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COP 30 Is A Failure… “Only Europe Remains Committed”

By Prof. Fritz Vahrenholt | No Tricks Zone | November 12, 2025

Cooling trend continues

The global temperature did not change in October compared to August. The cooling trend remains intact. The American National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) foresees a cool LA NINA developing in the Pacific this winter, which will lead to a further decline in global temperatures as well.

Belém – All that fuss for nothing

The 30th World Climate Conference in Belém is not yet over, but it is already becoming apparent that the event, announced as the “Conference of Truth,” will go down in the history of climate conferences as a turning point.

No head of state from the four largest CO2-emitting nations—China (33%), the USA (12%), India (8%), and Russia (5%)—is showing up in Belém.

Even before the conference, the New York Times headlined: “The whole world is fed up with climate policy.” And the fact that Bill Gates, one of the biggest supporters and sponsors of climate policy, explicitly warned against excessive, shortsighted climate policy just 14 days before the conference, and put prosperity back in focus — a major blow.

Glenn Beck, a prominent American television host, explains the change of heart by Bill Gates: “It’s not about science, it’s about Trump.” Expressed differently: it’s not about conviction; it’s about damage control for his own company, which is planning multibillion-dollar investments in data centers in the USA and globally. And given the situation, these will have to rely on electricity from new gas-fired power plants in the short term, as the reactivation of old nuclear power plants will not suffice, and the construction of new nuclear power plants will still take several years in the USA.

Only 1/3 of the states actually submit a plan

For the Climate Conference in Belém, states had to report on their future plans for the use of coal, oil, and gas. The fact that only one-third even submitted a statement already hints at the dissolving importance of the climate issue in most nations around the world. But the reports that were submitted are revealing. Most states reported continuously increasing use of coal, oil, and gas. The reports show an increase in global coal usage by 30%, oil by 25%, and gas by 40% by 2030 compared to 2015. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) hoped to reduce global CO2 emissions by 45% by 2030 compared to 2015; now they are continuing to rise.

Only Europe onboard

Only Europe remains unshakably committed to the goal of achieving Net Zero CO2 emissions by 2050. Germany, the industrial heart of Europe, is even more ambitious and, according to Axel Bojanowski, is “the ‘leader’ among industrialized countries: It aims to be climate-neutral by 2045 – a self-destructive plan: Germany’s reduction will inevitably be compensated by rising emissions in other EU countries. This is because the European Emissions Trading System ensures that emission allowances not used in Germany are consumed in other EU countries.

It is becoming increasingly clear what the Wall Street Journal meant when it called Germany’s energy policy the ‘dumbest in the world.’

A few days before the conference, the European states agreed on a common goal, namely to achieve a 90% CO2 reduction by 2040 compared to 1990. 5% of the self-commitment could come from emission reductions abroad, which, of course, must also be expensively paid for. The German Minister for the Environment celebrated this agreement as “good news for the German economy, as everyone would now have the same competitive conditions.”

This statement reveals how little the German federal government and its ministers understand the global economy. As if German industry only exports goods to European countries. German goods, however, compete in a global market that does not have the burdens of CO2  taxes and high energy prices on German products and can therefore always offer them more cheaply. 50% of exports go to countries outside the EU.

Chancellor Merz and his Environment Minister Schneider are blatantly downplaying the German situation. Germany has set self-imposed shackles with the Climate Protection Act that will become highly painful in the coming years.

German climate policy: “script for an economic catastrophe”

Welt journalist Axel Bojanowski: “The German Climate Protection Act, cemented by the Federal Constitutional Court, seems to be a script for an economic catastrophe. It only allows Germany a remaining budget of 6.7 gigatonnes of CO2, which is likely to be used up by the early 2030s. According to the law, penalties, shutdowns, and restrictions on freedom are then threatened to meet the climate goals.”

6.7 gigatonnes was the remaining permissible budget after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court from 2020 onwards. As of today, only 3.6 gigatonnes of this remain. The buffer is reduced by about 0.5 gigatonnes each year. By 2032 at the latest, the remaining budget will be exhausted, and Germany will have reached the end of the line set by the Federal Constitutional Court. This will happen in the next legislative period, not just in 2040.

Chancellor Merz whitewashes

And in his 5-minute speech in Belém before a half-empty hall, Chancellor Merz spreads negligent whitewashing: “The economy is not the problem. Our economy is the key to protecting our climate even better.” Does the Chancellor not know the perilous state our industry is in?

Scandal surrounds tropical forest Ffund (TFF)

Probably the only outcome of the Belém conference will be the establishment of an investment fund, proposed by Brazilian President Lula, to finance the protection of tropical forests.

The fund works as follows: Donor countries pay $25 billion into the fund. Private investors (investment funds) are supposed to pay in $100 billion. The donor countries receive a return of about 4.0-4.8%, which corresponds to the return on their government bonds, as they generally have to raise the money through government debt. The return for private investors is 5.8% to 7.2%. The fund’s money is invested in emerging market government bonds, which yield comparatively high interest due to the higher risk (Brazilian government bonds are currently at 12.25%). Private investors are served first, followed by the donor countries. If anything remains after the distribution of profits to private investors and donor countries, the amount is paid out to 74 countries with tropical forests. It is hoped that this way, $3-4 billion will be distributed annually to the tropical forest countries.

The catch is this: To entice investors, private investors are given preference in the payment sequence: first the private ones, then the donor states. Furthermore, the donor countries must insure the fund against default. A default by an emerging market could quickly lead to the fund’s insolvency. In that case, the taxpayers of the donor countries would be held liable and, in an extreme scenario, lose their capital.

Disadvantageous for the German taxpayer

In preparation for Belém, there was fundamental disagreement over Germany’s participation in the fund between the Ministry of Finance and the Chancellor’s Office. The Chancellor’s Office clearly advocated for participation and a contribution of at least $1 billion. It was assisted by the Ministry for the Environment under Minister Schneider and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development under Minister Alabali-Radovan. The Ministry of Finance, under Lars Klingbeil, strongly objected, viewing the fund as a billion-dollar risk and doubting the viability of the fund’s structure.

And indeed, the model is structurally disadvantageous for the German taxpayer. One could also say: We are subsidizing the returns of private investors with public money and providing the default guarantee for BlackRock and Co. That is why the Federal Ministry of Finance is persistently blocking Germany’s participation in the fund. It can be unequivocally stated that the Federal Ministry of Finance has thus far bravely defended the interests of the German taxpayer against the interests of BlackRock and Co.

This is the background to Chancellor Merz being unable to name a figure (“a noteworthy amount”) in Belém. The billion € or $ is now supposed to be found in the budget reconciliation for the 2026 federal budget, which is taking place this week, so that the federal budget can be adopted on November 28. It is to be expected that the SPD will concede. But it could be a Pyrrhic victory for Chancellor Merz, who would then visibly be prioritizing the interests of international financial investors, especially if the fund were to run into difficulties.

Whether the fund will ultimately materialize is still questionable, as it only comes into effect if the donor states commit to $10 billion. So far (excluding Germany), $5.6 billion has been raised.

The USA and the UK have already declined.

If the fund comes into being, the investment companies will profit first, with high returns secured by states, and then the emerging markets, which can sell their high-risk government bonds. Whether the tropical forest will benefit in this confusing financial jungle is not yet certain. The biggest risk remains with the donor countries, who are putting their taxpayers’ money at risk with the catchy story of saving the rainforest.”

November 13, 2025 Posted by | Corruption, Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity | , | Leave a comment

Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025

The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.

In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?

Trump’s visit

Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.

Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.

The new thinking

The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.

To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.

Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.

Beyond Ambitions

Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.

Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

November 11, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

Oklo’s Valuation: Nuclear on Welfare (joining wind, solar, batteries)

By Robert Bradley Jr. – Master Resource – November 5, 2025

Commercial nuclear power has turned into the welfare energy de jure. It is politically correct despite many decades of failure to compete against other forms of thermal energy. Uranium might be the ultimate energy density-wise, but nuclear fission (and more so nuclear fusion) is the most complicated, expensive, fraught way to boil water.

Commercial nuclear power was government-created in the 1950s and remains government dependent today. (Stay tuned: my primer on the history of this energy source is forthcoming. [1]). Regarding the present, consider this example from Jamie Smyth, editor of US Energy, who wrote:

Nuclear technology company Oklo has no revenues, no licence to operate reactors and no binding contracts to supply power. But this has not stopped the Silicon Valley-based start-up from riding a wave of investor enthusiasm that has propelled its stock market valuation above $20bn, a rise of more than 500 per cent since the turn of the year.

He provided the background.

The company, backed by technology boss Sam Altman and with close ties to Donald Trump’s energy secretary, has set ambitious targets to deliver commercial power to its first customers in 2027, having broken ground on its pilot in Idaho last month.

Oklo, led by the husband-and-wife team Jacob and Caroline DeWitte, envisages a future powered by a new generation of small modular reactors that use liquid sodium rather than water as a coolant. The company is seeking to become a leader among businesses that will supply energy hungry data centres with the power they need to fuel the artificial intelligence boom.

Yet the surge in its shares, buoyed by enthusiasm from retail investors who make up an outsized proportion of its shareholders, has worried experts who fear the stock has become wildly overheated. It is among the highest valued pre-revenue businesses listed in the US.

I commented:

A government play, like Tesla. Political capitalism with the US DOE ready to subsidize commercial nuclear power. Nuclear is the new subsidy baby, or welfare queen, the politically correct replacement for wind/solar/batteries under a new political regime.

The siren song of “competitive” nuclear power continues into its seventh decade. Taxpayer and ratepayers beware.

———————

[1] “Nuclear Power: A Free-Market Perspective.” American Institute for Economic Research, forthcoming.

November 10, 2025 Posted by | Corruption, Economics, Nuclear Power | | Leave a comment

Iran–Russia railway pact sets keystone in North–South Corridor

Long-delayed rail deal unlocks final segment of a Eurasian freight artery, bolstering Axis of Resistance and bypassing western sanctions

By Vali Kaleji | The Cradle | November 7, 2025

In a long-anticipated development, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, announced on 26 October that a final contract with Russia for the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway would be signed the following month.

This 164-kilometer line through Gilan province, hugging the southwestern Caspian Sea, marks the last missing segment in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and is poised to radically transform Eurasian trade routes.

Beyond economics, the project also represents an effort to re-establish Iran’s rail connection with the South Caucasus for the first time in 35 years.

During the Soviet era, the Tabriz–Jolfa Railway, which connected to the Jolfa (Nakhichevan)–Meghri–Zangilan–Baku–Moscow line as well as the Jolfa–Nakhichevan–Yerevan route, was considered one of Iran’s main transit routes with the Soviet Union.

But the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s ruptured the web of regional rail lines, isolating Nakhchivan and severing Iran’s decades-old railway link to the Caucasus.

Thirty-five years later, Iran reconnects to the Caucasus

Since the early 2000s, Tehran has explored multiple avenues to re-establish these lost links. A proposed Iran–Armenia route via Marand and Meghri never materialized. Efforts to revive the Soviet-era Jolfa–Nakhchivan–Zangilan line have stalled amid Yerevan and Baku’s ongoing dispute over the Zangezur corridor.

In contrast, the Rasht–Astara line, as part of the larger Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, is now the only active rail project linking Iran back to the Caucasus. It also extends further along the Astara–Baku–Dagestan route, reconnecting the Islamic Republic to a key segment of the Eurasian transport grid.

This idea is not new. The Soviet Union had extended its own railway network to Astara, Azerbaijan, in 1941, reaching the Iranian border. But within Iran, the crucial stretch from Astara to Qazvin remained incomplete.

Construction on the Rasht–Qazvin leg only began in 2009 and was completed a decade later, with an official launch in March 2019 attended by then-Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and Azerbaijan’s then-economy minister Shahin Mustafayev.

However, the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway encountered significant challenges. A 2016 deal with the International Bank of Azerbaijan for a $500-million loan was shelved after US President Donald Trump – during his first term – unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Fearing US secondary sanctions, Baku froze its financial commitments.

Tehran subsequently turned to Moscow. When the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Russia in January 2022, both sides finalized a $5-billion credit line to fund key Iranian infrastructure projects, including the Rasht–Astara Railway. Russia’s own trade needs had grown increasingly urgent under the weight of western sanctions, prompting Moscow to double down on the INSTC as a lifeline to India, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin, accompanied by Iranian railway officials, surveyed the route by helicopter in January 2023. Four months later, on 17 May, the two sides signed a $1.6-billion contract to complete the railway. Raisi presided over the ceremony in Tehran, with Russian President Vladimir Putin joining via video link.

Map of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

Strategic rail link hinges on Russian capital and Iranian land

Despite the celebratory optics, the Rasht–Astara project faces formidable obstacles. The mountainous, forested, and ecologically fragile terrain in northern Iran presents serious engineering and environmental challenges. Specialized bridges, tunnels, and stabilization systems are required to navigate landslide-prone zones and protect sensitive ecosystems such as the Hyrcanian forests and regional wetlands.

Costs are steep. At an average of $10 million per kilometer, the entire line will cost an estimated $1.6 billion. Masoud Shakibaeifar, a transportation planning expert in Iran, believes that “the gross revenue of the project in this optimistic scenario could increase from $500 million in the first year of operation to $1 billion in subsequent years. In this case, a return on investment would be achievable within a 10-year period.”

But others, like Seyed Hossein Mirshafi, former infrastructure advisor to the Roads Ministry, argue Iranian contractors could complete the railway for under $700 million. It remains to be seen whether a new and different figure will be determined in the new Iran–Russia contract, which is set to be signed next month.

Land acquisition has been another sticking point. Much of the route runs through farmland, requiring time-consuming negotiations with private landowners. Under the current division of labor, Iran shoulders land procurement costs while Russia funds construction.

In this regard, Minister Sadegh stated: “Despite challenging climatic conditions and the constraints imposed by sanctions, approximately 80 kilometers of land along the route have so far been acquired and secured, and more than 30 kilometers have been handed over to the Russian side. We are prepared to transfer half of the route for the commencement of technical operations within the next few weeks.”

In addition, to overcome these challenges and mitigate environmental concerns in Iran, Hadi Haqshenas, the Governor of Gilan Province, announced that, following the emphasis of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the 160-kilometer Rasht–Astara route will be constructed on an elevated bridge.

These complexities make the Rasht–Astara Railway unlike any other infrastructure project in Iran’s recent history.

Map of Rasht-Astara Railway

The North–South Corridor challenges Atlanticist chokeholds

The strategic weight of the Rasht–Astara line cannot be overstated. For Iran, under relentless sanctions, and for Russia, seeking alternatives to its embargoed European trade routes, the railway represents a crucial artery in the multipolar world order. It also restores Tehran’s long-lost rail link to the South Caucasus and, by extension, to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As such, it represents a major geoeconomic and geopolitical development.

Kamal Ebrahimi Kavori, a senior expert on Iran’s free trade and economic zones, believes that “the Rasht–Astara Railway project is not merely a simple rail line, but a vital artery linking Iran to major trade corridors – a route that connects the country’s northern and southern ports, free trade zones, and neighboring countries into an integrated and competitive transport chain.”

For Azerbaijan, which is not formally involved in the project, the completed rail link offers faster freight access to Pakistan – a key strategic ally – and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Given Baku’s expanding trade with these partners, the benefits are clear even without direct investment.

Currently, the lack of a direct rail connection at Astara means cargo has to be manually transferred between rail and road, clogging border terminals and slowing transit between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Once the Rasht–Astara line is operational, freight can move seamlessly from Russia’s northern cities to Iran’s southern port of Bandar Abbas.

An important point is that the North–South Corridor has three main routes: the eastern route (Central Asia), the central route (Caspian Sea), and the western route (South Caucasus). Although all three routes have gained significant momentum in recent years, particularly after the war in Ukraine and western sanctions on Russia, the main volume of transit and trade occurs along the western segment of the North–South Corridor, connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.

Consequently, there is heavy truck traffic, especially at the Astara border terminals (Iran–Azerbaijan) and the Samur border terminal (Azerbaijan–Russia). Therefore, the construction and completion of the Rasht–Astara Railway could play a crucial role in reducing road congestion, lowering transportation costs, and accelerating transit and trade along this corridor.

In the first year of operation, the Rasht–Astara Railway is expected to handle up to approximately 10 million tons of cargo. In the long term, the cargo capacity of this route could reach approximately 15 million tons.

Adding momentum, Iran’s Preferential Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signed in October 2019, became a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025. While Azerbaijan is not part of the EAEU, it remains central to the INSTC’s westward stretch. The Rasht–Astara Railway will thus help streamline trade between Iran and major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Just days before the return of UN sanctions on Iran, Russia hosted a major nuclear deal with Iran on 24 September, and the two sides signed a $25-billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) to build four small-scale nuclear power plants in Sirik, in the southern Hormozgan Province. This was followed by the announcement of the Rasht–Astara Railway contract.

These moves signal a fundamental shift. Unlike in the 2006–2013 period when Russia backed UN sanctions against Iran, Moscow now stands aligned with Tehran against western coercion. Both reject the legitimacy of the UN snapback mechanism.

Far from being weakened by sanctions, the Iran–Russia partnership is expanding – anchored by energy cooperation, strategic transport corridors, and a shared challenge to western economic warfare.

November 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , | Leave a comment

Iran’s oil exports hit new post-sanctions record

Press TV – November 9, 2025

Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.

The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.

“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.

Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.

The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.

The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.

That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.

The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.

However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.

Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.

November 9, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Leave a comment

Germany to sharply increase funding for Ukraine – Reuters

RT | November 5, 2025

Germany is set to significantly increase its funding for Ukraine in 2026, Reuters has reported, citing government sources.

Berlin is Kiev’s largest EU backer, and has already provided it with around €40 billion ($46 billion) since the escalation of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in February 2022.

According to Reuters, Berlin is considering an additional €3 billion ($3.5 billion) increase in 2026, meaning the overall amount of German aid could reach €11.5 billion ($13.2 billion) next year.

The German authorities had allocated €8.5 billion ($9.8 billion) for Ukraine in its budget for next year, although sources told Reuters on Tuesday that the sum will likely balloon by more than a third due to additional funds from the finance and defense ministries. Similar figures were reported by the Handelsblatt newspaper.

The extra money will cover artillery, drones, armored vehicles, and the replacement of two US-made Patriot air-defense systems, according to the agency’s sources.

“We will continue our support for as long as necessary,” one source told Reuters.

The Ukrainian allocation has been approved despite German Chancellor Frederich Merz acknowledging in August that the German economy is suffering a “structural crisis” with large sectors “no longer truly competitive.”

The country’s economy saw two years of annual contraction in 2023 and 2024, partly due to the loss of cheap Russian energy as a result of EU sanctions on Moscow.

Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky last week thanked Merz for providing Kiev with an unspecified number of Patriot systems, saying that earlier agreements had been implemented.

In late October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the German authorities of pursuing policies reminiscent of Adolf Hitler’s objectives of dominating Europe and inflicting a strategic defeat on Moscow.

Speaking about Merz’s plans to make Germany the strongest army in Europe, Lavrov said “it is not just militarization – there are clear signs of re-nazification.”

Moscow has repeatedly said Western military aid to Zelensky’s government will not prevent it from achieving its goals in the Ukraine conflict, but only prolongs the fighting and increases the risk of a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

November 5, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Leave a comment

The enigma of Tusk and Nord Stream as original sin

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 3, 2025

Do you remember Nord Stream 2? The story was discussed by the media for months and, after various accusations and assumptions, it ended with the bitter truth: an operation devised by Western powers, coordinating Kiev and London, to sabotage the energy channel and accuse Russia, thus discrediting it. Investigations were then launched, implicating several players, including Germany and Poland.

Now the story is back in the spotlight.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has clearly stated his position on the Nord Stream 2 sabotage, arguing that it is not “in Poland’s interest” to hand over to Germany the Ukrainian citizen detained in Warsaw and accused of participating in the explosion of the gas pipeline. But, above all, he reiterated that the real problem with Nord Stream 2 “is not that it was destroyed, but that it was built.” Excuse me? The prime minister must have had a little too much to drink before making his statements.

With these words, Tusk defined the Warsaw government’s position on the 2022 attack, attributed to men linked to Kiev, against the pipelines that carried Russian gas to Europe, particularly to Germany.

Although the operation had serious economic consequences for Berlin—with a sharp rise in gas prices and repercussions for the entire German economy—the Polish head of government was clear in his assessment of the events that took place in the Baltic Sea after the start of the SMO.

Just a few hours earlier, commenting on the extradition request for the citizen known to the press as Volodymyr Z. (Yes, that is his real name, which only makes the whole thing even more ridiculous), who is suspected of having participated in the attack and is currently detained in Poland, Tusk had stated: “It is certainly not in Poland’s interest to accuse or hand over this citizen to another country,” although the final decision will still be up to the judiciary.

Historically, Poland has always opposed the construction of gas pipelines from Russia, considering them instruments that have made Europe overly dependent on Moscow’s energy. “Russia, thanks to funding from some European states and German and Anglo-Dutch companies, has been able to build Nord Stream 2 against the vital interests not only of our countries but of the whole of Europe. There can be no ambiguity on this point,” Tusk stressed, with a critical reference to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who in the past had accused Poland and the Baltic countries of bearing some of the responsibility for the war between Russia and Ukraine.

As for the Ukrainian suspected of sabotage, who was arrested in Poland at the end of September, a Polish court ruled on Monday that he must remain in custody for another 40 days while Germany’s extradition request based on a European arrest warrant is examined. According to German prosecutors, the man is a diver involved in a group of people suspected of chartering a yacht and placing explosives in gas pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. The charges against him relate to conspiracy to carry out an attack with explosives and the crime of “unconstitutional sabotage.”

Political stability issues

The reason behind Tusk’s statements may be more profound. Germany’s leadership position in the EU is weakening, and the absence of cheap Russian gas is contributing significantly to this process. Poland can now more actively promote its own interests and impose its own vision of problem solving on Berlin, including the situation regarding the sabotage of Nord Stream.

Germany’s economic strength has long been based on cheap Russian/Soviet energy resources (mainly natural gas). Berlin’s refusal to purchase Russian gas has already led to a significant economic and industrial decline. This benefits Warsaw, as well as other major European powers, particularly the UK and France, in their efforts to curb German influence in the region. In essence, Warsaw is carrying out the will of its “senior European partners,” primarily London.

By defending the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines and refusing to extradite Ukrainian citizens suspected of taking part in the attack to Germany, the Warsaw government seems to be legitimizing further sabotage operations, even on European territory, against infrastructure linked to Russia or to EU and NATO countries that have not yet cut off energy supplies from Moscow.

Donald Tusk’s statement is emblematic in this sense: “The problem with Nord Stream 2 is not that it was blown up, but that it was built.” Radosław Sikorski, too, had posted a message on X (“Thank you, United States”) after the explosion of the gas pipelines in September 2022, only to delete it later. More recently, he even publicly called on Ukrainians to destroy the Druzhba oil pipeline.

During a heated exchange with the Hungarian government, Sikorski also stated that Warsaw “cannot guarantee that an independent Polish court” would not order the arrest of Vladimir Putin if he were to fly over Poland to attend a meeting in Budapest. The ironic response from Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was not long in coming: “Perhaps the same independent court that, on the orders of Prime Minister Tusk, refused to extradite the terrorist who blew up Nord Stream?” Sikorski’s reply was peremptory: he said he was “proud of the Polish court that ruled that sabotaging an invader is not a crime.” This statement is cause for concern, as the “invader” in question is Russia in Ukraine, not Poland or Hungary. If this legal principle were to be applied universally, Warsaw would end up justifying international chaos.

If the logic of the “Tusk-Sikorski Doctrine” were followed, any country accusing another of invasion could feel justified in striking its interests anywhere.

From this perspective, this doctrine would theoretically make actions against Israel, the United States, or other NATO members, all accused at various times of conducting invasions or occupations, “justifiable.” Poland itself, in fact, participated in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside its Western allies.

Still according to this logic, would it even be permissible to sabotage the gas pipeline connecting Norway to Poland, which was inaugurated — curiously — on the same day that Nord Stream was destroyed, September 22, 2022? And, by analogy, should Islamist attacks against the United States, France, and the United Kingdom be considered “legitimate acts” in response to their military campaigns in the Arab world?

It should also be remembered that both Joe Biden and Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland had already announced the destruction of Nord Stream, which many observers interpreted as a possible indication of plans for sabotage that were never officially clarified.

Beyond speculation and paradoxes, the statements coming out of Warsaw appear highly dangerous, as they contribute to normalizing and even glorifying acts of terrorism, if carried out against Russian or pro-Russian targets, as well as sowing divisions among European countries themselves. Above all, they foreshadow disturbing scenarios in which new acts of sabotage could target strategic infrastructure in Europe, justified by the narrative of the ’war against the Russian invader’.

While Germany continues to support Ukraine militarily and financially, even at the cost of its own energy security, it is perhaps time to question the true nature of ’allies’ who, in the name of an ideological war, do not hesitate to compromise the interests of the entire continent.

It remains to be asked of Tusk, Sikorski, and their friends whether we can really continue to believe that refineries catch fire on their own and gas pipelines commit suicide at sea. All just “coincidences,” right?

November 5, 2025 Posted by | Economics, War Crimes | , , , , | Leave a comment

Taliban unveil five-year plan to help Afghan farmers replace poppy crops

The Cradle | November 3, 2025

The Ministry of Agriculture of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan announced on 3 November the approval of a five-year plan to provide alternatives to growing poppies for the country’s farmers.

Afghanistan has traditionally been a hub for growing poppies, which are used to produce heroin, a highly addictive and deadly drug, for consumption in Europe and elsewhere.

After taking power in 2021 following a chaotic US military withdrawal, the Taliban banned the cultivation of the plant.

Poppy cultivation flourished during the 20-year US occupation of the country, with many drug lords connected to the CIA receiving top positions in the Afghan government in Kabul.

According to the Agriculture Ministry, the five-year program will benefit some 149,900 farmers and involve $71 million in funding.

“This plan is designed to provide legal and sustainable economic opportunities for farmers in the sectors of agriculture, livestock, natural resources, and irrigation,” stated Sher Mohammad Hatami, spokesperson for the ministry.

The plan includes projects focused on orchard development, grain production, livestock growth, irrigation system improvements, the establishment of greenhouses, and training centers for farmers.

The ministry stated that other crops, including saffron, asafoetida (hing), cotton, and wheat, will be promoted as alternatives for farmers.

Meanwhile, several farmers told Tolo News that the ban on poppy cultivation had created serious economic challenges for them and called on Afghan authorities to provide help in transitioning to an alternative.

“We were forced to grow this crop, and now the government doesn’t help us even once a year,” said Barat, a farmer from Badakhshan.

Azim, another farmer from Badakhshan, said, “We want support in finding alternatives to drug cultivation, because farmers in this province are in need.”

A June 2023 report published by Alcis, a British-based geographic information services firm, revealed that the Taliban government had largely eliminated opium cultivation in the country, wiping out the base ingredient needed to produce heroin.

This outcome mirrored a similar move by the Taliban in 2000 when they were in power the first time.

Under the guise of the “War on Terror,” the 2001 US and UK invasion of the country was driven in part by the desire to restore the heroin trade, which the Taliban had abruptly terminated after taking power for the first time in 1996.

The western powers sought to re-establish the lucrative flow of billions of dollars that the heroin trade provided to their financial systems.

November 3, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , | Leave a comment

Only 11% of the French citizens support Macron

By Lucas Leiroz | October 31, 2025

The popularity of European liberal governments is steadily decreasing. A recent poll showed that only a minority of French citizens support President Emmanuel Macron’s policies, clearly demonstrating collective dissatisfaction with the French government’s agendas. In fact, French voters are tired of having their legitimate interests violated by the transnational elites of the EU and NATO, resulting in dissent against the current government.

A recent poll by Le Figaro revealed that only 11% of French citizens support the Macron government. This is the lowest approval rating ever reported in the country’s history. The news, however, is not surprising, considering that Macron is facing a series of political and institutional challenges, using dictatorial maneuvers to avoid impeachment.

Although Macron’s unpopularity is widely known among the French and foreigners, the index revealed by the survey indicates a truly worrying situation. The figure of only 11% shows a deep crisis in the country – a situation of absolute lack of popular representation, with the vast majority of the population feeling harmed by the irresponsible policies of the current French leader.

Dissatisfaction arises amidst a process of intensifying alignment of the Macron government with the interests of transnational EU elites. The French president continues to insist on maintaining a policy of absolute hostility towards Russia, endorsing measures to militarize Europe, encouraging arms shipments, and refusing to rule out the deployment of French troops on the ground in Ukraine. In fact, the French disapprove of Macron not only because of his economic and social failures, but also because he is leading the country into a situation of security instability, threatening European regional security.

Furthermore, Macron’s domestic administration has been chaotic. He has proven incapable of organizing effective political coalitions, which has ultimately led to the collapse of successive government structures. Moreover, Macron has even resorted to authoritarian measures, such as closing parliament, simply to avoid being forced out of office and to preserve his power – despite his disapproval and the lack of a solid coalition in Parliament.

Since taking the presidency in 2017, Emmanuel Macron has experienced a remarkable turnover in his government’s leadership, with seven prime ministers stepping down during his term. Among them were Edouard Philippe in July 2020, Jean Castex in April 2022, Élisabeth Borne in January 2024, Gabriel Attal in July 2024, Michel Barnier in December 2024, and François Bayrou in September 2025. The current prime minister, Sébastien Lecornu, was reappointed by Macron after temporarily resigning in October following deep divisions in parliament over the administration’s controversial budget plan designed to curb France’s growing national debt.

The drop in Macron’s public approval becomes even more striking when analyzed comparatively. In January 2025, 21% of the French still supported Macron. By September, this number had already fallen to 15%. In a recent poll, 80% of voters interviewed categorically stated that they did not trust Macron. All of this shows the seriousness of the local situation, giving clear signs of an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy.

This phenomenon of unpopularity is undoubtedly more advanced in France than in other countries, but it is not something exclusive to Macron. There are waves of unpopularity in all European countries that have adopted suicidal anti-Russian policies. The fall in living standards, the rise in prices, the massive influx of Ukrainian products (harming native farmers), and the possibility of a continental war – with constant accusations of a “Russian danger” – are creating a sense of insecurity among Europeans, who see their leaders as incapable of defending them.

In addition to this, there is also the cultural and identity issue. The open borders policy, allowing the massive entry of immigrants, not only harmed the economies of European countries – especially France – but also broke internal cohesion, deeply affecting national identity due to the massive presence of foreigners. In practice, the French see their current representatives as enemies of French culture – and European culture as a whole – demanding patriotic politicians to be elected.

Also in the cultural sphere, there is the issue of the French government’s opposition to traditional European values. Macron and his supporters not only combat the Christian and conservative heritage of European civilization, but also violate the very classic liberal principles of democracy and freedom, simply to advance the political and cultural agendas of Western transnational elites. All of this contributes to Macron’s unpopularity.

Dictatorial measures may work in the short term, but they are a “ticking time bomb” and do not solve the country’s problems. Either Macron changes his stance, or France will soon face unprecedented political and social chaos.

Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Associations, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

October 31, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Russophobia | , | Leave a comment

Iran needs up to $180bn to meet oil production targets: Official

Press TV – October 29, 2025

An Iranian Oil Ministry official says that the country requires up to $180 billion in investment to increase its oil production by at least 1 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2028, as outlined in its national development plan.

Nasrollah Zarei, who serves as CEO of Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, said on Wednesday that Iran’s Seventh National Development Plan targets an output of 4.8 million bpd within three years.

However, Zarei said that the target may be out of reach due to financial constraints caused by foreign sanctions.

He said that even a more modest target of 4.5 million bpd would require $170 to $180 billion in investment, of which the government can only allocate $10 billion. He called for an immediate revision of funding schemes for oil projects in Iran, saying the country’s sovereign wealth fund could play a larger role in financing such projects.

Despite stringent US sanctions that restrict oil sales and reinvestment, Iran has maintained its production at approximately 3.5 million bpd in recent years. Nearly 2 million bpd are exported, with the remainder used for domestic fuel and petrochemical production.

While Iran has faced challenges in meeting its oil output targets, it has achieved significant breakthroughs in the production of natural gas. The country is now the world’s third-largest gas producer, with a daily output of nearly 1 billion cubic meters, which experts believe is equivalent to approximately 6.3 million barrels of oil.

This solidifies Iran’s position as a leading hydrocarbon supplier, whose petroleum industry has a key role to play in global energy markets.

Chairman of Iran’s Geological Society, Mansour Ghorbani, said on Wednesday that the country holds some 36 trillion cubic meters of gas, representing 16% of global reserves, adding that the figure could rise to 50 trillion cubic meters with new discoveries.

Ghorbani also said that Iran’s oil reserves are estimated at 157 billion barrels, ranking among the world’s largest.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity, Wars for Israel | , | Leave a comment

Eurasian Integration as an Anti-Hegemonic Economic System

By Prof. Glenn Diesen | October 30, 2025

We are living in an era of economic disruptions as US-centric globalisation is replaced by a more decentralised format of globalisation spearheaded by the Greater Eurasian continent. The consequence of these disruptions during this transition period is instability in economics, politics, and international security, as economic coercion escalates into war.

The disruptions to the international economy were predictable—and indeed predicted—for decades. When immense economic power is concentrated in a hegemon, the hegemon has incentives to build trust in an economic architecture under its administration. This translates into an open international economic system with access to technologies, industries, energy, food, physical transportation corridors, banks, currencies, and payment systems. This is referred to as a benign hegemon, as building trust in an open system ensures that alternatives are not developed and the world becomes immensely dependent on the hegemon. Subsequently, globalisation meant Americanisation.

Hegemons are, however, inherently temporary. Over the years, the US economy became excessively rent-seeking, financialised, and debt-ridden as its competitive edge declined. A hegemon makes mistakes and fails to prioritise strategically, as it can absorb the costs—until it reaches a breaking point. Around the world, other countries climbed up global value chains and grew concerned about the fiscal irresponsibility and unsustainability of the hegemonic system.

A declining hegemon will predictably behave very differently. It will use its administrative control over the global economy to prevent the rise of rival centres of power. Economic coercion is the new normal—for example, restricting China’s access to key technologies, seizing Iranian tankers and preparing the establishment of maritime choke points, stealing Russia’s sovereign funds, etc. Trust collapses, and efforts to create a more decentralised international economic system only intensify.

The declining hegemon will also attempt to divide rival centres of power: Germany must be severed from Russia, Russia must be split from China, China should be kept at a distance from India, India should reduce its economic connectivity with Iran, Iran should not resolve its disputes with the Gulf States etc. Markets are captured as the declining hegemon, for example, pushes Europe to reduce cooperation with Chinese technology and Russian energy. As the Europeans and other allies develop excessive reliance on the US, economic and industrial power can be transferred to the US. Eventually, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe will recognise that hitching their wagon to a declining hegemon to preserve a unipolar order that is already gone, is inherently destructive. The option is to either diversify their economic connectivity for prosperity and political autonomy, or become captured markets that can be cannibalised by the declining hegemon.

The declining hegemon has—much like its adversaries and allies—strong incentives to embrace multipolar realities. New political forces within the declining hegemon will recognise that pursuing hegemonic policies under a multipolar international distribution of power will be punished by the international system. Exhausting its remaining resources and incentivising the rest of the world to collectively balance against the declining hegemon is unsustainable. The ideal strategy for the declining hegemon is to accept a more modest role in the international system as one among many great powers, reducing collective balancing and enabling socio-economic recovery to rebuild former strength.

The rise of Eurasia marks the end of 500 years of Western leadership and dominance in the world, since European maritime powers began connecting the world in the early 16th century. While some panic in the West is therefore understandable, there are nonetheless great opportunities.

Adam Smith famously wrote: “The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind… By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial”.

However, Adam Smith also recognised the problems of the skewed power distribution between the Europeans and the rest of the world. Adam Smith wrote: “To the natives however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned… At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries”.

Adam Smith argued that a more even distribution of power could create a more harmonious international economy: “Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it”.

I conclude that the aspiration of Eurasian integration should be to make it anti-hegemonic but not anti-Western by descending into bloc politics.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

US sanctions on Russian oil companies make Europe even more dependent on Washington

By Ahmed Adel | October 30, 2025

United States President Donald Trump is playing a double game by imposing new sanctions on Russian oil and gas, as he positions himself as the only one capable of saving Europe from the energy crisis that they themselves created by following Washington’s sanctions regime.

The US imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil and their respective subsidiaries on October 22, a move aimed at continuing pressure on Russia amid its special operation in Ukraine. The measure, however, had serious side effects for countries allied with Washington, especially Germany.

Berlin began a frantic race against time to exempt Rosneft subsidiaries in the country that have been under German state administration since 2022, including refineries, an action denounced as illegal by the Russian controlling group. Germany argued to the Trump administration that Rosneft’s German subsidiaries are independent of the Russian parent company.

On October 27, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche reported that she had obtained a “Letter of Comfort” (a document that provides guarantees) from Washington acknowledging that the operations of Rosneft’s subsidiaries in Germany are completely separate from the Russian company and exempting them from the new sanctions.

“The US has confirmed in writing that the assets in Germany are completely separate from Russia,” Reiche emphasized.

This case once again exposes the energy crisis affecting Europe, which depends on imported gas and oil for power generation and has entered an economic crisis since suspending Russian supplies of these resources and aligning itself with the White House’s sanctions policy. The sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, which hold stakes in oil and gas projects in several European countries, are likely to worsen the already critical European economic situation.

A potential closure of Rosneft and Lukoil subsidiaries in Europe will further increase energy prices on the continent, which are already impacted by the replacement of Russian gas with American gas and by high winter demand. The heating of homes, the energy used by industries, and the increased costs of these processes will lead to an inflationary crisis in European prices, in a situation that is already not very favorable to these countries.

In the German context, the high disapproval rating of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, currently at 60%, reflects the economic crisis triggered by Europe becoming a subsidiary of US interests, which, in turn, are playing a double game. By sanctioning Russia and exacerbating the crisis in Europe, Europeans are forced to turn to the Americans. The US becomes the only possible savior of Europe within this crisis scenario that they themselves created.

By replacing Russia, which supplied these fuels at relatively low cost via long-range pipelines from Russia to Central Europe, there is now a much more expensive, much more inefficient form of supply via ships.

Furthermore, shifting energy dependence from Russia to the US leaves Europe vulnerable to market whims, since Russian contracts came with prearranged prices, while American imports are priced at market rates. And in recent days, with these sanctions, prices there have risen by 5% to 6% in a single week. The Europeans are facing a rather critical situation, and this crisis should not be considered only in the short term. It is likely to extend over the coming years and decades if this distancing from Russia is not reversed.

Although it has granted exemptions to Rosneft’s subsidiaries under German control, Germany is not among the White House’s concerns. Trump understands that the multipolarization of the international system is already a reality and is now seeking to regain Washington’s lost power. To this end, unlike past US leaders, he has abandoned Europe. Trump even thinks that Europeans should organize themselves and a European bloc leadership should emerge, because the US will no longer play that role.

The Germans are being seriously affected by embarking on the complete delirium of believing that Russian President Vladimir Putin has a project to conquer Western Europe. This led Germany to join the US sanctions and to abandon the purchase of petroleum products from Russia. Many German companies could not handle the energy price hikes and went bankrupt, while the strongest ones moved to the US. As a result, the German economy sank, with a very high unemployment rate and deindustrialization.

Even in the face of economic deterioration, Europeans remain determined to confront Russia because, at this point, they have no way to retreat, having created a mystique that Ukraine would be Russia’s first obstacle to a supposed plan of military expansion on the continent. Due to this ludicrous belief, Europe spent enormously, exhausted its weapons stockpile, followed Washington in this, and now finds itself alone, watching Trump negotiate directly with Putin, in which the latest US sanctions package is a part of.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

October 30, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Russophobia | , , , | Leave a comment

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