Iran Nuclear Negotiations Bring New, Suprising Developments
By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | May 20, 2025
In the past several days, there have been surprising developments in the negotiations between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s civilian nuclear program.
U.S. President Donald Trump has frequently, but not always, defined the goal of the negotiations as being limited to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. He repeated that definition as recently as May 25, saying Iran must “permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons…They cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
But the message from his team has been contradictory. Then-National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said that the United States is demanding “full dismantlement,” and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff said that “a Trump deal” means “Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.” Rubio said that Iran can have a civilian nuclear program, but by importing uranium enriched up to 3.67%, and no longer by enriching their own. On May 9, Witkoff told Breitbart News that “An enrichment program can never exist in the state of Iran ever again. That’s our red line. No enrichment.”
But Iran has drawn the mirror image red line. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has placed a firm limit that Iran will not negotiate “the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian repeated that red line ahead of the talks, insisting that “Iran has never sought, is not seeking, and will never seek nuclear weapons” but that “Iran will not give up its peaceful nuclear rights.”
American insistence on ending Iran’s civilian enrichment program could put a quick end to the talks. Widening the negotiations to Iran’s missile program or to Iran’s relationship with its regional proxy groups could also jeopardize the talks.
But Trump raised that possibility on May 14 when he suggested that breaking off relations with proxy groups in the region must be part of any deal. Iran “must stop sponsoring terror,” he said, and “halt its bloody proxy wars.”
The contradictory statements emanating from the Trump administration appear to have been “because of a lack of decision on key strategic points,” Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an expert on Iran, told me. And, indeed, on May 7, Trump said, “We haven’t made that decision yet.”
“As a result,” Parsi said, “the debate on these points is now, rather unhelpfully, taking place out in public.”
That the talks have progressed to a fourth meeting suggests, at this point, that the public crossing of these Iranian red lines may not be being repeated in the private meetings. Iran’s Foreign Minister hinted at that possibility when he identified one of the difficulties in the negotiations as being “contradictions both inside and outside the negotiating room.” Supporting this possibility, when Trump introduced Iran’s support of regional proxies into the discussion, Araghchi called the remark, not unproductive or unhelpful, but “deceitful.”
And Araghchi may know. Barak Ravid of Axios has now reported that, during the fourth round of talks, the United States presented Iran with a written proposal. The report says that, during the third round, Araghchi gave Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff a document with Iran’s proposals for a deal. The U.S. studied it and returned it to Iran with “questions and requests for clarifications.” Iran replied, the U.S. prepared a new proposal, and then presented it to Araghchi who has now brought it back to Tehran for consultations with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian.
How far down the path to a settlement the proposal is is unknown. Araghchi said future negotiations now become more difficult. But he said that “despite the difficulty and frankness of the talks, very useful discussions were held.” He then said, “We can now say that both sides have a better understanding of each other’s positions.”
This major breakthrough may have been facilitated by another recent development: a subtle change in tone by Trump. Following a flurry of American threats, the fourth round of talks was postponed. Iranian officials said that [d]epending on the U.S. approach, the date of the next round of talks will be announced.”
Recently, that approach subtly changed. Previously, Donald Trump had formulated Iran’s choice as “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” But in his most recent remarks, which went largely unnoticed, Trump softened the consequence, saying only “If Iran’s leadership rejects this olive branch…we will have no choice but to inflict massive maximum pressure, drive Iranian oil exports to zero.” Notably, bombing was replaced with sanctions.
On May 15, Trump again seemed to reject the risk of war:
“Because things like that get started and they get out of control. I’ve seen it over and over again. They go to war and things get out of control, and we’re not going to let that happen.”
In another surprise development, Iran may have facilitated negotiations with a creative and unexpected proposal.
There are now reports that Iran has suggested for consideration that they could join with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a nuclear enrichment consortium. Iran would continue to enrich uranium but accept a cap at the 3.67% enrichment required by a nuclear energy program. Saudi Arabia and UAE, who would gain access to Iran’s nuclear technology, would be shareholders and funders.
If true, the proposal would be based on a consortium idea first proposed by Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel and former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian.
Von Hippel told me that the idea was inspired by the URENCO enrichment consortium of Germany, the Netherlands and Britain and by the ABAAAC consortium of Brazil and Argentina.
The consortiums, he said, allow nuclear experts from each country to “visit each other’s facilities to assure themselves that the activities are peaceful.” He added that “decisions that might have proliferation implications are made by the [partner] governments.” Saudi Arabia’s, the Emirates’ and Iran’s watchful eyes would all help the International Atomic Energy Agency ensure that the program is peaceful.
Aside from the implications for the nuclear negotiations, this level of trust between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE was unthinkable only a very short time ago and testifies to the changes going on in the region and in the evolving Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship. That Iran would trust Saudi Arabia with access to its nuclear technology indicates that a region changing shift in the relationship is underway.
As Annelle Sheline, research fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, told me:
“The Iranians’ willingness to join a consortium with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to develop civilian nuclear energy demonstrates significantly improved relations between these countries. This sends a strong signal that Tehran as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would prefer to prioritize cooperation over conflict.”
She said that all three countries have growing motivation for peace in the region. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman needs to avoid violent conflict to encourage the foreign investment and tourism needed to fuel his planned economic diversification. Mohammed bin Zayed needs economic security in the face of competition from Saudi Arabia to be a regional hub. Iran needs to encourage peace in the region because of the recent weakening of its own strategic position in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have recently been moving towards enhanced friendship both bilaterally and through multinational organizations.
Sheline expressed the hope to me that “Trump should take advantage of these circumstances to sign a nuclear deal with Iran and avoid unnecessary war.”
All of these developments, from the contradictory American messaging, to the until now unreported existence of a written proposal, to the subtle and little noticed change in Trump’s tone to the Iranian idea of a nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and UAE are shocking and new. They may present an opportunity to return to a nuclear agreement with Iran and to usher in a new hope for peace and friendly relations both between the U.S. and Iran and in the region. Hopefully, the two sides will seize this opportunity.
Are US-Israel ‘special relations’ about to end?
By Murad Sadygzade | RT | May 19, 2025
Last week, US President Donald Trump embarked on his first official overseas tour since taking office, choosing to visit three key Gulf nations – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
This itinerary was both unexpected and, in many ways, unprecedented. Unlike his predecessors, who traditionally began their foreign policy engagements with visits to long-standing Western allies, Trump opted to prioritize America’s Arab partners, deliberately bypassing Israel – Washington’s principal strategic ally in the region. This marked the first time in decades that a sitting US president visiting the Middle East consciously excluded it from the agenda.
This decision signaled a potential recalibration of Washington’s priorities in the region. Relations between the Trump administration and the Israeli leadership, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were already strained in the early stages – largely due to Israel’s growing intransigence on the Palestinian question and the increasing influence of far-right factions within the Israeli government. Faced with mounting frustration over Israel’s hardline policies, the White House appeared to pivot toward a more pragmatic, less confrontational, and economically advantageous partnership with the Gulf monarchies.
However, the rationale behind this shift extended beyond political calculation. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long played a pivotal role in sustaining American influence in the Middle East – not only because of their strategic geography but also due to their substantial investments in the US economy and multi-billion-dollar arms contracts. For a business-minded president eager to showcase the profitability of foreign policy through economic deals, these nations represented ideal counterparts.
The lavish receptions afforded to Trump during his Gulf tour might have been dismissed as mere pageantry were it not for their deeper symbolic resonance. The true significance of the visit lay in what it revealed about broader geopolitical currents: namely, the transformation of the Gulf monarchies from regional players into increasingly assertive global actors.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are no longer content with being perceived as passive participants in American-led regional frameworks. Instead, they are positioning themselves as independent centers of power in an emerging multipolar world order. Their growing international stature stems from several interrelated factors.
First, these countries have embraced ambitious and forward-looking development strategies, investing heavily in infrastructure, clean energy transitions, technological innovation, and global finance. No longer simply hydrocarbon exporters, they are becoming hubs of digital transformation, international logistics, Islamic finance, and global policy discourse on issues ranging from security to sustainable development.
Second, the Gulf states have pioneered a distinctive model of governance that blends traditionalism with modernization. While maintaining deep-rooted commitments to Islamic and tribal values, they have achieved remarkable progress in building diversified and globally competitive economies. This synthesis has not only enabled them to thrive amid intensifying global competition but, in some respects, to outpace certain Western nations grappling with internal divisions and economic stagnation.
Equally noteworthy is the political resilience of these monarchies. Western narratives often portray them simplistically as ‘absolute monarchies,’ failing to appreciate the internal mechanisms of governance that underpin their stability. In reality, the political architecture of the Gulf is more accurately described as ‘sheikhism’ – a system rooted in consensus among tribal and familial elites, structured around a balance of obligations, reciprocal loyalties, and ongoing consultation. This model, which integrates Islamic principles such as shura (consultation) with practical statecraft, has proven remarkably adaptive and resilient.
In this context, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar can no longer be viewed merely as privileged US allies or energy suppliers. They are emerging as autonomous actors in global politics – capable of forging regional alliances, shaping international agendas across energy, media, and technology, and mediating in global conflicts. Their evolving role reflects not dependence on external security guarantees, but the outcome of deliberate, long-term strategies to consolidate sovereignty, enhance prestige, and assert influence in the 21st century.
Money above all: Trump’s deal-based diplomacy
President Donald Trump’s visit to the Gulf states was far more than his first foreign trip as head of state. It was a bold, highly symbolic debut of a new US foreign economic doctrine rooted in pragmatism, transactionalism, and strategic capitalism. Unlike previous administrations, which typically foregrounded diplomacy, security alliances, and value-based partnerships, Trump approached this tour as a high-stakes business deal. His mindset was that of a dealmaker, not a traditional statesman. The objective was clear: to restore America’s economic dominance by leveraging the vast wealth and strategic ambitions of the Middle East’s richest monarchies.
Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” found tangible expression in this tour. His mission was to bring back jobs, reindustrialize key sectors, boost the US high-tech ecosystem, and enhance national competitiveness – all fueled by a surge in foreign direct investment. In this pursuit, the oil-rich, capital-heavy Gulf monarchies – endowed with massive sovereign wealth funds and seeking greater global visibility – emerged as ideal partners.
In Saudi Arabia, Trump signed an unprecedented economic package worth over $600 billion, including the largest arms deal in US history – $142 billion covering missile defense systems, advanced aviation platforms, cybersecurity capabilities, and military-grade AI technologies. Equally significant was the launch of a new tech alliance: Saudi-based DataVolt committed $20 billion to build data centers and energy facilities in the US, while a consortium led by Nvidia, AMD, and Amazon Web Services will co-develop an AI innovation hub within the Kingdom. A $50 billion venture fund was also established to support US-based startups in renewable energy and cybersecurity.
In Qatar, the results were even more staggering: agreements totaling $1.2 trillion, the largest single-country deal package in US diplomatic history. Central to this was Qatar Airways’ order for 210 Boeing aircraft valued at $96 billion, making it the most lucrative deal ever for the American aerospace giant. Qatar also pledged tens of billions of dollars for joint ventures in quantum computing, smart energy networks, and STEM education programs for engineers and IT specialists in the US. In a provocative symbolic gesture, Qatar proposed gifting President Trump a custom-built Air Force One, sparking intense debate in the American media landscape.
In the United Arab Emirates, new agreements totaling $200 billion were signed – in addition to a previously negotiated $1.4 trillion package. Key components included the construction of an aluminum plant in Oklahoma, expansion of oil and gas infrastructure with US firms, and a landmark $100 billion commitment to American companies specializing in artificial intelligence over the next three years.
In total, Trump’s Gulf tour yielded over $2 trillion in contracts and investment pledges – an economic windfall of historic proportions. But beyond the numbers, the trip marked a fundamental redefinition of American foreign policy: from projecting power through military force and ideological alignment, to securing influence through economic penetration and transactional partnerships. Trump unveiled a new image of the US – not as a global policeman, but as a global entrepreneur. A nation that negotiates not with declarations, but with data, contracts, and employment metrics.
This new model resonated deeply with the Gulf monarchies themselves, which are undergoing profound transformations. Once reliant solely on oil exports, these states are rapidly evolving into tech-driven economies with ambitions to become global hubs of innovation, finance, and logistics. In Trump’s America, they found not just a security guarantor, but a strategic co-architect of a post-oil economic order – one where capital, innovation, and mutual profit outweigh traditional diplomatic protocol and ideological rhetoric.
Trump’s message was unambiguous: the era of foreign policy as charity is over. What now matters are mutual returns, strategic alignments, and economic gains. The Gulf states, driven by their own visions of modernization and diversification, eagerly embraced this shift. Together, they reimagined international relations not as a sphere of obligations, but as a marketplace of opportunities.
What about Israel?
One of the most significant – albeit unofficial – outcomes of Donald Trump’s Middle East tour could be discerned even before the journey began: the US President conspicuously bypassed Israel. This omission became all the more striking given that even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who had initially planned a visit to Tel Aviv, abruptly cancelled his trip at the last moment. The message did not go unnoticed in either Washington or Jerusalem: nearly all observers interpreted the move as a clear sign of a cooling relationship between the US and Israel – more precisely, between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The rift between the two leaders appears less personal than strategic, rooted in diverging visions of the region’s future. Tensions had been mounting for months. The first major flashpoint came when Trump unilaterally announced the withdrawal of American forces from operations against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, citing the group’s supposed commitment to halt attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes. The decision, made without prior consultation with Israel – which continues to endure daily rocket fire from the Houthis – dealt a blow not only to diplomatic norms but also to the foundational trust between Israel and its closest ally.
An even more sensitive issue has been the quiet resumption of US contacts with Iran. With Oman acting as mediator, Washington has been exploring the outlines of a possible new nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, Israel remains steadfast in its conviction that no negotiations with Tehran should occur until decisive military action is taken against its nuclear and military facilities – a show of force intended to compel concessions. Netanyahu failed to persuade Trump of this hardline approach, and the US president has increasingly charted his own, more flexible course.
Tensions have also sharpened over the future of Syria. Israel refuses to recognize the country’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, branding him a former al-Qaeda affiliate and a dangerous actor. Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory continue, the buffer zone in the Golan Heights remains under Israeli control, and the Druze population has formally been placed under Israeli protection. While Israel promotes the vision of a weak, decentralized Syria, Washington is embracing the opposite: al-Sharaa was invited to meet with Trump in Saudi Arabia, and following those talks, the US signaled its intent to lift sanctions on Damascus. Even more striking was the revelation that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – previously restrained by US pressure – are now prepared to invest in Syria’s reconstruction, viewing it as both a stabilizing opportunity and a chance to expand their regional influence.
Israeli frustration has been further stoked by Washington’s evolving stance on the Palestinian issue. Despite Israel’s ongoing military operation in Gaza, Trump has increasingly expressed a desire – even a demand – for a resolution to the conflict. His Gaza reconstruction plan, unveiled in February, sent shockwaves through Washington: it proposed the complete depopulation of Palestinians from the enclave and the transformation of the territory into a luxury international resort zone under US control. Not only was this radical proposal never coordinated with Israel, but it also raised fundamental questions about the future of the US-Israel alliance.
To make matters more complex, credible reports have emerged that the US has been engaged in direct negotiations with Hamas, without informing Israel. The recent release of an American citizen, IDF soldier Idan Alexander, who was captured in October 2023, was reportedly achieved through these covert channels – of which the Israeli government only became aware through its own intelligence services.
Against this backdrop, speculation is growing that the White House is seriously considering formally recognizing an independent Palestinian state. Such a move would not be a mere diplomatic gesture – it would reshape the strategic architecture of the Middle East. Should Washington proceed down this path, Israel could find itself in strategic isolation, while the center of regional gravity shifts toward Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Türkiye – countries with which Trump is building pragmatic, mutually beneficial, and business-driven relations.
None of these states demand unconditional support from Washington, meddle in its internal politics, or leverage domestic crises for influence. More importantly, they offer Trump what he values most: investment, trade, strategic partnership based on reciprocal interest, and freedom from ideological constraints.
Thus, a new geopolitical reality is taking shape before our eyes. In this emerging landscape, Donald Trump appears less inclined to view Israel as an indispensable ally and more drawn to politically agile, economically potent, and regionally assertive actors across the Arab world – and Türkiye. If rumors of Palestinian state recognition prove true, it will mark the end of the long-standing era of “special relations” between the US and Israel and signal the dawn of a new chapter in American Middle East policy – one governed not by ideological loyalty, but by unambiguous political and economic rationality.
Murad Sadygzade is President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).
‘A battle between right and wrong’: Houthi spokesman on confronting the US and Israel
The Grayzone | April 21, 2025
The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal interviews Muhammad Al-Bukhaiti, senior political officer and spokesman for Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement), on Yemen’s direct confrontation with a US military machine which is hellbent on destroying its ability to resist Israel. In this third conversation between The Grayzone and Bukhaiti, the Ansar Allah spokesman explains why he believes his movement’s war with the US-Israeli axis is unlike any conflict that preceded it, and why he believes Yemen is engaged in a righteous battle despite the terrible toll its civilians have faced. This interview was translated by Hekmat Aboukhater.
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If the US launches a ground operation against Yemen, it will backfire
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | April 21, 2025
Frustrated by its costly ongoing offensive campaign against Yemen, the Trump administration is said to be in talks to launch a ground effort aimed at seizing the strategic port city of Hodeidah, before effecting regime change in Sanaa. If this offensive does occur, it will result in a disastrous defeat for Washington.
In 2015, when then-US President Barack Obama backed the Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen, Riyadh had estimated that it would only take a few months to uproot the Ansar Allah leadership that had taken over Sanaa. Instead, they faced defeat after defeat at the hands of a highly-motivated armed force that received the backing of the majority of Yemen’s Armed Forces.
A decade later, despite the 2022 ceasefire, the conflict remains unresolved – and Ansar Allah’s power has only continued to grow. The movement that once seized control of Sanaa with the backing of key elements of the existing power structure, including segments of the military, was a shadow of what it has since become. Not only has it forged strong alliances with various tribal factions across Yemen, but it has also made leaps and bounds in developing both offensive and defensive weapons technologies.
The Yemeni Armed Forces that aligned with the Ansar Allah-led government proved capable of holding off the combined power of the Saudi-backed and UAE-backed Yemeni forces, in addition to various militant groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, also battling Saudi Arabia’s armed forces and later mercenary fighters from Sudan and elsewhere. They fought on the ground for years, amidst a US-Saudi blockade in the Red Sea, combined with US-British-Israeli logistical support being provided to their enemies, backing Riyadh’s air attacks against the country.
While managing to inflict countless defeats on what was supposed to be a militarily superior opposition – on paper – the Yemeni government in Sanaa continued to expand its power and territorial control in a country that has historically been divided between north and south.
In late 2021, game changing technological advances introduced a new dynamic to the conflict, ultimately pressuring the Saudi-led coalition to accept a UN mediated ceasefire proposal. By early 2022, after an expansion of the ground war the previous year, the Yemeni Armed Forces had launched a wave of successful drone and missile attacks at targets across the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.
While Riyadh had been dealing with Ansar Allah’s drones and missiles for years by that point, it was clear that a significant technological advancement had occurred. And whereas the Saudi State had some capacity to absorb limited attacks on its vital infrastructure, the Emirati regime was far less equipped to withstand repeated blows from Yemen.
Abu Dhabi in particular cannot afford to absorb sustained waves of drone and missile attacks, especially if Dubai becomes a target. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE is a tiny and vulnerable country. If Yemen decides to blanket them with strikes, their endeavors to diversify their economy will likely disintegrate, and no amount of deals with the US nor the Israelis can help them.
The claims that are being spread, particularly across Arabic language media, speculate that a Saudi-UAE backed force of about 80,000 soldiers is being amassed in order to launch an offensive aimed at seizing Hodeidah. Then, so goes the report, the US will offer air support and even launch a smaller ground attack to invade Yemen.
Donald Trump’s Vietnam?
Yemen was once dubbed Egypt’s Vietnam – and if the United States decides to launch a ground campaign there, the outcome is unlikely to align with President Donald Trump’s intentions. Already, the air campaign alone, which has to date killed around 150 civilians, has proven to be an embarrassing failure, costing US taxpayers billions of dollars with little to show in return.
Despite this war of aggression against Yemen being launched without a popular mandate, nor congressional approval, the US corporate media have largely chosen to ignore it. Yet, if Trump sends boots on the ground, Yemen will quickly dominate headlines, for the simple reason that US service members will start returning home in coffins.
So far, the Yemeni Armed Forces have limited their confrontations with the US’s naval fleets to defensive maneuvers, meaning that they have not been attempting to sink ships or aircraft carriers and are focused on defending their nation. If a large-scale ground operation is launched, the defensive posture will shift to one of offense.
The ground campaign will not only be costly and far from a walk in the park, the US will also endure direct hits to its vessels and significant casualties. Additionally, we should expect major attacks on both Saudi and Emirati infrastructure, which will disrupt oil markets. It is also very likely that US bases located in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond will come under attack.
Furthermore, we should probably expect occasional strikes against the Zionist regime that will be more intense than previous waves. If we begin to see the civilian death toll climb dramatically in Yemen, while the war is overtly an American-Zionist aggression, the way in which Ansar Allah will deal with it won’t be restricted any longer. On top of this, it could even end up uniting the people of Yemen to an even greater degree as a result, including factions and tribes that have always been at odds with Ansarallah.
Yemen is not Iran, but it has the capacity to inflict considerable losses on the US-allied regimes surrounding it and can target US forces directly. The question then becomes, can Riyadh and Abu Dhabi endure continuous barrages of munitions being fired towards them? Also, when the war lasts much longer than anticipated and the proxy ground force used to attack Yemen is suffering severe losses, as American soldiers return home in body bags, what will the strategy be then?
Will the 80,000 strong force continue to fight if they are suffering considerable losses, all in order to achieve a victory for Israeli strategic interests? Or will they begin to experience serious morale issues and defections? Will the US public be able to stomach the losses, and can the US military itself justify the loss of assets in a pointless fight to please their Zionist allies?
There will be no benefits to launching such an assault, and the US has not amassed nearly enough ground troops to launch a war alone. On every level, this would be a catastrophic strategic blunder. If they lose, this would be an embarrassment of historic proportions and nation-defining victory for the Sana’a government, despite the immense civilian suffering that will inevitably come from the war. All of this leaves out the potential involvement of other regional actors who may take advantage of the situation too.
If Trump decides to go ahead with such a conflict, in order to please his Zionist ally, it will greatly backfire. There will also be no way to hide the fact that he is working against US interests and sacrificing his own citizens in order to make the Israelis satisfied, without any real end goal or vision for victory.
Will Yemen turn its missiles on the UAE and Saudi Arabia?
By Bandar Hetar | The Cradle | April 16, 2025
The US war on Yemen, now in its second round, has passed the one-month mark with no clear gains and no timeline for success. What is emerging instead is the growing risk of escalation – one that could force regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, into direct confrontation.
Still, several factors may delay or even prevent such a scenario, much like what played out last year. Understanding where this war may be headed requires a clear grasp of the terrain: how Yemen views the conflict, how its Persian Gulf neighbors are reacting, and what could trigger a wider eruption or a negotiated backtrack.
Sanaa ties its military strategy to Gaza’s resistance
Even in western circles, there’s little dispute that the war on Yemen is now deeply intertwined with Israel’s brutal war on Gaza. Washington tried, under former US president Joe Biden, to separate the two. But the reality on the ground tells a different story – one where Sanaa’s military operations were in lockstep with events in Palestine.
That link became even clearer after the January 2025 ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, which prompted a pause in Yemen’s attacks – until Tel Aviv predictably walked back its commitments. US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House brought with it a resumption of strikes on Yemen, under the pretext of defending international shipping.
Yet those attacks would not have taken place had the US not already committed to shielding Israeli vessels. The new administration, unlike the last, makes no real attempt to disguise the overlap between the two fronts.
Yemen’s strategy has been clear from the outset: Its military activity is calibrated with the resistance in Gaza. Palestinian factions determine the pace of escalation or calm, while Yemen remains prepared to absorb the fallout.
Sanaa has paid a steep price for this stance. Washington has moved to freeze economic negotiations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, effectively punishing the former for refusing to abandon its military support for Gaza. The US has dangled economic incentives in exchange for neutrality – offers readily accepted by Arab states across the region – but Sanaa has refused to fold.
Faced with a binary choice – either maintain its support for Palestine and accept a freeze on domestic arrangements, or open a second front with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – Yemen chose to stay the course.
That decision was rooted in three core beliefs: that Palestine must be supported unconditionally, even if it means sacrificing urgent national interests; that Ansarallah’s political identity is grounded in opposition to Israeli hegemony and thus incompatible with any alignment with Persian Gulf normalization; and that Yemen must deny Washington and Tel Aviv the opportunity to distract it with side wars designed to weaken its strategic focus.
Gulf frustration builds over Yemen’s defiance
Arab coalition partners Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not taken kindly to Yemen’s decision. Both countries have used the moment to begin backpedaling on the April 2022 truce and to impose punitive costs on Sanaa for throwing its weight behind Gaza.
The optics have not favored either of the Gulf monarchies. Abu Dhabi is fully normalized with Israel, while Riyadh is edging ever closer. Yemen, meanwhile – still scarred from years of Saudi–Emirati aggression – has moved swiftly to back the Palestinian cause. The contrast could not be more stark: The Arab state most brutalized by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is now standing up for Palestine while the aggressors look away.
Yemen’s stance also clashes with the broader geopolitical alignment of both Persian Gulf states, which remain deeply embedded in Washington’s orbit. But their frustration has remained mostly rhetorical.
Despite their roles in the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has made major military moves against Yemen since the new round of US airstrikes began. Initially, Riyadh attempted to tie Yemen’s maritime operations in the Red Sea to the Gaza war, but that framing soon gave way to vague talk of threats to commercial shipping – code for backpedaling.
Saudi political messaging shifted sharply in January when it refused to take part in joint US–UK bombing raids. Its defense ministry moved quickly to deny reports that Saudi airspace had been opened for US strikes, and later distanced itself from any Israeli involvement. The message from Riyadh was clear: It does not want to be dragged into another full-scale war with Yemen – not now.
Yemen counters with a policy of containment
Despite Saudi Arabia’s retreat from its prior commitments, Yemen has actively encouraged Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to maintain a posture of neutrality. This is not out of optimism but pragmatism: Avoiding a wider war with the Persian Gulf would prevent a dangerous regional blowout. Sanaa’s goal has been to steer Saudi and Emirati decision-making away from military confrontation, proxy mobilization, or economic escalation.
That last point nearly tipped the balance in July 2024, when Riyadh instructed its puppet government in Aden to relocate Yemen’s central banks from Sanaa. It was a clear economic provocation – and a red line.
Within days, Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi delivered a sharp warning, framing the Saudi move as part of an Israeli–American playbook.
“The Americans are trying to entangle you [Saudi Arabia], and if you want that, then try it … The move towards aggressive escalation against our country is something we can never accept,” he revealed in a 7 July 2024 speech.
He warned Riyadh that falling for this trap would be “a terrible mistake and a great failure, and it is our natural right to counter any aggressive step.”
Sanaa responded with an unmistakable deterrent equation: “banks for banks, Riyadh Airport for Sanaa Airport, ports for ports.”
The Saudi maneuver may have been a test of Yemen’s resolve, possibly based on the assumption that Sanaa was too overextended – facing down a US-led coalition and spiraling domestic hardships – to respond decisively.
If so, Riyadh miscalculated. Houthi’s reply was blunt:
“This is not a matter of allowing you to destroy this people and push it to complete collapse so that no problems arise. Let a thousand problems arise. Let matters escalate as far as they may.”
No appetite in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi for a war without guarantees
The day after Houthi’s warning, massive protests erupted across Yemen. Millions marched in condemnation of Saudi provocations, offering the clearest signal yet that public opinion was firmly aligned behind the resistance – and willing to escalate.
Riyadh knows this. Even before the latest crisis, much of Yemeni society held Saudi Arabia and the UAE responsible for what even the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Any new conflict would only deepen that anger.
Faced with the threat of direct retaliation, Riyadh backed off its banking gambit. The memory of past Yemeni strikes on Saudi oil facilities – particularly those between 2019 and 2021 –still haunts the Saudi leadership.
Today, Yemen’s capabilities have expanded. It now possesses hypersonic missiles and increasingly sophisticated drone technologies. And it is precisely because of these advances that Washington has failed to strong-arm the Gulf into renewed warfare. There are no meaningful US security guarantees on the table – nothing that would shield Saudi oil fields, critical infrastructure, or commercial shipping lanes from blowback.
The failures are already evident. The “Prosperity Guardian” coalition has done little to stop Yemeni strikes on Israeli-linked vessels, and US–UK airstrikes have failed to stem Yemen’s ability to hit deep inside Israel. These battlefield realities have changed the calculus in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Escalation, for now, is off the table.
Yemen’s red lines are expanding
That does not mean Washington has stopped trying to drag Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the fight. The Biden administration failed to do so. The Trump team, however, is seen as more aggressive and more likely to provide advanced weapons systems that might tempt Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to take the plunge.
There is also the perception among Gulf elites that this is a strategic opening: Syria’s collapse, Hezbollah’s supposed decline, and shifting regional dynamics may provide a rare window to redraw the map.
But for the Saudis, Yemen remains the central concern. A liberated, ideologically defiant state on their southern border is an existential threat – not only to security, but to the cultural rebranding project that the Kingdom has invested so heavily in. The UAE shares similar anxieties. A rising Yemeni Resistance Axis threatens its carefully curated image as a regional player in sync with Israeli and western interests.
That is why Sanaa has placed its forces on high alert. Ansarallah is monitoring every move by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and their local proxies – many of whom are eager to join the war. These groups have signaled readiness to participate in an international coalition to “protect shipping,” and have already held direct meetings with US military and political officials.
But the Sanaa government knows these factions would not act without orders. If they are mobilized for a broad ground offensive, Yemen will respond by targeting the powers behind them. Any ground war will be seen as a Saudi–Emirati initiative, not a local one. The same logic applies to renewed airstrikes or deeper economic war. These are Sanaa’s red lines.
A warning to the Axis of Normalization
Abdul Malik al-Houthi laid it out clearly during a 4 April address:
“I advise you all [Arab states neighboring Yemen], and we warn you at the same time: Do not get involved with the Americans in supporting the Israelis. The American enemy is in aggression against our country in support of the Israeli enemy. The battle is between us and the Israeli enemy.
The Americans support it, protect it, and back it. Do not get involved in supporting the Israeli enemy … any cooperation with the Americans in aggression against our country, in any form, is support for the Israeli enemy, it is cooperation with the Israeli enemy, it is conspiracy against the Palestinian cause.”
He went further:
“If you cooperate with the Americans: Either by allowing him to attack us from bases in your countries. Or with financial support. Or logistical support. Or information support. It is support for the Israeli enemy, advocacy for the Israeli enemy, and backing for the Israeli enemy.”
This was not just a warning. It was a strategic declaration. Any country crossing these lines will be treated as an active participant in the war – and subject to retaliation.
The message is aimed not just at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but at other Arab and African states that might be tempted to join the fray under the guise of “protecting international navigation.”
Yemen is preparing for all scenarios. It will not be caught off guard. And this time, it won’t be fighting alone.
US airstrikes in Yemen lay groundwork for ‘ground invasion’ by UAE-backed militias: Report
The Cradle | April 15, 2025
With US support, UAE proxy militias in Yemen are planning a ground offensive to take the port city of Hodeidah from the Ansarallah-led Yemeni government and armed forces, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 15 April, in a move that would reignite the country’s devastating civil war.
“Private American security contractors provided advice to the Yemeni factions on a potential ground operation, people involved in the planning said. The United Arab Emirates, which supports these factions, raised the plan with American officials in recent weeks,” the WSJ wrote.
The ground offensive seeks to take advantage of the recent US bombing campaign targeting the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
US officials speaking with the newspaper said Washington has launched more than 350 strikes during its current campaign against Yemen and claim that the YAF has been weakened as a result.
While the Ansarallah-led National Salvation Government controls Yemen’s most populous areas, including the capital, Sanaa, and the strategic port city of Hodeidah, other parts of the country have remained in control of UAE and Saudi-supported factions since the end of the civil war in 2022.
Under the plan being discussed, factions of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) would deploy their forces north to the western Yemeni coast and try to seize the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, pro-UAE Yemeni sources said.
If successful, the ground operation would push the YAF back from large parts of the coast from where they have launched attacks on Israeli-linked ships transiting the Red Sea.
The YAF began targeting Israeli-linked ships in November 2023 in response to Israel’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. The US launched a war against Yemen and the YAF on Israel’s behalf shortly thereafter.
Capturing Hodeidah would be a “major blow” to the Ansarallah-led Yemeni government, “depriving them of an economic lifeline while also cutting off their main route to receive arms from Iran,” the WSJ wrote.
“A major ground offensive risks reigniting a Yemeni civil war that has been dormant for years and that spurred a humanitarian crisis when a Saudi–Emirati coalition supported local ground forces with a bombing campaign,” the WSJ added.
Officials from Saudi Arabia, which supports another Yemeni faction, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), have privately said they will not join or help a ground offensive in Yemen.
During the civil war, the Saudi-led coalition, alongside the UAE, conducted a major bombing campaign in Yemen that killed nearly 15,000 people, while the Saudi navy blockaded Yemen’s major ports, causing a humanitarian crisis that killed hundreds of thousands more.
In 2018, the Saudi Kingdom launched three operations against Ansarallah in an attempt to capture Hodeidah, yet failed.
Ansarallah forces retaliated by launching ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi cities, including striking a Saudi Aramco oil storage facility in Jeddah, which threatened to devastate the kingdom’s oil production and exports.
The YAF also responded to the UAE’s aggression on Yemen by launching its first drone and missile attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, targeting three oil trucks and an under-construction airport extension infrastructure.
Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia allegedly cooperated with and recruited fighters from the local Al-Qaeda affiliate, known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to assist in their proxy war against Ansarallah.
Australian cricket commentator sacked for noting mass deaths in Gaza
By Oscar GRENFELL | Strategic Culture Foundation | February 5, 2025
For the second time, the cricket world has provided a petty, vindictive and downright ridiculous example of the broader campaign by the powers-that-be to silence opposition to the Israeli genocide in Gaza.
In December 2023, the International Cricket Council (ICC) forbade Australian batsman Usman Khawaja from taking the field in international matches with shoes that read “all lives are equal” and “freedom is a human right.” The bureaucrats, who run the game from the ICC’s headquarters in the dictatorial United Arab Emirates, deemed those statements to be “political” because they were regarded as a reference to Israel’s mass murder of Palestinians.
The ICC’s suspicious and hostile attitude to professions of human rights and basic decency has now been matched by the Sports Entertainment Network, which runs the popular SEN sports radio broadcaster.
Over the weekend, SEN unceremoniously dumped Peter Lalor, a widely-respected cricket commentator, over posts he made on his X/Twitter account referencing Gaza. The sacking was done in a hurry. Lalor was in Sri Lanka as a freelance commentator commissioned by SEN to cover the ongoing Australia-Sri Lanka Test cricket series when he was dismissed.
Lalor had commentated the first test in Galle without incident, and was scheduled to cover the second. Why then the sudden rush by SEN to sever all ties with a leading cricket expert? For anyone familiar with the witch-hunts of the past 16 months that have accompanied the Israeli war crimes, inevitably “upset” and “offended” Zionists were in the picture.
As per Lalor’s account, “I was asked by station boss Craig Hutchison, who was civil, if I didn’t care that my retweeting of events in Gaza made Jewish people in Melbourne feel unsafe. I said I didn’t want anyone to feel unsafe.” Predictably, Hutchison reportedly related accusations that Lalor may be an antisemite, which has been the go-to line for shutting down opposition to the assault on Gaza.
Lalor went on: “The following day Hutchison told me that because the ‘sound of my voice made people feel unsafe’ and that people are ‘triggered by my voice,’ I could not cover the cricket for them anymore.”
If Zionists were telling SEN management that Lalor’s measured commentary of a Test cricket match was making them feel “unsafe,” the appropriate response would have been to dismiss the remarks as absurd.
More to the point, SEN should have noted that the complainants were making a cynical bid to have someone sacked for disagreeing with them politically. They should have told the witch-hunters to stop harassing their employee.
But, as has so often been the case with the Zionist witch-hunts, SEN management rolled over.
After Lalor’s sacking, Hutchison issued a nauseating statement. “SEN Cricket is a celebration of differences and nationalities,” it proclaimed, although those “differences” evidently did not extend to opposing the unfolding genocide or referencing the mass killing of Palestinians. To justify its censorship, the statement went on to describe the station as a “a place where our SEN audience can escape what is an increasingly complex and sometimes triggering world.”
Like the saga of Khawaja’s shoes, the most striking aspect of this incident is the complete mismatch between Lalor’s “offence” and the response. Lalor is not accused of ever having mentioned Gaza during a broadcast, so the references to the sound of his voice are presumably because it reminds the Zionists of his X/Twitter feed.
Moreover, the posts on his feed are simply not of a highly controversial character. In any objective assessment, Lalor comes across as a humane and democratically minded man, disturbed by the mass killing of Palestinians and wishing for an end to war.
Most of his posts were retweets from other accounts. As per Lalor’s account, Hutchison indicated that SEN was hit with complaints over Lalor during the first Test match, played from January 29 to February 1. It is difficult to determine when something was retweeted, as against when it was posted by the original account.
But some of Lalor’s X content around that time included retweeting a post reporting that “Palestine Red Crescent teams have recovered another 14 decomposed Palestinian bodies from several areas on the Rashid Coastal Road in Gaza.”
Another was a statement by a Palestinian Christian leader, condemning the invitation by US President Donald Trump for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to visit Washington. The pastor wrote, “The man who has an arrest warrant for him from the ICC [International Criminal Court] is invited to the White House as a guest of honor. This is the world we live in. Faith leaders must make their voices heard in times like this.” Other retweets by Lalor have highlighted the plight of Palestinian children and prisoners.
People instigating a witch-hunt over such content, which has nothing whatsoever to do with antisemitism, are simply supporters of war crimes.
Media and cricket figures have spoken out in defence of Lalor.
Khawaja declared on Instagram: “Standing up for the people of Gaza is not antisemitic nor does it have anything to do with my Jewish brothers and sisters in Australia, but everything to do with the Israeli government and their deplorable actions. It has everything to do with justice and human rights.” He concluded: “Pete is a good guy with a good heart. He deserves better.”
As per Lalor’s account of the sacking, “I was told in one call there were serious organisations making complaints; in another, I was told that this was not the case.”
Throughout the genocide, right-wing Zionist lobby groups that collaborate closely with the Israeli state and support its every crime against the Palestinians have fraudulently been depicted by governments and the media as representative Jewish organisations. Their every pronouncement has been reported uncritically and they have had access to the corridors of power.
These groups have repeatedly instigated witch-hunts targeting critics of Israel. Journalist Antoinette Lattouf is currently in the Federal Court, having brought a case against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) for unlawful termination. Lattouf was sacked halfway through a week-long fill-in position, after a concerted campaign by Zionist lawyers who barraged the ABC with vexatious complaints.
Lattouf’s sacking, ostensibly because she shared a post to her personal social media from Human Rights Watch condemning Israel’s use of starvation as a weapon of war, occurred in December 2023. The dismissal of Lalor, more than a year later, in such similar circumstances, underscores the normalisation of witch-hunting and politically motivated sackings by the Australian political, media and corporate establishment.
Such repressive measures set a precedent for broader attacks on working people as they enter into struggle against the broader eruption of militarism, including Australia’s transformation into a frontline state for a US-led war against China, completed by the same federal Labor government that has consistently backed Israel’s war crimes in Gaza.
Trump’s call for Palestinians’ relocation will threaten regional peace, Arab nations warn
Press TV – February 1, 2025
Major Arab nations have expressed their opposition to US President Donald Trump’s proposal to relocate Palestinians from Gaza and the occupied West Bank to neighboring Egypt and Jordan under any circumstances.
In a joint statement following a meeting in Cairo, the foreign ministers and officials from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League presented a unified stance against the US president.
They warned that such a move would threaten regional stability, risk spreading the conflict, and undermine prospects for peace and coexistence among its peoples.
“We affirm our rejection of [any attempts] to compromise Palestinians’ unalienable rights, whether through settlement activities, or evictions or annex of land or through vacating the land from its owners… in any form or under any circumstances or justifications,” the statement read.
The top diplomats emphasized that they were looking forward to working with Trump’s administration to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region, it noted.
Trump said last week that he had spoken with the king of Jordan about potentially building housing and moving more than 1 million Palestinians from Gaza to neighboring countries.
The US president added that he would like both Jordan and Egypt — which borders the battered enclave — to house the Palestinians displaced by 15 months of the Israeli regime’s genocidal war.
However, critics said that Trump’s suggestion would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on Wednesday opposed the idea that his country would facilitate the displacement of Gazans and said Egyptians would take to the streets to express their disapproval.
Trump on Thursday insisted that Egypt and Jordan would accept displaced Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, despite the two nations having dismissed his plan to relocate Gazans there.
Jordan is already home to several million Palestinians, while tens of thousands live in Egypt. The foreign ministries of Egypt and Jordan have both rejected Trump’s suggestion in recent days.
Emirati defense firm acquires 30 percent stake in top Israeli military supplier

The Cradle | January 30, 2025
Emirati defense firm EDGE is set to acquire a 30 percent stake in Israeli military supplier Thirdeye Systems, which develops AI-powered drone detecting systems.
Thirdeye Systems announced the deal in a statement on 28 January.
EDGE will also put down an extra $12 million into a new joint venture with Thirdeye Systems, which will be majority-owned by the Emirati company and tasked with developing and selling electro-optical object recognition systems to new regions and emerging markets.
It will own 51 percent of the joint venture, while Thirdeye Systems will retain 43 percent, and an unidentified third party will hold six percent.
“This technological and security partnership sends a strong message about the capabilities of our AI-driven products and their contribution to national security,” said Thirdeye Systems CEO Lior Segal.
“Partnering with a globally recognized supplier like EDGE will help us showcase Thirdeye Systems’ technological advantages and further expand our footprint in additional international markets,” he added.
The Israeli company’s drone-detecting systems are deployed by the Israeli military. Throughout the genocidal Israeli war that began after 7 October 2023, Tel Aviv faced a serious UAV threat from Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
Israel’s advanced systems failed to prevent sophisticated drone attacks by the resistance movements in many instances during the war.
EDGE President and CFO Rodrigo Torres said that the new deal “reflects our confidence in Thirdeye Systems’ solutions, which provide a critical layer of protection in unmanned aerial vehicle detection.”
“We believe this collaboration would benefit both parties and accelerate the development of new products to enhance identification capabilities in the evolving modern warfare,” Torres added.
Defense cooperation between the UAE and Israel has accelerated since the 2020 Abraham Accords, which saw the normalization of ties between the two countries during US President Donald Trump’s first term.
In 2023, the UAE and Israel unveiled their first jointly developed, unmanned naval vessel.
Trump has vowed to use the recent ceasefire agreement in Gaza to accelerate a normalization agreement between Israel and other Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia.
UAE’s support of Israeli economy and militarism
Press TV – August 24, 2024
The UAE has allocated $10 billion for direct investment in the Zionist entity in compliance with its obligations under the US-guided Abraham Accords.
The UAE’s deep involvement in Zionist militarism is barely noticed in the shadow of the Gaza genocide.
A deal was signed in 2021 between state-owned UAE arms firm, Edge Group, and weapons manufacturer, Israel Aerospace Industries, to design unmanned surface vessels with a range of military applications.
The UAE has also initiated a partnership between G42 and the Zionist entity-owned arms firm, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. G42 is run by Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s National Security Advisor who is the controlling shareholder and chairs the company.
Dorian Barak, co-president of the UAE-Israel Business Councilو expects to see about 1000 Israeli-owned companies operating in the Persian Gulf state very soon.
One such example could be Elbit Systems, which has set up a subsidiary in the UAE known as Elbit Systems Emirates. The branch produces weapons for both the UAE military and Israel.
The UAE state-owned firm, Mubadala, has an 11% participating interest in the Tamar and Dalit leases, which includes the bountiful Tamar gas field.
Mubadala has also invested in the Israeli venture capital firm, Pintango Venture Partners. Originally named Polaris Venture Capital, it was founded in 1993 by Chemi Perez, the son of the late Israeli president, Shimon Peres.
The UAE has also invested in the tech firm Synaptech, which is closely linked to the Israeli military. The chairman of Synaptech is the former war minister and the military chief of staff, Moshe Ya’alon.
The UAE is deeply integrated, economically, with the Zionist entity.
Failure of US policy in the Middle East
By Veniamin Popov – New Eastern Outlook – 10.08.2024
The dramatic events of late July in the Middle East are a clear indication of the failure of American policy in the region.
The Americans, staking their hopes on being able to sweep the Palestinian problem under the carpet, have miscalculated and as a result not only has their influence been weakened, but there is now a real possibility of a new full-scale war.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has made nearly a dozen visits to Middle Eastern countries since October 2023, and the only result has been that the mass murder of Palestinians is continuing. The much-publicized “Biden Plan” to resolve the crisis has simply been shelved. All USA’s actions in the Middle East have merely served to exacerbate the situation.
The likelihood of an Iranian response to the Netanyahu government’s actions has brought the entire region to the brink: according to the New York Times, Israel could not fight a war for long alone, so Washington must decide whether to go to war with Iran, along with Israel.
The governments of the Arab countries are aware of the dangers of the situation: as the Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani puts it, political assassinations and the ongoing attacks on civilians in the Gaza Strip during peace talks make us question how mediation can be successful if one side kills the negotiators from the other side. To achieve peace, there is a need for serious partners, and a position of disregard for human life is unacceptable.
Washington is trying to create a military bloc
The American administration tried its best to forge a military alliance between the Arab monarchies and Israel, and to this end it did all it could to woo Riyadh. Today, this strategic plan appears to be an ill-considered fantasy, but Washington is still seeking to create some sort of bloc, with the latest initiative being an economic grouping tentatively named I2U2, consisting of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.
The US is also trying to create an important economic corridor from India to Europe via the Middle East, also known as IMEC (India—Middle East—Europe Economic Corridor). It was designed to promote closer trade and energy ties between the European Union and India, with the help of US allies in the Persian Gulf. The goal is to help India distance itself away from China’s attempts to sideline New Delhi from its One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative. while creating a grand pro-American economic alliance stretching from the EU through Saudi Arabia and the UAE all the way to India—a grouping that would also isolate Iran. The founding partners of the IMEC are the US, EU (France, Germany and Italy), Saudi Arabia, the UAE and India.
The American plan was to give military weight to these intersecting alliances by forging a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and also normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations. America’s allies in the Middle East—Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain—would thus serve as an anti-Iranian alliance.
Current events make it clear how unrealistic the calculations of the US are. In this regard, it is worth remembering the words of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who described Muslim countries that normalize relations with Israel as “betting on a losing horse,” before adding that “the definitive stance of the Islamic Republic is that the governments which prioritize the gamble of normalization with the Zionist regime will incur losses… Today, the situation of the Zionist regime is not one that should motivate closeness to it; they should not make this mistake.”
The decline of the US is also evident in its foreign policy
Washington officials frequently display wishful thinking—notable in this regard is an article dated August 2, 2024 by University of Texas professor Gregory Gause III, published in the Foreign Affairs magazine. He argues that the real prospects for a US-Saudi security deal are very elusive, and that Riyadh should hardly be expected to “take Washington’s side Against China and Russia.”
The well-known US American political scientist John Mearsheimer believes that the US, through its unconstructive actions and miscalculations, “has itself played a decisive role in destroying its own world dominance.”
The renowned French scientist Emmanuel Todd, in a recent interview with the Berliner Zeitung, emphasized that trust in the United States around the world is declining because “the West, with America at its center, is experiencing internal disintegration, and we can see the decline of the West at various levels—if we look not at the GDP inflated by the service sector, but at the real industrial and agricultural production of the West, we can see a huge weakness… here the failures in education, especially in the United States, are even more alarming. Educational attainment there has been falling since 1965, there has been a decrease in the number of students, and tests show that IQ levels are dropping. Today in America they often train not engineers, but lawyers and stockbrokers.” Perhaps this can help to explain the huge failures of US foreign policy, including in the Middle East.
Renowned US economist Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University has repeatedly stressed that America’s meddling in the Middle East destabilizes the region and provokes mass suffering. Professor Sachs also believes that changes taking place around the world make it reasonable to expect that “a comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on a two-state solution is still achievable.”
A leading neoconservative for most of the last half century has released a comprehensive series of recommendations on 