” the reality is that she has worked for several Brazilian mass media outlets, such as Poder360, Diário Catarinense, and Zero Hora, in addition to also writing for Revista Piauí, from the same Moreira Salles. Leal is less “internationally connected” than Tardáguila, but she was “graced” with an award from the International Center for Journalists, an association of “independent journalists” that, in fact, is also funded by the US State Department’s National Endowment for Democracy, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Meta, Google, CNN, the Washington Post, USAID, and the Serrapilheira Institute itself, also from Moreira Salles.

Quite clearly, it is somewhat difficult to take seriously the notion that Lupa would have sufficient autonomy and independence to act as an impartial arbiter of all narratives spread on social networks when it and its key figures themselves have these international connections, including at a governmental level.

But even on a practical level, it is difficult to take seriously the self-attributed role of confronting “fake news.” Returning to the pandemic period, for example, the differentiated treatment given by the company to the Russian Sputnik vaccine and the Pfizer vaccine is noteworthy. The former is treated with suspicion in articles written in August and September 2020, both authored by Jaqueline Sordi (who is also on the staff of the Serrapilheira Institute and a dozen other NGOs funded by Open Society), the latter is defended tooth and nail in dozens of articles by various authors, ranging from insisting that Pfizer’s vaccines are 100% safe for children, to stating that Bill Gates never advocated for reducing the world population.

On this matter, by the way, it is important to emphasize that Itaú coordinates investment portfolios that include Pfizer, therefore, there are business interests that bring the Moreira Salles family and the pharmaceutical giant closer.

But beyond disinformation about Big Pharma, as well as about other places around the world, such as Venezuela, regarding which Lupa claims that María Corina Machado has the popular support of 72% of the Venezuelan population (based on a survey by an institute that is not even Venezuelan, ClearPath Strategies), Lupa seems to have a particular obsession with Russia and, curiously, Lupa’s alignment with the dominant narratives in Western media is absolute.

Lupa argues, for example, that the Bucha Massacre was perpetrated by Russia, using the New York Times as its sole source. Regarding Mariupol, it insists on the narrative of the Russian attack on the maternity hospital and other civilian targets, even mentioning Mariana Vishegirskaya, who now lives in Moscow, has admitted to being a paid actress in a staging organized by the Ukrainian government, and now works in the Social Initiatives Committee of the “Rodina” Foundation. It also denies the attempted genocide in Donbass and the practice of organ trafficking in Ukraine.

An article written by founder Cristina Tardáguila herself relies on the Atlantic Council as a source to accuse Russia of spreading disinformation, one of which would be that Ukraine is a failed state subservient to Europe — two pieces of information that any average geopolitical analyst would calmly confirm.

A particular object of Lupa’s obsession is the Global Fact-Checking Network — of which, by the way, I am a part. It is one of the few international organizations dedicated to fact-checking in a manner independent of ideological constraints, counting among its members a team that is, certainly, much more diverse and multifaceted than the typical “revolving door” of fact-checking agencies in the Atlantic circuit, where everyone studied more or less in the same places, worked in mass media, and were, at some point, funded or received grants from Open Society, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and/or the US State Department.

Lupa’s criterion for attacking the GFCN is… precisely obedience or not to Western mass media sources, in a circular reasoning that cannot go beyond the argument from authority.

This specific case helps to expose a bit the functioning of these disinformation apparatuses typical of hybrid warfare, which disguise themselves in the cloak of journalistic neutrality to engage in informational warfare in defense of the liberal West.

February 7, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Russophobia, Science and Pseudo-Science | , | Leave a comment

Beijing cancels Panama deals after court blocks Chinese port operations

The Cradle | February 5, 2026

Chinese authorities have asked state-owned companies to suspend talks on new projects in Panama, in response to the Central American nation’s cancellation of a contract with China’s CK Hutchison Holdings to operate two ports along its strategic canal, Bloomberg reported on 5 February.

According to sources familiar with the matter, Panama’s decision could jeopardize billions of dollars in potential Chinese investments.

Chinese authorities also asked shipping companies to consider rerouting goods through other ports if the extra cost is not prohibitive, and have stepped up inspections of Panamanian imports, such as bananas and coffee.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian issued a statement saying that the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling “ignores the facts, violates credibility,” while harming the interests of Chinese companies.

Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison responded to the Supreme Court decision by initiating international arbitration proceedings against Panama.

CK Hutchison has operated Panama’s Cristobal and Balboa ports for decades. The ports lie at opposite ends of the Panama Canal – the strategic waterway that connects the Pacific and Caribbean Oceans, and through which roughly three percent of global seaborne trade passes.

The move comes amid US President Donald Trump’s campaign to counter Chinese influence over strategic infrastructure in the Americas.

Following his election last year, Trump argued that it was “foolish” of the US to hand over control of the canal to Panama. The US built the canal in 1904 and handed it back to Panamanians nearly a century later, in 1999.

Trump has also complained about the fees Panama charges the US to use the waterway.

Amid pressure from Washington, Panama also withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in February last year.

At the time, Beijing stated it “firmly opposes the United States using pressure and coercion to smear and undermine Belt and Road cooperation. The US side’s attacks … once again expose its hegemonic nature.”

Twenty Latin American nations have participated in the BRI since Beijing initiated it in 2013.

Current Chinese infrastructure projects in Panama include a $1.4-billion bridge over the canal, a cruise terminal constructed by China Harbour Engineering Co., and a segment of a metro line by China Railway Tunnel Group Co.

In Latin America, Trump is seeking to revive the 200-year-old Monroe Doctrine. It states that Washington will not allow European powers to interfere in the Western Hemisphere as they had in colonial times, asserting that the region would be regarded as a sphere of US interest.

Trump used the doctrine as one of his justifications for bombing Venezuela and abducting its president, Nicholas Maduro, on 3 January.

The US president claimed that Maduro was hosting “foreign adversaries in our region” and acquired “menacing offensive weapons that could threaten U.S. interests and lives.”

February 5, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Sinophobia | , , , | Leave a comment

Russia doubts ‘bright future’ for US economic ties – Lavrov

RT | February 5, 2026

The actions of US President Donald Trump’s administration contradict its claims that it is willing to restore economic cooperation with Russia, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said.

Since returning to the White House more than a year ago, Trump has repeatedly said he wants to do business with Moscow. After a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin last March, the White House teased “enormous economic deals” between the two countries once the Ukraine conflict is settled.

Moscow doubts the sincerity of those claims by Washington, Lavrov said in an interview with RT’s Rick Sanchez on Thursday, ahead of Diplomatic Workers’ Day on February 10.

Not only the economic restrictions that had been slapped on Moscow under the previous administration of US President Joe Biden “all remain in place,” but “very harsh sanctions have been imposed against our largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, for the first time,” he said.

Washington’s move “surprised” Putin, the foreign minister recalled, coming just weeks after his face-to-face meeting with Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, in August, during which Moscow “supported the US proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.”

According to Lavrov, the Americans are now “openly trying to push Russian companies from Venezuela.” This follows a January raid by US commandos on the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, during which President Nicolas Maduro and his wife were abducted.

“India is being banned from buying Russian oil. At least, that is what was announced,” the Russian diplomat added.

Last month, Washington also said that “a state of emergency is being declared due to the threat Cuba poses to US interests in the Caribbean, including due to Russia’s hostile and malicious policies,” the minister noted.

The US is looking to introduce “a worldwide ban” on Russian oil and gas supplies, saying that they should be replaced by American oil and liquefied natural gas, Lavrov stressed.

“Well, the bright future of our economic and investment cooperation doesn’t really square with that,” he noted.

February 5, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics | , , , | Leave a comment

Focus on Panama’s ‘port case’ must not be misplaced

Global Times | February 3, 2026

Since the Supreme Court of Panama ruled that CK Hutchison’s concession contract to operate Panama Canal ports was “unconstitutional,” the most elated individuals over the past few days have undoubtedly been certain US politicians and media outlets. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly posted on social media that the US is “encouraged,” while some American media outlets claimed this marks a “major victory” for Washington in curbing Chinese influence. The Wall Street Journal even issued a blunt threat, stating that other countries “might re-examine their ties to the world’s second-biggest economy.”

The cries of “victory” coming from the US confirm widespread outside suspicions and further expose Washington’s hegemonic arrogance in using geopolitical means to interfere with commercial cooperation and undermine trade rules. Although the US formally handed over control of the Panama Canal in 1999, in Washington’s Cold War mentality, this area remains an “inner lake” that others are not allowed to touch. The US has repeatedly expressed desire to “retake control of the Canal,” and Secretary of State Rubio chose Panama for his first overseas visit, threatening the country that it “must reduce Chinese influence.” Therefore, when the Supreme Court of Panama issued its so-called ruling, it is difficult for the international public opinion not to question its independence.

However, if one follows Washington’s rhythm and views this turmoil through the lens of “US-China competition,” they fall into a cognitive trap set by the US, and the focus on this matter becomes misplaced. These ports have never been, and should never be, bargaining chips in a geopolitical game. In fact, CK Hutchison has operated these ports for nearly 30 years; in such a long span of time, where has there ever been a shadow of a “Chinese threat”?

On the contrary, under the company’s management, these ports have been developed, benefiting the local area and contributing to global free trade. In this process, the US itself has been one of the beneficiaries. Therefore, regarding the attention on Panama’s port operation rights, if one must talk about winners and losers, the core should lie in the contest between free trade and hegemonism, and the confrontation between the spirit of contract and power politics.

Whether it is the ports along the Panama Canal, Australia’s Darwin Port mired in controversy, or the case of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the same “invisible hand” looms in the background. Some countries repeatedly claim to uphold a “rules-based order”; yet in practice, what they defend is an “order based on the interests of a single country.” This is, in essence, a targeted demolition of global investment credibility. If commercial contracts can be nullified at the whim of politicians or under pressure from allies, then no long-term investment within the Western system is truly safe. From Southeast Asia to the Middle East, global investors are watching closely, asking whether today’s rapacious acts will tomorrow descend upon any profitable industry.

International investment law does indeed recognize “security exceptions,” but these are by no means a universal master key for hegemonism. The core of international commercial law is certainty: companies that operate in compliance with the rules deserve the protection of the law. By using diplomatic coercion to push allies into rulings that defy legal principles, the US is eroding from within the very credit foundations on which the capitalist world depends. In the short term, Washington may have secured a few “strategic footholds”; however, in the long term, this has fundamentally undermined the international credibility of the US and the space for transnational commercial interactions. It is foreseeable that when the law ceases to be a fair arbiter and becomes a political tool, global capital will have to seek safe havens independent of the dollar system and the US “long-arm” influence.

What is even more concerning to the international community is that the geopolitical will of the US often surpasses the constitutions of some sovereign nations. This is a mockery of the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. From the case of Alstom years ago to the current controversy over Darwin Port, the methods used by the US to attack competitors and seize interests are strikingly similar. The international business community needs a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment, not a “law of the jungle” dominated by hegemonic will. If this trend of politicizing economic and trade issues and weaponizing legal tools continues unchecked, the ultimate victim will be the entire international economic and trade order. Those who attempt to curb their rivals by undermining the rules will also find themselves facing a bankruptcy of credibility.

As an important maritime passage that carries about 5 percent of global shipping trade, the Panama Canal ports have become a crucial cargo hub on a global scale, and they should not waver under the shadow of hegemonism. According to reports, concessions for the Panama Canal ports will now need to be auctioned off.

In this context, it is hoped that the Panamanian side will truly demonstrate its “independence” by providing a predictable environment for fair competition for all bidders, rather than trying by any means to “ensure that China is blocked from the bidding” as some US media outlets have trumpeted. The whole world is watching everything that happens there.

February 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Davos, Mark Carney’s frankness, and the Euro-American rift

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 29, 2026

One of the defining factors of the era beginning from the second half of the 20th century is the partnership between the USA and Europe – initially only Western Europe, eventually most of the old continent. But “partnership” is perhaps an imprecise term. The ideal term would probably be “occupation,” since, as defined by Lord Ismay, NATO was created to “keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down.”

In the meantime, Europeans grew accustomed to an automatic alignment with the USA, quite similar to that of Ibero-American countries during the same period, with the exception of the brief period when Charles de Gaulle distanced his country from NATO. Otherwise, the Atlantic Alliance gradually absorbed European countries.

The confusion is such that when speaking of “Western civilization,” most people think of Europe and the USA together, not only as expressions of the same civilization but as possessing identical fundamental and strategic interests. The Davos Forum or World Economic Forum can be thought of as the “celebration” of this civilizational alliance, an event bringing together political, economic, and societal leaders from around the world to discuss the priorities to be adopted in the coming years.

Historically, the USA and its representatives have always been prominent at the Davos Forum in all discussions, whether on environmental issues, the supposed need to censor the internet, or the social transformations considered necessary to deal with the 2020 pandemic crisis or future health crises. It was a space for consensus and planning among the North Atlantic elites.

However, Trump’s antagonistic stance towards the countries of the European Union inevitably significantly changed the atmosphere of Davos this time.

The pressures and demands for the cession of Greenland, including the threat of using military force, ultimately became the driving force of interactions among the elites. Naturally, at this moment, EU countries would not be capable of mounting significant military resistance to the USA in Greenland. But the increase in European military presence on the Danish-owned island seems to serve simply as the drawing of a red line.

And despite Mark Rutte rushing to try to find some sort of compromise with Trump on the Greenland issue, the reality is that Trump’s mere threat and pressure against his supposed allies was enough to leave scars. In other words, no matter how timid and cowardly current European leadership may be, to the point of yielding time and again, European distrust and ill-will towards the USA is still likely to increase.

Perhaps it is even necessary to look at other sectors besides the political summit. Among intellectuals, think tanks, journalists, and influencers, it seems easier to find tougher and more critical positions regarding the USA, as well as less willingness to reconcile, than among national political leaders.

“Anti-Americanism,” once a central plank for both nationalist and socialist parties in Europe but fallen into disuse after the Cold War, may end up becoming an important discursive topic again in this era of rising diverse populisms.

To a large extent, the speech by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, can be seen as a reasonable summary of the current geopolitical moment.

Throughout his speech in Davos, Carney emphasized that for decades, Canada and most Western countries remained aligned with the so-called “rules-based international order,” even considering it partly fictional; still, it was a useful and pleasant fiction. The other Western countries knew that these rules were not applied equally to all countries, and that stronger countries were practically exempt from most of their regulations. Everything in that order depended on who was the “accused” and who was the “accuser.” Different countries, engaged in the same actions, such as suppressing civilian protesters, for example, would receive different treatment depending on who their leaders and governments were: some would receive no more than a symbolic slap on the wrist, others would be bombed and have their heads of state executed in sham courts.

And these Western countries were satisfied as long as the bombed countries were African or Arab or, occasionally, some Slavic country like Serbia. This was because, for a few countries, that order allowed them to collect benefits in the form of capitalist extractivism.

Now, however, the international order has ended. It does not even survive as a farce – according to Carney himself. Faced with a series of crises, many countries began to perceive global integration more as an Achilles’ heel than as an advantage. Goods might have been cheaper, but what good is the theoretical availability of cheaper products when, in times of crisis, they become inaccessible, as during the health crisis. Or when sanctions simply make trade relations unviable for targeted countries.

For Carney, therefore, some countries have decided to transform themselves into fortresses, primarily concerned with ensuring their own energy, food, and military autonomy. And one of the basic consequences of this change is the decline of multilateral organizations. International courts, the WHO, the WTO, the World Bank, and various other bodies are increasingly ignored and disdained by regional powers – in the case of countries outside the “Atlantic axis,” because they consider the influence of the USA and its allies in these bodies too great; in the case of the USA, because, on the contrary, they consider that these bodies do not sufficiently serve US national interests.

This parallel and crosswise dissatisfaction is natural, to the extent that international institutions only ever served the USA and its hegemony insofar as that hegemony was the best tool for gradually constituting a “world government,” that “New World Order” proclaimed by George H. W. Bush.

The consequence of this process of collapse of globalist multilateralism is that international relations have come to be dominated by force. Most medium-power countries are not prepared to deal with this new and sudden reality. Moreover, it is naive to simply condemn the current situation and hope for a return to the “good old days” of a “rules-based” international order where the rules do not apply equally to everyone.

Carney also makes a suggestion for these medium-power countries to deal with the current international situation: strengthen bilateral relations with countries of similar mindset and orientation, building small coalitions of reasonably limited scope, aiming both to eliminate possible economic weaknesses and to enhance security mechanisms.

Naturally, Carney is specifically referring to strengthening Canada-EU relations, but, to some extent, we can also apply this kind of reflection to those counter-hegemonic or non-aligned countries that are not continental powers like Russia, China, and India. The case of Venezuela demonstrated that it is, in fact, necessary to be prepared to deal with US aggressiveness.

Countries like Brazil, despite its size and the importance given to it in international relations, lack nuclear weapons and sufficiently modern military forces to effectively protect itself against a focused and determined military action. Naturally, Brazil should seek to solve these deficiencies (and, indeed, the debate on “Brazilian nuclear weapons” has already begun in political, military, and social circles), but no significant change will be seen in the short term – which is why Brazil actually needs to develop other ways to guarantee its own security that do not depend on simple servility to the USA.

It would be fully in Brazil’s interests to lobby, within BRICS, for increasing the “security” dimension of the coalition. Still, we doubt that the current Brazilian administration has any interest in this, or even that it understands the need for such a radical transformation. In the absence of this initiative, at the very least, Brazil should seek to update its military, intelligence, and radar technology with the help of Russian-Chinese partnerships. But on a regional level, Brazil needs to strengthen its ties with other South American countries and begin, subtly, to try to attract them and remove them from the US orbit.

In short, the mere fact that we are discussing these needs, instead of naively betting that international forums created on Western initiative will be enough to defend us, already proves that we are already in a new and dangerous world.

January 29, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

US pressure contributing to Israeli influence in Latin America: Experts

Press TV – January 26, 2026

US political pressure is contributing to the Israeli regime’s influence across Latin America, even as long-standing regional support for the Palestinian cause continues through diplomatic, legal, and grassroots channels, experts say.

For decades, several left-wing governments in the region shaped their foreign policy around anti-imperialism and de-colonial identity, aligning openly with Palestinian rights, but analysts warn the legacy is now at the disposal of a mix of US interference, far-right political shifts, and economic leverage, the Middle East Eye news and analysis website reported on Monday.

Following the launch of the Israeli regime’s war of genocide on Gaza in October 2023, Brazil’s president verified the nature of the onslaught as being “genocidal,” Colombia suspended diplomatic ties with the regime, and Chile sought accountability for Israeli atrocities at international courts. Yet experts cited by the outlet said Washington has worked to counter that momentum through lobbying, political threats, and direct pressure on outspoken governments.

“Latin American states lack instruments of hard power and are therefore constrained in how they can respond to US pressure,” said Ali Farhat, a Latin American affairs specialist. “That limitation creates openings for Israel to consolidate influence, particularly where governments seek to avoid confrontation with Washington.”

US officials have increasingly framed cooperation with Washington as a test of “security” and “democratic alignment,” while linking regional diplomacy to broader American foreign policy goals that dovetail with closer ties with Tel Aviv.

Argentina has emerged as the clearest example of this shift. Far-right President Javier Milei has announced plans to move the country’s embassy to the holy occupied city of al-Quds and expand security and economic cooperation with the regime, while openly backing its war on Gaza as “legitimate self-defense.”

Last year, Argentina received a $20-billion bailout from Washington, which US President Donald Trump defended as support for a “good financial philosophy,” despite skepticism over its impact on the country.

Farhat said US meddling has reshaped the regional landscape, pointing to Washington’s targeting of Venezuela’s leadership as part of a broader effort to weaken vocal supporters of Palestine.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, long seen as one of the most uncompromising defenders of Palestinian rights in Latin America, was kidnapped by US forces earlier this year and is now standing trial in New York on “drugs, weapons, and narco-terrorism” charges.

“He (Maduro) was among the most uncompromising defenders of Palestine on the continent,” Farhat said. “His marginalization [and now ouster] represents the loss of a fierce advocate for the cause.”

The pundit said Maduro framed the Palestinian struggle as inseparable from anti-imperialism and viewed the US as a colonial power and the regime as an occupying entity backed by it.

Since Trump’s return to office last year, Farhat said, left-leaning leaders have shifted tactics rather than abandoning Palestine, opting for recalibration over confrontation, but far-right governments have accelerated alignment with both Washington and Tel Aviv.

As of 25 January, Argentina is the only Latin American country to have agreed to join Trump’s controversial “Board of Peace” initiative in Gaza, which describes itself as an international organization seeking to promote stability and secure “peace.”

Nilto Tatto, a congressman from Brazil’s Workers’ Party, urged Latin American governments to reject the board and any initiatives undermining Palestinian rights.

“Any framework managed by Washington would not serve peace so much as reproduce hegemony under an international guise,” Tatto said.

“Brazil, evidently, cannot take part in a process whose outcome is already predetermined, namely one that focuses on the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip only to then keep the territory under US control.”

Julia Perie, a former Argentine lawmaker, said Argentina’s shift reflected ideological realignment.

“Argentina’s position is part of a geopolitical vision that prioritizes alignment with the United States,” said Perie.

She added that Latin American solidarity with Palestine has always been cyclical. “This is another phase in a longer historical transformation, not the end of solidarity.”

‘Recalibration not abandonment’

Amid the situation, observers noted, support for Palestine in countries facing mounting political pressure was increasingly being channeled through legal action, multilateral institutions, and popular movements rather than overt diplomatic confrontation.

Ramon Medero, president of Venezuela’s La Danta TV, said the current moment represented adaptation, not retreat.

“It is difficult to argue that the Palestinian cause has suffered a decisive blow,” Medero said.

“What we are seeing is a repackaging of escalation through legal and multilateral avenues to reduce the costs of sanctions and backlash.”

Medero added that the Palestinian cause was now embedded in a broader Global South struggle.

“The Palestinian cause has become a structural symbol of liberation, sovereignty, and self-determination,” he said. “What is shifting is agency – away from governments and toward popular consciousness.”

He added that far-right advances could intensify grassroots mobilization.

January 26, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Solidarity and Activism | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment