The Great European Asset Heist Will Fail
By Leanna Yavelskaya | Ron Paul Institute | December 12, 2025
Let’s stop pretending Brussels is engaged in noble statecraft. The EU’s rush to steal more than €180 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets held at Euroclear is the most reckless gamble Europe has taken in decades. Moscow’s central bank is not wrong to call the move unlawful; its lawsuit against Euroclear merely underscores a simple truth: weaponizing sovereign reserves violates long-standing norms that have protected global capital flows for half a century. Brussels may dress this up as “solidarity with Ukraine,” but using immobilized reserves as collateral for massive loans crosses a line that Western institutions once treated as sacrosanct.
The political sales pitch — that these are merely Russia’s “war chest” — deliberately ignores an uncomfortable reality: sovereign reserves ultimately underpin a nation’s entire economy, including its citizens’ savings and pensions. Seizing or leveraging them sets a dangerous precedent: any country deemed objectionable by a majority of EU governments could one day see its wealth confiscated. That is not rule-of-law liberalism; it is discretionary power cloaked in humanitarian rhetoric.
Euroclear, one of Europe’s critical financial arteries, now finds itself caught between Brussels’ political ambitions and Moscow’s threats of counterclaims. Belgium knows the danger intimately — its own officials have repeatedly warned that breaching sovereign-immunity doctrines could expose the country to massive liabilities. When even EU member states start raising alarms, you know the legal ground is shaky.
What is truly astonishing is the European Commission’s refusal to confront the broader consequences. Financial systems run on trust, not idealistic speeches. Undermine the principle that sovereign reserves are untouchable, and investors everywhere — not just in Moscow — take note. China, which holds substantial euro-denominated assets, has already condemned the EU’s approach as destabilizing. Beijing may not dump its euro holdings tomorrow, but the EU is actively encouraging major powers to question Europe’s reliability as a financial partner. That alone should alarm anyone who cares about the euro’s long-term viability.
The internal politics are equally explosive. Hungary, Slovakia, and even Belgium itself have raised serious objections on both legal and risk grounds. If Brussels forces the plan through regardless, it will only strengthen the already potent narrative in several member states that the EU is willing to trample national interests and established law in pursuit of ideological crusades. This is the kind of overreach populists dream of — an elite-driven project that can be portrayed, not entirely unfairly, as prioritizing geopolitical theater over the economic security of European citizens.
Then there is the Ukraine question itself. For many Europeans, supporting Kiev is neither a moral nor a strategic imperative. Ukraine’s deep governance problems are real and have been acknowledged by its own officials and Western auditors alike. Pouring unprecedented sums into the country without ironclad safeguards invites legitimate criticism that Brussels is acting on emotion rather than sober judgment.
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, Washington has every incentive to watch Europe stumble. If investors lose confidence in the euro, the dollar benefits. If European financial institutions face turmoil, American ones expand their reach.
Europe could still choose a wiser path. Instead of prolonging an unsustainable conflict by stealing sovereign Russian assets — a move that virtually guarantees escalation and risks spilling the war into the Eurozone itself, with unimaginable and utterly destructive consequences — European leaders could support genuine peace efforts.
The EU cannot afford to make the wrong choice. Yet that is precisely what it is doing, and for nothing more than short-term political posturing.
Putin aide responds to Zelensky call for referendum on Donbass
RT | December 12, 2025
Donbass is sovereign Russian territory and Moscow will sooner or later establish control over parts of the region still occupied by Ukraine, Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov has said. His comments came after Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky indicated the country may hold a referendum on territorial concessions to Moscow.
On Thursday, Zelensky – who has consistently refused to recognize former Ukrainian regions as part of Russia – suggested that Ukrainians could vote in a referendum or election on the Donbass issue. The region overwhelmingly voted to join Russia in 2022 in referendums.
Speaking to Kommersant business daily on Friday, Ushakov stressed that “whatever happens, this [Donbass] is Russian territory, and it will be under the control of our administrations, sooner or later.” He noted that Zelensky has so far opposed the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the region, despite this being among the US proposals for peace.
According to Ushakov, Moscow will establish full control over the region either through negotiations or military force, and any ceasefire with Ukraine can only be possible once Kiev’s troops withdraw.
“I think what happens afterward can be discussed later. Because it is quite possible that there will be no regular troops there – neither Russian nor Ukrainian,” he acknowledged, adding that public order would be maintained by Russian law enforcement.
The shift in Zelensky’s tone came amid US President Donald Trump’s efforts to mediate the end of the conflict. The US president has suggested that the Ukrainian leader is one of the key stumbling blocks towards peace, while urging him to hold a presidential election.
Zelensky – whose term expired more than a year ago – did not reject the call, but demanded Western security guarantees for any vote to take place. Ushakov suggested that Zelensky could be using the election narrative as a pretext for a ceasefire. Moscow has said a truce would only be beneficial for Ukraine, as it would allow it to patch up its battered forces.
Meanwhile, Russian troops have been making steady gains in Donbass, recently liberating the key stronghold of Seversk, which opens the way to the regional cities of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.
Trump’s National Security Strategy: Rethinking US Policy on Europe and Russia-Ukraine
By Abbas Hashemite – New Eastern Outlook – December 12, 2025
The new 33-page National Security Strategy document issued by the US government endorses Russia’s stance on Ukraine, rejecting aggressive European policies.
Trump’s Divergence from European Policies on Russia-Ukraine
Since assuming the presidency for a second non-consecutive term, US President Donald Trump has diverged from the European view on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. President Trump has been highly critical of the European Union and NATO allies of the United States over their controversial policies. The new 33-page National Security Strategy (NSS) announced by the incumbent US government has once again validated the Russian stance over this conflict and has unambiguously rebuffed the European aggressive and violent designs regarding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
This latest security strategy document acknowledged that the European Union is responsible for prolonging the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The document also condemned the unrealistic expectations of the European officials from this violent conflict, costing hosts of lives on both sides. The US government blamed the EU for blocking several US efforts to end this conflict, stating that the United States has a “core interest” in ending the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Furthermore, the document also accuses the European governments of “subversion of democratic processes” as they remain unresponsive to the desires of their people for establishing peace between Russia and Ukraine. As per the NSS document, it is one of the top priorities of the United States to “re-establish strategic stability with Russia,” which would help stabilize European economies. This new security strategy document is widely seen as the re-evaluation of the US policy towards its European allies.
The Alaska Summit and Peace Negotiations
President Trump has long been critical of European policies. During his election campaigns, he repeatedly claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine conflict within a day. After assuming the presidential office in January 2025, he engaged with the Russian President Vladimir Putin to establish peace between Russia and Ukraine. The positive engagement between the two leaders led to a summit between them in Alaska in August 2025. After the summit, US President Donald Trump praised President Putin’s positive attitude towards peace negotiations. He also described President Putin’s observations about the conflict as “profound.”
After the summit between the two leaders in Alaska, President Trump stated, “Many points were agreed to. There are just a very few that are left. Some are not that significant. One is probably the most significant, but we have a very good chance of getting there.” He further stated that he would talk to Zelenskyy and NATO regarding the discussions in the summit, adding that “It’s ultimately up to them.” However, after consulting with the NATO allies, President Trump realised that the European Union has ulterior motives behind procrastinating this violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The European and Ukrainian demand to deploy a NATO-like combined EU force in Ukraine to ensure the latter’s security derailed these peace negotiations. In the past, the European leaders repeatedly thwarted all the peace efforts between Russia and Ukraine to achieve their covert regional strategic interests and to undermine Russian security and sovereignty. The NSS also criticised Europe over “censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition.” It further claimed that Europe is confronting the “prospect of civilizational erasure” due to “failed focus on regulatory suffocation” and migration policies. The document also claimed that Europe will be “unrecognisable in 20 years or less” due to its economic issues. The NSS further read, “It is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.”
Implications of the New National Security Strategy
Indeed, the European powers, particularly NATO countries, are heavily reliant on US military power for their survival and security. For years, President Trump has been urging the European nations to pay their fair share in the alliance. However, the European leaders are unable to address US concerns due to the economic issues of their countries. In this new NSS document, the United States has threatened to withdraw its security umbrella from the European nations. It states that the US would prioritise “enabling Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by taking primary responsibility for its own defence, without being dominated by any adversarial power.”
This re-evaluation of the US policies towards Europe and the Russia-Ukraine conflict has astonished many European leaders. Nonetheless, the United States’ new security policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been widely regarded as commendable. European nations and the broader Western world must address Russia’s security concerns to ensure peace and stability between Russia and Ukraine. Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for the Kremlin, expressed support for the Trump administration’s newly unveiled security strategy. He stated, “The adjustments that we see correspond in many ways to our vision.” He also encouraged the US to pledge to end “the perception, and prevent the reality, of the NATO military alliance as a perpetually expanding alliance.”
However, he also cautioned that the US ‘deep state’ views the world differently from President Trump. Indeed, the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy document is based on realistic assumptions. However, the mighty US deep state would never allow him to undermine or challenge the long-established status quo in the country. The European Union and Israel have significant influence over the US deep state. Therefore, it would be hard for the Trump administration to diverge from the prior US stance over its alignment with Europe and Israel over the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the Middle East.
Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist
What’s on Trump’s mind as US adjusts to multipolarity
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | December 12, 2025
The world order’s transformation to multipolarity is a work in progress with the variables at work, but its outcome will be largely determined by the alignment of the three big powers — the United States, Russia and China. Historically, the ‘triangle’ appeared as the lid came off the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s and a ferocious public acrimony erupted between Moscow and Beijing, which prompted the Nixon administration to moot Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing to meet up face to face with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-lai and, hopefully, work out a modus vivendii to jointly counter Russia.
Revisiting the Sino-Soviet schism, it is well understood by now that the US-Soviet – China triangle never really ran the course that Kissinger had envisaged. Kissinger’s failure to consolidate the opening of relations with China was partly due to his loss of power by January 1977 and, in a systemic sense, inevitably so, given the complexity of the boiling cauldron of Sino-Soviet schism where ideology mixed with politics and geopolitics — and realpolitik.
While the western mythology was that the US built up the foundations of China’s rise, historiography points in another direction, namely, that Beijing always had in mind the dialectics at work and even as a degree of compatibility of Chinese and American interests in checking the expansion of Soviet power existed, Beijing was determined to avoid military conflict with the Soviet Union and concentrated its attention on improving its tactical position within the US-Chinese-Soviet triangle.
On its part, the Soviet Union also consistently promoted increased exchanges with China despite the bitter acrimony and even military clashes with a view to undercut perceived advantages the US derived from the Sino-Soviet split — and even sought to persuade China to accept the military and territorial status quo in Asia.
In fact, to retard Sino-US cooperation against them in the early 1970s, the Soviets offered at one point to modify their territorial claims along their border, to sign non-aggression pacts and / or agreements prohibiting the use of force, to base Sino-Soviet relationship on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and to restore high-level contacts, including party ties, in the interests of their common opposition to the US.
If China largely ignored these overtures, it was almost entirely due to the great turbulence in its internal politics. Suffice to say, no sooner than Mao, the Soviet Union’s nemesis, died in September 1976 (and the curtain descended on the Cultural Revolution), Moscow followed up quickly with several gestures, including Brezhnev sending a message of condolence (the first CPSU message to China in a decade), followed by another Party message in October congratulating the newly-elected CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, and shortly thereafter in November sending their chief negotiator for border talks Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev back to China in an attempt to resume the border talks. But, again, if nothing came of it, that was because of China’s invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan soon thereafter in 1980.
Indeed, looking back, the main legacy of the 1970s viewed through the prism of the US-China-Russia ‘triangle’ was the reorientation of China’s defence policy and its geopolitical realignment with the West. China made no contribution significantly to weaken the Soviet Union or to aggravate the stagnation and brewing crisis in the Soviet political economy.
Meanwhile, the Sino-US differences over Taiwan and other issues had reemerged by 1980-1982, compelling China to reassess its foreign policy strategy, which manifested in Beijing’s announcement in 1982 of its “independent” foreign policy — plainly put, an attempt to rely less explicitly on the US as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union — and the move to open “consultative talks” with Moscow, and a growing receptiveness towards the numerous pending Soviet overtures for bilateral exchanges (in sports, cultural and economic areas, etc), the overall direction being to reduce tensions with the Soviets and increase the room for manoeuvre for Beijing within the China-US-Soviet triangle.
Indeed, a broader detente between China and the Soviet Union had to wait till the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan following the Geneva Accords signed in April 1988. Nonetheless, a basic change in the Sino-Soviet relations through the 1980s appeared, which included regular scheduled summit meetings; resumption of cooperative ties between the CCP and the CPSU; Beijing’s acceptance of the pending Soviet proposals for non-aggression / non-use of force; and resumption of Sino-Soviet border questions at vice-foreign minister level.
Washington could sense the shift in Chinese policy directions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Notably, reviewing the marked shift in the Chinese strategy, a CIA assessment noted:
“More recently, Moscow followed Brezhnev’s call in 1982 for improved relations with China with a halt in most authoritative Soviet statements critical of China. When Sino-Soviet discussions resumed in October 1982, Soviet media cut back sharply on criticism of China. And they have remained restrained on this subject, although occasional polemic exchanges marked Sino-Soviet coverage at the time of Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to the United States in January 1984. Moscow has continued to be critical of China through the Soviet-based clandestine radio Ba Yi… China for its part has continued criticism of Soviet foreign policy, although past attention to Soviet “revisionist” internal policies has all but disappeared since China’s own economic policies have been significantly changed after Mao’s death.”
Succinctly put, with CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev consolidating power circa late 1988 by his election to the chairmanship of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and on a parallel track, Deng had outmaneuvered political rivals and become China’s paramount leader by 1978 — and had launched the Boluan Fanzheng program to restore political stability, rehabilitate those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and reduce ideological extremism — the door had opened for the two erstwhile adversaries to enter the rose garden of reconciliation.
Significantly, the timing of Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing to meet up with Deng in 1989 was far from ideal by virtue of the Tiannenmen Square incidents, but neither side proposed to postpone or reschedule the meeting. Such was the intensity of their mutual desire for reconciliation.
Today, the above résumé has become necessary when we assess the future directions of the Trump administration’s China policies. The common perception is that Trump is attempting to create a wedge between Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China with a view to isolate the latter and thwart it from surpassing the US. But there is no shred of evidence available hinting at the potential for decoupling Russia from China.
All the signs are to the contrary in the direction of the steady integration of the two countries. Last week, the Kremlin announced a visa-free regime for Chinese citizens to visit Russia. Interestingly, this was a reciprocal move. FT reported recently that a Chinese businessman has been given equity in Russia’s biggest manufacturer of drones which supplies the military — in the first known collaboration in the area of defence industry.
With the Power of Siberia 2 on the anvil, China’s dependence on Russia for its energy security will increase further. Russia’s foreign trade is undergoing a profound shift, with China replacing the EU as Russia’s main trading partner. Overall, Sino-Russian relations are closer today than they have been in decades.
On the other hand, there is no credible suggestion that the Trump administration is preparing for a war with China. Japan under its new leadership is whistling in the dark.
So, what is on Trump’s mind? In his revolutionary agenda for the remaking of the new world order, Trump aims at a strategic concord between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other. The recent US National Security Strategy strongly points in that direction, too. The implications of this revolutionary thinking for multipolarity are going to be profound — for partners such as India or allies like Japan or Germany alike.
EU backers of Russian asset theft are ‘psychologically at war’ – Belgian PM
RT | December 11, 2025
The EU states pushing hardest to tap Russia’s frozen assets are acting as if they are “psychologically at war” with Moscow, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has said.
Speaking after condemning the latest EU proposal to use the frozen Russian sovereign funds to help finance Ukraine, De Wever labeled the plan “very unwise and ill-considered.” He also warned that the plan backed by European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen would amount to “stealing” and would open the bloc up to potential legal action.
Von der Leyen last week proposed providing Ukraine with €90 billion over the next two years, anchored by a so-called “reparations loan” backed by the frozen assets, or by debt financed by EU member states, deemed politically unworkable by most.
Belgium, which hosts the financial clearinghouse Euroclear, where the bulk of Russia’s immobilized central bank assets are held, has long resisted such efforts. Brussels argues that forcing Euroclear to make the funds available could carry severe legal, financial and geopolitical risks.
De Wever also argued that the strongest supporters of the proposal are EU states geographically closest to Russia, claiming they “mentally are almost in a state of war” with Moscow. He stressed that Belgium is “not at war” with Russia and doesn’t want to “have a war with Russia.”
The Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Poland have become the EU’s most vocal advocates of a hard line toward Russia, warning of what they claim is an imminent threat.
Meanwhile, Politico has reported that EU leaders are considering politically sidelining De Wever if he continues to block the plan. Belgium could be treated like Hungary – frozen out of key talks, ignored in negotiations and given little influence over future EU decisions – unless it backs down, the outlet claimed, citing a source.
“The Belgian leader would be frozen out and ignored, just like Hungary’s Viktor Orban has been given the cold shoulder over… his refusal to play ball on sanctioning Russia,” one diplomat told the outlet, adding that Belgium’s views on EU proposals would no longer be sought and phone calls would go unanswered.
Scott Ritter: With Seversk Lost, Ukraine’s Position in Donbass is Beyond Hopeless – It’s Desperate
Sputnik – December 11, 2025
Russian forces have liberated the city of Seversk in northeastern Donetsk, one of the final Ukrainian-occupied fortress strongholds in the region. Sputnik asked Scott Ritter to comment on the development’s big picture significance.
“Ukraine is facing a manpower shortage. Every one of these battles that are being fought consumes a tremendous amount of precious manpower resources. Ukraine is losing many thousands of soldiers every day, whether through desertion, whether being wounded, whether being killed in this conflict, and they can’t be replaced,” the former US Marine Corps intelligence officer told Sputnik.
When Russia takes a major stronghold like Seversk or Pokrovsk, “it also means that there’s huge gaps in the Ukrainian line,” Ritter explained. That means every time Ukrainian forces fall back, they don’t have the forces to hold the new positions, and defenses aren’t nearly as well prepared and fortified.
When Russian forces reach the Kramotorsk agglomeration, the last area between them and a fully freed Donbass, major battles are unlikely, the observer predicts.
“Russia will rapidly pin down the Ukrainians in locations that they choose to defend strongly and then surround them, compelling them to either die, surrender, or retreat,” Ritter said.
As for Seversk, its primary significance is its status as “a major” and irreplaceable “logistical [and] command and control hub.”
There aren’t many “fortress cities” like it left in Ukraine. Its fall indicates that a “culminating point in this war” has been reached “where Ukraine is no longer able to maintain cohesive defense along the entire front,” Ritter summed up.
Biden, Neocons Didn’t Stop Easily Preventable Ukraine Crisis Because They See War as a ‘Table Game’
Sputnik – 11.12.2025
Former Biden European security policy architect Amanda Sloat’s bombshell admission that the conflict in Ukraine could have been prevented if the US pushed Kiev to drop its aspirations to join NATO reveals a deep rot in Washington, Karen Kwiatkowski has told Sputnik.
“The diplomatic corps increasingly has not experienced war, so many see it completely as a table game,” the retired US Air Force Lt. Col. and former DoD analyst-turned Iraq War whistleblower explained.
Beyond that, “the type and quality of the people advising the decisionmakers is amateurish,” the prolific commentator said. “Biden himself never met a war he didn’t want someone else to die in, as his Senate record bears out.”
Throughout his tenure, “a powerful neoconservative network was in place in the State Department and the National Security Council. Biden himself had several Ukrainian business associates who were enriching his family and friends. So believing in Ukraine as both a US partner and having a powerful military was a case of groupthink, probably fueled by personal friendship and neoconservative contempt for Russia,” Kwiatkowski believes.
As for attempts to pivot on the issue under Trump, these can be attributed to the removal of “many” neoconservative voices from his orbit, and listening to a younger generation of Republicans like JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard, who understand and reject neoconservatism.
In addition, while Trump is also a “game player,” he’s one “who does not like to lose,” which through his life in business taught him to “seek out better information” and “determine what risks to take and which losing enterprises to disband and sell off.”
In a conversation with Russian pranksters Vovan and Lexus, Sloat, the ex-special assistant to the president and senior director for Europe at the US National Security Council, let slip that simply getting a “no NATO” commitment from Ukraine would have prevented the Ukraine crisis, and that Washington rejected the idea at multiple stages.
“I was uncomfortable with the idea of the US pushing Ukraine not to do that and sort of implicitly giving Russia some sort of sphere of influence or veto power,” Sloat said. “There is certainly a question…you know, would that have been better to do before the war started? Would that have been better to do in Istanbul talks? It certainly would have prevented the destruction and the loss of life,” she casually admitted, showing no remorse.
European Leaders ‘Willing to Pay for Their Hubris With Ukrainian Lives’
Sputnik – 10.12.2025
Ukrainians “who are being used as cannon fodder for Europeans pushing a failing narrative” have become the “greatest victims of this conflict,” London-based foreign affairs analyst Adriel Kasonta tells Sputnik while commenting on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent statements to the Russian parliament.
“Thus far, these leaders are willing to pay for their hubris with Ukrainian lives,” Kasonta laments.
He also observes that, while European economies “are declining, and the cost-of-living crisis continues to worsen,” European elites refuse to acknowledge their mistakes – as it could discredit them politically – and instead opt to “double down on their hostile posture toward Moscow.”
In the meantime, Donald Trump essentially acknowledged the previous US administration’s “miscalculation” and had a change of heart on the Ukrainian conflict issue.
For his part, French geopolitical analyst Come Carpentier de Gourdon adds that the EU policy of fighting for Ukraine is part of a strategy aimed at stripping Russia of much of its land and power, and that “and it is not likely to change unless it becomes totally impossible for the Europeans to continue.”
Even if the powers that be in Ukraine agree to a peace deal, the European leadership believes that there will be a confrontation with Russia in the future, he warns.
Globalization Shaped Entirely by West is No Longer Effective
Western-led globalization is a no-goer as it is increasingly “dominated by factors that are outside Europe and to an extent outside the West, because even the U·S now has to make major concessions to China,” French geopolitical analyst Come Carpentier de Gourdon tells Sputnik.
He further speculated that there may be “some sort of reconnection between Russia, America, and Europe,” and that “an understanding or an agreement reached between the United States and Russia in the coming months or years would be the first step in bringing together the West again in a defense of its general interest.”
Global institutions like BRICS and their architects created “an alternative to the predatory institutions of the Bretton Woods system,” allowing nations to trade “on an equal footing” instead of suffering from exploitation, London-based foreign affairs analyst Adriel Kasonta adds.
“China has demonstrated that an alternative model of development is possible — one that is more beneficial for sustainable growth,” he notes.
This model, Kasonta explains, promotes a “win-win situation rather than the debt enslavement of weaker nations by Western powers,” whereas the dynamics imposed by the West “keep countries dependent and perpetually indebted, rendering the idea of genuine decolonization little more than a façade.”
The West Fears ‘Alternative Views That Challenge Their Narrative’
Europe is “becoming increasingly intolerant of and afraid of outside information channels that provide very distinct viewpoints and open minds to other perspectives,” Come Carpentier de Gourdon tells Sputnik.
The European leadership, he suggests, is especially fearful Russian media like RT and Sputnik, which “project a very different perspective and show facts that Europeans, are generally left to ignore.”
One such example of the information Europe was keen to suppress was the warnings about the risks of NATO’s expansion to the east and “the circumstances of the Ukraine conflict” that did not fit into the official Western narrative.
“The fact that Russian media are exposing a lot of these facts and also are exposing a lot of the things that are very wrong in the structure of the European Union and in American policy, in the American society and in the American political system, that is what generates a very hostile reaction with the attempt to ban any such information which is regarded as hostile propaganda,” De Gourdon says.
For his part, Adriel Kasonta adds that the West’s fear of alternative views “manifests as hostility toward free speech,” which drives Europeans “to engage” with outlets like RT and Sputnik.
“Western leaders adopt a paternalistic attitude toward their citizens, believing they cannot discern between truth and falsehood,” he remarks.
Do You Believe in Coincidence… Was the CIA Involved in Operation Spiderweb and Israel’s June 12 Attack on Iran?
By Larry C. Johnson | December 9, 2025
With the benefit of hindsight, we’re all geniuses. The Wall Street Journal article, Inside Ukraine’s Daring Operation Spiderweb Attack on Russia (published December 8, 2025) details the operation’s planning as a 18-month effort starting in late 2023, with significant activities ramping up in 2024. While the piece emphasizes the full timeline’s secrecy and oversight by President Zelenskyy and SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk, it highlights 2024 as a pivotal year for infiltration, testing, and logistics preparation. I am more interested in what it does not state outright — i.e., that Ukraine relied heavily on Western intelligence, meaning the CIA and British MI-6, in planning this operation.
The attack took place on June 1st, 2025 and, despite a flood of Western propaganda touting it as a tremendous success, it was a tactical and strategic failure — i.e., it did not damage Russia’s ability to continue its offense in Ukraine. But here is the question of coincidence… Two weeks later, Israel launched the decapitation attack on Iran, which also failed to topple the Iranian government and cripple the Iranian military, who promptly retaliated. Do you think it is just a coincidence that Israel and Ukraine used similar tactics — i.e., launching drones from within Russia and Iran to attack strategic targets? I do not.
Let’s take a look at the timeline of Operation Spiderweb as laid out in the WSJ article.
December 2023: Planning begins under direct oversight of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Initial focus: Smuggling disassembled drones, batteries, and explosives into Russia via borders (e.g., Belarus, Black Sea routes) and commercial trucking networks. Goal: Target Russia’s strategic bomber fleet to disrupt missile launches on Ukrainian cities. Hmmm… If the SBU was involved then so was foreign intelligence.
Early 2024 (January–March): Initial scouting and prototype testing. Ukrainian operatives conducted reconnaissance of target airbases (e.g., Olenya, Dyagilevo) using commercial satellite imagery and smuggled spotters, according to the WSJ. In my opinion, an audacious operation like this would also require imagery from Western intelligence. The WSJ is mute on that point. The article notes that early experiments with “spider nest” launch mechanisms—disassembled FPV drones (Osa quadcopters) hidden in truck roofs— were tested in simulated Russian environments near the border. This phase reportedly involved ~20 commandos refining smuggling routes via Belarus and the Black Sea, with failures (e.g., a test drone malfunction) leading to redesigns. The WSJ article conveniently ignores the likely role that the territories other than Ukraine, such as Khazakstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan also were used as infiltration points for this operation.
Mid-2024 (April–July): Infiltration buildup. The WSJ describes “web-like” networks expanding, with agents embedding in Russian trucking firms to map logistics. Over 100 drones were smuggled in parts during this period, reassembled in hidden workshops (e.g., Bryansk region sheds). A key activity was recruiting unwitting Russian truckers (e.g., via bribes or coercion) for transport, with the article citing intercepted FSB chatter revealing early suspicions but no disruptions. Zelenskyy approved budget reallocations (~$50M) for Western tech integration (e.g., Starlink relays). What do you think are the chances that some of this money was siphoned off by Zelensky and his intel bubbas and sent to their overseas retirement accounts?
Late 2024 (August–December): Final rehearsals and positioning. Intensive dry runs simulated the June 1 strike, focusing on simultaneous launches across time zones. The piece highlights a December 2024 “dress rehearsal” near Ivanovo, where signal jamming countermeasures (AI autopilots) were validated. By year-end, all 117 drones were prepositioned, with operatives establishing safe houses. The article quotes an anonymous SBU officer: “2024 was the spider spinning its web—silent, patient, invisible.”
January–May 2025 Infiltration phase: Ukrainian agents (150+ operatives, including commandos and drone technicians) establish “spider nests” (hidden launch sites) across five Russian oblasts spanning three time zones. Drones (117 total, FPV models with Western tech like Starlink) are reassembled in disguised cargo (e.g., wooden sheds on trucks). Scouting identifies four primary airbases: Olenya (Murmansk), Dyagilevo (Ryazan), Ivanovo Severny (Ivanovo), and Belaya (Irkutsk/Siberia, 4,300 km from Ukraine). A fifth target (Ukrainka in Amur) is aborted due to a truck fire.
June 1, 2025 Execution: Coordinated strikes unfold over ~72 hours starting ~1 p.m. local time. Remotely activated truck roofs release drones, hitting ~40–50 aircraft (15–20 destroyed, including Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 bombers, and A-50 radar planes; ~$2–7B in damage). Fires reported at all sites; Russia confirms attacks but claims minimal losses. Ukrainian operators control from Kyiv; no SBU fatalities, though two teams captured.
There is no denying that this was a sophisticated operation and, in my judgment, depended heavily on intelligence support from the US and the UK and, possibly, Israel. Why Israel? Because of the similarity of the tactics used in the attacks on Russia and Iran within a span of two weeks. Both were deep-penetration operations targeting high-value, hardened assets far from the front lines. Both required extensive intelligence support.
I also believe that the US played a significant role in coordinating the two attacks as part of a broader strategy to weaken both Russia and Iran. The planning for these operations were carried out in separate channels, but there was someone, or a group of someones, overseeing the broader strategic goals.
The publication of this article comes at a time when the Trump administration’s support for Ukraine is weakening. I don’t rule out the possibility that the CIA, who has an enormous investment in Ukraine, is working to undermine Trump’s efforts to secure a peace that will come at Ukraine’s expense. I do not believe that some intrepid reporter thought that this would be a swell story to tell and that it was published now just because the WSJ had nothing better to report. I believe this is part of a unending effort by the Deep State to try to pump life into Project Ukraine, which is now on life support and fading fast, by pushing a narrative that Ukraine is far from defeat.
Kremlin responds to Zelensky’s energy ceasefire proposal
RT | December 10, 2025
Russia is seeking a durable, legally binding peace agreement with Ukraine rather than a limited ceasefire, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Wednesday. His remarks came after Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky proposed a moratorium on energy strikes as the country faces worsening power outages.
Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, Peskov weighed in on Zelensky’s signal that Kiev was prepared to discuss a halt to energy-related attacks, which he said “is important for the people.”
According to Peskov, Russia remains focused on reaching a legally binding settlement rather than a temporary pause. “I’ll leave out some nuances, but we are working on peace, not on a ceasefire. A stable, guaranteed, long-term peace, achieved through the signing of appropriate documents, is an absolute priority,” the spokesman stressed.
In March, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a 30-day energy infrastructure ceasefire, which was reached after a phone call between President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart, Donald Trump. Russian officials, however, accused Ukraine of constantly violating the truce, including by targeting oil refineries and other energy facilities. Moscow said at the time that it had opted not to retaliate as a goodwill gesture toward the US and its mediation efforts.
Zelensky’s latest proposal comes as Russia has targeted Ukraine’s military and energy infrastructure in recent weeks, prompting officials in Kiev to impose rolling blackouts.
Moscow has said the strikes are in response to Ukrainian “terrorist acts” deep into Russia, targeting critical infrastructure and residential areas. Russia maintains that its forces never target civilians and strike only military-related facilities.
Washington’s ‘Waiver On, Waiver Off’ Game at Chabahar
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – December 9, 2025
In recent months, Washington has swung from revoking to restoring India’s sanctions waiver for operating Iran’s Chabahar port. The ‘waiver on, waiver off’ routine, however, comes with a clear strategic intent.
The move is not just leverage over New Delhi as trade talks loom; it’s also a signal to Central Asian states that their economic futures — including access to Chabahar — depend on aligning their foreign policies with US preferences.
In September 2025, the United States pulled the rug out from under one of India’s most carefully nurtured strategic ventures: the Chabahar Port in Iran. Long viewed by New Delhi as a critical gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Chabahar suddenly became a high-stakes chess piece in Washington’s policy game. On September 16, the US Department of State announced it would revoke the special exemption granted in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), with the revocation taking effect September 29. Overnight, Indian companies, shippers, insurers, and banks involved in the port’s operations were cast into uncertainty: their assets could be frozen, their access to the US financial system curtailed, and their commercial contracts imperilled.
This move did not occur in isolation. At the same time, New Delhi was itself involved in a high-stakes game with the US over bilateral trade. Specifically, it is resisting US pressure to halt oil imports from Russia. By targeting Chabahar, Washington signaled that it was willing to leverage unrelated strategic projects to enforce compliance elsewhere, effectively turning Indian economic and geopolitical interests into bargaining chips. Yet the situation shifted quickly: reports emerged on October 28 that Indian firms had halted Russian oil imports, and the very next day, the US issued a fresh six-month waiver, allowing Chabahar operations to continue without immediate penalty.
The rapid “waiver on, waiver off” cycle exposes the transactional and unpredictable logic of US sanction policy. A project that represents over $120 million in Indian investment, long-term regional connectivity, and painstaking diplomacy is reduced to a geopolitical pawn, its fate dictated less by commercial or developmental imperatives and more by Washington’s strategic calculus. This particular calculus, however, is not meant for India only. The politics of granting and restricting waivers is also tied very closely to Washington’s relationship with Central Asia.
The Central Asian gamble
Chabahar port is important not only for India but also for the landlocked states of Central Asia, offering a rare direct link to the Indian Ocean and a potential route to India that bypasses Pakistan. Several Central Asian states have expressed interest in using Chabahar Port for this purpose. Tajikistan has emerged as the most active player, signing a formal cooperation agreement with Iran in early 2025 and committing to developing a logistics hub with terminals and storage facilities. Uzbekistan has held discussions about utilising the port for trade and storage. While a lot of this is still far from being fully operational, there is little denying that a major roadblock has been the US sanctions.
In the same vein, the waiver also signals to Afghanistan, where India has recently become very active. The Taliban regime is currently involved in a border standoff with Pakistan. Kabul has suspended its trade with Pakistan, and the reopening of this route remains highly uncertain. At the same time, Washington has been pressuring the Taliban to come to terms with handing over the Bagram airbase to the US military for its potential operations against China. In this context, if Afghanistan wants to continue—and even expand—its trade with Central Asia and other countries beyond the region, i.e., with India itself, as an alternative to Pakistan, its best route goes through the Chabahar Port.
Beyond this, the US decision to grant the waiver—and unless it restricts it again in the future—also puts it in a position where it can influence several other regional trade and connectivity projects, including the Trans‑Caspian and broader International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) projects. By granting or revoking waivers, the US is signalling that it can create opportunities and or introduce uncertainty for companies and governments contemplating investment or trade through corridors that touch Iran.
For example, Central Asian states considering cargo flows via Chabahar—or via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and beyond—must now weigh the risk that US sanctions could suddenly be applied, making insurance, financing, or banking services problematic and/or unavailable. Even if the Trans‑Caspian route itself does not pass through Iran, the interconnected nature of regional logistics networks means that a disruption at Chabahar could ripple across supply chains, raising costs or forcing alternative routing through Russia, Turkey, or China.
In essence, the waiver policy acts as a geopolitical lever. Its application is meant to put pressure on countries and companies so that they align their foreign and trade policies with US preferences, discouraging full exploitation of alternatives like the Trans‑Caspian corridor that could reduce American influence. The US has, for some time, been trying to expand its geopolitical footprint in Central Asia. Its ability to strangulate or allow Chabahar helps it signal its continued relevance. On the whole, the uncertainty imposed by such sanctions creates a risk premium, slows governmental and private investment, and subtly nudges regional actors toward pathways that the US finds strategically acceptable, even if they are less efficient or commercially less viable.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
