Russian Cybersecurity Gains Traction in Global South and East – Deputy Foreign Minister
Sputnik – 01.06.2025
Russian cybersecurity solutions have become increasingly sought after by countries in the Global South and East amid the growing discreditation of most leading Western IT firms, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin told Sputnik.
“In the field of information and communication technologies, we possess significant capabilities — from legislation and law enforcement practices to extensive experience and developments in ensuring ‘digital sovereignty,’” he said.
According to the senior diplomat, Russian companies are offering cybersecurity solutions that are in high demand among nations in the Global South and East.
“This is largely due to the fact that many leading Western IT corporations have discredited themselves,” Vershinin noted.
He pointed out that there have been recurring revelations about Western companies ignoring the laws of the countries in which they operate, embedding hidden “backdoors” in their products — often for the benefit of intelligence agencies — and carrying out politically motivated directives from Western governments.
“All of this is, of course, being noticed by our partners in developing countries, who are increasingly leaning toward supporting our depoliticized and impartial approaches and initiatives in the ICT sphere on multilateral platforms,” he emphasized.
“Senators from Israel” Sabotaging Trump’s Iran Deal

By Kevin Barrett | American Free Press | May 27, 2025
Last month I warned in these pages that Donald Trump faces a stark choice regarding Iran: “Nuclear Deal II or World War III.” I pointed out that Iran is open to a deal, but that it won’t be much different from the JCPOA that Trump unilaterally canceled during his first term.
Failure to reach a nuclear agreement would make a catastrophic US war on Iran almost inevitable—not because Iran would quickly build nuclear weapons or threaten anyone, but because failed negotiations would embolden Israel to attack Iran, knowing that it would almost certainly be able to draw the US into the war. And if that happened, Iran could climb the escalation ladder by killing thousands of US soldiers, sinking US ships, and most importantly, destroying enough of the region’s oil production to completely collapse the global economy.
Iran doesn’t want nuclear weapons, which are banned by a decades-old religious edict renewed by the current Supreme Leader. But a growing minority of Iranians want to rethink that edict. They believe that Iran’s lack of nuclear weapons has allowed nuclear-armed Israel to repeatedly attack it, murder its scientists, perhaps even (deniably) assassinate its president, and commit genocide and other crimes with impunity. So even though nukes are ungodly, the minority claims, there is a “necessity doctrine” that allows people to do things that are ordinarily forbidden if survival requires it.
Israel, for its part, wants to completely dominate the region. Zionist extremists, who now represent about half the Israeli public, are committed to building “Greater Israel.” That would require genocide at industrial scale to eliminate regional populations so Yahweh’s supposedly chosen people can steal all the land and resources between the Nile and Euphrates rivers.
An ever-expanding Israel that continues invading and occupying its neighbors, stealing their land and resources, and murdering and expelling their populations cannot dream of doing such things unless it is the only nuclear weapons state in the region. So the possibility that one day Iran might “go nuclear” worries Israeli hardliners. If Iran continues developing its civilian nuclear program, Israelis believe, someday its leaders might change their minds and decide to build nuclear weapons. The Israelis apparently don’t understand that it is their own reckless criminality that is driving more and more Iranians toward considering the necessity of developing nukes for self-defense.
A Trump nuclear agreement would, like its predecessor, keep Iran in a position of needing about a year of “breakout time” to build nuclear weapons—as opposed to months or even weeks without a deal. But that’s not good enough for Netanyahu and other Israeli hardliners. They want to lay waste to Iran, even if it requires blowing up the global economy and with it Trump’s presidency.
A group of “Senators from Israel” led by Tom Cotton (R-IS) and Lindsey Graham (R-IS) is trying to torpedo Trump’s nuclear negotiations with Iran. The treasonous Israeli-owned senators are pushing a resolution demanding that Iran completely dismantle its civilian nuclear program. That’s a non-starter. International law, beginning with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) specifically allows Iran (like other non-nuclear-weapons states including Japan, Brazil, and the Netherlands) to enrich up to 5%. Under the 2015 JCPOA Iran agreed to limit enrichment to 3.67%, a significant concession representing roughly the minimum enrichment required for nuclear power and research.

The “Senators from Israel” also want Iran to abandon its ballistic missiles—the core of its defense strategy—and stop cooperating with regional allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and above all, Palestine. Those demands, too, are non-starters. Their only purpose is to destroy the possibility of any agreement, thereby opening the door for Israel to drag the US into a disastrous war on Iran.
Will the Trump Administration break free from the malign influence of the Israel lobby and its extremist leader, Benzion Mileikowsky, that Polish-born internationally-wanted criminal who operates under the alias “Benjamin Netanyahu”? Will Trump take the advice I offered last month and “terminate Bibi’s command…with extreme prejudice if necessary?”
There are encouraging signs that Trump may jettison Netanyahu in order to avoid the war-on-Iran-for-Israel trap that Bibi has set for him. By striking a separate peace with Yemen’s Houthis that allows them to continue targeting Israel, then triumphally visiting the region’s Arab capitals (including Hamas-funding Qatar) Trump has done everything but order Israel to stop its genocide in Gaza.
Trump needs to give that order ASAP—not only for humanitarian reasons, but also to create a fait accompli that will help bring down Netanyahu and forestall the Israeli hardliners’ efforts to trick the US into yet another disastrous war for Israel. If the Trump Administration does not act decisively, Netanyahu’s bought-and-paid-for “US” senators will keep pushing Bibi’s war plans, with potentially catastrophic results.
The Right Approach to the US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations
By Glenn Diesen | May 27, 2025
I recently attended a media festival in Tehran and also had the opportunity to explore Iran’s weapon systems and one of its nuclear facilities. Iran’s nuclear program is cited as the main reason for Israel and the US to threaten war with Iran. Such a war would likely escalate into a disastrous regional conflict, and perhaps even pull in the other great powers in a world war. Israel obviously needs to bring America on board to attack Iran, so the discussions between the US and Iran are of great importance. What do the Americans and Iranians want, and is there common ground that can be reached?
If the only demand by the US was for Iran to abstain from developing nuclear weapons, then an agreement could be reached, as Iran claims it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons and has accepted that inspectors are there to ensure compliance. Indeed, Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and honoured its obligations before the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement. The US now demands a renegotiation and demands the complete dismantlement of Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program, which it is entitled to have as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Furthermore, the US has linked its hegemonic policies in the region to the nuclear issue. The US demands that Iran limit the range of its ballistic missile program and also suspend its support for allies in the region – primarily Yemen, Lebanon and Hamas. From Tehran’s perspective, this represents a complete capitulation that would make its security dependent on the benign intentions of Israel and the US. This neglects that the US has had Iran in its crosshairs for the past 45 years, and Iran does have legitimate security concerns.
What can be considered a legitimate security concern by the US is that Iran has become a nuclear threshold state, with the knowledge and material to develop a nuclear weapon. Restricting the extent to which uranium is enriched and imposing strict inspections could possibly be negotiated.
However, threatening to bomb Iran would not eliminate its know-how or all of its material, and such an attack would only incentivise Iran to develop a nuclear deterrent. Even US threats to attack Iran unless it complies with US demands must be making the political leadership in Iran consider acquiring a nuclear weapon. So far, Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, because doing so would encourage other states, such as Saudi Arabia, to also pursue nuclear weapons. Recognising the security competition, the result would not be greater security for Iran.
In my opinion, another approach to negotiations would be to do what is rarely done anymore in Western diplomacy: to recognise and mitigate the security concerns of the other side for the purpose of reducing the security competition. Threatening and bullying Iran into making unilateral concessions has become the new normal in the unipolar era. The US offer to remove sanctions on Iran is merely an offer to stop punishing Iran. The point of departure in any diplomatic approach should be to address mutual security concerns and explore where an agreement that enhances security for both sides can be found. Threatening Iran with capitulation and linking nuclear issues to unrelated matters will only ensure the failure to reach an agreement.
Crazy shopping in Tel Aviv
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | May 23, 2025
If you are still wondering what Italy’s position is in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, don’t worry: for the umpteenth time, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has reiterated that Italy stands with Israel, always, at any cost.
In front of an international court, such a statement would automatically be condemned as ‘complicity in genocide’, on a par with what was decreed in Nuremberg after the Second World War. However, since mere statements by politicians are not enough, evidence of this ‘participation’ in a crime against humanity must be provided. There are several pieces of evidence, including the recent shopping spree that the Italian government went on in Tel Aviv and the surrounding area.
While Israeli bombing continues in the Gaza Strip, Italy is preparing to purchase military technology to equip itself with a new fleet of reconnaissance aircraft. It should be noted that military cooperation between the two countries is not a new development, far from it. On 15 April, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto sent Parliament a draft ministerial decree (SMD 19/2024) aimed at the ‘gradual implementation of multi-mission multi-sensor (MMMS) operational suites on a shared Gulfstream G550 platform’. By 26 May, the Senate Defence Committee will have to give its opinion: it may approve, reject or request amendments to the measure. Meanwhile, on 6 May, the Chamber of Deputies’ Budget Committee gave the green light to the decree in just five minutes and without discussion. According to the Military Code, if the parliamentary committees express a negative opinion, the executive is obliged to refer the decree back to the Chambers accompanied by counter-arguments. If the negative opinion is confirmed by an absolute majority and justified by non-alignment with the Multi-Year Defence Programme, the programme cannot be implemented.
The measure represents the third phase of a long-term project to convert Gulfstream G550 civil jets (known as ‘green’ in military circles) into surveillance and intelligence aircraft, thanks to technology provided by Elta Systems Ltd, an Israeli company part of the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) group. The total value of the entire programme exceeds three billion euros. The first two phases have already been approved and implemented.
Elta Systems’ technologies, specialising in surveillance, electronic warfare and target identification, are used worldwide and supplied to regular armies and paramilitary forces. These same technologies are also widely used by the Israeli armed forces against the Palestinian people and other entities considered “enemies”. The link between Elta and the Israeli army is very close: many employees come from special units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) or are still serving there.
In 2016, Italy received its first two G550 CAEW (Conformal Airborne Early Warning) aircraft from Israel, equipped by the company with advanced surveillance and command capabilities, currently operational at the 14th Wing in Pratica di Mare.
As part of a bilateral agreement, in addition to the spy planes, Italy also purchased the OPTSAT 3000 optical military satellite from Israel, while in exchange Tel Aviv bought thirty Alenia Aermacchi M-346 training jets from Italy, supplied by Leonardo Spa.
Decree SMD 3/2020 marked the start of the next phase of the programme: the purchase and conversion of eight more aircraft to Full Mission Capable (FMC) configuration, integrating CAEW capabilities with electronic warfare, interception and intelligence systems. Six civilian Gulfstream aircraft were purchased for conversion and two were already equipped for military use. Cost: €1.223 billion. The courier has already delivered the package to Pratica di Mare.
The 2020 decree explicitly refers to intergovernmental agreements (Gov to Gov) between Italy and Israel, the Memorandum of Understanding and agreements between Italian companies (primarily Leonardo), Israeli companies (Elta System) and US companies (L3 Harris), with the possibility of involving additional Israeli companies. If the deal is good, shopping works.
The next phase, SMD 37/2021, provided for the conversion of four of the six civilian aircraft already purchased into military aircraft. This part of the programme was also carried out using Elta technology, at an additional cost of €925 million.
The third and current phase of the project, defined in decree SMD 19/2024, has gone from an initial estimate of €994 million to an updated cost of €1.632 billion. It includes the military conversion of the last two civilian Gulfstreams, the purchase of an eleventh aircraft for testing and experimentation, and the construction of the ISTAR citadel in Pratica di Mare, equipped with hangars, operational facilities and satellite connection to support the fleet. As in previous decrees, this one also provides for intergovernmental cooperation based on existing schemes.
Business is business
Let’s face it: wars have always existed and the world cannot stop in the face of conflict. Nor can the commercial business that follows. This is the logic of the double game that Italy continues to play with Israel: arms sales behind the scenes, controversy over respect for international law in front of the cameras.
According to Italian law, the sale of arms to states involved in armed conflicts is prohibited. Israel falls into this category, which is why exports should be suspended. The law in question is No. 185 of 1990. Italy ranks third among the main suppliers of arms to Israel, with a share of 4.7%, behind the United States (65.6%) and Germany (29.7%). However, data from the Customs Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate, in italian) show that between December 2023 and January 2024, Italy exported arms and ammunition worth more than €2 million to Israel. The government justified this in 2024, specifying that the business of blood and destruction continues under old licences that were signed before 7 October 2023.
Nevertheless, considering the preliminary decision of the International Court of Justice on alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide and the request for an arrest warrant for Prime Minister Netanyahu, arms exports to Israel after 7 October could expose Italy to the risk of being held jointly responsible for violations of international law attributed to Israel.
This is the political rhetoric of Italy, which leads the way in relations with Israel for the whole of Europe, as the main commercial hub for the IMEC, the Cotton Road, which is multilateral in nature and represents, from the US point of view, an alternative to the Chinese ‘New Silk Road’. It should be remembered that the initiative was presented during the G20 summit held in New Delhi, India, on 10 September 2023. On that occasion, India, the United States (Biden administration), the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding for the creation of an economic corridor linking India, the Middle East and Europe (IMEC).
The ambitious plan focuses on infrastructure development and has two main components: a railway line connecting Europe with the Gulf (involving the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Jordan), and a maritime route connecting India with the Gulf region. The initiative is supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), created by the G7 in 2022, and by the European Global Gateway program, which has earmarked up to €300 billion for investment in international infrastructure between 2021 and 2027.
For Italy, the initiative is also of strategic importance due to its geographical position between the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, and it is from Israel and its ports that it will receive the goods that Israel will always need to build its business. It does not matter if this means perpetrating genocide, the important thing is that the economic interests of the two countries are protected. Capital wins over Man, the logic of interest prevails over that of humanity.
Netanyahu’s endgame: Isolation and the shattered illusion of power

By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | May 20, 2025
There was a time when Benjamin Netanyahu appeared to have all the cards. The Palestinian Authority was largely passive, the occupied West Bank was relatively calm, Israel’s diplomatic reach was expanding, and the United States seemed ready to bend international law to accommodate Israel’s desire for complete control over Palestine.
The Israeli prime minister had also, at least in his own estimation, succeeded in subduing Gaza, the persistently defiant enclave that had for years struggled unsuccessfully to break the suffocating Israeli blockade.
Within Israel, Netanyahu had been celebrated as the nation’s longest-serving prime minister, a figure who promised not only longevity but also unprecedented prosperity. To mark this milestone, Netanyahu employed a visual prop: a map of the Middle East, or, in his own words, “the New Middle East.”
This envisioned new Middle East, according to Netanyahu, was a unified green bloc, representing a future of ‘great blessings’ under Israeli leadership.
Conspicuously absent from this map was Palestine in its entirety—both historic Palestine, now Israel, and the occupied Palestinian territories.
Netanyahu’s latest unveiling occurred at the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September, 2023. His supposedly triumphant address was sparsely attended, and among those present, enthusiasm was notably absent. This, however, seemed of little consequence to Netanyahu, his coalition of extremists, or the broader Israeli public.
Historically, Israel has placed its reliance on the support of a select few nations considered, in their own calculus, to be of primary importance: Washington and a handful of European capitals.
Then came the October 7 assault. Initially, Israel leveraged the Palestinian attack to garner Western and international support, both validating its existing policies and justifying its intended response. However, this sympathy rapidly dissipated as it became apparent that Israel’s response entailed a campaign of genocide, the extermination of the Palestinian people in Gaza, and the ethnic cleansing of Gaza’s population and West Bank communities.
As images and footage of the devastating carnage in Gaza surfaced, anti-Israeli sentiment surged. Even Israel’s allies struggled to justify the deliberate killing of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, predominantly women and children.
Nations like Britain imposed partial arms embargoes on Israel, while France attempted a balancing act, calling for a ceasefire while suppressing domestic activists advocating for the same. The pro-Israel Western narrative has become increasingly incoherent, yet remains deeply problematic.
Washington, under President Biden, initially maintained unwavering support, implicitly endorsing Israel’s objective – genocide and ethnic cleansing.
However, as Israel failed to achieve its perceived objectives, Biden’s public stance began to shift. He called for a ceasefire, though without demonstrating any tangible willingness to pressure Israel. Biden’s staunch support for Israel has been cited by many as a contributing factor to the Democratic Party’s losses in the 2024 elections.
Then, Trump arrived. Netanyahu and his supporters, both in Israel and Washington, anticipated that Israel’s actions in Palestine and the wider region — Lebanon, Syria, etc — would align with a broader strategic plan.
They believed Trump’s administration would be willing to escalate further. This escalation, they envisioned, would include military action against Iran, the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, the fragmentation of Syria, the weakening of Yemen’s Ansarallah, and more, without significant concessions.
Initially, Trump signalled a willingness to pursue this agenda: deploying heavier bombs, issuing direct threats against Iran, intensifying operations against Ansarallah, and expressing interest in controlling Gaza and displacing its population.
However, Netanyahu’s expectations yielded only unfulfilled promises. This raises the question: was Trump deliberately misleading Netanyahu, or did evolving circumstances necessitate a reassessment of his initial plans?
The latter explanation appears more plausible. Efforts to intimidate Iran proved ineffective, leading to a series of diplomatic engagements between Tehran and Washington, first in Oman, then in Rome.
Ansarallah demonstrated resilience, prompting the US on 6 May to curtail its military campaigns in Yemen, specifically the Operation ‘Rough Rider’. On 16 May, a US official announced that the USS Harry S. Truman would withdraw from the region.
Notably, on 12 May, Hamas and Washington announced a separate agreement, independent of Israel, for the release of US-Israeli captive Edan Alexander.
The culmination occurred on 14 May, when Trump delivered a speech at a US-Saudi investment forum in Riyadh, advocating for regional peace and prosperity, lifting sanctions on Syria, and emphasising a diplomatic resolution with Iran.
Conspicuously absent from these regional shifts was Benjamin Netanyahu and his strategic ‘vision’.
Netanyahu responded to these developments by intensifying military operations against Palestinian hospitals in Gaza, targeting patients within the Nasser and European Hospitals. This action, targeting the most vulnerable, was interpreted as a message to Washington and Arab states that his objectives remained unchanged, regardless of the consequences.
The intensified Israeli military operations in Gaza are an attempt by Netanyahu to project strength amidst perceived political vulnerability. This escalation has resulted in a sharp increase in Palestinian casualties and exacerbated food shortages, if not outright famine, for over two million people.
It remains uncertain how long Netanyahu will remain in power, but his political standing has significantly deteriorated. He faces widespread domestic opposition and international condemnation. Even his primary ally, the United States, has signalled a shift in its approach. This period may mark the beginning of the end for Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career and, potentially, for the policies associated with his horrifically violent government.
Iran Nuclear Negotiations Bring New, Suprising Developments
By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | May 20, 2025
In the past several days, there have been surprising developments in the negotiations between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s civilian nuclear program.
U.S. President Donald Trump has frequently, but not always, defined the goal of the negotiations as being limited to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. He repeated that definition as recently as May 25, saying Iran must “permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons…They cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
But the message from his team has been contradictory. Then-National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said that the United States is demanding “full dismantlement,” and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff said that “a Trump deal” means “Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.” Rubio said that Iran can have a civilian nuclear program, but by importing uranium enriched up to 3.67%, and no longer by enriching their own. On May 9, Witkoff told Breitbart News that “An enrichment program can never exist in the state of Iran ever again. That’s our red line. No enrichment.”
But Iran has drawn the mirror image red line. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has placed a firm limit that Iran will not negotiate “the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian repeated that red line ahead of the talks, insisting that “Iran has never sought, is not seeking, and will never seek nuclear weapons” but that “Iran will not give up its peaceful nuclear rights.”
American insistence on ending Iran’s civilian enrichment program could put a quick end to the talks. Widening the negotiations to Iran’s missile program or to Iran’s relationship with its regional proxy groups could also jeopardize the talks.
But Trump raised that possibility on May 14 when he suggested that breaking off relations with proxy groups in the region must be part of any deal. Iran “must stop sponsoring terror,” he said, and “halt its bloody proxy wars.”
The contradictory statements emanating from the Trump administration appear to have been “because of a lack of decision on key strategic points,” Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an expert on Iran, told me. And, indeed, on May 7, Trump said, “We haven’t made that decision yet.”
“As a result,” Parsi said, “the debate on these points is now, rather unhelpfully, taking place out in public.”
That the talks have progressed to a fourth meeting suggests, at this point, that the public crossing of these Iranian red lines may not be being repeated in the private meetings. Iran’s Foreign Minister hinted at that possibility when he identified one of the difficulties in the negotiations as being “contradictions both inside and outside the negotiating room.” Supporting this possibility, when Trump introduced Iran’s support of regional proxies into the discussion, Araghchi called the remark, not unproductive or unhelpful, but “deceitful.”
And Araghchi may know. Barak Ravid of Axios has now reported that, during the fourth round of talks, the United States presented Iran with a written proposal. The report says that, during the third round, Araghchi gave Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff a document with Iran’s proposals for a deal. The U.S. studied it and returned it to Iran with “questions and requests for clarifications.” Iran replied, the U.S. prepared a new proposal, and then presented it to Araghchi who has now brought it back to Tehran for consultations with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian.
How far down the path to a settlement the proposal is is unknown. Araghchi said future negotiations now become more difficult. But he said that “despite the difficulty and frankness of the talks, very useful discussions were held.” He then said, “We can now say that both sides have a better understanding of each other’s positions.”
This major breakthrough may have been facilitated by another recent development: a subtle change in tone by Trump. Following a flurry of American threats, the fourth round of talks was postponed. Iranian officials said that [d]epending on the U.S. approach, the date of the next round of talks will be announced.”
Recently, that approach subtly changed. Previously, Donald Trump had formulated Iran’s choice as “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” But in his most recent remarks, which went largely unnoticed, Trump softened the consequence, saying only “If Iran’s leadership rejects this olive branch…we will have no choice but to inflict massive maximum pressure, drive Iranian oil exports to zero.” Notably, bombing was replaced with sanctions.
On May 15, Trump again seemed to reject the risk of war:
“Because things like that get started and they get out of control. I’ve seen it over and over again. They go to war and things get out of control, and we’re not going to let that happen.”
In another surprise development, Iran may have facilitated negotiations with a creative and unexpected proposal.
There are now reports that Iran has suggested for consideration that they could join with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a nuclear enrichment consortium. Iran would continue to enrich uranium but accept a cap at the 3.67% enrichment required by a nuclear energy program. Saudi Arabia and UAE, who would gain access to Iran’s nuclear technology, would be shareholders and funders.
If true, the proposal would be based on a consortium idea first proposed by Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel and former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian.
Von Hippel told me that the idea was inspired by the URENCO enrichment consortium of Germany, the Netherlands and Britain and by the ABAAAC consortium of Brazil and Argentina.
The consortiums, he said, allow nuclear experts from each country to “visit each other’s facilities to assure themselves that the activities are peaceful.” He added that “decisions that might have proliferation implications are made by the [partner] governments.” Saudi Arabia’s, the Emirates’ and Iran’s watchful eyes would all help the International Atomic Energy Agency ensure that the program is peaceful.
Aside from the implications for the nuclear negotiations, this level of trust between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE was unthinkable only a very short time ago and testifies to the changes going on in the region and in the evolving Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship. That Iran would trust Saudi Arabia with access to its nuclear technology indicates that a region changing shift in the relationship is underway.
As Annelle Sheline, research fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, told me:
“The Iranians’ willingness to join a consortium with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to develop civilian nuclear energy demonstrates significantly improved relations between these countries. This sends a strong signal that Tehran as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would prefer to prioritize cooperation over conflict.”
She said that all three countries have growing motivation for peace in the region. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman needs to avoid violent conflict to encourage the foreign investment and tourism needed to fuel his planned economic diversification. Mohammed bin Zayed needs economic security in the face of competition from Saudi Arabia to be a regional hub. Iran needs to encourage peace in the region because of the recent weakening of its own strategic position in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have recently been moving towards enhanced friendship both bilaterally and through multinational organizations.
Sheline expressed the hope to me that “Trump should take advantage of these circumstances to sign a nuclear deal with Iran and avoid unnecessary war.”
All of these developments, from the contradictory American messaging, to the until now unreported existence of a written proposal, to the subtle and little noticed change in Trump’s tone to the Iranian idea of a nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and UAE are shocking and new. They may present an opportunity to return to a nuclear agreement with Iran and to usher in a new hope for peace and friendly relations both between the U.S. and Iran and in the region. Hopefully, the two sides will seize this opportunity.
Are US-Israel ‘special relations’ about to end?
By Murad Sadygzade | RT | May 19, 2025
Last week, US President Donald Trump embarked on his first official overseas tour since taking office, choosing to visit three key Gulf nations – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
This itinerary was both unexpected and, in many ways, unprecedented. Unlike his predecessors, who traditionally began their foreign policy engagements with visits to long-standing Western allies, Trump opted to prioritize America’s Arab partners, deliberately bypassing Israel – Washington’s principal strategic ally in the region. This marked the first time in decades that a sitting US president visiting the Middle East consciously excluded it from the agenda.
This decision signaled a potential recalibration of Washington’s priorities in the region. Relations between the Trump administration and the Israeli leadership, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were already strained in the early stages – largely due to Israel’s growing intransigence on the Palestinian question and the increasing influence of far-right factions within the Israeli government. Faced with mounting frustration over Israel’s hardline policies, the White House appeared to pivot toward a more pragmatic, less confrontational, and economically advantageous partnership with the Gulf monarchies.
However, the rationale behind this shift extended beyond political calculation. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long played a pivotal role in sustaining American influence in the Middle East – not only because of their strategic geography but also due to their substantial investments in the US economy and multi-billion-dollar arms contracts. For a business-minded president eager to showcase the profitability of foreign policy through economic deals, these nations represented ideal counterparts.
The lavish receptions afforded to Trump during his Gulf tour might have been dismissed as mere pageantry were it not for their deeper symbolic resonance. The true significance of the visit lay in what it revealed about broader geopolitical currents: namely, the transformation of the Gulf monarchies from regional players into increasingly assertive global actors.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are no longer content with being perceived as passive participants in American-led regional frameworks. Instead, they are positioning themselves as independent centers of power in an emerging multipolar world order. Their growing international stature stems from several interrelated factors.
First, these countries have embraced ambitious and forward-looking development strategies, investing heavily in infrastructure, clean energy transitions, technological innovation, and global finance. No longer simply hydrocarbon exporters, they are becoming hubs of digital transformation, international logistics, Islamic finance, and global policy discourse on issues ranging from security to sustainable development.
Second, the Gulf states have pioneered a distinctive model of governance that blends traditionalism with modernization. While maintaining deep-rooted commitments to Islamic and tribal values, they have achieved remarkable progress in building diversified and globally competitive economies. This synthesis has not only enabled them to thrive amid intensifying global competition but, in some respects, to outpace certain Western nations grappling with internal divisions and economic stagnation.
Equally noteworthy is the political resilience of these monarchies. Western narratives often portray them simplistically as ‘absolute monarchies,’ failing to appreciate the internal mechanisms of governance that underpin their stability. In reality, the political architecture of the Gulf is more accurately described as ‘sheikhism’ – a system rooted in consensus among tribal and familial elites, structured around a balance of obligations, reciprocal loyalties, and ongoing consultation. This model, which integrates Islamic principles such as shura (consultation) with practical statecraft, has proven remarkably adaptive and resilient.
In this context, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar can no longer be viewed merely as privileged US allies or energy suppliers. They are emerging as autonomous actors in global politics – capable of forging regional alliances, shaping international agendas across energy, media, and technology, and mediating in global conflicts. Their evolving role reflects not dependence on external security guarantees, but the outcome of deliberate, long-term strategies to consolidate sovereignty, enhance prestige, and assert influence in the 21st century.
Money above all: Trump’s deal-based diplomacy
President Donald Trump’s visit to the Gulf states was far more than his first foreign trip as head of state. It was a bold, highly symbolic debut of a new US foreign economic doctrine rooted in pragmatism, transactionalism, and strategic capitalism. Unlike previous administrations, which typically foregrounded diplomacy, security alliances, and value-based partnerships, Trump approached this tour as a high-stakes business deal. His mindset was that of a dealmaker, not a traditional statesman. The objective was clear: to restore America’s economic dominance by leveraging the vast wealth and strategic ambitions of the Middle East’s richest monarchies.
Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” found tangible expression in this tour. His mission was to bring back jobs, reindustrialize key sectors, boost the US high-tech ecosystem, and enhance national competitiveness – all fueled by a surge in foreign direct investment. In this pursuit, the oil-rich, capital-heavy Gulf monarchies – endowed with massive sovereign wealth funds and seeking greater global visibility – emerged as ideal partners.
In Saudi Arabia, Trump signed an unprecedented economic package worth over $600 billion, including the largest arms deal in US history – $142 billion covering missile defense systems, advanced aviation platforms, cybersecurity capabilities, and military-grade AI technologies. Equally significant was the launch of a new tech alliance: Saudi-based DataVolt committed $20 billion to build data centers and energy facilities in the US, while a consortium led by Nvidia, AMD, and Amazon Web Services will co-develop an AI innovation hub within the Kingdom. A $50 billion venture fund was also established to support US-based startups in renewable energy and cybersecurity.
In Qatar, the results were even more staggering: agreements totaling $1.2 trillion, the largest single-country deal package in US diplomatic history. Central to this was Qatar Airways’ order for 210 Boeing aircraft valued at $96 billion, making it the most lucrative deal ever for the American aerospace giant. Qatar also pledged tens of billions of dollars for joint ventures in quantum computing, smart energy networks, and STEM education programs for engineers and IT specialists in the US. In a provocative symbolic gesture, Qatar proposed gifting President Trump a custom-built Air Force One, sparking intense debate in the American media landscape.
In the United Arab Emirates, new agreements totaling $200 billion were signed – in addition to a previously negotiated $1.4 trillion package. Key components included the construction of an aluminum plant in Oklahoma, expansion of oil and gas infrastructure with US firms, and a landmark $100 billion commitment to American companies specializing in artificial intelligence over the next three years.
In total, Trump’s Gulf tour yielded over $2 trillion in contracts and investment pledges – an economic windfall of historic proportions. But beyond the numbers, the trip marked a fundamental redefinition of American foreign policy: from projecting power through military force and ideological alignment, to securing influence through economic penetration and transactional partnerships. Trump unveiled a new image of the US – not as a global policeman, but as a global entrepreneur. A nation that negotiates not with declarations, but with data, contracts, and employment metrics.
This new model resonated deeply with the Gulf monarchies themselves, which are undergoing profound transformations. Once reliant solely on oil exports, these states are rapidly evolving into tech-driven economies with ambitions to become global hubs of innovation, finance, and logistics. In Trump’s America, they found not just a security guarantor, but a strategic co-architect of a post-oil economic order – one where capital, innovation, and mutual profit outweigh traditional diplomatic protocol and ideological rhetoric.
Trump’s message was unambiguous: the era of foreign policy as charity is over. What now matters are mutual returns, strategic alignments, and economic gains. The Gulf states, driven by their own visions of modernization and diversification, eagerly embraced this shift. Together, they reimagined international relations not as a sphere of obligations, but as a marketplace of opportunities.
What about Israel?
One of the most significant – albeit unofficial – outcomes of Donald Trump’s Middle East tour could be discerned even before the journey began: the US President conspicuously bypassed Israel. This omission became all the more striking given that even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who had initially planned a visit to Tel Aviv, abruptly cancelled his trip at the last moment. The message did not go unnoticed in either Washington or Jerusalem: nearly all observers interpreted the move as a clear sign of a cooling relationship between the US and Israel – more precisely, between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The rift between the two leaders appears less personal than strategic, rooted in diverging visions of the region’s future. Tensions had been mounting for months. The first major flashpoint came when Trump unilaterally announced the withdrawal of American forces from operations against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, citing the group’s supposed commitment to halt attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes. The decision, made without prior consultation with Israel – which continues to endure daily rocket fire from the Houthis – dealt a blow not only to diplomatic norms but also to the foundational trust between Israel and its closest ally.
An even more sensitive issue has been the quiet resumption of US contacts with Iran. With Oman acting as mediator, Washington has been exploring the outlines of a possible new nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, Israel remains steadfast in its conviction that no negotiations with Tehran should occur until decisive military action is taken against its nuclear and military facilities – a show of force intended to compel concessions. Netanyahu failed to persuade Trump of this hardline approach, and the US president has increasingly charted his own, more flexible course.
Tensions have also sharpened over the future of Syria. Israel refuses to recognize the country’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, branding him a former al-Qaeda affiliate and a dangerous actor. Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory continue, the buffer zone in the Golan Heights remains under Israeli control, and the Druze population has formally been placed under Israeli protection. While Israel promotes the vision of a weak, decentralized Syria, Washington is embracing the opposite: al-Sharaa was invited to meet with Trump in Saudi Arabia, and following those talks, the US signaled its intent to lift sanctions on Damascus. Even more striking was the revelation that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – previously restrained by US pressure – are now prepared to invest in Syria’s reconstruction, viewing it as both a stabilizing opportunity and a chance to expand their regional influence.
Israeli frustration has been further stoked by Washington’s evolving stance on the Palestinian issue. Despite Israel’s ongoing military operation in Gaza, Trump has increasingly expressed a desire – even a demand – for a resolution to the conflict. His Gaza reconstruction plan, unveiled in February, sent shockwaves through Washington: it proposed the complete depopulation of Palestinians from the enclave and the transformation of the territory into a luxury international resort zone under US control. Not only was this radical proposal never coordinated with Israel, but it also raised fundamental questions about the future of the US-Israel alliance.
To make matters more complex, credible reports have emerged that the US has been engaged in direct negotiations with Hamas, without informing Israel. The recent release of an American citizen, IDF soldier Idan Alexander, who was captured in October 2023, was reportedly achieved through these covert channels – of which the Israeli government only became aware through its own intelligence services.
Against this backdrop, speculation is growing that the White House is seriously considering formally recognizing an independent Palestinian state. Such a move would not be a mere diplomatic gesture – it would reshape the strategic architecture of the Middle East. Should Washington proceed down this path, Israel could find itself in strategic isolation, while the center of regional gravity shifts toward Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Türkiye – countries with which Trump is building pragmatic, mutually beneficial, and business-driven relations.
None of these states demand unconditional support from Washington, meddle in its internal politics, or leverage domestic crises for influence. More importantly, they offer Trump what he values most: investment, trade, strategic partnership based on reciprocal interest, and freedom from ideological constraints.
Thus, a new geopolitical reality is taking shape before our eyes. In this emerging landscape, Donald Trump appears less inclined to view Israel as an indispensable ally and more drawn to politically agile, economically potent, and regionally assertive actors across the Arab world – and Türkiye. If rumors of Palestinian state recognition prove true, it will mark the end of the long-standing era of “special relations” between the US and Israel and signal the dawn of a new chapter in American Middle East policy – one governed not by ideological loyalty, but by unambiguous political and economic rationality.
Murad Sadygzade is President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).
The Israeli Syria Dilemma
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | May 15, 2025
Although it could appear that the Israelis are having their way with Syria, their aggression is short sighted and could at any moment backfire. The only reason they still enjoy the freedom to continue carrying on in the manner they are, is because of the leadership in Damascus.
Syria’s new President Ahmad al-Sharaa and his administration, staffed primarily by members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have so far failed to take advantage of opportunity after opportunity that have fallen in their laps. Instead of uniting the country behind a common cause, working on building a strong functional nation, and finding some leverage to use in future negotiations, they chose the path of least resistance.
We have now reached a phase in Syria where President al-Sharaa, according to several sources who spoke to both Reuters and The Times, is considering a normalisation deal with the Zionist entity. To begin with, even the fact that this is being spoken of and he hasn’t denied it is an admission of guilt and represents a betrayal of the Palestinian people.
Yet, putting aside the fact that normalisation with the Zionist entity would make al-Sharaa and his administration directly complicit in the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza and a collaborator with the Israeli regime, it is a ridiculous move, politically speaking.
What we have to understand here is that the Israelis are not the ones begging Syria for a normalisation agreement, it is the other way around. However, the Syrian government has no leverage whatsoever. As al-Sharaa remains trapped between multiple regional and Western interests, he evidently has little wiggle room with which he can work in order to make his regime work.
For example, one of his primary backers is Turkiye, which has at least publicly expressed its interest in strengthening the Syrian State and also uniting it, whereas the Israelis put their foot down and are openly seeking balkanisation of the country. This all came to a head when the Syrian security forces were ordered to seize Druze majority areas south of Damascus and to head towards Sweida.
Unfortunately, al-Sharaa decided to completely dismantle the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and pull apart the security forces, meaning that the de facto military and security forces of the country are a collection of largely ill-trained and undisciplined militiamen. So, when they are sent into any area, we see sectarian bloodshed and lawlessness. This is then exploited by the Israelis, who back their own militia forces, falsely claiming to be on the side of Syria’s Druze community.
To give some context to this situation, the Israelis were giving military, financial, and medical aid to Jabhat al-Nusra – now rebranded as HTS – at a time when it was committing massacres against Druze civilians, yet are now pretending to be the saviours of those same communities.
Because of the fact that al-Sharaa doesn’t have a real army or security forces yet, militarily, he is weak. Then, when he attempts to disarm Syrian villages, this only ends up dividing the country further. Meanwhile, the US, EU, UK, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and other players all have their own opinions on what Damascus should be doing.
What al-Sharaa has chosen to do is suck up to the United States and the rest of the collective West, yet he lacks the intellectual prowess necessary to negotiate with them properly. Instead, he is floating ridiculous proposals like the construction of a Trump Tower in Damascus and a Ukraine-style resource deal with the US. He also believes that making friends with the West is as easy as joining a normalisation deal with the Zionist regime.
Yet, when the Israelis look at Syria, they see a leadership that is willing to crack down on the Palestinian Resistance, allow the occupation of their lands and abandons its own people who are coming under attack. Therefore, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu looks at the predicament of Syria and laughs at the prospect of normalisation for now, not because he doesn’t eventually seek this outcome, but because there is no need to entertain it yet.
Instead, the Israelis are looking to exploit the weakness of the Syrian leadership and push for finishing their agenda in at least the south of the country. The Zionists have long sought to annex a large portion of strategic territory in southern Syria, which they are doing without so much as a single bullet fired at them from the forces belonging to Damascus, while working alongside Syrian minority militias to extend their de facto control all the way to the Euphrates River.
The major challenge now, for the Zionist entity, has nothing to do with the government in Damascus, but rather how far it can get away with pushing. We have already seen signs from local forces in Daraa, that there are groups willing to defend their villages and cities. This local resistance, rather than the government, is the primary factor holding the Zionist advance back.
If you trace back to the reaction to the ambushes carried out against the convoys of Israeli soldiers in southern Syria, the immediate response was to withdraw and use airpower to inflict deaths and injuries in Daraa. It has now been over a month since the clashes occurred, and the Israelis have not admitted to their casualties, nor have they bothered returning on the ground.
The Israeli agenda does not actually encompass any areas that extend beyond Damascus, they have been very open with their intentions being contained to everywhere south of the Syrian Capital. Yet, they have painted themselves into a corner that could result in a brief incursion into Damascus at some point or another.
The Israeli Premier, Benjamin Netanyahu, has pledged to come to the aid of the Druze communities in Syria, which has ended up causing tensions within the Israeli Druze population in occupied Palestine. The Israeli Druze serve crucial roles in the Israeli military and contribute greatly to the Zionist regime’s economy, therefore, when Netanyahu pledges to help the Druze of Syria, this is not a pledge he can simply go back on.
When Ahmed al-Sharaa sent his security forces towards Sweida, this caused protests amongst Israeli Druze and calls for a ground incursion to fight against the Syrian government forces. That night, Israeli airstrikes were launched within 500 meters of the Presidential palace as a warning to the Syrian president. This was followed by one of the largest bombing campaigns in past decades against the country.
In response, al-Sharaa capitulated and decided to arrest the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), Talal Naji, likely in a good will gesture to help the Zionist regime locate the body of an Israeli soldier considered missing since 1982.
It is clear that the Israeli project in Syria is not over and that Tel Aviv seeks to use what it sees as a historic opportunity to divide the country and achieve “Greater Israel”. But this will come at a potentially huge cost, due to the fact that more action inside southern Syria will eventually lead to an organic resistance movement emerging. On the other hand, if the Zionists decide to engage with Syrian security forces on the ground, there is no telling how things could spiral out of control.
The Israelis simply do not have the ground capability to open up another broad front inside of Syria, because if they do so, they are going to leave themselves vulnerable on other fronts. If the current Syrian administration was politically intelligent, it would weaponise the situation to its benefit. Instead, it appears to be appealing for normalization without any need for Israeli concessions, meanwhile, Netanyahu doesn’t appear to be entertaining a deal at this time and wants to steal more from Syria first.
US War on Yemen Exposes Limits of American Military Might
By Brian Berletic – New Eastern Outlook – May 13, 2025
Despite years of devastating military and economic pressure, Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement continues to defy U.S. operations, exposing the growing limitations of American military power in the region.
Yemen, a nation of approximately 40 million people, is one of the poorest nations on Earth. It has suffered decades of political instability, including a US-engineered regime change operation in 2011 followed by a nearly 7 year long war with a US-armed and backed Saudi-led Persian Gulf coalition. The war included air strikes and a ground invasion, along with economic sanctions and a naval blockade. Subsequently, the UN has declared Yemen to be one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with up to 14% of the population displaced by conflict.
Since then, the US has carried out direct attacks on Yemen. Both the previous Biden administration and now the current Trump administration have carried out military campaigns in a bid to subdue Ansar Allah (often referred to as the “Houthis”) – the military and political organization administering Yemen’s capital and surrounding cities along the nation’s western coast.
The most recent military campaign has included strikes on civilian infrastructure, including a major port and reportedly a reservoir.
Leaked messages between the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, the US Vice President and other senior officials reveal the deliberate targeting and complete destruction of residential buildings to kill a single suspected enemy individual.
Despite the tremendous power of the US military and the protracted brutality the US has applied to Yemen, Ansar Allah remains a viable political and military organization. It continues to target and destroy US drones conducting surveillance and attacks in Yemeni airspace, as well as targeting US warships in the Red Sea, amid a much wider blockade Ansar Allah has placed on Israeli-bound vessels and now US oil shipments.
While Ansar Allah has regularly claimed to have targeted and forced US warships to flee, a recent CNN article appears to confirm that indeed drones and anti-shipping missiles targeting US ships have not only forced them to take evasive maneuvers, they have also caused material losses including a $60 million F-18 warplane.
The article admits:
A US official said initial reports from the scene indicated the Truman made a hard turn to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the fighter jet falling overboard. Yemen’s Houthi rebels claimed on Monday to have launched a drone and missile attack on the aircraft carrier, which is in the Red Sea as part of the US military’s major operation against the Iran-backed group.
Other Western media outlets have admitted the loss of multiple $30 million drones over Yemen. An April 29, 2025 article by France 24 reported that the US had lost up to 7 MQ-9 Reaper drones over the previous 2 months.
The drones are used to identify and guide munitions to targets. They have a service ceiling comparable to modern manned warplanes like the US F-35 Lightning. The regular loss of MQ-9 drones over Yemen implies that Ansar Allah possesses air defense systems also capable of reaching altitudes manned US warplanes operate at. This is why the US has failed so far to establish air superiority over Yemeni airspace, forcing the US to instead carry out standoff strikes.
Standoff strikes involve the use of long-range precision guided missiles fired far beyond the reach of enemy air defenses. The missiles then travel into enemy airspace to strike their targets. While the obvious advantage of this strategy is avoiding enemy air defenses, there are many disadvantages, including the use of standoff munitions which are expensive and made in relatively small quantities. Enemy radar systems can detect stand-off weapons as they travel across their airspace, allowing them to potentially intercept the incoming missile. It also provides personnel and equipment time to take cover before the stand-off munitions reach their target.
Western media outlets have reported that Ansar Allah is believed to have surface-to-air missiles from Iran. This includes systems like the Barq-1 and Barq-2 air defense systems. These are comparable to the Russian-made Buk air defense system. While considered a “medium range” air defense system, it is capable of targeting modern warplanes at their maximum service ceiling.
Western media outlets have also noted the US’ use of electronic warfare aircraft against targets across Yemen, armed with anti-radiation guided missiles designed to detect and home in on radar signals. Such missiles are used as part of “suppression of enemy air defenses” (SEAD) missions to either force air defense operators to turn off their radar sets to prevent their destruction, or to target and destroy the radar set if they don’t. Whether switched off or destroyed, the radar systems are unable to target and destroy incoming warplanes, allowing airstrikes to be conducted.
Despite the simple premise, the detection and suppression of enemy air defense systems as part of SEAD missions is dangerous and complex. The fact that Ansar Allah is still regularly detecting and downing MQ-9 drones means US SEAD missions have fallen short of destroying Ansar Allah’s air defenses and establishing air superiority over Yemen.
The limitations of US military power have been steadily exposed in recent conflicts. The US proxy war in Syria and now its military operations against Yemen has required US warplanes to conduct standoff strikes because of an inability to either destroy or evade Russian and Iranian-designed air defense systems. The transfer of US weapons to Ukraine and their failure on the battlefield there have further exposed the limits of US military might.
Despite this, the US remains a dangerous threat to the nations it targets. In Syria, the US used asymmetric military power in the form of armed militants, economic warfare, and political interference to succeed where its airpower had failed. While the disparity between US military might and that of the nations it targets has narrowed significantly over recent years, its vast array of economic and political weapons remain potent alternatives.
Only time will tell whether the emerging multipolar world can close the gap in regard to these US advantages in the same way it has regarding America’s quickly shrinking military advantages.

