Israeli Opposition Leader Endorses Greater Israel
The Dissident | February 24, 2026
U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, sparked major backlash during his recent interview with Tucker Carlson, where he openly endorsed the idea of a Greater Israel, stating that “it would be fine” if Israel took large swaths of the Middle East.
In damage control mode, Zionists attempted to paint Huckbee’s claims as fringe or extreme within Israel, but Israel’s opposition leader , Yair Lapid, has confirmed that the prospect of an expansionist Greater Israel is supported even by the more supposedly “liberal” wing of the Israeli political spectrum.
When asked, “The Ambassador Huckabee said this week, and we know the extent of the American administration on the government here, that he supports Israeli control from the Euphrates to the Nile, this means [control] over Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, do you support it or do you think this should be stopped?”, Lapid replied, “I don’t think I have a dispute on the biblical level [about] what the original borders of Israel are.”
Lapid went on to endorse massive Israeli expansion, saying, “support anything that will allow the Jews [to have] a big, vast, strong land, and a safe shelter for us, for our children, and for our children’s children. That’s what I support” adding, “However possible” when asked “How vast?”.
When further asked, “Until Iraq?” Lapid replied, “The discussion is a security discussion. The fact that we are in our ancestral land… Yesh Atid’s position is as follows: Zionism is based on the bible. Our mandate of the land of Israel is biblical. The biblical borders of Israel are clear. There are also considerations of security, of policy, and of time. We were in exile for 2,000 years… you don’t really want all this lecture, right? At least you were not waiting for it… The answer is: there are practical considerations here. Beyond the practical considerations, I believe that our ownership deed over the land of Israel is the bible, therefore the borders are the biblical borders”.
Lapid even advocated that Israel take “as much as possible” of Greater Israel, saying, “Fundamentally, the great, big and vast Israel, as much as possible within the limitations of Israeli security and considerations of Israeli policy”.
Similarly, Benjamin Netanyahu has previously stated that he “subscribed to a ‘vision’ for a ‘Greater Israel’” and “very much”, “felt connected to the ‘Greater Israel’ vision”.
Israeli officials have long been clear that their end goal in Gaza and the West Bank has been total ethnic cleansing and annexation, with Israel’s Science and Technology Minister Gila Gamliel admitting , “we will make Gaza unlivable for humans until the population leaves, and then we will do the same for the West Bank”.
But Yair Lapid’s comments show that across the spectrum from Netanyahu to his “liberal” opposition, Israel has expansionist ambitions beyond Gaza and the West Bank, and wants to take “as much as possible” of Greater Israel.
Trump’s military buildup against Iran on Netanyahu’s behalf is a gambit doomed to fail
By Iqbal Jassat | Press TV | February 25, 2026
While uncertainty clouds the possibility of America launching a full-scale war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, pro-war narratives emanating from the apartheid regime of Israel desperately seek to justify it.
The war cries raised by Israel’s genocidaires are hardly surprising. After all, it is well known that the regime premier and the criminal-in-chief, Benjamin Netanyahu, has, since the 1990,s been pressuring the United States to carry out direct military action against Tehran.
Hence, it would not be incorrect to conclude that Washington’s war drums over Iran are not the product of strategy. They are the product of imperial reflex and Zionist pressure masquerading as deterrence.
Bizarrely, the spectacle of force assembled under President Donald Trump’s orders, the largest concentration of US air and naval power in the region since 2003, is being sold as strength, whereas it is, in fact, insecurity dressed up as bravado.
The indicators tell their own story.
Despite the theatrics of deployment, the expected escalation signals, mass embassy evacuations and sweeping NOTAM expansions remain limited.
Even within the American military establishment, caution seeps through the cracks. As noted in the February 2026 analysis circulated by Larry Johnson and Douglas Macgregor, the absence of full-spectrum preparatory measures suggests hesitation, not inevitability.
Contrary to the mainstream Western media’s view of “weighing options”, the reality points to a deeply fractured power struggle inside Washington’s war machine.
For instance, the Washington Post report citing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dan Caine is particularly revealing.
Caine’s warning about depleted munitions stockpiles, exhausted by Washington’s underwriting of Israel’s war machine and its proxy entanglements in Ukraine, punctures Trump’s fantasy of an “easily won” confrontation.
Trump’s public denial of Caine’s caution is predictable. But the leak itself is the story when senior military officials allow their reservations to reach the press, it is the Pentagon placing a marker in history: we warned him.
Netanyahu’s pressure on Trump has left him in a huge dilemma.
Iran is not Iraq. It is not Libya. It is not a fragmented state awaiting aerial collapse. It is a formidable military with layered air defenses, dispersed missile clusters, hardened infrastructure and strategic depth supported by Russia and China.
The fantasy that standoff air power will induce “disintegration” is recycled doctrine from Kosovo, Iraq and countless failed coercion campaigns. Precision bombing has never delivered political submission where sovereignty is embedded in national resistance.
Yet Trump persists in the illusion that overwhelming force will produce capitulation. Historians will remind us about the folly of imperial habits.
What is absent from Washington’s framing is the geopolitical driver beneath the rhetoric.
The protection of Israeli supremacy remains the unspoken constant. Every escalation is filtered through Tel Aviv’s military and “security” doctrine. Every negotiation is judged by whether it secures Israel’s interests rather than American interests.
Just as the American public is told the “reason” for US hostility is about nuclear proliferation, so too have Zionist-allied agents in South Africa used similar fake arguments to justify the annihilation of Iran.
Some analysts based in the Israeli-occupied territories, who are skeptical about Netanyahu’s motives, remind us that his long-held view about a US attack on Iran would be a “masterstroke” to attain his personal incentive to remain in power.
The reality, though, as Caine cautioned, exposes a deeper truth: the United States is overextended. Its munitions stockpiles are strained. Its alliances are brittle. Its domestic coalition is fractured. A war with Iran would not be a swift surgical strike. It would be attrition, retaliation and regional conflagration.
What unfolds now is not a clash of civilizations. It is the exhaustion of empire confronting the limits of coercion.
A war with Iran would not restore American dominance. It would accelerate its unraveling and the warning has been issued from within.
Whether Trump listens is irrelevant to the structural decline already underway.
Iqbal Jassat is an executive member of the Media Review Network, Johannesburg, South Africa.
U.S. General Caine Warns: STRIKING IRAN is a HUGE RISK /Glenn Diesen & Lt Col Daniel Davis
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – February 23, 2026
The Pentagon is raising concerns to Trump about an extended military campaign against Iran, advising that war plans being considered carry risks including U.S. and allied casualties, depleted air defenses and an overtaxed force.
The warnings voiced by Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, within the Defense Department and during meetings of the National Security Council, current and former officials said, but other Pentagon leaders also have noted similar worries.
Such discussions are always part of the contingency-planning process before military operations, some officials said, noting that military leaders—especially the Joint Chiefs chair—provide prudent estimates of possible casualties and other potential costs of military operations.
The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’
By Amro Allan | Al Mayadeen | February 23, 2026
The confrontation forming around Iran is increasingly defined not by diplomacy or de-escalatory statecraft, but by infrastructure: aircraft, tankers, ships, interceptors, forward bases, and the logistics that bind them into a usable strike system. What is being assembled around Iran is coercion by force posture—a regional arrangement designed to make the use of violence not only possible, but administratively routine.
The danger is not simply that the United States is “sending a message.” It is those messages, once backed by operational capability and sustained logistics, that develop their own momentum—especially in a region where a single incident, whether staged, misattributed, or opportunistically interpreted, can push escalation beyond the point where political actors can plausibly reverse it. That is how wars become “inevitable”: not because they must happen, but because the architecture is built until restraint begins to look like an admission of weakness.
What is underway is best understood as a transition from episodic pressure to a posture designed to make sustained operations feasible. Deterrence theatre is reversible: it can be intensified, paused, or theatrically concluded. War-enabling posture is different. It organizes the region for a campaign that could last weeks, not hours—requiring refuelling depth, airborne command, electronic warfare, forward munitions, missile defense, and a permissive regional geography. In other words, it is not the language of crisis management; it is the language of readiness for force.
The Israeli role
Any realistic scenario involving major strikes on Iran necessarily includes Israeli capabilities, even if formal command structures remain ambiguous. The Israeli Air Force is not simply a parallel instrument. It is a forward-deployed capacity that can be synchronized with US regional power while allowing Washington to stage-manage deniability until the moment of activation.
“Israel” maintains a large combat fleet with a long-range strike capacity built around multiple platforms: approximately 66 F-15 aircraft (including F-15I variants configured for longer-range strike), roughly 173 F-16 fighters, and about 48 F-35I stealth aircraft in service, with additional units expected over time. The operational implication is a structure suited to repeated waves rather than a single, demonstrative raid: stealth assets prioritized for penetration and suppression, with conventional fighters sustaining the bulk of strike and support roles once corridors are opened.
Defense planning in “Israel” also signals expectation of retaliation on a scale that exceeds symbolic exchange. The layered interception network—Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and THAAD—is designed to deal with different classes of incoming fire, from rockets and drones to ballistic threats, and it functions as a prerequisite for any prolonged confrontation in which Israeli and US regional assets become primary targets.
This is where the political and military lines converge. Israeli leadership has long framed Iran as the central strategic adversary, and war planning has repeatedly been presented as a means of reshaping regional balances. Whatever language is used—“pre-emption”, “self-defense”, “containment”—the practical effect is to normalize the idea that Iran’s sovereignty can be overridden by an external security narrative. In that framework, escalation is not an accident; it is a policy option that is repeatedly rehearsed as common sense.
What the United States has built
The most revealing element in the US posture is not any single platform, but the way assets are being layered into an integrated strike system.
Open sources indicate that, on the air side, the forward package includes at least 30 F-35A fighters deployed in theatre, 24 F-15E aircraft, and an additional 36 F-16s moving toward the region. Electronic attack support includes 6 EA-18G Growlers, alongside 8–12 A-10 aircraft. Around a dozen additional F-16s are operating from Prince Sultan and possibly Al Dhafra, supported by 3 E-11A communications aircraft. In addition, a deployment of 12 F-22 stealth fighters is underway, with part of the force already forward-positioned and the remainder expected to continue toward regional bases.
The intelligence and command layer expands this into something far beyond a “show of force”: the movement or deployment of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, an RC-135 signals-intelligence platform, a WC-135 nuclear-detection aircraft, and additional E-3 AWACS aircraft preparing for redeployment to forward bases—strengthening airborne battle management and command capability.
Operational persistence depends on fuel and lift. The posture is underpinned by up to 22 tanker aircraft operating from regional hubs, and sustained transport activity by C-17, C-5M, and C-130 aircraft delivering troops, equipment, and air-defence systems to forward locations.
At sea, the naval component includes the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group moving toward the region while the USS Abraham Lincoln group operates in the Arabian Sea, alongside multiple Arleigh Burke destroyers positioned across key waterways (the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean). The posture is reinforced by the USS Georgia, an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine capable of launching a large volume of cruise missiles.
Individually, each of these deployments can be framed as “routine”. Collectively, they form something more consequential: an operational environment in which launching a campaign becomes logistically straightforward. That is the essence of coercion-by-infrastructure. It does not announce war. It makes war easier to begin.
The aircraft carrier story
Washington foregrounds naval deployments because they are legible, dramatic, and politically manageable. Ships can be repositioned without forcing host governments into public commitments. Carrier strike groups allow Washington to appear decisive while keeping escalation thresholds ambiguous. This is useful domestically and diplomatically: it reassures partners, pressures adversaries, and sustains a narrative of control.
Yet the obsession with carriers often obscures the real center of gravity: land-based access, refuelling depth, persistent surveillance, and the defensive systems that keep regional bases operational. A serious campaign aimed at degrading Iran’s missile forces, air defenses, energy infrastructure, or nuclear-related facilities requires sortie generation and basing access that naval aviation alone cannot supply. The decisive question is not what is sailing; it is what is already positioned on land and in the air.
Iran reads this not as theatre, but as preparation. That reading is rational. When an adversary constructs a system designed for sustained strikes, it is the targeted state—not the deploying one—that is forced to plan for worst-case scenarios.
The geography of war
The enabling infrastructure of any sustained campaign sits in fixed locations. The operational map spans the Gulf and the Levant.
From Al Udeid in Qatar—often described as the operational heart of US Central Command—Washington can coordinate high-tempo operations supported by ISR and refuelling. Al Dhafra in the UAE extends its reach with advanced platforms and command integration. Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, if politically activated, shortens flight times and increases sortie density. The Harir airbase in Erbil provides forward access for strike and surveillance missions, while Jordanian airfields open western approach corridors. US positions in eastern Syria facilitate drone and reconnaissance activity along Iran’s western flank.
Beyond the Arab theatre, “Israel’s” bases operate in close alignment with US operational planning, forming an integrated environment even if formal command lines remain blurred. To the north, Azerbaijan offers potential basing or surveillance access along Iran’s sensitive frontier. Strategically, long-range bombers operating from the continental United States or Diego Garcia can be integrated through aerial refuelling and forward command nodes—adding strike capacity not captured by carrier-focused narratives.
This geography also clarifies what Washington rarely foregrounds: regional states become the battlefield’s enabling terrain. The bases, depots, radars, command centres, and runways that make sustained operations possible also sit within Iran’s retaliatory envelope. Iran does not need to neutralize a carrier to impose strategic and political costs. It can target the infrastructure that keeps the campaign running: runways, fuel depots, hangars, radar nodes, and the host-nation systems that sustain them.
If escalation occurs, the political question for host governments will not be abstract. It will be immediate: whether they are willing to absorb retaliation for choices made in Washington and Tel Aviv. That is precisely why the build-up is destabilizing. It expands the list of actors exposed to consequences while narrowing the space for de-escalation.
This is where the moral and legal questions sharpen. If host states provide launchpads, they are not passive bystanders; they become parties to the escalation. Yet these governments are rarely treated, in Western coverage, as societies that will absorb the consequences. They are treated as facilities—terrain, not people. Iran, by contrast, is treated as a problem to be managed.
Missile defense
If the escalation logic runs through bases, the defensive requirement runs through interceptors. Missile defense in this doctrine is a central operational requirement rather than a supporting function.
Patriot and THAAD batteries protect major airbases and logistics nodes across the Gulf and the Levant, integrated with early-warning radars, airborne surveillance, and regional command networks. Following the US withdrawal from Ain al-Assad in western Iraq, defensive emphasis shifted toward fewer but more politically sustainable bases: Al Udeid and Al Dhafra remain heavily protected, while positions in Jordan and eastern Syria rely on combinations of Patriot systems, shorter-range counter-drone defenses, and persistent surveillance.
“Israel” constitutes a distinct but integrated pillar in this interception architecture. Its layered air-defense network—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Patriot, and Arrow—is linked to US early-warning and interception planning, forming a shared defensive envelope rather than a purely national shield.
Notably, the defensive geography is widening. Cyprus has deployed Israeli-made air-defense systems, and Greece is moving toward integrating Israeli interception technology into its own architecture—developments that point to the gradual emergence of an Eastern Mediterranean interception depth, built around interoperable sensors and strategic alignment rather than formal collective defence commitments.
At sea, US Aegis-equipped destroyers add a mobile interception layer capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and limited ballistic threats—again supplementing, not replacing, land-based interception.
This matters because missile defense introduces a vulnerability that carrier narratives often conceal: interceptor stocks are finite, and a sustained high-volume exchange strains them. In a scenario of large-scale missile and drone retaliation, the question becomes not simply “can you intercept?” but “for how long?”—and at what political cost to host governments whose territory becomes the absorbing surface for escalation.
Tehran’s strategic logic
Iran’s deterrence logic has been recalibrated by lived confrontation, namely the “12-day war”. The central conclusion drawn in Tehran is that survivability precedes deterrence. Missiles, air-defense systems, command-and-control, missile production, and retaliatory capabilities must be structured to endure the opening shock of war, not to dominate it.
In the opening phase of that confrontation, Iran’s air defenses suffered rapid degradation: fixed or semi-mobile systems were destroyed early, their locations effectively pre-mapped, and their network dependence exploited through precision strikes, electronic warfare, and intelligence integration. Mobile missile systems—long assumed to be the backbone of survivable retaliation—also proved vulnerable once movement became detectable under persistent surveillance and integrated strike networks. The conclusion Tehran extracts is structural: in a conflict dominated by satellite tracking and real-time targeting, anything that must move, emit, or communicate openly at the onset of war is at elevated risk of rapid attrition.
That assessment drives the turn toward underground infrastructure. Iran’s missile force is being reconfigured around hardened tunnels, concealed storage, underground silos, and pre-positioned launch infrastructure designed to reduce exposure time and reliance on vulnerable command links. In this model, air defense still matters, but its role is framed as damage limitation rather than denial: complicating targeting, absorbing strikes, and preserving enough capability to ensure retaliation after the opening exchange.
Disruptions cascade into command delays and coordination bottlenecks, so Tehran’s preparations increasingly prioritise hardened domestic infrastructure, reduced external dependencies, and decentralized command authority to ensure retaliation does not hinge on uninterrupted connectivity. Parallel to this is the elevation of the domestic front—civil defense, continuity, internal stability—as a core component of deterrence rather than an auxiliary concern.
This is not the posture of a state seeking war. It is the posture of a state that has learnt—through repeated threat and episodic attack—that its adversaries prefer to treat its security as negotiable. Tehran’s strategic lesson is bleak but coherent: if the US and “Israel” reserve an expansive right to strike, then Iran must reserve the ability to respond even after absorbing the first blow. This is not radical; it is the minimal condition of sovereignty.
The escalation problem
A central risk is that escalation is unlikely to remain geographically contained. Even if Washington frames an initial operation as “limited”, allied forces and partner theatres are not mechanically separable. Under conditions of sustained strikes on Iran, groups and allied actors across Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq face their own strategic pressures, with intervention becoming a function of credibility and survival rather than preference.
Meanwhile, regional governments that host US assets occupy an exposed position. They may privately prefer de-escalation, but their bases and airspace can become operational requirements once Washington activates the posture it has assembled. Washington has 35,000–40,000 personnel deployed around Iran, expected to carry out the main attack in the event of war—an estimate that underscores how deeply the region is already militarily interlocked with any potential campaign.
This is where political constraint becomes as dangerous as military capability. When leaders publicly elevate threats, they increase the domestic cost of restraint; when adversaries interpret restraint as weakness, they increase the cost of compromise. In such conditions, accidental escalation—triggered by a strike, a misattributed attack, or a rapid chain of retaliation—can become more plausible than deliberate strategic design. And in an environment saturated with narrative warfare, the line between “accident” and “pretext” is rarely as clear as officials insist.
The build-up manufactures the conditions for war
The build-up is not reducible to theatre. It is a layered strike-and-defense system: forward stealth fighters and conventional strike aircraft; electronic warfare; airborne command and ISR; tanker depth and heavy lift; carrier groups and missile-capable submarines; a regional lattice of bases; and an expanding interception architecture stretching across the Gulf, the Levant, and into the Eastern Mediterranean. The combined effect is to make sustained operations technically feasible, while widening the geography of vulnerability and entanglement.
The strategic irony is that the more “prepared” this posture becomes, the less space remains for political off-ramps. Host governments become exposed. Interceptor sustainability becomes a decisive variable. Tehran’s retaliatory doctrine evolves toward survivability and endurance rather than symbolic signalling. In such an environment, the question is no longer whether war is “intended”. It is whether the operational infrastructure of war is now sufficiently in place that a single trigger—miscalculation, provocation, or opportunism—can transform a posture into a campaign faster than political channels can arrest it.
Iran’s reading of this is neither paranoia nor ideology. It is a basic inference. When a superpower constructs the machinery for a sustained strike and embeds it across neighbouring territories, the targeted state will plan accordingly. The real moral burden, then, lies not on Iran’s preparations for survival, but on the political decision—repeatedly rehearsed in Washington and Tel Aviv—that a regional order can be engineered through coercion and air power, while everyone else is expected to absorb the consequences.
If the international community is serious about preventing war, it should stop treating Iran’s defensive doctrine as the primary problem while granting the US-Israeli posture the presumption of legitimacy. The liability of proof lies with those constructing a regional strike system and calling it “stability”. There is nothing stabilizing about embedding a war option across neighbouring territories, then demanding that the targeted state behave as though this is normal. The region has seen this script before: coercion presented as protection, escalation presented as necessity, and catastrophe presented—after the fact—as an unfortunate surprise.
Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | February 21, 2026
While it is impossible to predict precisely what the war on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies will result in, the winnability of the regional conflict is clear. The only thing driving this attack is sheer Israeli arrogance, as there is no conceivable situation where all out regional war delivers anything short of uncontrollable chaos.
Why is an all out regional war unwinnable? Although there are various reasons as to why this is the case, it suffices to say that the US and Israelis have no way of controlling its outcomes, in addition to this, they simply do not possess the military industrial capacity to wage such a war for a long period of time.
Now, when this argument is made, it is not done from an idealistic point of view. Therefore, it is important to preface this piece on the fact that there is a clear Israeli-US superiority in terms of technology and the kinds of weapons they possess. Nobody disputes this. There is also clear superiority in the field of their intelligence agencies.
So, let us first assume that the United States and the Zionist entity manage to score all of their desired tactical victories. Working on this assumption will then definitively prove the injudicious nature of the endeavour.
Therefore, under the best case scenario for the Zionist coalition, perhaps they succeed in conducting another decapitation strike on the Iranian military leadership, manage to penetrate and destroy some missile bases, nuclear facilities, while gutting the Islamic Republic’s air defences. These are very likely goals that they will seek to achieve.
Let’s also work under the assumption that they manage to put Tehran on the backfoot for at least a week, due to the intensity of their air campaign, making it difficult for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) to fire large bursts of ballistic missiles at a single time. Then, after achieving air dominance, strikes on essential infrastructure begin, including cultural sites, government buildings, the media, but also the likes of oil facilities, agricultural areas and water systems.
On top of all of this, assume hybrid warfare tactics will be ongoing. Militant groups, especially those focused along the Iranian periphery, will start major offensive operations, working in conjunction with foreign intelligence agents and operatives on the ground, similar to what we witnessed during the 12-day War in June of 2025.
Note that the much debated potential goal of assassinating Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is not included above. Although many have speculated that the strategy could very well hindge upon this, it guarantees a war with no predictable end, no escalation ladder and will likely trigger calls for global Jihad.
An inevitable US-Israeli defeat
Giving the Zionist coalition the best possible conditions and achievements as a result of their opening offensive, this strategy will quickly begin to run into major issues.
As we saw last June, decapitation strikes against the Iranian leadership do not work at crippling the government and its military, they are simply replaced by another line of leadership, who implement a whole series of pre-planned counter attack strategies.
The Israelis wrongfully believed that their success during the initial attack on Iran last year was going to yield major results, even attempting to utilise their asset in the United States, the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, to call for a revolt. Not only did no such action take place, as Iranians outside of the diaspora do not support this clear Zionist puppet, but the very opposite occurred as the population rallied behind the flag.
Within 15 hours, the Iranians not only managed to get their air defences back online, but captured the initiative and began launching huge volleys of ballistic missiles into the heart of Tel Aviv. As the conflict evolved, a few important developments occurred: the Israeli air defences began to buckle – with the draining of anti-air munitions – while their agents on the ground carried out most of the attacks, something that is key to note.
While it is clear that the US will bring in greater firepower than the Israelis can muster, an air force is still run by human operators who get tired and operate equipment that needs to be serviced. Iran will very easily be able to launch drones waves constantly at US and Zionist positions, and even if their ability to launch large salvos of missiles is constrained during the first week of the conflict, eventually the opportunity will present itself.
If the Iranian State has not crumbled and civil war has not erupted within this time, then the US and Israelis will then be subjected to wave after wave of counterattacks. Inevitably, this means that airbases will be struck, equipment will be lost, and with fewer assets, this means less ability to keep up the pace of their offensive.
Bear in mind that warhawks employed by Washington and Tel Aviv based pro-war think tanks, who claim that the Iranian State is crumbling at least once a year, are far detached from reality. Take the latest round of foreign backed riots for example, the Western corporate media invented an alternate reality in order to sell the idea that Iran was falling, yet the entire ordeal was more or less over in two days.
It is clear to any learned observer, that without a significant ground element, toppling the Iranian government is impossible. Which then leads to the obvious next question: What if major militant offensives occur inside Iranian territory?
Answering this in depth would take time and a more nimble military mind. Yet, again assuming some level of success on the behalf of separatist militias and al-Qaeda linked Takfiri groups, even if they were to seize territory, Iran is a massive country that allows for mistakes. None of these groups compare and can stand up to the Iranian army and IRGC, nor do they likely possess any considerable advanced capabilities.
What this means is that even if they manage to see some level of initial success, the much larger, well trained, motivated and well equipped Iranian armed forces will eventually crush these insurgents. The only real threat is some kind of mass civilian mobilisation that will deal a blow to the Iranian economy, for which there is no indication this will happen, especially as the nation is suffering through a bloody war of aggression against it.
Then come the attacks on missile bases and nuclear sites. Even if some of these attacks are successful, they won’t destroy all of Iran’s capabilities, and as we saw in June of last year, the US attacks on the nuclear facilities don’t appear to have stopped the nuclear program. If it were that easy to simply take out Iran’s capabilities, it would have been done long ago. The Israelis tried last year and failed. If anything, on the nuclear issue, such a war could end up leading to Tehran actually reversing course on its stance against developing the bomb.
Even with full US-Israeli air superiority, the remaining air defences of Iran will at some point come back online, but even in the event that 100% of their anti-air capabilities are gone, their power is in their offensive, not defensive capabilities.
Once this initial period of assumed US-Israeli offensive dominance is over, Iran can easily block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, inflict large casualty events on US and Israeli targets, while taking out assets. It is impossible to predict which strikes will be the most effective, however, it is clear that everything will become a target. So expect a big hit on the global oil market, resulting in an economic crisis.
If Iran simply keeps up a pace of fire against the Israelis, the likes of which we saw during the 12-day War, then they only have a matter of weeks before their air defences also become useless.
This is all without factoring in Iran’s various allies, which may enter at any level of intensity at any point in this conflict. There’s Ansar Allah, which has the capability of striking the Israelis, but also assets throughout the Persian Gulf. If Hezbollah manages to wage a considerable ground war, the Israelis have proven in the past to be the weakest in this arena.
The Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU/PMF, Hashd al-Shaabi) are around 250,000 men strong, alongside Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who can use their own capabilities to not only target the US, but the Israelis also. So far, since October 7, 2023, we have not seen a true demonstration of their power. Another factor which is not often discussed, but is also very important, is the role of the Palestinian resistance, who are more likely to wait for the right opportunity, but can also pose a major ground challenge to the Israelis from Gaza.
None of this considers the other elements that could come into play, such as the roles played by regional nations, armed groups we may not have previously heard of, the likes of the Fatemiyoun of Afghanistan and Zainabiyoun of Pakistan, or the general populations throughout the region and what we could see in the event that chaos erupts. Governments could be overthrown, the civilian populations of Jordan and Egypt could become active and out of control. There is also the possibility that some groups in Syria could seize the opportunity to attack the Israelis.
In the event that such a war occurs, the longer it goes on, the more chaotic and unpredictable it becomes. A situation will be totally out of the US’s control, especially as the only means of combating this regional explosion is through the air. As we witnessed with the US campaign against Yemen, airstrikes alone change very little. Even in Gaza, the armed resistance groups fought for over 2 years with no supply chain, and by the admissions of the US and Israelis, their fighting force is still roughly the same size.
If things don’t go their way very quickly, then the Zionist coalition is going to get battered, and not even nuclear weapons will get them out of it. Therefore, [if] the US and Israelis, as long as we again grant them another assumption, that they are somewhat sane, choose to go to war, they will have to try and establish an escalation ladder, devising a real exit strategy.
The question becomes whether the Iranians and their allies allow them to exit the fight. An all out war will be bloody, it will claim an enormous amount of civilian lives, and it will also inflict considerable damage on civilian infrastructure. Truly, the effects of such a war are not desired by anyone in the region, yet the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance have long prepared their capabilities in order to combat what appears to have been inevitable.
Another thing to be mentioned here is that the US government, under the Trump administration, is totally captured by the Zionist entity. For all the reasons noted above, no previous administrations have dared escalate to this extent. If it were easy to launch a regime change operation against Iran, it would have been carried out many years ago.
However, a Zionist stooge is occupying the White House, a narcissistic man whose already low cognitive abilities are clearly declining. He is a President that an FBI report concluded had been compromised by the Mossad, but even if that report isn’t to be taken seriously, his whole campaign was bankrolled by Zionist donors, and his administration is an embarrassing collection of Zionist war hawks. If there was ever any US administration that was foolish enough to launch such a war, it is that of Donald Trump.
US envoy Huckabee claims Israel has ‘biblical right’ to conquer all West Asia
The Cradle | February 21, 2026
During a recent interview with Tucker Carlson, US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee claimed Israel has a biblical right to take over “all” of West Asia.
“It would be fine if they took it all,” Huckabee said when asked whether a passage from the Book of Genesis can be interpreted as granting Israel the right to steal all the land between the Nile River in Egypt and the Euphrates in Syria.
Huckabee was appointed by President Donald Trump as Ambassador to Israel in 2025. He is a former Arkansas governor and Southern Baptist minister.
Carlson and Huckabee discussed interpretations of Old Testament (Torah) scripture used by Christian Zionists to justify Israel’s killing and expulsion of native Christians and Muslims from the Holy Land.
Carlson asked Huckabee about a biblical verse in which God promises Abraham that his descendants will receive land “from the wadi of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates – the land of the Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaites, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites and Jebusites.”
“Israel is a land that God gave, through Abraham, to a people that he chose. It was a people, a place, and a purpose,” Huckabee claimed.
Carlson responded, saying this would include “like, basically the entire Middle East.”
“The Levant … Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon – it’d also be big parts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq,” Carlson said.
“I’m not sure it would go that far, but it would be a big piece of land,” Huckabee answered.
Since 7 October 2023, Israel has launched wars to occupy land in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, including to establish settlements for Israeli Jews. Israel has also escalated its efforts to steal and annex Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank.
Israel has killed at least 72,000 Palestinians during its effort to conquer Gaza, the majority of whom were women and children. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands more may die from the indirect effects of Israel’s destruction of the strip.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to justify the eradication of Palestinians in Gaza at the start of the war, calling them “Amalek,” a reference to the Biblical account of a people exterminated by ancient Israelites.
Israeli Finance Minister and settler leader, Bezalel Smotrich, has stated that Israel would expand “little by little” and eventually encompass all Palestinian territories as well as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
“It is written that the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus,” he said, referencing the “Greater Israel” ideology.
Carlson also pressed Huckabee about Israel’s role in pushing the US to go to war against Iraq in 2003, which led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of US soldiers.
“How many Americans put their boots on the ground for Israel?” the US ambassador asked.
“Everybody who served in Iraq,” Carlson responded, adding that the intelligence falsely claiming that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction had come from Israel.
As Gary Vogler has detailed, neoconservatives inside the government of George W. Bush worked secretly with the Israeli lobby and government to launch the invasion of Iraq to satisfy Israel’s energy needs.
Since the start of the genocide in Gaza, members of Trump’s so-called “America First” political movement have become increasingly critical of Israel’s dominant influence in the US government, in particular at the expense of US citizens.
President Trump has currently amassed an “armada” of US forces in West Asia to prepare for a possible attack on Iran, long a key priority for Israel and Netanyahu, which would lead to the deaths of additional US citizens for Israel’s sake.
Testing the Alliance: Netanyahu’s Washington Visit
By Abbas Hashemite – New Eastern Outlook – February 21, 2026
Netanyahu’s recent rush to the United States signals that Israel seeks Washington to expand the agenda of negotiations with Iran. However, the Trump administration seems to recalibrate its policy alignment with Israel.
A Diplomatic Visit or a Geopolitical Stress Test?
Soon after the first round of US-Iran peace negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to Washington. This visit was not part of routine diplomacy, but rather a test of geopolitical endurance. Israel and the United States had always been close allies. This bilateral relationship reached a new high during the tenure of US President Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump’s reelection as the 47th President of the US, both sides have exchanged numerous visits. Yet the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu displayed pressing importance and urgency that signaled Israel’s anxiety over the recent US-Iran peace talks. Since the visit, analysts around the world are trying to analyze if the US will once again conduct a military attack on Iran at the behest of the Israeli government or if it will assert strategic independence.
The regional landscape in the Middle East is fraught with stress. Washington has intensified its military posture across the region to reinforce strategic deterrence and stability. The United States is critical of Iran’s nuclear program. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s uranium enrichment purity reached up to 60 percent as of mid-2025. This made Tehran’s nuclear enrichment levels the flashpoint for Western concern. Iranian officials insist that their nuclear program is merely for peaceful purposes and reversible. However, Tel Aviv views Iran’s nuclear enrichment levels as an existential threat. Some Arab states are also concerned about Iran’s nuclear program.
Due to these concerns by Israel and some pro-West Arab states, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Tehran. Moreover, it increased its military pressure on Iran by intensifying its military presence in the region. The United States deployed its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, in the Middle East. Reports suggest that the Pentagon has also ordered the deployment of another aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, in the region. US President Donald Trump has also confirmed the deployment of another aircraft carrier in the region. However, none of these arrangements appears to be enough to appease Israel.
Expanding the Negotiation Framework
Netanyahu visited Washington to seek expansion of the US-Iran negotiation outline. Tel Aviv has long maintained that any negotiations and agreement with Tehran must also include restrictions on Iran’s regional alliances and ballistic missile program. This demand has further increased after the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Israel views the range of Iranian missiles and its regional proxy network as a unified threat to its security and expansionist ambitions.
However, Washington’s posture after the Trump-Netanyahu meeting did not suggest any major breakthrough. After the meeting, President Trump stated that nuclear talks with Iran would continue, without mentioning anything about Iran’s ballistic missile program. This suggests that President Trump made no immediate commitment to the Israeli Prime Minister about including Iran’s ballistic missile program in the agenda of ongoing diplomatic negotiations. The absence of a clear US stance on Israel’s demands has drawn global attention.
Domestic Pressures and Global Constraints on Washington
The United States has been Israel’s closest ally for decades. Israel has received the largest amount of US aid in terms of money and weapons. However, it appears that this time the US wants to draw a boundary. There are numerous reasons behind this shift in Washington’s response to the Israeli demands. On the domestic front, the Trump administration is dealing with scores of challenges. American society is highly polarized over the Israeli aggression. Independent estimates suggest that the Palestinian death toll since October 7, 2023, has surpassed 80,000.
More than 90 percent of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure has been intentionally destroyed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). A recent report revealed that Israel used prohibited US-made thermobaric weapons, capable of generating temperatures above 3500 degrees Celsius, in Gaza, which made thousands of Palestinian people evaporate. The United States also provided diplomatic assistance to Israel at international forums. Such reports sparked sustained protests across the United States against unequivocal military and strategic alignment with Israel. These protests and the American youth’s criticism have altered the domestic environment in the country and diminished the influence of the AIPAC on American politics.
On the international front, the United States is already facing diplomatic and strategic challenges. Due to Trump’s “America First” approach and his increasing sanctions, tariffs, and interventionist attitude, Washington is facing diplomatic isolation. The rapid rise of Russia and China as new global superpowers and the increasing role of middle powers in global politics have made the world multipolar. The American economy is also burdened by federal debt of around $34 trillion. A war with Iran would deepen Washington’s economic strain and complicate its diplomatic standing. Due to all these issues, the Trump administration seems to adopt a cautious approach towards Iran. However, given the Zionist influence in the US establishment, it would be hard for President Trump to reject Netanyahu’s demands. The increasing US military posture in the Middle East suggests that the coming few weeks will be decisive for the region.
Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist.
Behind US war drums against Iran: No goals, no plan, no off-ramp
Al Mayadeen | February 20, 2026
As the United States continues to amass unprecedented military firepower in West Asia, the largest such build-up since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a senior analyst at the Atlantic Council is warning that Washington has yet to answer fundamental questions about what a military campaign against Iran would actually achieve, or what catastrophic consequences it might unleash.
In a piece published this week, Nate Swanson, director of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project and senior advisor on Iran policy to successive US administrations, outlined six critical questions that US policymakers appear unable, or unwilling, to answer before potentially launching a “massive, weeks-long” aggression against Iran.
The analysis, while emerging from a Washington policy establishment that has long driven the logic of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, nonetheless lays bare the incoherence and recklessness of the current US posture.
No clear objective, no clear endgame
Swanson acknowledges that the White House has failed to define what it hopes to achieve militarily. The possible objectives he outlines, leveraging a strike to force nuclear concessions, decapitating Iran’s leadership, or launching symbolic attacks to appear supportive of rioters, each carry “significant obstacles.”
Most notably, Swanson concedes that Iran’s leadership appears to have calculated that dismantling its defense capabilities would be more dangerous than absorbing a US strike. In other words, Washington is considering going to war against a country that has already determined it will not surrender to US demands, regardless of the military cost.
No diplomatic path
Swanson is frank that a diplomatic off-ramp is effectively closed, though the reasons illuminate where responsibility lies. The Trump administration, he notes, is not seeking a deal in the conventional sense but something closer to “an Iranian surrender pact.”
Iran, meanwhile, insists on its sovereign right to a civilian nuclear program. The vast gap between the two positions is less a failure of Iranian diplomacy than a reflection of maximalist US demands that leave no room for negotiation.
The human cost
One of the more significant acknowledgements in Swanson’s piece is the human toll of the June 2025 unprovoked Israeli war on Iran, which the US supported. Over 900 Iranians were martyred in the aggression, including many civilians.
He cautions that a new, prolonged campaign would risk far greater casualties, which is something the great majority of Iranians would oppose. The analyst also notes that Iranians did not come out to protest against the government during the twelve-day war, so there is no reason to believe a large-scale US aggression would trigger protests to overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Regional alarm bells ignored
Arab and Turkish partners of the United States have spent the past month urging Washington to step back from the brink, with Gulf states publicly refusing to permit US use of their airspace for attacks on Iran. The regional consensus against military escalation is striking and largely being ignored in Washington’s war calculus.
Swanson also raises the possibility of Iran retaliating against Gulf states if it cannot de-escalate, echoing the 2019 precedent when Iran struck UAE and Saudi Arabian infrastructure during the last “maximum pressure” campaign. It is a reminder that Washington’s wars rarely stay contained to their intended theatres.
A war machine in search of a justification
Swanson’s analysis, despite being authored from within the US foreign policy establishment, ultimately underscores a troubling reality. The United States is on the edge of a potentially devastating war without a clear objective, without a viable diplomatic track, without regional support, and against the wishes of 70 percent of its own population.
The questions Swanson is asking should have been answered before B-2 bombers were positioned in Diego Garcia and carrier strike groups were dispatched to the Gulf.
That they remain unanswered speaks not to a failure of analysis but to the nature of a foreign policy apparatus that treats war as a tool of first resort.
The Only Motive Behind The ‘Imminent’ U.S. War With Iran Is The Zionist Lobby
The Dissident | February 19, 2026
Barak Ravid in Axios reports that , “The Trump administration is closer to a major war in the Middle East than most Americans realize. It could begin very soon” in reference to Iran.
According to a source in the Trump administration, “it would likely be a joint U.S.-Israeli campaign that’s much broader in scope — and more existential for the regime — than the Israeli-led 12-day war last June.”
The report adds, “Trump’s armada has grown to include two aircraft carriers, a dozen warships, hundreds of fighter jets and multiple air defense systems. Some of that firepower is still on its way” adding, “The Israeli government — which is pushing for a maximalist scenario targeting regime change as well as Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — is preparing for a scenario of war within days, according to two Israeli officials.”
If this report is accurate, and the Trump administration actually is about to carry out a regime change war in Iran, there is only one driving motive behind it: the Zionist lobby’s control over Trump and broader U.S. foreign policy.
A Zionist Regime Change Campaign
During the June U.S./Israeli “12 day war”, Trump claimed it was about stopping Iran from obtaining Nuclear weapon, but Trump’s own Director of National Intelligence report from March found no evidence Iran was building a Nuclear weapon, writing, “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003”.
The real motive behind the Israeli pushed war, was regime change in Iran.
An inside source in the Trump administration told journalists Max Blumenthal and Anya Parampil that Israeli intelligence officials who were pushing for U.S. involvement in the war “have demonstrated a single-minded focus on regime change, clamoring for authorization to assassinate Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Israeli officials have emphasized that the moment to take out Khamenei is now.”
The Times of Israel later reported on leaked transcripts of Israeli officials during the June bombing, which showed that the real motive was to “find an opportunity to assassinate Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and destabilize Tehran’s regime”.
One senior Israeli intelligence official was quoted as saying that “for years” there was an Israeli “intelligence operation to disrupt enemy activities, including activity to destabilize the regime”.
The Times of Israel noted, “While not initially publicly stated as a goal of the war, the transcripts make it clear that Israel was also looking to destabilize the regime and even to kill Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei” adding, “Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that Israel needed to ‘keep searching for the leader,’ referring to Khamenei” and “Netanyahu also said entire Iranian neighborhoods and districts should be evacuated, and that Israel should work on destabilizing the Islamic regime.”
Israel’s real motive behind the bombing, being regime change, is also underscored by the fact- uncovered by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab – that during the bombing, social media bots backed by Israeli intelligence ran a propaganda campaign “promoting regime change in Iran”. During the bombing, the Israeli bot network “published a series of posts highlighting the alleged economic upheaval in Iran after the first few rounds of bombings. The network told followers to head to ATMs to withdraw money, emphasized that the Islamic Republic was ‘stealing our money to escape with its officials,’ and urged followers to rise up against the regime,” and “urged followers to get on their balconies at 8 p.m. each evening and shout ‘Death to Khamenei’”.
In a later interview with the Daily Caller, Trump boasted that he took part in the bombing at the behest of Israel, boasting, “Israel is amazing, because, you know, I have good support from Israel. I have. Look, nobody has done more for Israel than I have, including the recent attacks with Iran”.
Following the “12-day war,” the U.S. and Israel exploited protests in Iran in an attempt to destabilize the Iranian government before the apparent upcoming regime change war.
After protests started in Iran due to citizens’ economic concerns, Trump’s Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent repeatedly boasted that the protests were the intended effect of U.S. sanctions on Iran designed to crash the Iranian economy, saying:
What we can do at treasury, and what we have done, is created a dollar shortage in the country, at a speech at the Economic club in New York in March I outlined the strategy, it came to a swift -and I would say grand- culmination in December when one of the largest banks in Iran went under, there was a run in the bank, the central bank had to print money, the Iranian currency went into free fall, inflation exploded and hence we have seen the Iranian people out on the street
If you look at a speech I gave at the economic club of New York last March, I said that I believe the Iranian currency was on the verge of collapse, that if I were an Iranain citizen, I would take my money out.
President Trump ordered treasury and our OFAC division, (Office of Foreign Asset Control) to put maximum pressure on Iran, and it’s worked because in December, their economy collapsed, we saw a major bank go under, the central bank has started to print money, there is a dollar shortage, they are not able to get imports and this is why the people took to the streets.
This is economic statecraft, no shots fired, and things are moving in a very positive way here
(Emphasis: Mine)
Similarly, the former Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, boasted in response to the question, “Is there a way to bring about the (Iranian) regime falling without using American force?” : “Use economic force, there are ways that you can cripple their economy and some of that has been in the works. It’s more about just weaken their economy and it weakens the support they do have, because they do have support in the rural areas in the more conservative Imams and the rest of that, but we have to make them feel the pain as well”.
Following the protests sparked by economic sanctions on Iran, the Mossad and CIA infiltrated the protests to turn them into a pro-regime change direction.
A Mossad-connected social media account wrote in Persian, to Iranian protestors, “Come out to the streets together. The time has come. We are with you. Not only remotely and verbally. We are also with you in the field,” while former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wrote , “Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them.”
Israel’s Channel 14 similarly reported that, “foreign actors are arming the protesters in Iran with live firearms, which is the reason for the hundreds of regime personnel killed” while Israel’s Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu said , “When we attacked in Iran during ‘Rising Lion’ we were on its soil and knew how to lay the groundwork for a strike. I can assure you that we have some of our people operating there right now”.
Afterwards, the mainstream media ran a propaganda campaign claiming that Iran had killed tens of thousands of Iranian protestors, citing anonymous sources and explicitly pro-war and pro-regime change sources, including the German-Iranian eye surgeon Amir Parasta – a lobbyist for the Israeli puppet Reza Pahlavi – and Iran International, an outlet which journalist Barak Ravid said , “the Mossad is using… quite regularly for its information war”.
Given the likelihood of a U.S./Israeli regime change war happening, the propaganda campaign can be seen in the context of previous “atrocity propaganda” campaigns used to justify war such as the false claims that Saddam Hussein was throwing babies out of incubators in Kuwait used to justify the first Iraq war, false claims that Muammar Gaddafi was killing civilians in Libya used to justify the 2011 regime change war, and false claims that Hamas committed mas rape and beheaded babies on October 7th used to justify the genocide in Gaza.
Trump Controlled By The Zionist Lobby
If Trump launches a regime change war in Iran, his main motivating factor is the Zionist lobby’s influence over him.
While Trump began diplomatic talks with Iran in Oman, Benjamin Netanyahu flew to Washington to pressure Trump to make unrealistic demands, including demanding Iran give up its ballistic missiles, in order to sabotage diplomacy and force a U.S. war on Iran.
As journalist Glenn Greenwald noted , “Israel is demanding that the U.S. go to war with Iran even if Tehran satisfies Trump’s demands on its nuclear program. Netanyahu is insisting that Trump also require Iran to give up its ballistic missiles before any deal can be signed: something no country would ever do.”
Given Trump’s record, it is highly likely that he will follow the demands of the Zionist lobby and go to war with Iran on behalf of Israel.
Trump has repeatedly boasted that the Zionist lobby- more specifically, pro-Israel mega donor Miriam Adelson – controls his Middle East policy.
Trump boasted during his speech to the Israeli Knesset that Miriam Adelson -and during his first term her late husband Sheldon- were “responsible for so much” of his Middle East policy, adding, “I actually asked her (Miriam Adelson) once, so Miriam, I know you love Israel, what do you love more, the United States or Israel? She refused to answer, which might mean Israel.”
Trump boasted that at the behest of the Adelsons, he “terminated the disastrous Iran nuclear deal”, “authorized the spending of billions of dollars which went to Israel’s defense” and “officially recognized the capital of Israel and moved the American Embassy to Jerusalem”.
Trump later boasted that , “Miriam (Adelson) gave my campaign $250 million” adding that during his first term in office, “her husband Sheldon was an amazing guy, he’d come up to the office, and there was nobody more aggressive than Sheldon … he would always say ten minutes it turned out to be an hour and a half and what he did was he fought for Israel, it’s all he really fought for”.
Along with Trump’s self-admitted capture by the Zionist lobby, there is even the possibility – given Trump’s connection to Jeffrey Epstein and the growing body of evidence that Epstein was an Israeli intelligence asset – that Israel will use sexual blackmail to get its way on Iran.
This was argued by former Israeli intelligence official Ari Ben-Menashe who said , “The Israeli’s are holding some of the sensitive stuff (in the Epstein files) and they might let it out when they feel threatened by Trump” adding, “I believe the Israelis have quite a bit of information that they can release that the Department of Justice doesn’t want to release” and adding that Israel is “very much against the talks with the U.S. and Iran”.
The Final Phase Of The ‘Clean Break’
An Israeli pushed American regime change war in Iran is nothing new, and is in reality the final phase of a long-term Zionist plot to “reshape the Middle East” in Israel’s favour, going back to the Iraq war.
As Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs explained:
In 1996, Netanyahu and his American advisors devised a ‘Clean Break’ strategy. They advocated that Israel would not withdraw from the Palestinian lands captured in the 1967 war in exchange for regional peace. Instead, Israel would reshape the Middle East to its liking. Crucially, the strategy envisioned the US as the main force to achieve these aims—waging wars in the region to dismantle governments opposed to Israel’s dominance over Palestine. The US was called upon to fight wars on Israel’s behalf.
The Clean Break strategy was effectively carried out by the US and Israel after 9/11. As NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark revealed, soon after 9/11, the US planned to “attack and destroy the governments in seven countries in five years—starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.”
The first of the wars, in early 2003, was to topple the Iraqi government. Plans for further wars were delayed as the US became mired in Iraq. Still, the US supported Sudan’s split in 2005, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia that same year. In 2011, the Obama administration launched CIA operation Timber Sycamore against Syria and, with the UK and France, overthrew Libya’s government through a 2011 bombing campaign. Today, these countries lie in ruins, and many are now embroiled in civil wars.
Netanyahu was a cheerleader of these wars of choice–either in public or behind the scenes–together with his neocon allies in the U.S. Government including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Victoria Nuland, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, and others.
Sachs documented that war with Iran in the final phase of this plan, noting:
In September 2023, Netanyahu presented at UN General Assembly a map of the ‘New Middle East’ completely erasing a Palestinian state. In September 2024, he elaborated on this plan by showing two maps: one part of the Middle East a “blessing,” and the other–including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran–a curse, as he advocated regime change in the latter countries.
Israel’s war on Iran is the final move in a decades-old strategy. We are witnessing the culmination of decades of extremist Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy.
Lindsay Graham – one of Israel’s closest allies in the U.S. Senate outright admitted that the hope behind a U.S. regime change war in Iran is that it will cripple resistance in the Middle East to Israel and cause Arab States to normalize with Israel without a Palestinian State – paving the way for the “New Middle East” laid out by Netanyahu at the UN in 2023.
Graham boasted referring to regime change in Iran, “If we can pull this off, it would be the biggest change in the Mid East in a thousand years: Hamas, Hezbollah gone, the Houthis gone, the Iranian people an ally not an enemy, the Arab world moving towards Israel without fear, Saudi-Israel normalize, no more October the 7th”.
Graham’s comments mirror Netanyahu’s at the UN weeks before the start of the Gaza genocide.
As journalist Jeremy Scahill reported :
Just two weeks before the October 7 attacks, the Israeli leader delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, brandishing a map of what he promised could be the “New Middle East.” It depicted a state of Israel that stretched continuously from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Gaza and the West Bank, as Palestinian lands, were erased.
During that speech, Netanyahu portrayed the full normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia as the linchpin of his vision for this “new” reality, one which would open the door to a “visionary corridor that will stretch across the Arabian Peninsula and Israel. It will connect India to Europe with maritime links, rail links, energy pipelines, fiber-optic cables.”
In 2024, Netanyahu held up another map at the UN portraying Iran and the axis of resistance as a “curse” in the way of this Israeli goal.
It is surely not a coincidence that Israel is hoping to resume the full-scale genocide in Gaza in a few months.
The Times Of Israel reported that , “Israel plans to afford Hamas a 60-day period to disarm, and if it does not, the Israeli military will go back to war in the Gaza Strip, a senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Monday.”
This is an obvious attempt to force the failure of ceasefire negotiations in Gaza to justify resuming the full scale genocide, given the fact, as journalist Jeremy Scahil reported , that, “Hamas will not accede to sweeping demands that the Palestinian resistance unilaterally disarm, nor will it submit to a total demilitarization of the Gaza Strip” adding, “the group is willing to negotiate on disarmament of resistance forces only if it is linked to a long-term ceasefire that restrains Israel and is accompanied by a political process that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state and armed force capable of defending itself”.
Israel hopes that after a regime change war in Iran, it will be clear to carry out its ethnic cleansing plan in Gaza and the West Bank without opposition – and it wants to get the U.S. to carry out the operation on its behalf.
Erdogan wants nukes: What a Turkish bomb would mean for the Middle East
Ankara is telling the world that a selective and force-driven approach to the Iranian nuclear issue could ignite a chain reaction
By Murad Sadygzade | RT | February 18, 2026
In Ankara, the idea of Türkiye one day seeking a nuclear weapons option has never been entirely absent from strategic conversation. Yet in recent days it has acquired a sharper edge, as the region around Türkiye is sliding toward a logic in which raw deterrence begins to look like the only dependable language left.
Türkiye’s foreign policy has expanded far beyond the cautious, status-quo posture that once defined it. It has positioned itself as a mediator on Ukraine and Gaza, pursued hard security aims through sustained operations and influence in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and inserted itself into competitive theaters from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long framed this activism as a corrective to an international order he portrays as structurally unfair. His slogan that the world is bigger than five – referring to the UN Security Council – is a statement of grievance against a system in which a narrow group of powers retains permanent privileges, including an exclusive claim to ultimate military capability.
Within that narrative, nuclear inequality occupies a special place. Erdogan has repeatedly pointed to the double standards of the global nuclear order, arguing that some states are punished for ambiguity while others are insulated from scrutiny. His references to Israel are central here, because Israel’s assumed but undeclared nuclear status is widely treated as an open secret that does not trigger the same enforcement instincts as suspected proliferation elsewhere. That asymmetry has long irritated Ankara, but it became more politically potent after the war in Gaza that began in 2023, when Erdogan openly highlighted Israel’s arsenal and questioned why international inspection mechanisms do not apply in practice to all regional actors.
Still, for years this was mostly an argument about fairness and legitimacy rather than a declaration of intent. What has changed is the sense that the regional security architecture itself is cracking, and that the cracks are widening at the very moment the US and Israel are escalating pressure on Iran. Türkiye’s leadership has warned that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, others in the region will rush to follow, and Türkiye may be forced into the race as well, even if it does not want dramatic shifts in the balance.
This is the key to understanding the new intensity of the debate. Ankara’s signaling is not primarily an emotional reaction to Tehran. Türkiye and Iran remain competitors, but their frictions have also been managed through pragmatic diplomacy, and Türkiye has consistently argued against a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Erdogan has again presented Türkiye as a mediator, insisting on de-escalation and rejecting military steps that could drag the region into wider chaos.
The driver is the fear that the rules are no longer the rules. When enforcement becomes selective, and when coercion is applied in ways that appear to disregard broader stability, the incentives change for every middle power caught in the blast radius. The signal from Ankara is that if the Middle East moves into a world where nuclear capability is treated as the only ironclad guarantee against regime-threatening force, then Türkiye cannot afford to remain the exception.
That logic is dangerous precisely because it is contagious. It turns proliferation into an insurance policy. In an unstable region where trust is thin and the memory of war is always fresh, the idea of nuclear weapons as a shield against interference can sound brutally rational. If possessing the bomb raises the cost of intervention to unacceptable levels, it can be perceived as the ultimate deterrent, a guarantee that outsiders will think twice. But the same logic that appears to promise safety for one actor produces insecurity for everyone else. In practice it fuels an arms race whose end state is not stability, but a crowded deterrence environment in which miscalculation becomes more likely, crisis management becomes harder, and conventional conflicts become more combustible because nuclear shadows hover over every escalation ladder.
The renewed urgency also reflects a broader global drift. Arms competition is intensifying well beyond the Middle East. The erosion of arms control habits, the normalization of sanctions as a tool of strategic coercion, and the return of bloc-like thinking in many theaters all contribute to a sense that restraint is no longer rewarded. For Türkiye, a state that sees itself as too large to be merely a client and too exposed to be fully autonomous, the temptation is to seek leverage that cannot be negotiated away. Nuclear latency, even without an actual bomb, can function as a strategic bargaining chip.
Yet the jump from ambition to capability is not straightforward. Türkiye does have important ingredients for a serious civil nuclear profile, and those capabilities matter because they shape perceptions. The country has been building human capital in nuclear engineering and developing an ecosystem of research institutions, reactors for training and experimentation, accelerator facilities, and nuclear medicine applications. Most visibly, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project with Russia has served as an engine for training and institutional learning, even if technology transfer is limited and the project remains embedded in external dependence.
Türkiye also highlights domestic resource potential, including uranium and especially thorium, which is often discussed as a long-term strategic asset. Resource endowments do not automatically translate into weapons capability, but they reduce one barrier, the need for sustained and vulnerable supply chains. As a result, Türkiye can credibly present itself as a state that could, if it chose, move from peaceful nuclear competence toward a latent weapons posture.
The real bottleneck is not simply material. It is political and legal. Türkiye is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it operates inside a web of international commitments that would make an overt weapons program extremely costly. Withdrawal from the treaty or large-scale violations would almost certainly trigger sweeping sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and a rupture with major economic partners. Unlike states that have adapted their economies to long-term siege conditions, Türkiye is deeply integrated into global trade, finance, and logistics. The short-term shock of a proliferation crisis would be severe, and Ankara knows it.
This is why the most plausible path, if Türkiye ever moved in this direction, would not be a dramatic public sprint. It would be a careful, ambiguous strategy that expands latency while preserving diplomatic maneuvering room. Latency can mean investing in expertise, dual-use infrastructure, missile and space capabilities that could be adapted, and fuel cycle options that remain justifiable on civilian grounds. It can also mean cultivating external relationships that shorten timelines without leaving fingerprints.
Here the debate becomes even more sensitive, because proliferation risk is not only about what a country can build, but also about what it can receive. The Middle East has long been haunted by the possibility of clandestine technology transfer, whether through black markets, covert state support, or unofficial security arrangements. In recent months, discussions around Pakistan have become particularly salient, not least because Islamabad is one of the few Muslim majority nuclear powers and has historically maintained close security ties with Gulf monarchies.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly signaled that it will not accept a regional balance in which Iran alone holds a nuclear weapon. Saudi leaders have at times implied that if Iran acquires the bomb, Riyadh would feel compelled to match it for reasons of security and balance. Those statements are not proof of an active weapons program, but they are political preparation, shaping expectations and normalizing the idea that proliferation could be framed as defensive rather than destabilizing.
There have also been unusually explicit hints in regional discourse about nuclear protection arrangements, including arguments that Pakistan could, in some scenario, extend a form of deterrence cover to Saudi Arabia. Even when such claims are partly performative, they underscore how the region’s strategic conversation is shifting from taboo to contingency planning.
Once that door is open, Türkiye inevitably enters the picture in regional imagination. Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are linked through overlapping defense cooperation and political coordination, and analysts increasingly discuss the emergence of flexible security groupings that sit alongside or partially outside formal Western frameworks. The idea that technology, know-how, or deterrence guarantees could circulate within such networks is precisely the nightmare scenario for nonproliferation regimes, because it compresses timelines and reduces the visibility that international monitors depend on.
For Ankara, this creates both opportunity and risk. The opportunity is that Türkiye could enhance its deterrent posture without bearing the full cost of overt development. The risk is that Türkiye could become entangled in a proliferation cascade that it cannot control, while simultaneously inviting a Western backlash that would reshape its economy and alliances.
This is where the question becomes deeply geopolitical. A nuclear-armed Türkiye would not simply change the Middle East. It would alter Europe’s security landscape and challenge the logic that has governed Türkiye’s relationship with the West for decades. Western capitals have tolerated, managed, and constrained Türkiye through a mixture of incentives, institutional ties, defense cooperation, and pressure. Türkiye’s NATO membership, its economic links to Europe, and the presence of US nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik as part of alliance arrangements have all been elements of a broader strategic framework in which Türkiye was seen as anchored, even when politically difficult.
If Türkiye acquired its own nuclear weapons, that anchoring would weaken dramatically. Ankara would gain a form of autonomy that no sanction threat could fully erase. It would also gain the capacity to take risks under a nuclear umbrella, a dynamic that worries Western capitals because it could embolden more confrontational regional behavior. Türkiye’s disputes with Western partners are already intense on issues ranging from Eastern Mediterranean energy politics to Syria, defense procurement, and the boundaries of alliance solidarity. A nuclear deterrent could make those disputes harder to manage because the ultimate escalation dominance would no longer sit exclusively with the traditional nuclear powers.
At the same time, a Turkish bomb could accelerate Türkiye’s drift away from the West, not only because the West would react with pressure, but because the very act of building such a capability would be an ideological statement that Türkiye rejects a Western-defined hierarchy. It would be Ankara’s most dramatic way of saying that it will not accept a subordinate place in a system it considers hypocritical.
None of this means Türkiye is on the verge of producing a weapon. Political obstacles remain huge, and technical challenges would be substantial if Ankara had to do everything indigenously while under scrutiny. A credible weapons program requires enrichment or plutonium pathways, specialized engineering, reliable warhead design, rigorous testing regimes or sophisticated simulation capabilities, secure command and control, and delivery systems that can survive and penetrate. Türkiye has missile programs that could in theory be adapted, but turning a regional missile force into a robust nuclear delivery architecture is not trivial.
The more immediate danger is not that Türkiye will suddenly unveil a bomb, but that the region is moving toward a threshold era, in which multiple states cultivate the ability to become nuclear on short notice. In such an environment, crises become more perilous because leaders assume worst-case intentions, and because external powers may feel pressure to strike early rather than wait. The irony is that a weapon meant to prevent intervention can increase the likelihood of intervention if adversaries fear they are running out of time.
The escalation by the US and Israel against Iran, combined with the broader arms race logic spreading across the Middle East and globally, is making this spiral more plausible. Uncertainty is the fuel of proliferation, because it convinces states that the future will be more dangerous than the present, and that waiting is a strategic mistake.
Türkiye’s rhetoric should therefore be read as a warning as much as a threat. Ankara is telling the world that a selective and force-driven approach to the Iranian nuclear issue could ignite a chain reaction. It is also telling regional rivals that Türkiye will not accept a future in which it is strategically exposed in a neighborhood where others have ultimate insurance.
The tragedy is that this is exactly how nuclear orders unravel. They do not collapse when one state wakes up and decides to gamble. They collapse when multiple states simultaneously conclude that the existing rules no longer protect them, and that deterrence, however dangerous, is the only available substitute. In a stable region, that conclusion might be resisted. In the Middle East, where wars overlap, alliances shift, and trust is scarce, it can quickly become conventional wisdom.
If the goal is to prevent a regional nuclear cascade, the first requirement is to restore credibility to the idea that rules apply to everyone and that security can be achieved without crossing the nuclear threshold. That means lowering the temperature around Iran while also addressing the deeper asymmetries that make the system look illegitimate in the eyes of ambitious middle powers. Without that, Türkiye’s nuclear debate will not remain an abstract exercise. It will become part of a wider regional recalculation, one that risks turning an already unstable region into a nuclearized arena where every crisis carries the possibility of catastrophe.
Murad Sadygzade, President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).
Trump stalls over Iran strike plan, Iran holds all the aces
By Martin Jay | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 17, 2026
Trump has the option of going to war with Iran and receiving much-needed campaign funds from Israel for the midterms – or opting to defy Bibi and facing certain defeat by losing both houses and facing certain impeachment. Can the Iranians save him?
Is Trump serious about going to war with Iran? To understand this, it’s important to examine his relationship with Netanyahu and to see who has the advantage when it comes to dragging the U.S. into a war, and whether Israel can actually be a greater threat to the U.S. than Tehran can ever be.
The trap that Trump is falling into is one where he has little or no wiggle room at all to control the Iran crisis, whereby Israel can threaten him with isolation while it goes ahead with its strike.
There are two dynamics at play here which are struggling to find a compromise. Trump wants a deal with Iran which takes away their nuclear capability, while Israel wants a war which overthrows the Iranian regime and installs a Mossad/CIA puppet. The problem, though, is that Israel is not an honest broker and keeps shifting the goalposts. The latest demand now is that removing Iran’s ballistic missiles should be at the heart of any deal that Trump pulls off.
Trump is ensnared and is aware of how Bibi is manipulating him. He may, on occasion, swear at journalists and pretend he is his own boss and his own president and that Israel is a client state of Washington which has to toe the line, but in reality, it is clear that Israel is calling the shots.
In recent days, we have heard that the one aircraft carrier the U.S. had in the region, the USS Abraham Lincoln, is to be joined by a second called the USS Gerald Ford. U.S. media report that the Lincoln is in the “Arabian Sea,” which is a comical way of saying that it’s keeping its distance from Iran’s shores and Houthi missiles off the coast of Yemen. But other reports are suggesting that the reason why Trump claims he has sent a second carrier – to beef up the “flotilla” in case of a war breaking out with Iran – is untrue. Some insiders are briefing journalists that the Lincoln has technical problems which will render it useless in a combat situation and so needs to be replaced with the more advanced Ford.
However, even this might be a false narrative offered by Pentagon insiders who are not supporters of Trump. A second explanation about the carriers is that it buys Trump time. He has even told reporters that it will take about a month for the Ford to get there, which he believes should be ample time for a deal to be struck with Iran, or at least will give him four more weeks to work out a way of dealing with the threat – that’s the threat from Israel, not Iran.
Israel threatened Trump before when he went ahead with his bunker buster bombs in June of last year by saying simply, “If you don’t do it, we’ll nuke Iran.” It worked. This time around, the threat is, “If you don’t join us, then we’ll strike Iran alone and you will have to deal with the consequences of being the first U.S. president to have to explain to the Jewish lobby why Iran is wiping Israel off the face of the map.” This second threat is multi-layered and also might work with Trump, given that the midterm elections, which are approaching, will cost twice what the elections cost which got him into office. It will be Jewish money which bankrolls him this time around, with the intention of saving him from losing both houses and facing inevitable impeachment.
And so, in many ways, Trump is closer to and more dependent on the regime in Tehran to help him out. A deal which limits the enrichment of uranium and can guarantee no nuclear bomb can be made might be something he can present to the American people as a great victory. The irony is that the deal might be more or less a carbon copy of Obama’s, which he, Trump, rejected while in his first term in office, a rejection which has created the present crisis.
The trouble with any deal now about enrichment is that it is unlikely to satisfy the Israelis, who have become more aware in recent weeks about the capability of Iran’s latest generation of ballistic missiles both in terms of defence and attack. Moreover, the U.S. attack on Iran last year for 12 days has now raised the stakes to a fever pitch, making the Iranians clearer and more focused about any kind of attack happening against them: all-out war.
According to some credible reports, Trump was recently asking Pentagon chiefs if the U.S. could carry out a single in-and-out strike operation which could be used to warn Iran while satisfying Israel at the same time about the U.S. threat, and he was told no such options are feasible. This is due to Iran being much more prepared now for such attacks, both militarily and intelligence-wise, while the Mossad operation of creating civil strife on the ground failed spectacularly. The U.S. is in a very tight corner right now, as its forces and its allies in the region are in the crosshairs of Iran the moment the first bomb is dropped, and so Trump’s options to go to war are very limited. It would be suicidal for Trump to strike Iran, as the losses to U.S. forces and the disruption to oil distribution via the Straits of Hormuz would be too great, not to mention the destruction of infrastructure in Israel itself.
But there is also another factor which is putting all the pressure on Trump to get a deal with Iran. Since last June’s attack and more recently Trump’s betrayal of cordial relations with Putin conjured up at Alaska, along with the Venezuela coup, both Russia and China have upped their support for Iran. This is a critical factor now preventing Trump from hitting Iran with anything. China recently gave Iran its latest state-of-the-art new radar system which can identify U.S. stealth bombers at a range of 700km. Game changer. If you consider Iran, Israel, and the U.S. as three poker players at the table, it is clear that Iran now has the best hand with the most options. It can maximize its role now and exploit Trump’s vulnerability by going for a deal which involves sanctions being relieved, or it could hold out and play a long game way beyond Trump’s one-month breathing space and really turn up the heat on him leading up to the midterms in November. Iran always plays for time and is good at this strategy. And given that even the kindest analysis of America’s strike capability in Iran is two weeks before depletion of all missile stocks is reached, any hawks close to Trump who are pushing for a strike must have the destruction of the U.S. in their strategy as well, as Iran cannot be pounded into a state of submission in such a short space of time. Surely that can’t be the aim of Bibi. Surely not!
The Hidden Map: US and Israel May Use Unexpected Neighbors to Attack Iran
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | February 15, 2026
Amidst heightened tensions between the US-Israeli alliance and Iran, an enormous amount of focus has been placed in the media on Iran’s missile program and how this will impact any upcoming war. What is often ignored are the origins of the regional threats to Tehran and its stability.
While covering each and every threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran would be beyond the scope of such an article, there are a number of hostile nations surrounding the country that can be used to destabilize the nation. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan, are often cited as pro-Israeli, but there is another nation that flies under the corporate media’s radar.
Iran shares its second-largest land border with the nation of Turkmenistan, a country that is rarely mentioned as a regional player. What many don’t know is that the nation, long characterized as a neutral player, has strong ties with both the US and Israel.
Turkmenistan: Neutral State or Strategic Corridor?
Unlike many Muslim-majority nations, Turkmenistan has long recognized and maintained ties with the Israelis, their relationship beginning in 1993. Then, in April of 2023, these ties were further cemented with the inauguration of a permanent Israeli embassy in Ashgabat for the first time.
It should therefore be no surprise that Tel Aviv and Ashbagat’s relationship is closest in the intelligence sharing and security cooperation spheres. Afterall, the Israeli embassy – opened back in 2023 – was strategically placed only 17 kilometers away from Iran’s border, marking a major symbolic achievement for Israel, especially as it operates through what are suspected to be thousands of Mossad recruited agents inside the Islamic Republic.
Although Israel has no official military bases inside Turkmenistan, there have been a number of reports indicating that it has set up attack drone bases inside the country. This would make sense, considering that Ashbagat has been purchasing Israeli drone technology since the 2010s, more recently acquiring the SkyStriker tactical loiter munition (suicide drone), developed by Elbit Systems.
Ashgabat has long been in alignment with the West. In May of 1994, it became the first country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. However, the following year, the UN approved granting Turkmenistan the status of a neutral country, meaning it would not join military blocs.
In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, this neutral stance suddenly began to change. While other Central Asian nations – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – all immediately offered their military bases to the United States, due in large part to their concerns over the advancements of the Taliban, Turkmenistan only publicly admitted to allowing the US to use its airspace for military cargo aircraft to travel in transit.
In reality, the US airforce were operating a team on the ground in Ashgabat in order to coordinate refueling operations. In 2004, the Russian State protested the growing US-Turkmenistan military relationship, after reports emerged stating that American forces had “gained access to use almost all the military airfields of Turkmenistan, including the airport in Nebit-Dag near the Iranian border.”
Reports, which are not possible to independently verify but nonetheless have appeared consistent throughout the years, indicate that the US military has even established remote desert bases throughout different locations inside Turkmenistan.
Clinging to its neutral status on the public stage, Ashgabat rejects any mention of cooperation of this kind, including the denial of a 2015 statement by then US Central Command chief Lloyd Austin that the Turkmens had expressed their interest in acquiring US military equipment.
Signals of Military Activity
Perhaps the most concerning developments are the more recent revelations, revealed through OSINIT channels and Turkmen media, citing flight trackers to monitor the movement of US aircraft in the region. These reports indicate the confirmation that US Air Force transport aircraft C-17A Globemaster III and MC-130 Super Hercules have landed at undisclosed locations in Turkmenistan.
The significance of this, opposed to the rest of the military buildup that has been occurring in potential preparation for an attack on Iran, is that of the MC-130 Super Hercules, which is used specifically for transporting special forces teams, running night operations, as well as performing unconventional takeoffs and landings.
Paired with a recent report issued by the New York Times, indicating that the US’ options not only include an air campaign against Iranian nuclear and missile sites, but ground raids using special forces, it could be concluded that Turkmenistan is the location from which the US may seek to inject special forces units into Iran.
The Wider Ring around Iran
The Turkmenistan factor clearly cannot be ignored here, despite it often being dismissed as a neutral power that maintains friendly relations with both Russia and China. In fact, because of these relationships, with Moscow in particular, Tehran has refrained from attempting to expand its reach into the Central Asian country.
To Iran’s benefit is that Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Russian influence can reduce the extent to which the US and Israel can use Iran’s neighbors to threaten it. In Pakistan, for example, it is clear that both Islamabad’s joint security concerns – largely over Balochi militant groups – along its border, in addition to Beijing’s influence, make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would remain neutral and is instead inclined to help support Iran; within its limits, it should be added.
Azerbaijan is another potential threat to the stability of the Islamic Republic, due in large part to the large Azeri population in Iran’s own Azerbaijan Province. However, the vast majority of Azeri citizens are in fact loyal to the State and no major separatist movement exists at this time. The Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Ayatollah Khamenei himself are both ethnically part Azeri.
Meanwhile, many supporters of the Israeli puppet Reza Pahlavi openly express their intention to crack down on the Azeri ethnic minority inside Iran. During the reign of the CIA-MI6-installed Shah of Iran, minority groups suffered immensely, due to a clear tradition of ethno-nationalism that exists amongst the current supporters of the deposed monarchy.
Baku, for its part, is the top gas supplier to Israel, maintaining close military, diplomatic and intelligence ties with them. Azerbaijan even made Hebrew media headlines for its use of Israeli suicide drones and other military equipment during its war with Armenia.
On the other hand, Iran is militarily superior to Azerbaijan and has a considerable base of support amongst the nation’s population, of which the majority belong to the Shia branch of the Islamic faith. Therefore, Tehran has major leverage and could not only paralyze its oil and gas infrastructure, but perhaps has the potential of organic movements forming within Azerbaijan that will owe allegiance to Iran.
There is also the threat that the Israelis, in particular, will attempt to use Kurdish militant groups in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to carry out attacks on the Islamic Republic. Israel does not publicly acknowledge its presence in northern Iraq, yet Iran has directly struck its bases housing Mossad operatives in the past, while Kurdish separatist groups have been utilized countless times in attempts to destabilize the country. During the June 12-day-war last year, Israel also weaponized these proxies.
For those also concerned about Afghanistan’s role in threatening Iranian security, this has always historically been a precarious situation, yet Tehran has not only been improving its ties with Kabul, it officially recognized the Islamic Emirate during the past week. Again, this does not mean there is no potential threat there, but an alliance that holds with the Taliban government may prove important.
Gulf States, Jordan and the Regional Balance
Then there are the more obvious players, the UAE and Bahrain, which are not only partners of the Israelis as part of the so-called “Abraham Accords” but are overtly aligned with Tel Aviv’s regional agenda.
The Emiratis are speculated to hold some cards regarding trade, but their leverage is negligible. Both the Bahraini and Emirati leaderships are clearly anxious, because Iran’s responses to the use of their territory to attack the Islamic Republic could quickly collapse their regimes.
Jordan, meanwhile, is where the US appears to be focusing much of its military buildup, even withdrawing forces previously stationed in Syria’s al-Tanf region into the Hashemite Kingdom’s territory.
The Jordanian leadership is evidently permitting its territory to become a key battleground, which will likely be subjected to attacks if the US chooses to use it to aid the Israeli-US offensive, but it is simply powerless in such a scenario.
Jordan has become a Western-Israeli intelligence and military hub in the region, meaning that if King Abdullah II objects to the demands of its allies, he understands well that his rule could be ended in a matter of hours. Therefore, he must risk his country being caught in the crossfire and just hope that an internal uprising doesn’t take shape, which is one of the reasons why he has been so hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood, fearing they could end up leading any revolt as the organization did in Egypt.
Turkiye, on the other hand, which is also a major regional player, is likely to play both sides behind the scenes, attempting to stay out of such a fight. If it takes either side, it will suffer the repercussions. Perhaps the most important role it could play is to prevent its bases or airspace from being used by the US.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar both maintain cordial relations with Iran, clearly favoring a scenario where no war occurs at all, because they are home to US bases. As we saw last June, the US used its CENTCOM headquarters in Doha to direct its attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, and as a result, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck US facilities there.
Riyadh and Doha do not want to get dragged into such a scenario. It is also of note that they have a vested interest in neither side winning the war conclusively, because it is in their interests for there to be a multi-polar West Asia, not an Israeli-dominated region that will inevitably consume them.
A Conflict with Wider Consequences
Some have also speculated about Syria’s role in any war. Damascus is clearly in the US-Israeli sphere of influence, but it will have a negligible impact in its current form. If Syria’s military forces assault Lebanon or Iraq, they will suffer enormous blows and fail tremendously. The only wildcard with Syria is whether armed groups there will choose to use the opportunity to attack Israel, although as a military power, the Syrians are a relative non-factor at the current time.
For now, the US-Israeli plot to stir civil war inside Iran and to follow through with an air campaign that aids their proxies has failed. Given the readiness of Iran’s allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and even Palestine, perhaps beyond, the US would be entering a point of no return scenario if it were to attempt a regime change operation.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
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Israel Would Have No Qualms About USS Liberty-Style FALSE FLAG If Iran Campaign Falters – Analysts
By Ilya Tsukanov – Sputnik – 18.06.2025
Donald Trump is mulling whether or not to join Israel’s aggression against Iran as Tel Aviv faces problems sustaining its defenses against growing counterstrikes, and apparently lacks a realistic game plan for an end to hostilities after failing to achieve its goals. Analysts told Sputnik how the US could be ‘nudged’ into the conflict.
“The US is already assisting Israel with supplies, intel, refueling support, etc. One of the many US posts in the region could be attacked for a casus belli,” former Pentagon analyst Karen Kwiatkowski explained.
“If Trump doesn’t comply with Israel’s demand” and join its aggression voluntarily, “a false flag may be needed” to drag the US in, Kwiatkowski, retired US Air Force Lt. Col.-turned Iraq War whistleblower, fears.
Netanyahu has a diverse array of options at his disposal, according to the observer, including:
- a false flag against US assets abroad blamed on Iran or one of its Axis of Resistance allies, like the Houthis
- a US domestic attack or assassination blamed on Iran
- Iranian air defenses ‘accidentally’ hitting a civilian jetliner carrying Americans
- use of a dirty bomb or nuclear contamination somewhere in the region blamed on Iran
- even blackmailing by threatening to use nukes against Iran if the US doesn’t join the fight
Kwiatkowski estimates that Israel probably has “enough blackmail power” against President Trump and Congress to avoid the necessity of a false flag operation, but a “USS Liberty-style” attack, targeting the soon-to-be-retired USS Nimitz supercarrier that’s heading to the Middle East, for example, nevertheless cannot be ruled out entirely, she says. … continue
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