Israel is going all out to stop Turkey from getting F-35s
Despite the pressure, President Trump seems to be moving closer to approving Ankara’s reentry into the fighter jet program
By Fatih Kocaibiş | Responsible Statecraft | August 10, 2026
For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.
At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..
Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.
But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, “destroy the power balance” in the region. The phrase invokes Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.
Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel’s claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.
How Turkey was pushed out
Turkey’s search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.
But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure.
The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.
Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey’s defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave.” Repeated at rallies, Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.
This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.
Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet, with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.
How Israel built a case against Turkey’s return
Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was “not a friend” and could not be trusted.
The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel’s targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, “these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” The reference to “these policies” and “this mindset” pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel’s isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance.
But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel’s erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary. Netanyahu carried it further on Fox, telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.
The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel’s right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric, repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles. Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.
Balance for whom?
The most revealing element of Netanyahu’s argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would “destroy the power balance,” he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority. Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100, while Ankara’s immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey’s return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.
Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of “aggressive aspirations,” Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Qatar, and Gaza. In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu’s “balance” is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel’s air superiority and freedom to strike.
Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.
But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance’s southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO’s requirements.
Israel’s concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump’s broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, “nobody tells me what we should be selling or not.”
Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel’s security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.
Fatih Kocaibis is a Turkey-based journalist and political analyst covering U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and European security, and their implications for Turkish foreign policy.
US military pressure forcing Hormuz closure – Iran
Washington must cease its strong-arm tactics before shipping can resume through the key waterway, the Foreign Ministry in Tehran has said
RT | August 10, 2026
The Strait of Hormuz cannot be reopened through diplomacy while Washington continues to use military pressure against Tehran, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has said.
Iran closed Hormuz in response to a US-Israeli military campaign launched in late February. Washington subsequently imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports, escalating a standoff over a strategic waterway that has historically carried around a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said on Monday that diplomacy is “certainly” part of the “struggle to safeguard our national interests,” but added that “when dealing with a side that insists on the use of force, a maritime blockade is not a diplomatic action that we can lift through diplomacy.”
“Certainly, you have to use authority and military power, along with diplomacy, to prevent the United States’ aggression, and that is what is being done,” Baghaei told a press briefing.
Tehran has set out a series of conditions for reopening the strait, including compensation for war damage, the lifting of sanctions, and the release of frozen Iranian funds, as well as a permanent end to hostilities against Iran and its regional allies.
The IRGC has also said that reopening Hormuz will depend on Washington fully accepting Tehran’s conditions.
US President Donald Trump said that Washington was in no rush to reach an agreement, telling Axios that Washington was “low-keying” negotiations while allowing economic pressure on Tehran to build.
“We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money,” Trump said, adding “It’s like a chess game.”
The talks follow weeks of disagreement over a 14-point memorandum of understanding that established a temporary ceasefire and provided for the gradual lifting of the US blockade of Iranian ports and the restoration of commercial traffic through Hormuz. Fighting resumed last month after the sides failed to agree on how the deal should be implemented.
Iran and Oman, meanwhile, are discussing arrangements for future shipping through the strait, although Tehran has stressed that any agreement with Muscat would not in itself mean the waterway would reopen.
The disruption to traffic through Hormuz has put sustained pressure on global energy markets. Oil prices rose nearly 3% on Monday amid uncertainty over negotiations, with international benchmark Brent reaching $85 a barrel and US WTI hitting $80.
US Military testing sowing chaos in civilian skies
By Stavroula Pabst | Responsible Statecraft | August 10, 2026
Almost every day, the military tests various emerging technologies across the U.S., including drone and counter-drone systems and GPS jamming.
To a certain extent, this testing is inevitable. But, as experts told RS, the government has in many cases not ensured that the proper safeguards and necessary interagency coordination are in place to make sure such tests can be conducted safely. These testing issues strain civilian airspaces — increasingly disrupting aircraft and even sometimes leading to accidents.
Drone and counter-drone mayhem
In particular, the military’s domestic testing and use of drone- and counter-drone technologies have precipitated several recent high-profile mishaps.
Last March, the Navy and Secret Service tested counter-drone technologies at a military base near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). As a result, several flight crews received faulty alerts warning of possible collisions with nearby aircraft.
In 2020, an MQ-9 reaper drone crashed during testing at the Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, which shares its flight line with Syracuse Hancock International Airport. Military officials did not tell the public about the incident, which caused over $6 million in damages, until more than a year later.
Interagency disagreements and coordination issues over the tech’s use in U.S. airspaces have only caused more problems.
Back in February, the military lent a counter-drone laser to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP subsequently used it, without coordinating with other agencies, to target what it thought were Mexican cartel drones. Instead, it hit party balloons.
The incident prompted the FAA — which had concerns about the laser’s possible effects on civilian aircraft — to temporarily close the surrounding airspace. The agency did so without notifying other agencies in advance, causing confusion amid fears that the U.S. could intervene militarily in Mexico.
Later in February, the military shot down a CBP drone with a laser-based anti-drone system after mistaking it for a cartel drone — again prompting the FAA to close airspace around El Paso.
The FAA and Pentagon formally agreed in April that the laser system’s safety controls work and “do not pose undue risk to passenger aircraft.”
But broader tensions over the testing and use of these technologies in civilian airspace persist.
The FAA’s departing deputy administrator, Chris Rocheleau, said at a drone leadership conference late last month the agency is being “nudged” to accept “more risk” regarding uncrewed drones. FAA officials told Politico last week that the Pentagon’s decisions about aviation often prevail over the FAA’s safety concerns in practice.
Following the repeated airspace closures in Texas, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) called for an investigation into “potential serious and alarming problems and deficiencies” with interagency coordination and oversight over counter-drone systems.
“As we saw with the DCA Midair Collision, failures in interagency planning create an unacceptably dangerous situation where it’s no longer a matter of if but rather when the next catastrophic accident occurs that will claim American lives,” Duckworth wrote, referencing a collision between a commercial flight and an Army helicopter near the DCA airport in January of last year.
As Dana Goward, founder and president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, tells RS, it’s “not clear” the U.S. is prepared for drone and counter-drone operations in its airspace.
He questioned whether officials consistently know where and how such systems are used, and whether they have adequate safeguards to manage them safely and efficiently.
“My sense is that while those things are being worked on, they’re not in place right now,” Goward said. That “should be a concern.”
Aircraft ‘couldn’t navigate safely’ near White Sands
The U.S. military has also been testing GPS jamming across the continental U.S., especially in the American Southwest. While it has worked to notify pilots of its efforts, testing often stands to interfere with civilian aviation in practice.
A notable example is a recent accident back in May in New Mexico, where a small medical plane lost its GPS signal due to military jamming testing in the White Sands region. Attempting to land with older navigation methods, the plane became disoriented and crashed into a mountain.
Under investigation, the crash is the first known case where military jamming testing can be directly linked with a civilian plane crash in the U.S. But many other episodes could have come close.In 2021, engineering magazine IEEE Spectrum revealed internal Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records showing that 233 GPS interference incidents took place in the southwestern U.S., where military testing is especially frequent, during 2017 and the early months of 2018.
In those cases, testing repeatedly led commercial, civilian and medical aircraft to lose their navigation capabilities, drift off course, and sometimes enter restricted airspace. Pilots declared emergencies in five of the incidents.
“The GPS jamming at White Sands was effecting [sic] the safety of flight of the aircraft to the point to where they couldn’t navigate safely,” an air traffic controller anonymously wrote to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System in 2021. They added that the military often refuses to stop testing when asked to do so by pilots nearby.
The military issues Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) before it tests electronic warfare technologies like jamming, spoofing, and anti-jamming and – spoofing capabilities, which can all disrupt aircraft navigation systems.
But these NOTAMs often cover regions spanning thousands of square miles and cannot predict exactly where or when interference will occur. Pilots receive large numbers of NOTAMs with little relevance to their flights and can often fly through NOTAM-affected areas without experiencing interference. Such circumstances mean many pilots overlook or otherwise miss important warnings.
In any case, the air traffic controllers assisting the troubled medical plane crew in New Mexico helped three other aircraft without GPS signal on the same evening — despite a NOTAM having warned pilots of possible interference beforehand.
Pilots are required to know how to use older navigation aids in case they lose access to GPS mid-flight. But, as Goward tells RS, GPS has become central to how pilots navigate in practice.
GPS “is something that they’ve grown up with, and trained with, and used for decades,” Goward said. “When that system is no longer available [due to interference], the workload increases, distractions increase, and safety margins decrease.” (In aviation, safety margins refer to the buffers crews maintain to manage unexpected events, including having additional time and fuel, and maintaining greater distances from other aircraft.)
“You end up with a higher likelihood that something bad is going to happen,” Goward said.
As Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, tells RS, “there is no question that testing increases aviation risk in the short term.”
“But not doing the testing would increase aviation risk in the long term,” he warned. “We need to test anti-jam and anti-spoof technologies if we hope to put them on planes in the years to come.”
Malaysia seizes ‘Israel’-bound cargo container violating export bans
Al Mayadeen | August 10, 2026
Malaysian authorities have intercepted a shipping container at the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in Johor over suspicions that its cargo was intended for export to “Israel” in breach of the country’s trade restrictions, local media reported.
The Malaysian Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS) carried out the operation on Friday after receiving intelligence concerning the shipment, prompting officers to inspect the container.
According to a statement cited by Berita Harian, initial findings suggested that the shipment may have violated Malaysia’s customs regulations governing exports to “Israel”.
“Based on preliminary checks, the shipment is suspected of not complying with Item No 15, Second Schedule, Customs (Prohibition on Export) Order 2023, which provides for the prohibition of direct or indirect export of goods to ‘Israel’,” AKPS stated.
Authorities are now seeking to determine the exact nature and specifications of the cargo, its intended purpose, and how it should be legally classified.
The investigation will also examine whether the shipment contains strategic goods falling under Malaysia’s Strategic Trade Act, which regulates exports of sensitive and dual-use items.
“Any attempt to export goods directly or indirectly to ‘Israel’ that is against the law and government regulations will be dealt with strictly,” the agency added.
Anwar praises enforcement action
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim welcomed the seizure, saying it reflected Kuala Lumpur’s determination to prevent Malaysian territory and infrastructure from facilitating trade that could benefit “Israel”.
“Congratulations to AKPS for the swift action in seizing a container suspected of carrying strategic trade cargo intended for export to ‘Israel’ at the Port of Tanjung Pelepas,” Anwar wrote on X. “This action demonstrates Malaysia’s firm stance to ensure that our country will never serve as a conduit for trade that could support or contribute to the Israeli regime’s atrocities against the Palestinian people.”
The prime minister said the move was consistent with measures Malaysia introduced in December 2023, as well as with its commitments as a member of The Hague Group.
Malaysia’s earlier measures included barring vessels owned by the Israeli shipping company Zim from docking at its ports, prohibiting Israeli-flagged ships from entering Malaysian waters, and preventing vessels headed for “Israel” from loading cargo at Malaysian ports.
The latest case indicates that enforcement is extending beyond restrictions targeting particular ships or maritime operators to include individual shipments suspected of reaching “Israel” through direct or indirect trade routes.
The Hague Group welcomes seizure
The Hague Group, a coalition of states seeking to prevent transfers of weapons, ammunition, military fuel, military equipment, and dual-use goods to “Israel”, also welcomed the Malaysian authorities’ action.
The group said the interception represented practical implementation of states’ international legal obligations, pointing to the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion and UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24.
Those measures, according to the group, require states not to provide aid or assistance that contributes to maintaining the unlawful situation arising from the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.
“The defence of humanity is won at ports, courts, and factories, not from the podium. Law that goes unenforced is no law at all,” said Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, Executive Secretary of The Hague Group. “By halting this cargo, Malaysia has upheld the obligations that bind every UN member state under international law. We invite all states to join The Hague Group and do the same.”
The contents of the seized container and its ultimate destination have not yet been formally established, with Malaysian authorities saying the investigation remains ongoing.
Is Donald Trump Serious About Declaring Victory Over Iran?
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | August 10, 2026
According to a Wall Street Journal report citing US officials, President Trump has been privately weighing the possibility of declaring victory against Iran and ending the war without securing a nuclear deal.
Trump reportedly has floated to senior aides that if the US can keep Iran’s nuclear program in check and traffic resumes through the Strait of Hormuz, he would be willing to extend the ceasefire “indefinitely” and effectively declare the conflict over.
In recent meetings, Trump has expressed confidence that Iran is “likely unable to revive its nuclear work” after Operation Midnight Hammer caused heavy damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June 2025. He believes US intelligence capabilities would catch any Iranian attempts to rebuild, and that the threat of further American strikes would “serve as an enduring deterrent.”
Trump’s key condition for ending the war is that Iran agrees to fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. In exchange, officials expect Trump would lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
According to the Wall Street Journal, a White House official said that the U.S. has “completed all of its military objectives against Iran,” and the president’s focus is now on “securing the flow of the world’s energy through the Strait of Hormuz.” The reporting suggests Trump is patient and expected to ride out the latest diplomatic snarl, especially so long as gas prices remain where they are.
Let’s assume that this WSJ report is accurate (a big assumption). President Trump is still living in a fantasy world. Despite his recent outbursts about bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, he now seems content to revert to his original declaration from June 2025 that Iran’s nuclear program has been obliterated. Count me skeptical. However, if Trump is willing to make that assumption then it removes one item from the negotiation list… Until recently the US, via Pakistani mediators, was pressing Iran to discuss the Iranian nuclear program before addressing the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, and the unfreezing of assets. Iran, for its part, has insisted on the reverse position: i.e., lift the blockade and sanctions, unfreeze the assets and accept Iran’s sovereignty over the Persian Gulf.
If Trump’s decision to declare victory and end the war hinges on Iran, “fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping,” then prospects for a deal are slim. Iran will only agree to allowing ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with the Persian Gulf Strait Authority guidelines it issued on April 22nd. In early May, the Supreme National Security Council and other Iranian bodies publicly confirmed the PGSA’s formation and role. It began administering a permit-based system requiring vessels to submit a detailed “Vessel Information Declaration” (covering ownership, insurance, crew, cargo, etc.) before receiving clearance. Fees for “specialized services” were part of the planned mechanism. Iran is not going to back down on this point.
The WSJ article hints at the major focus of concern for Trump: the domestic price of gas. I have repeatedly pointed out on several recent podcasts that there is a global shortage of diesel and aviation fuel and that the price effects of this shortage will become more profound with each passing week. Also, as I discussed in a recent article, the damage to the oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and the departure of maintenance/repair personnel from the Persian Gulf Arab nations, along with the destruction of warehouses that held replacement parts needed to repair damage to the oil and gas terminals, the shortage of diesel and aviation fuel will persist for several months, if not longer.
Trump’s attention at present appears to be focused more on the November mid-term elections than on pursuing a new missile and bombing campaign on Iran. Although Iran has fired on at least five ships trying to transit the Omani channel in the Strait of Hormuz without submitting to the PGSA protocol, Donald Trump has not ordered any new strikes on Iranian targets despite his previous vow to attack Iran for each such incident.
I think that there is growing concern within the Trump administration about the potential for a global economic crisis if the Persian Gulf remains shuttered, especially if this continues as is into September. And this is likely the main factor pushing Trump to do a repeat of the end of Operation Rough Rider… i.e., Declare victory and leave.
