Did Israel Just Forfeit Its ‘Right To Exist’? — Carlson’s Interview with Huckabee
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | February 28, 2026
Key Takeaways
- Senior political figures openly endorsed a Nile-to-Euphrates territorial vision.
- The “Greater Israel” concept is no longer fringe rhetoric.
- Israel’s borders remain undeclared while territorial expansion continues.
- Legal justifications rooted in Balfour and UNGA 181 are increasingly strained.
- The demand to recognize Israel’s “right to exist” faces growing scrutiny.
The Mainstreaming of ‘Greater Israel’
There is no nation on earth whose government constantly demands its critics acknowledge its ‘right to exist’ as does Israel; this is because it seeks the world’s acquiescence as a means of enabling the indefensible. In truth, nobody, short of Christian Zionists and Jewish Supremacists believe Israel has a right to exist.
In Tucker Carlson’s recent interview with US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, the idea of Israel’s legitimacy was not only touched upon, but completely unraveled through a basic series of questions. Instead of furiously clashing with the self-described Christian Zionist, all Carlson did was ask serious follow-up questions and demand answers.
Since then, the fallout from what was a trainwreck of an interview for Huckabee has triggered a wave of backlash from countries throughout the region. The US ambassador triggered this backlash after affirming his belief that Israel is entitled to all of the land between the River Nile and the Euphrates River, as part of its biblical right to exist.
This enormous land grab is what is known as the ‘Greater Israel Project’, once dubbed an outlandish conspiracy theory. ‘Greater Israel’ would include all of Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, most of Syria, along with parts of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Turkiye. Therefore, it is no wonder that a US ambassador expressing his belief that Tel Aviv is entitled to all of this territory drew the ire of the entire region.
However, an even more important development came only days later, receiving much less media attention. The leader of the Israeli opposition, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, expressed his own belief that Israel should seize all of the territory between the Nile and the Euphrates. Pegged as the more liberal and moderate opponent of Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu, Lapid argued that the territory should be seized only when the right “security” predicament presents itself.
Even though Lapid’s comments did not draw the same kind of backlash from the Arab world’s leadership, his open confession of belief in a biblical right to all of ‘Greater Israel’ is a more important and damning development than the comments of Huckabee. This clearly demonstrates that the entire mainstream Israeli political establishment seeks to achieve this vision.
The Loss of Legitimacy
As pointed out during Tucker Carlson’s interview with the US ambassador to Israel, the infamous Balfour Declaration was written by British Lord Arthur Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild. An important fact that is often never brought into question as the Balfour Declaration is often cited as a legal document justifying Israel’s existence. Instead, it was a document between two men.
From there, Israeli propagandists will point to later British government declarations as cementing this ‘right to establish a Jewish State in occupied Palestine. Finally, there is the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 that is held up as Israel’s de facto birth certificate. This, of course, ignores the fact that Israel was only granted 56% of the land, yet seized nearly 80% of the entire territory.
However, all of this is now irrelevant to the question of Israel’s alleged legitimacy and ‘right to exist’. The reason for this is very simple: the British sought to grant the territory of occupied Palestine, and so too did the UNGA resolution 181. No legal document exists to legitimize the occupation of Syrian and Lebanese lands, as the Israelis continue to expand their borders into these neighboring nations.
Which brings us back to the alleged ‘biblical’ right to existence that the US ambassador, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, and opposition leader Yair Lapid have all expressed their belief in. The Israelis have historically occupied Egyptian territory, and many Israeli politicians, including current ministers in the Likud Party’s coalition government, have expressed their desire to return to Egypt once again.
The Politics of the ‘Right to Exist’
Israel has never declared its borders, and since 1967 has occupied territory from both Syria and Lebanon, in violation of international law. At this current moment, it is capturing more and more land in southern Syria on a near-daily basis.
Therefore, Israel, as a nation that has no definable borders and whose political leadership, along with its society, believes in its biblical right to seize the territory belonging to its neighbors, has no legal basis to exist as it does today. It has committed genocide, apartheid, mass ethnic cleansings, and operates a system of total Jewish Supremacy in all the land it has seized, through war.
In addition to this, the Zionist movement has actively worked, especially since October 7, 2023, to not only undermine the United Nations as a whole, but to replace it. Yet turns around and cites a UNGA resolution as its ‘legal right to exist’. It violates all known diplomatic norms, having attacked the former Iranian embassy in Syria, bombarded Doha despite its status as a US ally, while ignoring a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza back in 2024.
The only argument that can be made for the continued existence of Israel as it functions today is an ideological one. This means that only two categories of human beings fit into this camp, Jewish Supremacists who believe in a biblical title to the land, and their Christian Zionist allies, who also provide a similar, theologically grounded argument.
There is no evidence that the majority, or even a plurality, of Christians believe in the concept of a ‘Greater Israel’, despite the best efforts of Christian Zionist lobby groups – the most powerful of which operate in the United States. In other words, a very small portion of the global population believes in this biblical interpretation. Even more troubling for the Zionist movement is that its settler colonial project was founded and led for much of its history by atheists.
If we are to define Israel by its current borders, which are undeclared and forever expanding, then there simply is no basis for arguing its existence, unless you do so from a theological perspective. As demonstrated through the questions offered to Ambassador Huckabee, who is himself a Christian pastor, there is no way of demonstrating that the Jewish population, or at least the majority of those Jewish people living in occupied Palestine, are directly related to the Israelites of the bible. In fact, all of the available DNA evidence would suggest that the Palestinians are more closely blood related to that population.
There is no nation on earth today that operates a system of ethno-religious supremacy as Israel does, no nation that violates international law as Israel does, nor is there another nation that bases its legitimacy on isolated and out of context passages from religious texts like Israel does either.
The reason why pro-Israel advocates are constantly demanding that everyone validate their legitimacy and ‘right to exist’ is simple: the affirmation of their flimsy arguments is what provides them the basis to continue behaving as the out-of-control regime that Israel is.
What Israel’s ‘right to exist’ comes down to is the belief that it should be allowed to dispossess millions of Muslims, Christians, and other indigenous peoples of their lands, in order to establish a system of domination. That ethnic cleansing is its right, the acquisition of territory via war is its right, and that committing mass murder against anyone who fights back is also their right.
Israel’s biblical ‘right to exist’ is just as valid as its right to kill entire populations it deems to be ‘Amalek’. If they do have that right, then so too does the so-called “Islamic State” terrorist organization.
The arguments made by Daesh (ISIS) and Israel for their ambitions to establish ever-expanding regimes of tyranny both carry the exact same level of historical and factual legitimacy. That is to say, neither argument carries any weight, beyond it being the belief of an isolated group of extremists – amongst the global population – who believe in a warped religious ‘right’ and that their theological arguments make them superior to all other human beings.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Lebanon: Between sovereignty and the mirage of normalization
By Ali Abou Jbara | The Cradle | February 26, 2026
The smoke had barely lifted from the latest Israeli bombardment of south Lebanon when another conversation began circulating in Beirut. While border villages buried their dead and families searched through rubble, a parallel discourse surfaced in studios and on digital platforms: normalization with Israel presented as a viable political path.
The ongoing war on Lebanon, marked by unprecedented Israeli escalation, daily raids, and widespread destruction, exposed more than military vulnerability. It revealed that certain voices inside the country no longer conceal their position toward Tel Aviv.
They now speak openly of public normalization as the cure for Lebanon’s crises – even as Israeli warplanes violate Lebanese skies, despite the so-called ceasefire. What is marketed as pragmatism begins to resemble political surrender.
Prominent personalities have amplified this shift. Journalist Marcel Ghanem declared live on his program “Sar al-Waqt” on MTV that he was considering speaking directly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suggested repealing Lebanese laws that criminalize dealings with Israel.
Digital platforms followed the same trajectory. “Hona Beirut” circulated videos of Israelis sending populist messages to Lebanese audiences – “We want peace with Lebanon. We want to visit Beirut and enjoy fattoush and shawarma” – carefully packaged to soften the image of a state whose aircraft continue to strike Lebanese territory.
Political figures moved even further. MP Paula Yacoubian stated publicly: “If salvation comes through Israel, let it come but save us.” Charles Jabbour, head of the Lebanese Forces (LF) party media apparatus, argued that Israel does not occupy Lebanon and does not attack the Lebanese, claiming instead that it monitors Hezbollah to ensure implementation of past agreements. He concluded: “If Hezbollah wins, Lebanon loses. If Israel wins, Lebanon wins.”
Such statements are deliberate. They substitute national consensus with partisan calculus and recast normalization as responsible governance.
Expansion as governing doctrine
Advocates of a “quick peace” treat Israel as a state seeking stability. The political current in Tel Aviv suggests something else entirely.
Under Netanyahu and his alliance with ultra-religious and nationalist forces, the “Greater Israel” vision operates as a strategic direction.
On 22 September 2023, Netanyahu stood before the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and presented a map that includes Gaza and the occupied West Bank as part of Israel, using the biblical name “Judea and Samaria” instead of the West Bank – in a symbolic dedication to the annexation project.
His coalition partner, Finance Minister and leader of “Religious Zionism” Bezalel Smotrich, had stated in 2016 that Israel’s borders “must extend to Damascus,” and appeared in Paris in March 2023 in front of a map that considers Jordan part of the “Land of Israel.”
Since Menachem Begin and the Likud party came to power in 1977, the concept of “Greater Israel” has morphed into a political program based on settlement expansion and changing demographic realities. This current is based on interpretations from the Book of Genesis that consider the “Promised Land” to extend from the Nile to the Euphrates. Even Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, wrote in the 1930s that establishing a state on part of the land would serve as a first stage, not an endpoint.
Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, expansionist language hardened. Military operations broadened in Gaza and the occupied West Bank while strikes intensified in Syria and Lebanon. “Security depth” expanded to encompass regional theaters.
On 21 February 2026, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said in an interview with Tucker Carlson that, under a biblical interpretation of land promised in Genesis, it “would be fine if [Israel] took it all,” implicitly extending Israel’s reach across much of West Asia – remarks that sparked sharp regional condemnation.
Maps circulated by proponents of this project extend beyond historic Palestine. They incorporate Lebanon, Jordan, most of Syria, half of Iraq, and territories in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Kuwait.
Against that strategic horizon, Lebanese normalization rhetoric begins to feel profoundly detached from the lived reality of the country. Border villages remain scarred, Lebanese airspace is violated without consequence, and sovereignty is subjected to daily erosion, yet normalization is presented as transactional diplomacy, detached from geography and history.
It is precisely here that the Lebanese debate turns unsettling. What does it mean to pursue “peace” with a project whose declared maps stretch beyond its recognized borders? How does a state whose skies, waters, and land are routinely breached convince itself to trust assurances from a government that treats expansion as a generational mission?
The occupied West Bank as precedent
The occupied West Bank offers a concrete case study. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the settler population has grown from roughly 250,000 to more than 700,000. Hundreds of settlements and outposts now fragment the territory. Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen has described this as imposing “de facto sovereignty” – gradual annexation without formal declaration.
Land confiscations, bypass roads, settlement blocs, and armed settler protection have eroded the territorial basis for Palestinian statehood. Smotrich openly advocates annexation and rejects Palestinian sovereignty. Netanyahu presides over what observers describe as the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, with settlement expansion central to its agenda.
Three decades of negotiations unfolded alongside continuous territorial transformation. Diplomatic processes advanced in parallel with irreversible changes on the ground. This is how “peace” is managed when it is a tool to strengthen control, not to end it.
Despite this record, similar assumptions appear in Lebanese discourse. MP Camille Chamoun of the Free Patriots Party says he does not believe Israel has an interest in violating international agreements and Lebanese borders.
MP Sami Gemayel, head of the Kataeb Party, suggests that relations with Israel and western countries may protect Lebanon. Even Lebanese actress and writer Carine Rizkallah said on the TV program Al-Masar that she hoped there would be no new war with Israel and that “it’s time to end these problems between the two countries.”
The irony is that Lebanese rhetoric promoting normalization leans on an assumption of good faith from the other side, even though the occupied West Bank continues to show how such assumptions unfold in practice. There, decades of agreements, conferences, and international sponsorship did not halt expansion; they unfolded alongside it, as settlements multiplied, land was fragmented, and entire areas were quietly absorbed into a new reality.
If this is where the occupied West Bank has arrived after years of accords and external guarantees, on what basis is Lebanon encouraged to trust similar assurances? The experience is not abstract or distant. It is ongoing, visible, and instructive for anyone willing to look.
Regional patterns of influence
The broader region reinforces this reading. After the fall of the previous Syrian government on 8 December 2024, Israeli influence expanded in southern and central Syria, capitalizing on security vacuums and fragmentation. Strategic corridors between northern Syria and Israeli ports strengthened. Control over the occupied Golan Heights and adjacent water resources deepened.
Turkiye adopted a confrontational stance toward Israeli expansion, warning that the absence of clear red lines destabilizes Syria and opens space for broader intervention. Ankara expanded its diplomatic engagement on Palestine, strengthened regional alliances, and emphasized deterrence, demonstrating that even governments with formal ties to Israel are wary of unchecked expansion.
Across neighboring states, internal divisions have created entry points for influence. Settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, strikes in Syria, and sustained violations in Lebanon reflect an interconnected strategy.
Normalization premised on unilateral concession narrows strategic space. In regional practice, asymmetrical engagement tends to consolidate the stronger party’s position.
Lebanon operates within that same environment. Any official normalization would unfold against Israel’s strategic framework and military advantage. Expectations of reciprocal restraint lack precedent in current regional dynamics.
Lebanon’s historical record
Lebanon’s experience with Israeli aggression remains documented. In April 1996, Israeli forces bombed a UN base in Qana, killing more than 100 civilians who had sought shelter. In September 1982, the Sabra and Shatila massacre occurred under the watch of the Israeli army. The 1982 Israeli invasion reached Beirut, and south Lebanon remained under occupation until 2000, liberated only through sustained resistance.
The July 2006 war resulted in more than 1,200 Lebanese deaths, extensive infrastructure destruction, and the displacement of nearly one million people. Airspace violations continued long after hostilities subsided.
Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s decision to open a northern support front, strikes on southern villages resumed, placing Lebanon within a wider expansionist frame.
In this context, normalization proposals detach policy from cumulative experience. They assume recalibration without structural change. Historical precedent suggests otherwise.
Legal foundations
Lebanon’s stance toward Israel is codified in law. Since 1955, the Boycott of Israel Law has prohibited commercial, cultural, and political dealings with the Israeli enemy. The law remains in force and constitutes a foundational element of Lebanese state policy.
The penal code criminalizes espionage and communication with the enemy, including cooperation that provides political, media, or moral benefit. In contemporary circumstances, public statements or digital content that promote normalization may fall within this framework if deemed to confer advantage. Penalties can include imprisonment and fines.
Given ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, normalization carries national security implications under existing legislation. Judicial and security institutions retain authority to investigate potential breaches.
This legal architecture reflects accumulated historical experience rather than abstract doctrine.
Sovereignty under pressure
The present debate concerns strategic direction under sustained pressure. An expansionist project operates openly in the region. Lebanon’s historical memory remains recent.
Calls for normalization at a moment of ongoing aggression raise structural questions about sovereignty, deterrence, and long-term stability. Strategic environments shaped by military asymmetry rarely reward unilateral accommodation.
Lebanon faces a clear dilemma. Defending sovereignty requires political coherence and deterrent capacity. Pursuing normalization without reciprocal structural change invites further testing of borders and institutions.
The chosen trajectory will shape more than just diplomatic posture. It will define how the state positions itself within a region undergoing forced transformation.
US fears Iran war will ‘deplete’ air defenses stretched thin by Ukraine, Israel: Report
The Cradle | February 26, 2026
Military officials and lawmakers in Washington have warned that a prolonged war with Iran could stretch US military stockpiles of air defense interceptor missiles “to the brink and make the country more vulnerable,” POLITICO reported on 26 February.
“Gen. Dan Caine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair, has raised concerns about the military’s shortage of air defense interceptors since January,” POLITICO wrote, citing a person familiar with the matter.
“But the fears have magnified in recent weeks as the Pentagon amassed the largest military buildup in the Middle East since the Iraq War,” the magazine added.
Since returning to the White House a year ago, US President Donald Trump has won praise from Israelis while supporting the genocide in Gaza and overseeing a massive expansion of US military operations, including in Venezuela, Yemen, and Nigeria.
Crucially, Trump ordered US warplanes to join Israel’s 12-day war on Iran to bomb Tehran’s nuclear sites in June 2025.
Interceptor missiles were used not only to protect US forces from Iranian and Yemeni counterattacks but also to protect Israel from Iran’s barrages of ballistic missiles and drones.
During these operations, US forces “burned through” significant numbers of Standard Missile-3s, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, and Patriot missiles, POLITICO observed.
Since then, the Pentagon has been unable to replenish its interceptor stocks due to the complexity and slow pace of their production.
Six current and former US officials and members of Congress told POLITICO of their widespread worries that a sustained war with Iran could deplete remaining US air defenses and “leave tens of thousands of American troops in the region unprotected against Tehran’s missile salvos.”
An Israeli intelligence official stated on Thursday that the US only has the capacity to sustain four or five days of intense aerial assault on Iran, the Times of Israel wrote, citing the Financial Times (FT).
Israel is pushing for a major war, claiming that limited US strikes on Iran could only “embolden the regime,” the Times of Israel added.
Since January, President Trump has assembled what he called an “armada” of US naval ships with accompanying war planes in the region in preparation for a possible renewed attack on the Islamic Republic.
Analysts have suggested that Iran will retaliate much more strongly in the event of a second war, including against US bases in the Gulf, leading to a much longer and more devastating war than last June.
“Do we have enough interceptors to sustain a retaliation?” said the person familiar with the talks. “We don’t have a discretely focused objective. Is it regime change or is it [just] ballistic missiles?”
A US military spokesperson responded to the POLITICO report by saying its weapons stockpiles are sufficient.
“The Department of War has everything it needs to execute any mission at the time and place of the president’s choosing and on any timeline,” said spokesperson Sean Parnell.
However, some US lawmakers say that the defense industry is not producing enough Lockheed Martin-built Patriot interceptors or RTX’s Tomahawk long-range missiles, nor quickly enough.
“There have been urgent calls for reforms in procurement, but the net result is that we are seemingly unable to meet all of the needs for defense production – for Ukraine, for our partners in the Middle East,” said Richard Blumenthal, a Democratic congressman.
“It may be problematic to think about moving Patriot missile interceptor systems from the Middle East because now we’re going to have to protect our embassies, not to mention our bases,” he added.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank, estimated the US had used up to 20 percent of the Standard Missile-3 interceptors and between 20 and 50 percent of its THAAD missiles.
John Mearsheimer: The Case for a Nuclear Iran
Glenn Diesen | February 25, 2026
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. Prof. Mearsheimer argues why Iran should be considered a rational actor, and why Iran should develop nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent.
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Israeli Opposition Leader Endorses Greater Israel
The Dissident | February 24, 2026
U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, sparked major backlash during his recent interview with Tucker Carlson, where he openly endorsed the idea of a Greater Israel, stating that “it would be fine” if Israel took large swaths of the Middle East.
In damage control mode, Zionists attempted to paint Huckbee’s claims as fringe or extreme within Israel, but Israel’s opposition leader , Yair Lapid, has confirmed that the prospect of an expansionist Greater Israel is supported even by the more supposedly “liberal” wing of the Israeli political spectrum.
When asked, “The Ambassador Huckabee said this week, and we know the extent of the American administration on the government here, that he supports Israeli control from the Euphrates to the Nile, this means [control] over Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, do you support it or do you think this should be stopped?”, Lapid replied, “I don’t think I have a dispute on the biblical level [about] what the original borders of Israel are.”
Lapid went on to endorse massive Israeli expansion, saying, “support anything that will allow the Jews [to have] a big, vast, strong land, and a safe shelter for us, for our children, and for our children’s children. That’s what I support” adding, “However possible” when asked “How vast?”.
When further asked, “Until Iraq?” Lapid replied, “The discussion is a security discussion. The fact that we are in our ancestral land… Yesh Atid’s position is as follows: Zionism is based on the bible. Our mandate of the land of Israel is biblical. The biblical borders of Israel are clear. There are also considerations of security, of policy, and of time. We were in exile for 2,000 years… you don’t really want all this lecture, right? At least you were not waiting for it… The answer is: there are practical considerations here. Beyond the practical considerations, I believe that our ownership deed over the land of Israel is the bible, therefore the borders are the biblical borders”.
Lapid even advocated that Israel take “as much as possible” of Greater Israel, saying, “Fundamentally, the great, big and vast Israel, as much as possible within the limitations of Israeli security and considerations of Israeli policy”.
Similarly, Benjamin Netanyahu has previously stated that he “subscribed to a ‘vision’ for a ‘Greater Israel’” and “very much”, “felt connected to the ‘Greater Israel’ vision”.
Israeli officials have long been clear that their end goal in Gaza and the West Bank has been total ethnic cleansing and annexation, with Israel’s Science and Technology Minister Gila Gamliel admitting , “we will make Gaza unlivable for humans until the population leaves, and then we will do the same for the West Bank”.
But Yair Lapid’s comments show that across the spectrum from Netanyahu to his “liberal” opposition, Israel has expansionist ambitions beyond Gaza and the West Bank, and wants to take “as much as possible” of Greater Israel.
Trump’s military buildup against Iran on Netanyahu’s behalf is a gambit doomed to fail
By Iqbal Jassat | Press TV | February 25, 2026
While uncertainty clouds the possibility of America launching a full-scale war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, pro-war narratives emanating from the apartheid regime of Israel desperately seek to justify it.
The war cries raised by Israel’s genocidaires are hardly surprising. After all, it is well known that the regime premier and the criminal-in-chief, Benjamin Netanyahu, has, since the 1990,s been pressuring the United States to carry out direct military action against Tehran.
Hence, it would not be incorrect to conclude that Washington’s war drums over Iran are not the product of strategy. They are the product of imperial reflex and Zionist pressure masquerading as deterrence.
Bizarrely, the spectacle of force assembled under President Donald Trump’s orders, the largest concentration of US air and naval power in the region since 2003, is being sold as strength, whereas it is, in fact, insecurity dressed up as bravado.
The indicators tell their own story.
Despite the theatrics of deployment, the expected escalation signals, mass embassy evacuations and sweeping NOTAM expansions remain limited.
Even within the American military establishment, caution seeps through the cracks. As noted in the February 2026 analysis circulated by Larry Johnson and Douglas Macgregor, the absence of full-spectrum preparatory measures suggests hesitation, not inevitability.
Contrary to the mainstream Western media’s view of “weighing options”, the reality points to a deeply fractured power struggle inside Washington’s war machine.
For instance, the Washington Post report citing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dan Caine is particularly revealing.
Caine’s warning about depleted munitions stockpiles, exhausted by Washington’s underwriting of Israel’s war machine and its proxy entanglements in Ukraine, punctures Trump’s fantasy of an “easily won” confrontation.
Trump’s public denial of Caine’s caution is predictable. But the leak itself is the story when senior military officials allow their reservations to reach the press, it is the Pentagon placing a marker in history: we warned him.
Netanyahu’s pressure on Trump has left him in a huge dilemma.
Iran is not Iraq. It is not Libya. It is not a fragmented state awaiting aerial collapse. It is a formidable military with layered air defenses, dispersed missile clusters, hardened infrastructure and strategic depth supported by Russia and China.
The fantasy that standoff air power will induce “disintegration” is recycled doctrine from Kosovo, Iraq and countless failed coercion campaigns. Precision bombing has never delivered political submission where sovereignty is embedded in national resistance.
Yet Trump persists in the illusion that overwhelming force will produce capitulation. Historians will remind us about the folly of imperial habits.
What is absent from Washington’s framing is the geopolitical driver beneath the rhetoric.
The protection of Israeli supremacy remains the unspoken constant. Every escalation is filtered through Tel Aviv’s military and “security” doctrine. Every negotiation is judged by whether it secures Israel’s interests rather than American interests.
Just as the American public is told the “reason” for US hostility is about nuclear proliferation, so too have Zionist-allied agents in South Africa used similar fake arguments to justify the annihilation of Iran.
Some analysts based in the Israeli-occupied territories, who are skeptical about Netanyahu’s motives, remind us that his long-held view about a US attack on Iran would be a “masterstroke” to attain his personal incentive to remain in power.
The reality, though, as Caine cautioned, exposes a deeper truth: the United States is overextended. Its munitions stockpiles are strained. Its alliances are brittle. Its domestic coalition is fractured. A war with Iran would not be a swift surgical strike. It would be attrition, retaliation and regional conflagration.
What unfolds now is not a clash of civilizations. It is the exhaustion of empire confronting the limits of coercion.
A war with Iran would not restore American dominance. It would accelerate its unraveling and the warning has been issued from within.
Whether Trump listens is irrelevant to the structural decline already underway.
Iqbal Jassat is an executive member of the Media Review Network, Johannesburg, South Africa.
U.S. General Caine Warns: STRIKING IRAN is a HUGE RISK /Glenn Diesen & Lt Col Daniel Davis
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – February 23, 2026
The Pentagon is raising concerns to Trump about an extended military campaign against Iran, advising that war plans being considered carry risks including U.S. and allied casualties, depleted air defenses and an overtaxed force.
The warnings voiced by Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, within the Defense Department and during meetings of the National Security Council, current and former officials said, but other Pentagon leaders also have noted similar worries.
Such discussions are always part of the contingency-planning process before military operations, some officials said, noting that military leaders—especially the Joint Chiefs chair—provide prudent estimates of possible casualties and other potential costs of military operations.
The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’
By Amro Allan | Al Mayadeen | February 23, 2026
The confrontation forming around Iran is increasingly defined not by diplomacy or de-escalatory statecraft, but by infrastructure: aircraft, tankers, ships, interceptors, forward bases, and the logistics that bind them into a usable strike system. What is being assembled around Iran is coercion by force posture—a regional arrangement designed to make the use of violence not only possible, but administratively routine.
The danger is not simply that the United States is “sending a message.” It is those messages, once backed by operational capability and sustained logistics, that develop their own momentum—especially in a region where a single incident, whether staged, misattributed, or opportunistically interpreted, can push escalation beyond the point where political actors can plausibly reverse it. That is how wars become “inevitable”: not because they must happen, but because the architecture is built until restraint begins to look like an admission of weakness.
What is underway is best understood as a transition from episodic pressure to a posture designed to make sustained operations feasible. Deterrence theatre is reversible: it can be intensified, paused, or theatrically concluded. War-enabling posture is different. It organizes the region for a campaign that could last weeks, not hours—requiring refuelling depth, airborne command, electronic warfare, forward munitions, missile defense, and a permissive regional geography. In other words, it is not the language of crisis management; it is the language of readiness for force.
The Israeli role
Any realistic scenario involving major strikes on Iran necessarily includes Israeli capabilities, even if formal command structures remain ambiguous. The Israeli Air Force is not simply a parallel instrument. It is a forward-deployed capacity that can be synchronized with US regional power while allowing Washington to stage-manage deniability until the moment of activation.
“Israel” maintains a large combat fleet with a long-range strike capacity built around multiple platforms: approximately 66 F-15 aircraft (including F-15I variants configured for longer-range strike), roughly 173 F-16 fighters, and about 48 F-35I stealth aircraft in service, with additional units expected over time. The operational implication is a structure suited to repeated waves rather than a single, demonstrative raid: stealth assets prioritized for penetration and suppression, with conventional fighters sustaining the bulk of strike and support roles once corridors are opened.
Defense planning in “Israel” also signals expectation of retaliation on a scale that exceeds symbolic exchange. The layered interception network—Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and THAAD—is designed to deal with different classes of incoming fire, from rockets and drones to ballistic threats, and it functions as a prerequisite for any prolonged confrontation in which Israeli and US regional assets become primary targets.
This is where the political and military lines converge. Israeli leadership has long framed Iran as the central strategic adversary, and war planning has repeatedly been presented as a means of reshaping regional balances. Whatever language is used—“pre-emption”, “self-defense”, “containment”—the practical effect is to normalize the idea that Iran’s sovereignty can be overridden by an external security narrative. In that framework, escalation is not an accident; it is a policy option that is repeatedly rehearsed as common sense.
What the United States has built
The most revealing element in the US posture is not any single platform, but the way assets are being layered into an integrated strike system.
Open sources indicate that, on the air side, the forward package includes at least 30 F-35A fighters deployed in theatre, 24 F-15E aircraft, and an additional 36 F-16s moving toward the region. Electronic attack support includes 6 EA-18G Growlers, alongside 8–12 A-10 aircraft. Around a dozen additional F-16s are operating from Prince Sultan and possibly Al Dhafra, supported by 3 E-11A communications aircraft. In addition, a deployment of 12 F-22 stealth fighters is underway, with part of the force already forward-positioned and the remainder expected to continue toward regional bases.
The intelligence and command layer expands this into something far beyond a “show of force”: the movement or deployment of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, an RC-135 signals-intelligence platform, a WC-135 nuclear-detection aircraft, and additional E-3 AWACS aircraft preparing for redeployment to forward bases—strengthening airborne battle management and command capability.
Operational persistence depends on fuel and lift. The posture is underpinned by up to 22 tanker aircraft operating from regional hubs, and sustained transport activity by C-17, C-5M, and C-130 aircraft delivering troops, equipment, and air-defence systems to forward locations.
At sea, the naval component includes the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group moving toward the region while the USS Abraham Lincoln group operates in the Arabian Sea, alongside multiple Arleigh Burke destroyers positioned across key waterways (the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean). The posture is reinforced by the USS Georgia, an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine capable of launching a large volume of cruise missiles.
Individually, each of these deployments can be framed as “routine”. Collectively, they form something more consequential: an operational environment in which launching a campaign becomes logistically straightforward. That is the essence of coercion-by-infrastructure. It does not announce war. It makes war easier to begin.
The aircraft carrier story
Washington foregrounds naval deployments because they are legible, dramatic, and politically manageable. Ships can be repositioned without forcing host governments into public commitments. Carrier strike groups allow Washington to appear decisive while keeping escalation thresholds ambiguous. This is useful domestically and diplomatically: it reassures partners, pressures adversaries, and sustains a narrative of control.
Yet the obsession with carriers often obscures the real center of gravity: land-based access, refuelling depth, persistent surveillance, and the defensive systems that keep regional bases operational. A serious campaign aimed at degrading Iran’s missile forces, air defenses, energy infrastructure, or nuclear-related facilities requires sortie generation and basing access that naval aviation alone cannot supply. The decisive question is not what is sailing; it is what is already positioned on land and in the air.
Iran reads this not as theatre, but as preparation. That reading is rational. When an adversary constructs a system designed for sustained strikes, it is the targeted state—not the deploying one—that is forced to plan for worst-case scenarios.
The geography of war
The enabling infrastructure of any sustained campaign sits in fixed locations. The operational map spans the Gulf and the Levant.
From Al Udeid in Qatar—often described as the operational heart of US Central Command—Washington can coordinate high-tempo operations supported by ISR and refuelling. Al Dhafra in the UAE extends its reach with advanced platforms and command integration. Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, if politically activated, shortens flight times and increases sortie density. The Harir airbase in Erbil provides forward access for strike and surveillance missions, while Jordanian airfields open western approach corridors. US positions in eastern Syria facilitate drone and reconnaissance activity along Iran’s western flank.
Beyond the Arab theatre, “Israel’s” bases operate in close alignment with US operational planning, forming an integrated environment even if formal command lines remain blurred. To the north, Azerbaijan offers potential basing or surveillance access along Iran’s sensitive frontier. Strategically, long-range bombers operating from the continental United States or Diego Garcia can be integrated through aerial refuelling and forward command nodes—adding strike capacity not captured by carrier-focused narratives.
This geography also clarifies what Washington rarely foregrounds: regional states become the battlefield’s enabling terrain. The bases, depots, radars, command centres, and runways that make sustained operations possible also sit within Iran’s retaliatory envelope. Iran does not need to neutralize a carrier to impose strategic and political costs. It can target the infrastructure that keeps the campaign running: runways, fuel depots, hangars, radar nodes, and the host-nation systems that sustain them.
If escalation occurs, the political question for host governments will not be abstract. It will be immediate: whether they are willing to absorb retaliation for choices made in Washington and Tel Aviv. That is precisely why the build-up is destabilizing. It expands the list of actors exposed to consequences while narrowing the space for de-escalation.
This is where the moral and legal questions sharpen. If host states provide launchpads, they are not passive bystanders; they become parties to the escalation. Yet these governments are rarely treated, in Western coverage, as societies that will absorb the consequences. They are treated as facilities—terrain, not people. Iran, by contrast, is treated as a problem to be managed.
Missile defense
If the escalation logic runs through bases, the defensive requirement runs through interceptors. Missile defense in this doctrine is a central operational requirement rather than a supporting function.
Patriot and THAAD batteries protect major airbases and logistics nodes across the Gulf and the Levant, integrated with early-warning radars, airborne surveillance, and regional command networks. Following the US withdrawal from Ain al-Assad in western Iraq, defensive emphasis shifted toward fewer but more politically sustainable bases: Al Udeid and Al Dhafra remain heavily protected, while positions in Jordan and eastern Syria rely on combinations of Patriot systems, shorter-range counter-drone defenses, and persistent surveillance.
“Israel” constitutes a distinct but integrated pillar in this interception architecture. Its layered air-defense network—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Patriot, and Arrow—is linked to US early-warning and interception planning, forming a shared defensive envelope rather than a purely national shield.
Notably, the defensive geography is widening. Cyprus has deployed Israeli-made air-defense systems, and Greece is moving toward integrating Israeli interception technology into its own architecture—developments that point to the gradual emergence of an Eastern Mediterranean interception depth, built around interoperable sensors and strategic alignment rather than formal collective defence commitments.
At sea, US Aegis-equipped destroyers add a mobile interception layer capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and limited ballistic threats—again supplementing, not replacing, land-based interception.
This matters because missile defense introduces a vulnerability that carrier narratives often conceal: interceptor stocks are finite, and a sustained high-volume exchange strains them. In a scenario of large-scale missile and drone retaliation, the question becomes not simply “can you intercept?” but “for how long?”—and at what political cost to host governments whose territory becomes the absorbing surface for escalation.
Tehran’s strategic logic
Iran’s deterrence logic has been recalibrated by lived confrontation, namely the “12-day war”. The central conclusion drawn in Tehran is that survivability precedes deterrence. Missiles, air-defense systems, command-and-control, missile production, and retaliatory capabilities must be structured to endure the opening shock of war, not to dominate it.
In the opening phase of that confrontation, Iran’s air defenses suffered rapid degradation: fixed or semi-mobile systems were destroyed early, their locations effectively pre-mapped, and their network dependence exploited through precision strikes, electronic warfare, and intelligence integration. Mobile missile systems—long assumed to be the backbone of survivable retaliation—also proved vulnerable once movement became detectable under persistent surveillance and integrated strike networks. The conclusion Tehran extracts is structural: in a conflict dominated by satellite tracking and real-time targeting, anything that must move, emit, or communicate openly at the onset of war is at elevated risk of rapid attrition.
That assessment drives the turn toward underground infrastructure. Iran’s missile force is being reconfigured around hardened tunnels, concealed storage, underground silos, and pre-positioned launch infrastructure designed to reduce exposure time and reliance on vulnerable command links. In this model, air defense still matters, but its role is framed as damage limitation rather than denial: complicating targeting, absorbing strikes, and preserving enough capability to ensure retaliation after the opening exchange.
Disruptions cascade into command delays and coordination bottlenecks, so Tehran’s preparations increasingly prioritise hardened domestic infrastructure, reduced external dependencies, and decentralized command authority to ensure retaliation does not hinge on uninterrupted connectivity. Parallel to this is the elevation of the domestic front—civil defense, continuity, internal stability—as a core component of deterrence rather than an auxiliary concern.
This is not the posture of a state seeking war. It is the posture of a state that has learnt—through repeated threat and episodic attack—that its adversaries prefer to treat its security as negotiable. Tehran’s strategic lesson is bleak but coherent: if the US and “Israel” reserve an expansive right to strike, then Iran must reserve the ability to respond even after absorbing the first blow. This is not radical; it is the minimal condition of sovereignty.
The escalation problem
A central risk is that escalation is unlikely to remain geographically contained. Even if Washington frames an initial operation as “limited”, allied forces and partner theatres are not mechanically separable. Under conditions of sustained strikes on Iran, groups and allied actors across Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq face their own strategic pressures, with intervention becoming a function of credibility and survival rather than preference.
Meanwhile, regional governments that host US assets occupy an exposed position. They may privately prefer de-escalation, but their bases and airspace can become operational requirements once Washington activates the posture it has assembled. Washington has 35,000–40,000 personnel deployed around Iran, expected to carry out the main attack in the event of war—an estimate that underscores how deeply the region is already militarily interlocked with any potential campaign.
This is where political constraint becomes as dangerous as military capability. When leaders publicly elevate threats, they increase the domestic cost of restraint; when adversaries interpret restraint as weakness, they increase the cost of compromise. In such conditions, accidental escalation—triggered by a strike, a misattributed attack, or a rapid chain of retaliation—can become more plausible than deliberate strategic design. And in an environment saturated with narrative warfare, the line between “accident” and “pretext” is rarely as clear as officials insist.
The build-up manufactures the conditions for war
The build-up is not reducible to theatre. It is a layered strike-and-defense system: forward stealth fighters and conventional strike aircraft; electronic warfare; airborne command and ISR; tanker depth and heavy lift; carrier groups and missile-capable submarines; a regional lattice of bases; and an expanding interception architecture stretching across the Gulf, the Levant, and into the Eastern Mediterranean. The combined effect is to make sustained operations technically feasible, while widening the geography of vulnerability and entanglement.
The strategic irony is that the more “prepared” this posture becomes, the less space remains for political off-ramps. Host governments become exposed. Interceptor sustainability becomes a decisive variable. Tehran’s retaliatory doctrine evolves toward survivability and endurance rather than symbolic signalling. In such an environment, the question is no longer whether war is “intended”. It is whether the operational infrastructure of war is now sufficiently in place that a single trigger—miscalculation, provocation, or opportunism—can transform a posture into a campaign faster than political channels can arrest it.
Iran’s reading of this is neither paranoia nor ideology. It is a basic inference. When a superpower constructs the machinery for a sustained strike and embeds it across neighbouring territories, the targeted state will plan accordingly. The real moral burden, then, lies not on Iran’s preparations for survival, but on the political decision—repeatedly rehearsed in Washington and Tel Aviv—that a regional order can be engineered through coercion and air power, while everyone else is expected to absorb the consequences.
If the international community is serious about preventing war, it should stop treating Iran’s defensive doctrine as the primary problem while granting the US-Israeli posture the presumption of legitimacy. The liability of proof lies with those constructing a regional strike system and calling it “stability”. There is nothing stabilizing about embedding a war option across neighbouring territories, then demanding that the targeted state behave as though this is normal. The region has seen this script before: coercion presented as protection, escalation presented as necessity, and catastrophe presented—after the fact—as an unfortunate surprise.
Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | February 21, 2026
While it is impossible to predict precisely what the war on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies will result in, the winnability of the regional conflict is clear. The only thing driving this attack is sheer Israeli arrogance, as there is no conceivable situation where all out regional war delivers anything short of uncontrollable chaos.
Why is an all out regional war unwinnable? Although there are various reasons as to why this is the case, it suffices to say that the US and Israelis have no way of controlling its outcomes, in addition to this, they simply do not possess the military industrial capacity to wage such a war for a long period of time.
Now, when this argument is made, it is not done from an idealistic point of view. Therefore, it is important to preface this piece on the fact that there is a clear Israeli-US superiority in terms of technology and the kinds of weapons they possess. Nobody disputes this. There is also clear superiority in the field of their intelligence agencies.
So, let us first assume that the United States and the Zionist entity manage to score all of their desired tactical victories. Working on this assumption will then definitively prove the injudicious nature of the endeavour.
Therefore, under the best case scenario for the Zionist coalition, perhaps they succeed in conducting another decapitation strike on the Iranian military leadership, manage to penetrate and destroy some missile bases, nuclear facilities, while gutting the Islamic Republic’s air defences. These are very likely goals that they will seek to achieve.
Let’s also work under the assumption that they manage to put Tehran on the backfoot for at least a week, due to the intensity of their air campaign, making it difficult for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) to fire large bursts of ballistic missiles at a single time. Then, after achieving air dominance, strikes on essential infrastructure begin, including cultural sites, government buildings, the media, but also the likes of oil facilities, agricultural areas and water systems.
On top of all of this, assume hybrid warfare tactics will be ongoing. Militant groups, especially those focused along the Iranian periphery, will start major offensive operations, working in conjunction with foreign intelligence agents and operatives on the ground, similar to what we witnessed during the 12-day War in June of 2025.
Note that the much debated potential goal of assassinating Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is not included above. Although many have speculated that the strategy could very well hindge upon this, it guarantees a war with no predictable end, no escalation ladder and will likely trigger calls for global Jihad.
An inevitable US-Israeli defeat
Giving the Zionist coalition the best possible conditions and achievements as a result of their opening offensive, this strategy will quickly begin to run into major issues.
As we saw last June, decapitation strikes against the Iranian leadership do not work at crippling the government and its military, they are simply replaced by another line of leadership, who implement a whole series of pre-planned counter attack strategies.
The Israelis wrongfully believed that their success during the initial attack on Iran last year was going to yield major results, even attempting to utilise their asset in the United States, the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, to call for a revolt. Not only did no such action take place, as Iranians outside of the diaspora do not support this clear Zionist puppet, but the very opposite occurred as the population rallied behind the flag.
Within 15 hours, the Iranians not only managed to get their air defences back online, but captured the initiative and began launching huge volleys of ballistic missiles into the heart of Tel Aviv. As the conflict evolved, a few important developments occurred: the Israeli air defences began to buckle – with the draining of anti-air munitions – while their agents on the ground carried out most of the attacks, something that is key to note.
While it is clear that the US will bring in greater firepower than the Israelis can muster, an air force is still run by human operators who get tired and operate equipment that needs to be serviced. Iran will very easily be able to launch drones waves constantly at US and Zionist positions, and even if their ability to launch large salvos of missiles is constrained during the first week of the conflict, eventually the opportunity will present itself.
If the Iranian State has not crumbled and civil war has not erupted within this time, then the US and Israelis will then be subjected to wave after wave of counterattacks. Inevitably, this means that airbases will be struck, equipment will be lost, and with fewer assets, this means less ability to keep up the pace of their offensive.
Bear in mind that warhawks employed by Washington and Tel Aviv based pro-war think tanks, who claim that the Iranian State is crumbling at least once a year, are far detached from reality. Take the latest round of foreign backed riots for example, the Western corporate media invented an alternate reality in order to sell the idea that Iran was falling, yet the entire ordeal was more or less over in two days.
It is clear to any learned observer, that without a significant ground element, toppling the Iranian government is impossible. Which then leads to the obvious next question: What if major militant offensives occur inside Iranian territory?
Answering this in depth would take time and a more nimble military mind. Yet, again assuming some level of success on the behalf of separatist militias and al-Qaeda linked Takfiri groups, even if they were to seize territory, Iran is a massive country that allows for mistakes. None of these groups compare and can stand up to the Iranian army and IRGC, nor do they likely possess any considerable advanced capabilities.
What this means is that even if they manage to see some level of initial success, the much larger, well trained, motivated and well equipped Iranian armed forces will eventually crush these insurgents. The only real threat is some kind of mass civilian mobilisation that will deal a blow to the Iranian economy, for which there is no indication this will happen, especially as the nation is suffering through a bloody war of aggression against it.
Then come the attacks on missile bases and nuclear sites. Even if some of these attacks are successful, they won’t destroy all of Iran’s capabilities, and as we saw in June of last year, the US attacks on the nuclear facilities don’t appear to have stopped the nuclear program. If it were that easy to simply take out Iran’s capabilities, it would have been done long ago. The Israelis tried last year and failed. If anything, on the nuclear issue, such a war could end up leading to Tehran actually reversing course on its stance against developing the bomb.
Even with full US-Israeli air superiority, the remaining air defences of Iran will at some point come back online, but even in the event that 100% of their anti-air capabilities are gone, their power is in their offensive, not defensive capabilities.
Once this initial period of assumed US-Israeli offensive dominance is over, Iran can easily block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, inflict large casualty events on US and Israeli targets, while taking out assets. It is impossible to predict which strikes will be the most effective, however, it is clear that everything will become a target. So expect a big hit on the global oil market, resulting in an economic crisis.
If Iran simply keeps up a pace of fire against the Israelis, the likes of which we saw during the 12-day War, then they only have a matter of weeks before their air defences also become useless.
This is all without factoring in Iran’s various allies, which may enter at any level of intensity at any point in this conflict. There’s Ansar Allah, which has the capability of striking the Israelis, but also assets throughout the Persian Gulf. If Hezbollah manages to wage a considerable ground war, the Israelis have proven in the past to be the weakest in this arena.
The Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU/PMF, Hashd al-Shaabi) are around 250,000 men strong, alongside Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who can use their own capabilities to not only target the US, but the Israelis also. So far, since October 7, 2023, we have not seen a true demonstration of their power. Another factor which is not often discussed, but is also very important, is the role of the Palestinian resistance, who are more likely to wait for the right opportunity, but can also pose a major ground challenge to the Israelis from Gaza.
None of this considers the other elements that could come into play, such as the roles played by regional nations, armed groups we may not have previously heard of, the likes of the Fatemiyoun of Afghanistan and Zainabiyoun of Pakistan, or the general populations throughout the region and what we could see in the event that chaos erupts. Governments could be overthrown, the civilian populations of Jordan and Egypt could become active and out of control. There is also the possibility that some groups in Syria could seize the opportunity to attack the Israelis.
In the event that such a war occurs, the longer it goes on, the more chaotic and unpredictable it becomes. A situation will be totally out of the US’s control, especially as the only means of combating this regional explosion is through the air. As we witnessed with the US campaign against Yemen, airstrikes alone change very little. Even in Gaza, the armed resistance groups fought for over 2 years with no supply chain, and by the admissions of the US and Israelis, their fighting force is still roughly the same size.
If things don’t go their way very quickly, then the Zionist coalition is going to get battered, and not even nuclear weapons will get them out of it. Therefore, [if] the US and Israelis, as long as we again grant them another assumption, that they are somewhat sane, choose to go to war, they will have to try and establish an escalation ladder, devising a real exit strategy.
The question becomes whether the Iranians and their allies allow them to exit the fight. An all out war will be bloody, it will claim an enormous amount of civilian lives, and it will also inflict considerable damage on civilian infrastructure. Truly, the effects of such a war are not desired by anyone in the region, yet the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance have long prepared their capabilities in order to combat what appears to have been inevitable.
Another thing to be mentioned here is that the US government, under the Trump administration, is totally captured by the Zionist entity. For all the reasons noted above, no previous administrations have dared escalate to this extent. If it were easy to launch a regime change operation against Iran, it would have been carried out many years ago.
However, a Zionist stooge is occupying the White House, a narcissistic man whose already low cognitive abilities are clearly declining. He is a President that an FBI report concluded had been compromised by the Mossad, but even if that report isn’t to be taken seriously, his whole campaign was bankrolled by Zionist donors, and his administration is an embarrassing collection of Zionist war hawks. If there was ever any US administration that was foolish enough to launch such a war, it is that of Donald Trump.
US envoy Huckabee claims Israel has ‘biblical right’ to conquer all West Asia
The Cradle | February 21, 2026
During a recent interview with Tucker Carlson, US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee claimed Israel has a biblical right to take over “all” of West Asia.
“It would be fine if they took it all,” Huckabee said when asked whether a passage from the Book of Genesis can be interpreted as granting Israel the right to steal all the land between the Nile River in Egypt and the Euphrates in Syria.
Huckabee was appointed by President Donald Trump as Ambassador to Israel in 2025. He is a former Arkansas governor and Southern Baptist minister.
Carlson and Huckabee discussed interpretations of Old Testament (Torah) scripture used by Christian Zionists to justify Israel’s killing and expulsion of native Christians and Muslims from the Holy Land.
Carlson asked Huckabee about a biblical verse in which God promises Abraham that his descendants will receive land “from the wadi of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates – the land of the Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaites, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites and Jebusites.”
“Israel is a land that God gave, through Abraham, to a people that he chose. It was a people, a place, and a purpose,” Huckabee claimed.
Carlson responded, saying this would include “like, basically the entire Middle East.”
“The Levant … Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon – it’d also be big parts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq,” Carlson said.
“I’m not sure it would go that far, but it would be a big piece of land,” Huckabee answered.
Since 7 October 2023, Israel has launched wars to occupy land in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, including to establish settlements for Israeli Jews. Israel has also escalated its efforts to steal and annex Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank.
Israel has killed at least 72,000 Palestinians during its effort to conquer Gaza, the majority of whom were women and children. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands more may die from the indirect effects of Israel’s destruction of the strip.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to justify the eradication of Palestinians in Gaza at the start of the war, calling them “Amalek,” a reference to the Biblical account of a people exterminated by ancient Israelites.
Israeli Finance Minister and settler leader, Bezalel Smotrich, has stated that Israel would expand “little by little” and eventually encompass all Palestinian territories as well as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
“It is written that the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus,” he said, referencing the “Greater Israel” ideology.
Carlson also pressed Huckabee about Israel’s role in pushing the US to go to war against Iraq in 2003, which led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of US soldiers.
“How many Americans put their boots on the ground for Israel?” the US ambassador asked.
“Everybody who served in Iraq,” Carlson responded, adding that the intelligence falsely claiming that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction had come from Israel.
As Gary Vogler has detailed, neoconservatives inside the government of George W. Bush worked secretly with the Israeli lobby and government to launch the invasion of Iraq to satisfy Israel’s energy needs.
Since the start of the genocide in Gaza, members of Trump’s so-called “America First” political movement have become increasingly critical of Israel’s dominant influence in the US government, in particular at the expense of US citizens.
President Trump has currently amassed an “armada” of US forces in West Asia to prepare for a possible attack on Iran, long a key priority for Israel and Netanyahu, which would lead to the deaths of additional US citizens for Israel’s sake.
Testing the Alliance: Netanyahu’s Washington Visit
By Abbas Hashemite – New Eastern Outlook – February 21, 2026
Netanyahu’s recent rush to the United States signals that Israel seeks Washington to expand the agenda of negotiations with Iran. However, the Trump administration seems to recalibrate its policy alignment with Israel.
A Diplomatic Visit or a Geopolitical Stress Test?
Soon after the first round of US-Iran peace negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to Washington. This visit was not part of routine diplomacy, but rather a test of geopolitical endurance. Israel and the United States had always been close allies. This bilateral relationship reached a new high during the tenure of US President Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump’s reelection as the 47th President of the US, both sides have exchanged numerous visits. Yet the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu displayed pressing importance and urgency that signaled Israel’s anxiety over the recent US-Iran peace talks. Since the visit, analysts around the world are trying to analyze if the US will once again conduct a military attack on Iran at the behest of the Israeli government or if it will assert strategic independence.
The regional landscape in the Middle East is fraught with stress. Washington has intensified its military posture across the region to reinforce strategic deterrence and stability. The United States is critical of Iran’s nuclear program. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s uranium enrichment purity reached up to 60 percent as of mid-2025. This made Tehran’s nuclear enrichment levels the flashpoint for Western concern. Iranian officials insist that their nuclear program is merely for peaceful purposes and reversible. However, Tel Aviv views Iran’s nuclear enrichment levels as an existential threat. Some Arab states are also concerned about Iran’s nuclear program.
Due to these concerns by Israel and some pro-West Arab states, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Tehran. Moreover, it increased its military pressure on Iran by intensifying its military presence in the region. The United States deployed its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, in the Middle East. Reports suggest that the Pentagon has also ordered the deployment of another aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, in the region. US President Donald Trump has also confirmed the deployment of another aircraft carrier in the region. However, none of these arrangements appears to be enough to appease Israel.
Expanding the Negotiation Framework
Netanyahu visited Washington to seek expansion of the US-Iran negotiation outline. Tel Aviv has long maintained that any negotiations and agreement with Tehran must also include restrictions on Iran’s regional alliances and ballistic missile program. This demand has further increased after the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Israel views the range of Iranian missiles and its regional proxy network as a unified threat to its security and expansionist ambitions.
However, Washington’s posture after the Trump-Netanyahu meeting did not suggest any major breakthrough. After the meeting, President Trump stated that nuclear talks with Iran would continue, without mentioning anything about Iran’s ballistic missile program. This suggests that President Trump made no immediate commitment to the Israeli Prime Minister about including Iran’s ballistic missile program in the agenda of ongoing diplomatic negotiations. The absence of a clear US stance on Israel’s demands has drawn global attention.
Domestic Pressures and Global Constraints on Washington
The United States has been Israel’s closest ally for decades. Israel has received the largest amount of US aid in terms of money and weapons. However, it appears that this time the US wants to draw a boundary. There are numerous reasons behind this shift in Washington’s response to the Israeli demands. On the domestic front, the Trump administration is dealing with scores of challenges. American society is highly polarized over the Israeli aggression. Independent estimates suggest that the Palestinian death toll since October 7, 2023, has surpassed 80,000.
More than 90 percent of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure has been intentionally destroyed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). A recent report revealed that Israel used prohibited US-made thermobaric weapons, capable of generating temperatures above 3500 degrees Celsius, in Gaza, which made thousands of Palestinian people evaporate. The United States also provided diplomatic assistance to Israel at international forums. Such reports sparked sustained protests across the United States against unequivocal military and strategic alignment with Israel. These protests and the American youth’s criticism have altered the domestic environment in the country and diminished the influence of the AIPAC on American politics.
On the international front, the United States is already facing diplomatic and strategic challenges. Due to Trump’s “America First” approach and his increasing sanctions, tariffs, and interventionist attitude, Washington is facing diplomatic isolation. The rapid rise of Russia and China as new global superpowers and the increasing role of middle powers in global politics have made the world multipolar. The American economy is also burdened by federal debt of around $34 trillion. A war with Iran would deepen Washington’s economic strain and complicate its diplomatic standing. Due to all these issues, the Trump administration seems to adopt a cautious approach towards Iran. However, given the Zionist influence in the US establishment, it would be hard for President Trump to reject Netanyahu’s demands. The increasing US military posture in the Middle East suggests that the coming few weeks will be decisive for the region.
Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist.
Behind US war drums against Iran: No goals, no plan, no off-ramp
Al Mayadeen | February 20, 2026
As the United States continues to amass unprecedented military firepower in West Asia, the largest such build-up since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a senior analyst at the Atlantic Council is warning that Washington has yet to answer fundamental questions about what a military campaign against Iran would actually achieve, or what catastrophic consequences it might unleash.
In a piece published this week, Nate Swanson, director of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project and senior advisor on Iran policy to successive US administrations, outlined six critical questions that US policymakers appear unable, or unwilling, to answer before potentially launching a “massive, weeks-long” aggression against Iran.
The analysis, while emerging from a Washington policy establishment that has long driven the logic of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, nonetheless lays bare the incoherence and recklessness of the current US posture.
No clear objective, no clear endgame
Swanson acknowledges that the White House has failed to define what it hopes to achieve militarily. The possible objectives he outlines, leveraging a strike to force nuclear concessions, decapitating Iran’s leadership, or launching symbolic attacks to appear supportive of rioters, each carry “significant obstacles.”
Most notably, Swanson concedes that Iran’s leadership appears to have calculated that dismantling its defense capabilities would be more dangerous than absorbing a US strike. In other words, Washington is considering going to war against a country that has already determined it will not surrender to US demands, regardless of the military cost.
No diplomatic path
Swanson is frank that a diplomatic off-ramp is effectively closed, though the reasons illuminate where responsibility lies. The Trump administration, he notes, is not seeking a deal in the conventional sense but something closer to “an Iranian surrender pact.”
Iran, meanwhile, insists on its sovereign right to a civilian nuclear program. The vast gap between the two positions is less a failure of Iranian diplomacy than a reflection of maximalist US demands that leave no room for negotiation.
The human cost
One of the more significant acknowledgements in Swanson’s piece is the human toll of the June 2025 unprovoked Israeli war on Iran, which the US supported. Over 900 Iranians were martyred in the aggression, including many civilians.
He cautions that a new, prolonged campaign would risk far greater casualties, which is something the great majority of Iranians would oppose. The analyst also notes that Iranians did not come out to protest against the government during the twelve-day war, so there is no reason to believe a large-scale US aggression would trigger protests to overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Regional alarm bells ignored
Arab and Turkish partners of the United States have spent the past month urging Washington to step back from the brink, with Gulf states publicly refusing to permit US use of their airspace for attacks on Iran. The regional consensus against military escalation is striking and largely being ignored in Washington’s war calculus.
Swanson also raises the possibility of Iran retaliating against Gulf states if it cannot de-escalate, echoing the 2019 precedent when Iran struck UAE and Saudi Arabian infrastructure during the last “maximum pressure” campaign. It is a reminder that Washington’s wars rarely stay contained to their intended theatres.
A war machine in search of a justification
Swanson’s analysis, despite being authored from within the US foreign policy establishment, ultimately underscores a troubling reality. The United States is on the edge of a potentially devastating war without a clear objective, without a viable diplomatic track, without regional support, and against the wishes of 70 percent of its own population.
The questions Swanson is asking should have been answered before B-2 bombers were positioned in Diego Garcia and carrier strike groups were dispatched to the Gulf.
That they remain unanswered speaks not to a failure of analysis but to the nature of a foreign policy apparatus that treats war as a tool of first resort.
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15 Saudi ‘hijackers’ were CIA agents working for US: Scholar
Press TV – April 13, 2016
Fifteen of the 9/11 “hijackers” from Saudi Arabia were CIA agents working for the United States government, which was seeking to destroy the Middle East for Israel and to double the American military budget, says Dr. Kevin Barrett, an American academic who has been studying the events of 9/11 since late 2003…. continue
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- Macgregor: We Haven’t Seen the Worst of the Iran War Yet
- ‘We are not like everyone else’ laws that bind other nations do not apply to Israel, says Likud lawmaker
- Report: Saudi Arabia seeks allies’ assistance as missiles deplete amid war on Yemen
- If Americans Knew
- Debunking The Claim That Macklemore Has A “History Of Antisemitism”
- CPJ demands release of arrested Palestinian-US journalist near Bethlehem
- Robert Kraft: The Billionaire Friend of Netanyahu Pulling The Strings Behind the Macklemore/Ed Sheeran Blow Up
- Columbia Administered Fund Gives Big Money to Pro-Israel Groups
- Deportation Case of Palestinian Activist Salah Sarsour Tests First Amendment
- ‘We Will Not Forget’: Palestinians Mark 44 Years since Sabra and Shatila
- Why do we let Zionists decide what we can and can’t say?
- US welcomes Israeli, Iranian delegations to UN, but not Palestinians – Daily Update
- Biden’s Genocide Accomplices Targeted by New Accountability Campaign
- AIPAC’s Network Has Already Spent $67.2 Million to Shape the Midterm Elections
- No Tricks Zone
- New Study: ‘Global Drought Shows No Detectable Recent Acceleration Under Climate Warming’
- Economic Masterminds: German Socialists Suggest Taxing Productivity Gains Stemming From Using AI
- The South China Sea Has Not Been Cooperating With The Climate Change Narrative
- Energy Crisis: Germany Enters Heating Season With Historically Low Gas Reserve Fill Levels
- New Study: The Antarctic Ice Sheet Gained Mass From 2020-2024 Due To Staggering Snow And Ice Accumulation
- Study: Ocean Heating Rates From Thousands Of Years Ago ‘Dwarf’ Modern Ocean Heating Rates
- Climate Extremists Target, Attack Large-Scale Power Grid Infrastructure In Germany!
- New Study: Antarctic Ice Melt Has Contributed Less Than 1 Centimeter To Sea Level Rise In The Last 30 Years
- Fear Of Debate: Alarmist German Climate Scientist Calls On Mainstream Media To Discredit Skeptic Voices
- End-Of-August Arctic Sea Ice Extent Hasn’t Fallen In 20 Years, Official Data Show!
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