‘We did not attack Pakistan with drones’: Afghan sources
Al Mayadeen | September 24, 2026
An Afghan source told Al Mayadeen that Afghanistan did not launch drone attacks against Pakistan, rejecting Islamabad’s account and describing the Pakistani claims as a pretext for the strikes carried out against Afghan territory.
The source said Afghanistan will determine “the nature of the response and the appropriate timing to respond to the repeated Pakistani violations of our sovereignty.”
The Afghan source categorically denied that Kabul’s forces had attacked Pakistan using drones, saying the allegations were being used to justify Pakistan’s latest strikes.
“Afghanistan will choose the nature of the response and the appropriate timing to respond to the repeated Pakistani violations of our sovereignty,” the source told Al Mayadeen.
The statement comes amid a sharp escalation in tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, following a series of cross-border strikes and clashes in recent days. Pakistan has accused Afghan territory of being used by armed groups to launch attacks against Pakistan, while Afghan authorities have repeatedly rejected accusations that Kabul is facilitating such operations.
Pakistan says it struck 10 sites in Afghanistan
The source’s comments to Al Mayadeen came after Pakistan announced that it carried out a series of drone and airstrikes against 10 sites inside Afghanistan following what Islamabad claimed were drone incursions launched from Afghan territory.
“In exercise of its sovereign right to self-defence, Pakistan conducted precision aerial and drone strikes against 10 locations in Afghanistan used for launching and storing these drones,” Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said. “The strikes were deliberate, precise, calibrated, and proportionate, and strictly limited to identified military objectives directly linked to the attempted attacks against Pakistan.”
Pakistan said the strikes were limited to military objectives it linked directly to the alleged drone attacks, although official details of where the sites were located were withheld. A resident of Kanfahar, however, told AFP that an airstrike targeted the southern Afghan city.
Tarar said in a statement that the drone incursion “constitutes a blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and is a grave and unacceptable act of aggression.”
Kabul warns attacks could derail dialogue
The Afghan source also said there had been efforts to resume dialogue with Pakistan, warning that the latest attacks could undermine prospects for negotiations and rebuilding confidence between the two neighboring countries.
“There was an effort to resume dialogue with Pakistan,” the source said, adding that “the latest attacks may thwart opportunities for dialogue and confidence-building” between the two sides.
The warning comes as regional mediation efforts face mounting pressure following renewed military exchanges along the border.
A spokesperson for the Afghan Taliban said four people were killed as a result of Pakistani airstrikes against targets inside Afghanistan.
Earlier this week, Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan also resulted in civilian casualties, according to Afghan officials and the United Nations. Reuters reported that three civilians were killed in strikes on September 21, while Pakistani authorities said they had targeted militants
Read more: UK inquiry hears claims soldiers abused Afghan detainees ‘for fun’
Pakistan-Iran talks secure LNG shipment to Islamabad through Hormuz
Al Mayadeen | September 21, 2026
Pakistan has negotiated with Iran to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for another liquefied natural gas shipment, offering some respite as the South Asian nation struggles with an energy shortfall.
The tanker, which loaded LNG from Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility in late June, crossed the strait over the weekend and is signaling that it will arrive at Pakistan’s import facility by Tuesday, according to ship-tracking data.
The passage was negotiated between government officials, said people with knowledge of the matter, and would mark the second such Qatari delivery this month. The people asked not to be named as the conversations are not public.
Pakistan relies on relations with Iran to avoid blackouts
While LNG shipments through Hormuz remain heavily disrupted, some vessels have been able to get through. Import-dependent Pakistan, badly hit by the upheaval in the Gulf due to the US war on Iran, has been leveraging its relationship with Tehran to receive several cargoes since Washington launches its war on February.
Pakistan had been considering a tender if the shipment didn’t get through Hormuz. A successful delivery, however, is preferable for the government, eager to avoid buying additional expensive shipments from the spot market, where prices have spiked to the highest level since 2022.
The South Asian nation received nearly all of its LNG from Qatar last year. The emirate is home to the world’s largest LNG export plant, which is still exporting only a very small amount through Hormuz, Energy Minister Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi said at the Qatar Economic Forum in New York Sunday.
QatarEnergy says Hormuz crisis could delay expansion projects
The crisis over the Strait of Hormuz could delay some QatarEnergy expansion projects because critical equipment is unable to reach Qatar, the company’s CEO Saad al-Kaabi said on Sunday.
Al-Kaabi said QatarEnergy was currently producing only a “very minute” volume of liquefied natural gas.
Speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum in New York, al-Kaabi said a few LNG trains under QatarEnergy’s North Field East (NFE) expansion are due to start up in 2027, with the North Field South (NFS) expansion set to begin production in 2028.
This comes as the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz continues to affect Qatar’s economy negatively, in light of the US war on Iran, which prompted Tehran to close the Strait in retaliation.
Imran Khan’s entire immediate family detained in Pakistan ahead of mass protest demanding his release
The Cradle | September 21, 2026
Pakistan’s police have detained the three sisters of former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan ahead of mass protests to demand his release, Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported on 21 September.
Khan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party leader and former cricket star, has been jailed since August 2023 on corruption charges that he and his supporters say are politically motivated.
The PTI has called for a mass march in the capital, Islamabad, on 27 September, with Khan’s release from prison as a central demand.
On Sunday, his sister Aleema Khan was detained at her residence in Lahore under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) law as part of a crackdown ahead of the protest.
PTI spokesperson Sheikh Waqas Akram denounced the arrests. Akram said Aleema Khan was detained “because she refused to stay silent about her brother’s illegal detention, solitary confinement, and denial of medical care.”
Aleema and her children were taken to an unknown place in an armored vehicle, Akram added.
Khan’s other two sisters, Uzma Khan and Noreen Niazi, were detained later on Sunday after holding a press conference to denounce their sister’s detention. The three sisters’ children were also detained.
Khan’s son Kasim said police broke into his relatives’ homes and forced them into vehicles without explanation.
“This is criminal behavior. Inexcusable,” he wrote on X on Sunday.
The sisters’ detentions have been challenged in the Lahore High Court, Aleema’s lawyer Rana Mudassar Umer said.
Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi demanded that the PTI cancel Sunday’s march.
“They cannot achieve anything through such drama. I will say again today that there is still time. Don’t get into a situation from which there is no turning back,” Naqvi said.
In May, a secret Pakistani diplomatic cable was published for the first time confirming that a senior US diplomat insisted on the removal of Imran Khan from his position as prime minister in 2022.
According to the cable, revealed by Drop Site News, Donald Lu, then US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, told Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, Asad Majeed Khan, that “all will be forgiven” if the former premier was removed through a no-confidence vote in parliament.
Khan was ousted as prime minister in a legislative coup six weeks after the cable was sent, on 9 April 2022. Khan revealed the existence of the cable at that time, claiming his removal was part of a “US-backed regime-change operation.”
Report: Saudi Arabia seeks allies’ assistance as missiles deplete amid war on Yemen
Press TV – September 17, 2026
Saudi Arabia is reportedly facing depleted reserves of missile interceptor systems and has appealed to regional partners and Western allies for assistance as Yemeni Armed Forces continue retaliatory missile and drone operations against strategic sites deep inside the kingdom.
The Associated Press, citing two regional officials speaking on condition of anonymity, reported on Wednesday that Saudi authorities have appealed to France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt to establish air-defense reinforcements in the region to bolster protection against missile and drone operations conducted by Yemeni Armed Forces.
The Yemeni operations are being carried out in retaliation for ongoing airstrikes and the blockade against their Arab Peninsula nation.
The outreach effort commenced due to the fact that Saudi Arabia’s principal ally and primary arms supplier, the United States, has faced a significant reduction in its interceptor inventory over the course of a six-month war of aggression on Iran, according to one official.
Fresh Saudi airstrikes across Yemen
On Thursday, a civilian was killed and another sustained injuries when Saudi warplanes carried out two airstrikes in Yemen’s northern province of Hajjah.
Yemen’s al-Masirah television channel, citing local sources, reported that the aerial assaults destroyed four passenger cars and damaged a house in the Abs district.
Elsewhere in the southwestern province of Ta’izz, Saudi fighter aircraft targeted three telecommunications towers in the al-Ta’iziyah and Dimnat Khadir districts.
On July 20, the Sana’a government announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia in response to “an unjust and oppressive siege” on Yemen for almost 12 years.
Subsequently, the Yemeni armed forces have reported a series of successful missions that have targeted vessels associated with Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea.
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its allies imposed a blockade on Yemen, initiating a comprehensive military offensive that received support in terms of military, political, and logistical assistance from the United States and several Western countries.
Tens of thousands of Yemenis have lost their lives; however, Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve its primary goal of reestablishing a puppet government that served its interests.
Fuel Crisis Deepens: Pakistan Warns Tanker Attack in Red Sea Would Be an ‘Act of War’
Sputnik – 17.09.2026
The Saudi East-West oil pipeline, a critical bypass route for the kingdom’s oil exports around instability in the Strait of Hormuz, was closed last week after Houthi attacks and may remain shut for up to six weeks.
Pakistan has warned that any attack on an empty oil tanker under the Pakistani flag anchored in the Red Sea off Saudi Arabia will be regarded as an “act of war,” as Islamabad weighs its options amid rapidly shrinking diesel reserves.
The Saudi East-West oil pipeline, a critical bypass route for the kingdom’s oil exports around instability in the Strait of Hormuz, was closed last week after Houthi attacks and may remain shut for up to six weeks.
Speaking on a private news channel, Oil Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik stated that if crude oil supplies are cut, Pakistan will face an imminent diesel fuel shortage, since the country has reserves for only the current and upcoming month.
“This kind of statement should be understood in the context of Pakistan’s national security, sovereignty context, and also an increasingly serious energy security situation,” Syed Ali Ehsan, chief development officer at the Policy Research Institute of Market Economy, Economic Policy Analyst, told Sputnik.
According to Ehsan, the immediate issue is not simply that a tanker is stranded there, but that Pakistan has established a broader principle — that its civilian shipping should remain outside the regional conflict. Moreover, Pakistani flag vessels are critical to maintaining the country’s energy lifeline, and allowing one to be deliberately attacked, without consequence, could weaken the protection afforded to subsequent shipments.
However, declaring a red line does not mean that Pakistan must enter a wider regional war if an incident occurs.
As for the response Pakistan can give, the country has a substantial range of responses available to it, according to the expert. Pakistan can increase naval escorts or maritime surveillance and defend its vessels against incoming attacks, and in the event of a deliberate attack, retain the option of a limited and proportionate response, Ehsan believes.
In this photo released by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the United Kingdom’s carrier strike group led by HMS Queen Elizabeth (R 08), and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces led by
At the same time, diplomatic channels with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other regional actors can communicate clearly that Pakistan seeks to protect its commercial shipping, rather than become a party to the wider conflict, he emphasized.
As for solving the problem of Pakistan’s oil reserves being exhausted, the country needs to diversify both the source and the form of its petroleum imports.
“In the immediate term Saudi crude rerouted from Oman could provide an important alternative to disrupted routes, and Pakistan can simultaneously procure crude oil from alternative suppliers in Africa, such as Angola and Libya, or from Central Asia, for example, Malaysia,” Ehsan says.
Larger tankers can serve as temporary floating storage, effectively creating an emergency petroleum reserve offshore, the expert believes.
“I think the immediate policy objective is twofold: number one is to protect Pakistan shipping without being drawn unnecessarily into the regional conflict, and number two is to use the available window to rapidly diversify supply routes, the suppliers, and petroleum inventories,” Ehsan added.
Sana’a strikes back: How Yemeni military’s lightning advance redrew the Red Sea’s strategic map

Territory liberated by Yemeni Armed Forces during the recent operation, including the ports of Al-Mokha, Dhubab, and Al-Khokha, and towns such as Hays and Maqbanah.
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | September 12, 2026
In the span of roughly one week, the Yemeni armed forces accomplished what eight years of attritional warfare had failed to achieve.
In a military operation officially named “God Is Strongest in Might and Severe in Punishment,” the Yemeni military, backed by the Ansarullah resistance forces, liberated more than 5,400 square kilometers of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, capturing strategically vital ports, towns, and geographic features that Saudi-backed forces had seized and held since 2017 and 2018.
The speed, coordination, and depth of the advance stunned military and security observers, shattered a carefully constructed Saudi media narrative, and fundamentally altered the strategic geometry of the war imposed on Yemen.
The ports of Al-Mokha, Dhubab, and Al-Khokha fell. Key towns, including Hays, Maqbanah, and Al-Mafraq, were liberated. The entire Jabal Habashi region came under Sana’a’s control.
These were no minor outposts but positions that the former Saudi-backed regime had spent four months capturing during the so-called “Golden Arrow” operation in 2017 and an entire summer offensive in 2018, backed by heavy Saudi air support and financial resources.
The intelligence that started it all
The roots of the operation lie in a body of intelligence and an assessment reached in Sana’a months before the first shot was fired. It was believed that Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the United States, was preparing to launch a major offensive under the diplomatic pretext of securing international navigation in the Red Sea at some point in the near future.
The Saudis aimed, first, to create operational space for Washington to assert dominance over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic waterway whose leverage Ansarullah-backed Yemeni military had wielded with increasing effect since joining the Gaza solidarity front two years earlier.
Second, they sought to neutralize that leverage by igniting a land conflict along the western coast and driving northward toward Hodeidah, effectively diverting the Yemeni military’s attention from maritime operations and drawing it back into a costly ground war.
The broader context matters. Since early 2016, Saudi Arabia had gradually sidelined the UAE across provinces outside the Yemeni government’s control, consolidating its influence over the mercenary coalition nominally operating under the banner of the Saudi-recognized regime.
By this stage, the Emiratis had been largely pushed to the margins of the ground equation. Washington, having failed to achieve decisive results in either the Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab through its own military aggression, appeared to be recalibrating around Riyadh as its primary instrument.
For Saudi Arabia, specifically, a single operation on the western coast offered the prospect of three simultaneous gains: accelerating the US push for Red Sea control; transforming what had remained an internationalized war into a fratricidal intra-Yemeni war by stoking internal fronts; and consolidating Riyadh’s dominance over the fractious coalition of Yemeni military factions, many of them previously under UAE command, by bringing them together under a unified operation.
The Saudi Maneuver and Miscalculation
Saudi preparations had begun well in advance, reportedly even before the Yemeni operation to break the siege, which was launched following the funeral ceremony of a martyred leader in Sana’a. The plan envisioned opening three simultaneous fronts in Al-Jawf, Ma’rib, and along the western coast. It immediately ran into structural problems.
Southern factions within the Saudi-backed coalition refused to commit their forces to battles in the north. This single factor created a fracture line through the entire scheme.
Riyadh’s mercenaries, many of whom were fighting for locally defined interests rather than any coherent national project, could not be so easily redirected. The Saudis responded by redeploying forces from eastern Yemen northward and shifting the primary axis toward the western coast, where the geographic and symbolic stakes were highest.
Meanwhile, Riyadh worked the diplomatic track. A host of mediators – Egypt, Turkey, and most prominently Oman – were mobilized. Sana’a, not yet ready to foreclose negotiations entirely, granted a brief reprieve, holding off on launching the second phase of its operations.
None of this changed the military reality. While negotiations proceeded, Saudi Arabia sought to reinforce its mercenary positions and replenish ammunition stockpiles. Sana’a concluded that the window for a negotiated outcome had been deliberately exploited to buy time, not to buy peace.
The intelligence war
What followed was not a conventional military offensive launched from a standing start. It was the terminal phase of a carefully sequenced preemptive campaign that had been underway for approximately four weeks before the main ground advance.
Yemeni military’s intelligence apparatus, operating under the direction of Abu Ali al-Hakim, demonstrated a level of precision that repeatedly left the Saudi-backed coalition wrong-footed.
Newly established mercenary positions were destroyed before they could be consolidated. Ammunition depots were located and struck. Command centers and operations rooms were systematically degraded. The cumulative effect was a coalition whose combat readiness had been substantially hollowed out before the ground offensive even began.
The resulting weapons shortages were severe enough that Riyadh dispatched ships carrying arms to resupply its forces, seeking to close the gap before the main battle.
But the ships, arriving at the port of Mokha, were treated as targets, much like the trucks moving through the Al-Wadiah and Al-Abr crossings. The resupply effort largely failed.
The intelligence picture was so consistently accurate that speculation arose that UAE-aligned elements, still resentful of Saudi dominance over coalition affairs, may have contributed to the flow of intelligence to the Yemeni military. Whatever the source, the Yemeni military’s penetration of the coalition’s operational security was demonstrably deep.
The spark on the Taiz Axis
The specific trigger for the ground offensive came in early September, when the Yemeni military launched a first strike against a Saudi-backed position, anticipating an offensive push northward.
The preemptive strike sparked clashes across four axes simultaneously. The result was not a cascading, domino-like collapse of positions. What the Saudis had intended as the opening move of their western coast offensive instead became the opening phase of their humiliating retreat.
Over the following days, Riyadh attempted to activate additional fronts in Al-Bayda, Al-Dhale’e, and Al-Jawf in an effort to stretch the Yemeni military forces thin across multiple theaters.
Saudi airstrikes intensified across Yemen. Saudi officers reportedly promised direct ground support to coalition factions to incentivize them to hold their positions. The Yemeni military’s own assessment of the dynamic was clear: the Saudis had previously tried activating 52 fronts simultaneously, and each time the result had been further Yemeni military advances, rather than a reversal.
The media war
As the Yemeni military advances accelerated, a parallel battle unfolded in the information space. Saudi-aligned media channels worked to construct a counter-narrative, circulating footage of mercenary vehicle convoys, highlighting minor territorial gains in areas already under Saudi coalition control, and projecting an image of momentum that bore little resemblance to the battlefield reality.
The narrative briefly gained traction by drawing, inaccurately, on the recent Syrian precedent. Some observers speculated that Sana’a might face a “Damascus moment”: a rapid, unexpected collapse of authority under a fast-moving offensive.
The comparison was analytically flawed. The structural, operational, and social conditions that led to the fall of Damascus bear little resemblance to those in Yemen. Sana’a’s military organization, popular base, intelligence infrastructure, and decade-long experience of sustained warfare against a better-resourced coalition have produced a very different kind of fighting force from the one that crumbled in Syria.
The battlefield results made it clear. The “Damascus moment” narrative did not survive contact with the liberation of the islands, the western coast, and the string of ports that followed.
Sana’a’s logic of escalation
Throughout the campaign, Ansarullah-led Yemeni military forces have maintained a consistent list of demands directed at Riyadh: the complete lifting of the air and naval blockade on Yemen; payment of civil servant salaries; an all-for-all prisoner exchange; reopening roads between provinces; Saudi withdrawal from Yemeni territory; and the complete cessation of funding and material support to anti-Sana’a factions.
The strategic logic underlying the current operation can be summarized in three interlocking equations that Sana’a appears to be establishing simultaneously:
The first is Siege for Siege: The imposition of a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia stretching from Bab al-Mandab across the full length of the Red Sea, mirroring the blockade Riyadh maintains on Yemen.
The second is Preemptive Action: Continuous surveillance and interdiction of mercenary logistics and troop movements from eastern to western Yemen, preventing the reconstitution of forces that have already been degraded.
The third is Direct Deterrence: The targeting of Saudi military bases, military airports, and Aramco infrastructure in southern Saudi Arabia in direct response to any Saudi violation of Yemeni airspace or attacks on Yemeni territory.
The endgame
Sana’a has officially announced the conclusion of the operation and directed its forces toward consolidating the liberated territories. The reasoning behind stopping the advance at this stage, rather than pushing farther, reflects three overlapping calculations.
The first is the immediate military imperative of securing and clearing 5,400 square kilometers of newly captured terrain, a task that demands both manpower and time and must be completed before any counteroffensive can be mounted effectively.
The second is the existence of other fronts requiring attention. Ma’rib retains significant economic importance because of the Safer oil-field infrastructure. Taiz carries major political weight for Sana’a’s long-term governance ambitions. Yemeni forces cannot allow gains on the western coast to come at the cost of deterioration on these other critical axes.
The third consideration is strategic restraint, an awareness that actions crossing certain thresholds could trigger a qualitatively different response and draw in actors whose involvement would complicate the current trajectory.
Arab media reports indicate that tensions inside mercenary formations in Taiz have already escalated sharply in the wake of the coastal losses. A critical highway remains in play; delaying withdrawal from the city could leave those forces cut off from a viable exit route, a development that could dramatically accelerate Taiz’s fall without requiring a further ground offensive.
Regional ripples: Tehran, Riyadh, and beyond
The operational dimensions of this campaign extend beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia has engaged directly with Tehran in an effort to halt flights to Sana’a since the Yemeni attacks resumed. Pakistan, meanwhile, is reportedly working to include Yemen in a new ceasefire framework, not unlike its role during the previous round, when Islamabad’s diplomatic activity coincided with and helped shape the Saudi naval blockade ceasefire process.
Saudi officials have a documented pattern of denying involvement in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon even while conducting active operations across all three theaters. Following its setbacks on the western coast, Riyadh may seek to recover leverage through alternative pressure points, with Lebanon and Iraq among the most likely arenas. That possibility warrants close monitoring.
American support for the Saudi-backed mercenary coalition has continued, but Washington has so far stopped short of direct combat involvement or assuming battlefield command.
Whether that calculus holds in the face of continued Yemeni military advances, or whether disillusionment with Saudi performance drives Washington toward renewed engagement with the UAE, remains one of the most consequential open questions as the war enters its next phase.
What comes next
If Saudi Arabia declines to meet Sana’a’s demands, as its past behavior suggests is the most probable near-term outcome, the Yemeni armed forces retain a substantial menu of escalation options. These include expanded strikes on Saudi supply chains, production and processing facilities, and oil-export infrastructure, with Yanbu and the East-West pipeline specifically on the table.
Operations in the Arabian Sea targeting foreign vessels with Saudi connections represent another avenue. Ground operations in southern Saudi territory constitute a further option that Sana’a has explicitly retained.
Crucially, the balance of internal coalition dynamics has shifted. Over the past two weeks, the Yemeni military has substantially neutralized one of Riyadh’s key remaining leverage mechanisms: its ability to activate internal Yemeni fronts. The collapse of the mercenary coalition and deepening factional rifts have made it increasingly difficult for Saudi officers to reconstitute any credible offensive capability in the near term. That fundamentally alters the timeline calculations for both sides.
The strategic implications of the Yemeni military now holding the coastline overlooking and approaching the Bab al-Mandab Strait are substantial and will require sustained analysis as the situation develops. Control of that coastline does not simply mean territory. It means depth, positioning, and, in the language of maritime chokepoints, leverage.
Yemeni military’s consolidation of Yemen’s western coast represents the acquisition of geographic depth at one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints. Previously, its coastal positions remained vulnerable to suppression. That calculus has now changed.
Al-Mukha, Dhubab, and the surrounding coastline, now under firm control, give Sana’a the ability to position layered anti-ship and air-defense systems across a continuous 200-plus-kilometer stretch. The islands amplify this advantage further, functioning simultaneously as forward sensors and firing platforms, enabling earlier target acquisition, reducing the stand-off advantages of opposing forces, and potentially denying the flanks of the strait to any force attempting to escort commercial shipping.
The relationship with the Strait of Hormuz is noteworthy as well. A dual-chokepoint architecture, with Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab simultaneously subject to hostile pressure, creates a co-equal second front.
A single carrier strike group cannot cover both. Reinforcing one theater necessarily draws resources from the other, complicating the Pentagon’s traditional force-posture hierarchy, which has historically treated Bab al-Mandab as manageable through periodic shows of force.
For Saudi Arabia, the loss is asymmetric in a specific way. Riyadh could previously threaten ground pressure on Ansarullah and the Yemeni military while remaining comparatively insulated from reciprocal pressure on its maritime lifelines. That insulation is now gone.
Red Sea export terminals and the Yanbu complex sit within a substantially more threatening strategic envelope. The Yemeni military can potentially transition from a land-based force with maritime ambitions into a coastal-defense and power-projection actor. That changes the strategic character of any future negotiation and the architecture of any subsequent security ceasefire.
Pakistan threatens Yemeni strikes on KSA ‘could trigger’ Mecca defense pact
The Cradle | September 9, 2026
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif threatened in comments published on 9 September that the Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) attacks “could trigger” the Mecca Defense Pact between Riyadh, Islamabad, and Ankara.
The Pakistani war chief’s comments coincide with a massive YAF campaign of retaliatory strikes on Saudi Arabia and its assets in Yemen, as well as brutal Saudi bombing against the Arab world’s poorest nation.
“Under the trilateral agreement, any aggression against any of the three [countries] is regarded as an aggression against all. There is no ambiguity about that,” the Pakistani minister said in an interview with Geo News.
He added that the YAF retaliations “could trigger the pact” between the three states, which was finalized and signed last month.
According to Saudi authorities, over 70 people were wounded by YAF strikes on Tuesday, which targeted military and energy infrastructure.
The kingdom’s Energy Ministry acknowledged fires and a halt to operations at a number of sites on 8 September due to Sanaa’s attacks.
Pakistan’s threat against Yemen coincided with a statement by the YAF, condemning Saudi Arabia’s “attempts to evade responsibility” for war crimes against Yemen, including the kingdom’s Monday strike on a prison in Yemen’s Al-Jawf governorate.
The attack killed at least 16 people and injured scores.
“At 4:30 pm, an F-15SA fighter aircraft took off from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait and carried out two airstrikes targeting the prison. It then returned to the same base in Khamis Mushait at 4:45 pm,” the Yemeni army said.
“The Saudi enemy’s attempts to evade responsibility for its crimes and aggression against our country will not absolve it of the consequences and repercussions of this aggression and criminal conduct, no matter how hard it tries to conceal or cover up what happened,” it added.
Saudi Arabia’s Khamis Mushait site was among those targeted by YAF ballistic missiles and drones this week. The new YAF statement on Wednesday came hours after heavy Saudi bombing targeted multiple governorates in Yemen. At least 32 Saudi airstrikes were carried out across Marib, Taiz, Hodeidah, and Al-Jawf.
Yemen’s retaliatory operations come as part of a string of recent Yemeni strikes in recent days, which inflicted heavy damage on Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.
The YAF announced several military operations on 7 September, including the destruction of weapons shipments coming in from Saudi Arabia.
Footage of the operation was released. It shows Saudi military equipment – en route to Riyadh’s proxies in Yemen – being struck and blown up by Yemeni forces.
The YAF recently released footage of multiple other attacks targeting Saudi-backed mercenary groups and forces loyal to the Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), backed by the kingdom. The footage was captured by YAF drones.
Sanaa’s recent escalation of retaliatory operations was prompted by Saudi Arabia’s July attack on Sanaa International Airport, which has been under blockade by the kingdom for more than a decade since Riyadh launched its brutal war on Yemen in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition.
A 2023 Saudi–Yemeni peace process nearly resulted in an agreement between the two sides.
The peace talks stalled but prevented a major escalation from erupting. Yet the kingdom for years continued attacks and its illegal and deadly blockade on Yemeni ports and airports.
Pakistan’s threats in defense of the kingdom’s brutal war on Yemen come weeks after a Reuters report cited sources as saying that Islamabad is concerned it may be “drawn” into the fighting between Riyadh and Sanaa.
Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza
Palestinian Information Center – September 6, 2026
GAZA – Eight Arab and Muslim countries have condemned remarks by far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Israel Katz on plans to forcibly displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.
The foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar said in a joint statement released on Sunday that such Israeli plans violate international and humanitarian law and pose a direct threat to the Palestinian people’s legitimate and inalienable rights.
The ministers voiced rejection of any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from or within the occupied territory, warning against transforming extremist rhetoric on forced displacement into official state policy.
The ministers warned that the displacement of Gazans would destabilize the region and derail global peace efforts, undermining US president Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza war, which clearly rejects forced population transfers.
The ministers stressed that Gaza is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for preserving the unity of Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem.
They reiterated their countries’ support for a two-state solution establishing an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital.
They urged the international community and UN Security Council to oppose Israeli attempts to impose a new demographic or geographic reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.
SCO leaders sign Bishkek Declaration against ‘western unilateralism’
The Eurasian bloc condemned the US war on Iran as Washington widens secondary sanctions on Tehran’s trading partners
The Cradle | September 1, 2026
Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adopted the Bishkek Declaration on 1 September, marking the organization’s 25th anniversary and setting out a joint position on West Asia, global security, and economic cooperation.
The 10-member Eurasian bloc used the anniversary text to press for a “representative, democratic, and equitable multipolar world order,” rejecting bloc-based and confrontational approaches to international affairs.
Member states opposed unilateral coercive measures, such as banking restrictions, asset freezes, and secondary sanctions on third-country firms, that contradict the UN Charter and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. They also condemned the unlimited buildup of global missile defense systems, calling attempts to secure one state at the expense of others unacceptable.
The declaration reiterated the bloc’s condemnation of the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iranian territory, which have stretched on for 6 months and caused significant economic damage and disruption to global energy and shipping markets.
Member states called the attacks a violation of international law and the UN Charter that created “serious risks to international peace, security and stability.”
On Palestine, the declaration stated that a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian question is the only possible route to peace and stability in the region.
Member states committed to expanding the use of national currencies in mutual settlements and backed reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to increase developing-country representation.
The declaration noted progress toward establishing an SCO Development Bank during Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, with leaders also supporting Iran’s expedited entry into the SCO Interbank Consortium.
Eight of the 10 SCO member states – Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – reaffirmed support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while India declined to join the statement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping called on members to build “universal security” and prevent external interference in the internal affairs of states.
Meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines, Xi said unpredictability in the international situation had risen sharply and that Beijing was ready to work with Moscow to advance a multipolar order and reform of global governance.
Putin told the summit that national currencies now account for more than 98 percent of Russia’s trade payments with SCO partners, and named expanded intra-bloc trade as a priority.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov opened the meeting, saying member states account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and about a quarter of global GDP, and that the organization had grown from a border security mechanism into a global actor.
The summit convened six months into the US war on Iran, and four and a half years into the war in Ukraine, with Washington also pursuing trade disputes with China and India, and threatening to impose secondary sanctions on any country or company trading with Tehran.
Beijing, the main purchaser of Iranian crude, said it would firmly defend its interests.
Arab states call US sanctions on Iran unrealistic: Report
Press TV – August 31, 2026
Leaders of the Arab Persian Gulf states have reportedly told Washington that sanctions imposed on Iran by the US Treasury Secretary are “unrealistic” and difficult for the countries to accommodate, citing their geographic proximity and close ties with Iran.
Officials from the Persian Gulf states formally conveyed to the US side that the directive issued by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, as part of an economic war against Iran, was “not realistic” and could not be tolerated given their geographic circumstances, neighboring status and proximity to Iran.
The regional newspaper Rai al-Youm reported that Western diplomatic circles believe the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar are unlikely to show the same willingness as European countries to comply with decisions and memoranda issued by the US Treasury Department.
According to the report, some foreign governments, including Qatar, may not adhere to US threats of economic sanctions, viewing them as unrealistic and evidence of the continued escalation of tensions in the region.
Such measures, the report said, could also undermine efforts to pursue scenarios aimed at reducing regional tensions.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the new “economic terrorism” campaign, absurdly comparing it to the D-Day Normandy landings of World War II.
Bessent claimed the measures target Iran’s financial networks worldwide and warned that no partner is beyond Washington’s reach.
He said the Trump administration has identified entities dealing with Iran and will impose deadlines for them to cut ties or face exclusion from the US dollar system.
China, Russia and Pakistan have also opposed US threats of sanctions against countries trading with Iran.
Abdolamir Rabihavi, director general of the West Asia Office of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, said Iran’s trading partners had largely disregarded the announcement of new US sanctions and that trade with these countries was continuing.
Rabihavi said expanding trade with neighboring countries as well as major Eastern economies could provide an opportunity to strengthen Iran’s foreign trade.
“One should not be overly influenced by unprofessional remarks by US officials, as many countries need Iranian goods and the country’s products are competitive in target markets in terms of quality and price,” he said.
The official said trade was a two-way, mutually beneficial relationship, noting that just as Iran seeks markets for its goods, its trading partners are also looking for suitable suppliers to meet their needs, and Iran can supply part of those requirements.
Rabihavi also stressed the need to diversify Iran’s export markets, saying Africa, with around 50 countries and a population of nearly 1.5 billion, represents an important and relatively underdeveloped market for Iranian exports of goods and services.
Alongside African countries, Rabihavi said, Central Asian states could also provide suitable markets for Iranian goods, particularly given their existing capacities and the opportunities offered by free-trade agreements, which Iran should seriously seek to utilize.
Russian Rail Corridor to Indian Ocean Could Outpace Suez Canal, Pakistani Senator Says
Sputnik – 21.08.2026
Russia–Central Asia–Indian Ocean rail corridor through Afghanistan and Pakistan could slash delivery times from 35 days to just five.
A proposed railway network linking Russia with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan could unlock trade potential exceeding that of the Suez Canal, according to Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain.
Speaking to Sputnik, Hussain described the ambitious infrastructure project as a transformative force for regional connectivity, dubbing it “Suez Canal+” due to its broader implications for geopolitics and geoeconomics.
The remarks follow an announcement by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, who confirmed that Russia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are exploring the extension of railways through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. “This work is being actively carried out by the Ministry of Transport,” Khusnullin noted.
A Revolutionary Shift in Regional Connectivity
Hussain emphasized that the project would provide Central Asian countries and Afghanistan with direct access through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, potentially uniting the region in unprecedented ways.
“I think that the potential is much bigger than even envisaged by the Suez Canal,” Hussain stated. “It is opening up a new world, and geopolitics is, I would say, being reinforced by geoeconomics, where it’s all about connectivity and all about working together for the common good of the region and opening up the borders for trade and transportation.”
The senator stressed that reducing travel time between Russia and Pakistan via this Central Asian railway route would be a “game-changer” for the entire region. Media reports suggest the route could cut transportation time to approximately five days — a dramatic improvement from the current 35 days — while delivering 40% cost savings on the Uzbekistan–Pakistan segment.
“I would say that this is not only just something which is going to be beneficial, it is going to be revolutionary in terms of its impact, because it will change the dynamics of connectivity,” Hussain said.
Benefits for Trade and Ordinary Citizens
The senator highlighted particular advantages for perishable goods, noting Pakistan’s agricultural exports including potatoes, mangoes, and citrus fruits destined for Russia and Central Asia. “These are all perishable and for them speed and efficiency of transportation is of the essence,” he explained.
Pakistani analysts, including those from the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, have already drawn comparisons between the proposed corridor and the Suez Canal, recognizing its potential to reshape trade flows across the region.
Ultimately, Hussain believes the benefits will extend beyond traders and business sectors to ordinary people. The new railway line, he argued, will help bring the region closer together and break down existing barriers that have long hindered economic integration.
“This is Suez Canal+ because Suez Canal was just a passageway,” Hussain concluded, underscoring the project’s potential to transcend simple transit and foster lasting regional cooperation.

