Aletho News

Iran war marks end of US Middle East order: Foreign Affairs

Al Mayadeen | August 18, 2026

A decades-old regional system built around US military supremacy, support for “Israel”, and the containment of Iran has reached a breaking point following Washington and Tel Aviv’s war on Tehran, political scientist Marc Lynch argued in Foreign Affairs.

In an extensive analysis titled “The End of the American Middle East”, Lynch said the war has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the security architecture Washington constructed after the 1991 Gulf War, particularly its ability to protect allies, impose military outcomes, and guarantee access to strategic waterways.

“The American Middle East is finished,” Lynch wrote, arguing that the regional order prevailing since 1991 has become “one of the many casualties of the US-Israeli war with Iran”.

According to Lynch, Washington spent more than three decades attempting to build a regional bloc centered on protecting “Israel” while containing Iran, Iraq, and later Tehran’s regional allies. President Donald Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran, he argued, was not a break with that strategy but its culmination.

Trump’s administration sought to eliminate the Iranian challenge through overwhelming military force, but the campaign failed to remove the government in Tehran or prevent Iran from retaliating throughout the region.

“The American and Israeli failure to dislodge the regime in Tehran has proved the bankruptcy of decades of sanctions and violence,” Lynch wrote.

Gulf security bargain shaken

At the center of Lynch’s argument is the erosion of confidence among Washington’s Gulf partners.

The US military presence in the region has long been justified by Washington’s ability to deter attacks, defend allied governments, secure energy infrastructure, and ensure navigation through strategic waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz.

The war with Iran put those guarantees under unprecedented pressure.

Gulf governments opposed the war and were angered that Washington and “Israel” launched military operations while Oman was mediating negotiations with Tehran, Lynch noted. Those states then found themselves exposed to Iranian retaliation despite having little influence over the decision to begin the confrontation.

US missile defenses intercepted part of Iran’s retaliation, but enough strikes penetrated defensive systems to cause significant damage and disrupt Gulf states’ sense of security.

Iran also demonstrated that it could severely restrict maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a key artery for global energy exports and the economies of Washington’s Gulf allies.

Lynch argued that the experience raised a fundamental question for regional governments: whether hosting US military infrastructure continues to provide security or increasingly exposes them to wars initiated by Washington.

“What the Gulf took away from all this was that American security guarantees, the heart of the regional bargain, were no longer reliable,” he wrote.

Gaza and Iran deliver ‘death blow’

Lynch identified two developments as particularly damaging to Washington’s position: US support for the Israeli war on Gaza and the subsequent war against Iran.

The devastation of Gaza, he argued, eliminated much of the remaining credibility Washington claimed among Arab populations, while the Iran conflict challenged assumptions about overwhelming US military superiority.

“The dual crisis of Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran may seem like just another episode in this cycle,” Lynch wrote. “But in truth, these events together have dealt a death blow to the American Middle East.”

Washington’s attempts to build closer cooperation between Arab governments and “Israel” were already under strain because of Gaza, particularly as successive US administrations pursued normalization without resolving the Palestinian issue.

Lynch argued that US policymakers misjudged the continued importance of Palestine to Arab public opinion and underestimated opposition to normalization. At the same time, unconditional US support enabled “Israel” to act with increasing military freedom across the region, including in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.

According to Lynch, Washington is consequently confronting a contradiction of its own making: a regional order partly designed to guarantee Israeli security has helped produce an increasingly interventionist “Israel” that US governments struggle to restrain.

Iran adapted to decades of pressure

The strategy of isolating Tehran also produced unintended consequences, according to the analysis.

Cut off from Western military technology and subjected to sanctions, Iran invested heavily in comparatively inexpensive drones, ballistic missiles, and asymmetric warfare capabilities capable of imposing substantial costs on technologically superior adversaries.

Tehran also developed relationships with armed movements across the region, allowing it to expand its influence in environments destabilized by US, Israeli, and regional wars.

Although Iran suffered major damage during the latest fighting, Lynch argued that its leadership survived and demonstrated that the country could withstand direct military confrontation with the United States and “Israel”. It also proved capable of striking US partners and challenging Washington’s ability to guarantee uninterrupted passage through Hormuz.

The outcome, Lynch suggested, weakened decades of arguments that a large-scale attack could decisively eliminate the Iranian threat.

Washington’s ‘Suez moment’

Lynch compared the Iran war to the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Britain, France, and “Israel” attacked Egypt in an unsuccessful effort to regain control over the Suez Canal and weaken Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Although Britain and France maintained significant regional influence for years afterward, Suez came to symbolize the irreversible decline of their imperial dominance. The same process could now be underway for Washington, Lynch argued. “The full effects of the US disaster in Iran will similarly take time to materialize”, he wrote.

American forces, military bases, arms sales, and alliances are unlikely to disappear immediately. Gulf governments could even seek additional US weapons or security guarantees in response to growing uncertainty. But Lynch warned that such developments should not be interpreted as a restoration of the previous system.

Instead, regional states are likely to exercise greater independence, pursuing arrangements with Iran while expanding political and economic relations with China and Russia when doing so serves their interests.

Gulf states could seek accommodation with Tehran

Rather than maintaining the anti-Iran coalition envisioned by Washington, Lynch expects regional alignments to become more fluid.

Gulf states seeking to avoid becoming targets in another confrontation could negotiate bilateral understandings with Tehran rather than depend exclusively on US protection.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could also increasingly compete for regional influence, further complicating Washington’s attempts to maintain a unified bloc.

Before the latest war, Lynch noted, Riyadh had already begun strengthening relations with Egypt, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey, while Abu Dhabi maintained close ties with “Israel”. Those rival alignments could become increasingly important as US primacy weakens.

The emerging Middle East, in Lynch’s assessment, would therefore be less centered around a single external hegemon and more defined by shifting coalitions, regional competition, and countries pursuing multiple partnerships simultaneously.

Lynch urges shift from domination to diplomacy

The decline of the old order does not necessarily mean the United States will disappear from the region, Lynch argued, but Washington would have to abandon the assumption that regional stability depends on American domination. He called for a policy based on diplomacy and collective defense rather than regime change, military intervention, and permanent containment.

That would include reducing dependence on large Gulf military bases, concentrating on missile defense and intelligence cooperation, securing freedom of navigation, and eventually incorporating Iran into a broader regional security framework. “The United States must pursue stability in the Middle East through diplomacy and collective defense, not militarized containment”, Lynch wrote.

He also called for Washington to place greater pressure on “Israel” over the occupied Palestinian territories and its military interventions in Lebanon and Syria, while reconsidering unconditional support for authoritarian allies throughout the region.

Ultimately, Lynch argued, the Iran war did not itself create the crisis facing US regional leadership. Rather, it revealed the consequences of weaknesses that had accumulated over decades. “Washington struggles to conceive of a Middle East it does not dominate,” he concluded.

The question now, according to Lynch, is whether US policymakers accept that transformation and seek a different relationship with the region or continue attempting to preserve a system whose foundations have already eroded.

August 18, 2026 Posted by aletho | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Timeless or most popular, Wars for Israel | Israel, Middle East, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, United States, Zionism | Comments Off on Iran war marks end of US Middle East order: Foreign Affairs