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The Mecca pact and the limits of a ‘Muslim NATO’

Divergent threats, US ties, and economic interests leave the collective-defense pact’s real purpose open to dispute.

By F.M. Shakil | The Cradle | August 13, 2026

The oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan, and Turkiye, which commands NATO’s second-largest army, signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on Friday, 7 August. The accord arrived as fighting again intensified in Yemen. Days later, the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni armed forces (YAF) launched ballistic missiles at Marib and the Red Sea port of Mokha, the latest escalation against Saudi-backed forces.

Iran noted the turn toward regional security arrangements, saying it showed a growing recognition that security cannot be guaranteed by foreign powers. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the accord reflected a rapidly changing understanding of security across the region.

Pakistan welcomed the accord and said the Mecca agreement stipulates that an attack on any member will be treated as an attack on all. Islamabad described it as a major step toward stronger strategic relations, regional security, and cooperation in mutual defense.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar called the accord a defensive document that does not target any one country. Posting on X on 9 August, Dar said it remained open to any regional state willing to commit to its founding principles.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went further, insisting that neither Iran nor any other country was the pact’s designated target. In an online discussion, he also expressed hope that Egypt would eventually join.

Veteran Pakistani diplomat Riffat Masood offered a narrower reading. In a discussion with Saudi-American researcher Dr Hamza al-Kanani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran and Norway said the phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all” applies specifically to external threats.

“It does not have any regional implications, which means that this clause would apply whenever any country signing this agreement came under attack from Israel, the US, or any external force,” she claimed.

Masood added that the article does not cover intra-regional rivalries involving Iran or the YAF.

Egypt was conspicuous by its absence from the Mecca signing ceremony, despite taking part in months of foreign minister-level consultations with the grouping.

Cairo’s apparent disenchantment rests on the belief that the military agreement is driven more by political alignment than deployable defense capability. Egypt retains positive bilateral relations with the three signatories, but is wary of joining a Saudi-led bloc that could narrow its room for maneuver across the region.

“I expect more countries will join this alliance in the future. The alliance may expand beyond the military sphere to encompass economic and strategic dimensions in the future,” Sajjad Azhar, an Islamabad-based analyst, tells The Cradle.

Riyadh looks beyond Washington

Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with Washington dates to the closing years of World War II, when oil and strategic access became bound up with US protection. But Washington’s shift toward competition with China, coupled with its uneven responses to attacks on Persian Gulf partners, has pushed Riyadh to look for additional options.

The September 2019 attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, claimed by the YAF, temporarily knocked out around half of Saudi oil production. Washington did not retaliate militarily, despite US and Saudi accusations that Iran was responsible. For Riyadh, the episode exposed the limits of the US security umbrella.

The Hamas-led Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and the regional war that followed added to Saudi concerns. Those concerns deepened after Israel’s September 2025 attack on Doha, which targeted Hamas negotiators in the capital of a US-allied Gulf state. Eight days later, Riyadh signed a bilateral defense pact with Pakistan.

The US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February 2026 further exposed Arab states to retaliation without providing them with any clear say over Washington’s war aims. According to Azhar, the conflict reinforced the sense that reliance on a single external guarantor had become increasingly dangerous:

“The attacks launched by Tehran and its allies, including the Houthis [YAF] and Iraqi Shia armed organizations [PMU], against Saudi Arabia changed the situation. In this perspective, an end to recurring Iranian threats seems to have been the main strategic purpose behind the new alliance.”

Collective defense, undefined obligations

At the signing ceremony, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan displayed copies of the Mecca agreement, but its full provisions have not been made public. Beyond the collective-defense formula contained in the joint statement, analysts still lack details on command structures, activation procedures, force commitments, and the geographical reach of the pact.

Dr Muqtedar Khan, a US-based analyst and professor at the University of Delaware, tells The Cradle that the pact rests on two pillars: a collective-defense commitment and joint deterrence and defense cooperation. The first treats an armed attack against one of the three states as an attack against all three.

“This sets up a mutual-defense duty that is similar to NATO’s Article 5, but the details about how quickly and strongly they will respond are mostly unclear,” he says. The second pillar, he adds, resembles the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year.

Khan says the Mecca accord marks an important step in the region’s security evolution, showing how middle powers are seeking greater autonomy and a wider range of partnerships instead of relying almost entirely on the US:

“While it is premature to label it a fully fledged ‘Muslim NATO,’ the pact creates a new framework for collective deterrence and defense cooperation among three of the most consequential Sunni-majority states.”

Its durability and effectiveness, he says, will ultimately depend on how the parties define an “attack,” what each is prepared to do when the commitment is tested, and whether other countries join.

“For now, it functions as both a political signal of reduced dependence on external patrons and a practical platform for deeper military collaboration,” Khan says.

A pact made with Washington’s blessing? 

Washington’s public response to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has been notably restrained.

For some observers, the pact signals that US partners want to diversify their security arrangements after a succession of regional crises exposed the limits of depending on one external guarantor.

Others argue that, if the agreement produces stronger missile defense, maritime patrols, and a wider sharing of regional security burdens, it could advance Washington’s stated goals rather than threaten them.

The pact may therefore loosen exclusive dependence on the US without displacing the vast American military architecture already embedded in the region.

Retired Pakistani diplomat Abdul Basit, who served as high commissioner to India and as Foreign Office spokesperson, argued in a television interview that the trilateral agreement had Washington’s backing.

“Without US consent, these three regional actors could not succeed in creating a trilateral defense mechanism that challenges the US’s hegemonic security apparatus in the region,” he argued.

Other analysts likewise see an implicit US role in the creation of a large regional force whose likely purpose is not confrontation with Israel but containment of Iranian influence.

Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), tells The Cradle that Washington’s lack of opposition suggests the coalition was formed with at least tacit US approval and a clear assurance that it would not be directed against Israel:

“This alliance doesn’t significantly deter Iran from attacking US bases in Saudi Arabia. Iran is not attacking these countries but only hitting the US bases wherever they exist. As long as these bases remain there, Iran will continue targeting them in one way or another.”

Three states, three threat maps

The pact is also burdened by conflicting threat perceptions. Pakistan and Turkiye are unlikely to enter a direct clash with Israel while maintaining close strategic ties with Washington. This has fed suspicions that the bloc was established with US backing precisely because it does not challenge the regional red lines enforced by Washington.

Gul says the alliance is no uncomplicated marriage. Its central ambiguity remains unresolved: is it primarily a political declaration, or does it impose binding military obligations on its members?

“The three countries have different threat assessments and priorities. Pakistan’s focus is mostly on India and Afghanistan, but Turkiye or Saudi Arabia will not build deterrence for Israel or India due to their strategic and commercial interests. For Saudi Arabia, the emphasis is on maintaining stability in the Gulf area and promoting economic diversification. Turkiye is seeking to sell its military hardware, even though it has obligations as a NATO member.”

Pakistan and Turkiye also stand to gain financially from the pact as both manage strained economies. Turkiye has found a lucrative regional market for drones and aircraft, while Pakistan secures badly needed Saudi financing.

In August 2023, Saudi Arabia signed a record $3 billion deal with the Turkish defense firm Baykar to procure Bayraktar Akinci unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones).

Saudi Arabia also committed a fresh $3 billion support package to Pakistan. The funding came in addition to $5 billion in Saudi deposits previously placed with Pakistan and extended through 2028. The new support helped Islamabad repay roughly $3.5 billion owed to the UAE later that month.

“The public relations advantages for Pakistan are evident, but only time will reveal whether the alliance will yield any financial benefits that trickle down to the poor masses,” Gul remarks.

For now, the Mecca pact’s signatories have announced collective defense without revealing who would command it, which threats would activate it, or what each capital would actually risk for the others.

Until those questions are answered, the Mecca pact remains more a declaration of intent than a functioning military alliance.

August 13, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Mecca pact and the limits of a ‘Muslim NATO’

Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alliance shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran: Analyst

Press TV – August 9, 2026

Underlying regional calculations behind the new military alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have been shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran, says an analyst.

Speaking to the Press TV website, Anusar Farooqui, a US-based writer and commentator who is also the founder and CEO of Systematic Portfolios LLC, said the newly signed “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” is aimed at the Israeli regime.

“The alliance politics of the Sunni Arab powers is driven by fear of Israel, not Iran,” he said.

“The Saudis and especially the Turks are very fearful of Israeli plans,” he added, noting that Israeli discussions about confronting Turkey, including talk of a possible surprise attack intended to cripple the Turkish air force, had contributed to Ankara’s concerns.

The agreement was signed on Friday in Mecca by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

The three countries said an armed attack against any one of them would be regarded as an attack against all, while describing the pact as a means of strengthening collective deterrence and regional stability.

The agreement did not specify the practical obligations of its members. A Turkish official said it was not directed against any particular actor, remained open to other regional countries and did not replace existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Farooqui said the absence of Egypt from the initial agreement was particularly significant.

“The important thing about the announcement is the conspicuous absence of Egypt,” he told the Press TV website, adding that the possibility of a Turkish-Egyptian military pact was central to understanding the regional balance.

“The Egyptian question is paramount: why has it taken a pass,” the analyst asked.

He added that such a pact would represent a much stronger counterweight to Israel and said the United States understood the implications.

“So it seems to have intervened to prevent the nightmare from happening,” he said.

Egypt’s position, however, has not been presented as permanently outside the arrangement. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Saturday Egypt could eventually join the pact after several technical issues were resolved.

He described Egypt as Ankara’s “natural partner” and said other countries had also expressed interest in joining, although the founding members were still discussing how expansion should be handled.

The new military alliance comes amid US-Israeli destabilizing actions in the region. Since October 2023, Israel has waged a genocidal war on Gaza, invaded southern Lebanon and occupied territory in Syria, while also launching two wars of aggression with the United States against Iran that triggered massive retaliatory strikes against US and Israeli assets in the region.

Meanwhile, the regime’s bellicose agenda has raised concerns about the so-called “Greater Israel” scheme that regards Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories as well as parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon as part of the Zionist entity.

Israeli regime prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in October 2025 that he feels a deep connection to “this vision”, describing it as “a historical and spiritual mission.”

On the other hand, some analysts have linked the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry to a broader contest over regional influence. Turkey and Israel have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and their strategic and commercial ties have survived tense rhetoric.

Yet tensions seem to have intensified recently over Gaza, Syria, energy routes, maritime issues and Ankara’s expanding regional role.

Pakistan’s position has added another dimension to the emerging security alignment.

Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on Saturday, following the signing of the agreement, that Israel was “a threat to the entire Muslim world” and called for “a united military front” against it, while noting that the regime poses a direct threat to countries across the region.

The broader security environment has also been affected by changes in the US military posture. Washington has reportedly withdrawn warplanes and other military equipment from countries including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates following Iranian retaliatory strikes.

Asked whether the new alliance could eventually contribute to a region without US military presence and with Israel more contained, Farooqui said the current arrangement is insufficient.

“Not without Egypt,” he told the Press TV website. “The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistan pact is mostly for show. By itself, it is not an effective balancing coalition against Israel.”

August 9, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alliance shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran: Analyst

Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Pakistan Sign Defence Pact

Mario Nawfal & Glenn Diesen | August 7, 2026

August 8, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Pakistan Sign Defence Pact

Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Sign Memorandum on Collective Defense – Statement

Sputnik – 07.08.2026

Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum on collective defense on Friday, according to a joint statement from the countries seen by Sputnik.

According to the Turkiye newspaper, the joint defense agreement provides for cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and regional security coordination. Turkiye’s accession to the system of strategic defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, an agreement on which was signed in 2025, may become an important stage in changing the balance of power in the Middle East.

“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed an agreement in Mecca on collective defense, showing the countries’ shared commitment to further enhance collective security,” the joint statement said.

The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen collective deterrence of any act of aggression, the statement read.

According to the document, an attack on any of the three countries would be considered as an attack on all of them. It also implies strengthening all aspects of defense cooperation between the three countries, the statement said.

August 7, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Sign Memorandum on Collective Defense – Statement

Kuwait Ratifies Landmark Defense Agreement with Pakistan

Sputnik – 27.07.2026

Kuwait has officially ratified a broad defense cooperation pact with Pakistan that was signed in June 2023. The ratification follows high-level military contacts between the two countries.

“This agreement reintroduces Pakistan as a direct security stakeholder in the Gulf, beyond its traditional role of providing manpower and training,” said Sultan M. Hali, writer and retired Group Captain of the Pakistan Air Force.

Key points from his commentary:

1️. New role. Pakistan ceases to be merely a supplier of troops. The pact positions Islamabad as a direct security stakeholder in the Gulf.

2️. Hedging strategy. Kuwait is reducing excessive dependence on the US and NATO by relying on a nuclear-armed Muslim-majority ally.

3️. Multipolarity. Arab monarchies are turning to China, Turkiye, and South Asia in response to a fragmented world order.

4️. Basing. Permanent bases are unlikely, but joint exercises, rotational deployments, and maritime patrols are realistic scenarios.

5️. Defense industry. Kuwait may consider the Pakistani-Chinese JF-17 Thunder — cheaper than Western analogs and less vulnerable to embargoes.

6️. Forward presence. Expands Pakistan’s capability to monitor Gulf maritime traffic, including energy chokepoints.

7️. Defense diplomacy. Strengthens Pakistan’s leverage in Gulf councils and its position vis-à-vis India.

8️. Economic dividends. Military cooperation often accompanies labor, trade, and energy agreements, boosting Pakistan’s regional integration.

“Kuwait’s move signals recognition that multipolarity in defining relations is now essential for resilience in an increasingly fragmented regional order,” Hali said.

July 27, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , | Comments Off on Kuwait Ratifies Landmark Defense Agreement with Pakistan

The nuclear leash: Washington’s deal to put Saudi Arabia back in its place

By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | July 24, 2026

The United States has presented its new nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia as a gift: reactors, technology, investment, prestige, and the radiant promise of a peaceful atomic future. Washington is forever giving gifts of this kind. Curiously, they tend to arrive fitted with surveillance equipment, political conditions, and a discreetly concealed choke chain.

This is not merely a civil nuclear agreement. It is a disciplinary instrument aimed at Mohammed bin Salman — a strategic summons issued to a crown prince who has recently behaved less like an obedient client and more like the ruler of an indispensable state.

Its message is simple: Saudi Arabia may diversify its economy, its diplomatic partners, and even its wardrobe of alliances, but it may not diversify the source of its ultimate protection. That franchise still belongs to Washington.

The agreement therefore concerns nuclear energy only in the same sense that a prison contract concerns architecture. Its deeper purpose is to reconstruct American authority over a kingdom that has begun imagining life beyond the imperial security nursery.

Riyadh has committed three increasingly intolerable offenses.

First, it has moved too close to Pakistan. The Saudi–Pakistani relationship is hardly new: money, soldiers, intelligence cooperation, religious patronage, and strategic ambiguity have bound the two states for decades.

What has changed is the context. As confidence in American protection has weakened, Pakistan has ceased to look merely like a useful military subcontractor and begun to resemble a possible component of an alternative security architecture.

That possibility is especially sensitive because Pakistan is nuclear-armed. No formal Saudi–Pakistani nuclear arrangement has been acknowledged, and neither capital needs one publicly declared. Strategic ambiguity is useful precisely because it performs deterrence without submitting an invoice to the International Atomic Energy Agency. A defense pact, carefully suggestive official language, and decades of intimate military cooperation can generate considerable anxiety without anyone having to unveil a warhead in Riyadh.

Washington’s nuclear offer is designed to interrupt that imagination. It tells the Saudis: there will be no Pakistani shortcut to strategic autonomy. If the kingdom wants reactors, fuel-cycle expertise, advanced technology, and the political symbolism of nuclear modernity, those ambitions must pass through American gates. The atomic future may be Saudi, but the key to the laboratory must remain in Washington.

Second, Mohammed bin Salman has shown insufficient enthusiasm for the campaign against Iran. Riyadh has no sentimental attachment to Tehran; states do not exchange friendship bracelets. But it has learned, after years of expensive confrontation, that permanent hostility to Iran is a ruinous American luxury financed by Gulf vulnerability. Saudi–Iranian accommodation is not ideological reconciliation. It is an insurance policy against being drafted into someone else’s war.

This is precisely what makes it objectionable to Washington and Israel. An autonomous Saudi Arabia might decline to become the logistics platform, financier, diplomatic choir, and eventual target of a regional war against Iran. It might decide that oil facilities, desalination plants, investment plans, and glittering megaprojects are poorly served by turning the Gulf into a missile exchange. Such ingratitude cannot be encouraged.

The nuclear deal places Washington back at the center of Saudi strategic planning. Technology creates dependency; dependency creates leverage; leverage restores obedience.

The reactor is not merely an energy source. It is a thirty-year listening device embedded in the kingdom’s national-security imagination.

Third, Riyadh has refused to normalize relations with Israel on Washington’s preferred terms. Saudi leaders continue to tie normalization to a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood — an inconvenient demand in an imperial order that prefers Palestinians as humanitarian statistics rather than political subjects. Trump’s subsequent insistence that the nuclear arrangement depends on Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords merely stripped the agreement of its ceremonial clothing.

The bargain is now indecently clear: Washington will help construct Saudi Arabia’s nuclear future if Riyadh helps rehabilitate Israel’s regional standing. Nuclear cooperation becomes diplomatic blackmail. The kingdom is invited to purchase strategic reassurance with Palestine. This is less a treaty than a geopolitical obedience course: sit beside Israel, distrust Iran, step away from Pakistan, and receive your reactor.

China and Russia are the other uninvited guests at the signing ceremony. Saudi Arabia is not merely another energy producer; it is the central Arab power in OPEC, a financial heavyweight, and a pivotal actor in the emerging multipolar order. Its relations with Beijing and Moscow challenge Washington not because Riyadh has become anti-American, but because it has become insufficiently exclusive.

Empire does not require affection. It requires the absence of alternatives.

A Saudi nuclear program built with Chinese or Russian assistance would deepen technological, financial, and strategic relationships that Washington can no longer confidently control. American companies want the contracts, certainly, but the larger concern is architectural: whoever builds the reactors helps shape the dependencies surrounding them.

Nuclear cooperation produces decades of training, maintenance, fuel arrangements, regulatory influence, security coordination, and elite access. Washington is not selling machinery. It is purchasing strategic occupancy.

The irony is exquisite. The United States portrays the agreement as evidence of restored strength, yet its generosity reveals its weakness. A hegemon secure in its position does not need to offer extraordinary concessions to retain an old client. It does so when the client has discovered competing suppliers, alternative protectors, and the invigorating sensation of being courted.

Nor does the agreement simplify nuclear diplomacy with Iran. Washington has spent years treating Iranian enrichment as uniquely sinister while now constructing a far more permissive vocabulary for Saudi ambitions. The distinction will be explained through the usual theological machinery of empire: allies possess peaceful atoms; adversaries enrich malicious ones. Centrifuges, apparently, acquire moral character from the flag hanging above them.

The result is a nonproliferation doctrine so intellectually elastic that it can be folded into a campaign brochure.

Mohammed bin Salman may believe Saudi Arabia has accumulated enough leverage to escape the old hierarchy. Washington’s answer is this agreement: not quite a reward, not quite a threat, but an elegant combination of both. America will protect the kingdom — from Iran, from uncertainty, and above all from the dangerous temptation to protect itself through arrangements Washington cannot supervise.

The reactor, then, is the bait. Israel is the condition. Pakistan is the warning. China and Russia are the targets.

And the leash, freshly polished and marketed as partnership, remains unmistakably American.

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on The nuclear leash: Washington’s deal to put Saudi Arabia back in its place

US-Saudi nuclear pantomime is with eye on Iran

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | July 24, 2026

The excitement over the US-Saudi nuclear deal has proved to be short-lived. Apparently, the US President Donald Trump himself poured cold water into it by adding a caveat on Thursday that in order for the deal to be advanced, Saudi Arabia must first join the Abraham Accords. That is, as things stand, may seem like asking for the moon.

However, it’s all but certain that Trump allowed the Saudi deal to be signed after consulting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a last throw of dice to pin down Saudi Arabia as a participant / collaborator alongside Israel (and the UAE) for an all-out war against Iran that  might at some point entail ground operations, which is not possible without first getting Riyadh on his side firmly, irrevocably.

If Saudi Arabia dissociates from Tump’s upcoming war and disallows the US to use the Saudi bases or work out the logistics accordingly, Pentagon generals will be hard-pressed to conduct the war. In political terms too, the Saudi stance will influence other regional oligarchies in the Persian Gulf in their own attitudes towards Iran, which is astride the Arab street like a colossus. The timing of the July 15 meeting of Trump with the visit of the pro-American prime minister of Iraq Ali al-Zaidi also needs to be factored in here. Simply put, Iraq has become a frontline in the US-Iran conflict.

Saudis won’t like the prospect of Iran emerging as a towering regional power. On its part, Iran is also closely watching the Saudi mood swings stemming out of its compulsions not to annoy Trump who is in a position to to play a helpful role in the event of the succession issue coming to the fore in Riyadh at any time. Of course, this is apart from the profound petrodollar linkages critical to both protagonists.

Meanwhile, the recent Pakistani advisory to Tehran to steer clear of targeting Saudi Arabia, the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia and the potential closure of Strait of Bab el-Mandeb are tell-tale signs of latent tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, although both sides are maintaining a semblance of normalcy.

Most certainly, Trump’s remark on Thursday making the nuclear deal conditional on the Saudis normalising relations with Israel has thrown the deal as such into question barely 24 hours after it was signed. Is it a U-turn or is the episode just another confusing rollout that has become the trademark of Trump’s presidency? The truth could be somewhere in between.

According to an AP report, the White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters in a briefing yesterday that Trump has said if the Saudis don’t join the Abraham Accords, “the deal is off.” When asked why the condition wasn’t mentioned Wednesday when the Energy Department announced that the deal was signed, Leavitt said it was because Trump “is always the final dealmaker.”

My own reading is that Trump is backtracking according to a script. He could have taken credit for the condition on Abraham Accords, had it been a part of the deal. But it is within his ingenuity to try to increase his leverage with the Saudis by adding the caveat openly: that might even improve the deal in certain respects such as enrichment or verification clauses, for instance.

The Saudis appear to have been taken by surprise on Wednesday when US Energy Secretary Chris Wright signed the decades-long, multibillion-dollar deal with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy but that doesn’t have to be taken at face value. The deal reportedly includes a “123 Agreement” and an accompanying “bilateral safeguards agreement,” and the two agreed to a two-year study to see whether enrichment is necessary. This seems like kicking the can down the road. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s office said Saudis joining of the Abraham Accords “would be an historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East.”

On the whole, Trump has a deal here. The caveat of Abraham Accords may serve to delay the agreement from coming to fruition unless and until the Saudis jettison their bottomline [a Palestinian state] linking normalisation with Israel. On the other hand, Trump has the leverage insofar as the Saudis now have to address whether they want to normalise relations with Israel.

Indeed, the Saudis too are getting an optimal deal here, which doesn’t expressly block reprocessing and enrichment and doesn’t allow for the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its inspections. The Saudis have apparently got away with not having a customary additional protocol, which would have ensured there is no cheating, and it will stay a peaceful programme. On Truth Social, Trump maintained on Thursday that “there will be no enrichment of material,” but added that the US is “not opposed to Civil (Non-Enriched) Nuclear Facilities.” Conceivably, the US may have control of a Saudi enrichment facility and keep a military / security presence.

The Congress will be able to review the deal in a 90-day window. Lawmakers do not need to approve it, but they could oppose it, although that is unlikely. (See a Congressional Research Report Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, March 11, 2026) All in all, the chances are of the agreement “staying in place and nothing substantive happening until Saudis agree to something” regarding Israel, as [per] Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, an influential pro-Trump DC-based think tank.

The most bizarre coincidence of the entire sequence of developments since Wednesday is the shadow this deal could potentially cast on the US-Iran agreement that is on the horizon. But that is only hypothetical. If Trump intends to launch an all-out war with Iran, there will be no more negotiations to be had on a nuclear deal.

Saudis, being stakeholders, may no longer resist Trump’s entreaties to collaborate with the war effort going forward, whose objective would be to destroy Iran comprehensively with all the military might at Washington’s command. The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said in the past that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, the kingdom would have to follow suit.

In such a scenario, there will be no conceivable reason for Israel at the present juncture to try to kill the US-Saudi deal that is struggling to be born.   

July 24, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on US-Saudi nuclear pantomime is with eye on Iran

Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

By Elfadil Ibrahim | Responsible Statecraft | July 22, 2026

Four weeks ago, Pakistan looked like one of the biggest winners of the U.S.-Iran war.

Its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, shuttled between Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals for months. As part of his efforts, Pakistan hosted the first face-to-face U.S.-Iran talks in years and helped broker the Islamabad memorandum of understanding that Vice President JD Vance signed in June, thanking Munir and calling him one of the “very, very important people” in his life.

Islamabad hired a Washington lobbying firm to convert that goodwill into defense cooperation and minerals investment, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a “sun of progress and prosperity” for Pakistan’s chronically stressed economy after the MoU between the U.S.and Iran brought an end to major military operations.

Pakistan’s fortunes have since reversed. Fighting between Washington and Tehran has resumed, and Islamabad’s dual goals of being Iran’s trusted interlocutor and the Arab Gulf states’ security guarantor are once again at odds.

President Donald Trump declared the deal was “over” in early July, after which the U.S. struck civilian and military targets in Iran. Iran, for its part, declared on July 18 through its deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, that it was “suspending all obligations” under the framework. The war has since widened into exactly the kind of multi-front regional conflict Pakistan spent the spring trying to prevent.

The clearest new exposure for Pakistan is in Saudi Arabia, where Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base at al-Kharj — its first direct hit on Saudi territory since March — just days after the Houthis, Iran’s Yemeni ally, fired missiles on the kingdom, hitting Abha airport in the country’s south. That escalation occurred after Saudi-allied forces hit Sanaa airport in Yemen to prevent the landing of an Iranian airliner; the U.S. Treasury alleged without providing evidence that the plane is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. The strikes effectively enforced Riyadh’s airspace veto over the Houthi-controlled capital.

Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Riyadh last year. It deployed fighter jets and thousands of troops to the kingdom after earlier Iranian strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. More recently, Islamabad has reportedly communicated to Tehran directly that attacks on Saudi Arabia will be treated as attacks on Pakistan itself. Sharif’s own statement in the aftermath called the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia a violation of the kingdom’s sovereignty that Pakistan “strongly condemns,” pledging “unwavering support” for Riyadh’s security.

The tone is notable given that Pakistan’s parliament explicitly refused to get entangled in Yemen over a decade ago. In April 2015, faced with a nearly identical Saudi request to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously to “maintain neutrality.” Islamabad’s calculus has not changed. If anything, recent events have sharpened Pakistan’s desire to broker a lasting peace.

Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in February set off deadly unrest in Karachi and Islamabad; Munir himself had to intervene to calm a wave of processions and pledges of allegiance to the new supreme leader across Shia neighborhoods.

Significantly, Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attended Khamenei’s funeral in July, and Sharif posted after that “the late Supreme Leader’s wisdom, leadership and profound influence on Iran and the wider region will be remembered for generations” — a demonstration of the fine line Pakistan’s leadership has to walk, one no doubt delivered with a domestic audience in mind as much as an Iranian one.

That fine line becomes impossible to walk when a defense pact, triggered by Saudi-Houthi fighting or by further Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, would ask Pakistan to do the exact thing its parliament explicitly refused a decade ago: take a military side against a Houthi-Iran axis, and do so at a moment when its domestic Shia politics is highly combustible

Kuwait is now reportedly asking for the same kind of commitment that Saudi Arabia already has. Reuters reported last week that Islamabad is in early-stage talks with Kuwait — which has absorbed repeated Iranian strikes on its infrastructure in recent days — over an expanded defense agreement that would include “thousands of Pakistani troops on the ground, fighter jets, drones, an air defence system, and other defence-related facilities,” according to an anonymous Pakistani government official cited in the report.

Another anonymous Pakistani security official said the country “cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.” That hesitation suggests that stacking multiple defense commitments across Gulf states in Iran’s crosshairs makes Islamabad’s balancing act much harder to sustain. Each new pact narrows the room to claim neutrality the next time Tehran calls.

During this war, Pakistan discovered what happens when Gulf partners doubt its ability to balance between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates recalled a $3.5 billion loan in April and quietly began deporting Pakistani Shia workers by the thousands. The move was widely read as retaliation for Islamabad’s perceived tilt toward Tehran during the mediation. Saudi Arabia stepped in with $3 billion to cover the gap, but the lesson was clear: Pakistan’s neutrality satisfies no one fully, and the cost of disappointing any single Gulf patron is measured in the billions of dollars.

Economic self-preservation has been Pakistan’s primary motive for steering mediation and ending a war that has hobbled the economies of its creditors and choked the trade routes that power its own electric grid. Pakistan is on its 25th International Monetary Fund program; more than half of its tax revenue is put towards servicing its debts. It had barely stabilized its inflation before the Strait of Hormuz’s closure sent rates back into double digits.

In March, as the war’s first phase disrupted energy flows out of Hormuz, Islamabad ordered a two-week school closure and imposed a four-day work week to conserve fuel — measures the government has now indicated it may need to revive.

A parallel disruption to the Red Sea, like the blockade of Saudi Arabia declared by the Houthis Monday, would be highly disruptive to Pakistan’s energy security, and by extension, its economy. While Pakistan imports the overwhelming majority of its fuel from the Gulf, the closing of another critical chokepoint would simultaneously tighten global tanker capacity and insurance costs everywhere, pushing the same spot-market prices Pakistan is already struggling to afford even higher.

It would also add further pressure on Pakistan’s defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh will not tolerate such a closure. In a recent statement, Riyadh pledged to deal with “Houthi threats against transiting vessels… firmly and swiftly.” The stakes for Saudi Arabia are high: Since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, Saudi Arabia has relied on its East-West pipeline to divert roughly 5 million barrels per day of crude to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu — its only viable export outlet while Hormuz is all but closed.

None of this means Pakistan’s mediation was a mistake, or that its diplomatic capital has evaporated. Kuwait’s foreign minister still thanked Pakistan last week for its “constructive and mediatory role,” and Islamabad remains one of the few channels through which Washington and Tehran would resume talks, when the time comes. But the specific bet Pakistan made — that ending the war would allow it to bank the goodwill through commerce and financial aid — has not yet paid off.

Instead, the restart of the war has brought Saudi Arabia back into Iran’s crosshairs. At the same time, the Saudi-Houthi front has reopened, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed again, and a blockade of Saudi-linked ships on the Red Sea has been formally declared.

Each of these factors adds immense pressure on Pakistan, which now has every reason to double down on diplomacy, lest it be drawn in as a combatant.


Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst covering the politics of the Middle East and Africa, with a special focus on Sudan. His work has been featured in The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Open Democracy and other outlets.

July 22, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan thought it won the peace. Now, it could be dragged into war.

Houthi Blockade Against Saudi Arabia Creates Geopolitical, Economic Dilemma for Pakistan

Sputnik – 21.07.2026

Any threat to the Kingdom’s stability is a threat to Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests, experts stress.

Pakistan is grappling with the potential fallout from a Houthi threat to blockade Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, a development that could activate one of the region’s most consequential defense agreements.

“For Pakistan, the implications are direct and serious,” Abdullah Khan, director of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, tells Sputnik.

The reason is a binding defense pact signed in September 2025. Under its terms, an attack on Saudi Arabia is treated as an attack on Pakistan and vice versa.

“Pakistan’s interest lies in preventing further escalation through restraint and diplomacy while remaining fully committed to Saudi Arabia’s security under the mutual defense framework. Any threat to the Kingdom’s stability is a threat to Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests,” Khan stresses.

The Houthi threat is no bluff, according to Khan. They possess ballistic missiles, long-range drones, and explosive-laden unmanned boats. They have already hit Saudi oil facilities and struck commercial ships in the Red Sea. Their capabilities allow them to choke energy exports, spike insurance costs, and force billions in defensive spending – a reality that extends far beyond Yemen’s borders.

The economic consequences for Pakistan could be severe also, Ali Ehsan, an economic policy analyst, warns. With Bab el-Mandeb now under threat, Pakistan loses its alternative route for Saudi oil shipments. That means higher petrol and electricity prices, disrupted textile exports to Europe, and mounting pressure on an already fragile economy.

“Pakistan’s trade with Europe, which is an export market, will get highly affected by this situation and Pakistan’s economy will come under more pressure,” Ehsan says.

July 21, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on Houthi Blockade Against Saudi Arabia Creates Geopolitical, Economic Dilemma for Pakistan

Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

The Cradle | July 17, 2026

Pakistan and Kuwait have entered early-stage negotiations to expand defense cooperation, with Islamabad seeking deeper energy ties and greater investment from the Gulf monarchy in return, Reuters reported on 17 July.

“Kuwait’s wish list includes everything,” said a Pakistani security official familiar with the negotiations. “But let me be clear about one thing: We are not and we cannot consider a deployment of combat troops at this stage.”

One source confirmed the talks have covered defense procurement, but noted it was “not clear this will amount to a defense pact per se.”

In exchange for any deal, Islamabad wants expanded cooperation on energy security as it builds up its strategic oil and fuel reserves as part of a wider initiative led by Pakistan’s Energy Ministry.

Over the past year, Pakistan and the Gulf monarchies have moved toward new regional defense arrangements.

The realignment was accelerated by the US’s war on Iran, which saw Gulf countries absorb the brunt of the retaliatory impact, and called into question the reliability of the US as a defense partner.

Meanwhile, Islamabad commands one of the region’s largest armies and manufactures its own fighter jets, credentials that have positioned it as a potential supplement, or even alternative, to US protection.

For Kuwait, Pakistan represents a dependable partner, according to a source in the region familiar with Kuwaiti security planning.

“They are already in with the Saudis, they have a long history of defense development, they are Muslim Sunni, they have a good relationship with the Americans, so it’s not as sensitive as some other options,” the source said.

Turkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been preparing a draft agreement for a three-way mutual defense pact, distinct from the existing accord between Islamabad and Riyadh.

Bahrain is pursuing a similar arrangement, one source said, while Jordan has signaled interest in a weapons and training deal.

Last year, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement committing each to treat an attack on one as an attack on both – a pact widely understood to place Riyadh under a de facto Pakistani nuclear umbrella, after Pakistan’s defense minister said all the country’s capabilities “will be made available under this agreement.”

July 18, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on Pakistan, Kuwait hold early talks on defense-for-energy partnership

Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?

Press TV – July 4, 2026

The funeral ceremony for the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, brought together one of the largest gatherings of foreign dignitaries in Iran in recent decades, with representatives from across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and major international organizations attending the event in Tehran.

The delegations included presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary speakers, foreign ministers, senior government officials, political leaders, and representatives of religious organizations and resistance movements, underscoring the broad international participation in the ceremony.

Asia

Asia accounted for the largest share of official delegations.

From West Asia, Iraq sent one of the largest delegations, including Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, senior officials, and representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Saudi Arabia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji, while Oman sent the chairman of its State Council and Qatar was represented by Parliament Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim.

Shia community representatives also attended from Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf countries.

Lebanon dispatched Defense Minister Michel Menassa alongside senior delegations from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.

Yemen was represented by Vice President Mahmoud al-Junaid and an Ansarullah delegation.

Palestinian groups also attended, including senior Hamas leaders and Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah.

From the wider Asian region, Pakistan sent one of the highest-level foreign delegations, headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. The delegation also included the Senate speaker, senior government officials, and religious leaders.

Afghanistan was represented by delegations from the Taliban administration and the Afghan resistance.

India sent a special government envoy at the deputy foreign minister level.

China was represented by He Wei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended the ceremony in person, while Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Georgia sent President Mikheil Kavelashvili along with a Muslim delegation.

Türkiye dispatched Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, together with political and party representatives.

Turkmenistan was represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chairman of the People’s Council and National Leader.

Among other participants were Azerbaijan’s parliament speaker, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister; the parliamentary speakers of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; Thailand’s deputy prime minister; Malaysia’s agriculture minister; Myanmar’s special envoy; and official delegations from South Korea and North Korea.

Africa

Several African governments were represented by ministerial- or cabinet-level delegations.

Egypt sent its Senate speaker.

South Africa, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania, and Tunisia all sent official representatives.

Nigeria and Senegal also dispatched delegations to participate in the funeral ceremonies.

Europe and the Americas

Russia sent Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, as President Vladimir Putin’s special representative.

Belarus was represented by its parliament speaker, while Serbia sent its communications minister. Bulgaria also dispatched parliamentary and political representatives.

Germany was represented by members of the country’s Shia community.

From Latin America, Cuba sent its higher education minister as a special representative, while Nicaragua was represented by Foreign Minister Valdrack Jaentschke.

International organizations

The ceremony also drew senior representatives of several international organizations.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was represented by Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) sent Deputy Secretary-General Tariq Ali Bakheet.

The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were represented by their respective secretaries-general.

July 4, 2026 Posted by | Solidarity and Activism | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?

Israel Brings The War Rhetoric Towards Türkiye

After Being Defeated In Iran, Israel Targets Türkiye.

By Justin K.P. – The Dissident – June 22, 2026

The idea of Israel going to war with Türkiye- a NATO member- potentially triggering World War III seems insane.

And yet Israel is using their war rhetoric towards Türkiye.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry put out a post seemingly laying the groundwork for an Israeli war, claiming that “Hamas terrorists based in Turkey are directing attacks against Israelis, funding terrorism, and recruiting operatives. The network is exposed. The facts are clear.”

This is far from the first time Israel has used war rhetoric towards Türkiye.

Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli recently said that Israel “will be at war with Syria sooner or later” in part because he called Syria “a Turkish protectorate”.

He also fabricated a new “radical Sunni axis of evil” which supposedly includes Pakistan, Turkey and Qatar.

Middle East Eye reported:

“What we are witnessing before our eyes is the rise of a new axis,” Chikli told 103FM radio on Wednesday, referring to Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan. He described this so-called alliance as “a radical Sunni axis of evil, more dangerous than anything we have seen before”.

While Chikli mentioned both Qatar and Pakistan in his interviews, he mainly focused on Turkey, branding Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s vision “an extremely dangerous combination for us”.

Other members of the ruling Israeli Likud party have similarly been declaring Türkiye “an enemy state”.

Middle East Eye noted, “Last week, Israeli lawmaker Ariel Kellner, also of Likud, called Turkey an ‘enemy state’, while Culture and Sports Minister Miki Zohar said last month that Israel’“must begin to treat Turkey as an enemy state,’ suggesting that Turkey would suffer heavy blows in a possible conflict with Israel.”

It added that “In February, former prime minister Naftali Bennett indicated that he sees Turkey as an enemy, with the opposition figure stating: ‘Turkey is the new Iran.’”

Perhaps the most concerning development is the fact that the Foundation for The Defence of Democracies (FDD), an Israeli lobby cutout that played a large role in the U.S. war on Iran, has begun publishing articles using similar rhetoric towards Türkiye.

FDD put out an article titled , “Turkey the new Iran? Ankara’s growing challenge to Western interests”.

The article attempted to label Türkiye as the “new Iran”, writing:

As Iran and its proxies take a beating from American and Israeli forces, observers are questioning whether Turkey is waiting in the wings to emerge as the region’s next “bogeyman.” The answer is likely yes, albeit in its own form.

Turkey is not Iran, but depicting Turkey as a nuisance or simply “complicated” only emboldens a maturing adversarial regime with an established track record of undermining its Western allies.

The article attempted to ratchet up hostilities between Türkiye and the United States, writing, “The real question is whether Turkey is actively undermining US, NATO, and regional security interests. There is little doubt that Ankara is doing just that, and doing so more brazenly with the passage of time.”

It also lamented that Türkiye is too supportive of the Palestinian resistance, writing “Hamas, as an Iranian proxy, has served Ankara’s interests in undermining Israel’s security interests, something which Turkey would like to see intact after the end of the current war.”

FDD has similarly put out articles pushing for the U.S. to put sanctions on Türkiye, saying that “Washington should pursue Global Magnitsky sanctions against targets in Turkey” and that “the United States should utilize Global Magnitsky authorities to target Turkish individuals responsible for human rights violations”.

It also called for the U.S. to designate “government officials” in Türkiye as “terrorist organizations” and wrote that “The United States should protect the international financial sector by recommending added scrutiny and screening to transactions involving Turkish financial institutions” and that “Washington should coordinate with the G7 to return Turkey to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’ until further improvements are seen in combating terrorism financing.”

The Carnegie Endowment for Peace documented that “FDD was the brainchild of a New York Times journalist-turned-Republican operative, Clifford May,” adding that “it arose out of an organization committed to burnishing Israel’s reputation in the United States. On April 24, 2001, three major pro-Israel donors incorporated an organization called EMET (Hebrew for ‘truth’). In an application to the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exempt status, May explained that the group ‘was to provide education to enhance Israel’s image in North America and the public’s understanding of issues affecting Israeli-Arab relations.’ But in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, May broadened the group’s mission and changed its name to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. As he explained in a supplement to the IRS, the group’s board of directors decided to focus on ‘develop[ing] educational materials on the eradication of terrorism everywhere in the world.’”

It added that, “FDD’s chief funders have been drawn almost entirely from American Jews who have a long history of funding pro-Israel organizations. They include Bernard Marcus, the co-founder of Home Depot, whiskey heirs Samuel and Edgar Bronfman, gambling mogul Sheldon Adelson, heiress Lynn Schusterman, Wall Street speculators Michael Steinhardt and Paul Singer, and Leonard Abramson, founder of U.S. Healthcare.”

Sima Vaknin-Gil, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, in the Al Jazeera documentary The Lobby, admitted that “We have FDD” and that “the foundation is ‘working on’ projects for Israel, including ‘data gathering, information analysis, working on activist organizations, money trail. This is something that only a country, with its resources, can do the best”.

FDD played a huge role in shaping American policy towards Iran at the behest of Israel.

Now, as Israel calls Türkiye an “enemy state”- the FDD has begun pushing Washington to place sanctions on the country and designate government officials as terrorists, laying the groundwork for a new Israeli war.

June 22, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Israel Brings The War Rhetoric Towards Türkiye