Iran and the United States have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aimed at launching expanded negotiations and ending the war across all fronts in the region.
The text of the agreement, published by Tasnim News Agency, outlines a framework for a permanent cessation of hostilities, sanctions relief, maritime security arrangements, nuclear negotiations, and a roadmap toward a final agreement to be concluded within 60 days.
The full text of the Iran-US MoU
Below is the full text of the MoU as reported by Tasnim News Agency :
Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war by signing this MoU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph.
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days, extendable with mutual consent.
Immediately upon the signing of this MoU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.
Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.
The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, i.e. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions-termination issue abovementioned, and expressed their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations, in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material, pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph Seven, with the minimum methodology to be downblending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues abovementioned and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy additional forces in the region.
The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MoU until the termination of sanctions, the US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MoU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, either retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MoU and the future compliance of the final deal.
After signing this MoU and subject to the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of this MoU and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.
The final deal will be endorsed by a binding UN Security Council resolution.
A Ukrainian drone attack has struck a bus carrying a children’s soccer team from Belarus to a Russian seaside resort, according to acting Bryansk Region Governor Egor Kovalchuk.
The attack killed an adult woman who was accompanying the underage passengers to the resort town of Gelendzhik in Krasnodar Region and injured six others, including four children, the official said.
One young victim has been rushed to hospital in serious condition, while the injuries of the others are considered moderate, Deputy Health Minister Aleksey Kuznetsov told the media. He said seven people in total were injured. Meanwhile Belarusian Deputy Health Minister Aleksandr Khodzhaev said eight victims were being treated following the incident, including six minors.
The bus was carrying 44 passengers, including 28 young athletes from a school sports team based in the town of Rechytsa in Belarus, according to Russia’s Investigative Committee. The incident has been designated a terrorist attack, the agency added.
Source: Social media
Images published by Russian and Belarusian media showed the attacked vehicle – a single-deck passenger bus rather than a double-decker initially reported by the Investigative Committee – with holes apparently left by shrapnel and a deflated front-right tire.
The acting governor later shared photos of what appears to be the same bus, including of the interior, showing shattered windows and seats apparently smeared with blood.
The woman who was killed was the wife of the team coach, a source in Belarusian law enforcement told RT.
Kiev has intensified its long-range drone campaign against Russia in recent months, describing the strikes as “long-range sanctions” aimed at inflicting economic damage. Moscow has accused Ukraine of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and attempting to terrorize the population.
In May, Ukrainian drones struck a dormitory at a vocational college in Starobelsk in the Lugansk People’s Republic, killing 21 people. According to local authorities, many of the victims were teenage students who were spending the night on campus.
Officials in Russian regions bordering Ukraine also regularly report strikes on vehicles used by repair crews, medics, and other community services. Earlier on Wednesday, Kovalchuk reported an attack on an ambulance in Bryansk Region that was responding to an emergency, in which the driver, a nurse and a paramedic were injured. In a separate incident, a drone hit a civilian car, injuring the driver and a female passenger, he added.
Belarus is a close military and political ally of Russia, but has not directly joined the Ukraine conflict. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly said he would only enter the fighting if attacked first.
Since mid-May, Zelensky has issued a series of warnings to Minsk, threatening a pre-emptive strike over what he claimed were preparations for a possible attack from Belarusian territory. However, Ukrainian officials themselves have said there was no evidence of such plans.
Lukashenko has dismissed the claims as empty grandstanding, saying the Ukrainian military lacks the manpower to launch an incursion into Belarus.
On 17 June, G7 leaders announced that US and EU arms makers will start manufacturing advanced long-range weaponry “under license” in Ukraine, as western stockpiles dwindle, aiming to industrialize the frontline and sustain pressure on Russia.
A diplomatic source at the summit in Evian-les-Bains clarified that the push involves “not just air defense systems, but deep strike capabilities,” allowing Ukraine to threaten targets much deeper into Russian territory, Le Parisienreported.
The official noted that local production is essential as Ukrainian forces currently deploy approximately 20 Patriot missiles to counter every massive Russian offensive, straining global stocks.
The move effectively entrenches a permanent industrial infrastructure for offensive warfare capabilities within Ukrainian territory.
In a joint statement, G7 leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, and the EU expressed their “readiness to grant Ukraine licenses enabling it to increase its military production.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz explained that US firms will grant these licenses to European and Ukrainian manufacturers to address current industrial shortages.
Merz stated he was “grateful to [US] President [Donald] Trump for this great willingness to cooperate,” adding, “We are all currently producing too little, and this can be compensated for by granting licenses to companies that have these production capacities, including European and Ukrainian companies.”
This military support coincides with a G7 agreement to escalate economic pressure on Moscow by tightening sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sectors, with leaders citing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following the Iran–US memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the catalyst for these measures.
“We consider this the right moment to proceed with additional measures, as President Trump has delivered a deal that we support in reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” the leaders declared.
The move follows the US reinstatement on Tuesday of oil sanctions that had been temporarily suspended during the war on Iran, which now may end with the signing of the MoU on Friday in Switzerland.
The summit highlighted a shift in US foreign policy. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described the new US stance as “harder toward Russia and more realistic, in our view, of the situation on the ground of the war.”
Trump, who told assembled leaders “I’m the boss,” pledged to “do everything” to help end the conflict.
While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed the “important results” regarding the military contracts, he remained cautious following a February 2025 meeting with US Vice President JD Vance and a demand that Ukraine provide resources as “compensation” for aid.
French diplomatic sources added that G7 members now “acknowledge that there is momentum on the ground” in Ukraine’s favor.
The new western military push comes after the EU had approved an approximately $105 billion loan for Ukraine on 22 April to fund critical defense needs and financial assistance.
The funding was released following a months-long deadlock after Ukraine resumed Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia.
Hungary had vetoed the loan, accusing Kiev of using “technical repairs” from a drone strike as a pretext to weaponize energy and exert political pressure.
US President Donald Trump is seeking to leverage severe Palestinian financial hardship to coerce a “normalization” agreement that would require the Palestinian Authority (PA) to drop all international legal challenges against Israel, the Times of Israel reported on 17 June.
This proposed memorandum of understanding (MoU), negotiated by US officials Aryeh Lightstone and Scott Leith, demands the Palestinian Authority (PA) “halt efforts to internationalize the conflict with Israel.”
In exchange for these concessions, Washington has offered the hollow possibility of reopening the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mission in Washington and lifting sanctions, but only after the PA completes a series of “Saudi-chaperoned reforms.”
The PA has further requested language in the MoU calling for a cessation of Israeli settlement expansion and a crackdown on “rampant settler violence” in the occupied West Bank.
Central to these talks is the fate of over $5 billion in Palestinian tax revenues, which Israel has been illegally withholding for over a year in violation of the Oslo Accords.
The US seeks to redirect these funds to the “Board of Peace” and its National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) to finance a post-war governance plan that bypasses the PA until it meets Washington’s benchmarks – including the dissolution of the PA’s welfare program for the families of Palestinians killed or imprisoned by Israeli occupation forces.
While the PA has agreed in principle to this diversion to secure a fraction of its own money, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has blocked the transfer, openly advocating for the “collapse of the PA” and rejecting even debt-settlement transfers in a deliberate effort to ensure the total financial strangulation of Palestinian governance.
Despite external audits confirming the PA has successfully reformed its welfare system to end payments based on attacks, a US Department report, relying on Israeli data, claimed the PA still provides “compensation in support of terrorism.”
As the US explores legally thin options to unilaterally seize Palestinian funds, officials admit the administration views the West Bank as an “afterthought” while prioritizing the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
In the years of Pro-Palestine demonstrations I’ve attended since 7th October 2023, there is rarely a mention of the group at the core of the whole issue: Hamas. For people are fearful to talk about them. But whilst calling for support for Hamas may be illegal, seeking its de-proscription is not. The UK Government’s 2000 Terrorism act permits requesting the de-proscription of any “terrorist” group. You can’t be penalised for calling for de-proscription. Citizens have the right to appeal against proscription if you give a reason as to why its proscription affects you.
Following the events of 7th October 2023, I did exactly that and launched a petition to the Home Secretary. Initially I tried to get the petition before Parliament using the UK Government portal but was told it was beyond Parliament’s remit! So, I launched it online on Go-Petition, promoted it using 20,000 flyers – which I took to all the demonstrations around London and Scotland – and started getting signatures.
By January, the online petition had 45,000 views and 1,410 signatures which, though fearing arrest, I took to Downing Street. My two supporters and I had our photo taken outside No. 10 and were welcomed into the building by police carrying a big box with Hamas Petition written on it.
The mainstream media was completely absent, despite my mailing 270 journalists – not one of whom decided to cover it. Only Russia Today, Al Jazeera, The Canary and Middle East Monitor carried it.
I experienced no issue with the police despite threats of being arrested from two of the 650 MPs I had written to on the petition. Unhappily for these two public servants, I had broken no law.
To be clear, although I have previously been in touch with Hamas on a prior campaign to twin Edinburgh with Gaza, they did not request nor have any involvement with this one. Indeed, around this time, an organisation called Riverways Law were asked by Hamas to submit a de-proscription application.
Their submission was much more thorough than my 8-page submission to the Home Secretary. You can check it out in full on their website at https://hamascase.com. It had lots of witness statements, including from members of Hamas describing what they saw on 7th October as well as the impact de-proscription was having on people’s lives. It was a phenomenal amount of work. They asked for de-proscription on three grounds:
They said the Home Secretary has a duty to prevent even a suspicion of genocide; the way that the rules are set out, it’s not that she needs to see someone committing genocide in order to stop them – if there is even a suspicion of genocide, it becomes incumbent upon her to act. But because she’s banned Hamas and Hamas is fighting genocide- proscription means she’s undermining that fight.
The second issue of course was Freedom of Speech. The Qassam Brigades (the armed wing of Hamas) were banned in 2001 by Tony Blair, but the political part of Hamas was accepted by Britain as being legitimate – they were essentially the government of Gaza. It wasn’t until 2021 when Priti Patel went on holiday to Israel, met Netanyahu and banned Hamas on her return. No vote in Parliament was required. Yet as Hamas has never operated outside Palestine, there is no issue of protection within the UK. We in Britain should have a right to discuss Hamas and by banning it, the Home Secretary has taken away our freedom of speech, which is Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. So, it is the British Government who are breaking the law here.
Finally, there is the lack of proportionality over banning. The Quartet (Russia, the US, UN and the EU) – set their preconditions after Hamas was democratically elected in 2006. Despite the fact that the UN has allowed the use of armed force against occupation since 1982, they said they would only engage with Hamas if they gave up arms, recognise Israel and accept all PLO/Israeli agreements that had been made in the Oslo Accords of 1993. Clearly, Hamas were never going to do that.
The Quartet later appointed Tony Blair because of his ability in Northern Ireland to get peace- which was an incredible achievement. But we got peace because we negotiated. We never asked Sinn Fein to recognise Britain’s authority over Ulster. We weren’t asking the same thing that he was then asking Hamas to do. Another example: Nelson Mandela, when he headed the armed wing of the ANC, wasn’t asked to renounce the ANC before discussing peace.
Also, Hamas is the Gaza administration- so proscription criminalises all public sector workers there. For example, Gaza City Council has 5,000 employees, just looking after the million people who lived in Gaza City. Technically, if you send money to one of those employees- you could be supporting Hamas. So its banning is simply unjust because it criminalises a vast swathe of people. It’s also pointless because they don’t have any influence over Britain.
The original charter was drafted when Hamas was established in 1987; there were some quite harsh things in there. It’s an Islamic resistance movement after all – but that wasn’t the full thoughts of Hamas, because it wasn’t written by all of them, it was written by one man. So, in 2017 they released a clarification – their Principles and Policies. In it, they even said they would settle for a “Hudna”, a truce, along the same lines as what the UN and UK demands – a return to the 1967 borders, Israel giving up the land it had taken then, giving up that occupation. Hamas also wanted the Palestinian prisoners to be released and the Palestinians who were driven out in 1948 to be given the right of return, as the UN had called for in resolution 194. But the Hamas offer of a truce was completely ignored; this proposal wasn’t covered in the West at all.
Each year Hamas calls for elections; but Fatah each year denies them. It’s true that Hamas would prefer Sharia law, but it has said it will go with the majority in a democratic Palestine. It seeks the end of Israel but would live alongside Jews who gave up Zionism. But none of this was or is talked about.
We get a very twisted view of Hamas. A brief look at its history: it all began with the advent of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt, which was then constituted in Palestine in 1946. The Brotherhood concentrated on philanthropic acts- setting up mosques, schools, universities and so on. Back then Russia and China supported the liberation movements all over the world and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) benefitted from this. As the Soviet Union fell, political Islam rose. In 1987 much of the Brotherhood realised it could not refuse to fight any longer and so with the first intifada in 1987, Hamas emerged. Initially, Israel discreetly supported them as a counter to the secular PLO. But in 1993 matters exploded after Israeli Baruch Goldstein killed 29 worshippers at a mosque in Hebron (Goldstein is a hero nowadays to people like Ben-Gvir); he committed mass murder and injured hundreds more. As a response, the Qasam brigades (the Hamas armed wing) declared they would retaliate, using two suicide bombs in buses against civilians in 1994. This resulted in Hamas’ proscription by the US and then the UK and EU.
Recall that in 1993, Israel and the PLO had signed the Oslo Accords- without most Palestinians knowing about it. The PLO was led by Fatah, Yasser Arafat’s party.
Hamas rejected these accords and wouldn’t get involved in the first elections but chose to give the new Palestine Authority (PA) a chance. The PA began then doing what Israel had said they should do in the agreement, which was to jail people who were resisting Israel’s rule. The PA started jailing Hamas supporters, doing Israel’s dirty work. Also, it was becoming quite corrupt.
Hamas was under attack on all fronts. From 1996 onwards, Israel began murdering Hamas leaders; in 2004 they assassinated Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, its founder. Fatah’s Arafat also died in 2004, following which Abbas stood for election. Hamas boycotted this, because any president of theirs would have had to negotiate with Israel, which they did not wish to do- so Fatah’s Abbas took power. But in 2006 Hamas decided they would stand for election because they fundamentally believe in democracy. They did stand, winning handsomely. But Israel and the US immediately set about undermining the Hamas Government, which Fatah had also rejected, because they didn’t want to give up power. Abbas had his own US-trained police force versus the Hamas Government police force; this was just a recipe for disaster. There were many killings of Hamas supporters, then revenge killings; eventually it became clear that Fatah was planning a coup, which led to Hamas seizing power in Gaza.
Thereafter, Israel refused to negotiate over Palestinian statehood. They employed a Catch-22; they said they wouldn’t negotiate with Hamas, because they were “terrorists”; and they wouldn’t negotiate with the PA because it didn’t reflect all Palestinians. There was no way to win because Israel had every excuse in the book for refusing the things that they had agreed to.
In the West Bank, as expected, the PA became responsible for arresting Hamas supporters, making them very unpopular. Then when Hamas took power in Gaza, Israel began its blockade; Hamas responded by firing rockets into Israel. Over 20 years from 2001 onwards, 44 Israelis were killed by rockets fired from Gaza; over the same period, Israel killed many, many thousands of Palestinians in Gaza.
Note that Hamas made repeated attempts over the years at peaceful protest, culminating in the 2018 Great March of Return. It was just so shocking; people were getting murdered by snipers just because they wanted to go home, back through the fence. Many of us became aware of the true nature of the Israeli regime at this time.
But Israel continued to allow Qatar to fund Hamas; suitcases full of dollar bills went into Gaza because Israel wanted to keep Hamas going, as then they would continue in conflict with Fatah (the PA), who were being funded by the EU and the US. The more they became polarised, the more the Israelis benefitted.
This carried on until Donald Trump set up the 2020 Abraham Accords in an attempt to “normalise” relations between the Arab states and Israel, seeking the former’s recognition and trade with Israel. Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates all signed and in 2023 it looked like Saudi Arabia was going to be next, even though up until then the Saudis had said they wouldn’t normalise unless Palestine attained statehood. But the more the Israelis promised the Saudis- their own nuclear power stations for example- the more the Saudis were tempted, which gave the strong impression that Palestine was being negotiated away. Hamas felt it had to put Palestine back in the public eye. Also, there was a lot of anger about Israeli actions at Al Aqsa Mosque in 2023, where IDF soldiers attacked people at worship during Ramadan.
Hamas launched their strike pre-emptively as they became aware that Israel was about to attack again and take the Hamas leaders. In this strike, their stated aim was to capture soldiers- as the going rate for one Israeli soldier was about one thousand Palestinians, as evidenced by the various previous prisoner exchanges that had taken place.
The plan therefore was to take captives. On 7th October Hamas launched an attack with the IDF falling back quickly, which Hamas didn’t expect. They then moved to settlements seeking more captives. Israel now employed the Hannibal directive, which is to stop Israelis falling into Palestinian hands. Clearly, the damage to cars at the scene could not have been done by guys on motorbikes with Kalashnikovs and were likely done by Hellfire missiles from IDF Apache helicopters. These cars were completely and utterly burned out. The cars had been taking Israelis back to Gaza as captives, but the IDF bombed them. Damage from IDF tank fire of kibbutz homes was also apparent. Whether there was a Palestinian in there and some Israelis, the IDF didn’t care, they just bombed the whole building because they knew that they could then blame Hamas. It’s believed as many as 800 Israelis were killed by the IDF. Furthermore, as more and more evidence has come to light following the attack, the claims of mass rape have by now been largely dismissed, despite the media frenzy. There were 19 breaches of the border fence, through which lots of people flooded out of Gaza, not just Hamas. The psychological state of these Gazans can be guessed at, after being starved and bombed for twenty years. They attacked the Nova festival that Hamas says they didn’t know was taking place.
The US and UK accepted Israel’s narrative. And now Israel uses the terrorist label to justify a genocide. And most Israelis have gone along with this because, they think “Oh no, they’re going to kill us all”. It’s got to that level of terror amongst your average Israeli – that they think “we can’t do anything but kill Palestinians, because otherwise we’re dead”. Which is exactly what Netanyahu and the Zionists want.
Even in this country, they brew up terror amongst Jewish people, because they know that just keeps the whole ball rolling that Jews everywhere are at risk– and nothing sells newspapers like antisemitism.
As long as Hamas represents the majority political view in Palestine, any negotiations would need to include Hamas, for any resulting deal to have any legitimacy within Palestine. Various UK Lords such as Lord Peter Hain and Lord Rickets have declared that wiping out Hamas is impossible. Even Tony Blair said it was a mistake to ban Hamas. Yet, these issues are shoved under the carpet and what we have is a very silent acceptance of proscription. But 80% of countries in the world do not label Hamas as terrorists. The UN does not define Hamas as terrorists. It’s actually the UK, the EU and the US that do so, which gives Israel all the cover it needs to continue killing Palestinians.
Pro-Palestine demonstrations are all very good but are not really getting at the root of what’s going on; Palestinians are fighting for their lives and land, and we should not ignore the fact that Hamas are fighting for them.
The tide is turning. A recent survey by the Higher Education Policy Institute indicated that more than a quarter of British undergraduates consider the Hamas attacks of 7th October to be “defensible”. Furthermore, Britain’s Muslim police body, the National Association of Muslim Police, recently defended Hamas and labelled the IDF as a “terrorist group”.
We must keep calling for de-proscription. If you agree, please sign the petition at www.tiny.cc/hamas – which also supports the Riverways Law bid. Although that was turned down, it is now being pursued through the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. We can then start getting people to write to their MPs. If enough people bug their politicians, we may succeed, not tomorrow perhaps, but if we persist for as long as it takes, it may lead to the establishment of a new democratic state for the most persecuted and oppressed people on this planet.
There are many lessons to be learned from the latest made-for-Israel war on Iran. The first and most damning is that the war resolved the very crisis it created. Donald Trump celebrated the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of the blockade against Iran. Two conditions that were fully in place before Benjamin Netanyahu dog walked Trump into this war. The agreement that concluded the war took us back to exactly where we stood before America spent $200 billion, and where Americans continue to pay Israeli surcharge tax at the pump and grocery stores.
As for Iran’s nuclear program, the arithmetic does not lie. The 400 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium that Iran possessed were zero before Trump — pressured by his largest Israel-first donors — tore up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran had fully complied not only with the IAEA non-proliferation agreement, which Israel has never signed nor accepted, but with the additional protocols governing verification and monitoring of its civilian nuclear program.
Trump canceled the deal anyway, not because it failed America, but because it did not satisfy Israel’s veto.
The deepest irony is that Iran’s nuclear knowledge and capabilities are more advanced today than when Trump discarded the JCPOA. Any new agreement — even one stricter in structure than the original — is therefore being negotiated from a fundamentally weaker position than the one that existed in 2018. No treaty can unlearn what Iran already knows.
On Monday, June 15, Trump heralded the end of war bragging that Iran agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. In a leaked copy of the supposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), item 8 states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons ...” The word reiterates is not incidental. It is a direct reference to Article III of the 2015 JCPOA, which Trump most likely never read, where Iran had already affirmed: “… that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” Same commitment. Same language. Different signatures. Twelve weeks of a war that went nowhere to get here.
From “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” to celebrate an MoU to reopen a Strait that was open before $200 billion and countless American and Iranian lives were squandered. Trump’s triumph is much ado about nothing.
He canceled an existing deal that took years to negotiate, inflicted economic hardship on ordinary Iranians, and allowed Iran’s nuclear advancement to leap forward. It is, in the most literal sense, like redefining water as H2O. The molecule did not change. Only the dressing did. Israel’s war took Trump back to the starting point, at twice the cost to American taxpayers.
The same special-interest group that pushed Trump to cancel the JCPOA, lobbied him long before the 2024 election. Israel-first donors poured hundreds of million into his campaign as a down payment for this war. Netanyahu visited Trump seven times in thirteen months, manipulating, and scheming for another made-for-Israel war.
This war should also carry a lesson for the Arab Gulf states that long believed American military bases were a guarantee of their security. Instead, they found themselves sidelined and never consulted on a war waged, directly or indirectly, from their own soil, ultimately in service of an Israeli agenda. Foreign military presence does not deliver security. It delivers dependency. Lasting regional stability is built through regional cooperation, on terms beneficial to the region.
More importantly, the region must now reckon with a pattern it can no longer afford to ignore: wherever Israel goes, instability follows. The so-called Abraham Accords brought Israel into the Gulf. What followed was bombs, drones and economic ruins never seen since the Second World War.
I have lived in the Gulf. The only pop people could hear was the backfire of an aging car exhaust. In the last three months, friends shared recordings of ballistic missiles splitting the sky and drones buzzing overhead. Israel did not bring a defense shield; it brought a target. Its presence is a magnet for unrest. It is a carcass attracting wasps.
In fact, Israel is an agent of disorder and a parasite nurtured by chaos. It wraps itself in the language of partnership, mutual benefit, and shared values, deceiving others into believing the arrangement is reciprocal when it is entirely one-directional.
Israel’s record speaks for itself: a genocide in Gaza, ethnic cleansing across the West Bank, 1.3 million internal refugees in Lebanon, the occupation of Syrian land following Assad’s fall, destabilization operations in northern Iraq and Sudan.
In Iraq, the American invasion and regime change did not satisfy Israel’s insatiable lust for total chaos. It targeted Iraqi scientists and waged war against knowledge itself. The blueprint, in this view, has not changed for Iran. Israel’s dissatisfaction over the MoU with Tehran is not that it fails to produce a non-nuclear Iran, but that it fails to wipe out knowledge. Its broader objective is the suppression of scientific and technological development across the region. Israel seeks neighbors unable to think independently, consume, not produce, import rather than innovate. It wants to maintain a monopoly over nuclear capabilities and control over regional scientific advancement.
Israel brought ruins to the U.S., too. The made-for-Israel Iraq war helped detonate the financial crisis of 2008, saddling future American generations with trillions in accumulated debt that has never been fully reckoned with. A war that Trump condemned, criticizing Democratic leadership for failing to impeach George W. Bush who “got us into the war with lies.”
The cost of current Trump’s made-for-Israel war on Iran requires no economist to explain. It arrives uninvited in every American home, at the meat counter, in every grocery bill, every gas receipt, every price that keeps rising without explanation. They may not realize its extent, yet. By the time they do, the damage to the U.S. economy, as in 2008, will be too deep to reverse.
To undermine potential peace with Iran, the ungrateful Israel-first loyalists like Ben Shapiro, Mark Levin are already panicking and challenging Trump’s MoU. Israel will activate the constellation of media outlets controlled by Israel-first billionaires to shape what Americans see, read, and are permitted to question. The once-respected 60 Minutes, under a new Israel-first boss, Bari Weiss, allows Netanyahu to handpick his own interviewer. Who knows, maybe he submits his own questions, too.
Now, Netanyahu and American Zionists have sixty days to sabotage a final deal with Iran. Israel will mobilize its donors, lobby Congress, and if that fails, resort to what it has perfected. A false flag operation against American forces in the region, or another assassination in Lebanon.
A conflagration ensues, and once again, it will be fought with American money and American lives. Because a Middle East free of American military entanglement is the one outcome Israel cannot tolerate — a prospect more threatening than any Iranian nuclear centrifuge.
“We are consolidating an Iranian equation in the region, one in which Iran will no longer exercise restraint in the face of any aggression or disorder. It will cost the Americans some pain and expense, but they will get used to it.” – Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for Iran’s parliamentary National Security Commission
Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesman for Iran’s parliamentary National Security Commission, was describing a policy already underway rather than offering a warning.
Lebanon is where that policy is now being tested, and where much of what western analysts thought they understood about Iranian strategic behavior is being quietly dismantled.
A policy already in motion
The most persistent misconception about Iran’s intervention in the defense of Lebanon is that it is driven by ideology – by revolutionary solidarity with Hezbollah, by commitments that rational statecraft would eventually subordinate to national interest.
This reading is not simply incomplete. It mistakes the symptom for the diagnosis. What is unfolding is a deliberate reconfiguration of Iran’s deterrence architecture, one in which the security of key regional partners is no longer a separate file that adversaries can negotiate away in isolation, but a constituent element of Iran’s own national security perimeter.
Something else is also being overlooked. The confrontation over Lebanon marked the first time the Islamic Republic entered a direct military confrontation, primarily in defense of a key ally. The decision points to a broader evolution in Iranian strategic thinking, one whose implications extend far beyond Lebanon.
The limits of strategic patience
For years, Tehran operated under what officials and analysts described as strategic patience. The approach prioritized responses to direct attacks on Iranian territory, personnel, or core interests, while absorbing pressure across other fronts. This framework shaped Iran’s posture through successive crises, from the assassination of Qassem Soleimani to repeated Israeli strikes on Iranian assets across the region.
The approach was internally consistent, but over time its costs became clearer. Acts of restraint were increasingly read as openings to test the next front, while each separately negotiated file encouraged further compartmentalization.
Tehran’s takeaway, formed incrementally, was that this pattern was being used to press its positions rather than stabilize them.
Iranian decision-makers have since drawn a conclusion from that experience, and it is now reflected in their posture. Reutersreported in March that Iran had informed intermediaries as early as mid-March that any ceasefire arrangement must include a halt to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon – linking the end of the broader war to a front that Washington insists is a separate matter.
Six regional sources confirm the linkage. One was explicit: “Iran is prioritizing Lebanon; it will not accept Israeli violations in Lebanon like what happened after the 2024 ceasefire.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated the same principle publicly, arguing that a ceasefire between Iran and the US constitutes a comprehensive ceasefire across all fronts, and that any violation on one front is a violation across all fronts.
Washington finds this inconvenient. That, from Tehran’s perspective, is precisely the point.
Reputation as deterrence
The underlying logic is not difficult to follow, and it is not unique to Iran. Great powers derive influence not from military capability alone, but from reputation – specifically, the reputation for honoring commitments when doing so is costly.
This is why NATO remains the organizing principle of US security strategy in Europe despite its expense and its complications. It is why Washington maintains military installations across five continents that serve no immediate operational purpose.
The function is primarily reputational. Presence signals commitment, and commitment deters. Iranian strategists have reached a similar conclusion regarding their own regional position.
If Tehran abandons Hezbollah under sustained pressure – military, diplomatic, or economic – the signal sent to every other partner would be unmistakable, with Iranian guarantees no longer seen as reliable under sustained pressure.
In a region where Iran is constructing an alternative security architecture, that signal would be more damaging than any battlefield setback.
This is less about Hezbollah as an individual actor and more about the network of relationships of which it is a part. Surrendering one component under pressure does not stabilize the structure. It shows adversaries how much pressure to apply to the next one. Arab states of the Persian Gulf, watching from the sidelines, are drawing their own conclusions about what kind of power Iran is becoming.
From demonstration to leverage
Those conclusions are shaped by more than alliance politics. In two consecutive confrontations, Iran held its ground against the combined military pressure of the US and Israel – the two most powerful militaries operating in the region. That outcome is not lost on anyone in the neighborhood.
Iran has now demonstrated, in practice rather than theory, that it can absorb strikes and continue functioning as a regional actor. The New York Times (NYT), not an outlet inclined toward flattering Tehran, acknowledged that Iran has emerged from this period as one of the powers shaping West Asia’s future. Whatever one thinks of its politics, that assessment is difficult to dismiss.
The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz reinforce this shift. What once functioned largely as a latent deterrent is now being used more directly. When oil prices jumped sharply on reports that Iran–US negotiations were breaking down, the market was pricing in a reality that policymakers in Washington have spent years avoiding: Iran’s geographic position is a permanent feature of any regional settlement, not a variable that military pressure can eliminate.
Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply moves through waters that Iran can reach. This leverage derives from geography and is now being used with a level of deliberateness that was less visible a decade ago.
Writing the next regional order
The Lebanon question cannot be separated from the broader contest over who writes the rules of the next regional order.
For decades, the US set those rules through military presence, alliance structures, and the credible threat of overwhelming force. Iranian officials increasingly assess that this period is shifting – not due to a collapse of American power, but because the conditions that once sustained its dominance no longer exist in combination.
Iran’s objective is to ensure that the next order is not written exclusively on American or Israeli terms, and that Iran participates as a power with recognized interests in shaping what comes next.
In that context, Lebanon becomes a test case. It is where Iran seeks to demonstrate that its red lines are enforceable, that its commitments to partners carry weight, and that the equation described by Rezaei is policy rather than posture.
The ceasefire remains fragile, with negotiations continuing through Qatari and Pakistani intermediaries, while escalation carries risks that Tehran does not dismiss. The direction, however, is no longer ambiguous.
Beyond patience
Strategic patience remains, but has been superseded by a broader framework.
In its place is a doctrine in which compartmentalization by adversaries is met with deliberate integration by Tehran, in which an attack on a partner is treated as an attack on the order Iran is building, and in which the costs of sustained pressure are designed to accumulate rather than dissipate.
Iran has demonstrated that it can fight. It controls a chokepoint that the global economy cannot ignore. And it has shown it is willing to act before its own territory is directly targeted.
That combination – military credibility, geographic leverage, and a willingness to move early in defense of allies – is what a regional power looks like.
Iran is planning to connect its electricity grid with Qatar and announced on 16 June that work on the matter is in its “final stage,” reviving a years-old agreement with the Gulf state in the aftermath of the brutal US-Israeli war against the Islamic Republic.
Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi said on Tuesday that “the connection between Iran and Qatar will begin soon.”
He added that “studies are in the final stage, and we are beginning the implementation phase.”
Aliabadi also said Tehran was “studying” power grid connection with other Gulf countries, according to Tasnim News Agency.
The minister affirmed that this would happen “in the near future.” The deal will involve a transfer of up to 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity.
Talks on the matter had been taking place between Tehran and Doha in December 2023.
The two countries had previously signed an electricity memorandum of understanding (MoU) under the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi’s government.
The new announcement comes several days after Qatar denied a Washington Postreport that said the Gulf state cut a “secret” deal with Iran to avoid further retaliatory strikes.
“Any suggestion that operational decisions relating to energy production were – or have ever been – made in coordination with Iran, for Iran’s benefit, or to influence the course of the conflict is entirely unfounded,” Qatar’s International Media Office said on 12 June.
The Washington Post had cited western and regional officials as saying that Qatar approached Iran at the start of the war, following Tehran’s major strike on the key Ras Laffan energy facility.
“Seeking to protect its economic crown jewel, Qatar approached Tehran … to present a mutually beneficial arrangement: Iran would refrain from hitting Ras Laffan, and Qatar would halt gas production unilaterally – a move that would send energy prices soaring and put economic pressure on the US and Israel to shorten the war,” the sources said.
After the Iranian strike on Ras Laffan, Doha said the attack caused $20 billion in losses and wiped out 17 percent of the Gulf state’s gas export capacity.
Iran largely refrained from attacking the country in the days that followed, although some drone attacks and explosions were reported.
Tehran said during the war that many attacks on the Gulf were actually Israeli “false-flags” aimed at inflaming tensions.
Political commentator Tucker Carlson also reported in early March that Qatar and Saudi Arabia detained Mossad agents who were planning bombings, implying that the foiled attacks were designed to be pinned on Iran.
Tehran’s announcement on the electricity agreement with Qatar coincided with a Bloomberg report that said Qatar is planning to rapidly increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) production once the Strait of Hormuz reopens, aiming to restore up to 80 percent of its export volume within two months.
Anyone would be skeptical about the sustainability of the “peace” taking shape in the Middle East from the Memorandum of Understanding to be signed between Iran and the United States in a few days. It is plausible that it may not even be signed. And even if it is signed, considering that it involves a gradual, phased unfolding of a peace process that would last at least two months, it is hard to believe that everything will go as intended by the parties and the Pakistani mediators.
Nevertheless, in the terms that this “peace” is presented and which have been accepted by the U.S., we are facing an overwhelming victory for Iran. Even if the diplomatic process is derailed, nothing will change the fact that the U.S. accepted peace with Iran on terms unilaterally favorable to the Persians, leaving Tehran in a much stronger position than before the war began.
First of all, the U.S. failure should be seen as obvious and rests on a very simple assessment: Washington failed to achieve any strategic objective in the conflict with Iran: the “regime” was not overthrown, the nuclear program was not destroyed, military capabilities were not eliminated, support for the Axis of Resistance was not liquidated, and finally, it was not possible to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force.
The U.S. committed the most basic error of any conflict: misjudging the balance of power. And in this, naturally, the U.S. was led into error by Israel and its allies within the U.S.. From the start, reports indicate that the Pentagon opposed military action against Iran, for good reasons.
Even considering the tactical and operational dimensions, the U.S. was unable to impose itself as intended. The U.S. failed to achieve air superiority over Iran and resorted to launching missiles from outside Iranian airspace. Most times the U.S. penetrated Iranian airspace, they encountered anti-aircraft systems capable of shooting down even F35s. The U.S. also could not take advantage of its regional military bases, which were harassed and operationally neutralized by barrages of missiles and drones, complicating U.S. logistics and forcing them to use increasingly distant bases. Iran also managed to force U.S. aircraft carriers to keep their distance, with one returning to port for maintenance. Furthermore, the U.S. demonstrated that it is not yet ready to face a war in which drones play a central tactical role. But perhaps the most significant embarrassment was the fact that Iran forced the U.S. to confront its own industrial shortcomings—the U.S. expended large quantities of Tomahawks, Patriots, and other types of offensive and defensive missiles, which are produced at a trickle. The fact that U.S. missile stocks plummeted rapidly without any objective being achieved was certainly decisive for U.S. reluctance to restart the conflict.
There was also the poorly explained situation involving the destruction of several aircraft and helicopters in an alleged attempt to rescue a downed pilot (a pilot who was simply never seen again and was not even reliably identified). The fact that the ceasefire came just days after this alleged rescue operation suggests that the story is very poorly told and that perhaps that was a failed special forces operation to seize Iran’s enriched uranium.
That is precisely why reducing the issue to “control of the Strait of Hormuz” is nothing short of amateurish, since control over the Strait itself was only possible because Iran surprised the U.S. tactically through its ability to present challenges for which the U.S. had no answers and to deny the U.S. certain important military advantages on that terrain.
Naturally, control of the Strait of Hormuz had a significant impact on the conflict, making it more complex and a global issue. Carrying out attacks against Arab Gulf countries rather than just U.S. and Israeli targets followed the same logic of demonstrating power and turning the conflict into a broader, more complex problem. This stance alone forced Qatar to concede and seek a separate peace and rapprochement with Iran.
Now, if pointing out the U.S.’s inability to achieve its objectives, as well as its tactical difficulties, is not enough to demonstrate its defeat by Iran, then the imbalance of the Memorandum of Understanding, which represents a draft peace treaty, is certainly sufficient proof.
The Memorandum is scheduled to unfold in three phases. The first immediate result is the end of military actions on all fronts and the end of the U.S. naval blockade. The situation in Lebanon is already extremely uncertain due to the “Joker factor” that is Israel. But the end of the naval blockade, which is already a reality, has left the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian control, and even if Iran does not charge a “toll,” it is already charging a “service fee” to authorize ship transit.
The next phase, lasting 30 days and beginning after the Memorandum is signed, involves a U.S. promise not to increase its military presence around the Persian Gulf, the return of $12 billion in frozen assets to Iran, the immediate removal of sanctions on Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemical exports, confirmation of joint management of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and Oman, and a U.S. promise to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. In return for all this, Iran promises not to seek to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
And in the final phase, expected to last at least 60 days, the return of the remaining $12 billion in frozen assets, the granting of $300 billion for the reconstruction of Iran (equivalent to reparations), and the beginning of the process of removing all remaining sanctions. In return, Iran promises to agree to discuss its uranium enrichment.
In short, Iran’s obligations under this Memorandum are minimal, while the commitments undertaken by the U.S. are disproportionate. Why take on all these commitments and accept all these conditions if the U.S. “won“—as Trump says—and could “destroy Iran at any moment”?
The reality is that between an international oil crisis, low missile stockpiles, the resilience of the Iranian population, and difficulty dealing with hypersonic missiles and drones, the U.S. suddenly found itself in a potential quagmire capable of causing infinitely greater harm than any conceivable benefit. Perhaps finally aware of the mistake of starting this conflict, with very low popularity, hosting a World Cup, and worried about a myriad of internal and external crises, Trump seems eager to get rid of the “Iranian issue.”
What is proven here is that although the U.S. remains a military superpower, it is possible to defeat them under certain specific conditions and with sufficient preparation. We are not saying here that any country could defeat the U.S. in a war, but that regional powers of a certain scale, immunized against color revolutions and with years of military preparation and investment in technologies capable of negating the potential of the U.S. Navy and its air superiority, can defeat them in a defensive war.
Having recently gone through the “unipolar moment” of uncontested U.S. superiority in the post-Cold War era, whose highest expression was the rapid destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime, clearly the world is no longer the same, which in itself is proof that we are in a phase of geopolitical transition toward multipolarity.
Weakened in the Middle East, Iran is left in control of the Strait of Hormuz. Its ability to simultaneously confront all the Arab Gulf countries has been proven, and Israel’s inability to defeat Iran without U.S. help has been as well. This opens up for the Middle East the possibility of a regional pax Iranica, though much water will yet flow under this bridge.
Israel, however, remains a problem. Driven by a messianic ideology and accustomed to being treated with privileges derived from the influence of its diaspora, Israel does not appear willing to respect the terms of the Memorandum, nor to give up trying to establish a Greater Israel by force of arms. It is the Israeli factor that makes it difficult to fully realize a peace agreement between Iran and the U.S..
Bloomberg News has published details of the memorandum of understanding reached between Tehran and Washington, whose central provision stipulates that both countries and their respective allies will declare an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts upon signing the agreement, including in Lebanon.
According to the text cited by Bloomberg, both sides committed to refraining from hostile acts, threats, or the use of force against one another. The memorandum also includes mutual pledges to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and to avoid interference in each other’s internal affairs.
The agreement further stipulates that Tehran and Washington will enter formal and direct negotiations on a comprehensive settlement after receiving guarantees regarding the implementation of key provisions. The parties aim to conclude a final agreement within 60 days, with the possibility of an extension, before it is ultimately endorsed through a binding UN Security Council resolution.
Naval blockade to be lifted, shipping to resume
The memorandum includes immediate measures concerning military and maritime issues. The United States has pledged to lift its naval blockade on Iran upon signing the agreement and to refrain from obstructing or interfering with Iranian maritime activities.
In return, Iran will work to restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days, taking into consideration the removal of any remaining logistical or security obstacles.
Bloomberg also reported that Washington committed to withdrawing its forces within 30 days of signing a final agreement. Until then, both parties have agreed to maintain the status quo, whereby Iran retains its current nuclear program while the United States refrains from imposing new sanctions or increasing its military presence in the region.
Roadmap for sanctions relief and economic recovery
On the economic front, the memorandum establishes the foundations for broad financial and sanctions-related arrangements.
According to Bloomberg, Washington committed to releasing frozen Iranian funds and assets and issuing immediate exemptions for Iranian crude oil exports, petrochemical products and related banking services from sanctions restrictions upon signing the agreement.
The United States also pledged to lift sanctions on Iran according to an agreed timetable as part of a final settlement.
The memorandum further states that Washington will cooperate with regional partners to develop a mutually agreed plan for Iran’s economic rehabilitation and development. Bloomberg reported that the plan guarantees funding of no less than $300 billion, with implementation mechanisms to be determined during the 60-day negotiation period.
Nuclear issues deferred to final agreement
Regarding the nuclear file, Iran reiterated in the memorandum that it will never produce nuclear weapons.
However, both sides agreed that the fate of Iran’s enriched nuclear materials and all remaining nuclear-related issues would be deferred to the forthcoming comprehensive negotiations and addressed as part of the final agreement.
A prospective study at a Level I trauma center in the United States examined 1,097 consecutive CT scans and asked the ordering physicians to identify, for each scan, the reason it was performed. Four hundred and sixteen of those scans (38 percent) were ordered primarily to protect the physician from a possible lawsuit, not because the clinical situation required imaging. The defensively ordered scans exposed patients to an average of 8.8 millisieverts of ionizing radiation per person. Of those defensive scans, 2.2 percent changed how the patient was managed. The remaining 97.8 percent produced no clinical benefit. What they did produce was radiation exposure to patients, charges to insurance, and legal cover for the ordering physicians.¹
The 2.2 percent represents roughly nine patients out of the 416 defensively scanned whose course of care shifted because of the scan. Those nine exist. They are the cases on which defensive practice rests its moral claim. The trade their existence requires, however, is one no consenting patient would knowingly accept: irradiating roughly forty-five people to alter the management of one, with the population-level cancer burden falling on the forty-four whose management did not change. “Management change” is also not a synonym for benefit; it includes precautionary medication, further imaging, and surveillance protocols that themselves produce iatrogenic harm. The defense of the 2.2 percent does not survive contact with the math.
Extrapolated nationally, defensive CT imaging alone is estimated to add approximately $501 million annually to American healthcare expenditure, a figure that covers only CT scans and only in the United States.¹ A 2025 paper in JAMA Internal Medicine projects that the 93 million CT scans performed in the United States in 2023 will eventually produce approximately 103,000 cancers across the lifetimes of the people who received them, accounting for roughly 5 percent of all new annual cancer diagnoses in the country.²
A subset of those cancers will arise from scans ordered to protect not the patient but the physician. The patient will never know they were exposed for that reason. By the time the cancer arrives, decades after the scan, the link between the encounter and the disease is no longer recoverable.
Defensive medicine is the operating principle that produces this arrangement. The practice is documented in peer-reviewed literature, in physician self-reports, and across the cost-accounting of the institutions that profit from it. The patient sitting across the desk from the doctor is rarely aware the principle exists. The doctor knows. What this essay describes is what happens in the consulting room as a result of that asymmetry of awareness.
What It Actually Is
The phrase “defensive medicine” is not a critic’s label. It is the term physicians use themselves, in their own surveys, to describe diagnostic and treatment decisions made primarily to avoid legal liability rather than to benefit patients. The practice has been studied for more than four decades, appearing in peer-reviewed journals, in confidential surveys conducted by professional societies, and in geographic analyses showing that physicians in high-liability states order more diagnostic tests than physicians in states with malpractice tort reform.³
A 2005 study published in JAMA surveyed physicians in six high-risk specialties in Pennsylvania. Ninety-three percent reported practicing defensive medicine, and 43 percent reported using imaging technology in clinically unnecessary circumstances. The authors noted that defensive practice was reported across all specialties studied and was not confined to physicians with prior malpractice claims.⁴ The behavior described was not the conduct of a deviant minority. It was the operating culture of the specialties surveyed.
Researchers distinguish two registers. The first, positive defensive medicine, involves ordering tests, procedures, or consultations that the physician believes are unlikely to benefit the patient but that protect against accusations of inadequate diagnostic effort. The second, negative defensive medicine, involves declining to treat patients perceived as carrying higher litigation risk regardless of their clinical need. Both registers redirect clinical decisions away from the patient’s medical interest and toward the physician’s legal exposure.
The point is not the existence of defensive medicine but its normalization. Concealment from patients is not required because the practice is invisible by default. The patient cannot tell, sitting in the consulting room, whether a test was ordered to investigate their symptoms or to insulate the doctor against a hypothetical plaintiff’s attorney. The recommendation looks identical from the patient’s chair.
From the patient’s vantage point, what is visible is a competent professional, with medical training the patient does not have, who has determined that this particular test is required. What is invisible is whether that determination was made for reasons entirely indifferent to the patient’s medical situation.
The One-Way Ratchet
The legal system creates the conditions that produce defensive medicine, and it does so through a single asymmetry. Physicians face liability for under-diagnosis and almost none for over-diagnosis.
A man whose physician declines to order a PSA test, and who is later found to have advanced prostate cancer, has a malpractice claim. The claim may or may not succeed, but it is the kind of case malpractice attorneys take and insurance carriers settle. A man whose physician ordered the PSA test, who returned an elevated reading, who underwent a transrectal biopsy, who developed post-procedure sepsis from bowel bacteria driven into the bloodstream by the needle, who survived the sepsis but was left with persistent erectile dysfunction and urinary incontinence following a radical prostatectomy for a low-grade cancer that autopsy data suggests would have killed him only if he lived to ninety, that man has no claim. In most cases, he is grateful. His cancer was “caught early.” He was never shown the autopsy data on indolent prostate cancers, never told that 16 percent of American men receive this diagnosis but only 3 percent die from it, and is unaware that his cascade of harm originated in a screening decision medical evidence does not actually justify.⁵
The doctor who ordered the unnecessary test produced durable, measurable harm. The legal system records no exposure for that doctor. The doctor who did not order the test, and whose patient happened to be the rare one whose cancer was missed, faces a lawsuit regardless of whether ordering the test would have changed the outcome. From inside the legal architecture, the safest course is always to test more, because the asymmetry between under-diagnosis liability and over-diagnosis liability mandates it.
Studies of physician behavior confirm the prediction empirically. Doctors in high-liability states order significantly more diagnostic tests than doctors in states with malpractice reform. The variation tracks the legal climate, not the underlying disease burden.³ When Texas enacted comprehensive tort reform in 2003, defensive testing patterns in the state shifted measurably, although the magnitude and durability of the shift remain contested.³ The literature is consistent on the underlying point. Physician behavior is responsive to liability exposure, and the response is toward more testing rather than less.
This is the one-way ratchet, moving in a single direction over time. Settled malpractice cases raise the practical threshold of caution. New appellate decisions enlarge the set of investigations a prudent physician must order to satisfy the standard of care. The countervailing pressure that should exist from the harms produced by overtesting does not exist, because those harms generate no legal exposure for anyone.
From the patient’s vantage point, none of this is legible. The ratchet appears as escalating recommendations for tests, scans, and follow-up procedures. The patient assumes the escalation reflects an improving understanding of their personal medical risk. It does not; it reflects an evolving legal climate that has nothing to do with the patient’s biology.
The Standard of Care as Liability Shield
The medical profession refers to “the standard of care” as if it were a quality benchmark, a threshold below which clinical performance becomes inadequate. The standard of care in legal practice is something different. It is a defense position. Meeting the standard is what a malpractice defense attorney needs to establish to defend a doctor against a claim. The phrase describes legal adequacy, not clinical excellence.
The structural problem follows from how the standard is defined. The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project, the specialty’s primary instrument of self-examination for half a century, contains data that makes this explicit. When anesthesia care was judged by peer reviewers as appropriate, meeting the standard of care, payment was still made in more than 40 percent of malpractice claims. When care was judged substandard, payment was more likely but not certain.⁶
The standard of care, in other words, does not predict patient outcomes. It does not even reliably predict legal outcomes. What it predicts is the defensibility of a physician’s practice in a malpractice proceeding.
The circular logic closes off accountability at the definitional level. If the standard of care is what the majority of practitioners do, and the majority of practitioners do not obtain pre-operative cognitive baselines before general anesthesia in elderly patients, do not disclose post-operative cognitive dysfunction risk before consent, and do not select anesthetic agents based on the mechanistic evidence suggesting that some agents are worse than others for cognitive outcomes, then none of these omissions constitute substandard care. The standard is self-referentially defined by the mean of existing practice. The mean of existing practice cannot, by definition, be substandard.⁷
Harm that occurs in conformity with standard practice is not negligence. Negligence requires deviation from standard practice. Standard practice is what most practitioners do. What most practitioners do is whatever protects them most reliably from claims, which is whatever the standard of care currently is. The loop closes on itself.
The result is a body of harm that the accountability system cannot see by its own architecture. The Closed Claims Project, for all its methodological rigor, measures only what generates a claim. Acute, visible, legally contested events register: death, brain damage, esophageal intubation. The reduction in respiratory-related anesthetic deaths between 1985 and 2000 followed exactly this mechanism. The harms were acute and visible, pulse oximetry made them detectable in real time, malpractice exposure existed, the insurance system promoted the monitoring standard, and uptake was rapid.⁶ Chronic, diffuse, legally uncontested events do not register in any meaningful volume. Post-operative cognitive dysfunction, the slow cascade of overdiagnosis triggered by routine screening, the accumulation of pharmaceutical harm over decades: these generate no claims. They produce no signal in the accountability system the specialty uses to identify and correct its harms.
The Closed Claims architecture, the standard of care doctrine, and the malpractice insurance system together form a coherent legal-administrative apparatus whose function is to defend physician behavior against external challenge. Protecting patients from the iatrogenic consequences of defensive practice was never within the apparatus’s design brief, and it does not perform that protective function in practice.
The Cascade
What patients experience inside the defensive system is rarely a single unnecessary test. It is a sequence of tests, each triggered by the previous, each individually defensible, none of them collectively defensible.
Consider a fifty-year-old executive who opts in to a whole-body CT scan offered by a private screening clinic. The scan reveals a small lung nodule. The nodule is asymptomatic and almost certainly benign, since incidental findings of this kind appear on roughly 25 percent of all CT scans.⁸ The clinic recommends a follow-up CT in three months to assess for growth. The follow-up shows the nodule unchanged but identifies a small adrenal mass in the same imaging field. A PET scan is recommended to characterize both findings. The PET scan is negative for malignancy but introduces ambiguity about a mediastinal lymph node. A bronchoscopy is performed to sample tissue. The pathology returns benign scar tissue. The bronchoscopy is complicated by a pneumothorax requiring chest tube placement. The chest tube placement is uneventful. The executive returns to work three weeks later, having paid approximately $14,000 out of pocket, with no disease detected, no condition improved, and a measurable cumulative radiation exposure that did not exist before the cascade began.
The pattern is not exceptional. Incidentalomas trigger an average of $1,100 to $3,500 per patient in additional testing, with no associated improvement in mortality.⁸ Lung cancer screening trials found that one-third of patients had false-positive findings after two scans, and that one in fifteen underwent unnecessary invasive procedures as a result.⁸
The PSA cascade follows the same architecture in a different organ. An elevated PSA reading, which can result from prostatitis, benign prostatic hyperplasia, recent ejaculation, a urinary tract infection, or simply a larger-than-average prostate, triggers a transrectal biopsy. The biopsy punctures the bowel wall and introduces fecal bacteria into otherwise sterile tissue. Post-procedure sepsis is a documented complication, with antibiotic-resistant E. coli identified as the most commonly cultured organism, and hospitalization rates have risen alongside global antibiotic resistance. The 2022 GRAM Report published in The Lancet attributed approximately 1.3 million annual deaths worldwide to what it terms antimicrobial resistance, identifying E. coli as the most significant contributing organism.⁹ Tuncel and colleagues found that 41 percent of men reported erectile dysfunction at one month post-biopsy, with 15 percent still affected at six months.¹⁰ Cardiovascular events increase by a relative risk of 1.3 in the first year after diagnosis. Suicide risk rises by a relative risk of 2.6, with the highest risk in the first week.¹¹ These complications do not appear on the consent form.
The thyroid cascade follows the same architecture in a different specialty. A postpartum woman is screened for thyroid dysfunction. Her labs are abnormal during the transient hypothyroid phase of postpartum thyroiditis, a condition that typically resolves within twelve to eighteen months without intervention. She is started on levothyroxine and told she will need it indefinitely. The ultrasound performed to evaluate her thyroid identifies nodules, which are common and usually benign. The nodules require monitoring. Monitoring reveals minor changes. The changes prompt biopsy. The biopsy is indeterminate. A partial thyroidectomy follows. The woman who had a self-resolving postpartum condition is now missing part of her thyroid, on lifelong hormone replacement, and entered as a chronic patient in the disease registry.¹²
No single doctor along the cascade feels responsible for the cumulative outcome. Each one acted on the previous finding, documented their reasoning, and met the standard of care for their step in the sequence. Stopping the cascade at any point would have required a particular doctor to accept the legal risk of letting an uncertain finding go uninvestigated, and that doctor would be the patient’s doctor, not the patient. The asymmetry of where risk lands is the engine of the cascade. Legal risk is borne by the physician’s career, clinical risk by the patient’s body.
The cascade is the natural product of an accountability system that punishes physicians for missed diagnoses but not for downstream harms. It is what the system is structurally calibrated to produce. From the patient’s chair the cascade looks like a sequence of reasonable medical decisions; from the physician’s, the same sequence looks defensible at every step. The two perspectives never meet, and the gap between them is where the iatrogenic harm accumulates.
What the Doctor Will Not Say Out Loud
The defensive arrangement depends on a structural information asymmetry. A patient cannot make an informed decision about a recommended test if the test’s purposes, risks, and statistical performance are not disclosed. The published data are consistent across multiple settings and countries: this information is not disclosed.
Among American academic medical centers, only 15 percent routinely inform patients about radiation risks before CT scanning. By contrast, 84 percent of the same institutions discuss the risk of contrast reactions, which is a less significant long-term risk for most patients.¹³ Only 9 percent of surveyed sites inform patients about non-radiation alternatives to CT that might avoid radiation exposure entirely.¹³
The communication gap has been measured directly. In one emergency department study, 78 percent of physicians reported that they routinely discussed CT radiation risks with patients. Twenty percent of patients in the same encounters recalled being told.¹⁴ Both groups were describing the same conversations.
In 1999, Federman and colleagues published a study in Effective Clinical Practice examining whether informed consent actually occurred before PSA testing. Of the men who had received PSA tests, 31 percent were unaware their physicians had ordered the test. Of those who were aware, only 47 percent recalled any discussion of risks and benefits.¹⁵ Some men were tested without their knowledge. The study is more than twenty-five years old. Subsequent investigations show that the pattern has not changed. A qualitative analysis of men’s lived experience after PSA-driven diagnosis found that patients felt inadequately prepared and unsupported from the point of screening through biopsy and treatment decisions, and that the harms of overdiagnosis and overtreatment were rarely explained.¹⁶
The Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists publishes a position statement on informed consent (document PS26(A)) that sets out what the specialty formally requires of its practitioners. The standard is specific: patients must be provided with information that a reasonable person in their position might wish to know and to which they might attach significance. The document includes the threshold that risks should be disclosed when “an adverse outcome is rare but the detriment severe, and an adverse outcome common but the detriment slight,” states explicitly that a surgical consent form does not constitute informed consent for anesthesia, and notes that time pressure does not eliminate the requirement for genuine consent.¹⁷
Applied to a documented condition such as post-operative cognitive dysfunction in elderly surgical patients, measurable in approximately one in four at one week after general anesthesia and one in ten still impaired at three months, with no known treatment, the ANZCA standard produces an unambiguous conclusion. The risk satisfies both disclosure thresholds, the detriment is significant, and the standard requires that the disclosure be made. Disclosure does not occur in clinical practice in the overwhelming majority of cases.¹⁸
The disclosure standard exists in writing. The disclosure itself does not occur in the consulting room.
The reason is not that physicians lack knowledge of these risks. The relevant studies appear in journals to which the practicing physicians subscribe and which they cite in their own work. The information has accumulated for more than two decades in some cases, more than seventy years in others. The reason disclosure does not occur is simpler than ignorance. Disclosing risks creates two adverse consequences for the physician. First, some patients decline the recommended intervention, which reduces the procedure rate and exposes the physician to liability if the rare missed diagnosis occurs. Second, patients who proceed and experience the disclosed complication have documented grounds for claiming they were misinformed about the relevant probabilities if the disclosure was incomplete. The path of least legal resistance is a generic, time-pressured consent process that satisfies the formal documentation requirement without producing a genuinely informed decision.
The consent form records that the patient was informed; the evidence shows they were not. Both statements are simultaneously true within the legal and clinical architecture as currently structured.
The Trapped Clinician
A complete account of defensive medicine has to address what is happening to the doctor inside the structure, because reducing the practice to physician greed or laziness misses what the evidence shows. Most doctors who order defensive tests are not behaving unethically by the standards of the system they trained in. They are responding rationally to the incentive structure they are embedded in.
That structure has several layers. The first is education. American medical training increasingly emphasizes adherence to clinical practice guidelines, many of which are written by panels with substantial financial ties to the manufacturers of recommended products. A widely cited analysis published in the BMJ found that the majority of panelists on the National Cholesterol Education Program guidelines had current or recent financial ties to pharmaceutical companies whose products the guidelines would mandate.¹⁹ Roughly two-thirds of American medical school department chairs hold financial relationships with industry of some kind.²⁰ A physician trained to follow guidelines that emerged from such panels is trained to order more tests, prescribe earlier, and intervene more aggressively, and to consider this evidence-based medicine.
The second layer is employment. Physician practice in the United States has shifted dramatically from independent practice to employment by health systems. The employed physician is subject to productivity metrics that reward volume: number of patient encounters per day, number of procedures per quarter, billing per visit. A physician who orders fewer tests, sees patients longer, or recommends conservative observation is not rewarded, and in many systems is penalized. Performance reviews and bonuses turn on whether the physician’s practice patterns align with institutional throughput targets, which are set to amortize the cost of expensive imaging equipment and staffed procedural suites.²¹
The third layer is time. A primary care visit in the American system is typically scheduled for fifteen to twenty minutes. That visit is meant to address whatever the patient came in for, plus all the screening reminders generated by the electronic medical record: colonoscopy overdue, bone density scan overdue, mammogram overdue, annual physical overdue. The path through this consultation that minimizes liability and maximizes billing is to order the indicated screenings, prescribe what the algorithm suggests, and move to the next patient. The path that protects the patient requires more. It requires taking time to ask whether each screening is appropriate for the particular person sitting in the chair, discussing harms as well as benefits, and documenting an informed refusal where indicated. That work adds twenty to thirty minutes of unbillable time to a visit that the system already says is too long.
The fourth layer is the broader commercial logic. A 2018 Goldman Sachs analyst report titled The Genome Revolution, written by Salveen Richter, included a section addressing the financial implications of curative therapies. The question, posed in writing within an investment research document published by one of the largest investment banks in the world, was direct: “Is curing patients a sustainable business model?” The report’s analysis indicated that one-time cures produce short revenue arcs, while chronic disease management produces long ones.²² The economic logic surrounding the physician, including the institutions that employ them, the products they prescribe, and the diagnostic technologies they order, is calibrated to manage disease rather than to cure it. The defensive medicine arrangement is consistent with this calibration. A patient subjected to a cascade of testing and treatment generates recurring revenue. A patient told that observation is reasonable does not.
None of this absolves the doctor. The structural pressures are real and explain why the system produces the outcomes it does, but the patient sitting across the desk is still being subjected to risks they have not been told about. A doctor who orders a defensively motivated CT scan, who fails to disclose its radiation risks, who refers an incidentaloma for follow-up imaging that initiates a cascade, is participating in iatrogenic harm whether they intend to or not. The structural account explains how the participation occurs without absolving the physician of having participated.
The honest version of the consultation would be something close to the following. I am going to order this test primarily because I will face legal exposure if I do not, and missing the rare cancer it might detect would be a career-ending event for me. I have no good way to predict whether the test will produce useful information in your case. If it produces a false positive, I will refer you for further investigation, and the cascade that follows may harm you. You can decline the test, and I will document your decision.
That consultation does not take place. Conducting it would expose the arrangement as it actually operates, and the arrangement depends on the patient’s continued belief that the recommendation reflects clinical necessity rather than legal self-preservation.
There is a question every doctor reading this should be willing to ask themselves before their next clinic. Of the tests, procedures, prescriptions, and referrals I will recommend today, how many would I recommend if there were no liability exposure attached to declining to recommend them? The honest answer, for most physicians in most American practices, would substantially shrink the volume of recommended interventions. That difference is the iatrogenic harm. The volume of intervention that exceeds what would be recommended on purely medical grounds is the volume the patient is being asked to absorb on the doctor’s behalf.
What to Do in the Consulting Room
The structural problem is not solved at the individual level. A single patient cannot reform American medical training, the employment structure of physicians, or the asymmetry of the legal system. What a single patient can do is recognize the arrangement, refuse to participate in the parts of it that produce harm, and document the refusal.
Three questions interrupt almost any cascade at the point of entry.
The first is what happens if we wait? Most diagnostic decisions are not emergent. The doctor will typically describe a worst case, because the legal exposure forces them to describe a worst case, but the relevant question is what happens in the average case if observation is chosen over intervention. For most screening tests, the answer is that nothing happens. The natural history of the condition, in the absence of detection, would not have caused symptoms or harm within the patient’s lifetime. The cascade was triggered by the test, not by the underlying disease.
The second is what are the alternatives? Most diagnostic algorithms admit multiple paths. Ultrasound and MRI can substitute for CT in a wide range of clinical situations; active surveillance is a documented option in many cancers where biopsy is reflexively recommended; lifestyle modification has demonstrated effects in conditions for which pharmaceutical intervention is the default. The default path is rarely the only path. It is the path of lowest legal exposure for the physician, which is not the same thing as the path of lowest harm for the patient.
The third is is this required, or recommended? “Required” is almost never the correct answer. The patient who receives a flat recommendation often assumes the test is mandatory. It is not. It is recommended. The distinction matters because a recommendation can be declined.
Declining is the operative skill. Pressure converges on the patient from multiple sources to maximize the rate of test acceptance: electronic medical record reminders for “overdue” screenings, clinic staff who raise the issue at every visit, automated reminder letters, partner and family pressure, the doctor’s recommendation itself, and the patient’s own fear of missing something serious. None of these constitutes medical necessity. They constitute the operating environment of a system that profits from compliance.
Specific phrases work. I have reviewed the evidence on this test and decided the harms outweigh the benefits for someone in my situation. Please note my informed refusal in my record.I understand you recommend this. Can you tell me the number needed to screen and the overdiagnosis rate? I would like to make an informed decision. *I am not declining medical care. I am declining this specific test based on the published evidence. I would like to discuss what, if anything, I should monitor instead.*²³
The documented refusal protects the patient and, by an arrangement the system rarely advertises, also protects the doctor. A patient who has formally declined a recommended test, with the refusal documented in the medical record alongside the doctor’s recommendation and the discussion of evidence, has produced exactly the consent process that the system claims to require. The doctor’s liability exposure for the refused test is substantially reduced because the patient now owns the decision. The patient’s exposure to the iatrogenic harms of the unnecessary test is eliminated because the test does not occur.
This outcome is available to any patient who insists on it. The system does not offer it spontaneously because it is the system’s least profitable configuration.
Closing
The trauma center study identified 416 patients out of 1,097 who received CT scans ordered for reasons that had little to do with their medical condition. Each of those patients sat through the procedure believing the scan had been ordered because the doctor’s clinical judgment required it. Each absorbed, on average, 8.8 millisieverts of ionizing radiation. A small percentage of them will develop cancers from that exposure decades from now, and by that point the link between cause and effect will be unrecoverable. None of the doctors who ordered the scans will be sued, none of the institutions that performed them will be sued, and the eventual cancer patients will not know which encounter caused the disease. If they did know, the standard-of-care defense would close the case before it began.
What is happening in the American consulting room, and increasingly in clinical encounters across every country that has adopted the American model, is a form of risk transfer. The legal risk that the physician would otherwise carry is transferred to the patient in the form of unnecessary radiation, biopsies, cascades of investigation, lifelong prescriptions, and the diminished autonomy of being managed rather than cared for. The transfer is invisible from the patient’s chair because it is denominated in a currency the patient cannot read.
The standard of care functions as a liability defense rather than a clinical benchmark, and the consent form that accompanies it operates as an administrative shield rather than a record of genuine disclosure. A defensive test recommended on these foundations is calibrated to the doctor’s legal exposure first and to the patient’s clinical situation second. The cascade that follows a positive result is not the pursuit of the patient’s recovery; it is the completion of a documentation chain demonstrating that the system did everything it was supposed to do.
You can decline. The right to decline is the last patch of ground in the consulting room that the system has not yet enclosed. The document the doctor wants you to sign is consent to a process calibrated for everyone except you. The document you can produce, a written and dated refusal of a specific recommended intervention with your reasoning attached, is the only piece of paper in the room that says what it claims to say.
How I’d Explain This to a Six-Year-Old
Pretend your school has a rule. If you fall down at recess, even just a little bit, the teacher has to send you to the nurse. Not because the teacher thinks you are hurt. The teacher knows you are fine. But if the teacher doesn’t send you and your knee turns out to be a bit bruised, your mom might call the principal, and the principal might get cross with the teacher.
So you go to the nurse. The nurse looks at your knee. To be safe, the nurse takes a picture of inside your leg with a special machine. The machine uses a tiny bit of bad stuff that goes into your body. Just a little. Not enough to hurt today. But every time the machine takes a picture of you, a little more bad stuff goes in, and after lots of pictures the little bits add up.
The picture shows your knee is fine. The nurse already knew that. But the picture also shows a tiny spot somewhere else that is probably nothing. To be safe, the nurse sends you for more pictures. The more pictures show another small thing. Now you are scared. Your mom is scared. Nobody can stop, because if they stop and the small thing turns out to be something, the nurse and the doctor and the school could get into trouble.
You came in with a scraped knee. You leave with three pictures of your insides, a worried mom, and a bit of the bad stuff inside you. Nothing was wrong. Nothing got better. All the grown-ups feel safer, because they did everything they were supposed to do.
That is what happens to grown-ups at the doctor every day. There is a name for it. The name is defensive medicine. It means the people taking care of you are mostly trying not to get into trouble themselves, and those two things, looking after you and not getting into trouble, almost never point the same way.
Here is the thing nobody tells you. You can say no. When the grown-up says “I think we should do this test,” you are allowed to ask, “what happens if we wait?” You are allowed to say, “no thank you, not today.” You are allowed to leave with a scraped knee and nothing else.
References
The prospective study at a Level I trauma center identifying 38 percent (416/1,097) of CT scans as defensively motivated, with associated radiation exposure of 8.8 mSv per patient and a 2.2 percent management-change rate, is documented in Unbekoming, The Screening Trap, v1.0, 2026, chapter on CT scan overuse. The $501 million annual estimate for defensive CT imaging in the United States is drawn from the same source, which synthesizes figures from Mello MM, Chandra A, Gawande AA, Studdert DM. “National Costs of the Medical Liability System.” Health Affairs 2010;29(9):1569–1577.
Smith-Bindman R, Miglioretti DL, Lacson R, et al. “Projected Lifetime Cancer Risks From Current Computed Tomography Imaging.” JAMA Internal Medicine 2025. The study projects approximately 103,000 future cancers from the 93 million CT scans performed in the United States in 2023.
On geographic variation in physician test-ordering tracking liability climate: Kessler DP, McClellan M. “Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996;111(2):353–390; Kessler DP, McClellan M. “How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity.” Journal of Health Economics 2002;21(6):931–955. On the specific effect of Texas tort reform (enacted 2003) and subsequent damage cap analysis: Paik M, Black B, Hyman DA. “The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 2, Effect of Damage Caps.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 2013;10(4):639–669.
Studdert DM, Mello MM, Sage WM, et al. “Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment.” JAMA 2005;293(21):2609–2617. The study surveyed physicians in six high-risk specialties in Pennsylvania; 93 percent reported defensive practice, and 43 percent reported imaging used in clinically unnecessary circumstances.
National Cancer Institute, “Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Test,” cancer.gov. The 16 percent lifetime probability of diagnosis and 3 percent probability of mortality figures are the standard reported values. Autopsy data on indolent prostate cancers: Bell KJL et al. “Prevalence of incidental prostate cancer: A systematic review of autopsy studies.” International Journal of Cancer 2015;137(7):1749–1757.
American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project data summarized in Unbekoming, Before You Go Under, v1.0, 2026, chapter on the consent gap and the standard of care. Original source: Domino KB, Posner KL, Caplan RA, Cheney FW. “Awareness during anesthesia: a closed claims analysis.” Anesthesiology 1999;90(4):1053–1061. Additional Closed Claims data on standard-of-care judgments and payment patterns from the ASA Closed Claims Project as documented through the early 2000s.
The circular logic of standard-of-care doctrine and the self-referential definition of negligence-by-deviation is analyzed in detail in Unbekoming, Before You Go Under, v1.0, 2026, chapter on the closed claims ceiling. The argument applies generally across surgical specialties.
Incidentaloma rates and associated downstream costs documented in Unbekoming, The Screening Trap, v1.0, 2026, drawing on Berland LL, Silverman SG, Gore RM, et al. “Managing incidental findings on abdominal CT: white paper of the ACR incidental findings committee.” Journal of the American College of Radiology 2010;7(10):754–773. Lung cancer screening false-positive rates: Croswell JM et al. “Cumulative incidence of false-positive results in repeated, multimodal cancer screening.” Annals of Family Medicine 2009;7(3):212–222.
GBD 2019 Antimicrobial Resistance Collaborators. “Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019: a systematic analysis.” The Lancet 2022;399(10325):629–655. The report attributes approximately 1.3 million deaths directly and 5 million deaths in association with antibiotic-resistant bacterial conditions.
Tuncel A, Toklu H, Belenli O, et al. “The impact of transrectal prostate needle biopsy on sexuality in men and their female partners.” Urology 2008;71(6):1128–1131.
Fang F, Keating NL, Mucci LA, et al. “Immediate risk of suicide and cardiovascular death after a prostate cancer diagnosis.” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 2010;102(5):307–314. Discussed in Unbekoming, The Screening Trap, v1.0, 2026, and in Unbekoming, The PSA Trap, 2026.
Postpartum thyroid cascade documented in Unbekoming, Medicalized Motherhood, edition 1.0, 2026, chapter on postpartum screening. See also Stagnaro-Green A et al. “Guidelines of the American Thyroid Association for the diagnosis and management of thyroid disease during pregnancy and postpartum.” Thyroid 2011;21(10):1081–1125, for the conventional clinical pathway.
Lee CI et al. “Diagnostic CT scans: assessment of patient, physician, and radiologist awareness of radiation dose and possible risks.” Radiology 2004;231(2):393–398. The 15 percent / 84 percent and 9 percent figures are widely cited and appear in subsequent surveys of academic medical centers.
Caoili EM et al. “Patients’ knowledge and perception of CT scan radiation risks.” American Journal of Roentgenology 2014;202(3):W232–W237. The 78 percent / 20 percent physician-patient recall gap is documented in emergency department settings and is broadly consistent across studies of CT consent.
Federman DG, Goyal S, Kamina A, et al. “Informed consent for PSA screening: does it happen?” Effective Clinical Practice 1999;2(4):152–157.
Hersch JK, Nickel BL, Ghane A, et al. “Resisting recommended treatment for prostate cancer: a qualitative analysis of the lived experience of possible overdiagnosis.” BMJ Open 2019;9(5):e026960.
Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists. PS26(A) Position Statement on Informed Consent for Anaesthesia or Sedation. Melbourne: ANZCA; 2021. The thresholds and standards quoted are from the publicly available document.
Post-operative cognitive dysfunction (POCD) prevalence figures and the disclosure gap are documented in Unbekoming, Before You Go Under, v1.0, 2026, drawing on Li LY, Staffaroni AM, Whitlock EL. “Subjective Cognitive Complaints and Anecdotal Descriptions of Postoperative Cognitive Decline: Missing Pieces of the Postoperative Neurocognitive Disorder Puzzle.” Advances in Anesthesia 2024;42(1):27–40; and Moller JT et al. “Long-term postoperative cognitive dysfunction in the elderly: ISPOCD1 study.” The Lancet 1998;351(9106):857–861.
Lenzer J. “Majority of panelists on cholesterol guidelines have current or recent ties to drug industry.” BMJ 2004;328(7452):8. See also Abramson J, Wright JM. “Are lipid-lowering guidelines evidence-based?” The Lancet 2007;369(9557):168–169.
Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S, et al. “Institutional academic-industry relationships.” JAMA 2007;298(15):1779–1786. The two-thirds figure for medical school department chairs holding industry relationships is widely cited and is documented in Unbekoming, The Architecture of Deception, v1.0, 2026.
Casalino LP et al. “External incentives, information technology, and organized processes to improve health care quality for patients with chronic diseases.” JAMA 2003;289(4):434–441. The broader literature on the shift toward physician employment and productivity-based compensation in American health systems is extensive.
Goldman Sachs Equity Research, Salveen Richter. The Genome Revolution. Industry note, April 2018. The “sustainable business model” question and the report’s analysis of revenue arcs for curative therapy are widely cited; the document was subsequently the subject of multiple public commentaries. Discussed in detail in Unbekoming, Chronic Conditions, v1.0, 2026.
Specific patient phrases for documented refusal adapted from the patient toolkit in Unbekoming, The Screening Trap, v1.0, 2026.
As the 13th anniversary of the crimes of September, 2001 approaches, the neoconservatives are shrieking from the rooftops – and effectively confessing that they were the real perpetrators of the 9/11-Anthrax false flag operation. (The neocons, you may recall, openly called for a “new Pearl Harbor” in September, 2000 – and got one exactly one year later.)
Every year at this time, the neocons orchestrate and hype a series of public relations stunts designed to magnify fears of “radical Islam” and reinforce their crumbling 9/11-Anthrax cover story. But this year’s propaganda campaign is so extreme that it represents a tacit confession: The neocons know that the truth about the 9/11-Anthrax operation is slowly closing in on them; so they are over-reacting by desperately trying to stoke the dying embers of the so-called War on Terror, in order to maintain the myth that Muslims (rather than neoconservative Zionists) attacked America in the autumn of 2001.
When a hysterical person exhibits guilty demeanor by trying too hard to blame a crime on someone else, that person is almost certainly the real perpetrator. As the neocons try much too hard to blame Islam for 9/11 and “terrorism” in general, their hysteria inadvertently reveals their own culpability. Like Shakespeare’s Lady MacBeth, the neoconservative movement has blood on its hands and “doth protest too much.” … continue
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